

Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Peter Pace

Defense Reforms

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your assignment as the Director for Operations, J-3, the Joint Staff.

Question: Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

Answer: The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 put us on a fast track to a more capable, integrated military. Today, the impact of this legislation is evident all across the force. Goldwater-Nichols changed the way we train and educate our officers; altered the manner in which we validate requirements and manage procurement; and improved the effectiveness of our joint forces. The legislation reaffirmed and strengthened the authority of civilian control over the armed forces while at the same time charging the combatant commander with clear responsibility for accomplishing his mission. Command and control of joint forces from the National Command Authorities through the combatant commander have been battle tested. Goldwater-Nichols reforms are firmly in place and have improved military operations by the U.S. Armed Forces.

Question: What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

Answer: One of the most important aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms is the concept of combatant command, or the expansion of the CINC's authority over forces assigned to his Area of Responsibility (AOR). Second, and closely related to the first point, is the establishment of a direct chain of command between the National Command Authorities and the CINC. Placing all forces assigned to a contingency under one commander -- the CINC -- and directing that he receive his orders from the NCA, as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, eliminated much of the confusion and competing command and service influences that existed in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era.

The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Question: Do you agree with these goals?

Answer: Yes.

Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.

Question: Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

Answer: At this time, I do not see the need for changes to Goldwater-Nichols.

Question: From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, particularly as Director for Operations of the Joint Staff, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders is appropriate?

Answer: Yes. Combatant commanders have the authority to organize and employ forces, assign missions and tasks, and direct all aspects of military operations, subject to direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By giving the combatant commander a direct line in the chain of command to the National Command Authorities (NCA), the CINC is empowered with authority commensurate with his responsibilities.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command.

Question: Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command to the following offices:

The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Answer: There is no command relationship between the Under Secretaries of Defense and Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the CINC. Under Secretaries of Defense and Assistant Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components such as combatant commands.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Answer: The Chairman is not in the chain of command from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the CINC and has no command authority over the combatant commander. However, the Chairman is the principal active-duty military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense and a key conduit between the CINC, the Interagency, and the Service Chiefs. Communications to the combatant commanders from the President or the Secretary of Defense are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINC has the obligation to promptly inform the Secretary of Defense on accountable matters and as a matter of course, should keep the Chairman and his staff advised of critical issues that affect his unified combatant command.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Answer: The Vice Chairman serves as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board – both key elements in the DOD procurement cycle. Accordingly, the CINC must ensure his prioritized requirements are clearly conveyed to the Vice Chairman. USSOUTHCOM submits its requirements through the formal process that includes the JROC members' periodic visits to the Unified Commands. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman's duties in the latter's absence, USCINCSO's relationship is as if the Vice were the Chairman.

The Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Answer: The Assistant to the Chairman is the Chairman's primary representative to the interagency community in Washington, D.C. and, therefore, a key individual in representing the CINC's concerns. The Assistant to the Chairman may consult directly with the combatant commander on interagency issues.

The Director of the Joint Staff

Answer: The Director and the Joint Staff support the Chairman in his duties to provide military advice to the NCA and communicate NCA decisions to the combatant commanders.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Answer: The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

Answer: As advisors to the Chairman and the NCA and as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services, the Service Chiefs play a critically important role in shaping and transforming their Services' force structure and capabilities – an issue of high interest to the combatant commander. The CINC must rely upon the Service Chiefs to provide properly equipped and capable forces to accomplish missions in his assigned AOR.

The other combatant commanders

Answer: Formal relationships between the CINCs are based on operational plans. The plans lay out clearly the roles of the CINCs as "supporting" or "supported." These planned relationships mandate close coordination in peacetime and training. USCINCSO depends on the other CINCs for support in responding to crisis events in his AOR.

Major Challenges

Question: In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command?

Answer: I believe there are four major challenges confronting the next CINC. The first will be implementing and maturing the new theater architecture. With the Headquarters' and Components' moves from Panama complete, USCINCSO and the Forward Operating Location (FOL) Executive Agents (USAF and USN) must carefully manage FOL military construction, develop procedures to maximize FOL utility, and match the right number and type of people and platforms at each site. Additionally, USCINCSO will need to work with DOD to purchase the Headquarters building in Miami. The second challenge will be ensuring that "Plan Colombia" is implemented efficiently and effectively, and in accordance with the recent Presidential Decision Directive (PDD/NSC-73). The United States Southern Command must promote an effective, long-term coordinated strategy for counterdrug (CD) operations that leverages the successes of Plan Colombia for all the nations of the region. The third major challenge will be promoting and sustaining adequate resources for the theater. The fourth will be to increase national policy makers' awareness of the strategic importance of the USSOUTHCOM AOR to our country's security and prosperity.

Question: If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer: If confirmed, I plan to continue many of the initiatives already in place at USSOUTHCOM. General Wilhelm deserves enormous credit for an innovative and well-planned theater architecture that has quickly compensated for our loss of facilities in Panama. The immediate and most difficult challenge will be to bring our Forward Operating Locations (FOL) up to full operational capability as quickly as possible. Sincere appreciation is due to the Members of Congress for approving the Administration's Plan Colombia Supplemental. USSOUTHCOM reorganized its headquarters staff and adjusted component roles and missions to better execute the military provisions of the Supplemental. All of us know how important coordinated interagency execution will be to Colombia, the region, and to our own nation. Finally, if confirmed, I should articulate at every opportunity the strategic importance of the USSOUTHCOM AOR. In the course of my duties, I must ensure we nurture the budding democracies in this theater and build neighbors, friends, and allies to our south.

Most Serious Problems

Question: What do you consider the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command?

Answer: I see four major problems that must be addressed by the next CINC. The first is the need for increased visibility of the strategic significance of the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). In a sense, the USSOUTHCOM AOR suffers from its own success. Currently, 31 of 32 nations are under a democratic form of government. Cuba is the only exception. Additionally, the AOR is generally not concerned with traditional threats such as general war, externally supported revolution, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or the exportation of terrorism. However, despite this good news, transnational elements threaten the fragile democracies of the region. These threats include the illicit drug industry, money laundering, arms trafficking, illegal migration, and criminally supported insurgencies. With Venezuela being our largest single supplier of petroleum and nearly half of all U.S. exports going to the Caribbean and Latin America, the region's strategic importance is without question. In passing the Colombian Supplemental, the Administration and Congress have responded to the needs of our Partner Nations and indicated the value of this region to United States foreign and economic policy.

