

**Advance Questions for Peter C. W. Flory**  
**Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy**

**Defense Reforms**

**Almost two decades have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms.**

**Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?**

Yes, I support the implementation of these reforms. The focus on "jointness" outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has significantly enhanced the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the U.S. armed forces.

**What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?**

These reforms have fundamentally changed the way the Department of Defense works by strengthening civilian control of DoD, improving military advice given to the President and Secretary of Defense, and advancing the ability of the Department to carry out its fundamental mission - protecting America's security and furthering its vital interests.

**What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?**

From my point of view, the most important aspects are strengthening civilian control, improving military advice, the clear responsibilities and authorities given the combatant commanders for mission accomplishment, and the increased attention to formulation of strategy and contingency planning,

**The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.**

**Do you agree with these goals?**

Yes, I support the goals of the Congress in enacting the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

**Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater- Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?**

I am unaware of any need to modify Goldwater-Nichols at this time. If I am confirmed, I will raise any such requirements that I may identify within the Department. The Department would consult closely with Congress, especially this Committee, on any changes that might be appropriate.

**Duties**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy?**

I understand that, if I am confirmed, my duties as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy will be to serve as the principal assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in formulating and implementing national security and defense policy in a wide range of areas, including: nuclear forces; technology security; missile defense; Europe and NATO; Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia; arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-proliferation.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld would prescribe for you?**

I would expect Secretary Rumsfeld to look to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy to fulfill all the duties assigned to that office under the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy - in particular, assistance and advice on the formulation of national security and defense policy in the areas noted in the response to the previous question.

**Relationships**

**If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:**

- The Secretary of Defense**
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense**
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics**
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**  
**The Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**  
**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**  
**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense**  
**The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director for Strategic Plans  
and Policy (J-5)**  
**Commander, United States European Command**  
**Commander, United States Strategic Command**  
**Director, Missile Defense Agency**  
**Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration**

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to maintain a close working relationship with the other Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, the offices of the Under Secretaries for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Personnel and Readiness, Comptroller, and Intelligence, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders of the U.S. European Command and U.S. Strategic Command, other Combatant Commanders, and the Missile Defense Agency. I will also, if confirmed, work closely with the National Security Council Staff and with officials in the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, the intelligence community, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and other agencies and departments.

### **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy?**

The United States and our allies face serious, growing, and unpredictable threats. We must maintain the ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against a wide range of threats, particularly ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Through arms control, export control groups, and non-traditional methods such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, we must seek to prevent and counter the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We must maximize our ability to deter the use of these weapons by development and deployment of improved strike and missile defense capabilities - - what we call the "New Triad. To address the possible use of these weapons, in addition to developing missile defense capabilities, we must seek to improve our other defensive capabilities, including enhanced chemical and biological defenses for our forces and enhanced consequence management training and preparedness.

As we work to transform our military forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges, we also

must work to transform our defense and security relationships with countries throughout the world. In Eurasia, we strive to promote stability and democratic development so that countries once part of the Soviet Union do not contribute to an “arc of instability” in the region. In Europe and NATO, we must continue the efforts this administration has begun to transform our alliances and structures, and the capabilities of the member states, so that NATO members can live up to their political commitments.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I will work to ensure we have a defense strategy and appropriate policies and plans to address the range of threats we face.

**NATO**

**What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?**

One of the key challenges will be to complete the Alliance transition from stationary forces to more mobile, deployable, and sustainable forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) has been designed as a catalyst for NATO transformation, as well as a highly capable military force to carry out NATO missions. We will continue to work with the new members and partners to assist them in developing forces that are better able to operate with NATO forces and to contribute niche capabilities, such as chemical and biological defense units, light infantry units, combat engineers, and special operations forces to the Alliance.

Another challenge is to develop a cooperative relationship with the European Union, as it develops its European Security and Defense Policy that preserves NATO as the primary instrument of transatlantic security and does not diminish the Alliance’s military effectiveness.

**Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?**

This latest round of enlargement will not be NATO’s last, and the door to membership remains open. There is no timetable for the next round of enlargement. It depends on each aspirant government’s achievement of the political, economic, military, and civil society reforms they laid out in their Membership Action Plans. NATO leaders at the Istanbul Summit reaffirmed NATO’s open door, and recognized the reform efforts of the three NATO aspirants (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia). Each NATO aspirant will be judged on its individual merits.

## **What criteria should NATO use in determining whether the Alliance would benefit from further expansion?**

Article 10 of the NATO Treaty allows for addition of European states that are “in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” There are no defined criteria for NATO membership, but there are two fundamental questions we should want answered prior to making decisions about a future round of NATO enlargement:

Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance’s ability to protect and promote its security, values, and interests?

