

**ANNEX A to Written Statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
2006 QDR
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
March 8, 2006**

I. Goals of the Department of Defense in the QDR

The 2006 QDR was designed to serve as a catalyst, to spur the Department's continuing adaptation and reorientation, as part of a longer-term continuum of change. The QDR effort had two main goals:

- To reorient the Department's capabilities and forces to be more agile, to prepare for wider asymmetric challenges and to hedge against uncertainty over the next 20 years; and
- To implement enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structures, processes, and procedures effectively support the Department's strategic direction.

These efforts are two sides of the same coin – you cannot achieve the former without the latter.

II. Any deviation from the requirements of section 118 of title 10, US Code, in the conduct or results of the QDR, and the reasons therefore

The 2006 QDR does not deviate from the requirements of section 118 of title 10, US Code. As a point of clarity, Section 118 (b)(1) requires the Department, as part of the QDR, to “delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy.” Though issued as a separate document, the March 2005 National Defense Strategy provides the strategic foundations for the 2006 QDR, as the QDR Report states.

III. Program and policy changes recommended by the QDR

To continue the Department's reorientation to meet 21st century security challenges, the 2006 QDR recommended programmatic and policy changes, in several broad categories:

- Adapting capabilities, forces, and policies to better address the four priorities identified as the focus of the QDR: defeating terrorist networks; defending the homeland in depth; shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD
- Reshaping the defense enterprise itself, to be more agile and responsive to the requirements of warfighters
- Updating workforce management policies, practices and authorities for the Total Force – active and reserve military, civilian and contractor – to improve its ability to adapt.
- Recommending policies and authorities to improve unity of effort within the US Government, and with international allies and partners.

Major recommendations of the 2006 QDR include the following:

- Increasing the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.
- Increasing General Purpose Forces' capabilities for irregular warfare.
- Continuing reorientation of tailored deterrence based on the New Triad.
- Improving long-range strike capabilities.
- Improving WMD response capabilities.
- Investing in broad-spectrum medical countermeasures.
- Strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
- Improving joint command and control capabilities.
- Strengthening and reshaping the defense enterprise.
- Strengthening and rebalancing the Total Force – active and reserve military components, civil servants, and contractors.
- Enhancing unity of effort in the Interagency.
- Supporting US Government strategic communications efforts.

IV. Threats and risks facing the United States and our allies that were examined for the purposes of the review

The foundation of the 2006 QDR is the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which outlines the four major categories of threats that the US faces: familiar traditional threats; irregular threats, including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare; catastrophic threats, including WMD; and disruptive threats designed to disrupt or negate traditional US military advantages. While America still faces traditional threats, the preponderance of future challenges are likely to fall into the other three areas, which requires the Department of Defense to continue to reorient and broaden its focus.

Against the backdrop of the NDS, the QDR's Terms of Reference identified four key challenges that the United States faces:

- The US faces threats from distributed, multiethnic networks of terrorist extremists, who use indiscriminate violence, propaganda, and intimidation to advance their ends.

- The US homeland is vulnerable to transnational movement of terrorists, extremist ideologies, advanced weapons, and disease, as well as to conventional military threats and natural disasters.
- Major and emerging powers could reject the path of cooperation and choose instead a hostile course, affecting the strategic position and freedom of action of the US and its allies.
- A growing number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups seek to acquire WMD, or to use it to devastating effect. They are not likely to respond to the traditional tools of deterrence.

Accordingly, four key priorities for the Department are: defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in-depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing the acquisition or use of WMD by hostile actors. While these four areas are not exhaustive, they are areas of particular concern, and addressing them will provide the Department with the capabilities, forces and policies it needs to be adaptable and versatile in response to other potential threats.

To refine the Department's vision and approach, senior civilian and military leaders engaged in detailed discussions of each focus area. Those discussions included input from the Military Departments, Components, and Combatant Commands, and were informed by DIA assessments. The entire process was further informed by operational experiences from the irregular Long War we are currently fighting, which shed additional light on the nature of the threats we face. Also, throughout the QDR process, the Department conducted outreach to key allies and partners, exploring their views of the shared threats we face. Their best ideas were incorporated into the QDR effort.