A second problem is one of perception. Many Americans mistakenly think of Latin America as locked in the 1980's and recall the revolutions, human rights abuses, and arms races of that period. Although there is work yet to be done, the nations of the region are making significant progress. The region is led by talented professionals who are reforming their militaries, building support for democratic rule, moving toward market economies, and fighting regional corruption. Some Americans believe that additional funding for Partner Nation militaries will fuel an arms race. Latin America is the least militarized region in the world, accounting for only four percent of worldwide investment in military equipment and weapons. Most of the countries in the region realize that there are few, if any, conventional threats to their security and sovereignty, and that limited budgets are better spent on more pressing national requirements. However, many of the militaries have legitimate modernization requirements that account for the majority of their military-related spending. Lingerin misperceptions present significant challenges as USSOUTHCOM competes for resources.

The third serious problem is the difficulty in securing sufficient resources for engagement in the region. For example, countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR received only \$3 million in Foreign Military Financing from the U.S. last year, and that funding was limited to only the Caribbean. In 1991, the figure was approximately \$200 million. The USSOUTHCOM staff estimates that the AOR needs a minimum of \$75 million in fiscal year 2002 for critical programs.

A fourth serious problem is the continued decay of economic, political, and social conditions in the Andean Ridge. The illicit drug industry is the corrosive element that is eroding the foundation of democracy in this region. It contributes to corruption, undermines the free economies in the region, and promotes many forms of illegal activity to include extortion, money laundering, arms trafficking, and illegal migration.

Question: What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer: To properly address these problems, we must articulate the strategic significance of the region, help change the invalid perceptions of the AOR, and provide our decision-makers with information and feedback to secure resources for sustaining past successes, fielding current initiatives, and posturing ourselves for a successful future. To that end, I must applaud General Wilhelm's efforts. He leaves many initiatives in place that have already encouraged Partner Nation militaries to support democratic principles, observe humanitarian law, and remain subordinate to civilian authority. If confirmed, I intend to continue these initiatives. In addition, we need increased funding in the right accounts to execute a meaningful Theater Engagement Strategy. I will work through established DOD venues and processes such as the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA), Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Integrated Priority List (IPL) to identify critical CINC requirements.

Qualifications

If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a time of heightened tensions, increased focus on counter-drug operations and the transition from United States control of the Panama Canal.

Question: What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer: I am truly honored by this nomination by the President for the position of Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command, and if confirmed, I look forward to the opportunities and challenges it represents. With regard to my qualifications, I have been fortunate to serve for the last three years as the Marine Component Commander for USSOUTHCOM, and in that capacity, have had the opportunity to be involved in U.S. military planning and discussions on major issues affecting this area of the world.

While serving as Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, I am also the Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe. This experience will serve me well from a number of standpoints. First, it offered me an opportunity to work for a number of CINCs simultaneously, to observe their approach to sometimes different, but often similar challenges within vastly different areas of responsibility. Secondly, juggling a number of “hats” -- and a number of bosses – provided me experience with balancing limited resources across a seemingly unlimited number of requirements. These skills will serve me well if given the opportunity to lead Southern Command.

My duties as Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia; as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Japan; and as the Director for Operations on the Joint Staff also provided a strong foundation of joint work that will serve me well. In addition, I have been assigned to a variety of command and staff positions that have provided a wide spectrum of experiences. Above all, the one experience that has and will continue to serve me best was my time as a platoon leader in Vietnam. That experience more than any other has defined my understanding of my leadership responsibilities and continues to guide me as I make the difficult decisions that are the responsibility of our country’s senior military leadership.

US Southern Command Headquarters

Although the Congress reluctantly concurred with the location of the United States Southern Command Headquarters in Miami, Florida, it has not authorized the purchase of the headquarters building property nor the adjacent properties required for force protection. A key concern has been the availability of adequate family housing and support facilities for military personnel.

Question: Other than the economic benefit of purchasing the United States Southern Command Headquarters location and adjacent properties, what are the other benefits of purchasing these properties?

Answer: While I have not been intimately involved with decisions concerning Southern Command's location, I am aware that the overriding benefits of purchasing these properties are enhanced mission effectiveness and force protection. The Department of Defense reaffirmed the appropriateness of the Miami location and recommended the purchase of Miami properties as the best long-term option in an April 99 Report to Congress. Acquisition of the headquarters allows Southern Command to pursue additional upgrades and benefit from return on substantial investments already made in force protection improvements, communications system architecture, and reconfiguration of facilities to more efficiently accommodate assigned personnel. It will also pave the way for expanded cooperation and integration of activities between Southern Command, the State of Florida, the local business community's private sector, and emerging activities such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Based on my experience, as a Component Commander in the US SOUTHCOM's Area of Responsibility, I believe operating from Miami strengthens Southern Command's credibility. The purchase of the headquarters building and associated properties will signal to the nations of the region that Southern Command is a durable organization, strategically important to the United States, and firmly anchored in the optimal strategic location.

Although the Department of the Army has leased sufficient housing to accommodate both officer and enlisted personnel, there is continued concern regarding medical, commissary and medical support activities.

Question: What are the long-term solutions to address these concerns?

Answer: I believe Southern Command's partnership with the local community is the key to continued improvement of support and services that are unlike and yet comparable to those found on a typical military installation. Through the presence of my Marine Forces South Component staff in Miami, I have become familiar with the operation of these programs and how the partnership between the military and community has worked to better the quality of life of our service members and their families. The majority of personnel at Southern Command use their Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) entitlement to individually lease housing available in the local communities. This appears to be an adequate option, and recent changes to more accurately calculate BAH only serve to improve this situation. Secretary Cohen's initiatives to decrease or

eliminate “out-of-pocket” costs associated with BAH will further improve conditions for military families in Miami. Government leased apartments to house junior enlisted personnel is an important program in this costly area -- a testimony to partnering where mutual cooperation enables Southern Command to provide cost effective housing that also meets appropriate standards of living. The small medical clinic and dispensing pharmacy at the headquarters serves as the primary care manager for Southern Command active duty personnel and their families. Additional requirements for specialized treatment, laboratory work, and dental care for family members is adequately supported through the network of medical providers and services available in the local community. The cost of food items and corresponding lack of commissary privileges remains an issue. Southern Command has not yet established a partnership within the local community to approximate typical commissary savings to service members. I am aware from previous inquiries that Southern Command is attempting to partner with the Defense Commissary Agency on several initiatives to bring savings that are comparable to commissary benefits to military personnel residing in Miami. These programs, of course, are extraordinary and will require considerable time to test and implement. Some of the other cost-effective methods employed to better support military personnel include contracting for available space at nationally accredited child care centers so the service member pays rates comparable to any military installation; and plans to implement intramural programs using an adjacent county park which is currently under construction.

In the original evaluation of candidate locations for the United States Southern Command, Miami was rated the lowest in the category in the area of crime.

