

STATEMENT OF  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARTIN R. STEELE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS,  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
BEFORE THE SENATE SEAPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE OF  
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
10 MARCH 1999  
CONCERNING REQUIREMENTS FOR  
21st CENTURY MARINE CORPS TACTICAL SEALIFT  
AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

## **OPENING REMARKS**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Marine Corps tactical sealift and tactical airlift requirements for the 21st century. Today, thanks to the support that you have provided, your Marine Corps continues to maintain a high state of readiness. Through your unflagging support, today's Marine Corps is the "versatile, fast moving, hard-hitting" force that the 82nd congress prescribed. Moreover, we remain "most ready when the nation generally is least ready." This would not be possible without your devoted support and leadership - your Marines thank you and I thank you.

During the course of my remarks this afternoon, I intend to address three areas. First, I want to discuss our vision of what conflict in the 21st century will look like. It is important to understand our vision of how and where future conflicts will occur in order to place into context the second area of discussion which is the Marine Corps' concepts for engagement and combat employment into the 21st century. These concepts, placed in context with our vision of the threat, will give rise to my third and perhaps most important area for today's hearing, the Marine Corps' equipment requirements necessary to support our engagement and employment concepts. Together, our concepts coupled with the material your support provides will ensure a Marine Corps which remains strong, capable and ready to answer our nation's 911 calls. Calls which are coming at an increasing rate and encompass an increasingly broad range of missions.

## **THE ENVIRONMENT**

I believe that it is important that I spend a few minutes relating our vision of the environment for conflict in the 21st century. Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world toward which our national security strategy had long been oriented, we have witnessed the beginning of a new era in world violence. The disintegration of the former Soviet

republics and Yugoslavia, the tragedies in Somalia and Rwanda, and the conflict in Liberia, all signify the trend toward nations splintering along ethnic, religious and tribal lines. This trend suggests not just crises between nations and within nations, but also a greater degree of general instability - - a time of asymmetry - - a time of chaos.

Our Commandant has noted, the threat of the early 21st century will not be the son of Desert Storm, but rather the stepchild of Chechnya. We believe our opponents will neither be doctrinaire nor predictable. Instead, they will seek to fight us where we are least able to bring our strength to bear. As seen in the August bombings of our east African embassies, they will not limit their aggression to our uniformed military. Further compounding the difficulty of the problem is the knowledge that future adversaries are certain to attempt to disrupt activities in our homeland. Today we are witnessing only the tip of the iceberg. Combined with the proliferation of high-tech weapons of mass destruction - - which further empower both third world nations and non-state entities - - this complex, dynamic, and asymmetric conflict might well be as lethal as a clash between superpowers. One thing is certain, this 21st century threat will be far more difficult to manage.

Much of this conflict and chaos in the 21st century will originate where the world's oceans meet its land masses, the littorals. People are the primary source of conflict and 70% of the world's population lives within 200 miles of the sea. 80% of the world's capitals are located within 300 miles of a coast. The urbanization of the littorals will be fed by an ever increasing world population (5.8 billion today; 7.5 billion by 2015 and 8.5 billion by 2025), a population which is moving from the rural to the urban environment. Today 45% of the world's population lives in the urban environment. By 2015 61% of the world's population will be city dwellers.

This environment will breed disease, vermin, malnutrition and overcrowding. It will apply an increasing strain on a city's ability to provide health, sanitation, water, sewage and other social services to its population. This environment will create a competition for resources. The competition will make the urbanized littorals ripe for conflict in the 21st century. The littoral regions of the world are chaotic today and will remain an area of challenges, tension and conflict far into the future.

Further complicating the conflict in the future will be a blurring of the spectrum of conflict and war. Our Commandant refers to a tactical vision of war where we see our Marines engaged simultaneously in warfighting, peace operations and humanitarian operations. These three activities will be conducted by the same Marines in close proximity in time and space. The three block war our Commandant refers to is the national security environment in which Marines currently operate and will continue to operate for the foreseeable future.

This is the environment we envision for the future. A multipolar world of state and non state actors competing for resources and against ideals that maintain a status quo. The competition will give rise to conflicts which blur current thinking about the spectrum of conflict and war. When US interests are at stake, we will engage and employ our forces to maintain order. Once engaged we are unavoidably targets of one side or another or perhaps even both. These foes will choose to attack us in places, both at home and abroad, and in manners which will make it difficult for us to bring our power to bear. If, as our current National Security Strategy indicates, managing this environment is important to the success of national policy, then we must place a premium on general purpose forces capable of rapidly responding to crises or potential crises anywhere in the world.

