Advance Questions for Lieutenant General James E. Cartwright, USMC
Nominee for Commander, United States Strategic Command

Defense Reforms

The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms brought about fundamental change in the manner in which the Department of Defense and the Services carry out the mission of national security.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

ANSWER: Yes, I support the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. They have strengthened our Armed Forces, joint operations and the effectiveness of our combatant commanders.

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

ANSWER: The most positive aspect is overall improvement in our joint military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in much needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is clarity in the chain of command from the National Command Authorities to the combatant commanders and unambiguous responsibility placed upon each combatant commander for execution of mission and preparedness of assigned forces.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

ANSWER: I believe the Department of Defense has vigorously and successfully pursued implementation of these important reforms.

The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

ANSWER: Yes. The law gives combatant commanders sufficient authority to carry out their assigned missions. Additionally, the voice of the combatant commanders has been strengthened in the resource allocation process ensuring vital requirements are properly resourced. Many complex joint operations conducted since the legislation was enacted have demonstrated this effectiveness. These changes continue to be vital to success of the STRATCOM strategic deterrence mission as well as the newly assigned missions of global strike, information operations, Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense and space.

Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy.

ANSWER: The Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly improved the performance and capabilities of the American military establishment. We have significantly improved our ability to conduct combat operations, manage defense resources, streamline management practices, and address organizational issues within the Department of Defense. The Department has undertaken, and continues to refine and develop, several internal processes that are further strengthening the spirit and intent of Goldwater-Nichols. As we continue to improve the joint influence in critical decision-making, the Goldwater-Nichols Act remains an important and effective piece of legislation. However, as with any of our organizational constructs, we should not hesitate to challenge underlying assumptions, initial intentions and plans as situations change. Defense organization is important and deserves innovative attention. Congress and the Department have recognized this with efforts to look Beyond Goldwater-Nichols. The results of these reviews will better inform the debate concerning any potential changes required to enhance our defense posture.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: The Commander, United States Strategic Command has responsibility and control for strategic forces in support of the national security objective of strategic deterrence. The commander's traditional role as custodian of our nation's nuclear forces remains paramount, and nothing can detract from this critical mission of ensuring safety, reliability and positive control of our nuclear forces. Additionally, the new Strategic Command structure created and evolved during the past two years, includes further missions such as kinetic and non-kinetic global strike, department-wide information operations, Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR), space operations, and an integrator for missile defense. In my view, Strategic Command as currently structured has tremendous opportunities to view the international security environment through an entirely new prism, and to continue to develop new mechanisms for dealing with the global issues that face us. This global perspective is critical as we further develop and integrate the other elements of strategic operations to more completely and comprehensively meet critical national security requirements.

Throughout the mission areas mentioned above, the commander exercises combatant command over the organization and operation of all assigned forces and headquarters in accordance with public law and the policies established by the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, he is a primary advisor to the Secretary of Defense on strategic military issues.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

ANSWER: Almost thirty-three years of service in the United States military have prepared me for this position through a variety of Marine Corps and Joint Assignments, in periods of peace, crisis and conflict, alongside the finest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen in the world. I have commanded two aviation squadrons, a Marine Aircraft Group, a Marine Aircraft Wing and was the Deputy Commanding General of Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic. Operationally, I have been fortunate to serve on numerous occasions overseas including recent operational involvement in Bosnia and Operation Enduring Freedom. I have been privileged to fill several Washington staff positions including my current assignment as the Director of Force Structure, Resources and Assessments on the Joint Staff, and previous tours in other billets on the Joint Staff, Marine Corps Staff and technical assignments in jet aircraft programs.

My career has included qualification as a Radar Intercept Officer, Naval Aviator, as well as graduate-level education from two war colleges.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: One of the great benefits of a military career is the continuing opportunity to learn, and I certainly have much to continue learning. Not only are we in a period of operationally challenging activities surrounding the war on terror, I believe we are also in a period of strategic transition, and the success of STRATCOM depends on many factors and organizations outside the immediate command structure. I have not worked regularly with several organizations that contribute to the success of STRATCOM (examples: National Security Council, Nuclear Weapons Council, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration and others). If confirmed, I will make it a priority to become more familiar with these organizations and the contributions they make to the success of our missions.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 164, the Commander of US Strategic Command (CDR STRATCOM) performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. CDR STRATCOM is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of the command and the ability to carry out missions assigned to the command.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform duties and exercise powers as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and in the absence of the Secretary of Defense, perform his duties. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Deputy Secretary on all strategic matters.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to specific functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication lines between Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on all strategic policy issues.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to specific functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication lines between Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to

working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in defining and attaining Command goals in the area of Intelligence.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to specific functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretary exercises policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretary may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication lines between Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on command issues pertaining to his departmental responsibilities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