Question: Has the city’s high crime rate had any negative impact on the quality of life of our military personnel?

Answer: I do not believe crime has had a significant impact on the military personnel at Southern Command. In fact, according to crime data from Miami-Dade County, local crime rates have decreased significantly since the selection committee evaluated and recommended Miami. Since 1996, violent crimes are down 33% and overall crimes are down 27%. Miami-Dade County is similar to most large metropolitan areas – it is blessed with some very good communities with crime rates below the national average while other areas have very high crime statistics. Southern Command personnel typically reside in areas with lower crime rates. Residents of any large city cannot dismiss the potential for crime and violence, but the risk can be mitigated through housing placement programs and awareness training. I think Southern Command has done well in this area and has not allowed problems that are common to many of our nation’s cities to adversely affect the quality of life of its families.

Question: If so, would you propose establishing a military compound to house our military personnel?

Answer: If confirmed, I would explore the idea of a military compound to safeguard our service members and families if I thought this action was warranted. However, I do not believe the criminal element has had significant impact on the quality of life of military personnel residing in Miami. In fact, Miami is not atypical of other large cities such as Washington, DC. Most of the service members serving in the Washington Military District do not live on an installation. Given existing programs and systems already in place in Miami, I believe reasonable support is currently being provided to our service members and their families. If confirmed, I will work to improve upon these already impressive programs and make U.S. Southern Command a choice assignment for all its members.

Perception of Vieques Island Dispute

Both the Congress and the Department of Defense agree that the Vieques Island Training Range is vital to the readiness of our Atlantic Fleet battle groups and that we should retain our ability to use the island.

Question: What impact has the ongoing dispute over the use of the range had on how the United States is perceived in South and Central America?

Answer: Regionally, the impact appears to be minimal and Vieques is not a topical issue that is often debated elsewhere in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility. Skillful public relations management by NAVSOUTH has muted regional impact. Occasionally, indirect reference to U.S. “exploitation” of the Caribbean and Latin America appears in print, but limited editorial commentary in Central and South American news media regarding the dispute indicates Vieques remains a local issue.

Panama Canal

It has been almost one year since the United States turned operations of the Panama Canal over to the Panamanian Government. Although there were great expectations of economic benefit, there has been little notice in the press about the aftermath of the United States' departure from Panama.

Question: What is the current political and economic situation in Panama?

Answer: President Moscoso's government holds a precarious one-vote majority in the National Assembly, making it difficult to implement many of her policies. Economic growth declined slightly in 1999, but is expected to increase in the coming years as the economy continues to slowly adjust to the departure of the U.S. military. Panama's historically low inflation rate and attractive banking policies should fuel continued foreign investment, which is essential for economic growth. Panama Canal operations have been consistent since the U.S. turnover, with no observed degradation of service. The Panama Canal Authority is currently implementing a billion-dollar modernization effort that will increase capacity by 20 percent and generate increased revenue, currently averaging \$1.6 million per day.

Question: To what extent does the Panamanian government attempt to interdict the drug flow out of Colombia through Panama?

Answer: President Moscoso's administration has demonstrated a commitment to combat drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, and other transnational problems. The Government of Panama (GOP) is taking steps to control the large volume of precursor and production chemicals transiting the country and is strengthening anti-money laundering efforts by implementing banking reforms. Panama also hosted the "Fourth Hemispheric Congress on the Prevention of Money Laundering." The GOP has indicated it wants to increase joint counterdrug efforts, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently reviewing a bilateral maritime agreement between Panama and the United States to support those efforts. USSOUTHCOM has continued to assist Panama's Public Force (PPF) in developing counterdrug capabilities. Panama participated in Operation Conjuntos, an operation with the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard that resulted in the arrest of drug traffickers and seizure of illegal contraband. Since 1996, Panama has also participated in United Counterdrug, an annual exercise sponsored by USSOUTHCOM with the purpose of refining regional counterdrug operations through high level concept development, improved command and control, and increased information sharing.

Question: Now that the U.S. military no longer has a permanent presence in Panama, what is your assessment of Panama's ability to protect and maintain the Panama Canal?

Answer: The Panama National Canal Authority employs a staff of skilled and well-trained engineering and maintenance personnel capable of maintaining the canal in good working order. Since the turnover of the canal to Panama in December 1999, we have not observed a degradation of maintenance, service, or effective operations. The continued, uninterrupted quality operation of the canal is fast becoming an element of national pride. The Panama Canal authority

also employs a very professional, well-trained 300-man private security force to work closely with the Panama National Police (PNP) to safeguard key canal facilities. Security provided to our High Value Transits since the departure of U.S. forces has been satisfactory.

Role of United States Southern Command

As the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command you will be responsible for all military operations in that region. These include the Department's counter-narcotics efforts in the source nations and transit zone, security of the Panama Canal, and expediting relationships between the military personnel of the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean in order to instill democratic values in the military organizations of the region. If confirmed, you will face the challenge of pursuing these missions at a time when there appears to be a movement away from democracy in some nations, and a decrease in the stability of other nations such as Colombia.

Question: If confirmed, what will be your highest priorities and what actions will you propose to counter the growing threat to democracy in the region?

Answer: If confirmed, my top priority will be accomplishing the tasks laid out by the National Command Authorities through such guidance as the Prioritized Regional Objectives. Beyond that, one of my principal concerns will be the effective implementation of our National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Our nation is investing more than a billion dollars in the emergency Supplemental to assist our Partner Nations and continue our efforts to achieve the goals of the NDCS. The Administration and Congress have given the Interagency the resources needed to attack the growing illicit drug industry in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. This industry is a corrosive force that erodes the foundation of democracy and disrupts the social order. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) are a destabilizing force that spawn corruption and promote a "shadow economy" of money laundering, arms trafficking, illegal migration, and other forms of transnational crime. USSOUTHCOM must continue to encourage regional approaches to these problems while maximizing our contribution to this effort by cooperating with the Interagency and assisting the Partner Nations in the development of counterdrug (CD) capabilities, to include the fielding of forces, equipment, training, and doctrine.

I see continued professionalization of the Partner Nation militaries as the next priority for Southern Command. Today, all militaries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR are subordinate to civil authority. While this concept is relatively new to several militaries in this AOR, it is a pivotal requirement for establishing "a community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations" with free market economies. By helping the militaries in the AOR to professionalize and observe the tenets of human rights and international humanitarian law, USSOUTHCOM can best support our nation's larger mission to promote democracy, stability, and collective approaches to all forms of threats in this theater.

U.S. National Interests in Region

There are a number of reasons why the United States should take a far more active interest in this region, and dedicate the resources necessary to ensure its stability.