## **MARINE CORPS CONCEPTS**

The Marine Corps has developed comprehensive concepts to meet the challenges of conflict in the 21st century. Our Commandant has long argued we should not approach a defense transformation with a mindset that we are in a strategic pause - - a lull in great power competition that we can take advantage of by resting. In our view, the term strategic pause, implies we need to just stop, catch our breath, and prepare for the next competitor to emerge on the horizon. It implies we can cut our defense budget because near term threats are less stressing than in the past. It fosters the impression we can plan for the future by making a straight line projection from the past, and that the future national security challenges and wars will be much the same as we know them now. Finally, it fosters the impression we need only graft new technologies onto old operational concepts to extend our current military dominance into the future. We do not believe that we are in a strategic pause.

As I have already indicated, Marines believe that the threats to national security will be far different in the 21st century than they have been through our Cold War era. As the challenges are radically different, so must be the concepts to meet those challenges. Marines subscribe to the view we now face what Andrew S. Grove, President and CEO of Intel Corporation, refers to as a strategic Inflection Point. In his words, a strategic Inflection Point is a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are about to change. They are full-scale changes in the way business is conducted, so that simply adopting new technology or fighting the competition as you used to may be insufficient. In the business of national security, Marines are convinced all of the signs point to just such an impending change. Accordingly, we have developed full-scale changes in our concepts for the employment Marines which will meet national security threats of the 21st century in a thoughtful way.

**Operational Maneuver from the Sea** (OMFTS) is the Marine Corps capstone operational warfighting concept for the 21st century. It is applicable across the range of military operations, from major theater wars (MTWs) to smaller scale contingencies (SSCs).

OMFTS describes a new form of littoral power projection in which Marines will apply the tenets of maneuver warfare - - at the operational level of war - - in the context of naval operations. In OMFTS, naval forces focus on an operational objective using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against critical enemy vulnerabilities.

OMFTS offers the promise of extraordinary leaps in operational flexibility by introducing the notion of enhanced capabilities for sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control. Sea-basing facilitates maneuver style operations by allowing commanders to land at times and places of their choosing, eliminating the requirement for an operational pause as the landing force builds combat power ashore, and by freeing the commander from the constraints of the traditional beachhead and its iron mountain of support and supply which accompany amphibious operations - - that support and supply will now come from the relative safety of sea-basing.

**Ship-to-Objective Maneuver** (STOM) provides for the tactical implementation of OMFTS by describing the applications of the tenets of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations at the tactical level of war. STOM builds upon many of the themes introduced in OMFTS: use of the sea as maneuver space, elimination of the requirement for a traditional beachhead, and sea-basing. The principal gain accrued from not stopping at the beach is the ability to retain the initiative and surprise inherent in an attack from the sea.

Departing from the traditional, linear form of amphibious operations practiced during most of this century, STOM envisions naval operations in which both surface and vertical lift combined arms teams commence their attacks from over the horizon, pass over the beach and proceed

directly to their assigned objectives. The concept calls for exploitation of navigation and situational awareness capabilities provided by new technologies to allow tactical commanders to command and control the maneuver of their units beginning at the moment they cross the line of departure at sea, instead of once they arrive at the beach. This aspect allows the commander to change littoral penetration points during the assault and use supporting arms to facilitate the attack.

Service and joint wargames have consistently validated the STOM concept, showing that tactical commanders who take advantage of the much greater maneuver space the sea provides can dictate operational tempo and attack enemy forces at times or from directions that put those forces at a significant disadvantage.

**Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)) (2010 and Beyond)** is the concept which describes how next generation MPFs will contribute to forward presence and power projection critical to supporting our National Security Strategy and meeting the emerging threats. It is best illustrated through its five pillars:

First, **force closure**: MPF Future force closure will provide for the at sea arrival and assembly of the MPF, eliminating the requirement for access to secure ports and airfields. Marines will deploy via a combination of surface mobility means and strategic, theater, and tactical airlift - - including the MV-22 - - to meet MPF ships while they are underway and enroute to objective areas.

Second, **amphibious task force (ATF) integration**: Through ATF integration, MPF Future will participate in OMFTS by using selected offload capabilities to reinforce the assault echelon of an ATF from over the horizon. While future maritime prepositioning ship will not

have a forced entry capability, they will possess the versatility to reinforce the striking power of an ATF.