ANSWER: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ISP) is subordinate to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship U.S. Strategic Command would require with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISP would be with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

ANSWER: Relations with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense would be conducted along the same lines as those discussed above regarding relations with the Under Secretaries of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense on Command related national security issues.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANSWER: The Chairman is clearly established by Title 10, United States Code, as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. He serves as an advisor and is not in the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) directly to each combatant commander. The law does allow the President to direct that communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman. This action keeps the Chairman fully involved so that he can execute his other responsibilities. By law and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. The legal duties of the Chairman are many and they require either his representation or personal participation in a wide range of issues. If confirmed, I will also have an obligation in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, to keep the

Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which he may hold me personally accountable. If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in the execution of my duties.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, section 165, provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is quite clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities a Service Secretary alone may discharge.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

ANSWER: As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. They now have two significant roles. First, their primary function is to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of assigned missions. Additionally, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment every combatant commander can and should call upon. If confirmed, I would work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.

The Combatant Commanders, including Commander, U. S. Northern Command

ANSWER: The Commander of STRATCOM has both supported and supporting relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are primarily identified in the Unified Command Plan, the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. In general, STRATCOM is the supported combatant commander for the national strategic war plan, and is a supporting combatant commander for many remaining plans and missions. The new missions recently added to STRATCOM create opportunities to further develop the supporting/supported command relationships between the combatant commands. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the other combatant commands to broaden and enhance the level and range of these supporting/supported relationships, especially in the areas of information warfare/operations, ISR, space operations, missile defense and global strike.

The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

ANSWER: In accordance with title 32, section 3212, of the National Nuclear Security Act of 1999, the Administrator is responsible to the Secretary of Energy for all Department of Energy programs and activities involving the production, safety, and security of nuclear energy and

nuclear weapons - including the stockpile stewardship program. Though the Administrator is outside the Defense Department's chain of command, these issues are of concern to STRATCOM as well, and if confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

The Director of the Missile Defense Agency

ANSWER: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the Department of Defense. It provides the research, development, testing, and evaluation of the missile defense and associated support systems that would be employed by the combatant commanders. U.S. Strategic Command maintains a close and continuous relationship with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency as they develop the systems to support our warfighting requirements. In accordance with Unified Command Plan, Change Two, U.S. Strategic Command advocates and ensures desired ballistic missile defense and missile-warning characteristics and capabilities of combatant commanders are properly represented to MDA.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

ANSWER: Title 10, United States Code, section 139, provides that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on operational test and evaluation in the Department of Defense and the principal operational test and evaluation official with the senior management of the Department of Defense. The director may communicate views on matters within the responsibility of the office of Operational Test and Evaluation directly to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the progress of command programs of interest.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: The responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command were recently broadened to help advance a global perspective on current and emerging capabilities and to enhance DoD ability to counter potential threats to our national security. Significant progress has been made in developing capabilities within all of the previously unassigned mission areas and, if confirmed, I look forward to continuing the efforts of my predecessor. As I look ahead, I see challenges along several fronts. Most significant of these is ensuring the ability to sustain and develop a corps of well-trained professionals with the technical competence to advance all assigned mission area disciplines, within both the operational and scientific realms. The right, properly skilled people will be key to tackling other important issues such as ensuring a safe and reliable

nuclear weapons stockpile, advancing credible and effective strategic deterrent capabilities and expanding command and control architectures beyond the legacy nuclear mission to help effectively integrate all of STRATCOM's strategic mission areas.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the excellent work of my predecessor and ensure we further operationalize the global missions assigned to STRATCOM in order to create a coherent integration effort that will provide greater, more flexible capabilities and options to the other combatant commanders and the National Command Authority. I will also seek to develop and nurture an effective organization comprised of talented, educated forces focused on strengthening our capabilities to adapt to strategic challenges wherever they may arise. If confirmed, I intend to build upon the cooperation which STRATCOM already enjoys with other combatant commanders to promote improved planning, intelligence, exercises, resource management, information operations and security, force protection, and command and control so that the nation is better prepared to respond appropriately to a variety of potential contingencies.

