

**Advance Policy Questions for**  
**Nominee Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for**  
**Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been successful in improving operational and warfighting effectiveness, and I do not see the need to modify that legislation.

**2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

I do not think modification is required.

**Relationships**

**3. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:**

**The Secretary of Defense**

At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD/SPC) advises the Secretary of Defense on the formulation of national security and defense policy, the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives, and strategy and policy on matters relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, and security cooperation. ASD/SPC also provides policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture and follow-on reviews, and annual program and budget reviews.

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above.

**The Under Secretaries**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Under Secretaries of Defense in support of the Secretary's objectives. Specifically, the ASD/SPC provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic activities, most notably relating to nuclear weapons and missile defense.

### **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with other Assistant Secretaries of Defense to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice on policy issues under consideration in the Department and provide policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance is implemented.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to provide support on matters that affect strategy, force planning and employment, nuclear weapons, and missile defense.

### **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Vice Chairman as described above.

### **The Service Secretaries**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning issues and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders.

### **The Service Chiefs**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning issues.

### **The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command**

At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons and missile defense.

### **The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command**

At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command in support of strategy development and execution and contingency planning.

### **The combatant commanders**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders, particularly in support of strategy development and execution, and steady-state and contingency planning.

### **The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency**

The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to provide the USD(P) with advice and recommendations on security cooperation issues to ensure alignment with defense strategy.

### **The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration**

The ASD/SPC works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on strategy and policy issues relating to nuclear weapons modernization and related issues.

### **Duties**

**The position for which you have been nominated has been substantially restructured.**

#### **4. What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned if you are confirmed?**

My understanding is that the ASD/SPC is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on formulation and coordination of national security and defense strategy, the forces and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy, U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense policy, and security cooperation plans and policies.

### **Qualifications**

#### **5. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

I have had more than 23 years of experience in a variety of positions as a career civil servant in the Departments of Defense and State, as a political appointee in DoD, and as a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton in many of the areas of responsibility assigned to the ASD/SPC. In my current capacity as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, I serve as the principal advisor to USD(P) and the Secretary on all policy matters pertaining to plans and force posture. During my 15-year tenure as a career civil servant in the Departments of Defense and State, I

helped develop the strategic basis for U.S. Defense strategy, including participating in the oversight of the Bottom-Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and I worked extensively on Presidential Decision Directive-56 on conducting complex contingency operations.

**6. What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to fulfill the responsibilities of this position?**

If confirmed, I would focus on the actions and relationships necessary to perform the duties of the ASD/SPC effectively. Nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy will need particular attention and, if confirmed, I would develop the relationships and knowledge needed to provide policy guidance in these critical areas.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

**7. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?**

Crafting strategic guidance, supporting programmatic options, and ensuring planning processes allow DoD to apply resources as efficiently as possible in an era of fiscal and strategic uncertainty will be challenging. It also will be a challenge to ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces meet policy and strategy requirements in a cost-effective manner.

**8. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, it would be my priority to ensure our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, and modernized in accordance with policy guidance. I also would work to publish strategic guidance that promulgates clear priorities and risk tradeoffs and infuse this guidance into processes and decision-making for throughout DoD.

**9. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of your responsibilities?**

I am concerned about implementing policies and strategies in a cost-efficient manner.

**10. If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems?**

If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) and the ASD/SPC staff to establish specific action plans and timelines and to identify and resolve problems relating to the ASD/SPC portfolio.

**Priorities**

**11. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for the office to which you have been nominated?**

If confirmed, my priorities for SPC would be to create a new fully integrated ASD component and to provide excellent policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary across my portfolio.

**Contingency Planning**

**One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy who is required to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.**

**12. What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?**

Civilian leadership is critical and a statutory responsibility in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. Civilian oversight takes our U.S. national security policies and establishes strategic ends and baseline assumptions for the military. The military uses those strategic ends and assumptions to guide its planning.

**13. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?**

In my experience, civilian leadership has the appropriate authorities and processes to provide effective oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning.

**14. What is your understanding and assessment of the capability and capacity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to provide comprehensive, objective and realistic joint analysis in support of formulating and evaluating strategy and operational plans and related force planning?**

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff maintain sufficient analytic capacity to support strategy and operational plan development, but this is an area that requires constant review for the DoD. The Department is reinvigorating aspects of our analysis capability through the Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA) process to represent innovative concepts more effectively and assess their impact on the dynamic security environment more fully. Both organizations work very closely with the Services and Combatant Commands to ensure that analysis informing senior DoD leadership decisions on force structure and force planning is both objective and realistic.

**15. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning?**

I believe our current processes and authorities support civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning. Discussions between civilian and military leadership are essential to the civilian oversight process. Existing processes ensure those discussions are taking place.

**Many Geographic Combatant Commands' contingency and operation plans are undergoing DOD review. These reviews are justified for a variety of reasons including geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities.**

**16. If confirmed, how would you determine whether the alterations to a contingency or operation plan are warranted due to geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities?**

The plans review process involves many stakeholders and several analytic steps to ensure plans are current, in terms of the geo-political dynamics and DoD capabilities, and are viable, resource-informed, and risk appropriate. If confirmed, I would leverage this process to ensure any change to planning is warranted and, then, ultimately approved by the Secretary.

**Major Challenges and Priorities**

**17. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?**

See my answer above.

**18. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

See my answer above.

**19. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?**

See my answer above.

**Strategic Reviews**

**20. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for each of the following strategic reviews?**

**The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of title 10, United States Code);**

**The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, United States Code);**

**Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, United States Code);**

**The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, United States Code).**

Each of these strategic reviews plays an important role in providing guidance to the entire Department of Defense to achieve the objectives outlined in the President's National Security Strategy. These reviews also help the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and DoD Components prioritize their efforts and resources collectively to meet the Department's objectives under changing security and fiscal circumstances. The final documents also serve to communicate the Department's priorities with other audiences, both at home and abroad.

