

**HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS
OF GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT,
USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND REAPPOINTMENT
AS THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND ADMIRAL ROBERT
F. WILLARD, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COM-
MAND**

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, and Thune.

Also present: Senator Inouye.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucien L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I.

Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Young, assistant to Senator Begich; Gerald Thomas, assistant to Senator Burris; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor, IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Chip Kenneth, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

This morning, the committee meets to consider the nominations for two very significant military positions. General James Cartwright, United States Marines, has been nominated for a second term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Robert Willard has been nominated to be the commander of United States Pacific Command.

On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you both for decades of service to this country, for your willingness to continue to serve. The country appreciates—and this committee reflects that appreciation—the sacrifices that you and your families have made along the way.

The support that our military families provide is critical, and we want to do all that we can to support them. Both of you have your family members with you today, and when it comes your time to give your opening statements, we would welcome your introducing family members.

Before I give my opening statement, Chairman Inouye is with us this morning to make an introduction. And given his incredible schedule, I am going to call on him before I complete my opening statement.

It is great to have you with us always, Danny. Senator Inouye?

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee.

I am pleased and honored to be here this morning to introduce Admiral Robert F. Willard, nominee for the position of Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, PACOM.

I commend this wise decision to designate Admiral Willard as our next PACOM commander. His invaluable experience as current commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet will serve him well as he leads our Nation's oldest and largest command.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, an F-14 aviator, operations officer and executive officer of the Navy Fighter Weapons School known as "Top Gun." He has commanded the Screaming Eagles, the amphibious flagship USS *Tripoli*, the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln*.

His experiences in the Pacific area of responsibility and his thorough knowledge and understanding of the region's history would be a tremendous asset to anyone that might assume the helm at PACOM. Commanding U.S. naval forces in the Pacific has given

him tremendous exposure to the challenges and rewards that face our military in that area of the world.

Because of Admiral Willard's firm grasp of the history of the Asia-Pacific region, he understands the geopolitical dynamics at work, which confront the United States. The PACOM commander's watchful eye over such an expansive area cannot be accomplished alone, and this enforces cooperation between U.S. military forces and those of our friends in the region.

I have had the honor and pleasure of working with Admiral Willard during his tenure as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on very important issues that face our Navy in the Pacific Ocean. The Admiral and I have discussed the value of Pearl Harbor, the shipyard, the Pacific Missile Range on a number of occasions. This intimate knowledge of Hawaii's importance to our National defense is in part why Hawaii will be welcoming the first of its new Virginia class submarines, the USS Hawaii, later this month.

Mr. Chairman, December 7, 1941, is a distant memory for most Americans. On that quiet Sunday morning, Hawaii's strategic importance was impressed on this Nation by an attack on our military forces on the island of Oahu and propelled our Nation into the 20th century second world war.

Despite time and technological advances, the significance of Hawaii's location in the Pacific has not changed, and it is still essential to the defense of all Americans and our allies in this region. There are many challenges and opportunities for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. And I have complete faith in Admiral Willard's ability to lead the U.S. Pacific Command.

It is essential our military have its most capable leaders at the helm to guide us through this difficult time. And Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am confident Admiral Willard's leadership will benefit all of our forces in the Pacific and ensure our National security.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inouye. It is always great to have you here. It is a very meaningful introduction, and I know Admiral Willard is most appreciative as well.

These nominees are going to face a host of challenges. General Cartwright is going to continue to serve as our country's second-highest ranking military officer, carrying out the Nation's military priorities and playing a major role in the Defense Department's acquisition process. General Cartwright is also responsible for making sure that the needs of the combatant commanders are addressed in a timely fashion and that they have what they need to carry out their missions when they need it.

General Cartwright, I first would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your candor, your accessibility over the past few years, and to let you know that all of us appreciate your willingness to meet with both members and staff of this committee and have had so many significant and serious discussions over those years on a number of issues.

Admiral Willard will assume command of the Pacific Command at a time of increasing tensions with North Korea and as a result

of a continuing series of provocative North Korean actions and a major repositioning of U.S. forces within the Pacific Rim.

Both of our nominees will lead our military in meeting the challenges of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, dealing with stateless terrorism, ethnic conflict, and violent religious extremism. General Cartwright will face these challenges globally, Admiral Willard in a region with a particularly troublesome history of proliferation.

In addition to your responsibilities to act as needed in the absence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Cartwright, you have important responsibilities in the context of acquisition, nuclear, space, cyber security, and ballistic missile defense matters.

It is the responsibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, which you chair, to identify the requirements of military commanders and to see that the acquisition process meets these requirements. An additional responsibility of yours is to co-chair with the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Deputy's Advisory Working Group. This group makes the key decisions as to the department's resources and what major investments will be made.

Between those two groups, the JROC and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, you have the opportunity to shape, through the investment decisions, the long-term capabilities of the department and the military services. Your experience in this capacity—General, given that experience, we will be interested in hearing from you as to how the changes in the defense acquisition reform that were in that act which Congress recently passed might assist you in improving the acquisition process.

We also would be interested, General, in your thoughts on the opportunities for future U.S.-Russian military cooperation, including missile defense, in light of the recently completed meetings between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev.

Admiral Willard, you have had extensive experience in the Pacific, having served as commander of Carrier Group Five, the commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, as well as a tour of duty as deputy commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

With that considerable regional experience and your many other impressive accomplishments in the Navy, you bring a strong background for assignment as the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command.

Admiral, we would be interested in your assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula and the current efforts to track ships suspected of carrying illicit cargo to and from North Korea in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. We would be interested also in our military relations with China and how you see that relationship evolving.

So we look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning. We thank them again for their service.

I now call upon Senator McCain for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

And Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming General Cartwright and Admiral Willard and congratulating them on their nominations. I thank each of them and their families for their service.

General Cartwright, you have demonstrated an extraordinary understanding of the global posture the United States must maintain in this area of constantly changing threats, and I believe that you are well qualified for a second term as Vice Chairman.

And I would like to echo the words of Senator Levin. You have been very candid and forthcoming with the members of this committee and with the two of us, and it is much appreciated on many of the difficult issues that we face. I applauded your comments last March about DOD's acquisition strategy, which you underscored that we must devote our procurement dollars to weapon systems that address the most likely threats instead of what some consider to be the most dangerous.

This was certainly borne out later in Secretary Gates' recommendations, and I agree with your premise that our weapon systems must impose greater cost on our potential and current enemies than they do on us. I hope you and we in Congress will be able to adhere to this philosophy in the days ahead.

With the recent launch of the major coalition operation in southern Afghanistan, I look forward to hearing more about how we intend to proceed in the theater. Success in Afghanistan requires that we employ troop levels appropriate to the mission we are asking our military to carry out. And as a result, it is vital that the commanders on the ground are free and perceive they are free to request the forces they conclude are necessary.

General Cartwright, I hope to hear from you precisely the degree of freedom that General McChrystal will have to request troops and resources and how that fits into recent reports suggesting the administration was preemptively counseling against higher force levels.

General Cartwright, one of the most—and I will talk about this more later—extraordinary articles I have seen in my many years of service appeared in the Washington Post, where apparently a reporter for the Washington Post was brought into a meeting in Afghanistan by General Jones with the military. And at that time, basically, according to this article, General Jones said there would be no additional troops under any circumstances.

I will be interested in hearing about how that jives with the supposed delay in a decision for an additional 10,000 troops that at that time the President had “delayed” the decision on. I must say, I have never seen quite such a scenario where a reporter is brought into a briefing between the President's national security adviser and our military commanders in the field.

So with the President just concluding a round of talks with his Russian counterpart on arms control, our National strategic capabilities, including missile defense, are currently at center stage. I have previously advocated for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals and for other steps that would reduce the risk that nuclear weapons would ever be used.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the target numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles announced this week and on what the implications of such reductions might be for the urgent

need to invest in the modernization of both the stockpile and the complex-wide intellectual and physical infrastructure needs.

With respect to the planned European-based missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, I am concerned that there is a perception, one that has been strengthened by the testimony of administration officials before this committee, that the United States is preparing to back away, even abandon commitments made to these countries during the past administration. I believe it is essential in the future that we keep faith with our close allies in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Admiral Willard, you have an outstanding record of joint and naval service, and you are well qualified to assume responsibilities of commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The importance of the theater, economically and from a strategic security standpoint, can't be overstated, and there are a number of short- and long-term challenges facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.

North Korea continues its variety of belligerent actions with the firing of missiles over the weekend and new reports of a possible Pyongyang-directed cyber attack on the United States and South Korea. I look forward to hearing about how PACOM intends to enforce the latest U.N. Security Council resolution banning North Korea's transit at sea of nuclear and missile technologies and what the limits are to that enforcement.

In addition, I hope to hear your thoughts on Japanese reaction to any changes in our nuclear posture, including arms reduction carried out through START, and about evolving Chinese naval capabilities and the value of military-to-military exchanges with China.

Again, I thank our nominees and their families for their service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

General Cartwright?

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC,
NOMINEE FOR THE POSITION OF VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, for this opportunity to appear today.

I believe the support of loved ones reinforces our servicemembers' ability to serve this Nation. This has been especially true for me. And so, it is with great pleasure that I have the opportunity to introduce my wife, Sandee, who is able to be with me this morning, along with our daughter Jamie and her husband, Chris—both members of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

My other daughter—or our other daughter Billie is awaiting the return of her husband, who is on his fourth overseas tour. He is a member of the 2nd of the 19 Special Forces Group of the West Virginia National Guard. And so, we are waiting in the next couple of days to welcome him home.