Can we be confident of the candidate’s enduring commitment to democracy and Allied values and interests?

## **What criteria should NATO use to determine which nations, if any, should be invited to join NATO?**

Although there are no set criteria for judging a country’s readiness to join NATO, from a DoD perspective we expect the invitees to:

- Share the risks and responsibilities of collective defense.
- Be able to participate in NATO missions (e.g., interoperability).
- Provide military value to the Alliance (commensurate with size); this value may be through a specialized capability.
- Spend at least 2% of GDP on defense.
- Have laws, regulations, and procedures to protect NATO classified information.
- Make progress on defense reform.

## **NATO/Russia**

### **How do you assess the NATO-Russia relationship, as formalized through the NATO-Russia Council?**

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has led to increased cooperation between Russia and the Allies, especially military-to-military cooperation. Russia has increased its participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities, assigned officers to the Partnership Coordination Cell, and agreed with NATO to establish a Russian military liaison mission at SHAPE. These steps will help enable Russian forces eventually to work with NATO in the field to address the threats of the 21st century.

Other examples of successful NRC cooperation include civil emergency preparedness exercises, terrorist threat assessments, a Joint Missile Defense Command Post Exercise in Colorado Springs in March 2004, and a cooperative airspace initiative.

### **DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program**

**The CTR program has several key objectives including: (1) reducing strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and preventing biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation threats.**

**In your view, how has the CTR program benefited U.S. national security?**

CTR has reduced the amount of weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure that might be poorly secured or subject to illicit transfer. Also, DoD has refined CTR to better support the Global War on Terrorism, by an increased focus on chemical and biological weapons, and assisting with WMD border security (in the non-Russia FSU) in coordination with other departments of the USG.

**What is your view of the CTR program's chemical and biological weapons elimination efforts?**

I support the CTR program's efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and prevent the proliferation of dangerous pathogens and BW expertise.

**Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U. S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., the State Department and the Department of Energy?**

CTR program activities and plans are well coordinated among U.S. Government agencies. Relationships among interagency offices handling CTR and other non-proliferation matters are mature; the system for coordinating issues and elevating disagreements through the NSC-chaired Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee functions effectively.

**If confirmed, would you anticipate being assigned responsibility for policy development, coordination, and oversight of the CTR program?**

The current Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy and all predecessor offices have had responsibility for CTR policy development, coordination and oversight. I anticipate no changes in this regard.

**What is your vision of the CTR program five years from now?**

My vision of CTR five years hence is of a program that has successfully implemented the management reforms of 2002-2004 to execute long-standing strategic nuclear elimination projects, and has successfully followed through on initiatives related to nerve agent elimination and WMD border security. We have overcome significant challenges over the last three years. Five years from now the program should have built on its already impressive threat reduction record, but with enhanced value for the U.S. non-proliferation investment and improved cooperation from recipient countries.

**In your view, are Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats they inherited?**

All of the states of the Former Soviet Union have taken significant steps over the past decade to reduce the threat posed by poorly secured weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure within their respective territories. However, the level of commitment and contribution on the part of Russia to the cooperative activities we undertake with Russia through CTR has been uneven. For instance, Russian officials have demonstrated clearly a desire to improve the security of their inactive nuclear warheads and have granted CTR the access it needs to warhead storage facilities to make this a reality. However, while Russia's economy is much stronger than in the early days of CTR, Russia continues to request substantial assistance. Russia could also contribute by following through on certain commitments, e.g., ratify the CTR umbrella agreement extension of 1999; turn over samples of Russia's altered anthrax strain; and agree to a biological weapons project implementing agreement.

**What needs to be done to enable agreement between Russia and the United States on access and liability issues that continue to hamper progress on some CTR programs?**

All CTR activities with Russia are conducted under the CTR "Umbrella Agreement," the foundation of CTR's legal framework that was extended in 1999 for a seven-year period. The Umbrella Agreement extension has not been ratified by the Duma but has been applied provisionally – with success – since 1999. Thus, there are no liability issues that currently hamper CTR program activities. We look forward to working with Russia in the coming years to extend the Umbrella Agreement again in 2006 with the same liability protections for U.S. assistance through CTR that have existed since the beginning of the program.

**In your view, what new projects, if any, should be added to the CTR program and what current projects, if any, should be closed out?**

CTR is sized appropriately at the current time.

**United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.**

**Do you support accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

Yes, I agree with the Administration's support of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

**In your view, would ratification of this Treaty be in the national security interest of the United States?**

Yes.