At various points throughout my career, most recently in my position as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, I have had the opportunity to participate in the preparation and dissemination of these reviews. I have observed various approaches based on defined requirements, including the strategic environment, timing, and leadership preference. That said, I believe each review should be grounded in a rigorous analytical approach that incorporates candid feedback and advice from both military and civilian leadership. Our Nation's defense depends on these reviews to ensure the Department makes the best use of its available resources as we meet current and future national security challenges.

The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is to articulate the Nation's defense strategy in support of the President's National Security Strategy. Title 10 U.S.C. Section 118 tasks the Department with conducting a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. In my experience, the most effective QDRs incorporate inputs from a wide range of stakeholders, including interagency partners, and work to ensure the defense strategy guides U.S. military force structure, plans, and programs.

The Chairman prepares the National Military Strategy as a means to convey the military's views on strategic priorities and associated risks. The National Military Strategy, which the Chairman submits every two years to the respective Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate, is an important review that draws on guidance in both the National Security Strategy and the

most recent QDR. The National Military Strategy delineates the “ends, ways, and means” – in essence, the military’s objectives, strategic and operational missions to achieve those objectives, and the required capabilities to carry out the military’s missions. It also describes the strategic and operational risks associated with accomplishing the military’s strategy.

The Global Defense Posture review describes the operational orientation of the Department’s military personnel and facilities, and includes an assessment of changes to that posture based on the evolving security environment and strategic priorities outlined in other guidance documents, such as the QDR. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the primary authors of this strategic review document, which offers a comprehensive look at the Department’s posture overseas, new initiatives, and defense agreements. It also supports senior leaders in the Department to make future resource decisions based on operational needs.

Title 10 requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform and support such roles and missions, known as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM). In the QRM, the Department is required to identify the responsible office, agency, activity, or command for providing these core competencies and capabilities, and identify any gaps or unnecessary duplication.

**21. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change title 10, United States Code, that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?**

These reviews are an important tool for the Department. They offer the Department an opportunity to reassess and, if necessary, adjust the nation’s defense strategy, required capabilities, and force structure in alignment with current national security interests, the future security environment, and available resources. In a time of fiscal uncertainty, these documents are more essential than ever in ensuring that the Department takes a strategic approach to defending the Nation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure that these reviews serve the needs of both Defense leaders and the Congress.

**22. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve DOD’s processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above?**

Based on my experience, there are many ways to conduct these reviews, but I see three broad principles for successful strategic assessments, analyses, and reviews. First, senior leaders should provide clear initial guidance on the terms of reference for the review. Second, these same leaders should remain involved in the execution. Third, the process should be transparent to all relevant Department stakeholders, including leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and the Combatant Commands.



In addition to and in support of these broad principles, the Department requires a robust and ongoing analytical effort. To ensure this, if confirmed, I would prioritize engagement with the Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA) process, which is designed to inform senior Department leadership deliberations on defense strategy and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system (PPBES) matters. Along with CAPE and Joint Staff colleagues, I would actively use wargames to seek innovative approaches to address a range of challenges.

If confirmed, I would recommend that insights from previous reviews, along the lines of those described above, be applied to future Department reviews.

**The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President.**

**23. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's QDR analysis and decision making processes to address these two requirements?**

The Department's QDR process is both strategy-driven and resource-informed. The strategy-driven component ensures the Department considers the full range of strategic challenges and opportunities facing the Nation, then identifies the defense approach that best secures U.S. national interests. This leads to decisions on the best mix of capabilities in which the Department should invest. The reality of constrained resources requires the Department to consider investment options from a resource-informed point of view to ensure we develop a strategy that is executable. The complex and ever-changing strategic environment requires us to prioritize and make difficult choices, and the QDR provides strategic direction for doing so. Given the uncertainty about funding levels, the 2014 QDR explicitly considered the implications and risks to the Nation and our defense strategy if sequestration level cuts continued.

**24. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current or projected budget requests or fiscal environment?**

In my view, the defense strategy should be strategy-driven and resource-informed. Assessments of the future security environment and the military missions required to support the President's National Security Strategy should be unconstrained, but the defense strategy is only viable and executable if informed by anticipated levels of resourcing. A resource-unconstrained strategy could inadvertently mask risk since investment gaps would be inevitable between the unconstrained approach and which investments were actually funded. A resource-informed approach helps ensure coherence between what the Department should achieve, how it expects to achieve it, and the resources available to execute the strategy.

**According to the report of the bipartisan National Defense Panel, “the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review...clearly exceed the budget resources made available to the Department.”**

**25. Do you concur with this assessment? Do you believe it will be necessary to repeal sequestration in order to make available sufficient resources to execute the QDR strategy?**

The National Defense Panel (NDP) provides an important and valuable tool chartered by Congress to review the QDR independently. The Department worked closely with the NDP throughout the QDR process. I concur in the NDP’s strong concern that current and likely budget constraints are “dangerous and self-defeating,” and significantly impact the Department’s ability to do long-term force planning. I think it is notable that the bipartisan NDP supports the capabilities and capacities set forth in the QDR as appropriate. I also concur in the NDP’s assessment that sequestration, if reinstated, would prevent us from achieving the strategy outlined in the QDR. Our defense strategy cannot be executed at sequestration levels without significantly higher levels of casualties, attrition of equipment, extended timelines for mission accomplishment, and risk to mission success. If we return to sequestration level cuts in Fiscal Year 2016, we will face significant risks across the board, and would have to reassess our defense strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to help solve this pressing problem.

**According to the report of the bipartisan National Defense Panel, “national defense needs should drive national defense budgets, not the opposite.”**

**26. What aspects of a strategy would indicate that a strategy is budget-driven versus budget-informed?**

A budget-driven strategy would define ends, ways, and means based on analysis that starts with available resources, and contains little to no risk because, by definition, the strategy is designed to do only what can be done with available resources, regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests. A budget-informed strategy considers national interests and objectives, then assesses how to achieve those objectives given the strategic environment first, and then develops specific ways and means to try to meet desired ends, informed by the likely available resource levels. It would explicitly consider risks to the strategy that may result from the reality that resource levels are finite, and ensures that the Department sets priorities among its investments and activities -- a central function of an effective strategy. A successful strategy should be started with an unbounded evaluation of the strategic environment, but then would be budget informed to have relevance; a defense strategy is effective only if it is executable. For example, the defense budget request that was informed by and accompanied the QDR, the President’s Budget 2015 request, is \$15 billion higher than Budget Control Act funding caps for 2015, demonstrating that the current strategy is not budget driven.

