

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

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UNITED STATES ARMY**

BEFORE THE

**SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
UNITED STATES SENATE**

SECOND SESSION, 109th CONGRESS

MARCH 15, 2006

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

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Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today. Over the past year, from January 2005 until January 2006, it was my honor and privilege to serve as the joint forces commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). You should be pleased to know that the support the members of this committee give to all of our Soldiers, Marines, airmen, and sailors involved in this conflict is invaluable, and on behalf of all who've served in MNC-I this past year, I want to extend my sincerest appreciation for all that you have done and continue to do in support of this great undertaking.

Over the past year the Iraqi theater of operations has seen historic and positive change. Three successful elections transpired resulting in the drafting of an Iraqi constitution and the selection of a democratically elected and representative government. Our strategy for winning the counter-insurgency fight in Iraq is working. In the preceding year, the Iraqi Security Forces have increased dramatically in numbers and capability. By January of this year more than 227,000 Iraqi Security Forces were trained and equipped representing 10 Iraqi army divisions and Ministry of Interior forces. This is nearly double the January 2005 total of 130,000. One division, eight brigades, and 37 battalions assumed battlespace during XVIII Airborne Corps' watch as MNC-I. Fifty-percent of Baghdad, Iraq's geographic center of gravity is under Iraqi control and on 30 December 2005, the first Iraqi battalion assumed battlespace in the formerly embattled city of Mosul.

As Iraqi Security Forces increase in strength and capability, the area of operations has also seen an adjustment in the coalition. Thirty-one forward operating bases were turned over to the government of Iraq and the United States footprint has reduced by a division equivalent headquarters and two brigades.

Transformation

The headway made in the security line of operation is a direct result of the magnificent performance of the uniformed members of the coalition of which the service men and women of the United States armed forces are such an integral part. In regard to the United States Army's contribution in particular, I can tell you that the benefits of Army transformation are readily apparent. During our assignment, MNC-I employed the Army's first transformed units, the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Modularity transformation, as it continues throughout the Army, will reduce the friction associated with the rotation of units into the area of operations by standardizing equipment and organization. This will have a positive impact on unit readiness for combat that will be felt in training efficiency and effectiveness and will ultimately result in formations better prepared to prosecute the fight in the combat zone.

Funding

One of the critical enablers for readiness of the Corps has been adequate funding to train and maintain our units and their systems. In addition to an adequate base level of funding, we could not have prepared the corps to deploy nor reset our units upon return without the supplemental funds provided by congress. For example, at Fort Bragg, the Corps expended \$99.1 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 and \$41.9 million in FY05 to train and equip units to deploy. To reset our systems returning from the fight, we expended \$100.6 million in FY04 and \$149.8

million in FY05. Without supplemental funds, we will not be able to maintain the rotational pace necessary to continue operations overseas.

Regarding programs in the area of operation, MNC-I, in this time period, executed the expenditure of 11.2 billion dollars. Of that, \$872 million was for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This program was the most visible program that we managed and there was never enough funding in this program to satisfy the needs of the commanders in the field. As reconstruction funding diminishes, demand for this program will likely rise. We also executed \$2.1 million in rewards payouts. This program must continue as a way to acquire information 'off the street' and as a way to conduct operations. The Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, a government supervised, contractor operated, Iraqi-manned program that is integrated with local military commanders and units resulted in inspection, disposition, storage, and destruction of over 150,000 tons of ordnance and establishment of two depots supporting ISF operations. Funding for this program is critical for without it, we could not be making the progress we are in the area.

Interagency Support

Progress in the security line of operation out-strips the headway we are making in the governance and economic lines. Security, as you all are well aware, is only one part of the answer. Standing up a coherent and viable government takes much more. In my view, the lack of ministerial capacity is the single greatest hindrance to long-term success in Iraq. The term "ministerial capacity" is used to cover those essential services and responsibilities that must be provided by a functioning government. For example, the capability to man, train, equip, and pay an army in the field is an essential responsibility for the Ministry of Defense. Likewise, the capability to find, drill, refine, distribute oil, and generate revenue is an essential responsibility for the Ministry of Oil.

An increased effort to develop the capacity of the fledgling nation of Iraq along governmental and economic lines will have a lasting positive effect on the ability of the Iraqi people to achieve self-governance. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently taking the lead in managing and implementing the contracts for reconstructing Iraq's economic infrastructure, including electricity, water/sanitation, telecommunications, roads, health care, and public safety, such as prisons. These activities are not DOD's primary mission and it may be better for other agencies and/or corporations, rather than DOD, to build up their capabilities to address these requirements. To be truly effective, our mission requires continued funding and a significant increase in expertise. Exploring ways to create and integrate a national capability for these types of tasks would be welcome and beneficial.

Joint Nature of the Iraqi Theater of Operations

The multi-national corps-Iraq is a truly joint headquarters operating in a joint environment. Service interoperability, is a requisite in this fight and occurs as a matter of course. The cooperation and integration that exists between conventional and special operations forces is a major success story that illustrates how far the military has come in creating a joint force. The requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 have helped us move to our present point. In light of our recent advancement and the progress made since 1986, a review of the requirements, specifically those stipulated for joint qualification, may be worth reviewing and updating.

In terms of truly joint support for the warfighter forward, I would ask for your continued support for Joint Forces Command and that Command's efforts to resource, train, and equip a truly joint military. The advantage that the nation gains by this capability is immeasurable.

Battle Command

The art and science of applying leadership and decision making to achieve the mission is the essence of battle command. In this age of advanced technology, the joint force commander must be able to leverage and integrate all tools at his disposal to prosecute the fight. With all the resources available to the United States military, our technological advancement creates an asymmetric advantage for us over our adversaries. We have made great advances, but we can and must do more to leverage this technology. The major challenges in this area revolve around data and bandwidth management, compartmented and proprietary systems, and doctrine and proponent responsibility. The effort to integrate existing but disparate systems and continue to develop future systems is of paramount importance as we grow and balance capabilities and modernize our force.

Conclusion

The Iraqi theater of operations is a fast-paced and dynamic environment. Some critics have commented that our strategy for Iraq lacks focus and that it is too slow to react to be effective in this environment. I can tell you that the opposite is true. After preparing the corps for deployment, serving as a joint force commander, and returning to prepare and provide forces for employment in theater, I am a first-hand witness to the flexible and adaptive nature of our nation's fighting force. A notable point from the preceding year is the degree of integration of the reserve component into the fight. Reserve and National Guard formations made up 60 percent of the force during XVIII Airborne Corps' tenure as MNC-I. Their participation and competency were essential in allowing the active army to continue transformation and reset redeploying units for the fight.

The current warfight has outpaced doctrine. The fight that General Casey and those with him continue to prosecute will inform our future policies and service manuals. However, at the present we are doing all in our power to prepare units and individuals for this counter-insurgency. In the past year the strategy has evolved to meet the demands of the environment. That strategy is understood, supported, and is being implemented at all levels by leaders of the highest quality. Prime examples of the adaptive nature of the force are the development and implementation of transition teams as a way to build capable Iraqi Security Forces; the shift from high-intensity combat operations to partnership with Iraqi formations at every level; and the creation of a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Academy to disseminate knowledge and provide incoming leadership the most up-to-date tactics techniques and procedures.

These examples are but a few, there are many more that highlight the united states military's contribution to the coalition that is protecting our way of life and bringing freedom to a people that have been without it for so long. You should be very proud of your military and the men and women of all the services for the exemplary manner in which they are serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. I know I am.