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SENATE COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES**

STATEMENT OF

**THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. WYNNE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS)**

**BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES**

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Missile Defense Program Progress
The Honorable Michael W. Wynne
Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 Department of Defense Missile Defense Program and budget submission. I am pleased to provide you this update on the progress of the Missile Defense development program.

The United States and our allies face serious and unpredictable threats to our homelands, populations, and interests. One of these threats is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, including ballistic missiles. These weapons have proliferated on a global basis and are possessed today by some two dozen states, including some of the world's least responsible regimes.

One of the reasons potential adversaries have sought ballistic missiles is that the United States has historically had no defense against long-range missile attack. President Bush has made it a top priority of his administration to end this vulnerability and to begin fielding missile defenses to protect the U.S., its deployed forces, and its friends and allies. The Department of Defense has made great progress in ending the nation's vulnerability to missile attack, and I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss this progress.

The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 established that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense

system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. Upon taking office, President Bush directed that the Department of Defense examine the full range of available technologies and basing modes for missile defense that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. In light of the changed security environment following 9-11 and the progress made in development efforts, the President directed the Department to begin fielding missile defense capabilities in 2004. We have indeed fielded an inherent capability that can be used for limited defense of the United States against long-range threats from North Korea. In 2005, we are enhancing that capability. Last year, I testified to the full Senate Armed Services Committee that we had encountered and solved a number of technical difficulties and can expect further challenges on the path ahead. This year, I must tell you that my statement from a year ago remains true, as our test program has had both successes and disappointments. But I am pleased to report that we have made a dramatic improvement over our previous condition of being defenseless against long-range ballistic missile attack. As we place additional components of our initial configuration in service in 2005, the effectiveness of the missile defense capability will incrementally improve. Further improvements planned for 2006 and beyond will continue to enhance both the capability of fielded missile defense components and the depth of those capabilities.

The Secretary's direction to consolidate ballistic missile defense development activity within a single program and to streamline our oversight process has enabled the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to make the program decisions that make the fielding of an initial ballistic missile defense capability possible more quickly than would be the case for a "standard" acquisition program. As I have testified in the past, the Ballistic Missile

Defense Program differs from the classical major defense acquisition program, so our approach to acquisition differs. Rather than produce and deploy a fixed “objective” missile defense configuration to serve its entire operational life, we plan an ambitious program of technology insertions and additional fielding actions to enhance the capability. This approach is justified not only by the uncertain nature of the security environment in which our missile defense system must work, but also by the advantages it offers from an acquisition strategy perspective.

I am confident that our acquisition approach and the management structure the Department has put into place for the Ballistic Missile Defense Program reduces decision times and promotes the capabilities-based, incremental development of our highly integrated and layered Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Director of the MDA reports directly to me; we meet weekly to discuss current issues and quarterly for a full review of the missile defense program. In addition, my predecessor created the Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG), a group of senior and experienced individuals from all the DoD stakeholder organizations to advise the Director of the MDA and support the Department’s senior leadership in this critical area. The MDSG has met over 50 times in the past 3 years to discuss complex issues and provide advice to the Director. The frequency of these MDSG meetings far exceeds the amount of senior level oversight and advice we give programs in the “normal” acquisition process. I have also encouraged an active interaction between the Director of the MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as well as their respective staffs. I am satisfied that their relationship has evolved in constructive ways, to the point that the Director of the MDA and the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation jointly approving a master test plan. You will also find that the testing community has

people embedded in the management offices of our missile defense elements. These actions give me confidence that the Department's management structure for, and oversight of, the missile defense program facilitates decisive senior leadership action, provides the Director of the MDA the authority he needs to execute the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, and also provides Congress extensive and frequent insight into our progress.

I continue to believe our innovative approach is proving successful. Based on recent reviews, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) appears to agree. The GAO has been actively engaged in reviewing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, having completed six MDA-specific reviews in the past year and with additional reviews on-going at this time. In many ways, our approach to developing the Missile Defense Program shares characteristics of the Government Accountability Office's knowledge-based criteria for major program decisions. We have worked closely with the GAO and have implemented a number of their recommendations.

We have made substantial progress in the nation's Missile Defense Program. We have already emplaced ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, updated radars, and modified Aegis ships for long-range surveillance and tracking support. Logistics support is in place. We have connected the elements to the fire-control system, and we have a command and control, battle management and communications capability in place. We are conducting increasingly realistic exercises and tests, and are learning more about the system with every exercise and test event. By the end of 2005, we will have added still more ground-based interceptors, upgraded additional radars, added a sea-based X-band radar, additional long-range search and track destroyers, and Aegis cruisers with engagement

capability using the Standard Missile – 3.

Our test program is designed to build confidence in the capabilities we are placing in service. Our sea-based midcourse defense element has had notable success while adding increasing realism. However, we have to remember that we are in the early stages of providing an unprecedented defensive capability. And while I am disappointed in the results of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense's recent tests, I am pleased with the program's overall progress and with the Director's response. Those setbacks have not shaken our confidence in the system's fundamental capability. This is a complex system with a number of components that must work together. The essential shift we must now make is to emphasize discipline in quality assurance. The problems we have seen recently are not unusual for new programs in this phase of development. The Director of the MDA has taken strong steps to reinforce process and product quality. He has put a plan into place to return the Ground Based Midcourse Defense program to a successful flight test program. I wholly endorse that plan and also want to improve "turnaround" time between test events. The Department will further build its confidence in the Ballistic Missile Defense System in the intercept tests we have scheduled for this year and next.

I would also note that our advances in the Ballistic Missile Defense Program have attracted increasing interest and attention from the international community. We have signed formal agreements with the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia. These agreements cover cooperation across a range of missile defense activities. Japan is acquiring a multi-layered BMD system, and we are working with Israel on improvements to the Arrow system. We are actively working on our collaboration with Russia on theater defense exercises and are

in discussions to explore other areas of potential missile defense cooperation.

The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 reflects the priorities set by the President and an implementation plan developed by the Secretary and his most senior military and civilian advisors. The budget was drafted in light of the progress that has been made—and the changes that have taken place—since September 11, 2001. As such, it responds to the need to prepare for an uncertain future that will require a more agile, lethal, and responsive force. At the same time, we must ensure that we maximize the capabilities gained from our defense dollars. In that regard, the budget fully supports the Ballistic Missile Defense Program. As you know, the Department has reduced missile defense funding in FY06 by \$1 billion, to \$7.8 billion, compared to our plan a year ago. We have not changed our mission in any way, and we are fully committed to fielding effective missile defenses. In implementing the reduction, we have allowed the Director of the MDA to plan how best to structure the program, balancing development, testing, and fielding, and I have approved his approach. We will accomplish this by focusing on key aspects of the program, through a thorough scrub of infrastructure needs and overhead, and through careful restructuring of out-year programs while mitigating risk. For example, we have established the Airborne Laser program as our primary boost-phase defense program. But because we will not know for several years whether ABL will contribute the capabilities we need, we are continuing with a restructured Kinetic Energy Interceptor program that emphasizes critical technology demonstrations. I believe that the President's Budget will allow the Department to pursue a fully capable missile defense system – one that meets the needs of the warfighter. I urge the Committee to support the President's Budget for this important program.

We are grateful for the support of Congress, which has made this bold effort to field missile defense capabilities possible. Congressional approval of the President's requests for missile defense funding has been critical to our smooth execution of the program. Continued cooperation between the Department and Congress will only grow in importance as we execute our mission to provide for the national security of the United States. I look forward to continuing that cooperation.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.