

Testimony Before
The Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Thursday, August 1, 2002

Arms Control and Nuclear Terrorism;
A Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you to offer my views on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT).

On the one hand, it is easy to do so: I, like virtually every other witness that has appeared before Senate committees deliberating on the Treaty, support it. I do so on the basis that the Treaty provides for us to make changes in our nuclear forces that are desirable anyway on cost and strategic grounds, and it does not constrain our capabilities in militarily significant ways. The Treaty therefore does not require us to make any difficult tradeoffs of our own capabilities for those required of the Russian Federation. In terms of the limits it places on the Russian arsenal, the Treaty is correspondingly modest. Former Senator Sam Nunn has pointed this out most elegantly in his recent testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. SORT addresses only a small subset of the overall Russian nuclear capability -- deployed strategic weapons. It is silent on the larger and more dangerous portion of the Soviet nuclear legacy -- tactical nuclear weapons, reserve weapons, and fissile materials. As far as the strategic forces are concerned, Senator Nunn also pointed out that SORT addresses only numbers and is silent on "hair-trigger" operational practices.

I would be pleased to answer questions about the SORT Treaty to the best of my ability. But there is another dimension to this issue that I would like to address squarely. The SORT Treaty, while it makes a net contribution to our security -- positive in sign if small in magnitude -- does not point to the future or to the nuclear danger that most threatens the nation's security. That danger is the potential acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile materials, either from Russia or elsewhere.

It has been a full decade since loss of custody of nuclear weapons or fissile materials replaced deterrence of Moscow as the central objective of U.S. nuclear policy. I was privileged to participate in the early deliberations that led Senators Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn to create the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. I later led

that very program in the Pentagon. I conducted the Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture Review with my counterparts in the Joint Staff. We concluded even then, eight years ago, that traditional arms control was no longer the central tool for dealing with nuclear danger to the United States. The Nuclear Posture Review instead focused on stabilizing a chaotic Russia, expanding the Nunn-Lugar program, and on ensuring that only Russia ended up with all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. While traditional arms controllers criticized that focus at the time, events have borne out that it was the correct focus.

By any measure, the Nunn-Lugar program has been a tremendous success. In May I had the privilege of accompanying Senators Lugar and Nunn, together with Representatives John Spratt and Chris Shays, to sites in Russia where nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missile threats are being systematically safeguarded, or eliminated altogether. These projects were just a gleam in our eyes a decade ago, and now they are mature engineering projects. At the G8 summit, President Bush took an important step in gaining the pledges of other nations who have just as much at stake as we do to contribute to the Nunn-Lugar program, in the so-called "ten plus ten over ten" plan.

In a move that defies all understanding, however, the Bush administration has taken a step that is bringing these projects to a screeching halt. This administration has failed to make the certifications required by Congress, certifications that were made every year by the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. This situation occurs two months after President Bush proclaimed a "new era" in U.S.-Russian relations and two months after he signed the new SORT arms control treaty whose implementation would be accelerated by Nunn-Lugar; it occurs eleven months after al Qaeda showed there are no limits to its destructive urges and considers acquisition of nuclear weapons "a religious duty;" it occurs ten months after President Bush declared that keeping the most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the most dangerous people to be his highest priority. The certification mistake must be corrected, and quickly. I understand that Senators Lugar and Levin have made some progress in arranging an interim solution to this problem, and I hope Congress and the administration can find a more lasting solution. As Senator Lugar has said, the engineers and program managers running these valuable programs should not be made to suffer the "perils of Pauline" every year.

Russia is the largest potential source of "loose" nuclear weapons and fissile materials for terrorists, but it is not the only one. Pakistan and India have built nuclear arsenals to deter their neighbors, but Pakistan's political future, at the very least, is as uncertain as was Russia's when the Soviet Union was crumbling and the Nunn-Lugar program was begun. Less well recognized is that scores of nations from Serbia to Ghana have research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium. Plutonium remains in North Korea, though under U.S. and international observation. Even non-nuclear allies such as Japan and Belgium have repositories of weapons-capable plutonium as a byproduct of their nuclear power programs.