Strategic Threats

In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats facing the United States today?

ANSWER: The globalization of our nation's security landscape has demanded fundamental defense policy shifts. The United States will face an array of potential adversaries whose political, cultural, and idiosyncratic differences will complicate our efforts to protect vital U.S. interests at home and abroad. We face four persistent and emerging global challenges: the traditional adversaries, unconventional non-state or state supported actors, catastrophic use of WMD or methods, and disruptive capabilities to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains. We must change the way we think about strategic deterrence to provide the President with a wider range of deterrent capabilities that effectively address the new set of challenges we face today.

What future strategic threats should the United States prepare for?

ANSWER: Considering the ambiguities today's environment holds as discussed above, it is difficult to clearly define all threats the U.S. may face in the future. That said, within the STRATCOM realm of responsibility, several significant challenges do seem to present themselves in my opinion: cyber threats, threats to assured access and use of space, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles are all areas where rising challenges can be seen. Encompassing yet also exceeding the traditional military domain, the first two are vitally important to our daily way-of-life and economic well-being nationwide. Likewise, the second two pose threats with obviously devastating consequences. As we develop plans and potential

responses to these known threats, we need to ensure capabilities developed for known challenges possess the flexibility to deal with what we do not predict today.

U. S. Strategic Command Missions

In an overarching sense, how do you define the U. S. Strategic Command mission?

ANSWER: U.S. Strategic Command was created to advance a global perspective on current and emerging capabilities to counter threats to our national security. The mission of U.S. Strategic Command is to establish and provide full-spectrum global strike, coordinated space and information operations, integrate missile defense, global C4ISR, specialized planning expertise to joint warfighters as well as retaining the legacy missions for our nuclear forces.
The intent is to meet both deterrent and decisive national security objectives globally.

U. S. Strategic Command has absorbed several new missions in the last two years, including ballistic missile defense, space operations, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), information operations, and computer network security.

How successful has U. S. Strategic Command been at integrating these new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?

ANSWER: I understand that USSTRATCOM headquarters has realigned, refocused, and is energized across the full range of missions assigned. New concepts have been shaped, innovative relationships crafted, aggressive milestones established, and real progress is being made towards full operational capability in the missions assigned by the Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I will continue to seek mechanisms, component relationships, and relationships with other combatant commanders that further develop the flexibility of pre-existing capabilities and expertise resident within the DoD and other agencies to support U.S. Strategic Command's missions. Additionally, we will continue coherent integration to advance efforts that provide new and innovative capabilities allowing the SECDEF and President more flexible options in support of our strategic interests.

What organizational challenges remain at U. S. Strategic Command related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for these new missions?

ANSWER: The assignment of forces, where appropriate, and establishment of effective component relationships with Services and Agencies, as well as strong ties with our allies will continue to transform our nation's security posture as directed in the Unified Command Plan. Partnerships with civilian agencies, private industry, and academia are vital to successfully accomplish U.S. Strategic Command's missions. If confirmed, I will investigate what if any challenges remain and how best to address any shortfalls I discover.

If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the missions currently assigned to U. S. Strategic Command? If so, what changes would you recommend?

ANSWER: U.S. Strategic Command has achieved full operational capability for the oversight and direction of all currently assigned missions. Each mission area, however, continues to develop and, if confirmed, I will continue to apply all of the commands resources to achieve full operational capability in each mission area. However, I believe that until U.S. Strategic Command achieves full operational capability in all missions, significant changes to these assigned missions should not be made.

Ballistic Missile Defense

How do you view the role of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, related to ballistic missile defense?

ANSWER: The Unified Command Plan directs USSTRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate for all combatant commands missile defense characteristics and capabilities. I understand that USSTRATCOM has already established a Global Missile Defense Strategic Concept and is developing operational procedures to execute its Unified Command Plan missions. If confirmed, my role is to continue to provide a clear voice for other Combatant Commanders with Defense Agencies on advocating requirements and concepts of operations; and, during crisis, to provide sound alternatives for the Secretary of Defense and President across the spectrum of missile defense responses, including global strike and information operations (offensive-defense integration).

If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the authorities of Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, as they relate to ballistic missile defense?

ANSWER: At present, it appears that the level of authority given to Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as they relate to ballistic missile defense, is appropriate.

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in the assessment of the military utility of ballistic missile defenses against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles?