Next, **indefinite sustainment**: MPF Future will provide for indefinite sustainment by serving as a sea-based conduit for logistics support. This support will flow from bases located in the US or overseas, then onto Marine units conducting operations ashore or at sea. This might be accomplished as part of a larger sea-based logistics effort which would include not only maritime prepositioning ships, but also aviation logistics support ships, hospital ships, and offshore petroleum distribution systems.

Forth, **reconstitution and redeployment**: Upon mission completion, MPF Future will conduct in-theater reconstitution and redeployment, without a requirement for extensive material maintenance or replenishment at a strategic sustainment base. This ability to rapidly reconstitute the MPF will allow for immediate employment in follow on missions.

Last, **force protection**: MPF Future provides for unparalleled force protection. Exploiting the sea as maneuver space, the dispersed, mobile MPF complicates the enemy's targeting process and takes advantage of extended stand-off ranges. This is important as enemy combatants become increasingly more effectively at acquiring and defeating incoming threats. A medium for the movement for the MPF, the sea also serves as a barrier to terrorists or special operations forces.

These concepts, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, and MPF Future offer a clear vision for seapower's answer to the chaos we will find in the littorals in the 21st century. These concepts together with our forward deployed - forward stationed nature and the equipment necessary to execute them, which I will address next, will ensure our NCA has

a naval force capable of unilateral action; one which has the ability to project power ashore in any theater without forward bases, and in the face of armed opposition.

## **MARINE CORPS TACTICAL SEALIFT AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS**

Concepts alone will not ensure our success. These concepts executed by well trained, well motivated and well equipped Marines guarantee our success. We can provide the first two elements of this equation. I ask your support in providing the third.

### **3.0 MEB Vs 2.5 MEB**

Amphibious forces are the Nation's most flexible and adaptive combined arms crisis response capability. They provide the NCA its only self-sustainable forcible entry capability. The requirement for an amphibious force structure which supports sealift for 3.0 MEBs, as originally stated in the DoN lift study and Mobility Requirements Study (stated in MEBs because that was the unit of measure at the time of the study [there are five categories of lift which make up a MEB = 13,100 **troops** + 300,000 **square feet of vehicles** + 560,00 **cubic feet of cargo** + 175 **vertical take off and landing spots** + 24 **LCAC spots**] and later in the Quadrennial Defense Review) remains a priority. Currently, amphibious force requirements are fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEBs or 12 ARGs. Amphibious capacity has declined from 55 ships in FY93 to 40 ships in FY98. Currently, we can lift only 2.07 MEBs worth of vehicles with active sealift. The Amphibious Lift Enhancement Plan (ALEP) to retain 2 LSTs in the Naval Reserve Fleet and 4 LSTs/5 LKAs in mothballs is not a very good solution to sealift requirements. Time constraints, 180 days to prepare mothballed ships to get underway, preclude them from participating in either MTW OPLAN, and, in the unlikely event the ships do become available, their characteristics will be inconsistent with the OMFTS concept outlined earlier.

Current fiscally constrained amphibious ship procurement/modernization plans result in an active sealift capable of lifting 2.5 MEBs or to form the 12 ARGs necessary to maintain our forward presence posture. By FY09 plans call for the delivery of the last of 12 LPD 17s. The amphibious fleet will then consist of 36 ships: 12 big decks (7 LHD/5 LHA) the 12 LPD 17s mentioned earlier and 12 LSD41/49s. Though fewer ships than currently in the amphibious fleet, procurement of more capable ships and modernization of the older ones equals more capability to the NCA (see chart attachment 1). The Marine Corps is satisfied with this fiscally constrained approach as long as funding is not cut, reduced, or delayed. In the absence of amphibious lift, shortfalls from the 3.0 warfighting requirement will continue to have be made up by commercial shipping. We continue to study our amphibious lift requirements in such studies as the ongoing Mobility Requirements Study 2005 which is due to report out in December 1999.