Question: Would you please outline what you believe to be our vital national interests in the region?

Answer: As defined in our National Security Strategy, vital national interests are those of broad, over-riding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. I see four U.S. interests in this theater that meet this criteria. One is continued unhindered access to strategic natural resources in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. A common misperception is that the U.S. is completely dependent upon the Middle East for our nation's petroleum needs. However, our largest single supplier of petroleum is actually Venezuela – a country that provides from 15% to 19% of our imported oil in any given month. Another vital interest is continued stability required for access to markets in the USSOUTHCOM AOR, which is critical to the continued economic expansion and prosperity of the United States. Today, our trade within the Americas represents approximately 46 percent of all U.S. exports, and we expect this percentage to increase in the future. The loss of our Caribbean and Latin American markets would seriously damage the health of the U.S. economy. A third vital interest in this AOR is freedom of navigation (FON), which is critical to our economy and to the strategic movement of some of our naval assets. Of particular concern is continued unencumbered access to the Panama Canal – a strategic choke point and line of communication (LOC) that, if closed, would have a serious impact on world trade and could create significant challenges for the rapid positioning of our naval forces. Finally, although not technically defined as a vital national interest, I consider shielding our shores from the destructive effects of illicit drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime a critical concern.

Stability of the Region

A recent white paper we received from the DOD indicated that “all of Colombia’s neighbors have expressed their concern about the instability brought on by insurgent and narco-trafficker operations that spill over into neighboring countries.” It went on to discuss the use of these neighboring countries by the insurgent groups for safe havens, logistical support as well as R&R sites for members of the insurgencies. These groups have even performed illegal activities in those countries such as the kidnapping for ransom of businessmen and missionaries.

Question: Can the Colombian government alone defeat these organizations or will it require the coordinated efforts of all countries in the region?

Answer: Colombia’s problems of illicit drug trafficking and insurgency are not contained by her borders. Today, Venezuela maintains troops along its common border with Colombia to check the flow of insurgents. The Governments of Peru and Ecuador also man their borders with Colombia to prevent intrusions by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), paramilitary forces, and Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). FARC and paramilitary units routinely enter Panama to traffic in drugs and arms and extort Panamanian citizens. Illicit drug production and trafficking, and the associated crime it generates, finances much of the insurgency movement and directly impacts regional stability. Plan Colombia is a significant step in the right direction with long term goals to end the insurgency through a negotiated settlement and defeat the illicit drug industry through eradication, interdiction, and alternative crop programs. Although Colombia centric, the problems are in fact regional in nature and require a regional response. The U.S. Supplemental provides \$1.3 billion in support of Plan Colombia and includes funding for counterdrug (CD) programs in several other Andean Ridge nations. The success of Plan Colombia is dependent on aggressive implementation by Colombia, continued U.S. support, and successful, regionally coordinated programs in other Andean Ridge nations.

Question: What actions will you take to achieve the required regional coordination?

Answer: For a long-term counterdrug (CD) campaign to be effective, countries throughout the Andean Ridge region must cooperate to develop a common strategy and coordinate their operations against drug traffickers. A recent USSOUTHCOM initiative called Nodal Analysis will identify key vulnerabilities of the illicit drug industry, which regional planners can target. This analysis will be shared with nations throughout the Andean Ridge Region so that resources can be pooled and effectively employed against high payoff targets. USSOUTHCOM hosted the first ever Source Zone Regional Counterdrug Conference in Miami on 14-15 August 2000. At this conference, cabinet ministers, senior military leaders, and policymakers made commitments to create a regional strategy to counter illicit drug production and trafficking in the Andean Ridge. The conference was a giant step forward. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to help build Partner Nation CD capabilities, encourage top level cooperation among regional nations, promote prudent but more liberal sharing of CD information, seek more effective command and control of CD assets, and work for more streamlined CD overflight procedures.

While Andean Ridge nations must lead the effort against narco-traffickers, the U.S. must make a firm commitment of financial, operational, and intelligence support.

Counter-narcotics--Overall Importance and Effort

Each year the Department of Defense spends several hundred million dollars for counter-narcotics programs. These programs range from outreach programs to teach children the dangers of drugs, to assistance to foreign governments to interdict the flow of drugs through their territory. Despite the expenditure of these funds and the several billion dollars that the Federal government spends as a whole each year, we have been unable to significantly reduce the flow of drugs into the United States and countries such as Colombia face a tremendous internal security challenge. This has led many to question the effectiveness of our counter-narcotics programs.

Question: How should we measure the success of each of the Department's counter-narcotics programs?

Answer: The Department of Defense (DOD) is primarily in a support role in the execution of our National Drug Control Strategy. DOD provides detection, monitoring, and tracking assets, intelligence, and other forms of support to U.S. law enforcement agencies and host nation security forces in their interdiction, eradication, and alternative development efforts. I believe we all would prefer to gauge our success by a quantifiable reduction in the flow of drugs to the United States. Goals 4 and 5 of the National Drug Control Strategy provide us a quantifiable target for success. However, comparing results to costs for any particular program or single department is very complicated for counterdrug (CD) operations. Comparisons are difficult because DOD is but one of the key players in the Interagency team, which is working with regional Partner Nations to curb drug production and trafficking in the Source and Transit Zones. To be sure, we need to develop and implement meaningful, relevant, and quantifiable measures of effectiveness that can be used to accurately determine the impact of DOD assets in the execution of the overall CD strategy. I believe the cooperation that is on-going to implement and track the effectiveness of the Supplemental is a positive step forward in gauging our success in CD operations.

Question: Do you believe that the current programs that the Department supports are the most effective for the region or should we focus the Department's efforts elsewhere?

Answer: I believe USSOUTHCOM is getting a good return on DOD's investment in counterdrug (CD) operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. In recent years, DOD has contributed significantly to the building of Partner Nation CD capabilities, the Air Bridge interdiction success, maritime interdiction in the Transit Zone, control of the interior river networks, and reductions of coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia. These programs are the outgrowth of years of study and practical experience. Nonetheless, we should subject our programs and objectives to constant review. We should frequently review our progress to ensure we have the right balance of resources committed to the CD effort, that we are continuing to move toward a coordinated and integrated strategy and regional campaign, and that we are maintaining the proper fusion of Source and Transit Zone efforts.

Question: Compared to other missions that you will be responsible for as CINCSOUTH, where would you rank counter-narcotics in terms of its threat to our national security and the ability of the Department of Defense to make a meaningful contribution?