**27. If sequestration remains in effect, do you believe that our strategy will have to be one that is budget-driven?**

Our strategy should be budget informed, but never budget driven. The Department has previously stated that at sequestration levels, it will not be able to achieve the strategy outlined in the QDR without unacceptable risk. If sequestration remains in effect, the Department will have to reassess its strategy. A revised strategy, like the QDR, should be budget informed if it will serve as a guide to prioritize and direct investments, but our strategy should not be a budget exercise. A budget-driven strategy, designed to do only what can be done with available resources regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests, is not the right strategy for our national defense.

**The National Defense Panel also recommended that “Congress should task the Department to do a thorough review to address in detail, without undue emphasis on budgetary constraints, how the Department would construct a force that meets the force sizing construct.”**

**28. Do you agree with the NDPs recommendation that such an assessment would provide the Department of Defense and Congress with a better understanding of our Armed Forces requirements?**

As part of QDR development, the Department develops a force sizing construct that meets future defense requirements. Rigorous analysis is central to this process. On this specific point, I do not agree with the NDP’s recommendation. The QDR is the product of a strategy-driven and resource-informed process. In conducting the 2014 QDR, the Department assessed the international security environment. This allowed the leadership to identify plausible strategic and operational futures that the United States could face in the near-, mid-, and long-term -- with particular attention to threats, challenges, and opportunities. Informed by this assessment, the senior leadership identified the objectives that the Department will likely need to be capable of accomplishing in support of U.S. national security interests and assessed the sufficiency and proficiency of the Joint Force to meet these demands. The results of these assessments guided development of the Department’s force planning construct.

**According to the force sizing construct in the 2014 QDR, American forces should be able to “defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of – or impose unacceptable costs on – another aggressor in another region.”**

**29. In the context of the recent and dramatic deterioration of the security environment in both the Middle East and Russia, as well as continuing instability in Asia, should the force sizing construct also mandate that American forces be able to defeat two adversaries at the same time, a standard embraced by previous QDRs?**

U.S. forces are still and will continue to be capable of prevailing in more than one conflict at the same time. The 2014 QDR envisioned an uncertain and complex security environment, and directed the Department to size and shape the Joint Force so that it would have the flexibility to respond to a wide range of challenges. Although the current force-sizing construct is a bit more

detailed in how we will build forces to prevail in any two conflicts in the unlikely event that they begin at the same time, in the end, our forces will prevail. The current force-sizing construct allows us to plan and deliver agile, technologically advanced forces of sufficient size to defend our Nation and secure our interests globally while preventing America's adversaries from achieving their objectives.

## **Global Force Posture**

**As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged in its ability to comprehensively and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense posture.**

### **30. What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas?**

The U.S. global defense posture is the most tangible expression of our interests abroad. To allies, partners, and adversaries alike, our posture demonstrates our ability to respond rapidly to developments that affect our national security. In some ways, it is easy to assess the costs of posturing forces overseas, but difficult to assess the benefits. Although difficult to quantify, there is real value in our posture, through which we deter aggression, safeguard regional stability, respond in a more timely fashion to contingencies, and facilitate close cooperation with our allies and partners.

Any evaluation of our posture requires the consideration of operational requirements, political-military dynamics, host nation support, effects on the force, and costs. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each region, operational demands, and costs. If confirmed, I would work to continue seeking new and innovative ways to posture U.S. forces in ways that leverage our strengths and advantages and to assess those costs.

### **31. In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department's planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United States?**

Any changes to our forces stationed abroad or within the United States must be decided through careful analysis of the operational requirements, political-military dynamics, host nation support, effects on the force, and costs. Each movement would be handled on an extensively vetted, case-by-case basis, as every military capability has unique characteristics, missions, and limitations that would influence the most beneficial placement.

**32. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?**

The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces. We look at a number of cost factors to evaluate the most efficient and effective stationing of U.S. forces, from host nation cost-sharing to rotational costs to base infrastructure costs to military construction costs. We combine this analysis with an accounting of the conditions in each region, the operational demands on U.S. forces, and the benefits of burdensharing with allies and partners who host our forces. If confirmed, I would work to ensure cost analysis remains a key decision criterion when evaluating where to station U.S. forces to ensure the most effective force posture.

**33. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD's methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States?**

If confirmed, I would work to ensure our cost methodology and assumptions leverage the most advantageous bilateral arrangements possible, and that planned expenditures on overseas basing are thoroughly reviewed to ensure investments are executable and efficient. If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize high-impact, limited-footprint methods and seek to build capacity among our allies and partners to provide for their security.

**On 12 November, the New York Times reported that "Tanks and other military vehicles [are] pouring over the border from Russia into eastern Ukraine" despite the ceasefire reached in September.**

**34. In the context of Russian aggression in eastern Europe, do you believe that the deterrence of further aggression will require the permanent stationing of additional U.S. or allied forces in eastern European nations?**

U.S. European Command, in close concert with our allies and partners, is evaluating how we can reassure and deter actors in the region. Going forward, adjustments to our European force structure will be considered, but we have to be cognizant of the need to balance limited fiscal resources and other global demands. In the end, our extensive diplomatic and operational commitments to NATO and European security, including any forces we station on the continent, all contribute to deterring further aggressive Russian actions. For example, at this year's NATO summit in Wales, members resolved to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. This multinational force will stand ready to deploy to NATO's periphery at a moment's notice.

Ultimately, the solution to the Ukraine conflict must be diplomatic in nature. Our defense posture plays a key role in the broader diplomatic push by sending a powerful signal to Russia; aggressive Russian actions have no place in a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.