ANSWER: US Strategic Command is responsible for conducting a Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Overall, the MUA serves as a progress report to the Secretary of Defense on the progress to date and the ultimate utility of the system. It is designed to support two purposes. First, to provide the Combatant Commanders' view of the military utility of the Ballistic Missile Defense System at Initial Defensive Operations in 2004. Second, to provide the Combatant Commander's assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Initial Defensive Operations capabilities and limitations.

What are your views on the relationship between ballistic missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?

ANSWER: The significant changes in the post-Cold War environment call into question the framework and analysis used at the height of the Cold War when bi-polar, offensive based strategic deterrence worked well. Deterrence theory needs to adapt to the multi-faceted, multi-threat world of today. A more comprehensive framework, including missile defense, can integrate additional elements of military strategy and deny an adversary specific benefits, to complement offensive nuclear forces and assure sustainment of a deterrent capability. Robust missile defenses can make the U.S. an even more valuable partner to friends and allies and possibly begin to devalue the expensive, long-range missiles to potential rivals or foes.

From the perspective of the warfighter, do you believe that the spiral acquisition of ballistic missile defenses through concurrent fielding, development, testing, and operations is appropriate?

ANSWER: Spiral acquisition methods facilitate collaborative processes that could incorporate rapidly evolving technologies and address ballistic missile threats in a dynamic and unpredictable security environment. I anticipate concurrent fielding activities will not only provide timely defensive coverage, but will also expedite inclusion of operational input from combatant commanders.

Do you believe that the exploitation of the operational capabilities of the ballistic missile test bed provides a militarily useful capability and contributes to deterrence?

ANSWER: If we are able to realize the operational capabilities, they will provide two fundamental benefits. First, we gain a rudimentary defensive capability against near term threats for the United States. Second, as we exercise and test the system, we will develop better procedures and experience to ultimately transition from a primarily test configuration into full operational capability status.

In your view, at what stage in the deployment of missile defense capabilities should operationally realistic testing be conducted?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will examine the current state of operational testing as we prepare for initial defensive operations later this year. US Strategic Command is tasked with operationalizing the capabilities being developed by the Missile Defense Agency. As an operational commander, it is essential to ensure that deployed systems will work as designed.

I understand that the operational test bed system to be deployed this fall is a rudimentary system that will provide the capability upon which to continue further spiral development work. In coordination with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation and Missile Defense Agency, US Strategic Command will assess, through the Military Utility Assessment, the degree to which delivered capabilities support execution of the missile defense mission with a focus on

effectiveness, interoperability and suitability. We will quantify system performance and assess mission execution, fully aware of the developmental capabilities and limitations identified. Observations and insights on system performance gained from wargames will also be added to determine whether modifications to tactics, techniques and procedures can enhance system capabilities.

Space

What is your view on the responsiveness of current space systems to meet warfighter needs?

ANSWER: (U) Our Nation's space systems have served us well and the importance of space systems and the warfighting capabilities they afford are widely recognized across the services and combatant commands. However, many of these systems are reaching the end of their useful life, posing challenges in our future ability to collect, assess and transmit timely, actionable information.

What is your view of the ability of the DoD to develop and deploy spaces systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?

ANSWER: (U) While there have been challenges with the cost and schedule performance of DoD space programs, I believe we understand the underlying reasons for many of those problems. I believe that with closer attention to three vital areas: the technical, intellectual, and industrial bases, we should be able to provide a greater impetus for success.

What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to improve the responsiveness of current space systems?

ANSWER: (U) The Department is aggressively working to improve the responsiveness of space systems. To achieve optimum responsiveness, I believe focus areas for improvement must address the following key attributes: horizontal integration—ensuring space capabilities are integrated with programs serving other functional areas; persistent capability; survivable and not bandwidth limited; and rooted in a responsive launch capability.

In your view, what are the most important unmet requirements for space systems?

ANSWER: (U) Persistent surveillance, increased bandwidth, survivability and horizontal integration are all key attributes which, if confirmed, I would continue to advocate as key enhancements required of our future space systems. I would also advocate investments in science and technology to maintain our space pre-eminence well into the future.

What do you believe should be done to meet those requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest priority?

ANSWER: I believe we should further develop those capabilities that provide assured, world-wide survivable communications, persistent surveillance and those systems which support these capabilities. The Department has several on-going programs to address these capability shortfall areas including Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT), Space-Based Infrared (SBIRS), and Space-Based Radar (SBR) and Operationally Responsive Launch (ORL).