Answer: I agree with General Wilhelm and consider the illicit drug trade to be a subtle form of a weapon of mass destruction and currently the most significant threat to our national security emanating from the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Illicit drug use claims thousands of U.S. lives and consumes billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs annually. Viewed through a longer-range lens, sustaining democracy and free market economies in this theater is in our national interest since they will contribute most to our nation's future prosperity. Sustaining democracy and support for counterdrug operations must be viewed as two sides of the same coin. The illicit drug industry is a corrosive force that attacks the foundations of democracy in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). It corrupts public institutions, undermines already struggling economies, and destroys the moral fiber of society. General Wilhelm's vision for the region has been "A community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations successfully countering illicit drug activities and other transnational threats." I believe his vision correctly points out the very dangerous threat that illicit drug activity poses to democracy in this theater, and to our own national security.

Forward Operating Locations

One of the most significant counter-narcotics issues that has been addressed by the Congress is the United States Southern Command's proposal to create three forward operating locations (FOLs) in the source and transit zone. There is some concern that the Department will not deploy sufficient aircraft to these FOLs to justify all of the planned construction. There is also concern that after investing several million dollars on these facilities the host nations will begin to restrict our use of these facilities.

Question: Would you outline the importance of the role that these FOLs will play in the Department's counter-drug efforts?

Answer: Forward Operating Locations are essential elements of USSOUTHCOM's post-Panama theater architecture. With Howard Air Force Base no longer available, the FOLs are the critical enablers of Southern Command's Counter-Drug Campaign Plan. The FOLs provide operational reach and flexibility for a variety of Detection & Monitoring (D&M) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms into both the Source and Transit Zones.

Question: What assurance do we have that the Department will deploy sufficient assets to the FOLs to justify their construction?

Answer: CJCS Counterdrug Execute Order (EXORD) authorizes continued DOD support to law enforcement efforts to detect, monitor and interdict drug trafficking. The EXORD establishes the minimum force levels that will be allocated to the counterdrug (CD) effort in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for any reduction in forces or capability that are specified in the EXORD. I have every confidence that the Department will support USSOUTHCOM's very important counterdrug mission.

Question: What is the current estimated cost of establishing and operating these FOLs?

Answer: Current estimated MILCON infrastructure and airfield upgrade costs for the full establishment of Manta, EC and Curacao/Aruba FOLs is \$137.19M. The Comalapa FOL infrastructure cost is estimated at \$9.87M. Operating and maintenance costs for all the FOLs are estimated to be \$18.0M in FY01, \$33.0M in FY02 and \$35-38M in FY03.

Question: What assurance will we receive from host nations that once these locations are established we will continue to have access to them for several years?

Answer: FOL Agreements of Cooperation between the host nations and the U.S. Government specifically approve use and access for a ten-year period. There is an additional provision for renewable five-year terms, subject to agreement by both parties. After the initial

ten-year period, either nation has the right to terminate the agreement upon one-year's notice in writing.

Counter-Drug Brigades

With the certification of Colombia this past year, we are now able to provide military assistance, including training, to the Colombian military. We are now engaged in the training of vetted Counter-Drug Battalions who will assist the Colombian National Police in their counter-narcotics efforts. However, there is some concern that many of the individuals receiving U.S. training are not career professional soldiers and will not remain in the Colombian military past their present enlistment. This has caused some to question the efficiency and effectiveness of this training program.

Question: What actions will you take to ensure that the Government of Columbia meets its commitment to include only professional soldiers in these battalions?

Answer: The value of volunteer professional soldiers and the essential advantages they bring to any military unit is unequivocally clear to senior Colombian leadership. Colombian Military (COLMIL) leaders are committed to fully manning the Counter-narcotics (CN) Brigade with highly trained, properly equipped, professional soldiers, and I will continue to encourage and reinforce the importance of that commitment. Their commitment is best exemplified by current status of the fully operational Counter-narcotics Battalion (CN BN #1). CN BN #1 is clearly the best-trained and equipped unit in the COLMIL. The COLMIL senior leadership hand-selected the officers and noncommissioned officers for this battalion. All original conscripts assigned to CN BN #1 have chosen to volunteer and have been converted to professional status. Initial manning for both CN BNs #2 and #3 includes 200 conscripts each. Colombian intent is to ultimately convert these personnel to volunteers and professional status. In December 1999, the Colombian Government also instituted an incentive program that increases the pay of conscript soldiers who complete an 18-month tour and join the ranks of the professional army, from 37,000 pesos (\$20.00) per month to 378,000 pesos (\$200.00) per month. This action should increase retention.

Riverine Program

One of the programs that will receive funding through the budget supplemental is the Peruvian Riverine Interdiction program. There is concern with reports that despite years of support for this program, including millions of dollars worth of equipment and infrastructure, the Peruvian Counter-narcotics Police, or DINANDRO, is not actively operating on the rivers to interdict the flow of drugs and precursor materials. On the other hand, the Peruvian Coast Guard as well as the Colombian Navy and Marine Corps seem to be making effective use of the riverine support we have provided, together with the resources they themselves have dedicated to this program.

Question: What actions are being taken to ensure that the aid we are providing to the Government of Peru for riverine operations is being put to effective use, and, if DINANDRO continues to resist interdiction operations on the river, should we reallocate resources from them to the Peruvian Coast Guard and the Colombian program?

Answer: As the Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces, South (MARFORSOUTH), I am familiar with the Peru Riverine Program. MARFORSOUTH is the Coordinating Authority for riverine training and operations throughout the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). The U.S. Embassy Country Team meets monthly with the Peruvian Coast Guard (PCG) and the Peruvian Counter-Narcotics Police (DINANDRO) to review the previous month's operations, finalize plans for the next month, and address critical riverine and counterdrug (CD) issues. In conjunction with the U.S. Embassy Country Team, the United States Southern Command is conducting a detailed review of Peru's Riverine Program to ensure U.S. funds are being effectively used to develop required CD capabilities. A key element of the ongoing review is the Bilateral Peru Riverine Implementation Plan (BPRIP), which updates and clearly defines Peru's operational and fiscal responsibilities for the riverine program. The BPRIP is currently with the Peruvian government for review. A total of four Riverine Interdiction Units (RIU) have been fielded since July 1999. Unfortunately, Peruvian budgetary constraints continue to limit operating hours and scope of operations. In spite of these constraints, during the past six months the DINANDRO and the Coast Guard have conducted eight joint CD operations that have resulted in narcotics seizures with an estimated street value of over \$2 million U.S. dollars. Although comparisons to the Colombian riverine program are inevitable, it is useful to point out that the Colombian program began operations in the early 1970's while the Peruvian program did not become operational until mid-1999. Although still in its infancy, the Peruvian program has a premier training base in the Joint Peruvian Riverine Training Center (JPRTC). The JPRTC has already achieved considerable success in refining the operational capabilities of Peru's riverine forces. Transitioning these well-trained forces into sustained interdiction operations is the current phase of a carefully defined, five-year program. I believe a reallocation of resources would negatively impact the ongoing progress and future potential of the Peruvian Riverine program.