I am grateful for all that they have done and what they have meant to me throughout my service.

Over the last nearly 2 years, I have had the privilege of working with the members of this committee on many vital issues, helping to shape the force, meet the wide variety of challenges our Nation faces. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts in support of the Nation.

I stand ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

Admiral Willard?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, NOMINEE TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain. I would like to thank the committee for scheduling this hearing during such a busy time in Washington, D.C.

I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and President Obama for their confidence in my service to have put forward this nomination.

I would like to thank Senator Inouye for his very kind introduction and for his enduring support to our military throughout the world and especially in Hawaii.

I am deeply honored to be considered for this command, and I think I appreciate the vital importance of the Asia-Pacific region to this Nation.

If I have one best attribute in pursuing this command, she is sitting behind me. My wife, Donna, pinned these wings on 35 years ago, and since then, she has devoted herself to the spouses and families of our military. Along the way, she raised three wonderful children—Jennifer, Bryan, and Mark—who, in turn, have given us three wonderful grandchildren to enjoy.

I would like to also introduce Donna's brother, who is here today, Mike Yelverton, a senior executive in the Defense Intelligence Agency; his wife, Anita; and son Rudy.

I very much look forward to opportunities, if confirmed, to work with this committee. I thank this committee for their devotion to our uniformed men and women throughout the country. And sir, I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Let me ask both of you these questions.

Senator INOUE. May I be excused?

Chairman LEVIN. Oh, of course. I am sorry. Senator, I should have given you that formal welcome and farewell before. Thank you for coming.

Have you adhered—these are the standard questions we ask of nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

[Both witnesses answered in the negative.]

Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

[Both witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Thank you.

Let us try an 8-minute first round today.

General Cartwright, there was a joint understanding issued by President Obama and President Medvedev on Monday indicating that the target range of deployed strategic nuclear weapons is in a range of 1,500 to 1,675. The current range under the Moscow Treaty is 1,700 to 2,200. Now that understanding also indicates that each party determines for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

From a military requirements perspective, General, are you comfortable with those new ranges?

General CARTWRIGHT. I am, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. And could you tell us briefly from a military perspective why is the ability to determine composition and structure important, and does this flexibility allow for greater reductions in both warheads and delivery systems?

General CARTWRIGHT. The key here is for the United States is at these levels, we will be able to preserve the triad. So the ICBM side of the force, which is our responsive side of the force, is maintained. The survivable element of our force, which is borne out in the submarines and the sea-launched ballistic missiles, is maintained, and we are able to maintain the bombers.

Bringing those numbers down to the 1,500 to 1,675 keeps us in that range and allows us to preserve that triad, which I believe is important at this stage of the negotiations. Bringing down the warheads and then bringing down the delivery vehicles gives us that triad and balance, when added into what we are now calling the new triad with ballistic missile defense, gives the Nation the protections that it will need as we move to the future.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General, Secretary Gates indicated on April 6th that the President's budget request relative to missile defense shifts the focus of our missile defense program to place more emphasis on theater missile defense capabilities to defend our forward deployed forces and allies against the many existing short- and medium-range missiles that we face today and also to place greater emphasis on the development and the testing of the longer range missile defense. Do you support that approach of the administration?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do, Senator. It is key from my perspective, one, that the threats that we are actually facing today is the proliferation of the short- and medium- range ballistic missiles, which are the theater threat. We have had a very good test program with the elements of that part of the missile defense capability, which are premiered by the Standard Missile 3, which goes with the Aegis system aboard ship.

The THAAD, which is the most recent addition, gives us a little more of an area defense capability, and Patriot, which gives us a point defense capability, point defense being to protect a base or a station or something like that.

Having these capabilities and deploying and focusing on getting these capabilities deployed is going to contribute to the stability within the region. And so, in areas like PACOM, we will be able to defend both the area of the country and the point at the critical infrastructure, bases, et cetera, for us.

Chairman LEVIN. Relative to the question of possible missile defense cooperation, do you agree with President Obama that missile defense cooperation with Russia would serve our mutual security interests, could enhance our security against potential missile threats from nations like Iran not only by preventing Iran from seeking and gaining any psychological advantage if they obtain nuclear weapons and missiles, but also sending a very clear signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are going to work together in that effort?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I believe that multilateral approaches to missile defense in general are to our advantage, number one. And number two, any ability to cooperate on the missile defense with the Russians is highly leveraging for us, both in the message it sends in a political or diplomatic form and in the capabilities that they can bring to the table that we might be able to incorporate into the system.

Chairman LEVIN. And would NATO support that effort of ours to work together with Russia against that kind of an Iranian threat?

General CARTWRIGHT. I won't speak for all of NATO, but all of the members, my counterparts that I talk to, support that effort.

Chairman LEVIN. General, we asked you a pre-hearing question relative to the F-22 production. And you indicated that you support the administration's request that we limit that production.

Can you tell us if, in fact, you do agree to stop F-22 production at 187 aircraft and whether or not there have been studies conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that found that the 187 figure was adequate to confront future opponents who have robust air-to-air capabilities and whether there has also been a Joint Staff study assessing the sufficiency and the proficiency of a buy of 187 F-22 aircraft?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I was probably one of the more vocal and ardent supporters for the termination of the F-22 production. The reason is twofold.

First, there is a study in the Joint Staff that we just completed and partnered with the Air Force on that, number one, said that proliferating within the United States military fifth generation fighters to all three Services was going to be more significant than having them based solidly in just one service because of the way we deploy and because of the diversity of our deployment. So that is point number one.

Point number two is in the production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the first aircraft variant will support the Air Force replacement of their F-16s and F-15s. It is a very capable aircraft. It is 10 years newer in advancement in avionics and capabilities in comparison to the F-22. It is a better, more rounded capable fighter. That is kind of point number one.

Point number two is the second variant is the variant that goes to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps made a conscious decision to forgo buying the F-18 E/F in order to wait for the F-35. So the F-35 variant that has the V/STOL capability, which goes to the Marine Corps is number two coming off the line.

And the third variant coming off of the line is the Navy variant, the carrier-suitable variant.

Another thing that weighed heavily certainly in my calculus was the input of the combatant commanders, and one of the highest issues of concern from the combatant commanders is our ability to conduct electronic warfare. That electronic warfare is carried onboard the F-18. And so, looking at the lines that we would have in hot production, number one priority was to get fifth generation fighters to all of the Services. Number two priority was to ensure that we had a hot production line in case there was a problem, and number three was to have that hot production line producing F-18 Gulfs, which support the electronic warfare fight.

So those issues stacked up to a solid position, at least on my part, that it was time to terminate the F-22. It is a good airplane. It is a fifth generation fighter. But we needed to proliferate those fifth generation fighters to all of the Services, and we needed to ensure that we were capable of continuing to produce aircraft for the electronic warfare capability, and that was in the F-18. In the F-18, we can also produce front-line fighters that are more than capable of addressing any threat that we will face for the next 5 to 10 years.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

Senator McCain?

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I want to thank the nominees for their service. You both are outstanding examples of service to the Nation, and we are very proud to have you serve in positions of great responsibility.

General Cartwright, I would like to return to what I was talking about in my opening statement and this Washington Post article, where apparently a reporter was in a meeting with General Jones and military commanders. During a briefing, General Nicholson said he was "a little light," more than hinting he could use more

forces, probably thousands more. “We don’t have enough force to go everywhere,” Nicholson said.

Then General Jones basically told him, he said, “How do you think Obama might look at this?” Jones asked, “How do you think he might feel?”

And then Jones went on, after all those additional troops, if there were new requests for force now, the President would quite likely have a “Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.” And then Jones finally went on to say with great emphasis to the group of Iraq veterans, said Afghanistan is not Iraq. “We are not going to build that empire again,” he said flatly.

You know, that empire succeeded where the previous strategy had failed. I guess my question to you, General Cartwright, and I may be asking the wrong person, does General McChrystal have the latitude to request additional forces and materiel that he may need to prevail in Afghanistan, or is this a clear signal to the military that “we are not going to build that empire again?”

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, let me address it in two ways. One, I wasn’t in the conversation, but the first would be that we have a new commander. We have a strategy that we have just stood up. Less than half of the forces associated with that strategy have been deployed.

We are in the midst of building the infrastructure to receive them, but most of them will close—the Marines being the first, and they have closed. Next comes the strikers. But they will close toward the end of this summer.

General McChrystal is doing an assessment right now of the force strengths and the capabilities he needs in order to in-place this new strategy. When he comes back to the Pentagon with that assessment, which I would expect will be toward the end of this month to middle of August, we will take a look at what he has now, what he believes he needs to win this fight—and that is why we are there is to win this fight—and we will look any request associated with increase in forces.

I will not be bashful about articulating those needs if it is appropriate. We will look at that in the context of what has deployed and what is yet to come so that we understand the difference between his assessment of what he actually has today versus what it is we are going to deploy.

But I think at the heart of your question, no commander will be told, at least—if confirmed—by me, to not submit what he believes he needs or she believes she needs to win the fight.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I don’t want to belabor it. But he says that if there were new requests for force now, the President would quite likely have a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment. That sends a clear message at least to the military in that room, I would think. I certainly know that if I were there, I would get it.