### **LPD 17**

Key to the procurement plan is your continued support for the San Antonio class ships, the LPD 17s. The operational flexibility of our ARGs will be significantly enhanced with the FY03 delivery of the first two of 12 LPD 17 landing assault ships to be procured between FY96 and FY04. The San Antonio class will be the first designed, from the keel up, to execute our OMFTS and STOM concepts. As a class, these ships will overcome amphibious lift shortfalls caused by the decommissioning of aging LPDs, LSTs, LKAs and LSDs. Each 25,000 ton ship will provide a large lift capacity for the rapid buildup ashore and sustainment of the force from a secure sea-base. These ships will augment the versatility of the LHD and LHA helicopter carriers with well deck and flight operations capability. Individually, these ships will carry 720 Marines, have a vehicle stowage capacity of 25,000 square feet, a well deck sized for two Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), and a flight deck for the simultaneous operation of two CH-53E Super

Stallions, two MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft or four CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. The ship will be outfitted with a Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system for self-defense and will incorporate design features which present a significantly reduced radar cross section compared to contemporary amphibious ships. The lead contract has been awarded to Avondale industries with initial deliveries scheduled for FY03.

\$954 million has been appropriated for the lead ship. The total price tag for the 12 LPD-17s is estimated at \$9.8 billion. Maintaining the projected procurement and delivery schedules (see fact sheet attachment 2) and attaining operational readiness of this ship class is key to eradicating existing shortfalls in amphibious lift. Ensuring that the ship maintains a robust self-defense capability as threat systems evolve is key to survivability in the littoral environment where the ship will fight.

### **LHA SLEP Vs LHD**

As noted earlier, 12 big deck assault ships, LHAs and LHDs, are critical to maintain our 12 ARG capability which support our schedule of planned deployments. 12 ARGs are essential to meeting the nation's forward presence requirements. Big decks provide 60% of the ARGs troop berthing capacity, 72% of the ARGs cargo carrying capacity, and 93% of the ARGs aircraft carrying capacity, and are the centerpiece of the ARG. We face serious challenges in maintaining 12 big decks after 2011. The LHA class ship reaches the end of its 35 year service life between 2011 and 2015. Options to maintain this capability beyond 2015 are; execute a service life extension program (SLEP) on all five ships; build more LHDs modified with cost-effective enhancements to replace the LHAs, or build a new class ship to replace the LHAs.

LHA class ships should be decommissioned at the end of their planned service. Designed for older lighter CH-46 helicopters and M-60 tanks, and possessing limited LCAC carrying

capability, the ship class is unable to accommodate planned growth in equipment and technology. The large expenditure required to nominally extend the ship's service life, coupled with the ship's limited growth potential, make LHA SLEP a bad investment.

The Congressional Plus Up in FY99 for LHD-8 was greatly appreciated and has aided us in funding LHD-8 in FY04 and FY05. Buying new LHDs is the best way to take advantage of technology to transition to LH(X) which will best accommodate leaps in technology and expansion of equipment.

An LHA replacement Development of Options Study (DOS), sponsored by N85 and conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), is currently in progress (Oct. 98 - Jun. 99). This study will provide an assessment of the LHA replacement options to meet the projected operational requirements. The results of this study will be incorporated into POM 02 planning.

#### **MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (ENHANCEMENT) (MPF (E))**

The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) remains a cost effective, proven, and relevant capability for use in responding to overseas crises. It is consistent with OMFTS and STOM, and it significantly increases responsiveness to contingencies and improves operational flexibility for combat, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance operations. The MPF (Enhancement) (MPF(E)) will sharply improve our capabilities by adding heavy engineer support equipment, fleet hospitals, and expeditionary airfields (EAF) set. The MPF (E) program adds three ships funded in the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF). Congress appropriated \$110M in FY 95 for conversion of one ship and \$250M in FY 97 for conversion of two additional ships. In FY 99, Congress rescinded \$65M and directed use of the remaining funds for the first two ships.

Our first ship, USNS MARTIN, was funded at \$116M (\$110M FY 95 funds plus \$6M FY 97 funds). The Military Sealift Command (MSC) awarded the contract to Tarago Shipholding

Corporation on 14 February 97. Delivery of the Martin is projected for July 99. Progress is on schedule. Modifications for \$6M to carry ammo in climate controlled spaces will be accomplished after delivery. We estimate the ship will be available to load and join Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON) 1 in November 00.

Our second ship, USNS WHEAT, was funded at \$179M (amount remaining from FY 97 funds less \$65M rescinded by Congress and \$6M moved to Ship 1.) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) awarded the contract to Ocean Marine Navigation Company (OMNC) of Annapolis, MD, on 9 April 97. On 19 October 98, the contract was transferred to Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Company (Bender) of Mobile, Alabama. Delivery is required in first quarter FY 01 to match the completion of MPSRON 2 Maintenance Cycle.