These caches of fissile materials around the world, we now must realize, pose an unacceptable long-term risk to humankind. Each is a “sleeper cell” of potential mass terrorism. And once a terrorist fashions a bomb, a device will be extremely difficult to detect as it passes through international borders in, say, shipping containers. Unlike its dangerous cousin bioterrorism, nuclear terrorism cannot be countered with vaccines or antibiotics. Once the material gets out, it is probably too late.

The simple technical fact is that nuclear terrorism can only be effectively prevented at the source. But here Nature has been kind. Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are difficult and conspicuous to produce. Only governments have done so to date, and all these materials are accordingly in the possession of governments. And whatever their disagreements about the arsenals in their possession, all governments should have a profound common interest in ensuring that these materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists.

The Preventive Defense Project at Harvard and Stanford has therefore worked to elaborate a concept put forward by Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar, in an impressive reprise of their invention of Cooperative Threat Reduction a decade ago – the concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.

The Coalition concept takes its cues from the coalition against al Qaeda. The coalition would contain all governments that perceive the profound common interest of keeping fissile materials away from terrorists, especially those that have bomb-capable materials to protect or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it, including Europe, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host research reactors using weapons-capable fuel. Each member could make contributions to the Coalition’s activities commensurate with its capabilities and traditions. The Coalition would extend the reach of its activities wherever in the world the means of nuclear terror seek harbor.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative sponsored a conference in Moscow on May 27, 2002 where American and Russian experts defined a specific agenda of activities for the Coalition. I have appended the report of that conference and a summary of the concept I wrote for *The Washington Post* to this statement, and I would request that both be entered into the record with my statement. The agenda called for a Global Coalition to combat terrorism in all phases – prevention, detection, protection, interdiction, and cleanup -- focused on the following actions:

- Establishing common, “world-class” standards for inventory control, safety, and security for weapons and weapons-usable materials – standards of the kind worked out between Russia and the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program.
- Establishing progressively stronger standards of transparency, to demonstrate to others that standards are being met.
- Providing assistance to those who need help meeting the Coalition’s standards.
- Cooperating to provide effective border and export controls regarding nuclear materials.

- Devising cooperative procedures to find and regain control of bombs or fissile materials if they are lost or seized by terrorists. One possibility is a Coalition version of the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) – a “global NEST.” Another possibility is to agree to facilitate deployment of national NEST teams, in the way that many nations deploy canine search teams to earthquake sites to search for survivors.
- Planning and researching cooperative responses to a nuclear or radiological explosion, such as mapping the contaminated area, addressing mass casualties, administering public health measures like iodine pills and cleaning up contaminated soil.
- Cooperating on forensic radiochemical techniques to find the source of a nuclear incident from its residue.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is clear to most of us that the SORT agreement upon which you are deliberating is probably the last of its kind. Its only parties are Moscow and Washington. It covers only deployed strategic forces, which were of paramount importance during the Cold War but are but a tip of the nuclear terrorism iceberg. I would suggest that the concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism is the seed of the arms control of 21st century.

The Coalition concept addresses the single most urgent problem of U.S. national security and international security. It just might provide a “big tent” for governments that have not participated much in “arms control” of the 20th century style – especially China, India, and Pakistan – since it is grounded in a deep and obvious common interest. If the United States and Russia jointly spearhead the Coalition, it would be a fitting next step after the SORT treaty and would provide Presidents Bush and Putin with an opportunity to give substance to their oft-spoken desire to move to a “qualitatively new” phase in relations.

The Coalition approach would open up a new and vitally important front in the war on terrorism. It would extend the principles of the successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way – from nuclear materials in Russia to nuclear materials worldwide, from a U.S.-funded program to wider international participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold War behind us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security problem.

Thank you.

PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT

A RESEARCH COLLABORATION OF STANFORD & HARVARD UNIVERSITIES
WILLIAM J. PERRY & ASHTON B. CARTER, CO-DIRECTORS

TO: Colleagues of the Preventive Defense Project

FROM: Ash Carter

SUBJECT: Trip Report: Nunn-Lugar Sites in Russia

This May represented the tenth anniversary of a trip to the former Soviet Union led by Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar, which launched the Nunn-Lugar program. I was privileged to accompany them on that first trip. Last week Nunn and Lugar led another trip and invited me to join them.

Moscow Conference Launching the Coalition Concept. The trip began in Moscow on Memorial Day with a conference sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the non-governmental organization co-founded by Sam Nunn and Ted Turner. The purpose of the conference was to promote the concept of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism. As most of you know, developing the Coalition concept is one of the main thrusts of the Preventive Defense Project this year, with support from NTI, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the MacArthur Foundation. The conference program is attached to this memo. I gave the conference wrap-up, the gist of which is contained in the conference report, also attached to this memo. An oped by Lugar and me from the Financial Times provides a short summary.

The Congressional Delegation led by Lugar consisted of Senators Bob Graham, Pete Domenici, Barbara Mikulski, and Jeff Bingaman; and Representatives Chris Shays and John Spratt. Sam Nunn and I were guests of the CODEL. PDP team members John Shalikashvili, Liz Sherwood, John Reppert, and Gretchen Bartlett also contributed to the Moscow conference.

Blowing Up SS-18 Silos. From Moscow the CODEL, with Nunn, Laura Holgate, and myself, flew to Magnitogorsk in the Urals on a U.S. Air Force C-9. We crossed the Ural River from Europe into Asia, driving past the town's Dickensian landscape of sulfur-belching smokestacks (thanks to Stalin), and made our first stop: the Strategic Rocket Forces base at Kartaly. There, in a ceremony of the type Holgate and I first

devised for Bill Perry, Russian Defense Minister Grachev, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Shmarov to showcase the denuclearization of Ukraine, the Members of Congress and I flipped switches on a platform mounted a distance from a hardened SS-18 silo (the SS-18 was the Soviet Union's largest ICBM and the inspiration for President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative). Three thousand pounds of explosives turned the silo into a deep, conical, blackened hole – thanks to the Nunn-Lugar program.

ICBM removal is complete in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, of course. In Russia the process will continue for some years and include implementation of the arms control agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow in the days before our arrival.

Destroying Chemical Weapons. After an overnight in Chelyabinsk, we traveled to Shchuch'ye (pronounced as in "Hands up or I'll...") where some 20,000 artillery shells and missile warheads filled with nerve gas are stored. After changing into gas masks and uniforms and testing the seals with CS riot gas, we walked through the sheds that house the munitions in shelves like bottles in a wine cellar. One "leaker" would kill us all if we were unprotected. One shell stolen by terrorists could kill a stadium full of people. All told, there was enough sarin, soman, and VX in those bunkers to kill the human race several times over.

The Nunn-Lugar program is building a facility to destroy the artillery shells from Shchuch'ye and another Russian storage site. For those like me who struggled for years to get this project going, it was gratifying indeed to see ground broken and construction underway.

Entombing Weapons-Grade Plutonium. This project was also a struggle to get underway, with plenty of blame to go around for the U.S. bureaucracy, U.S. Congress, and the Russians. But I am happy to report that the Mayak plutonium storage facility is a reality at long last, and an impressive one. Plutonium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons is to be placed in cans and the cans entombed in a huge concrete "massif" covered by 16 feet of concrete and overburden. Access to the facility is strictly controlled. No terrorist group could easily storm this fortress. And that's a good thing, since the half-life of plutonium-239 is 24, 400 years.

Reorienting a Bioweapons Lab. Our last stop was Novosibirsk, in Siberia north of Mongolia. There the Soviet Union built an entire city dedicated to exploring the use of viruses for biological warfare – Ebola, Marburg fever, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, and, of course, smallpox. We toured the VECTOR laboratory at which the world's second known smallpox culture is preserved (the other one is at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta). We entered the "hot zone" of one of the labs.

Happily, VECTOR's viral stocks are now surrounded by a Berlin-wall-style security perimeter built under the Nunn-Lugar program. Just as important, its scientists are working on peaceful collaborative scientific projects with American and other international scientific laboratories.