And I think you would agree, General, the reason why we succeeded in this counterinsurgency in Iraq is because we had sufficient forces to provide an environment of security, so economic, political, and all the other aspects of a free and open society could develop. Without the security environment, I think we proved in the earlier years in the Iraq, it doesn’t succeed.

So, and is there still a pending decision on the part of the President that 10,000 additional troops may be needed?

General CARTWRIGHT. The decision on the additional 10,000 that was made by the previous commander in front of this change in strategy was tabled at that time, and we all agreed—we all being the commanders agreed that that was appropriate at the time to deploy the forces that we really felt we need for the strategy we really felt could win.

And so, implementing that, we will go back. General McChrystal will have the opportunity to look—he won't look in the context of 10,000. He will look in the context of what he believes he needs to win, and he will articulate that. We will look at that in the context of what we have yet to deploy in the force, and if there are mismatches, either in strategy or in force structure, we will articulate those.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Admiral Willard, I would like to talk about North Korea and the U.N. Security Council resolution. If a North Korean ship vessel like the Kang Nam last month leaves port and is delivering illicit weapons to an unfriendly port such as Burma, which we believed at the time was the case, what action can the United States military take?

Admiral WILLARD. Senator, the Security Council Resolution 1874 provides for member nations to conduct inspections on the high seas if the flag nation consents to those inspections should we have reason to believe that the ship is carrying illicit materials, as you suggest. So it is a consensual search that is authorized by the Security Council.

Senator MCCAIN. And if the North Korean ship refuses to grant that consent, then what happens?

Admiral WILLARD. The flag nation is compelled by the security resolution to direct that ship into the next convenient port, and the Security Council resolution then calls for all nations to—that might take receipt of that ship in their territorial water to conduct the search.

Senator MCCAIN. And if that ship decides to continue on to its destination, which may be the port very likely if it is carrying illicit weapons to an unfriendly nation, to an unfriendly port, do we have any way of forcing them to change course, or do they just arrive at that port?

Admiral WILLARD. The Security Council resolution then calls for the flag nation to communicate the failure of that ship to adhere to the Security Council resolution call for search, to report that back to the Security Council itself. The resolution does not authorize nonconsensual search of those ships.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I hesitate to ask you what you think the likelihood of a North Korean vessel carrying illicit weapons would be to either allow boarding or to proceed to a port of our choice. So it seems to me that it is understandable that the U.N. Security Council, given China and Russia's behavior, would not enact meaningful sanctions. But I certainly don't view this view in Resolution 1874 as having any impact whatsoever on North Korean behavior.

But, Admiral, what level of concern should we have about these continued tests and launches? Recently, I believe seven short-range

missiles were launched. I have seen pictures recently of the Dear Leader, and he looks like he is certainly not in great health, as published reports.

What is your assessment of the situation there in North Korea's behavior, and if you have got any thoughts as to what the scenario, what might happen in the next few months or years as regards to North Korea?

Admiral WILLARD. Senator McCain, I think we are rightly concerned about the situation in North Korea. I think it is a mystery to me and I think to most who spend a lot of time assessing North Korean behavior as to what is behind this particular round of provocations by the leadership there. But a confluence of events has occurred that may be contributing to it.

His ill health and the issue of succession is certainly part of this calculus, perhaps the change in administration in South Korea and the relations that have been affected as a result of that, the change in our administration and the continued association with the Six Party Talks and the trends that the North Koreans were seeing there. So, many things may be contributing to this round of provocations and the messages that he is perhaps attempting to send.

As you suggest, they launched a series of short-range ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles in a demonstration last week and, as we are all aware, a Taepodong 2 some weeks ago.

We continue to posture for these and rely on our whole of government and the international community to continue to attempt to ascertain North Korea's intent, to try and control their behavior. And in the meantime, we rely on our deterrent level of effort on the peninsula with the Republic of Korea Government, the deterrence that is affected by our alliance with Japan, I think, and our overall posture in the region to effectively contain the behavior to within what is tolerable.

But I think to your point that we should be concerned about North Korea and continue to be vigilant in watching over their behavior and prepare to defend against a provocation should he follow up one of his threats.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, witnesses. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to both of you. You are really extraordinarily well qualified for the positions that the President has nominated you for. Our country is lucky to have you in service.

General Cartwright, I know from conversations we have had that you share the concerns that I and many members of this committee have about the stress on the United States Army as a result of its active deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan particularly and the impact that that has on dwell time and on the soldiers and on their families.

I am very pleased that our committee, in the mark-up of the National Defense Authorization Act for next year, has increased the end strength of the Army authorized by 30,000 for 2011 and 2012. Without going into the details, it was done for those years, one for-

ward, for budgetary reasons, even though there is no money attached to it.

It seems to me that with the increased deployments, including the possibility of additional deployments to Afghanistan as you have just discussed with Senator McCain, and the methodical drawdown from Iraq, that the period of great pressure on the Army will actually be in 2010. I have been contemplating introducing an amendment on the floor when our bill comes up next week to include 2010 as a year in which that increase of 30,000 from 547,000 to 577,000 can begin.

As you and I know, the Secretary of Defense has waiver authority to nonetheless increase 3 percent those in service in the Army. So I wanted to ask you how you react to the current stress on the Army and whether the department would view with favor the idea of extending this 30,000 increase authority to 2010 as an amendment to the bill next week?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, we have talked a little bit about this. The challenge that is introduced is that the drawdown in Iraq really starts in 2010—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General CARTWRIGHT.—in significant numbers and gets us down to around 50,000 to 35,000 around the end of August in 2010, assuming that we stay on a glide slope, and that that drawdown is pretty steep. In other words, the forces are staying there into 2010 for the majority of those that are there.

The growth in Afghanistan began this year, and so there is not a separation of the two. For the Marines, for the most part, they disengaged from Iraq and they have moved to Afghanistan. So the stress is not as significant on the Marines.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General CARTWRIGHT. The work that we have done inside the department, particularly with the Army, says there is that period of 2010 and 2011 in particular where the stress is going to be there. During 2010, because of execution. During 2011, because of coming back, refilling, and trying to retrofit, you are going to have stress on the Army in a significant way. At the same time, the Army is trying to get out of the stop-loss construct. And so, all of these things are occurring in 2010 and 2011.

We have looked at this. We have worked in a range from about 15,000 to 30,000. We believe the character of that activity should be temporary in nature, very clearly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree.

General CARTWRIGHT. I believe the Army is on the same sheet of music, and so what we are trying to understand is where are the resources to do it. But we believe there is a case for something between about 15,000 and 25,000. Thirty thousand would give us the range in which to work to allow us to do that.

Resourcing is going to be a challenge, but we believe—I believe inside of the department that we believe we will find that money if it is necessary to find it internally to do that. We would like the help probably. But again, we have got to make a decision inside the department. We have got to work that through. But the case for the additional forces is clearly there.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I really appreciate that answer, and I am sure that everybody in the Army and their families particularly will appreciate it. And I look forward to working with you really in the next few days to determine whether an amendment to the bill to cover 2010 will be of—will be helpful to the department in trying to achieve that increase in end strength in a timely fashion.

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

General, another question, a very different subject. Our committee, in its wisdom, decided to cut the President's request for 28 UH-1Y Huey helicopters. I know that the recommendation of the President and the department was based on a need to support our marines who are at the front lines in Afghanistan because they can operate in the high altitudes and hot temperatures there. That is, these Hueys can.

I want to ask you, because we may be involved on the floor again in an attempt to restore funding for that procurement, what your response would be, and do you see operational risks if we fail to restore that money for the Hueys?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I support the President's budget. I believe that those helicopters are, in fact, critical. We have had significant press about challenges that the forces have had with civilian casualties. And until now, we have had ground forces, maneuver forces, but we have not had the full complement of supporting arms, particularly in artillery and in attack helicopters.

And bringing CAV and bringing in the Marines who bring in their organic air with them has started to fill that in. And I would take note of the Marine campaign that is currently ongoing that in that campaign, in all the frontage that they have covered, we have not had civilian casualties because we have had our Cobras and because we have had our artillery, and that is important.

That helicopter for the Marines are their most lethal weapons. They are the most effective in the battlefield, particularly in the COIN arena. They are effective in built-up urban areas and in compounds because they can be discreet. And so, the value of those helicopters is significant.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer, and we will probably try to act on it next week.

A very different question. In your prepared responses, General Cartwright, to the questions that the staff asked you and the committee did leading up to the hearing, I thought you had a quite remarkable statement about what is happening in Iran now.

I quote, "We are concerned that the growing strength of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over Iranian politics will result in the militarization of Iranian foreign policy. Nonetheless, we do not project any significant changes to Iran's overall foreign policy objectives. However, should the political unrest continue, it is possible that Iran could attempt to create an incident or other crisis that would draw its population's attention away from internal strife and towards a perceived common threat."

I thought those were very thoughtful comments and very important for us to consider, and I want to ask you to just comment, extend a little bit on those remarks in two regards. One is the extent to which the growing role of the IRGC, the Guard corps, may lead

to a militarization of Iranian foreign policy. And the second, of course, is the extent to which the Iranian government, therefore, may look for an international incident as a way to suppress the prominence of the political dissent inside the country.

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, my comments were really based on the premise that when confronted with internal unrest, a tactic is to look external to a common foe that can be portrayed and, therefore, create a uniting activity within the country.