**35. Do you believe that the deterrent effect of American ground forces will be greatest if they are stationed in NATO member states that share a border with Ukraine or Russia?**

Our force posture in U.S. European Command's area of responsibility (AOR) is prepared to respond to contingencies across the AOR. Although geography plays a role, we plan with the understanding that we can leverage our logistical capabilities to meet threats with speed and agility wherever they may come up in the region.

**36. What is your assessment of which American forces and capabilities have the greatest deterrent effect upon Russia and other aggressive actors in the region?**

It's difficult to point to a specific capability or force element that's best able to deter aggressive actions such as those by Russia. Rather, our posture aims to leverage the contributions of a wide range of forces and capabilities. We can best deter aggressive actions by demonstrating a credible capacity to operate in a variety of domains.

**The rebalance to the Pacific will increase the percentage of U.S. ships in the region from 50 percent to 60 percent of the Navy's entire fleet. However if the fleet size is reduced from about 300 ships to about 250 ships, the number of ships forward deployed to the region will remain the same at about 150.**

**37. Does the potential of increasing the percentage of ships in the region, but the number of ships in the region remaining the same, lead to challenges regarding the expectations of allies, and if so, how would you plan to mitigate such an effect?**

The Department is on-track to meet its goal of home-porting 60 percent of the Navy's fleet in the Pacific by 2020. Current Navy projections show that the fleet size in 2020 will be 308 ships, yielding roughly 170 ships home-ported in the Pacific. Additionally, the Navy also will increase ship presence in the region to about 67 ships, up from an average of 50 today.

Numbers alone cannot tell the entire story. Of equal importance, if not more importance, is the prioritization of our newest technology to the region. For example, the new ships home-ported in the Pacific represent the best of America's new naval technology. The addition of Littoral Combat Ships to the fleet enable us to engage with regional allies and partners in a range of new training and exercise activities that are in high demand. We will be replacing existing cruisers in the region with ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers, enhancing our deterrent posture towards the North Korean missile threat. We will also be stationing additional amphibious technology in the Pacific, along with new platforms like the P-8A and the F-35C that will provide more capability for missions unique to the Pacific theater.

If confirmed, I would work with colleagues in the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Pacific Command, and with regional allies and partners to ensure that we continue to make progress on these important initiatives, contributing to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moreover, the new Assistant Secretariat that I would lead will help the Department be more effective in ensuring the proper alignment of strategy and resources as we seek to modernize our alliances while mitigating risk should we face additional resource constraints and improve our security cooperation activities.

### **Stability Operations**

**DOD Strategic Guidance established in January 2012 states that, while U.S. forces will capture the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they “will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”**

#### **38. In your view, what are some of the key lessons learned from the stability operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

There are many lessons learned from our recent combat experiences, and the Services and the Joint Staff have worked hard to ensure that no lessons so painfully learned are lost. In 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an extensive study to identify these enduring lessons. The resulting report identified eleven strategic themes that remain relevant for the Department’s current operations and future planning. The most notable of these themes for me include understanding the environment, providing a public narrative, integrating special operations forces and general purpose forces, increasing interagency coordination, and the importance of host-nation partnering.

Our efforts abroad over the past decade also highlight the importance of collaborative interagency and coordinated multinational efforts. Training foreign security forces and ministries is a whole-of-government approach, and it takes a robust interagency effort to maintain those capacities and institutions that can educate, equip, and enable them for future missions.

#### **39. What do you believe is the proper role for the DOD in the planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies?**

DoD will be an essential part of the planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies. However, I believe DoD’s stability operations efforts must be in support of a comprehensive interagency and international response. We must ensure that all departments and agencies are operating under a common national strategic framework in support of achieving sustainable outcomes overseas and building long-lasting relationships with our international partners. In most cases, the U.S. military’s presence, force protection capabilities, and extensive logistical network can provide the backbone for successful stability operations. If confirmed, I would continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible for future operations.

### **Nuclear Posture Review**

**40. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)?**

The NPR established the key objectives that guide the Department's work on nuclear policy. If confirmed, I would be specifically engaged in almost all of the NPR's objectives in various roles and venues and would ensure that they remain a top priority for the Department of Defense.

**Nuclear Weapons Management**

**Since the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on a B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30, 2007, the Air Force has taken a number of significant steps to increase its attention, discipline, and expertise on nuclear weapons management.**

**41. If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are safe, secure and accounted for, and that the military services have established a high level of attention, discipline, and conduct of operations with respect to nuclear weapons?**

Secretary Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to reinforce and ensure senior leader accountability and bring together all the elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. This group, which consists of the leaders responsible for training, funding, fielding, and implementing the nuclear mission, will review the actions we are taking and the progress we are making in improving the health of our nuclear forces. If confirmed, I would support the office of the USD(P) as it fulfills oversight responsibilities as a member of the NDERG.

**The various reviews of the Air Force incident also exposed significant gaps in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the attention and expertise to deal with nuclear weapons issues.**

**42. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient attention to management of nuclear weapon matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense?**

Secretary Hagel said that the nuclear deterrent is "DoD's top priority. No other capability we have is more important." If confirmed, ensuring our nuclear forces are safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, and modernized in accordance with policy guidance would be my top priority.

**43. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient technical expertise in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to nuclear weapons?**



Nuclear technical expertise within OSD resides in multiple organizations. Many of OSD's staff positions include experts from the various Department of Energy laboratories, federally funded research and development centers, think tanks, and agencies in order to ensure expert analysis supports the OSD decision-making process. Within OSD Policy, technical expertise for nuclear deterrence resides in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy (NMD). NMD contains an analytical cell, which has been specifically tasked by USD(P) to provide the Secretary of Defense independent technical analyses on a range of nuclear issues. If confirmed, I would do everything I can to ensure that we retain this unique capability and continue to advocate for technical expertise across the Department.

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

**The Nuclear Weapons Council is intended to be the joint Department of Defense – Department of Energy management organization for nuclear weapons matters.**

#### **44. If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect to have relative to the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

The USD(P) is a voting member of the NWC. If confirmed, I would support Policy leadership, or represent Policy, on the NWC and in its subordinate bodies. If confirmed, I would ensure Policy continues to play an active role on the NWC as we steer the nuclear weapons and infrastructure modernization programs to completion.