Summary. Thanks to the Nunn-Lugar program, projects like these dot the former Soviet Union, totaling some \$9 billion. These are large industrial projects, generally run by U.S. contractors with subcontracting to local firms for materials and services. They are beginning to make a substantial dent in the weapons of mass destruction legacy of the cold war. But they need continuing support and funding, which can be provided by members of Congress, like those on this CODEL, who take the time to visit and then bear witness to their colleagues in Washington. \$9 billion is only one fortieth of this year's defense budget!

Alas, Russia is not the only place where the stuff of mass destruction exists. Pakistan and India have it. Scores of countries have research reactors containing weapons-grade uranium fuel. Power reactors in nations from Japan to Belgium produce plutonium (you can make perfectly good bombs from reactor-grade plutonium). In North Korea, which Bill Perry and I visited in 2000, plutonium still exists at Yongbyon. The ingredients of chemical and biological weapons are even easier to find, since they are widespread in industry and science. In short, the problem is global, and – as the Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism proposes – the solution must be global.

Finally, since I was present at the birthing of Nunn-Lugar and worked to make it a reality in the Pentagon, seeing the job being accomplished is an inspiration – and we and our families all owe great gratitude to Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar.

Moscow Conference Report

Connecting the Dots on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism: The Clear Danger and the Imperative of a Global Coalition Response

Report on a Conference Sponsored by
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Moscow
May 27, 2002

Senator Richard Lugar and NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn

Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn called for the creation of a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism at a conference of Russian and American legislators, officials and experts on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) held in Moscow on May 27. The Coalition would extend the global effort to combat terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers and Pentagon to preventing the quantum leap in destructive potential that would result if such terrorists got access to WMD. The conference, sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, took place on the tenth anniversary of the historic visit to Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan that launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar. The Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism would build on the foundation of the highly successful Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, applying its principles globally to situations that pose similar risks of WMD terrorism.

To prevent the most dangerous people from gaining possession of the most dangerous weapons, the Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism would aim to eliminate “sleepers cells” of unsafeguarded ingredients for catastrophic terrorism – nuclear, biological, or chemical. If terrorists like Osama bin Laden get their hands on WMD, there will be no shield of deterrence or negotiation as there was between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War to prevent their use; terrorists will simply use them. The result – for example, a crude nuclear device detonated in lower Manhattan or downtown Moscow, or the release of smallpox in the U.S. or Russia – would dwarf 9/11 in destructiveness and transform our societies into camps of fear.

Unfortunately, the ingredients of WMD terror are all too readily available. Only a fraction of Russia’s huge store of nuclear bomb materials, enough for up to 80,000 or so devices, has yet been furnished with the latest protections under the Nunn-Lugar program. While Russia’s stocks are the largest, sleeper cells of bomb-making potential exist throughout the world as a result of nuclear weapons programs, as a byproduct of nuclear power projects, or in research

reactors. Research reactors in nations from Serbia to Ghana use bomb-sized quantities of highly-enriched uranium as fuel. Pakistan and India continue to build nuclear arsenals aimed at one another but posing a wider global risk if they fall prey to seizure by extremists. The grim bottom line is that the wherewithal for nuclear terrorism exists in score of nations and in hundreds of individual buildings. Once these materials get out, they are extremely difficult to locate and retrieve. And once a terrorist fashions a bomb from them, no vaccine or antibiotic offers protection.

The ingredients of biological and chemical terrorism are also frighteningly available, since they are a widespread and necessary part of industry and scientific practice. There is no worldwide effort to safeguard them from misuse, to detect attack in time for treatments to work, or to research and deploy better protections and treatments.

In short, “sleeper cells” of the makings for catastrophic terrorism dot the globe, as do terrorists who would use them. It is time to connect the dots. The objective of the Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism is to extend what the U.S.-Russian Nunn-Lugar program has been doing for the past decade to the entire globe, and with global cooperation and partnership.