Currently unfunded, our third ship needs your help. Congress rescinded \$65M and directed that remaining funds be applied to completion of our first two ships. On 26 June 98, the Navy, with CMC approval, canceled the solicitation for the third ship due to insufficient funds. The requirement for three ships remains. We are currently examining all sources of potential funding. We prefer to obtain a new construction, LMSR and complete the necessary modifications to meet MPF(E) requirements or modify currently leased AMSEA ships to meet our needs. Other options involve either converting commercial vessels or long term leases. Congressional language, however, prohibits new long-term leases.

MPF is a proven capability. It is key to our ability to rapidly close the force on a crisis and then sustain operations once engaged. I ask your support for providing the third MPF (E) ship which, if history is a guide, is certain to provide dividends immediately upon being placed into service.

**OMFTS MOBILITY TRIAD LCAC, MV-22 & AAV**

The OMFTS concept involves the marriage between maneuver and naval warfare. It will couple doctrine with technological advancements in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses across the spectrum of conflict. Three items of equipment will be key in making this concept a reality - - a mobility triad if you will.

The first is the **Landing Craft Air Cushion** or LCAC. LCAC was the first component of the triad to enter the fleet in 1986. The LCAC provides lift for 95% of Marine Corps vehicles and heavy weapons. It has proven to be a workhorse, carrying equipment from ship to shore at speeds up to 40 knots and proving capable of crossing a wide range of beaches not accessible to other landing craft. However, it is a tired workhorse. LCAC was designed for a 20 year service life. Unanticipated corrosion problems are reducing service life to approximately the 15 year mark. Furthermore, we believe it is not fiscally responsible to support LCAC's deteriorating electronics suite. To keep the LCAC fleet operational through FY14, the craft must undergo an extensive SLEP.

There have been a total of 91 LCAC built through September 99. 60 are necessary for the fiscally constrained 2.5 MEB lift requirement. 12 are set aside for training. Two serve as replacement craft with 17 placed in a non operational status. The most immediate problem facing the LCAC fleet is the corrosion problem. SLEP Phase I Corrosion abatement costs of \$3.9M per LCAC are required to sustain the craft for further improvements in Phase II. Phase II improvements include replacement of the LCAC's hull and an upgrade of its electronics suite. When complete, these SLEP Phase II improvements will extend the LCAC's life to 30 years and cost \$10.8M per LCAC.

The **Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)** will join the LCAC and the MV-22 as an integral component of the amphibious mobility triad required to execute OMFTS. The AAAV will allow naval expeditionary forces to eliminate the battlefield mobility gap and, for the first time in the history of naval warfare, to maneuver ashore in a single seamless stroke giving both ship and landing forces sufficient sea space for maneuver, surprise and protection. The AAAV's unique combination of offensive firepower, armor, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, and high speed mobility on land and sea represent major breakthroughs in the ability of naval expeditionary forces to avoid an enemy's strengths and exploit its weaknesses. The AAAV remains the Marine Corps number one ground acquisition program. The Marine Corps plans to buy 1,013 systems with initial operating capability in FY06.

The final leg in our mobility triad is the MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft. MV-22 specific missions include assault support, medium cargo lift, and fleet logistics support. The MV-22's design incorporates the advanced but mature technologies of composite materials, fly-by-wire flight controls, digital cockpits, airfoil design, and manufacturing. The MV-22 is capable of carrying 24 combat equipped Marines or a 10,000 pound external load. It also has a strategic self-deploying capability with a 2,100 nautical mile range with a single aerial refueling. The MV-22 will be the cornerstone of Marine Corps assault support possessing the speed, endurance and survivability needed to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. This combat multiplier represents a quantum improvement in strategic mobility and tactical flexibility for amphibious and prepositioned maritime forces.

The MV-22 will not reach its full operational capability until FY14, stretching the life of its weary predecessors, CH-46 and CH-53D aircraft, another 15 years. The MV-22 procurement schedule has been accelerated to 30 aircraft per year starting in FY03. However, this adjusted

schedule still fails to replace the aging CH-46 and CH-53D helicopters before they are no longer economically maintainable or before they encounter possible safety of flight problems. This 30 aircraft per year plan also fails to achieve the production economies which would result from a higher procurement rate. A procurement rate of 36 aircraft per year would allow us to achieve those economies and full operational capability approximately two years earlier.