Force Protection

The programs funded through the supplemental appropriation will require the deployment of a number of U.S. servicemen to the region. I understand that in the past members of the U.S. Military Group at the Bogota Embassy have shown up on target lists of the anti-government forces in Colombia.

Question: What measures are being taken to ensure the protection of U.S. military personnel in the country in the case that they become targets of the insurgents, or narco-traffickers?

Answer: USSOUTHCOM currently has no information that insurgents or narco-traffickers are deliberately targeting members of the U.S. military. Because we might expect an attack from the insurgents or narco-traffickers, or both, in response to the Supplemental package, USSOUTHCOM is maintaining a high level of vigilance in monitoring perceived or communicated threats to deployed U.S. personnel throughout its Area of Responsibility (AOR). USSOUTHCOM personnel operating from Colombian military (COLMIL) bases receive collateral force protection from Colombian troops occupying the base. U.S. DOD personnel do not participate in training or operations outside the military compound. If credible information is received indicating U.S. personnel are being targeted or an attack is imminent on facilities housing DOD personnel, USSOUTHCOM will coordinate directly with the Government of Colombia (GOC) to ensure additional force protection measures are taken to increase the security posture. If necessary, appropriate plans will be executed to evacuate U.S. DOD personnel to safe havens. The U.S. Military Group Commander in Colombia continuously monitors and assesses the security situation, maintains contact with all deployed DOD personnel, and coordinates continuously with Colombian forces and the Country Team. USSOUTHCOM continues to assist the Colombians to improve the defensive posture of Colombian bases where U.S. DOD personnel live and train. USSOUTHCOM conducts continuous evaluation and assessment and makes recommendations to the COLMIL for force protection improvements. Assessment reports are routinely shared with Colombian base commanders and instruction provided to security forces for improving base defenses. In May of this year, the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Team completed surveys of Tres Esquinas, Apiay, Tolemaida, and Larandia. I understand that USSOUTHCOM has already made significant force protection improvements to these bases in accordance with JSIVA recommendations. The recommendations will also be used to guide the expenditure of \$4 million of force protection improvements that are funded by the Supplemental.

FARC & Sophisticated Weaponry

A significant portion of the supplemental appropriation is to provide helicopters to the Colombian Armed Forces to give them the mobility they need to more effectively operate against the narco-traffickers and their FARC allies. The FARC receives significant reimbursement for their protection of the drug trade which could be used to purchase shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles that are available on the black market and are capable of shooting down these helicopters.

Question: What is the plan for dealing with the threat of surface-to-air missiles if the FARC begins to use them against the Colombian military?

Answer: Man-portable systems are available through arms dealers, non-governmental organizations, terrorists, and legitimate governments. The insurgents have a sophisticated organization and money. We should not discount the possibility that the FARC already possesses surface-to-air missiles (SAM) that, with the proper training, can be employed against the Government of Colombia's (GOC) security force helicopters. The GOC and the U.S. Interagency have considered this threat in deciding on the helicopter mission equipment configuration and the aviation training program for the aircrews. With this equipment, properly trained crews can effectively employ the helicopters in a SAM environment by taking advantage of low illumination and the protection offered by terrain.

Colombia

There have been several reports over the past few years regarding the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) insurgency within Colombia. These reports paint a picture of a nation state in decline that faces the real possibility of total collapse sometime during the next ten years. Given both the FARC's ideology and its links to the Colombian drug traffickers, a collapse of the elected Government of Colombia would have a serious impact upon U.S. interests in Latin America.

Question: Please outline your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon:

- The links between the FARC and the Colombian drug traffickers and the extent to which drug revenues are being used to support this terrorist organization:

Answer: Colombian insurgent groups exploit drug trafficking activities primarily as a means of financial support, supplementing income from kidnapping, extortion and robbery. Insurgents are heavily involved in providing security and support for trafficking operations, but there is mounting evidence of widespread involvement in cultivation, processing, and marketing ventures as well. The Colombian military estimates more than half of the FARC fronts and nearly one-third of ELN fronts participate in drug related activities. The FARC Southern and Eastern Blocks have the most involvement in drug cultivation and production.

- The ability of the Colombian military to regain control of its territory.

Answer: Last year's reported upsurge in coca cultivation and production, as well as the recent FARC attacks in overwhelming numbers on isolated Colombia National Police (CNP) outposts, provides considerable cause for concern. Yet, I believe, as General Wilhelm has previously stated before this Committee, that Colombia's current civilian and military leadership are a first class team that is making credible progress in defining a national strategy for ending the insurgency and curbing the illicit drug industry. Improved cooperation between the armed forces and the CNP and recent security force success in tactical engagements with the FARC bode well for reasserting sovereignty over the outlying regions.

- Ongoing DOD programs to assist the Colombian government in its counter-narcotics efforts specifically, and its military training and military professionalism in general.

Answer: The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided initial training, limited infrastructure support, technological support, and equipment to improve Government of Colombia (GOC) capabilities to fight drug trafficking within its borders. Ongoing programs are assisting the GOC in its counter-narcotics (CN) efforts by providing support for Colombian Military (COLMIL) ground, interdiction, and riverine programs. Support for ground programs includes equipment and training for the CN Brigade, Joint Task Force South Intelligence Center

(JTFSIC), and UH-1N helicopters for tactical mobility. Support for interdiction programs includes upgrades to C-26 aircraft, enhancements to Ground Based Radars (GBRs), and an improved CN Air Interdiction Plan to enhance current capabilities. Support to riverine programs includes the creation of the Fluvial Brigade of five organic battalions, establishment of bases to support and sustain riverine forces, and procurement of patrol boats, spare parts, night vision, and radio-navigation equipment. Collectively, DOD training and equipment will assist the GOC in successfully implementing its strategic plan for CN operations.

Question: Are you concerned that the turmoil in Colombia will spill over and destabilize other nations in the region?

Answer: The internal conflict in Colombia poses a direct threat to regional stability. The spillover into neighboring countries largely results from the corrupting effect of the narcotics trade and inadequate state control of the border in remote areas. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama are the most vulnerable to destabilization due to Colombian insurgent activity along their borders. The FARC and ELN routinely use each of these neighboring nations for sanctuary, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Peru is best prepared to prevent the potential spillover, having increased the number of security forces along its northern border to prevent the exodus of drug traffickers from Colombia's southern regions. Other Andean Ridge nations are beginning to prepare contingency plans, but in the case of Ecuador, economic challenges and political instability will limit the government's defensive measures and planned response.

