STATEMENT OF

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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

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STRATEGIC SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and Distinguished Members of the Committee,

It is an honor to again appear before you, representing the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command, to address the strategic issues that remain so vital to the nation. As you recall, during our last hearing we discussed space operations, allowing us to focus today on strategic deterrence and the actions underway to shape a dramatically different strategic future.

US Strategic Command, our components, and our task forces are crafting an entirely new command, instrumental in fighting the war on terrorism, deterring a wider array of potential adversaries, and focused on recasting the nation's global military capabilities for the demands of the 21st Century. We are drawing on the best elements of both US Space Command and US Strategic Command in order to eliminate seams, broaden oversight and streamline responsibilities. Significant reductions in the level of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons have begun in compliance with Presidential direction, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Moscow Treaty while continuing to meet our obligations under START. Associated deactivation or modification of strategic delivery platforms is also well underway.

STRATCOM continues to deploy or provide intelligence, planning, targeting, space, and information operations expertise to operations in US Central Command and around the world. We have reshaped and streamlined the command's component and organizational structure to enable an integrated and trans-regional approach to matching global capabilities to global challenges. Importantly, we also completed a comprehensive update to our deterrent force plans to reflect the needs of the new international security environment.

While these efforts are critical, they represent only the first steps toward a much broader vision of our strategic future. On January 10, 2003, the President signed Change Two to the Unified Command Plan and tasked us specifically with four previously unassigned responsibilities. These are:

global strike, missile defense integration, Department of Defense information operations, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This unique combination of roles, capabilities, and authorities under a single unified command will bring new opportunities in the strategic arena, in addition to further refining the global opportunities to support the regional combatant commanders.

We are quickly integrating the efforts of our strong and growing team of Service, Agency, national laboratory, and Intelligence Community partners to define specific goals, identify milestones and quantify the progress of our collective efforts. Today, the new US Strategic Command is improving our nation's joint combat effectiveness by modernizing systems, streamlining processes, and providing a broader range of fully integrated mission capabilities to the warfighter and to our nation's leaders.

The Future of our Nuclear Force Structure

I am proud to again report that our nation's nuclear deterrent forces remain fully ready. They are manned by a cadre of true professionals who, around the world and around the clock, effectively support the nuclear pillar of our national security strategy. As you know, for more than 56 years, Strategic Air Command and the former US Strategic Command stood at the ready, supporting deterrence through rigorous and disciplined planning, effective training, and robust command and control of our nation's strategic nuclear forces. The professionals of the new US Strategic Command still willingly shoulder that enormous responsibility. We remain fully confident that STRATCOM's readiness, and that of our Service components, is the most effective guarantee that the use of these weapons will never be required. As we reshape our organization and assume broader responsibilities, we remain committed to rigorously ensuring the continued safety and surety of our nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Zero defects remain our standard.

We are making prudent and measurable progress in achieving the President's goal, codified in the Moscow Treaty, of between 1700 to 2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2012. Air Force Space Command, our Air Force component, began deactivation of Peacekeeper ICBMs on 1 October 2002. This effort remains on schedule and will be complete by 2005. The Navy removed two Trident submarines, USS Ohio and USS Florida, from strategic service in FY03, to be followed in FY04 by USS Michigan and USS Georgia. All four of these capable vessels will be modified into TOMAHAWK cruise missile carriers, designated SSGN, by the end of 2007. They will also provide a tremendous increase in the size and sustainability of support to our special operations forces. With the 1996 re-role of the B-1 to a non-nuclear role, we are moving to retire several hundred gravity weapons in FY03, and are finalizing plans to remove many of the oldest ICBM warheads from the nation's active nuclear stockpile.

Sustainment and Modernization

With no new nuclear systems under development, the important task of sustaining and modernizing our nation's aging weapons and delivery platforms must be carefully managed and appropriately resourced. These forces must remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our nation's security posture. Other than the Navy's submarine launched D-5 missile, still in low-rate production, we are no longer building any of the weapons or platforms that comprise our strategic forces. We appreciate your continued strong support, through Service and Agency programs, of our key weapon, delivery platform, and communications life extension and upgrade programs. These include:

- Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP), replaces aging electronic components and updates software to preserve reliability, maintain accuracy, and ensure supportability through 2020. The GRP is the foundation of MMIII

modernization and is being completed at the rate of 80 per year, with 140 deployed to date.

- Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), corrects age-related degrades by repouring the propellant in stages I and II, and remanufactures stage III. PRP requires GRP software for fielding, and must be sequenced appropriately. It is programmed at the rate of 96 per year, with 49 boosters deployed to date.
- B-52 Avionics Mid-life Improvement, one of STRATCOM's highest priorities, and AEHF upgrade, to ensure mission capability and assured connectivity as this aircraft continues to establish new benchmarks in service longevity.
- D5 SLBM Life Extension and Backfit Programs, will provide a standardized fleet of 14 SSBNs for the full hull life of the Trident II. Two of four SSBNs have completed backfit with the remaining two scheduled for completion in FY06 and FY07. D5 life extension requires replacement of guidance and missile electronics on fielded D5 missiles, and procurement of 115 additional missiles to meet reliability testing needs over the 14-year life extension of the hull. The D5 Life Extension Program is adequately funded and on schedule for initial operational capability (IOC) in FY13.
- B-2 communications upgrade, which may require acceleration in future years to ensure secure and survivable connectivity as AEHF replaces MILSTAR.
- Strategic War Planning System (SWPS), which recently completed an initial upgrade and is now entering a new phase. This new modernization effort will incorporate the flexibility and responsiveness envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and broadened to support our newly assigned non-nuclear strategic and regional support missions.
- Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control System (C2IC2S), which will replace aging and unsustainable NORAD / US Strategic Command mission-unique battle management systems with a single, open architecture. CCIC2S is on track to incrementally deliver warfighting C2 capability for NORAD in

late FY04, strategic missile warning in early FY06, with space surveillance and control capabilities being delivered from FY03 through FY08.

In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs, we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense and Energy, and the Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable and credible. As the nation's nuclear stockpile continues to age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling, simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on aging effects, component reliability and physics phenomena we require in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. As you know, past drawdowns in nuclear weapon infrastructure require that the essential warhead life extension programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet operational deterrent force requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national labs and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the production complex operating near its peak capacity, we will need to optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and dismantlement work.

Annually, at the direction of the President, I provide a nuclear weapon stockpile assessment to the Secretary of Defense. In my last assessment, based on the information provided by my staff and independent advice from our expert Strategic Advisory Group, I outlined my confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This is the first time since the program began in 1996 that a STRATCOM assessment did not indicate a decline in confidence in the reliability of the stockpile. I attribute this directly to the continued improvements in and funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to the steps taken by NNSA and the Services to diligently address previously reported technical issues, and to the progress of the ongoing life extension programs.

I agree with the rigorous technical analysis conducted, and confirmed to the Secretary there is currently no need to consider resumption of nuclear testing. I appreciate your strong support for funding of the NNSA, enabling continuation of their important work.

As we continue to sustain and modernize our forces, we are also working closely with the Services and the Department of Energy to address the critical anti-terrorism and force protection requirements associated with safeguarding the nation's nuclear systems. The ongoing Mighty Guardian exercise series and the Nuclear Command and Control System Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review have helped the Services and the Department of Energy better focus their security efforts. While the changing character of the postulated threats requires continuous evaluation, I believe the Services are making concrete improvements in physical security, though much remains to be done. We will continue to encourage this effort through the STRATCOM Integrated Priority List and will remain an active participant in the creation of implementation guidance that will flow from completed Office of the Secretary of Defense policy studies such as the NPR and the End-to-End Review.

Future Enhanced Capabilities.

It is well known that much of our current military capability was designed or procured for a dramatically different international security environment. This is especially true of our nation's deterrent forces. Though sustainment and modernization of these systems remains essential, equally important is the examination of future concepts and the contribution they could make to our deterrent posture. A fundamental assumption of the Nuclear Posture Review is that a mix of advanced capabilities, some yet to be designed, that include conventional, non-kinetic, special operations and nuclear, is needed in order to offer the broadest range of options to our nation's leaders. Such a spectrum of capabilities will both enable the planned NPR draw down in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and

form part of a New Triad of deterrence in support of the President's goal of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. While there are certainly significant policy issues associated with this transformational effort, it is also true that much laboratory research and development, detailed analytical study and advanced simulation efforts are an essential underpinning to such a fact-based dialogue. A number of organizations, including the Department of Defense and the Defense Science Board have nascent reviews underway. As the Secretary of Defense has noted, these studies are intended to consider and weigh alternatives and in no way pre-suppose decisions as to detailed design, production or deployment.

Advanced Conventional Capabilities and Global Strike. US Strategic Command's newly assigned global strike mission extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities to the broader spectrum of conflict. We will incorporate conventional, non-kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum contingency arsenal and into the nation's strategic war plan to further reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. This innovative approach will enable the command to deliberately and adaptively plan and rapidly deliver limited-duration, non-nuclear combat power anywhere in the world. Our intent is to provide a wide range of advanced options to the President in responding to time-critical, high-threat, global challenges and, thereby, raise even higher the nuclear threshold.