**Nuclear Weapons**

**To meet U.S. national security needs in the post-Cold War world, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review recommended a new strategic triad consisting of nuclear and conventional offensive forces, active and passive defenses, and a robust nuclear and defense infrastructure.**

**Do you agree with the conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review?**

Yes. In contrast to the Cold War where the United States faced a single major adversary, the new security environment is characterized by unpredictability, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a large number of potential adversaries and hostile non-state actors, and a wide range of possible types of conflict, including cyberattack and terrorist strikes as well as traditional hostilities between nations. The new environment demands that the Department develop a new strategic posture. Expecting and adapting to surprise, quickly and decisively, is now a condition of planning.

The Nuclear Posture Review initiated a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in the U.S. deterrent strategy and provided the direction to transform our traditional nuclear triad into a New Triad. Nuclear weapons are being reduced to the lowest level consistent with our national security, including our commitments to our allies and friends. Achievement of fully integrated New Triad capabilities is an ongoing process that will continue for a number of years.

The New Triad offers the President a broader range of capabilities better suited to implementing our defense policy goals of assuring allies and friends of our ability to meet our military commitments; dissuading adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our friends and allies; deterring threats and countering coercion against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends; and defeating adversaries and defending against attack should deterrence fail.

**What roles should nuclear weapons, including the traditional nuclear triad, play in U.S. national security policy and strategy?**

The traditional nuclear triad of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers is now one part of the Strike element of the New Triad. Nuclear weapon capabilities remain a vital element of U.S. defense policy, allowing us to deter a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons attack on the United States and our friends and allies. Nuclear capabilities can be helpful in assuring our friends and allies of our ability to meet our security commitments; dissuading potential competitors from threatening U.S. interests or those of our friends and allies; deterring threats and countering coercion against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends; and, if necessary, defeating any adversary decisively if deterrence fails.

**Do you believe that exploration of new nuclear weapons concepts is justified?**

Yes. Although we are not developing any new nuclear weapons at this time, if the United States is to maintain an effective deterrent, it is critical that scientists and engineers examine ways to incorporate new technologies into advanced design concepts if this becomes necessary for national security reasons. Such work also helps to recruit and retain the high quality scientists we need to maintain a nuclear deterrent capability.

**Do you believe that there is a need for the development or fielding of new nuclear weapons that are not currently part of the stockpile?**

Currently, there is no requirement to develop and produce any new nuclear weapon. In conjunction with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense is studying ways to modify an existing gravity bomb to satisfy a long-standing requirement to place at risk a growing set of hard and deeply buried targets.

**In your view, will the United States need to resume underground nuclear testing in the foreseeable future in order to ensure the reliability, safety, and security of United States strategic nuclear forces?**

I support the President's policy to continue the moratorium on underground nuclear testing for the foreseeable future. If confirmed, I plan to get briefed on the

condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the effects of age. Each year, experts assess the condition of the stockpile to determine if nuclear testing is required to resolve a question about the safety and reliability of a warhead critical to the U.S. deterrent. I will participate in this process and will advise the Secretary accordingly on the need for nuclear testing.

**Do you support the moratorium on underground nuclear weapons testing? In your view, does unilateral U. S. restraint in nuclear weapons development promote nonproliferation and help dissuade other nations from similar development activities?**

Yes, I support the President's policy to continue the moratorium on underground nuclear testing for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the U.S. must continue to maintain its nuclear deterrent and its ability to meet its security obligations to its allies and friends. This could include the development of new weapon designs should they ever be required. I believe current policy on nuclear weapons is consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals.

**Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT):**

**Many U.S. adversaries are hardening or burying targets of interest to the U.S. military.**

**In your view, how serious is the challenge posed by hard and deeply buried targets to U.S. military capabilities?**

I am concerned about the number of potential adversaries now hardening or burying facilities that support WMD operations. There are a growing number of facilities, often associated with weapons of mass destruction, that are well beyond the capability of our most effective conventionally armed weapons to destroy. The Department of Defense must be able to provide the President with options to place these facilities at risk.

**Do you believe that the Department's efforts to develop the technical means to counter hard and deeply buried targets is adequate? Do you believe that the service support of these efforts is adequate?**

The Department has a multi-faceted program to defeat HDBTs that includes both advanced conventional capabilities—including non-kinetic approaches—and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study. If confirmed, I plan to examine the details of the program further to ensure that this effort is adequate.

**If confirmed, what steps would you recommend, if any, to strengthen programs, policy and management relevant to hard and deeply buried targets?**

If confirmed, I plan to examine the details of this multi-faceted program further to ensure for myself that this effort is adequate.