V. Assumptions used in the review including desired/ required readiness levels, warning times, the cooperation of allies, and interagency mission sharing

The QDR adopted the basic assumption of the President's 2002 National Security Strategy, and the Department's own 2005 National Defense Strategy, that the 21st century offers a greater range of security challenges, and greater uncertainty, than ever before. The importance of non-state actors is increasing, and they are less susceptible than states are to traditional deterrence tools. Most potential adversaries, unable to challenge America successfully through conventional means, will opt for unconventional, asymmetric ones. At the same time, traditional, state-based threats remain. We have been successful in keeping them at bay precisely because we are so well-prepared. Meanwhile, the pace of technological and scientific change, and the dispersion and availability of these changes through globalization, will only enhance the uncertainty.

The QDR also recognized that DoD cannot meet the array of challenges alone. The US needs to apply all available instruments of national power, through enhancing the expeditionary capabilities of some agencies, and through closer integration across the board in planning, training, exercising and implementation.

The QDR further assumed that the US Government as a whole cannot succeed in the Long War, or meet the rest of the array of security challenges, alone. The US will adapt long-standing alliances and foster new partnerships.

VI. Role that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Combat Support Agencies played in development of the QDR

The 2006 QDR process was the most inclusive review process ever carried out by the Department. It was leadership-driven, and it also included broad participation from all relevant stake-holders, in order to achieve unity of vision and purpose for the Department's ongoing, comprehensive re-orientation of focus.

The process was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout 2005, the Department's senior civilian and military leaders met regularly. That QDR deliberative body reported periodically to the Secretary of Defense. The process reached out to the Military Departments, DoD Components, and Combatant Commands.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) – chaired by the Vice Chairman and including the Vice Chiefs of the Services – did not have a separate defined role in the process. Rather, all of its members were full-time participants in the QDR effort, and were instrumental in shaping the process and the outcomes.

The QDR process did draw on the expertise of the Combat Support Agencies and their leadership. For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided intelligence and analytical support for the QDR discussions of the “four focus areas.” The Defense Threat Reduction Agency provided analytic support for QDR work on the focus area, “preventing acquisition or use of WMD by hostile actors.”

VII. Explanation of any new terminology used in the QDR

A critical component of the Department's 20-year strategic outlook is the *force planning construct (FPC)* used to size and shape the force. As part of the 2006 QDR, the Department's senior civilian and military leaders refined the FPC, to synchronize it with the QDR's updated strategic vision. The refined FPC divides the Department's activities into three broad categories, Homeland Defense, War on Terror/ Irregular Warfare, and Conventional Campaigns. It accounts for both “*steady-state*” requirements, activities that the Department conducts continuously; and “*surge*” requirements, those that occur episodically.

The refined force planning construct calls on US forces to be able to do the following things:

- *Defend the Homeland.* Steady-state requirements include detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating external threats to the US homeland, and enabling partners to contribute to US national security. Surge requirements include contributing to the nation's management of the consequences of WMD attacks or catastrophic events.

- *War on Terror/ Irregular Warfare.* Steady-state requirements include deterring and defending against external transnational terrorist attacks, enabling partners through integrated security cooperation programs, and conducting multiple, globally distributed irregular operations of varying duration. Surge requirements include conducting a large-scale, potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign including counterinsurgency, and conducting security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
- *Conventional Campaigns.* Steady-state requirements include deterring inter-state coercion or aggression through forward-deployed forces, enabling partners through theater security cooperation, and conducting presence missions. Surge requirements include waging two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one, plus a large-scale long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic aggressions.

VIII. Any changes in doctrine and training that would be required

Achieving the QDR strategic vision will also require some adjustments to doctrine and training. A number of these recommendations are spelled out in the QDR Report. In addition, in eight specific areas that cross-cut Military Department and OSD Component interests, the Department has created QDR follow-on “execution roadmap” efforts, to refine further and help implement QDR decisions. Those ongoing roadmap efforts may produce additional recommendations for training and doctrine changes needed to support the QDR decisions.