Question: What steps can be taken to prevent that from happening?

Answer: Colombia is the key to stability in the Andean Ridge. Plan Colombia presents a national strategy designed to defeat the narco-traffickers and resolve the military, economic, and social problems that the illicit drug industry and lingering insurgency have visited on society. The U.S. Supplemental is principally focused on Colombia. The Supplemental also provides funding and assistance to other regional partners who have made significant progress in counterdrug operations but may still be vulnerable to potential spillover as Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) adapt to Colombia's anticipated success in the Putumayo and Caqueta coca producing regions. As we assist Colombia in building CD capabilities, we should address the specific needs of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, and other regional partners as well.

Mexico

Over the last several years there has been a rise in the involvement of Mexican drug cartels in the international trafficking of narcotics. This has also led to reports of increased corruption among Mexican political, police, and military officials. To combat the rise in Mexican drug trafficking we have established a number of cooperative counter-narcotics programs between the U.S. government and the Government of Mexico including the training of Mexican military counter-narcotics units by U.S. Special Forces. We have also provided the Government of Mexico with significant quantities of military equipment including several helicopters. Despite this assistance, there appears to be little progress in preventing the flow of drugs across the Southwest Border, and rooting out the corruption in the government of Mexico.

Question: Please outline your views regarding the effectiveness of the contributions of the U.S. military in helping the Government of Mexico to disrupt the flow of drugs through Mexico focusing on:

- Mexican military CD units that have received U.S. military training,**
- military equipment that was provided by DOD and State to the Government of Mexico.**

Answer: As you know, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) does not include Mexico in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), but I appreciate the opportunity to provide my views on this important relationship. DOD maintains a strong military to military relationship with the Mexican armed forces, particularly for counterdrug (CD) training and assistance. Combined interdiction efforts over the past year have improved dramatically. We have a very effective and beneficial relationship with the Mexican Navy, the branch of the Mexican military that has the strongest and most visible participation in CD training with the U.S. Continued cooperation with Mexico in CD activities is imperative.

Intelligence Requirements

General Wilhelm has testified before the committee that he was reporting the readiness of his intelligence capability at C4 because he lacked the airborne assets to adequately execute the counter-narcotics detection and monitoring mission. Part of the reason is the requirement for assets in other theaters of operations, and he expressed concern that there simply was not enough airborne intelligence platforms to meet every CINCs requirements.

Question: Do you believe it will be possible to restore the readiness of SOUTHCOM's intelligence capability to at least C2, and maintain that of other CINCs, under the current programmed procurement of airborne intelligence platforms?

Answer: It is my understanding that the Command's most serious deficiency is in the Low Density High Demand (LDHD) assets that are required and prioritized for world-wide tasking. To effectively satisfy Southern Command's ISR requirements, we need to either increase the national inventory of these high demand assets or adjust allocation priority for counterdrug (CD) mission requirements. I do not believe that the current DOD inventory of airborne intelligence platforms or programmed procurement of additional assets is adequate to satisfy all of the CINCs' requirements.

Question: If so, when?

Answer: I would like to provide the Committee an answer to this question to include the specifics on SOUTHCOM ISR deficiencies for the record at a later date. As you might expect, I have not discussed this issue with the Joint Staff and any date that I would provide at this time would be speculative.

Question: If not, what specific platforms would be of greatest use to your theater?

Answer: USSOUTHCOM needs increased support from Low Density High Demand Assets. As you know, the combatant commands world-wide compete for these assets based on priority of mission. Specifically, USSOUTHCOM requires additional assets to support the Detection and Monitoring (D&M) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. I will be glad to provide the Committee with specific deficiencies after I've had the opportunity to review and evaluate them with the USSOUTHCOM staff.

Intelligence Limitations

Perhaps the most important tool in defeating the narco-traffickers and their FARC allies is the development of good intelligence. Without accurate information regarding the plans and operations of these groups, it is difficult to engage them successfully.

Question: What is the principal limiting factor in our ability, and the ability of the governments in the region, to develop the intelligence necessary to effectively combat the narco-traffickers and their FARC allies?

Answer: We need to commit additional U.S. intelligence resources to collect, analyze, and report on insurgent and narco-trafficking plans, intentions, and capabilities. Additionally, we need to improve our intelligence sharing protocols with the governments in the region.

Vietnam Concerns

There has been significant concern expressed by some members of Congress that the supplemental appropriation will result in us taking a path which will lead to another “Vietnam”. There are two similarities to that earlier episode in American history; a dedicated enemy and an American population which is divided.

Question: What differences do you see between Colombia and Vietnam that would convince the majority of the Congress to set aside their misgivings and support the increased U.S. role in Colombia?

Answer: I believe our involvement in Colombia differs significantly from that in Vietnam. First, unlike the Vietnam conflict, the Colombian situation poses a direct threat to our citizens at home, as evidenced by the documented loss of life and productivity associated with illicit drugs on the streets of America. Colombia’s fight to reduce illicit drug production and trafficking is our fight as well. Second, our current policy significantly limits the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia and the types of missions in which they are authorized to engage. During Vietnam, we actively supported a counterinsurgency with armed intervention. In Colombia, we play a support role and are limited to providing training, equipment, and intelligence to host nation security forces involved in counterdrug (CD) operations. U.S. troops are not allowed to accompany Colombian forces on actual operations. In addition, the number of uniformed personnel committed to our effort in Colombia is very small. At the height of our intervention in Vietnam in 1968, we had more than 500,000 servicemen in country. Last year, slightly more than 200 U.S. military personnel were on the ground in Colombia on any given day. Although USSOUTHCOM expects these numbers to increase slightly due to additional support required for the implementation of Plan Colombia, the average number of uniformed personnel in country that are directly supporting CD operations will remain below the Congressionally mandated cap of 500.

Colombian Military Spending

One of the concerns that has been expressed is that the Colombian Government will take the funding we provide through the supplemental and use it to offset reductions in the level of financial support it provides to its own armed forces. If the goal is to improve the capability of Columbia's armed forces, the funding we provide must truly be a supplement, rather than a replacement, to the resources Columbia dedicates to its military.

Question: What is the level of Colombian military spending this year compared to last year?

Answer: Real military spending, to include both the Armed Forces and National Police, is expected to decline by as much as six percent in CY2000, compared to CY1999. The reduction is a direct result of the Colombian Government's response to the worst economic recession in five decades. The Colombian National Planning Office, however, anticipates increases in military spending by 2002 and beyond. Their current projections indicate military spending may rise from the current 12 percent of the national budget to more than 17 percent of the national budget by 2002 and rise from 3.4 percent of GNP in 1999 to between 4 and 5 percent of GNP by 2004.