### **Strategic Nuclear Programs**

**The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established, among other things, nuclear force structure parameters prior to negotiation of the New START Treaty.**

#### **45. If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force structure and planning?**

In support of the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I would manage OSD Policy's role in all nuclear force structure decisions and in nuclear planning, in accordance with the President's June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy.

### **New START Treaty Implementation**

**The New START Treaty entered into force in February of 2011, and establishes limits on the deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. The treaty allows the parties up to seven years to comply with the numerical limits of the treaty.**

**46. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing implementation of the New START Treaty?**

If confirmed, I would lead in development and coordination of DoD policies required to implement fully U.S. obligations under the New START Treaty. This includes supporting DoD Components as they plan, program, budget, and allocate resources necessary for New START Treaty implementation and compliance. Additionally, if confirmed, I would fully support the interagency process of assessing the Russian Federation's compliance with its obligations under the Treaty and addressing any compliance or implementation issues.

**Modernization of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise**

**A principal issue in the debate of the New START Treaty was ensuring that as we draw down the number of deployed nuclear warheads that we modernize our nuclear warhead production capability as well as their command and control systems and delivery platforms.**

**47. If confirmed what role do you expect to play in modernizing these three areas?**

If confirmed, I would ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces, and their supporting infrastructure and command and control, meet our policy and strategy requirements. We must ensure our current nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective so that our deterrent remains credible and our force remains combat-capable. I will support efforts to do these things in a cost-effective manner.

**48. Do you support the President's commitment to modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM**

Yes. I agree that retaining all three legs of the triad will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. Each leg of the Triad has advantages and characteristics that must be maintained, and each leg must be modernized as appropriate.

**49. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?**

I agree that maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent is a critical national security priority. The DoD works closely with the Department of Energy and the Administration to prioritize and align modernization efforts with funding realities, and, if confirmed, I would continue that cooperation.

**50. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?**

Whether further reductions below New START limits would be prudent to consider is dependent on a number of contextual factors: whether such reductions are negotiated with Russia, the exact nature and extent of the reductions proposed, and the impact of such reductions on our ability to implement the President's deterrence and employment strategies. I can envision prudent reductions that are negotiated, that are properly structured, and that enable us still to meet the President's policy, strategy, and planning guidance.

I support the President's goal to reduce global nuclear dangers and to take practical steps toward the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. These goals were articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which concluded that the United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with its need to deter adversaries, reassure Allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise so long as nuclear weapons exist.

I believe that we should make necessary investments in infrastructure modernization regardless of potential future nuclear weapon reductions. If confirmed, I would ensure that the stockpiles of deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads sustain the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, including our commitments to extend deterrence to our allies.

**51. Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?**

With regard to CMRR and UPF, I understand that the approach to replacing those facilities has been reviewed and that a more cost-effective way forward has been identified. If confirmed, I would support efforts to modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure in a cost-effective manner. With regard to the strategic hedge, if confirmed, I would ensure any proposed changes remain aligned with the vision and objectives as articulated in the NPR and the President's policy and employment guidance.

**52. The Congressional Budget Officer has estimated the 10 year cost of modernizing the nuclear enterprise at approximately \$355Bn, while approximately 5-6 percent of the annual DOD budget, this is still an incredible amount of money, with the following 10 years expected to rise further as the construction programs for the Ohio replacement submarine get underway. Do you believe we should be spending this sum of money and will you work to find cost savings in these programs?**

As the recent Nuclear Enterprise Reviews made clear, modernizing our nuclear forces is critically important to our Nation's security and, if confirmed, I would continue to support

funding sufficient to meet this critical national security requirement. The DoD works closely with the Department of Energy and the Administration to prioritize and align modernization efforts with funding realities, and I would continue that cooperation as we work toward cost-effective nuclear modernization.

## **Nuclear Policy**

### **53. Do you support the President's vision for a world without nuclear weapons?**

Yes, I believe we should continue to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, and take practical steps toward that long term objective. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter adversaries and guarantee that defense to U.S. allies.

### **54. Do you support the June 2013 nuclear Employment Strategy?**

Yes, I support the June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy.

### **55. Do you believe the United States should pursue further nuclear weapons reductions? Please explain why or why not.**

Yes, I believe we should pursue further negotiated, verifiable reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia that would enhance U.S. national security. Further reductions could achieve this in a number of ways. They could promote our non-proliferation objectives by demonstrating our commitment to meeting our NPT commitments. Such reductions also could enable us to maintain strategic stability at lower force levels. Reducing Russian nuclear forces reduces the number of nuclear weapons that can be targeted on the United States. Unfortunately, Russia has shown no interest in pursuing further negotiated reductions, and such reductions require a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment.

### **56. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.**

As part of the nuclear weapons employment guidance announced in June 2013, the President concluded that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. The President also announced the U.S. intent to seek negotiated cuts with Russia. Negotiated cuts, and their attendant verification provisions, provide transparency and predictability, and they reduce the number of weapons that can be employed against the United States. For these reasons, and in light of the current strategic environment, I believe negotiated reductions are more prudent than unilateral reductions at this time.

### **57. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to: (1) assure our allies; (2) discourage other**

**countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons; and (3) hedge against future threats and uncertainties?**

No, I do not. Our nuclear targeting requirements are highly classified. As we do not share them with our allies, these requirements have no effect on the extent to which our allies are assured. Similarly, as other countries do not know what our targeting requirements are, they cannot be encouraged to seek strategic equivalence because of them. Finally, nuclear targeting requirements alone do not directly affect our ability to hedge against future threats and uncertainties. Our technical and geopolitical hedge strategy does affect our ability to hedge.

### **Ballistic Missile Defense Review**

**In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress.**

**58. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?**

Yes. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) provided the broad policy framework shaping the Administration's missile defense activities. If confirmed, I would continue U.S. efforts to implement the policies, strategies, and priorities in the BMDR.

**59. If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities?**

If confirmed, I would be the lead assistant secretary in OSD Policy for missile defense, so I would therefore have a direct role in implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities as they pertain to both homeland defense and regional defense.