As envisioned, global strike could be decisively conducted at the direction of our most senior civilian leaders. It also represents a powerful tool in support of the regional combatant commander, essentially increasing the forces and options he has available to deter and engage an adversary. In either case, global strike will provide the nation the ability to engage priority targets by moving rapidly from actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to senior-level decision-making and the delivery of kinetic or non-kinetic effects across thousands of miles. It can provide what may be

the most critical element early in the fight – time. As a regional combatant commander assembles and moves forces into position or needs to strike into temporarily denied areas, US Strategic Command can provide early planning and tangible, long-range combat capability. We are initially building this capability around the bomber force, and are bringing the B-1 back into our force structure in its purely conventional role. This committee's continued support of advanced conventional weapons initiatives such as the SSGN will assist in our immediate efforts to improve joint war fighting effectiveness. We continue to study concepts such as conventional ballistic missiles, Common Aerospace Vehicles, hypersonic aircraft, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could play a significant role in improving our global strike capabilities in the mid to long-term.

Information Operations (IO). Delivering on the promise of information operations is one of US Strategic Command's top priorities. Incorporating computer network attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations, strategic deception and operational security, this nascent mission area promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive capabilities, and may play a large role in shaping the size and character of future force structures. Quite simply, I believe that integrated IO comprise the next revolution in war fighting, and our new role as the integrator of DoD information operations will bring a joint perspective to improvements in capabilities, ensure ready access to IO planning, reduce stovepipes, test and validate new capabilities, and provide a responsive command and control system to the nation's civilian leaders and combatant commanders.

Our current vision has US Strategic Command serving as the central IO armory. While we need not own Service and Agency IO programs, or execute all IO missions, we must have full insight and access to all DoD IO capabilities as well as execution capability for strategic efforts. We will capitalize on our proven expertise in detailed intelligence collection, rigorous nuclear

planning and consequence analysis to bring a fully integrated, deliberate planning process to the IO realm. We envision providing weapons or capabilities with documented system reliability and analytically based estimates of consequences and effectiveness, just as we have done for decades with the nation's nuclear forces. We will support an expeditious national-level approval process for conducting IO, and we will work to ensure national leaders and war fighters have what they need at their disposal, not only during crisis but also during the critical planning, training, exercise, and deployment phases. In this vein, we have conducted a number of advanced information operations exercises, spanning the entire planning, approval, execution, and battle damage assessment phases, and have identified valuable lessons for inclusion in our future planning and development processes.

Missile Defense. The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is clearly one of our nation's top concerns. As we discussed during my last appearance, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is actively developing an array of land, air, and sea-based missile defense systems to provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our allies, and our forces in the field. Although still in the early stages of development, global missile defense will become an important third leg of the nation's New Triad beginning next year.

While the MDA develops and acquires our missile defense systems, US Strategic Command is charged with efficiently integrating and operationalizing global missile defense, enabling an initial defensive operations capability in less than 18 months from today. As General Myers noted recently before this committee, missile defense is inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and we are developing the global concept of operations and command and control architecture to provide the full support needed by the regional combatant commanders to defend their theaters, including the ballistic missile defense of the continental United States by US Northern Command. With the

unique combination of missions now assigned to our command, we are also working to integrate the emerging defensive capabilities with our full-spectrum of offensive capabilities, to support rapid and fully informed decision-making at the appropriate tactical level. This effort will be aided by the long-existing relationships we have crafted as the historic provider of ballistic missile integrated threat warning.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). In the fast-paced and complex national security environment of the 21st Century, US decision-makers and war fighters must have seamless access to superior information to conduct decisive operations. Under the Unified Command Plan, STRATCOM now is assigned the role of tasking and coordinating C4 in support of strategic force employment. Our objective is to provide a more capable and flexible means to integrate, synchronize, coordinate, and convey information at any level from the President to the front-line combatant. We will partner closely with US Joint Forces Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency in this critical effort.

The events of September 11, 2001, illustrate the need to improve our national command and control architecture, and we are working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and Communications (ASD/C3) and a host of others to craft a new national-level C4 system. This system must allow increased access to a broader array of federal agencies, provide improved information flow, enable rapid decision-making, and support the requirements of our network-centric forces in the Information Age. While this is important for the nation and all of the Department's missions, it is imperative for the strategic deterrent, integrated missile defense, and global strike missions, where data collection, analysis, decision-making, and execution must occur within dramatically compressed timelines. We will leverage our experience with nuclear command and control to create a robust, hardened component to the national C4 system to preserve and strengthen the

deterrent effect that assured communications, rapid decision-making and certain action provide. We appreciate your continuing support of the innovative communications initiatives such as the Transformational Communications Architecture and the important delivery platform connectivity upgrades vital to robust command and control.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). US Strategic Command is also tasked under the Unified Command Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate ISR for the Department of Defense in support of global and strategic operations. While ISR has always provided intelligence insight and targeting data, recent world events have demonstrated the critical role comprehensive ISR operations can play in senior-level decision-making, tactical planning and even deterrence.