And tied with the activities that we have seen particularly in the Gulf now that the IRGC is controlling the waters rather than the Iranian navy—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General CARTWRIGHT.—and that they have shown a proclivity to be aggressive in their behavior, that we could find ourselves in a generated military incident which would have significant overtones in our ability to work any kind of diplomatic approach to Iran or any kind of Iranian reach-out to the rest of the world.

And so, that is where I personally am most concerned that our opportunity right now in the change of our administrations, in the wake of their elections may be short-circuited. And I would see that as a significantly difficult issue for the region. It would create instability within the region.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you. That is to me a very important insight and one I think all of us should keep in mind.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I am looking forward to supporting both of you in your confirmations.

One of the problems that we have, we sit at this table and we listen to you guys who are experts and know a lot more about it than we do, that from administration to administration changes when the circumstances don't always change.

And when you were talking about leading the effort to stop the F-22 at the 187, I can remember sitting up here when they were talking about 750 F-22s. I remember the number 480. Then there was an agreement last year that 243 was the figure that was a must figure. And so, I am not asking, just it appears to be that way. And the same thing is true really in Future Combat Systems and other platforms, and it is true also in missile defense.

Now our President said that the need for action, talking about North Korea's missile launch, not just here in the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons. And despite this, they recommended a reduction of 16 percent cut in the missile defense budget by \$1.4 billion. And including some of the systems that we have looked at, the ABL that we really think is necessary when you look at the three phases of capabilities that we want to have—the multi-kill vehicle, the ground-based interceptors.

Of course, I think you know that goes right back to my first statement that you hear these figures, and I can remember when it was 54. We had to have 54, and that was going to be the one. Then it went down to 44. I know that Senator Begich has an

amendment to try to restore the 44. I will be supporting him on that. I think it is the right thing.

But with these changes, do you really feel that we are in a position to adequately move forward in our missile defense system? The technology is there. We are looking at it. We, at least I have, sitting at this table here have been convinced that we need to have all these in the boost phase, the midcourse, and the terminal phase, that we have to have all this capability.

I would just like to have each one of you just respond. Are you really happy with where we are right now, or is that driven mostly by budget?

General CARTWRIGHT. Let me go ahead and initiate. It is not driven by budget. I think that we would have made these decisions with additional resources or without them. For the ground-based interceptor and the midcourse phase, 44 is the number that we currently have under contract. The intent is to put 30 of them in the ground. Fourteen of them would be used to update configurations of missiles in older configurations based on the lessons that we have learned in testing thus far.

Fifteen with the additional radars and systems that we now have deployed that have been integrated into the system allows us to move from either three or four missiles in the ground-based interceptor per incoming RV to two in a construct of shoot-look-shoot.

So in a construct of two, that means that we could take on basically 15 simultaneous inbound threats from a rogue nation. Neither country that we consider a rogue nation right now, Iran and North Korea, have the capability yet demonstrated to launch one successful missile towards the United States and reach it, number one.

Number two, the opportunity to get to 15 that would be armed and able to come to the United States is several years off. So that gives us a point to look at.

With respect to the ground-based interceptor, we have two decisions that are yet to be made that may drive us to build additional ground-based interceptors. The first is a decision about the European site, and the second is a decision that needs to be made about the testing protocols for aging as the system ages out in its life.

So this is testing that you do to ensure that the system is still good and valid 5 years down the road, 6 years down the road, et cetera.

The other piece that I would add, and I will close off very quickly, Senator, is that the terminal side of this equation with THAAD, with PAC-3, and with SM-3 has performed significantly better than anybody would have envisioned.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. My concern has been in the boost phase, but we are running out of time here.

I did want to get into another area, and that is the age. We look at the Bradley fighting vehicle, and we look at the Abrams back in the 1970s technology, and even before, the Paladin, even before that, maybe 1950s or World War II technology. And we—General Shinseki and others have come in here and talked about our ground capabilities and that we need to have a transformation, and we have gone through several of these. And it seems as if—the last one being, of course, FCS, and a lot of that being terminated.

We haven't heard, at least I haven't heard of just anything really specific about what the next recommendation is going to be. I understand in August they are going to come up with something. So rather than to answer a question about that, I would like to, for the record, have you give me as much information as you can as to what we could consider.

It bothers me, and I have said this before several times, that when our guys and gals go out there, there is an assumption that they have the best of equipment. And in many cases, they don't. And certainly in our Paladin capability, there are some five countries, including South Africa, that make a better one than we have. And that is where I want to go with this thing to make sure that we have the very best of everything.

Is there anything you would like to share with us in terms of where we are now, General Cartwright, in our modernization program concerning that type of capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. And I am going back to the FCS and where you opened your comment, Senator, but I would tend to agree with what I think you have said, which is that the vehicle that is of most concern to me for modernization is the Bradley. It is aging, and it also is significantly underpowered for the task that it has.

So I believe, and I won't foreshadow the Army's analysis, but that that is where we will focus on FCS initially from a vehicle standpoint.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

And Admiral, you talked and responded to Senator McCain concerning North Korea and some of the capabilities up there. I have reason to question our own intelligence in terms of what the capability is there. I can remember in 1998, and you remember this, too, that we made a request as to when North Korea would have this motor stage capability. In fact, it was August 24, 1998.

The response, and I think that was consistent with our National Intelligence Estimate, was between 5 and 10 years. And 7 days later on August 30, they fired one.

How confident are you in our intelligence on the capabilities of North Korea?

Admiral WILLARD. Increasingly confident over time. We have been looking at this country for 50 years. We pay a lot of attention to what goes on in North Korea. To your point, there have been miscalculations at times when North Korea has been particularly covert in some of their activities.

I think as illustrated in the most recent launch sequences that have occurred, the intelligence associated with those launch sequences has been quite good.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. My time has expired. But for the record, I would like to have each of you respond to my three favorite programs—the Train and Equip 1206, 1207 IMET program, CCIF—as to the value that you see in those programs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral WILLARD. Will do.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

By the way, you see it was entered last night that our bill will be first up on the floor on Monday. I think we all know about that.

But in case any of us don't, we can be ready to go on Monday as soon as we come in, which is good news.

Senator Akaka?

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my welcome to our military leaders and thank you and the vice chairman for—the ranking member for holding this hearing.

And I also want to add my welcome to the families of the General and Admiral as well and also to thank both of you for the many years of dedicated service you have given to our country.

Admiral Willard, again, thank you for stopping by, and it was great to catch up with you. And knowing you out there in the Pacific, you have shown outstanding leadership as commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, and I want to congratulate you and your wife, Donna, on your nomination to become the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command.

And also congratulations to General Cartwright, Sandee, and the family as well.

General, Secretary Gates recently ordered the creation of a new military Cyber Command, and I am asking this question because of your comment about the fifth generation of weaponry and equipment. As DOD stands up this new organization, we must provide for our troops with resources that they need to defend our networks in a timely manner.

General, in March 2009, you stated, and I quote, “The current method of procurement for information technology is so slow that by the time software systems are purchased, they are out of date.”

What is DOD—General, what is DOD doing to meet these challenges in the timely procurement of information technology products?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, appreciate the opportunity to respond to that question and to the quote. We have worked hard over the last 2 years both on the requirements and the acquisition side of the house to speed up and move information technology programs of record in a fashion that is more appropriate for Moore's law rather than an industrial construct.

And so, we had up until now been using the same process we would build an aircraft carrier for to buy 1,000 lines of code, and it was just not serving us well. It is not a difference in the law. It is a difference in how we approach the risk calculus for what it is we are doing and how we manage that risk in the acquisition process and the requirements process.

And by adjusting that calculus, particularly with our combat support agency, the National Security Agency, we have been able to accelerate our ability to buy cutting-edge, competitive software and hardware for the IT enterprise that we operate in a way that has advantaged the warfighter.

We are seeing that advantage play out every day in Iraq and Afghanistan, what we have been able to do because we have not changed the law. We have not even changed the interpretation. But what we have done is change the risk calculus that we are willing to bear for these IT systems and produce them in a timely fashion. I think that has helped us.

Senator AKAKA. General, I am encouraged by the additional funding in the defense budget for wounded warrior care. And I am asking this as chairman of the Veterans Committee. I have been working on what I am calling a seamless transition, and it shows our continued commitment to servicemembers that we will take care of them as well as their families, and we need to continue this into their civilian life as well.

How would you assess the approach across the Services to care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families?

General CARTWRIGHT. We have learned many lessons. We have been the benefactor of an incredible amount of leverage that was brought to bear by the veterans side of the equation and the DOD side of the equation partnering to get at this issue that you are talking about, a seamless transition.

I believe our greatest challenge as we move to the future has to do with those unseen wounds, so to speak, the wounds of stress, the wounds of injury, traumatic to the brain, that we still have a significant amount of work to do between our two agencies, the Veterans Affairs and DOD, to ensure that that transition and that care is appropriate and that those who suffer these wounds have an opportunity to heal and reenter into either the military or the civilian sector in a way that is appropriate and commensurate with their abilities.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Admiral, Hawaii is the only State where NORTHCOM is not responsible for its homeland security. For Hawaii, the responsibility goes to PACOM.