How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance? What programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?

ANSWER: Persistent surveillance is paramount to better understanding of adversary intentions and movements and a key contributor to a credible strategic deterrent. As our adversaries learn more about our current surveillance systems, they are able to exploit gaps in our coverage. Shorter revisit times provided by enhanced persistence allow us to operate inside an adversary's decision cycle, minimizing the potential for him to conduct complex activities out of our view. Importantly, I believe integrated airborne and space ISR programs must be employed to provide the persistence this Nations requires.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national security payloads into space.

What, in your view, should the United States do in the future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?

ANSWER: The U.S. must maintain assured access to space. While most of the recent focus has been on launch vehicles, there are several other elements that help comprise the overall capabilities for the end-to-end process necessary for reliable access to space. If confirmed, I will support continued emphasis in all critical areas of space access including space ranges, launch facilities, support infrastructure, launch vehicles and launch services.

Do you believe that the nation should sustain redundant space launch capabilities?

ANSWER: There is always increased risk when relying exclusively on one system to achieve a particular capability. The history of the Space Shuttle program is ample evidence of the vulnerability in reliance on a single launch system. Our Nation's launch capability must be affordable and balanced against all elements required to maintain assured access to space.

How important, in your view, is the Air Force Operationally Responsive Launch program?

ANSWER: Robust augmentation and reconstitution of the capabilities addressed by operationally responsive launch programs will allow the warfighter to rapidly insert emerging technologies and meet the flexibility demands necessary for today's operational concepts.

In your view, what are the most significant challenges that the U.S. faces in military space programs and policy?

ANSWER: (U) I believe the most significant challenges are improving U.S. launch capabilities, improving space-based ISR, reducing space system vulnerabilities, improving satellite communications, and assuring access to space. Operations in Iraq last year provided a wake up call to potential vulnerabilities of space systems we take for granted (like GPS). If confirmed, I intend to remain committed to strengthening our space systems and ensure horizontal integration of space with other functional air, land, and sea capabilities.

Cruise Missile Defense

In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?

ANSWER: This is a serious threat. Numerous states continue to improve their ballistic and cruise missiles, focusing on longer range, better accuracy and deployment of new units. The preponderance of the cruise missiles under development can carry nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads and sub-munitions. Thus, prudent defense planning, active defense design, and command and control systems—both for Homeland Defense and Regional Defense of deployed forces and interests abroad —require that cruise missiles be considered. The actual assessment of vulnerability of specific targets is situation dependent and is considered in both Homeland and Regional Defense planning.

What role do you believe U. S. Strategic Command should play in the cruise missile defense of our nation?

ANSWER: The Unified Command Plan ((UCP) Change 2, 10 Jan 03,) directs USSTRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate for all combatant commands missile defense characteristics and capabilities. An integrated missile defense architecture must consider all credible threats including cruise missiles. USSTRATCOM is positioned, both by law and breadth of program oversight-space operations, offense-defense integration, and active defense integration-to provide leadership for integrating of cruise missile defense into existing capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with other combatant commanders, defense agencies and material developers in

this regard.

Nuclear Deterrence

What is your view of the significance of the nuclear triad in today's military and strategic environment?

ANSWER: The New Triad outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review allows us to adapt to new threats and also provide our national leaders a greater range of response options than ever before. I support the transition to our New Triad, which provides for a range of capabilities beyond our traditional nuclear forces. That said, the capabilities provided by the three components of our offensive nuclear forces are still very relevant today. They provide diversity in our deployed force that remains a viable and desired attribute in our New Triad. The three nuclear delivery means complicate potential adversary's attack planning, hedge against wholesale failure by one or more systems, reduces the risk of technological obsolescence by countermeasures developed against any particular system, and likewise, forces adversary's to consider a broad range of defense measures for themselves. The deterrent value and flexibility of options available has been greatly expanded by adding the elements included in the New Triad thereby increasing overall strategic value to the Nation.

If confirmed, what priority would you place on sustaining and modernizing the nuclear triad and what steps would you recommend in that regard?

ANSWER: As our Nation comes to rely on a numerically smaller deployed strategic nuclear force, the imperative for modernizing and sustaining that force becomes even more critical to ensure a continued viable deterrent. If confirmed, I would give priority to supporting on going life extension programs to strategic nuclear platforms, and planned life extension programs for our nuclear stockpile. Programs such as these are, in some cases, multi-decade long events and require continuous support to ensure their successful conclusion. These are the core nuclear deterrent capabilities and must be supported.