**Ballistic Missile Defense**

**What is your understanding of the nature and extent of ballistic missile threats to the United States, its allies and friends, and deployed forces?**

The United States and our allies face serious and unpredictable threats and potential adversaries are less predictable and more diverse than during the Cold War. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is of particular concern. Today, roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world's least responsible states, possess ballistic missiles and some are attempting to obtain missiles of longer range. Many of these states also have nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

One of the key reasons potential adversaries seek ballistic missiles is because we have no defenses against long-range missiles, and limited defenses against shorter-range missiles. Absent defenses, even primitive ballistic missiles can deliver devastating WMD attacks against population centers. Potential adversaries see these weapons as a means for exploiting an obvious U.S. and allied vulnerability. For example, North Korea continues to develop and deploy ballistic missiles, has deployed significant WMD capability, and threatens to expand its nuclear capability. North Korea continues to work on the Taepo Dong II long-range missile capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload. The Taepo Dong II could be flight-tested at any time. North Korea is also the world's foremost proliferator of ballistic missiles and has a track record of selling these weapons to some of the world's least responsible states. It has deployed--and sold--missiles with little testing. Hence, missile threats can emerge with little or no warning. Iran and other countries also are working on space-launch vehicles and long-range missiles that could be ready for testing in the next few years.

**From the perspective of the warfighter, do you believe that the spiral acquisition of ballistic missile defenses through concurrent fielding, development, testing and operation is appropriate?**

The Department's approach to developing and fielding missile defense has been consistent with the goal of transforming U.S. military forces and adopting a capabilities-based approach to planning. We begin with the recognition that we face serious and uncertain threats and that potential adversaries are less predictable and more diverse than during the Cold War.

In applying capabilities-based planning to missile defense, we concluded that an evolutionary or spiral approach to acquiring and fielding missile defense was the best way to address ballistic missile threats in a dynamic and unpredictable security environment. This approach to the acquisition and fielding of missile defenses will provide advanced capabilities to the war-fighter, while we continue to pursue follow-on improvements to meet the changing threats. Fielding modest capabilities in the near-term will provide not only timely defensive coverage, it also will allow operational input from combatant commanders. This is especially important for the missile defense mission where there is little previous operational experience to serve as a guide.

There are several good examples where we have taken a similar approach to the timely fielding of limited capabilities still in development, such as the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack System (JSTARS). As we begin missile defense operations, this step does not indicate a reduction in aggressive development and testing activities. Rather, the Department will continue a robust development effort, and will use test results to improve existing capabilities, field new ones, and gain even greater confidence in operating missile defenses.

**In your view, how important are international cooperative efforts to achieving effective missile defenses? What steps, if any, should be taken to strengthen such efforts?**

As the President has said, it is essential that we work together with allies and friends to defend against the shared ballistic missile threat we face. Accordingly, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. We have taken a number of steps to strengthen cooperative efforts. For example, the Defense Department has structured the missile defense program in a manner that encourages participation by other nations. Countries can participate at varying levels of involvement, up to and including co-development and production of various systems. Other countries might also provide in-kind contributions, such as territory and facilities upon which to build components of our missile defense system.

## **Space**

**The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 included a provision establishing as national policy support for two space launch vehicles or families of space launch vehicles capable of launching national security payloads.**

**Do you agree with this policy?**

I do. The Department of Defense and NASA are responsible for ensuring access to space for critical national security and civil space missions, respectively. Ensuring access to space means they will provide a sufficiently robust, responsive and resilient capability to allow continued space operations. Currently, this means maintaining the two Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launch service providers.

**If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to ensure U.S. access to space?**

The United States' ability to deter adversaries and, if deterrence fails, to project power across the globe is dependent on our access to space and assured, protected operations in space. The capabilities required to ensure access to space include our current launch vehicle programs, launch ranges, satellite control network, responsive launch, and flexible / protected space systems.

**What further policy actions, if any, do you believe are needed to support assured access to space?**

The security and well being of the United States, our allies, and friends depend on our ability to operate in space. Our increasing dependence on space and the vulnerability it creates require us to have the means to deter and dissuade threats to our national interests in space. If confirmed, I intend to be briefed extensively on U.S. space launch capability and other programs required to ensure assured access to space. I understand the Administration has included in its on-going strategic review the range of capabilities necessary to implement this policy, and I support this effort.

**Current U.S. national security space policy states that the United States should have the ability to use space to support its national security interests and the ability to deny the use of space to its adversaries.**

**Do you support current U.S. national security space policy?**

Yes. Although currently under review, the 1996 National Space Policy continues to provide policy and guidance for the conduct of our nation's space activities. This Presidential directive states that "consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal, or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services." I agree with the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization that "the

broad outline of U.S. national space policy is sound.” If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress and my administration colleagues to ensure that our national space policy provides a coherent approach and clear direction for advancing our interests in space.