Question: Is there any indication that the Colombian Government is reducing the amount of funds that are going towards its military?

Answer: As indicated in my previous answer, the Government of Colombia has been forced to reduce real military spending by as much as six percent due to Colombia's current economic situation. We expect to see military funding increased in 2002 and beyond.

Human Rights and Paramilitary Links

One of the principal criticisms of U.S. support for the Colombian military is its past history of human rights abuses, and its links to paramilitary organizations that engage in such abuses.

Question: What can you tell us about the human rights record of the Colombian military units with whom we will work, and links between military officers and paramilitary organizations?

Answer: The number of alleged human rights violations attributed to Colombian security forces has fallen dramatically in recent years. In 1999, approximately 2 percent of the known human rights violations in Colombia were committed by security force members, down from an estimated 54 percent in 1993. Colombia's extensive program of human rights and international humanitarian law training for all soldiers and officers helps account for this improvement. Additionally, all Colombian military units that receive U.S. government material assistance or training are thoroughly vetted for human rights violations in strict compliance with the Leahy Amendment. The Department of State (DOS) in Washington, D.C. makes the final determination of which units and individuals are eligible to receive U.S. assistance. This vetting process is continuous. Determining the eligibility for assistance is accomplished for each unit or individual *each time* that training or assistance for that particular unit or person is under consideration. The Colombian government is cooperating fully in this process. I am aware that the DOS Human Rights Report for 1999 reported that security forces sometimes collaborate with paramilitary organizations that are responsible for some of the most flagrant human rights violations. The Colombian Military (COLMIL) leadership does not condone or tolerate this type of misconduct. In fact, President Pastrana and top political and military leaders have stated repeatedly and unequivocally that collaboration with paramilitary groups is not permitted nor tolerated, and that those found guilty of such activities will be dismissed from the military and punished appropriately.

Anthrax Vaccination

Question: Have you received any of the series of anthrax vaccinations?

Answer: No.

Question: If not, why not? And would you be willing to begin the vaccination protocol before you are confirmed?

Answer: As you are aware, the focus of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program is the protection of personnel whose duties place them at the highest risk for exposure to anthrax bacilli, specifically those entering the Southwest Asian or Korean high threat areas. My duties as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic, U. S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, and U. S. Marine Corps Forces South did not take me to these high threat areas. As an aside, I have routinely taken all indicated immunoprophylaxis and chemoprophylaxis (such as the influenza, hepatitis A, typhoid and yellow fever immunizations and malaria chemoprophylaxis).

I would certainly begin the vaccination protocol if the responsibilities of the position warranted.

Question: If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the confidence of the force in the safety and necessity of the anthrax vaccine?

Answer: This is a Force Protection issue and is comparable to any other disease or vector protection program we have. Failure to prepare and protect our Service men and women can have grave consequences. Several potential adversaries have the capability - and the will - to deliver the colorless and odorless anthrax spores. Anthrax spores can be produced in large quantities using basic knowledge and unsophisticated equipment, can be stored for decades, and can be easily dispersed using a variety of weapons. Inhalational anthrax, the mode of exposure exploited by biological warfare, is highly lethal to unprotected individuals. There is no effective treatment for unvaccinated victims of inhalational anthrax. Studies and experience have shown the vaccine safe and effective. Thus, anthrax vaccination is the most important component of force health protection against an anthrax attack.

At-risk personnel must receive the anthrax vaccine – to protect them from this lethal threat. To this end, leaders must support resolution of production issues (potency/sterility/purity/safety and supply), provide education to leaders and subordinates alike, and deconflict the large amounts of misinformation in the media and on the Internet.

Micro-management

A survey of almost 2500 young officers last fall found that only about one-third intend to make a career of the military and that those planning to leave are disgruntled about “micro-management”, heavy workloads while in port, and a “zero defects mentality” among their superiors.

Question: What is your assessment of these findings?

Answer: “Micro-management” and “zero defects” are phrases that have come to represent almost any dissatisfaction by members of the military. These are leadership issues, and from my own experiences, I can tell you that the actions of one leader can make all the difference in the world on the morale and outlook of the entire unit.

My experience as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic leads me to believe that the greater issue here is the heavy workloads we place upon our service members while at home between deployments. The continued reliance upon our old equipment is a real concern to the overall readiness and morale of our units. Maintenance costs are increasing and our people are working longer hours to maintain aging equipment. While our equipment readiness rates remain sufficient to fully support our prioritized forward deployed forces, they have come at the expense of modernizing the force. We are facing block obsolescence of critical ground and aviation equipment, which is increasingly more expensive to maintain. The total cost grows exponentially as we expend more money for parts and more time and labor on maintenance, and less time on training our people. This frustrating situation is not lost on our young troops who want to do what’s best, but often have to make do with what the unit can afford, in both time and money.

Increased maintenance time and reduced training opportunities are taking their toll on our people and their families. Specifically, families accept the hardship of separations caused by deployments, but they do not understand continued separation upon return home, caused by long workdays required to maintain aging equipment. We owe our service men and women some recovery time after deployment to get reacquainted with their families.

Current manning levels have created a strain, leaving fewer people to support the mission, which has not ‘drawn down’. The increasing demands we are placing on our service personnel and their families, coupled with our nation's lucrative, private sector economy, are beginning to threaten our retention efforts, in both the officer and enlisted fields.

Question: If you agree with the findings, what actions do you plan to correct these concerns?

Answer: Retaining good people is the responsibility of every leader. I share a part of that responsibility, to ensure that those leaders who work for me are people I’d want to work for. Actions really do speak louder than words, and while some consider that an “old saw,” I believe it is ground truth. I plan to lead in a way that encourages others to continue in the service of their country, and I will expect nothing less of those leaders under me.

I, as do all members of the military, sincerely appreciate the efforts of the Congress, and especially the members of this Committee, to increase pay and to increase the DOD budget. I

plan to encourage Congress to spend more money on Defense. Insufficient operations and maintenance funding is a concern, but the larger issue is the shortfall in procurement money. We have paid for current readiness with our seed money for future readiness. Only the purchase of new equipment will stop the spiral of ever increasing maintenance costs. Modernization of our equipment, and significant investment in our infrastructure are paramount if we are to continue with a “shape, prepare and respond” strategy. These investments will positively impact every service member’s Quality of Life, which translates into increased job satisfaction, increased retention, more stability, and improved overall readiness.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Question: Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Answer: Yes.