The Nuclear Posture Review recommended a new triad consisting of offensive forces, both nuclear and conventional; defenses, both active and passive; and a responsive infrastructure to support those forces. With respect to offensive forces, the Nuclear Posture Review called for improved conventional strike capabilities and nuclear forces tailored to deter adversaries.

Do you support the conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review?

ANSWER: Yes. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided a good conceptual re-examination of our forces and posture and established a viable new framework to re-set how we consider our strategic Triad. The New Triad provides the Nation a more robust flexible capability that does not only rely on offensive response as the sole deterrent mechanism.

Do you believe that there is a minimum number of strategic nuclear weapons needed to sustain a viable deterrent posture?

ANSWER: I support the President's commitment to reduce the nuclear stockpile to the lowest number possible consistent with our national security needs. I also support the goals laid out in the Moscow Treaty of reducing our operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1700 and 2200 by 2012.

Do you believe new nuclear weapons are needed or will be needed to support a viable deterrent posture?

ANSWER: I do not foresee a need in the immediate future, but we need to ensure the Nation retains the response infrastructure that is capable of development, production, and fielding as a hedge against future uncertainty. I support the President's commitment to reduce the nuclear stockpile to the lowest number possible consistent with our national security needs. I also support the goals laid out in the Moscow Treaty of reducing our operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1700 and 2200 by 2012.

In your view, what steps, if any, are appropriate to tailor our nuclear forces to the new strategic environment?

ANSWER: Our immediately required actions are already underway as a result of the NPR and the recent stockpile reduction plan. As we develop the legs of the New Triad, we will be able to further consider appropriate changes to our existing nuclear forces. Any re-examination should look to ensure our stockpile is capabilities-based while simultaneously maintaining safety and security.

In your view, is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please describe the relationship.

ANSWER: A credible nuclear deterrent has been an important nonproliferation tool that has removed incentives for many allies to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons, in concert with treaty and alliance structures, have assured allies the U.S. will deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks. Our newly expanded definition of deterrence may in fact help discourage further proliferation. While some developing and existing nuclear powers may continue their improvement efforts, as U.S. defensive capabilities improve, this may devalue the enormous expense required to initiate nuclear capability development and lessen the proliferation drive from aspiring participants.

Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

In your view, how adequate are current efforts to address hard and deeply buried targets?

ANSWER: There are hard and deep buried targets in existence today that are difficult for us to place at risk. Deterrence requires we be able to hold these targets at risk - potential adversaries obviously value them highly or they would not go the trouble of deep location and hardened protection. If confirmed, I desire to comprehensively assess the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to place these targets at risk, both kinetically and non-kinetically.

If confirmed, would you support or recommend steps to improve the management or coordination of development efforts to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets?

ANSWER: I wholeheartedly support identifying and analyzing the capabilities the Nation desires against such types of targets. The ultimate capability required will better direct particular development efforts across the broad spectrum of potential military solutions – kinetic and non-kinetic, nuclear and conventional.

Do you support development of new or modified nuclear weapons to hold at risk hard or deeply buried targets?

ANSWER: I believe we need to first determine the capability we desire against such targets and then evaluate all material and non-material solutions to engage them. Nuclear weapons are only one of many potential arrows that we could carry in our quiver against hard and deep buried targets.

Arms Control

In the last several years, the United States ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia and withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

What is your view of the significance of strategic arms control agreements in the current environment?

ANSWER: Arms control agreements still remain a central feature in the strategic environment we face with other state-based actors. The recently ratified Moscow Treaty highlights this importance and will facilitate reductions in nuclear arsenals. However, our rapidly evolving security environment is no longer hinged on a static, bi-polar relationship and the certain stability and predictability that framework brought. In the future, arms control may need to place greater emphasis on managing strategic uncertainty than on codification of specific force structures.

If confirmed, what arms control initiatives, or other forms of cooperative initiatives related to armaments, if any, would you recommend?

ANSWER: As stated above, the evolving strategic environment may require us to reconsider the basic underpinnings of future arms control agreements. Regardless of any potential specific initiative, I feel future agreements will still have to possess confidence building measures, maintain linkage to the broader dictates of U.S. foreign and defense policy goals, provide timely and rapidly accessible information, be developed in consultation and cooperation with the Congress and our allies, and most importantly, provide protection mechanisms against the shock of unexpected strategic developments.