Conference participants called upon Presidents Bush and Putin to join in gathering international partners in a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.

The Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism would be spearheaded by the United States and the Russian Federation. President Putin was the first head of state to join the coalition against al Qaeda, in his much-publicized telephone call to President Bush on September 11 as the World Trade Towers fell. But the coalition against al Qaeda quickly gained the adherence of virtually all governments because all had a profound common interest. Members of the Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it -- including Europe, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and the many nations that host research reactors that use weapons-grade fuel. All nations, whatever else might divide them, and however much they might differ over policies on the nuclear arsenals possessed by governments, can recognize a clear and profound common interest in unifying to keep WMD away from terrorists. Each member could make a contribution to the Coalition's activities commensurate with its capabilities and traditions. The Coalition would extend the reach of its activities wherever in the world the means of WMD terror seek harbor.

Nations in the Coalition would cooperate to combat WMD terrorism in all phases --prevention, detection, protection, interdiction, and consequence management.

In the case of nuclear terrorism, examples of Coalition activities discussed at the conference included:

- Establishing common, “world-class” standards for inventory control, safety, and security for weapons and weapons-usable materials – standards of the kind worked out between Russia and the United States in the Nunn-Lugar program.
- Establishing progressively stronger standards of transparency, to demonstrate to others that standards are being met.
- Providing assistance to those who need help meeting the Coalition’s standards.
- Cooperating to provide effective border and export controls regarding nuclear materials.
- Devising cooperative procedures to find and regain control of bombs or fissile materials if they are lost or seized by terrorists. One possibility is a Coalition version of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) – a “global NEST.” Another possibility is to agree to facilitate deployment of national NEST teams, in the way that many nations deploy canine search teams to earthquake sites to search for survivors.
- Planning and researching cooperative responses to a nuclear or radiological explosion, such as mapping the contaminated area, addressing mass casualties, administering public health measures like iodine pills and cleaning up contaminated soil.
- Cooperating on forensic radiochemical techniques to find the source of a nuclear incident from its residue.

In the case of bioterrorism, conference participants discussed an equally rich menu of possible actions that the Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism could take, including:

- Establishing common, “world-class” techniques for safeguarding biological materials in preparation, handling, and scientific use.
- Developing public health surveillance methods on a global scale to detect an incident of bioterrorism in its early stages. Such methods would also provide important benefits in combating infectious disease and improving global public health.
- Shaping normative standards for the conduct of scientific practice in the area of biotechnology and microbiology, including the possibility of making it a universal crime, punishable under national laws, to make or assist the making of bioweapons.
- Cooperating in research on diagnosis, prophylaxis (e.g., vaccines against bioagents), and treatment (e.g., antibiotics and antivirals).
- Cooperating in developing protective techniques like inhalation masks and filtered ventilation systems.
- Cooperating in developing techniques for decontaminating buildings that have been attacked (as was needed in the Hart Senate Office Building after anthrax-contaminated mail was sent there).

- Cooperating in forensic techniques for identifying the perpetrators of a bioattack (as was needed in the analysis of the anthrax mailings in the United States).

Conference participants emphasized that only by taking urgent, concrete action on a global scale could terrorism be stopped from escalating to catastrophic scale. The Coalition approach we advocate would open a new and more important front in the war on terrorism. It would also extend the principles of the successful Cooperative Threat Reduction or Nunn-Lugar program in a new way – from WMD in the former Soviet Union to WMD worldwide, from a U.S.-funded program to wider international participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold War behind us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security problem.

In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, uniting against catastrophic terrorism as their highest priority would reflect the expressed determination of both President Bush and President Putin to move to a qualitatively new level in their relationship and to focus on the new problems of the 21st century at the same time they continue to deal with other issues such as arms treaties and treaty compliance, NATO, the Balkans, Chechnya, Iran, Iraq, missile defense, Jackson-Vanik, and trade issues. All these issues are important, and on some of them the United States and Russia differ. But the specter of WMD terrorism is more dangerous than any of them and should remind both nations that they have a deep and overriding common interest in combating terrorism. The Coalition concept can provide a new context within which the United States and Russia can pursue U.S. concerns about Russia's bioweapons program and its nuclear technology exports. Russia's technical expertise can be turned into a considerable asset in service of the Coalition concept, as befits one of the Coalition's founding members.