We will work closely with Department of Defense and Intelligence Community partners to develop and institutionalize the processes and systems necessary to maximize the capabilities of existing systems and assess intelligence collection priorities. New concepts such as intrusive ISR, incorporating space-based, air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements, could take us beyond passive collection benefits, especially when integrated with critical human intelligence and technical data. Our objective is to not only better provide persistent, actionable, predictive intelligence, but also to deter the threatening actions that a robust, global, persistent ISR capability could bring into full view. Systems such as the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Space Based Radar (SBR) represent the high end of a spectrum that must also bring advanced air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements into a global architecture. Our ISR needs and regional focus in time of crisis are well known. In the future, global challenges will require an ISR capability that is broad and deep enough to simultaneously meet all national and regional needs across the continuum of peace, crisis and conflict.

Optimizing the Organization

As you recall from my previous statements, US Strategic Command is realigning our overall headquarters organizational structure in order to effectively and efficiently address a wider range of responsibilities. We will organize along functional and operational lines, rather than administrative in an effort to focus on our primary mission areas. As we move to our new organizational alignment this month, we will expand the use of enhanced planning and analysis tools into our newly assigned mission areas. While we will draw heavily on their tools and skills, we will retain the core nuclear planning staff as a distinct element in our headquarters, organizationally aligned and consolidated to ensure focused and dedicated nuclear planning and expertise continues in the future as it has for more than half a century.

As we design concepts of operations for the new command, we are pursuing innovative new Service relationships that will enable the command to efficiently tap into the unique skills and expertise resident in an array of other organizations, without requiring full-time STRATCOM ownership of their forces. We are strengthening our partnerships with the national Agencies in order to collaboratively approach our new mission areas, particularly in the highly technical and focused realm of intelligence, information operations, and communications. We have forged new relationships with the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense Information Systems Agency. Each has incredibly talented professionals and dedicated systems, processes, and procedures that are important to our shared success but which need not be duplicated in our headquarters. We are also excited about the opportunity to leverage our strong relationships with the national laboratories as we expand and develop new capabilities applicable to our recently assigned missions.

As we discussed previously, success in any of our missions depends on our number one asset – our people. Creating a culture of excellence in a broader and deeper range of missions while sustaining the standards still reflected in our nuclear and space communities will depend on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and the brightest, in our military, in public service, in industry, and at the national labs. We will fully support and participate in efforts to create and sustain cadres of space, nuclear, and information operations professionals in both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. They are absolutely essential to our future.

Challenges and Opportunities

As we work to achieve the goals, carry out the responsibilities and deliver the capabilities needed for the global challenges of the 21st Century, we will encounter many difficulties and find many more opportunities. It will not be quick or easy; few truly important efforts are. We will need to keep in mind our broader objectives, even as we wrestle with the daily technical, operational or policy details. Though the list will doubtless change over time, our specific strategic goals are:

- Fully implement the guidance of the Nuclear Posture Review, to include advocating the development of advanced offensive and integration of defensive capabilities in order to meet the President's goal of reducing our reliance on operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
- Delivering on the promise of information operations to the war fighter.
- Integrating global missile defenses across regional boundaries, combining land, air and sea-based systems with capable offensive forces to better protect the nation and our forces in the field.
- Providing adequate bandwidth and a robust communications architecture for rapid decision-making and global combat operations at the strategic and operational level.

- Supporting technical and process enhancements in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance so as to provide comprehensive, persistent, predictive, and actionable strategic capabilities.
- Redefining the STRATCOM organizational structure and crafting new relationships with the Services and national Agencies to effectively and efficiently support our broadened responsibilities.
- Supporting the Services' and the Department of Energy's efforts to enhance anti-terrorism and force protection measures for our critical space and nuclear facilities.
- Addressing concepts of deterrence and the associated force structure appropriate for the new international security environment of this decade and beyond.

Each of these challenges will require a team effort, inside and outside the command. As we move forward, we look forward to working with you and the many others who are privileged to share the humbling responsibilities for our nation's defense.

Conclusion

It is a time of great enthusiasm, excitement, and opportunity at US Strategic Command. While 2002 was a year of new concepts, 2003 and 2004 must clearly be years of execution. Driven by new tasking and new responsibilities, in a real sense we at STRATCOM have reclaimed the classic definition of strategic, as articulated by Sun Tzu, Clauswitz, Washington, or Webster. We no longer live in a world where strategic is synonymous with nuclear, and we are integrating and interlinking the command's broad portfolio of missions to better and more flexibly meet the deterrent needs of the nation. We have taken the first important steps in the evolution of our full-spectrum "new" strategic capabilities, even as we have taken the historic first steps in drawing down our nation's deployed nuclear arsenal.

I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of STRATCOM and the unique and essential contributions they continue to make to our nation's security. I look forward to reporting our continuing progress to you in the future, as we take the next important steps in building the new United States Strategic Command.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.