What is your understanding of PACOM's homeland security responsibility and its relationship with NORTHCOM?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

As you have already stated, Pacific Command has homeland defense responsibilities for Hawaii, also for our territories throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Northern Command is, in fact, the supported commander for homeland defense to include ballistic missile defense of the mainland United States and Alaska.

Pacific Command conducts its defense of Hawaii and defense of territories within the region through a coordinated structure that is very much married to Northern Command and its responsibilities, Strategic Command and the support that it provides globally in that regard, and across all of the components that contribute to our homeland defense.

And we have a task force commander assigned, as you know, in Hawaii for purposes of homeland defense. I am confident that the approach is the correct one. The relationships, while we continue to learn to refine those relationships, are solid and maturing. And if confirmed, I will look forward to the defense of that region and the responsibilities that PACOM bears in that regard.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Thune?

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, thank you for your great service to our country and your willingness to continue to serve and that of your families,

who also sacrifice mightily for our freedoms, and we appreciate that very much.

General Cartwright, as you know, the Nuclear Posture Review is ongoing within the Department of Defense, and yet this week, we have a commitment on additional strategic warhead and delivery vehicle reductions. And I guess my question is that it appears that we have already sort of determined the future of U.S. nuclear posture and in some ways preempted the Nuclear Posture Review.

And I guess the question is, isn't that sort of putting the cart before the horse? Shouldn't the strategy be derived from the NPR and informed by that, as opposed to the other way around?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity. We prioritized in the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review the activities and the analysis that would be necessary to support the timelines associated with the START negotiations, or the follow-on START negotiations.

So the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, OSD, all worked very hard at the analysis that gave us ranges that we could operate in associated with the structure that would be appropriate for those ranges of operationally deployed weapons and then the strategically deployed delivery vehicles. I feel very comfortable that that analysis has served us well.

What remains in the Nuclear Posture Review then is how this all integrates with the general purpose forces in things like missile defense, cyber, et cetera. But I am very comfortable that we prioritized that analysis at the front end in order to support these negotiations.

Senator THUNE. Let me ask you about something that was said last month in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Keith Payne, who is a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. He testified that a post START arms agreement that significantly reduces the number of strategic delivery vehicles below 1,600 is good for the Russians and bad for the Americans.

And specifically, he testified that Russian strategic launchers will drop from approximately 680 today to about half that number simply as a result of aging systems and Russia's slow pace of modernization. So that in order to meet the launcher reduction commitment, the United States will need to make real cuts to existing systems while the Russians need only continue down their current path and that the U.S. will be giving up something for nothing in return.

And I have an additional concern that by significantly reducing our strategic delivery vehicles, we may lose the bomber leg of our nuclear triad. And I guess my question is do you agree with the commitment to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems, and in your view, at what point in this range between that 500 and 1,100 would the delivery vehicle reductions necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I think there are two pieces here. The first is that there are a substantial number of delivery vehicles associated with the United States that don't deliver anymore. We still count the Peacekeeper silos. We still count about 50 of the

Minuteman silos that were decommissioned. We have a large number of bombers that have been cut up and are sitting in Davis-Monthan but are still counted against us. The B-1s are still counted against us.

And so, part of what we need to do when we have this dialogue is to ensure that the assumptions of what we are counting from are correct. So our first objective is to get what we are calling the shadows out of the calculus so that the number that we are talking about is a real number and we all know what they are. So that is kind of point number one.

If we did that, that would bring us down substantially in our—what we are credited with having as delivery vehicles. If we go down in the range, I believe that the range at which we would if we assumed away all the phantoms, then we get down to a range somewhere in the 850 to 900 before we would have to start to cut any real delivery systems.

When we get into that range, and that is what drove the range is that from about 1,100 down to about 500—500 being principally where the Russians would like to be, 1,100 being principally where we would like to be—now the negotiation starts. I would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about mid point, and I certainly would like to have seen those ranges be closer, but that is a negotiation, and we have got to work our way through that negotiation as we go forward.

I will certainly express my military best judgment to the leadership if we start to get into a range that I would believe would endanger prematurely the concept of the triad.

Senator THUNE. And you had said in previous testimony in, I think, response to a question that I had asked, General, before this committee that the Nation does need a new bomber. In your opinion, should that new bomber be nuclear capable?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Nation will need a nuclear-capable bomber. Whether it is the same as a general purpose force activity bomber that we build in the future, whether it is a different variant, or whether we use existing platforms like the B-2 to carry us further into the future is something the analysis will have to tell us.

But I believe that a strategic range, air-breathing vehicle is going to be necessary as far out into the future as I am willing to trust my crystal ball.

Senator THUNE. Do you also believe that we ought to retain the bomber leg of the triad?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do.

Senator THUNE. Admiral, earlier this year during a hearing on current and future world-wide threats, Lieutenant General Maples, who is the Director of the DIA, had said that and I quote, “China, from an air defense standpoint, has developed a very modern, layered air defense capability and depth and is seeking additional air defense capabilities that will project even out to a range of 400 kilometers. It significantly affects potential U.S. operations in that region.”

And in an article published in the Foreign Affairs Journal in January of 2009, Secretary Gates wrote, “The Chinese improved air defenses, coupled with investments in other asymmetric capabili-

ties such as cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, and anti-ship weaponry, all threaten our ability to project power in the Pacific and will require us to rely on long-range, over the horizon systems such as the next-generation bomber.”

I guess my question, Admiral, is do you agree with Secretary Gates and Lieutenant General Maples’ assessment of China’s anti-access capabilities. And as the nominee to be combatant commander responsible for the Pacific theater, how important is it to you that the Air Force field a new long-range bomber in the 2018 timeframe that is capable of penetrating these advanced defenses?

Admiral WILLARD. Senator, as you know, we lay down our long-range bombers today in the theater for their deterrent effect. And the flexibility of having a long-range bomber capability is very important, I think, to the region, particularly given anti-access capabilities that we see in development there.

I think, to your point, there will come a time when certainly the follow-on bomber will be required. Whether it is 2018 I think will be determined as a result of the analysis ongoing in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, to General Cartwright’s previous statement.

Senator THUNE. Do you agree with the assessment of China’s anti-access capabilities, though?

Admiral WILLARD. I do.

Senator THUNE. Okay. And do you think that bomber, when it is fielded, should be nuclear capable?

Admiral WILLARD. I do.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Hagan?

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I just wanted to once again thank both of you for your service to our country. And you are certainly outstanding individuals, and I look forward to your confirmation.

And I also want to welcome the family because I think it is so important to have the family members standing with you and to be here at this hearing.

So, General Cartwright, I did have a couple of questions concerning I guess what is going on in the Helmand Province right now, and I know that the ongoing offensive led by Brigadier General Nicholson, who is the commander of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Lejeune, is implementing the department’s shift to protect the Afghan civilians.

And obviously, protecting the Afghan civilians is critical because what we don’t want to happen is for the Taliban to frame our operations as a war against the Afghan Pashtuns, which comprise about 42 percent of the Afghani population, which is some of the same ethnicity as the Taliban.

My hope is that the Marines can hold the areas inside the Helmand Province long enough for civil-military reconstruction efforts to enable the Afghan government to begin administering the basic services there. Can you give me your thoughts on the latest NATO and U.S. force offensive currently in the Helmand Province?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, I think you have framed it very well. The intent here is a shift in strategy to a more counterinsurgency-type strategy of clear, hold, and then build. We have been in the Helmand Province before with Marines and other forces and done clearing actions. The challenge is that when we finish the clearing actions, we return to our bases and the local population takes the brunt of the punishment after we leave.

What is fundamentally different in this campaign is that as the Marines move through along with their Afghan counterparts, we are leaving forces behind in the villages and the towns to protect those villages and towns and hold that area. So the hold part of this is the key, and the additional force has allowed us to do that.

And what we are seeing in response, number one, I had already alluded to the fact that our approach here is to win their hearts and minds, and we can't do that by having unnecessary civilian casualties. We have had very good luck in avoiding civilian casualties as we have done the clearing operations thus far.

It doesn't mean that we won't have casualties as we move forward. This is going to be a very deadly fight. But the fact that we are able to hold has clearly made a difference in the village elders, in the residents of those towns.

I believe personally that one of our key metrics for success will be over the next few months to see whether or not there is a shift in the attitude of the local residents. If they start supporting us with intelligence, with the giving of their own sons and daughters in the fight, and that they see there is more value in being able to produce crops rather than warriors and that they can be sustained in that type of a lifestyle, then we will have an opportunity to turn the corner.

But I think those are key metrics that we have to watch as the marines move into Helmand and followed by the strikers as they move on their flank.

Senator HAGAN. I think one of the key points is the use of the civilians, too, in helping them maintain those crops.

General CARTWRIGHT. Right.

Senator HAGAN. And I understand that we are sort of slow in getting the civilian numbers up and going, and obviously, it has to be secure in order to do that. But I believe, too, there are some other countries in the region that could perhaps help with that aspect of it. Once again, security would be first and foremost.

Can you give me your thoughts on, one, the civilians and, two, utilizing civilians in some of the other neighboring countries?

General CARTWRIGHT. In the hold, the quicker that we can transition to some sort of a livelihood and stability that gives the local residents the opportunity to make a living and be advantaged by the conditions is key.

Our ability to bring civilians in and surge those civilians from the U.S., from various organizations, the agriculture side, from the land grant colleges and things like that, right now has not moved at a pace that probably we would like it to. We would like to see them move faster, but we are working as hard as we can with our partners in State to make that happen.