I ask your support in maintaining, and where indicated, improving the funding for the mobility triad which will make OMFTS a reality.

### **TACTICAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS**

With regard to tactical airlift requirements in addition to the MV-22, which I have addressed under our OMFTS mobility triad, I would like to discuss our CH-53E and KC-130J programs. The **CH-53E SLEP** is planned and funded through the Future Years Defense Plan to enable this heavy lift aircraft to service the fleet into 2025. The CH-53 is an essential component to supporting the OMFTS concept and your continued support for this SLEP program is appreciated.

The **KC-130** provides both fixed-wing and helicopter tactical in-flight refueling, rapid ground refueling of aircraft or tactical vehicles; assault air transport of air landed or air delivered personnel, supplies and equipment; command and control augmentation; pathfinder; battlefield illumination; tactical aeromedical evacuation; and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) support. This force multiplier is well suited to the mission needs of forward deployed Marine units called for in OMFTS. The **KC-130J** tanker, with its increased range and speed, night vision systems compatible lighting, and improved air refueling system will provide the Marine Corps with state of the art refueling/transport necessary to support operations in the more challenging environments we face now and in the future.

The KC-130 Service Life Assessment Program center wing fatigue life data indicates that a KC-130 shortfall (15 aircraft) may occur as early as 2001 unless action is taken to replace or repair these aircraft. By 2009, all active KC-130Fs and Rs (49 aircraft, average age 37 and 22 years respectively) are projected to exceed 125% of Fatigue Life Expended. Continued procurement of modern KC-130Js is needed to replace these aircraft. Thanks to congressional support during FY97 through FY99, we have five KC-130Js on contract with initial delivery slated for late FY00 and hope to have another two on contract in April 1999. As part of the administration's topline increase, an additional two KC-130Js have been programmed, one in FY03 and one in FY05. The Marine Corps desires to fund the KC-130J in FY01 and continue annual procurement to replace our aged fleet of KC-130s. Greater reliability and maintainability, coupled with lower operating and support costs, will result in lower life cycle costs for the KC-130J.

## **CONCLUSION**

Our Commandant has provided us with a clear vision of the challenges 21st century conflicts will present. The equipment we procure must support the new operational concepts that are focused on winning in the 21st century battlefield environment. The cornerstone of tomorrow's Marine Corps doctrine, OMFTS, is one such concept. But turning this concept into operational reality cannot happen without the equipment that I have discussed with you today. We will continue to provide innovative concepts to meet the nation's security needs. We will continue to provide the well motivated, well trained Marines to execute these concepts. We rely on the support of the Congress to give these magnificent men and women the equipment necessary to ensure decisive victory and to protect and sustain them once engaged.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of your Marines and our Commandant, I thank you for permitting me to address you here today and for the steadfast faith you place in us.

## AMPHIBIOUS LIFT FACT SHEET

- Amphibious force structure of 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) equivalents of amphibious lift required for warfighting and forward presence. Requirement based on DoN Lift Study mid-threat scenario/CINC requirement to maintain continuous presence in European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) Areas of Responsibility (AORs).
- Amphibious force structure is fiscally constrained to 2.5 MEBs/12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) as per the 1996-2000 Defense Planning Guidance.
- A MEB (measured by the five “fingerprints” of amphibious lift) consist of 13,100 troops, 300,000 square feet of vehicles, 560,000 cubic feet of cargo, 175 vertical take off and landing spots, and 24 Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) spots.
- An ARG consists of 3 ships: 1 Big Deck (LHA/LHD), 1 LPD, and 1 LSD.
- Active ship lift projection (MEBs) for 1999 through 2009 provided:

Active Ship Lift Projections (MEBs)					
Year	Troops	Vehicles	Cargo	VTOL	LCAC
1999	2.63	2.07	3.49	2.99	3.38
2000	2.63	2.07	3.49	2.99	3.38
2001	2.75	2.14	3.72	3.25	3.50
2002	2.81	2.22	3.78	3.29	3.58
2003	2.80	2.27	3.78	3.30	3.63
2004	2.80	2.31	3.77	3.31	3.67
2005	2.77	2.35	3.76	3.33	3.67
2006	2.71	2.37	3.74	3.35	3.63
2007	2.67	2.42	3.73	3.38	3.71
2008	2.64	2.45	3.72	3.40	3.71
2009	2.63	2.50	3.71	3.41	3.75