### **"Fly before You Buy" Approach to Missile Defense**

**The BMDR stated that the Department of Defense would follow a "fly before you buy" approach to new missile defense capabilities, by testing them adequately before deploying them.**

**60. Do you agree with the Defense Department's "fly before you buy" policy for missile defense that "before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets" to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable?**

Yes. We have an obligation to field capabilities that work against the threats they are designed to counter. Realistic testing before full-scale acquisition is essential to fielding systems the United States can rely on.

### **Regional Ballistic Missile Threats and Response**

**Iran and North Korea each has hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United States intends to pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in various regions.**

**61. Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region?**

I understand our current policy is to develop regional approaches to ballistic missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region that are tailored to the deterrence and defense requirements of each region. Because these regions vary considerably in the character of the ballistic missile threat, geography, and the defense relationships on which we are able to build cooperative missile defenses, I believe such approaches provide us the best option for managing our own high-demand, low-density ballistic missile defense forces and for developing ally and partner ballistic missile defense capacity in support of combatant commander requirements.

**62. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs?**

Ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships are an excellent example of the type of mobility we have built into our current inventory of ballistic missile defense capabilities to help us address the growing demand for regional missile defense systems. These multi-mission ships offer not only the ability to provide surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles, but also a ballistic missile defense capability in the form of the growing Standard Missile-3 family of interceptors. Additionally, the land-based version of the Aegis system we are fielding in Romania and Poland will add substantially to the NATO ballistic missile defense architecture.

**63. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities?**

I understand building international cooperation and seeking appropriate levels of burden sharing are key tenets of our regional ballistic missile defense policy. I also understand that over time we have developed substantive ballistic missile defense relationships with our allies and partners

in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia Pacific, which have led to significant advances in fielding our own capabilities as well as those of our allies and partners. I view continuing these partnerships as critical to developing effective security architectures that deter, and if necessary, defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Accordingly, if confirmed, I would promote strong bilateral and multilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation in these regions.

### **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

#### **64. If confirmed, what role will you play in any efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?**

Although my position would not have direct responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I would support the Administration's efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to accession to the CTBT.

### **Building Partnership Capacity Activities**

#### **65. What is the proper role for DOD in building the security capacity of foreign partners? What, if any, overlap is there with State Department? What steps, if any, should DOD take to reduce or eliminate overlap between DOD and State Department capacity building programs?**

DoD plays a key role in building the tactical and operational capacity of foreign military forces within the broader foreign policy lanes established by the State Department. DoD also builds capacity at the ministerial and institutional levels through its defense institution-building programs. DoD contributes irreplaceable value to this range of capacity-building work by drawing upon the unique subject matter expertise and experience of defense civilians and active duty and reserve component personnel.

The Department's work at these levels -- from the tactical to institutional -- should be closely coordinated with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that the United States pursues a balanced approach to broader security sector reform efforts and that partners are able to sustain any training and equipment provided. Additionally, implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 23, which calls for whole-of-government security sector planning, should help reduce any overlap between DoD and State Department capacity-building programs.

#### **66. With regard to security cooperation, what is the appropriate role for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and what should be the ASD's responsibilities on security cooperation relative to the Combatant Commands, the military departments, and others DOD organizations?**

The ASD/SPC should provide policy guidance to ensure the alignment of security cooperation activities and resources with the defense strategy. Once the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) develop plans to implement this guidance, the ASD/SPC should review them to ensure they are aligned with the strategy. The Military Departments and Services and other capability providers then allocate adequate resources to accomplish the security cooperation efforts identified in the GCCs' plans. To the extent that there may be shortfalls in DoD resources to execute plans, the ASD/SPC may develop recommendations for adjustments in investment portfolios. Finally, the Joint Staff serves a critical monitoring and communications role, providing assessments of security cooperation requirements and military advice on the effectiveness of DoD activities to the ASD/SPC to inform future policy guidance.

**Over the past decade, Congress has provided DOD with a number of authorities to build the capacity of partner nations.**

**67. How would you rate the effectiveness of these investments and what will you do, if confirmed, to ensure that these resources provide a return on investment in the future?**

The authorities provided to DoD over the last decade have been critical, especially for support of coalition partners. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that projects relying on DoD authorities have clear and measurable planned outcomes. I also would seek to ensure that authorities evolve to keep pace with the dynamic environment in which DoD operates, which is characterized by both rapidly changing threats and fluctuations in partner nation roles and capabilities.

Further, if confirmed, I would seek to enhance the Department's "capability package planning" - planning that organizes and synchronizes "train-and-equip" efforts with related security cooperation activities to account for partners' institutional, sustainment, training, and infrastructure needs. Such efforts will better position partners to sustain and properly employ any operational and tactical assistance provided.

**The latest Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes security cooperation as a means to mitigate risk resulting from DOD's declining budget.**

**68. In your view, has the Department increased funds for security cooperation, accordingly? Is security cooperation adequately resourced?**

The Fiscal Year 2015 budget submission sought to protect resources most closely aligned to the three pillars of the defense strategy outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, including building security globally. In order to maximize the impact of our presence globally and ensure that security cooperation resources and activities are aligned with the defense strategy, the Department recently created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation (SC). The office will develop institutionalized policies and methodologies for prioritizing and evaluating security cooperation activities and resources, mature defense institution-building capabilities and strengthen their linkages to the Department's operational training and equipping efforts, and use security cooperation tools to drive strategic initiatives.



**69. How effective has security cooperation been as a means of mitigating the risks associated with declining DOD budgets, and what challenges, if any, do you see with such an approach?**

The need to strengthen and deepen partnerships is a theme that runs throughout the 2014 QDR to address the dynamic security environment, as no country alone can address the globalized challenges we collectively face. With reduced force structure and resources, the Department must make greater efforts to coordinate its planning to optimize allies' and partners' contributions to their own security and to combined activities. I believe there is an opportunity to pursue greater deliberate security cooperation planning with key allies and partners and, if confirmed, I would seek to increase such efforts.