But I do believe also that particularly from the agriculture side of the house, local soil, local customs, how you graze, how you raise

crops, et cetera, how you move them to market, the neighbors to Afghanistan have incredible expertise in that area and apparently, in my discussions at least, are very willing to give that expertise and to mentor and to bring in some of that agribusiness-type expertise that is unique to the area. I think we have to take advantage of that.

Senator HAGAN. Any idea how we are going to begin that process?

General CARTWRIGHT. We are going to reach out and start a dialogue as quickly as we can. What we are trying to understand from the military standpoint is how quickly we are going to be able to get a hold phase, but we don't want a gap after that hold phase. So this has got to be something that happens very quickly.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

And Admiral Willard, I had a question on China. As you know, China has terminated the military-military interaction with the U.S. due to the weapon sales that we have authorized to Taiwan after the Olympics. And as the commander, how do you plan on interacting with China to accomplish mutual objectives given the communication constraints, and what types of multilateral defense symposiums will you be able to attend that will assist in bridging this effort?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

The military-to-military dialogue with China has just in recent weeks recommenced, beginning with an international fleet review that was held in China. And it is measured steps clearly, but we are seeking to improve the military-to-military engagement over time.

And as you point out, China in the past has suspended military-to-military discussions, and they will have a vote in the future as well. So I think it is incumbent, first, on both nations to realize the value, the benefit of military-to-military dialogue and to sustain it. And I think that, for China, is going to be an evolutionary process in itself.

I think everyone collectively desires to see China emerge as a constructive partner and a constructive partner in regional security certainly. We think that the military-to-military dialogue to discuss the areas of common interest that we have with China, as well as to discuss the areas in which we disagree, is an important venue against all the diplomatic and other efforts that our Nation currently has invested in China as a nation.

So, if confirmed, I will look forward to seeking to determine new venues in which to engage the Chinese military. To your question regarding the conferences and so forth, there are a myriad of conferences in which the United States and China collectively attend.

I have had opportunities in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, in conference settings—in larger conference settings in Singapore and so forth to engage with my Chinese counterparts on occasion. And we have pretty consistently visited one another as well. So I look forward to all the opportunities that present themselves.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator Begich?

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, both of you, for your willingness to serve and obviously to your families that will be with you and serving with you in their own way. So thank you very much for your willingness.

I have a couple of questions. They will be a little varied. I am going to follow up on a little bit of Senator Hagan's comments here in just a minute. But first, I want to, General, you had commented in regards to I think Senator Inhofe's questions regarding missile defense, and one of the comments you had mentioned was the ratio of 2 for every 1, a 15 all at once that was shot effort.

Can you tell me is it that assuming that all 30 are in place, that all 30 are operational at all times? Because the ratio bases that on that assumption, and I am not sure that is the right assumption, but maybe you could add to that?

General CARTWRIGHT. Well, Senator, what we are endeavoring to do, again, we have 44 under contract. The first priority for the 14 above the 30 is to bring the 30 that are in the ground to a common configuration that represents the knowledge that we have gained from all of the testing. Then the intent would be to keep 30 in the ground.

Now we will do maintenance on those assets. So on any given day, likely there are not 30 in battery. But with any kind of warning, we would bring 30 up to speed and be ready based on the threat that we assessed had been detected.

Okay, and so in the best condition with the warning, there would be 30 available. And in a shoot-look-shoot scenario, that would give you the ability to counter just with the midcourse 15 simultaneous launches. It is at that point that we start to say now when you are dealing with 15 simultaneous launches, are you dealing with a rogue threat anymore? And so, there is a policy discussion that needs to occur if the belief is that the system should be developed beyond what we would call a rogue state capability.

Senator BEGICH. And in your document or the work you are doing now, I know there is the ballistic missile study that is going on, part of that study is that question, to some extent?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is to some extent. It is also in the sufficiency side of the equation, what is appropriate for regional defenses, how many weapons do we need there against what threats and in what configuration, and how much of that feeds the defense of the homeland?

So one of the keys that we are looking at in this assessment is are we able to—we have in the technology side, on what we could call the test and modeling side of the house, demonstrated a capability particularly for the SM-3 missile to be able to intercept in the ascent phase.

If we bring that to bear, then what is the right balance across all three phases for both homeland and for regional defenses? That is what we will be asking in the ballistic missile defense review is do we have that equation right?

Senator BEGICH. And then you had made a comment. I just want you, if you could expand on it, and you made a comment it also depends on what happens with the European sites.

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes.

Senator BEGICH. Can you expand a little bit and what you mean by that?

General CARTWRIGHT. We are looking—there are two priorities that we have set for the European site. One is a regional defense capability to protect the Nations, and the second is a redundant capability that would assist in protecting the United States or the homeland, okay?

And so, we have I think upwards right now of 40 different architectural laydowns that would—that we believe in some measure would address both the homeland issue and the regional issue. The question is which of those make the most sense?

You are looking at homeland. You are looking at regional. And you are also looking at stability in the region. And so, you run those three metrics against these alternatives and start to narrow in on what kind of an architecture best suits the defense of the region, the defense of the homeland, and the regional stability.

Senator BEGICH. Very good. And then how do you define testing, and let me stick to the long range if I can. How do you define what is the proper type of testing that should occur with the long-range system?

General CARTWRIGHT. Right. We have nominally now, if we stay with the 44 number, 14 missiles that are available to test, both the aerodynamic or performance margins of the missile so we know what exactly it does. Also to test the—or I am sorry, the interceptor itself and its ability to discriminate, the sensor grid, and then the command and control.

So there are three elements. There is the weapon and the delivery system, there is the sensor grid, and there is the command and control. In order to start to test that against situations in the extreme like 15 simultaneous launches, we are going to have to go and do some testing that we haven't done, which is multi-shot engagements against or simultaneous shot engagements against multiple targets. That testing needs to be done.

Senator BEGICH. If I can interrupt for a second? Do you consider that live testing, not virtual?

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct. That is correct. I mean, we will do both.

Senator BEGICH. You will do both.

General CARTWRIGHT. But the missiles are for the live testing.

The second is that the age life of these missiles—let us just nominally say it is 25 years. Over that period, in order to be confident of that number, we need to do what is called age testing. So each year, we will sample out of a missile that is in a silo, take it, bring it to a test facility and fire it live, and ensure that it can, in fact, do what it is supposed to do.

So there is going to need to be a population of missiles to support that. Part of the review that we are doing this year is to determine what that sampling quantity needs to be, and we will have to provide those missiles.

So you have two unknown variables. What is the configuration of the European capability, and what is the number of missiles associated with both the current testing and the future aging testing that we will need in order to perform through the entire life of the missile system?

Senator BEGICH. If I can just, you know, in our authorizing bill that will be up Monday at this point, we have some language in there specifically talking about a testing plan. And I don't know if you have had a chance to look at that language, but the idea was some of this discussion we are just having now is kind of formalize it so we have a better understanding of the law, how this testing will occur, what will be the impact, and do you feel comfortable in developing a plan that can be shared with this committee maybe in this forum or another forum?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. Okay. Let me—this question you may not want to answer, but let me now shift if I can real quickly because it was an interesting statement you made, and that is we are there to win and be successful.

How do you—this is kind of “the question.” How do you define in Afghanistan—that is what I am focused on right now. I apologize. I shifted. You will see me shift a lot here.

How do you define, how do you see a win in Afghanistan? And I know that is a difficult question because a lot of aspects, and both Senator Hagan and I and Senator Udall and a few of us just came back from the Afghanistan region. So just how do you define a win?

General CARTWRIGHT. The lack of presence of ungoverned and unmanaged weapons of mass destruction should they exist, that they have to be eliminated or put under control. In this case, there are no weapons.

Senator BEGICH. There are none. Correct.

General CARTWRIGHT. The absence and the control of terrorists who would export their terrorism globally. And then the presence of a governance system that could discover and deter the first two.

Senator BEGICH. If you could, and my time is up, and Admiral, no disrespect, but we had a great conversation yesterday. So that is why I left you second. I was trying to manage my time here. So I appreciate all your commentary yesterday with me.

But last question, if I can, and this is if you could have a crystal ball in Afghanistan, based on the resource allocation that you now are seeing move in there, what you have heard a little bit today on some of the concerns or issues we have on resource allocation, how would you measure that in time?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that there is a subjective side of this. The enemy clearly has a vote in this activity. The first two I believe that we have reasonably under control. Governance gives us the opportunity to put in place a structure that would control either the reemergence of terrorists or the potential for WMD.

The question then is how much can we do to bolster this government and give it the opportunity to provide basic services and justice and rule of law in a construct that would advantage the country and at the same time protect its neighbors and the rest of the globe from any kind of reemergence of terrorism?

It is a subjective judgment. I believe that whatever government comes out of Afghanistan as we move forward with success, it will probably not look like our government. They have thousands of years of a type of government that is associated with the tribes and with the clans. But if they can come to some mesh between the local governance and the central governance in a way that allows

them to move forward and provide services, that that will be our vision of success.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Senator Chambliss?

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And gentlemen, I had the opportunity to visit with both of you. Thank you for your continued service. Thank you for your leadership.

General Cartwright, I noted that earlier today, you had some comments relative to the F-22, which are not new. Your opinion on this has been out there for some time. But I note that it is not in accord with what we are hearing from a number of other folks within the military.