Recalling the launching of the Nunn-Lugar program ten years ago, conference participants agreed to work to build international support for the concept of a Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism. Senator Lugar, as the senior Republican on both the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees of the U.S. Senate, pledged to work with colleagues in the Congress to promote the concept. Senator Nunn pledged the assistance of the non-governmental Nuclear Threat Initiative in developing and promoting the Coalition concept. We are traveling to Norway after leaving Russia to discuss the Coalition concept with European policymakers and experts.

Moscow Conference Program

Reducing the Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction Building a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism

Monday, May 27

Location: Marriott Aurora
Petrovksy 1 Meeting Room

8:00-9:00 AM Registration

9:00-9:15 AM Welcome by Conference Chairman
The Hon. William S. Cohen, Former Secretary of Defense

9:15-9:45 AM The Unfinished Business of Nunn-Lugar: New Threats in the New
Century—U.S. Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee

9:45-10:15 AM Combating Terrorism and WMD: The Path Ahead
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (Invited)

Introduction by Susan Eisenhower, President, The Eisenhower
Institute

10:15-10:30 AM Break

10:30 AM-12:00 PM The U.S.-Russian Response to the Terrorists Attacks of September
11, 2001: A Panel Discussion of Congress and Duma Members

Moderator: U.S. Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of Senate
Intelligence Committee

Panelists:

Vladimir Lukin, Deputy Chairman, Duma

U.S. Sen. Barbara Mikulski

U.S. Rep. Chris Shays

Ilya Klebanov, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology

Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute for Europe

12:00-1:00 PM Buffet Lunch
Petrovsky 2 and 3 Meeting Rooms

1:15-1:45 PM A New Chapter in Threat Reduction:
A Multinational Coalition Against WMD Terrorism—Senator Sam
Nunn

Introduction by Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy of the Duma and
Russian Academy of Sciences

Petrovsky I Meeting Room

1:45-3:00 PM Agenda of a Coalition to Counter Nuclear Terrorism

Moderator: Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of the USA and
Canada

Panelists:

Alexander Rumyantsev, Minister of Atomic Energy

U.S. Sen. Pete Domenici

Anatoliy Zrodnikov, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

Amb. Linton Brooks, DOE

Col. Gen. Igor Valynkin

3:00-4:15 PM Agenda of a Coalition to Counter Biological and Chemical
Terrorism

Moderator: Amy Smithson, The Henry Stimson Center

Panelists:

Dr. David Franz, Southern Research Center

Zinovy Pak, General Director, Munitions Agency

Prof. Lev Sandakhchiev, Director “Vector”

Vladimir Andreevich Gavrilov, Pokrov Plan of Biopreparations

Gennady Onischenko, 1st Deputy Health Minister

U.S. Sen. Jeff Bingaman, Chairman, Energy and Natural Resources Committee

4:15-4:30 PM

Break

4:30-5:45 PM

Agenda for Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism.

Moderator: Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Panelists:

Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky

U.S. Rep. John Spratt

Amb. Rolf Ekeus, Chairman, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Alexei Arbatov, State Duma

5:45-6:00 PM

Summary and Action Plan: Ashton Carter

6:00-6:30 PM

Nunn and Lugar Press Conference

6:30-10:00 PM

U.S.-Russian Business Council Dinner
Hotel Metropol

Lugar-Carter OpEd on Coalition Concept

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May 23, 2002, Thursday USA Edition 1

SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 15

HEADLINE: A new era, a new threat: The US and Russia should form a coalition to stop terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons, say Richard Lugar and Ashton Carter:

BYLINE: By ASHTON CARTER and RICHARD LUGAR

BODY:

The news that George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin plan to sign a pact to bring cold war arsenals down to post-cold-war levels should be welcomed. But that should not disguise the fact that the agreement belongs to a bygone era.