There are some who may be concerned that, when needed, partners may not be willing to contribute capabilities to help address shared security concerns. And certainly, we should continue to maintain forces sufficient to address most of the threat to our interests on our own, should we so choose. However, we have witnessed the benefits of partners' and allies' cooperation in coalition operations, clearly demonstrating their willingness to take action, and their cooperation invariably helps in conducting these operations and in most cases reduced the need for some U.S. forces.

**70. What is your assessment of the sufficiency of existing security assistance authorities to address the evolving nature of global security threats? Given the evolving threat environment facing the United States, what new security cooperation missions, if any, might DOD need to take on in the next decade, and what tools and authorities might be required to accomplish those missions?**

Over the past decade, Congress has recognized the need for Title 10 authorities to enable military commanders to support allies and partners in addressing security threats, largely related to counterterrorism and instability. The Department is grateful for these authorities that provide commanders greater flexibility than traditional Title 22 security assistance authorities to address the capability and capacity shortfalls that they identify among allies and partners to ensure that these partners are able to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces. As we face new budget realities, building partners capable of supporting or replacing Title 10 missions will take on increasing importance.

Just as the U.S. Armed Forces are resetting for full-spectrum operations after more than a decade of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (CT) operations, the Department's security cooperation efforts also must be reset to address the full spectrum of security challenges. Over the last decade we have emphasized building partners' capabilities to combat internal or transnational CT threats. Now, our security environment demands that we also consider other functional areas where commanders see a need to enable partners to operate with or in lieu of U.S. forces, but that have been under-resourced due, in part, to a lack of dedicated tools and authorities. Such areas may include logistics, maritime security and domain awareness, cyber, and defense technology protection/security, among others. If confirmed, I would work with

Congress to see how we might modify, rationalize, or add to the existing authorities in light of these changes in the security environment.

**71. Given the numerous existing DOD security assistance authorities, what is DOD doing to ensure DOD programs are synchronized and applied in a manner consistent with strategic requirements? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend?**

The Department has begun an effort to improve the security cooperation governance structure, which began with the establishment of Policy's new office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation. This office is undertaking an ambitious series of initiatives to put in place oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure our security cooperation activities and resources are aligned to the defense strategy, including the building of an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation mechanism across the Department's security cooperation programs to be much more effective in gauging the return on investment of our building partner capacity programs. If confirmed, I would ensure the office's efforts receive sufficient support and attention from the ASD and other Department leaders to succeed.

**Some of DOD's work to build our partners' capacity is at the tactical and operational levels.**

**72. What tools do we have in place to ensure that foreign partners possess the institutional capacity to sustain these efforts and operate effectively both to meet their own defense needs and in a coalition environment?**

The Department must ensure that adequate partner nation institutional capacity exists to sustain and properly employ the operational and tactical assistance we might provide. To that end, the Department has developed a suite of defense institution-building (DIB) programs to ensure partner nations have the capacity to craft thoughtful defense policies and strategies, create sustainable budgets to resource those strategies, provide human resources, and procure equipment and provide logistics support. DIB programs are principally implemented through the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) Program, and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS).

DIB programs are a critical and growing element of a balanced and comprehensive approach to security cooperation. To that end, the Department is developing initiatives to integrate more effectively security cooperation planning, linking the development of tactical and operational capabilities with the governance, direction, and oversight mechanisms needed to support those capabilities.

**73. How does the Department ensure that partners' militaries operate effectively, accountably, and in accordance with international human rights standards?**

The Department believes that the ethical and accountable behavior of our partner nation security forces is critical to our long-term success. When we engage with partner nation militaries, at all

levels, DoD emphasizes that respect for human rights and the rule of law is a vital component to a successful military. To assist partner nation militaries who wish to promote human rights and accountability, DoD has a number of programs that provide training on compliance with the law of armed conflict and human rights, developing military justice systems, and strengthening civilian control of the military.

The Department also is committed to compliance with what is commonly referred to as the Leahy law and is working closely with the Department of State to strengthen our implementation of the law to help ensure accountability for those who commit gross violations of human rights.

**The Global Security Contingency Fund is a joint DOD/State program designed to leverage the strengths of both Departments to conduct a wide array of security cooperation missions.**

**74. Why has it, to date, mostly been used for counter terrorism missions when Congress authorized a much wider mission set?**

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) projects selected to date represent priorities selected by the Departments of State and Defense to provide training and equipment to partner nations that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. It is a State Department-led authority meant to enable partners to address contingencies, and project proposals to enhance the special operations and CT capabilities of partner nations have historically competed well in the current security environment. More recently, in light of developments in Ukraine, the Departments of State and Defense have submitted a congressional notification for a capacity-building project there. Clearly, it has taken time to work out a governance mechanism to allow the GSCF -- which represents a new model of interagency cooperation -- to function as an agile and responsive policy tool; if confirmed, I would work with ASD(SO/LIC), who oversees the authority for the Department, to ensure that it continues to mature into a tool that truly enables partners to respond to urgent and emerging contingencies that affect U.S. national security objectives.

**The Global Train and Equip Program (or Section 1206) has been a DOD tool for a number of years with an annual budget of \$350M.**

**75. How would you assess the effectiveness of that program? As the Assistant Secretary responsible for security cooperation, do you envision any changes to that program?**

Overall, the Section 1206 “train-and-equip” program, overseen by the ASD(SO/LIC), has been effective in achieving the limited set of objectives for which it was designed: namely, providing tools to partner nations to bolster their near-term capabilities to address counterterrorism and stabilization priorities. It has achieved positive results in this area.

The effectiveness of the Section 1206 authority is best exemplified by the individual program assessments conducted by country teams, combatant command staffs, and our own contracted

personnel who provide a more detailed analysis of six to eight countries annually. In those reports, the Section 1206 authority shows a positive return on investment in nearly every country in which the United States has invested. For the countries where the return is not as great, the assessments help to identify where course corrections may be needed.