Can you tell me, in your opinion, what is the military requirement for the number of F-22s that are called for?

General CARTWRIGHT. The military requirement right now is associated with the strategy that we are laying out in the QDR, and it is a departure from the two major theater war construct that we have adhered to in the past and in which this aircraft grew up. I mean it grew up in that construct of two major theater wars, and both of them being of a peer competitor quality.

The strategy that we are moving towards is one that is acknowledging of the fact that we are not in that type of conflict, that the more likely conflicts are going to be the ones that we—similar to the ones that we are in in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that we do need to have a capability against a major peer competitor and that we believe that the sizing construct, one, demands that we have fifth generation fighters across all three services rather than just one and that the number of those fighters probably does not need to be sufficient to take on two simultaneous peer competitors, that we don't see that as the likely. We see that as the extreme.

Senator CHAMBLISS. So what is the military requirement for the number of F-22s?

General CARTWRIGHT. One hundred eighty-seven.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Now you realize that is contrary to the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Schwartz?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do not realize that. He has sat down in several meetings with me, certainly in the tank with the chiefs. That has been the number that he has espoused.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, General, I just have to tell you it is in writing. It is on the record in this committee, as well as public statements in news conferences and speeches by General Schwartz, that the military requirement is 243.

You realize that your statement at 187 is contrary to the written statement and the opinion of the chief of Air Combat Command, General Corley?

General CARTWRIGHT. I realize that General Corley, and he and I have spoken about that, was speaking in terms of the two MTW construct.

Senator CHAMBLISS. And you realize that there is also a difference of opinion between the head of the National Guard, General Wyatt, and you with respect to the number that are needed?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do, after reading his comments in the paper today.

Senator CHAMBLISS. You also, I am sure, are aware the General Hawley, a former commander of Air Combat Command, says that not only are 243 needed, but 381 is the military requirement. Is that correct? Do you understand that?

General CARTWRIGHT. I understand that, and I am providing you with my best military advice.

Senator CHAMBLISS. And my point is that there is obviously disagreement in the military about what this number ought to be. Now every one of the individuals I mentioned—General Schwartz, General Corley, General Wyatt, General Hawley—base their opinion on studies that have been done. And as you and I well know, there are any number of studies that have been done over the years.

They base their opinion based on studies that have been done. Can you tell me one study that has been done that says that the military requirement is 187?

General CARTWRIGHT. Number one, we just finished an Air Force study that brings it in at the 187 level. But it does not look in isolation—

Senator CHAMBLISS. Has that been published?

General CARTWRIGHT.—at a single aircraft. It looks at the fleet of aircraft and our capability in addition to aircraft, to all of the other capabilities that the military brings forward.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Has that study been published?

General CARTWRIGHT. Let me go find out and provide it to you if it has not been provided.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. But that Air Force study would be contrary to the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force if that is the case.

In your news conference that you held back on April the 7th, you talked about movement toward UAVs, which I agree with. I think the UAV, the Predator and its counterparts are needed. We need to provide more of those. Is there any UAV in production today that has stealth capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that we would have to take that to a different forum, Senator.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Is there a UAV that has the capability of penetrating any theater where the sophisticated SAMs that are in the hands of any number of countries around the world today?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think we would have to take that to a classified forum, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Does the F-22 have that capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. It does, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. You also talk about that we need to move more quickly to the F-35. You mentioned the fact that in that April 7th news conference that the F-35 has had its problems and has been expensive. My understanding is that most of those problems are behind us at this point.

But you go on to say that with the F-35s that we are going to buy ahead of the final tests being concluded, that we are going to have to retrofit the F-35, and that is pretty common, is it not, to

have to retrofit a weapon system as different capabilities are found and different problems are found?

General CARTWRIGHT. I believe over half of the F-22 aircraft will have to be retrofitted.

Senator CHAMBLISS. And that is not unusual. If we did it with the F-15, the F-16, and we will have to do it with the F-35. Now how expensive is that F-35 going to be per copy?

General CARTWRIGHT. I would have to go back and get you exact numbers. I wouldn't want to give you a swag, sir. Let me provide that to you.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Can you tell us also, and you may have to look this up, but how expensive is that F-35 going to be once it is retrofitted?

General CARTWRIGHT. Again, I would have to—that would be a harder question because we don't know what issues we will find in fielding and test.

Senator CHAMBLISS. And again, you make my point, General. We have got a known quantity with the F-22. If you just divide the number of F-35s that we are going to procure by the dollars that have been requested by the Pentagon, the cost of the current F-35 is comparable to the cost of a current F-22.

We have a known quantity. We know that its capabilities are greater than the F-35, and it is a little mystifying to me why there seems to be continued opposition coming out of the Pentagon.

But I thank you for your comments, and again thank both of you for your service.

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Nelson?

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to both of you for your service and to your families for being here. We appreciate very much your continued service in new positions. I look forward to your confirmations.

General Cartwright, in response to the advance policy questions, you stated that one of the three challenges you would face and a continued goal as the Vice Chief is the emergence of cyber threats against private citizens, the commercial sector, and national security. You stated that in addressing this challenge, you would support the standup of the recently announced Cyber Command and the development of capabilities and protocols necessary to defend the Nation's interests and protect the rights that define our way of life under the Constitution.

Can you speak to the support that will be necessary for you to provide to STRATCOM in standing up this sub-unified command and how you can help and what kind of support would be necessary to encourage STRATCOM's role in addressing and developing the capabilities that are required in this subcommand.

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, as you say, the relationship, the command relationship, STRATCOM is the combatant command responsible for cyber. They will have a sub-unified commander—command, which we are calling right now Cyber Command, that will be responsible for the day-to-day work associated with cyber in all the areas that you just highlighted.

Senator BEN NELSON. Both offensive and defense?

General CARTWRIGHT. Both offensive and defense and will support STRATCOM, who will then integrate that capability across the broad range of capabilities of both the general purpose and strategic forces.

So STRATCOM's role is still very significant in this activity, but what we have now is somebody who is dedicated with all of the resources, the intelligence, the linguists, the technical expertise, and intellectual capital and equipment to be able to wage this war at the strategic level, at the operational level, and at the tactical level.

And that war is the defense of our networks both from a standpoint of national security and from a standpoint of our ability to do business, which is at the heart of what this cyber capability brings to this Nation, a global reach for its business and its engagement.

We have, through the auspices of STRATCOM, now significantly expanded the basic training for each of the services so that we can get what we will call cyber warriors into the system and start to grow them. We have expanded the schools at the technical level, the senior levels. In other words, we have done significant work in the structure of what it will take to support each of the combatant commands and what will have to be forward staged and what will have to be held back and how those forces get presented by each of the service cyber commands.

All of that work is ongoing. The next due out that we have is really from STRATCOM, which is an integrated roadmap of how this command will go to its initial operating capability and then to its final operating capability, the resources necessary and the capabilities that they must demonstrate before we are comfortable that they are ready to reach those stages. That is the next due out.

Senator BEN NELSON. And those resources will be made available because it is one thing to give the responsibility, another thing to give it with the resources in order to be able to achieve it.

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, if confirmed, I will work my best at that issue.

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, and as a former commander-in-chief of STRATCOM, in setting up a global command or going beyond a sub-unified command to a combatant command, if cyber is pulled from STRATCOM, how will the mission—how will the mission be integrated so that the two combatant commands are able to structurally work together?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, and you know this from my time at STRATCOM, but at each step of the way with this cyber capability that we are trying to build to defend the Nation, from its inception, we started—and there were those who wanted a stand-alone combatant command, some that wanted a sub-unified. We started with a functional component because we needed to crawl a little bit.

We are now moving to a sub-unified command, and it is because we believe we have matured in our understanding of what it is we need to be able to do. There is still more work to be done in that area.

My personal opinion on this is that a standalone, functional command that would be cyber only has the potential like what I believe

was a challenge for Space Command, that it would become disconnected from the warfighter and then would not be as readily integrated into the warfight and the scheme of maneuver and planning. And so, my position has been that I believe, at least until something fundamentally changes, it is most appropriate for this command to be at the sub-unified level and that STRATCOM offers us the venue to integrate it with general purpose forces.

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, I appreciate your thoughts in that regard. Without your background, I still share your conclusions.

Admiral, we spoke recently, and I appreciate very much your having come in. And the concerns that I have right now with North Korea are obvious because of the same concerns we all share. And we have also concluded that perhaps the best pressure point on North Korea can come from China, diplomatic and otherwise, to deal with North Korea's interests in continuing to terrorize the neighborhood and threaten globally.

In connection with what is going on in China today with the Uighurs and the turmoil and unrest that even brought President Hu Jintao back to China to try to provide leadership there, is China distracted to the point where we can't get their attention, in your opinion, to deal with North Korea now because they can't handle two issues at once?

I mean, that is sometimes very distracting to anyone. But it is particularly distracting to them right now.

Admiral WILLARD. I certainly—

Senator BEN NELSON. It is a tough question.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, it is. I can't account for President Hu and his ability to multitask. I think that China is a very complex country. Obviously, they have a great deal of influence that is growing regionally and internationally, and at the same time, they have internal pressures that are extraordinary, as illustrated I think in their most recent crisis internally.

We certainly see the need to leverage China, their leadership, their government in terms of influencing North Korea. And in the past, they have at times demonstrated that, more or less.