Highlighted here are some of the areas in which the Department’s reorientation is likely to produce training and doctrinal changes:

- *Preparing to participate in complex, interagency and multinational operations.* The QDR stressed the need for further advances in joint training and education to prepare for participation in complex operations, at home and abroad. To shift focus and address the shortfalls, the QDR recommended that the Department develop a Joint Training Strategy to address new mission areas and gaps; and that it revise the Training Transformation Plan to incorporate irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, combating WMD, and information operations.
- *Helping improve interagency unity of effort.* To help improve US interagency integration in planning and conducting complex operations, the QDR recommended enhancing opportunities for interagency training, including transforming the National Defense University into a National Security University with broad interagency participation.
- *Building the security capacity of partner states.* Fostering competent, indigenous security forces in partner countries is a key element of the strategy for success in the Long War. The QDR recommended that US general purpose forces assume greater roles in training, mentoring and advising foreign security forces. This new emphasis will require some adjustments in training.

- *Improving language and cultural skills.* To succeed in the Long War, and to facilitate closer cooperation with international partners, the QDR recommended significantly enhancing the language and cultural skills of the force. Measures include expanding Service Foreign Area Officer programs, recruiting and training heritage speakers to serve as translators, requiring language training as part of ROTC and Service Academy curricula, and improving pre-deployment language and cultural training.
- *“Operationalizing” the Reserve Component:* The QDR stressed the need to use the Reserve Component as an “operational,” rather than a “strategic,” force, and to make it more accessible. Recommendations include better focusing Reserve Component (RC) competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations; increasing flexibility for long-term service by individual RC volunteer augmentees; and developing select RC units that train intensively and require shorter deployment notice. These initiatives would likely require adjustments in training.

XI. Any changes in the Unified Command Plan that would be required

The 2006 QDR makes no changes to the Unified Command Plan.

The QDR’s decision to transform designated existing Military Department operational headquarters into fully functional and scalable Joint Command and Control Joint Task Force-capable Headquarters, complements standing guidance to move toward greater jointness at the operational level.

X. Any proposed legislation that would be required to implement decisions in the QDR

Implementing some aspects of the QDR strategic vision may require some changes to legislation. The Department of Defense is in the process of elaborating and putting forward specific proposals for legislative change. The Department’s senior leadership looks forward to working closely with the Congress on these initiatives.

Highlighted here are some of the more important initiatives:

- *Increasing flexibility in the use of the Reserve Component.* The QDR stressed the need for greater flexibility in the use of the Reserve Component in the Department’s support to civil authorities for homeland security missions. The QDR recommended seeking authorization to allow the use of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams for cross-border WMD events in Canada and Mexico. The QDR also recommended seeking authorization to use Presidential Reserve Call-up for natural disasters.
- *Expanding ability to shape the force.* The QDR stressed the need to improve the Department’s ability to shape and manage the force, in order to meet today’s much more diverse array of challenges. The QDR recommended seeking the authority to extend the length of service prescribed by Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 days to 365. It also recommended seeking tools to allow the Air Force and Navy to shape their forces for

the future, including greater flexibility in separation incentives and inter-service transfer bonuses.

- *Managing healthcare.* The QDR stressed the Department's commitment to responsible management of healthcare costs, while maintaining force medical readiness and satisfaction with TRICARE. The QDR recommended seeking legislative support to restore the balance between government and individual health care contributions.
- *Improving options for stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations abroad.* Victory in the Long War requires the application of all elements of US national power. To that end, the QDR proposed the creation of the President's Security Investment Fund, to enable the President to commit resources to respond to high-priority requirements overseas. The QDR also recommended seeking changes to make permanent the Commanders' Emergency Response Program currently in force in OEF and OIF.
- *Facilitating the more rapid integration of coalition partners into complex operations.* The QDR recommended the creation of a Defense Coalition Support Account, to fund rapidly and, where appropriate, stockpile, high-demand equipment such as helmets, body armor, and night vision devices, in order to reduce the lead time required to equip coalition partners. The QDR also recommended seeking the authority to provide non-reimbursable logistic support, supplies, and services to coalition partners in combined operations. This would make permanent authorities currently restricted to OEF and OIF. Finally, the QDR supported easing restrictions on the transfer of significant military equipment, such as armored HMMWVs, for temporary use by coalition partners in combined operations.
- *Building relationships with new partner countries.* The QDR stressed the need to initiate and build robust security relationships with new partners. To support that goal, the QDR recommended expanding the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund and the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program, which would allow Combatant Commands to seize opportunities for building partnerships.