Until little more than a decade ago, the biggest single threat in the world was the power of mass destruction in the hands of governments. Washington's and Moscow's greatest fear was each other. Today, things have changed dramatically and Russia and the US face a common enemy: terrorist groups in possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Presidents Bush and Putin have worked hard to forge the beginnings of a new relationship. When they meet tomorrow in Moscow, the two leaders should use this diplomatic momentum to declare a new front in the war on terrorism, aimed at building a coalition against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The goal should be the formation of a coalition to safeguard nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their component materials and technology so that they do not fall into the wrong hands.

The heaviest concentration of such materials is in Russia, where they are being systematically safeguarded and eliminated under the so-called Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction programme. But the co-alition against WMD terrorism should be global, like the ongoing war against al-Qaeda.

Weapons-grade uranium exists in research reactors in scores of nations around the world. Allies such as Belgium and Japan, which possess no nuclear arsenals, maintain large stocks of plutonium that, if stolen by terrorists, could produce many bombs. The nuclear programmes and arsenals of Pakistan and India constitute a growing and obvious risk of leakage that must be dealt with. Although China is not a party to traditional arms control regimes, exploratory overtures should be launched to determine its willingness to join a co-operative effort aimed at "loose nukes".

The coalition members would be asked to agree on standards for safeguarding weapons-grade materials. If any party needed help in meeting those standards, it could receive assistance from the others through a global, Nunn-Lugar-like coalition threat reduction programme. This could be financed via a fund made up of contributions from the US, Europe, Russia, Japan and others. Such a fund could be used for key coalition acquisitions in the area of materiel and weapons site enhancements.

The coalition members would work together on measures to retrieve dangerous materials or bombs in the event of theft or loss. They could even agree to aid any victim of nuclear terrorism, helping to define the area contaminated and to undertake the process of cleaning up radioactive areas and making them habitable.

One vital aspect of the coalition's duties would be to combat bio-terrorism. It would recommend standards for handling pathogens and for conducting peaceful and defensive scientific work in this field. Its members could share research results on diagnosis, prevention and treatment of likely bio-terror agents, on air filtration and other methods to stop their spread and on ways to decontaminate buildings exposed to bio-attack.

Russia has leading experts on biological warfare. Mr. Putin could use the establishment of such a coalition to open up Russia's bio-weapons laboratories and, working co-operatively with the US, put such scientific expertise to work for the broader cause of global public health. A gesture along these lines would increase exponentially the opportunities for enhanced co-operation with the US and other coalition partners.

By proposing that the next phase of the war on terrorism focus on weapons of mass destruction, and by forming a coalition including Russia to combat it, Mr. Bush would be tackling arguably the most important problem in international security today. By asking Russia to join as a founding member in the coalition against WMD terrorism, he would be seeking to draw Russia into a new - and vastly more influential - international role. Indeed, such a coalition could provide both leaders with a focus for the new post-cold-war relationship they have propounded but have yet to give real content. It would be a fitting replacement for the old-style bi-lateral arms control regimes whose era is drawing to a close.

Pursued creatively, the concept of a coalition could serve as a model for a new type of arms regulation for the 21st century. September 11 signaled the need. This week's summit in Moscow provides the opportunity.

Senator Lugar is a senior member on the Senate foreign relations and intelligence committees. Ashton Carter is a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and former assistant secretary of defence during the Clinton administration

Throw the Net Worldwide

By Ashton B. Carter

There's been much talk in the past few weeks about failures to connect the dots to find a pattern that might have alerted us to the terrorist plot of Sept. 11. Recently I visited a dot in a more fearsome pattern configuring the virtual certainty of mass terror involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons if the international coalition does not extend its efforts from hunting al Qaeda-like cells to locking up the ingredients of mass destruction.

The dot I visited was at Mayak, east of the Ural Mountains in Asian Russia. There, a huge concrete sarcophagus rises from the landscape. Its purpose is to entomb some 20,000 nuclear bombs' worth of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Russia is dismantling the Soviet Union's Cold War surplus warheads. The fissile metal chunks taken out of the bombs will be placed in stainless steel cans and the cans embedded in a concrete "massif," itself enclosed within 16-foot thick walls. Access to and from this fortress will be highly restricted and monitored with the latest in radiation and other sensors.