That said, it is important to underscore that Section 1206 was created with the intent of addressing near-term counterterrorism and stabilization priorities, rather than to build long-term partner capabilities. In order to maximize the return and longevity of our investments, the Department must continue to examine how to use Section 1206 in conjunction with other authorities to ensure that Section 1206 programs transition into sustainable capabilities. If confirmed, I would seek to enhance the Department's "capability package planning" -- planning that organizes and synchronizes train-and-equip efforts with related security cooperation activities to account for partners' institutional, sustainment, training, and infrastructure needs. Such efforts will better position partners to sustain and properly employ the operational and tactical assistance provided.

### **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation**

**The Department recently created Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Security Cooperation.**

#### **76. What is your understanding of this position?**

The Office of the DASD for Security Cooperation (ODASD(SC)) was established to prioritize Departmental focus on aligning security cooperation resources and activities with the defense strategy. Security cooperation activities of the Department, which include Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and Defense Institution Building (DIB), among other activities, play an important role in maintaining U.S. defense relationships and overseas presence, and building the capabilities of partner nations to act in coalition with or in lieu of U.S. military forces to address U.S. national security objectives. This latter role takes on increasing importance as defense budgets decline. ODASD(SC) will ensure that these valuable tools are employed to maximize strategic outcomes, continually prioritize and assess investments, and build enduring, reciprocal global partnerships.

#### **77. What is the relationship between the DASD for Security Cooperation and the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency?**

The DASD for Security Cooperation provides policy guidance on how to align security cooperation policies, authorities, resources, and activities in service to defense strategic objectives. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers security cooperation programs, provides procedural guidance to the broader security cooperation community on program implementation, and provides policy guidance on policies shaping the execution of security cooperation programs. As a result, the DASD SC focuses generally on the overarching architecture of DoD policies, processes, plans, and budgets that shape SC programming as a

means to achieve defense strategic ends, while DSCA's role is largely focused on executing current policies and processes to deliver security assistance and security cooperation programs to customers most effectively. The two offices will have to work in close collaboration to achieve security cooperation outcomes consistent with policy objectives.

**78. Does the DASD for Security Cooperation have management control of the Department's security cooperation programs? If so, what programs specifically? What major programs building capacity programs are not included in this portfolio?**

The DASD(SC) maintains direct oversight of a select number of security cooperation programs, primarily focusing on defense institution building (DIB). These programs include the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS), and Regional Centers for Security Studies.

The DASD(SC) also provides policy oversight over a series of programs administered by other, primarily military, components. Examples include, but are not limited to, the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) and the Developing Countries Combined Exchange Program (DCCEP).

As many of the Department's capacity-building programs address niche areas, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, the Department continues to rely on the expertise resident in the relevant functional offices to manage these programs. The DASD(SC) shapes the security cooperation governance architecture under which these programs function, however. Additionally, the DASD(SC) works closely with the State Department to support policy oversight of the Department's implementation of Title 22 authorities.

**79. In your view, what role should the DASD for Security Cooperation play with respect to security cooperation programs not directly under the DASD's management control?**

In general, ODASD(SC) is tasked with shaping a governance architecture to validate, prioritize, integrate, and assess security cooperation programs across the Department. Whether or not security cooperation programs are directly under the office's management control, it is critical that they be aligned with defense strategy, that they be linked together in ways that are mutually reinforcing, that they be evaluated to determine what is working and what is not, and that they obtain the greatest possible return on our investment. Shaping and overseeing processes to achieve these results is, in my view, the essential role of the ODASD(SC).

**Special Operations Forces**

**The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.**

**80. Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of special operations forces can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges?**

Yes. Given the threats we face, the unique military capabilities provided by our Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to be in high demand for the foreseeable future. We will continue to maintain our investment in SOF to preserve this strong capability to combat terrorism and confront other unconventional threats through direct action, indirect action, and building partner capacity. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD (SO/LIC), for SOF, the Service Chiefs, and the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the SOF community is appropriately sized to meet the full range of SOF missions.

**81. Special operations forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available to special operations forces when needed?**

Yes. In an environment of constraining resources and the drawdown of our forces in Afghanistan, the Department is reshaping and resizing our overall force structure aligned to our national security priorities. The Department will ensure that Special Operations Forces remain sufficiently supported by the general purpose forces, which currently provide SOF with intelligence, communications, logistics, and medical support. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD (SO/LIC), the Service Chiefs, the Joint Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to ensure the Department achieves the appropriate balance across the entire force.

**82. Do you believe special operations forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the general purpose forces?**

Our Special Operations Forces receive excellent support from the Services. Any organic enablers assigned to USSOCOM should be purposely designed for SOF-specific requirements, while the Services continue to provide SOF's enabler requirements. I believe this arrangement is most efficient in this fiscal environment by allowing USSOCOM to use their funding for SOF-specific capabilities and avoid duplication with the Services.

**Counterterrorism Partnership Fund**

**83. If confirmed, what role, if any, will you have in the development and implementation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund?**

The ASD/SPC would work through the DASD(SC) to issue policy guidance and develop governance processes to ensure security cooperation resources and activities are aligned to the

defense strategy. Additionally, the ASD/SPC, working through the DASD(SFD), is responsible for developing the defense strategy on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and recommending adjustments to the defense program in support of the strategy. Therefore, if confirmed, I expect that my role in implementation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) would be twofold. First, the office of the ASD/SPC would provide support to ASD(SO/LIC) in developing coherent, integrated, feasible implementation plans with detailed objectives, and would support institutional capacity-building aspects of these plans through defense institution-building programs managed by DASD(SC). Second, the office of the ASD/SPC would support ASD(SO/LIC) in teeing up decisions related to investments in enabling capabilities and resources for the joint force.

### **European Reassurance Initiative**

#### **84. If confirmed, what role, if any, will you have in the development and implementation of the European Reassurance Initiative?**

If confirmed, I expect to work closely with ASD(ISA) to institutionalize many of the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) program elements. I would reference changes to the European security environment in future strategy and global force management documents, assist in programming funds in future years' base budgets, assist in the allocation of forces to participate in exercises, training, and operations, and help secure the international agreements necessary to implement the ERI fully.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

#### **85. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

#### **86. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs?**

Yes.

**87. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

**88. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.