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UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF  
ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, USN  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND  
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
ON  
THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY  
(THE MOSCOW TREATY)

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, Distinguished Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before you once again representing the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command and our Nation's strategic forces. You have asked me to share with you my professional military assessment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty. As you know, earlier in the year I appeared before this Committee to discuss the Nuclear Posture Review, and I now welcome the opportunity to address this treaty which codifies the President's decision to significantly reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This historic treaty represents the most recent milestone in a journey toward a new and more positive relationship with Russia within a dramatically changed strategic environment.

I am pleased to convey to you today my strong support for the Moscow Treaty. The global security environment has evolved in new and unexpected ways over the last ten years. I believe that properly shaping the strategic environment as we draw down our deployed stockpile over the next ten years, and beyond, will require both constructive engagement and increased adaptive flexibility in appropriately structuring our strategic forces. This treaty is a step towards meeting those national security needs. While recent events have highlighted new dangers, on the positive side of the ledger our historical Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, has disappeared. Its place has been taken by a renewed Russia, with the stated goal of transforming into a peaceful, democratic, free-market nation. Today, as a Nation, we have more in common with Russia than we have lingering differences, and for the first time in my lifetime we face similar shared global challenges and not each other. The Moscow Treaty acknowledges this new relationship and the increasing trust and flexibility each nation seeks as we address the changing security requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Military Sufficiency**

The Moscow Treaty will allow the United States to sustain a credible deterrent with the lowest possible level of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads consistent with our national security requirements and obligations to our allies. This lower level, 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, is roughly one-third the level specified in the START Treaty. As you know, our country faces an array of security challenges that differ dramatically from our Cold War past. The Moscow Treaty will permit me, as the commander of our strategic forces, to prudently plan and anticipate a broad range of possible scenarios. As we look to the future, our planning necessarily includes adaptively positioning and posturing our strategic forces to meet the unique deterrent and security challenges posed by rogue states, non-state actors, and unknown adversaries yet to come. The Nuclear Posture Review and the Moscow Treaty allow warhead reductions reflective of our emerging relationship with Russia while enabling the Department of Defense to plan and prepare for a broader range of strategic options to present to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

If unforeseen circumstances arise, either through a decline in the safety and reliability of our aging stockpile or the emergence of unexpected new threats, this treaty allows the United States to react appropriately in response to our changing security needs. In short, under the Moscow Treaty we can militarily meet our deterrence needs, be prepared for a range of technological or security uncertainties, while continuing to encourage a relationship of trust, cooperation, and friendship with Russia that can lead to ever larger diplomatic, economic, and security benefits for us all.

## **Flexibility**

From a military perspective, a primary benefit of this innovative arms control agreement is its flexibility, which is achieved in several new ways. As you know, the Moscow Treaty allows each side to determine an appropriate pace for reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads enroute to

significantly lower codified levels. As we implement the NPR and develop a broader range of advanced conventional forces, new defenses, and renewed infrastructure, we must be able to carefully draw down the right number and mix of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads based on actual and anticipated need. This approach acknowledges the uncertainties associated with sustaining an aging stockpile, and permits the best sequencing of life extension and dismantlement programs according to military necessity and the capabilities of the supporting Department of Energy infrastructure.

As you know, under the Moscow Treaty the United States has the option of storing those warheads not operationally deployed. As a result of decisions made over a decade ago, the United States is the only nuclear power in the world today that does not possess a nuclear warhead production capability. From a military perspective, it is essential that we retain the capability to respond to emerging threats or weapon safety and reliability issues. Under these circumstances, the storing of an appropriate number of non-deployed nuclear warheads provides an important weapon reliability and contingency response capability that will allow us to meet national security needs over the life of the treaty.

While we will continue to follow START I counting rules, one important aspect of this treaty is that the actual deployed warheads are counted rather than assigning notional numbers to each potential delivery platform. This construct allows the United States to retain, reduce, or restructure critical dual-use weapons delivery platforms - those that also can employ conventional weapons - so as to meet a broader range of military requirements. Specifically, the provisions of the Moscow Treaty will enable the United States to pursue transformational concepts such as modifying Trident submarines for conventional missions. The agreement will also permit us to properly size and configure the bomber force, which continues to prove its value in the skies over Afghanistan.

## Verification

A dramatic reflection of the emerging strategic relationship with Russia is the absence of unique verification provisions in the Moscow Treaty. As you know, the comprehensive verification regime of the START Treaty will remain in force until at least December 2009, providing a solid foundation for continued confidence-building and improved transparency. But, in a real sense, the Moscow Treaty formalizes a weapon drawdown that reflects the declared interest and intent of both parties.

Rather than unnecessarily focus on inspection and compliance, we have an opportunity to forge a relationship which may encourage even further cooperation, transparency and trust. At United States Strategic Command, we are beginning important steps toward this goal in order to complement the efforts of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security created under the Joint Declaration on 24 May, and the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission. As a new initiative, I have recently added a senior State Department political advisor to my staff, who will bring valuable experience and expertise to the Command as we continue to work with our Russian counterparts. As part of the Defense Department's engagement program, we have also reinvigorated the Command's military-to-military security cooperation program and submitted detailed one, five, and ten-year goals to incrementally broaden the exchange of information, develop new relationships, and help preserve strategic stability. When the United States Strategic Command and the United States Space Command unite on October 1, 2002, the new unified command will have the opportunity to expand this program to even wider participation across the spectrum of global military missions.

This emerging and positive relationship will also permit the United States and Russia to address issues and challenges that are important, but appropriately not addressed in this treaty. Tactical nuclear weapons remain a concern and will be addressed in future consultations and engagements. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have each indicated to the Senate

they intend to use the upcoming discussions with their counterparts to continue the dialogue on this issue. In regards to the dismantlement of unneeded warheads, the different approaches taken by both parties in pursuit of this shared goal are appropriately reflective of their individual circumstances and capabilities. Having chosen a decade ago to forego weapon production, the United States' dismantlement effort is paced by long term stockpile reliability and potential national security needs. Russia simultaneously sustains an active production and disassembly capability and has a broader range of weapon and nuclear material security concerns. The continued support provided by the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, as part of a larger international effort, remains essential to the success of improved Russian counter-proliferation efforts.

### **Conclusion**

The Moscow Treaty is a positive milestone early in our strategic journey toward a new partnership with Russia, and formalized the decisions made by the nation's civilian leadership. As the Secretary of Defense highlighted recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this treaty provides all of the benefits attributed to arms control agreements – dialogue, consultations, lower force levels, predictability, stability, and transparency – without the need for extensive and adversarial negotiations and debates over compliance and enforcement issues. Under the Moscow Treaty, our nation can accomplish its essential military force re-structuring, meet its anticipated critical national security needs, and retain the ability to react to the inevitable unexpected challenges yet to come. I fully support this treaty.

As always, I must also express my appreciation for your continued support of the men and women of United States Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they continue to make to our Nation's security.

Thank you and I welcome your questions.