**What, in your view, are the policy implications of current and anticipated threats to U.S. space systems?**

Ensuring our freedom of action in space and protecting U.S. national security interests there are priorities for our space-related activities. U.S. space systems are national property afforded the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. In this regard, space is much like the high seas and international airspace. The political, military, and economic value of the nation’s activities in space may provide a motive for an adversary to attempt to counter U.S. space advantages. Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems would be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The United States must be prepared to take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on our rights.

**What role, if any, should arms control play a role in protecting U.S. space systems?**

The Outer Space Treaty provides certain basic rules. In addition, the START and INF Treaties prohibit interference with National Technical Means of Verification. At this time, the United States does not see any need for additional arms control measures. Any new arms control measure must be equitable and effectively verifiable, and must enhance the security of the United States and our allies. In the context of space, these are difficult to achieve.

**Arms Control**

**Arms control has been a prominent feature in U.S. security policy in the past, but clearly the international security landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade.**

**What is your view of the current significance of arms control efforts, and the proper role of arms control in U.S. national security strategy?**

Arms control agreements must be considered in the context of our national security requirements. Most existing arms control agreements were negotiated during, and are a product of, the Cold War. Our national security requirements have evolved since then. As an example, on the whole, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was no longer a net benefit to our national security; therefore, the President decided to withdraw from the treaty, with no negative effects. The Moscow Treaty codified with

Russia a decision that the United States had already made to reduce its strategic weapons to levels that we believe were necessary for the security of the United States. To be effective, arms control treaties must be based on all parties' willingness to comply with the limitations of the treaty, and must, in fact, control the arms they are designated to control. In some cases, traditional arms control agreements can provide the legal underpinning for non-traditional methods of controlling the spread of dangerous weapons. For example, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention are the legal bases behind other efforts, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

**What in your view are the opportunities for arms control with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery?**

Nuclear weapons: The emphasis in the upcoming year for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including the 5-year Review Conference in May 2005, will be on dealing with the main threat to the global nonproliferation regime – parties to the Treaty that cheat. In the case of Iran, we will continue to work through the IAEA Board of Governors and, eventually, the UN Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003, will be dealt with in the context of the Six Party Talks. Elsewhere, we have begun initiatives to support the IAEA. President Bush outlined these objectives in his February 2004 speech on combating WMD proliferation, and these objectives will remain a major focus of our international efforts.

Chemical weapons: We will continue to meet our own Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations while pushing for universal adherence to the CWC. We will also continue to work closely with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the world-wide implementation of the CWC and the monitoring of Russia's CW destruction progress. Additionally, we remain committed to ensuring all member-States meet their CWC obligations, including the institution of implementing legislation that criminalizes violations of the Convention. We will continue to support the work of the Australia Group to limit the transfers of chemical and biological weapons technologies and precursors.

Biological weapons: The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) establishes an important norm against the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological weapons. However, given the nature of biological weapons and biotechnology, the Convention is inherently unverifiable. We will continue to push for

universal adherence to the BWC and pursue initiatives that leverage existing mechanisms and national actions by States to combat the threat of biological weapons. The Department of Defense is actively engaged, along with other Departments, in the 2003-2005 BWC Work Program. This type of effort has and will continue to produce useful results.

Delivery systems: Although there is no international treaty controlling the development and spread of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, we do have several tools at our disposal to limit their proliferation. We will continue our strong support of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which serves an important role in coordinating the export controls of countries with the potential to be suppliers of missiles and missile-related items. We will also continue encouraging states to end their missile and defense-related trade with proliferators like North Korea.

In addition to the treaties covering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that are the backbone of our nonproliferation efforts, we will also use complementary mechanisms to address proliferation problems. For example, we recently worked successfully through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to advance the fight against weapons of mass destruction through the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation.

### **Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

**If confirmed, would you have a role in policy formulation and implementation of the PSI? If so, what would your role be?**

If confirmed, I would have a leading role in the policy formulation and implementation of the PSI. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy has been responsible for formulating and implementing PSI within the Department of Defense since the President announced this initiative in May 2003. The head of the U.S. delegation to the Operational Experts Group of the PSI will be under my supervision, and I will provide that person with policy guidance on how to improve PSI's operational focus internally within the Department and within the U.S. Government, while interacting with PSI experts from other governments. We will work closely with the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and the other agencies within the USG to strengthen and expand under the PSI efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

## **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

As a political appointee, I consider it my duty to be an advocate for the policies of the Administration. However, I will always be prepared to provide my best professional judgment when asked.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.