In your view, should the U.S. continue to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?

ANSWER: I support our current policy and program of science-based Stockpile Stewardship. However, while this is currently sufficient, we should not preclude the ability to resume such tests if serious technical issues, or other factors, call into question our data analysis or reliability of the nuclear stockpile. I feel we need to retain our capability for testing even while we honor the moratorium on such tests.

Global Strike

Are you satisfied with service efforts to provide appropriate weapon systems and platforms to support the U. S. Strategic Command global strike mission?

ANSWER: With close cooperation of the Air Force and Navy, SECDEF just signed the Interim Global Strike Alert Order, which provides the President a prompt, global strike capability. Today, we rely upon Navy Tomahawk missiles and Air Force bombers carrying conventional cruise missiles, Joint Direct Attack Munitions and other gravity released weapons to provide this kinetic-kill solution, and our global command and control reach. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for the advocacy of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that could be adapted to the global strike mission. As the Services develop new, even more responsive kinetic and non-kinetic solutions, global strike capabilities will achieve the desired effects with far greater time responsiveness.

What strike weapon systems and platforms do you believe are most important in this regard?

ANSWER: Global strike capabilities must have a global reach and unimpeded access as well as timely response to any threat to national security. While today's global strike capability is limited, if confirmed, I will advocate advancements in kinetic and non-kinetic solutions that improve global reach and access. Global Strike effectiveness will be limited, however, without robust Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). We must continue to improve our

persistent ISR capability to obtain warning and necessary targeting information to find and fix a target before we can neutralize or destroy it through Global Strike kinetic or non-kinetic weaponry.

In your view, what steps should be taken over the next 10 years to modernize and sustain the bomber fleet?

ANSWER: The long range bomber fleet is an essential element of the Nation's strategic deterrent force and USSTRATCOM's nuclear and Global Strike capability. The Air Force is currently executing plans to sustain and modernize our bomber fleet through 2037. Programmed upgrades to all three platforms including radar modernization, survivable communications and defensive/offensive systems upgrades are essential for the fleet to fulfill the new combat capabilities demanded by Global Strike. If confirmed, I intend to keep the Command fully engaged in advocating associated requirements and improving the fleet's concepts of operation.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously assess and annually certify the U. S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

ANSWER: The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to improve and the combined efforts of STRATCOM and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should be able to continue to certify the safety and reliability of the stockpile without resorting to underground testing anytime in the near future. To the best of my knowledge, we have no immediate need to, and no current plans to, recommence underground testing. What I think we do not want to do is preclude our ability to resume such tests if we find technically compelling reasons in future that call into question our data or weapons reliability.

In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

ANSWER: I think the program faces several challenges. The first is maintaining sufficient funding to ensure our current facilities are developed and maintained to world-class standards to support our national security requirements. The second major challenge as I understand it, is an acute aging of the scientific/engineering community in several areas of nuclear weapons research. This is particularly evident in the nuclear effects arena. Throughout a variety of nuclear weapons related scientific and engineering activities there is a lack of young scientists and engineers available and willing to undertake and persist in requisite apprenticeships to replace the expertise that is and soon will be retiring. Finally, as our stockpile ages, I believe we may need to reevaluate the baseline assumptions of a purely science based approach as there is little to no experience in extrapolating such complex matters over long periods of time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with our partners at NNSA in addressing these potential

challenges.

Pit Production Capability and Modern Pit Facility

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14, 2002, "I believe that of the countries that have nuclear weapons, we are the only one that does not have the capability to manufacture new nuclear weapons now." Since that time, Los Alamos National Laboratory has added the capability to manufacture small numbers of W88 pits, however, the United States still does not have a flexible production capability.

What is your view of the need for the United States to restore its pit production capability beyond the limited capability at the Los Alamos National Laboratory?

ANSWER: The third leg of our New Triad of flexible response capabilities is an R&D and industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems. The limited pit production capability at Los Alamos is one element of this Triad leg that is lacking in sufficient capability should the need arise. In order to be responsive, achieve the planned stockpile reductions without further risk, and maintain our commitment to a second-to-none strategic deterrent, it is vital that the U.S. develop a more robust pit production capability.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

ANSWER: Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

ANSWER: Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

ANSWER: Yes.