We believe that right now we are in a period where North Korea's provocations, as you suggest, are not in the region's interest, nor are they in the PRC's interest. And we believe that we are in a period of opportunity now where Chinese leadership can and should exert their influence, to the extent that they have it, over North Korean leadership in order to bring the current situation of provocations under control.

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, the Dear Leader is behaving like a young tot without the benefit of having a babysitter nearby. And one would hope that the PRC would focus on this and recognize that it is a threat not only to the near region, but on a broader basis in an intercontinental capacity as well.

So I would hope that we could get their attention and have it focused on that, and I hope in your new command, that will be part of what you can express in terms with the relationship that you will develop with the Chinese military. And we can perhaps deal with it as well at the State Department level, but I think the military certainly needs to be brought into the picture as well.

Admiral WILLARD. If confirmed, I look forward to sharing those views. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thanks to both of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

I just have a few additional questions.

Admiral, one of the most important missions assigned to the department is the responsibility to recover missing service members and to identify the remains that are recovered, and the principal agency involved in recovering and identifying those remains is the Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command, which is under the parent command, as you know, of the Pacific Command.

You indicated, I believe, in your answers that one of the recurring challenges for the Accounting Command is the shortage of scientific personnel to increase the number of identifications of remains that have already been recovered. And I am wondering if you could just briefly comment on that and whether you would support increasing the number of scientific personnel and whether that can be done fairly easily? Is that just a matter of resources, or are there other problems?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir.

There is a backlog, as you are aware, in terms of the scientific effort that is ongoing to identify remains that Accounting Command has, in fact, collected over time. It is currently our most advanced scientific endeavor, I believe, in the world in regard to identifying remains such as they are in their work.

And I think resourcing is part of this answer. I think being able to access that level of scientific expertise and the availability of scientists of that caliber to perform this nature of work is the other dimension. If confirmed, I will look forward to understanding fully the resourcing requirements for JPAC in order that they can advance this capability as far as we possibly can as a Nation and ensure that both our resourcing is communicated correctly, as well as the needs to be able to access the type of expertise that is so unique to this organization.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Well, thank you.

Just, of course, we would invite you to let the committee know of any shortfalls that we can make up for.

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. I would be happy to.

Chairman LEVIN. General, back to the F-22 for a moment. You have given us your view in terms of the requirement. Is that view shared by the—is your view shared by the Joint Chiefs?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. And was that issue the subject of significant discussion by the Joint Chiefs?

General CARTWRIGHT. It was. In the tank, we have gone through this several times.

Chairman LEVIN. You are going to make available the study that you made reference to, to the full committee. There was a second study that I referred to, I believe?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the one I referred to just now is the Air Force study, and we will get that.

Chairman LEVIN. There was a second study that I can't remember the exact name of, but—

General CARTWRIGHT. We will work with you to—

Chairman LEVIN. Joint Staff study? I think it was a Joint Staff study. If you could also make that available to us? Do we already have that study? Do we have it already? Yes, I don't think we have that. If you could dig that out for us, we would appreciate that as well.

General, on Monday, the Washington Post referred to an analysis of missile defense options for Europe, and that analysis was written by a Stanford physicist named Wilkening. The article said that in his analysis, which had been provided to the administration, that there are a number of options for missile defense in Europe that might provide a better missile defense, better defensive coverage of Europe against a potential long-range Iranian missile than the proposed deployment of a system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Are you familiar with that study?

General CARTWRIGHT. I am not familiar with that study, but I am familiar with a range of options that we believe have the potential to be more effective. But as I said earlier, the key here is to find the best options that give us both the regional defense and the defense of the homeland.

Chairman LEVIN. And in looking at that, are we keeping all of our options open? We are looking at all of the available—

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. I think we are in the neighborhood, I think, as I said, of over 40 options right now that we are starting to narrow down on.

Chairman LEVIN. General, Senator Lieberman and 14 members of this committee, including myself, wrote the President in May, urging him to declare higher end strength target levels for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police than the current target of 134,000 soldiers and 82,000 police personnel.

I understand that the Afghan police target has now been raised, but that the level—particularly I focus on the army—remains inadequate in terms of what I think most people believe the needs are going to be in Afghanistan for Afghan troops. I don't know why General Jones made the comment he did. That has already been explored. But I want to focus on the size of the Afghan army.

We had a brigadier general by the name of Larry Jacobson, who said the other day that the fact of the matter is we don't have enough Afghan forces and that we need more or he would like more, I guess, is his exact word in Helmand Province.

Is this a subject of major consideration and deliberation among the chiefs?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is, Senator. I think we all believe that there needs to be more Afghan, in particular Afghan National Army capability. We also believe, based on the assessments that we have done thus far, that there is the capacity to recruit and train more, particularly as we add the 4th of the 82nd to help us in the training throughput.

We have combined a current assessment that is ongoing of the Afghan national security force writ large with General McChrystal's assessment. And so, we expect that assessment to come in at the same time that General McChrystal delivers his assessment.

Chairman LEVIN. The McChrystal assessment is on our troop level and the Afghan national troop level?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. We have asked them to be combined.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. We have heard different arguments or positions about why we can't move faster. We have heard that the problem is the shortfall of Afghan leadership in the army. It is the training of those leaders. We have heard there is not enough mentors there yet. We have heard there is an equipment issue.

But I think everybody agrees that you have got in the Afghan army a motivated army. They are motivated against the enemy and are willing to undertake their own lives and put their own lives on the line.

This is not a question of a lack of motivation on the part of the Afghans. So we are all very anxious to do whatever we can to prod this issue along.

General CARTWRIGHT. Right. I think you are right, Senator. I mean, one thing we are not going to have to teach them how to do is fight. But we are going to have to work on command and control and organization and leadership. And so, building the NCO cadre, building the officer cadre is going to be part of the work, and we believe adding the 4th of the 82nd out there to do that work is going to help us get the throughput.

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, just one question about Pakistan. One of the things which has troubled me a great deal—let me start over. I think that in terms of recent events that the Pakistan army is showing a much greater willingness to take on the enemy for their own sake, not because we are asking them or we are paying them, but because from their national security perspective, it is in their interest.

I don't know how much that has been transmitted to the Pakistan people. I know it is transmitted through interviews in the London papers, but that is not the same as the president and the head of the army in Pakistan transmitting that to the Pakistani people themselves. And I am trying to find out the degree to which the statements that they have made recently reflect that or are made publicly in Pakistan.

But another thing which has troubled me is that is we are constantly criticized for the attacks by our UAVs inside Pakistan. I guess yesterday, the day before, we got a number of very high-level targets. There were civilian casualties, which obviously are to be minimized and regretted.

But when we knock out high-level targets, terrorist targets, Taliban targets that are out to destroy the government of Pakistan, the least we can expect, I believe, from the Pakistan government is silence. They politically don't have it inside themselves to tell the Pakistan people why we are doing it and that they are aware of it. They don't have that kind of political steel in their backbone. I have been in politics long enough to understand that. I don't condone it. I don't like it. But I at least can understand.

What I can't understand and do not accept is the attacks on us, the criticism on us, because what that does is undermine the effort. We are creating—they are creating, not us, every time they attack us as being foreign occupiers—or not occupiers, but foreigners at-

tacking their sovereign soil, they are creating another generation that are after us instead of after the terrorists.

And I just want to let you know I would welcome any comment that you might have. But I just want to let you know because you will have contacts with the Pakistani leadership. I have expressed this directly to their President, to the Chief of Staff of the Army. It affects my own view as to whether we should be providing support to Pakistan.

I can't tell you that—you know, I am willing to support the Pakistan government and to try to get them some economic where-withal to address all the issues they have got so that they are the ones that are supporting their people's needs. I am for that providing.

I believe that they have got the same goal we do, which at least their recent actions suggest they do, which is that it is in their security interest to go after the fanatics and the terrorists. I got that. And if that is real and is sustained, that is somewhat reassuring.

But what I don't have yet is assurance that their statements publicly, their rhetoric about the need for them to go after the terrorists serves their national interest. I am not sure that is done internally yet in terms of their rhetoric, and I sure as heck deeply object to their criticism of us for using attacks by UAVs, which they obviously acquiesce and condone and accept or else we wouldn't be doing them.

So, again, I know we also probably have a vote on, and I don't want to cut short an answer if you are just dying to give us an answer on this. [Laughter.]

But I don't need an answer. I would welcome it if you feel that you want to. But I just want to express that to you.

General CARTWRIGHT. I think just one short comment, Senator, because I think you have captured the issue.

But inside the military, our ability to work with our counterparts, at my level, I know my counterparts from school. But our lieutenant colonels and majors and captains don't because we had that hiatus. And so, bringing them back into our schools and building trust, which is what we are trying to do, will help us, I think, in the perception management here of what our role could be to assist them.

Every nation is proud, and I understand that, but every nation also can use friends. And we have got to work on this some way, but we have also got to have the help of the government, their central government to do that. They can undermine this in a way that is very damaging to both sides if we are not careful.

Chairman LEVIN. General, Admiral, thank you for your service. Thank you for being here today. Thank your families for us, those who are here within earshot, but those who aren't. Good luck to your son—

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN.—getting home. When is that due?

General CARTWRIGHT. Hopefully in the next 2 weeks.

Chairman LEVIN. Two weeks. Well, we know how much you are looking forward to it. And you can embrace him for all of us.

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, both.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the committee adjourned.]