Fortunately, when the sarcophagus is completed, it will be nearly impossible for a terrorist raid, or even a military assault, to breach Mayak's security. This fortress is being built with U.S. Department of Defense funds, through the foresight of former senator Sam Nunn and Sen. Dick Lugar, who led last week's trip to Mayak. The Defense program, universally known as Nunn-Lugar, is probably the wisest investment in security, dollar for dollar, of any piece of the defense budget.

Unfortunately the cans of fissile material have not yet been lowered into the massif at Mayak, nor will they be for several more years. Only a fraction of Russia's huge store of fissile materials, enough for a staggering 80,000 bombs, has yet been furnished with the latest protections. And if terrorists such as al Qaeda get such materials, there will be no shield of deterrence or negotiation as there was between Washington and Moscow; terrorists will simply use them.

Worse news, and far less well known, is that caches of bomb-making potential literally dot the globe. Research reactors in nations from Serbia to Ghana use bomb-sized quantities of highly enriched uranium as fuel. Pakistan and India brandish nuclear arsenals. Pakistan's political future is at least as shaky as Russia's was in 1992, when the Nunn-Lugar program began. Plutonium remains in North Korea, though under U.S. and international observation. Even non-nuclear allies such as Japan and Belgium have repositories of weapons-capable plutonium as a byproduct of their nuclear power programs.

Nowhere is this material protected to anything like Mayak's standards, and in many cases there are not even armed guards at the repositories. The grim bottom line is that the wherewithal for nuclear terrorism exists in scores of nations and in hundreds of individual buildings. Once these materials get out, they are extremely difficult to locate and retrieve. And once a terrorist fashions a bomb from them, no vaccine or antibiotic offers protection.

After leaving Mayak, I traveled with Nunn and Lugar to the "hot zone" of a once-secret city in Siberia that houses the only known smallpox culture outside the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Another dot. The ingredients of biological and chemical terrorism are even more widely available than fissile material, since many are widespread and necessary parts of industry and scientific practice.

In short, sleeper cells of the makings for catastrophic terrorism dot the globe. If a bomb goes off in New York, Moscow or Berlin, won't it be clear in hindsight that we should have connected these dots?

What is needed, as Nunn and Lugar have pointed out, is a global coalition against catastrophic terrorism, patterned on the coalition formed after 9/11. It should be spearheaded by the United States and the Russian Federation, a forward-looking move for Bush and Putin, and a refreshing change from once again declaring an end to the Cold War.

Members of the coalition against catastrophic terrorism would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it, including Europe, Japan, China, India, Pakistan and the many nations that host research reactors using weapons-grade fuel. All nations, however much they might differ over policies on the nuclear arsenals possessed by governments, can recognize a clear shared interest in unifying to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists.

Each member could make a contribution to the coalition's activities commensurate with its capabilities and traditions. As with the coalition against al Qaeda, this one would extend its reach to wherever in the world the means for terrorism using weapons of mass destruction can be found. Nations in the coalition would cooperate to combat such terrorism in all phases -- prevention, detection, protection, interdiction and cleanup. For nuclear weapons, the coalition would agree to world-class standards for protecting all fissile material everywhere as though it were a bomb. Assistance could be offered to those who need help meeting the standards. Coalition members could also agree to come to one another's aid to find materials lost or seized.

For bioterrorism, the coalition would develop world-class standards for safeguarding such pathogens as the Siberian smallpox cache, develop public health surveillance methods to detect bioterrorism in its early stages and perform cooperative research in vaccines, treatments, forensics and decontamination.

The coalition approach would open a new and more important front in the war on terrorism. It would also extend the principles of the successful Nunn-Lugar program in a new way -- from dots in Russia to dots worldwide, from a Pentagon-funded program to wider international participation, and from a focus on putting the Cold War behind us to focusing on the 21st century's most riveting security problem.

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