

Advance Questions for James Shinn
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

It is my understanding that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD(APSA)), a newly created position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), is the civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on national security matters in the Asian and Pacific region. The ASD(APSA) is responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense policies in support of the Secretary's objectives; overseeing operational execution of the Secretary's approved policies for the region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral security relationships in the region. The ASD(APSA) is the focal point for Asia policy within the Department of Defense for the Department of Defense Components, the United States Pacific Command, United States Central Command, and for the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The ASD(APSA) represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations related to the Asian and Pacific region.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I believe that I am qualified to perform these duties, if confirmed, by a combination of regional expertise, management training, and experience in several U.S. Government agencies.

In terms of regional expertise, I have spent a good deal of my adult life working on Asia problems, as a businessman, as a scholar, and as a U.S. Government official. I have worked or traveled in every country in the area of responsibility (AOR) (with a few notable exceptions such as North Korea) and lived in the region for about seven years. As a business executive, I set up and subsequently helped manage subsidiary corporations in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and India. As a scholar I wrote several publications and books on the region, which in retrospect have pretty well stood the test of time.

In terms of management skills, I am a professional manager by trade, with a good track record of setting goals and achieving results. I have built and managed organizations ranging from 30 to 3,000 employees, with both line and staff experience on the enterprise level, in various positions with prime responsibility for production operations, research and development, sales and marketing, finance and audit, and corporate governance.

In terms of government experience, I have worked in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense – principally on Asian security and economic problems, and closely involved in the interagency policy process.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Given the breadth of the responsibilities of this position and the complexity of the region, I have a great deal to learn. If confirmed, I intend to focus on three areas in particular: a better understanding of the Title 10 authorities applicable to the Department of Defense and the Military Departments, how the Department of Defense trains and equips forces for use in the region, especially with regard to the force and base realignments in Asia; a better grasp of how decisions are made and operationally executed for force allocation and deployment in the region generally, and for Afghanistan in particular; more insight on Congressional process, policy concerns and preferences in Asia, especially for budget formulation and conditionality on security cooperation in the region.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

The Commander, U.S. Central Command

The Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Combatant Commanders. As appropriate, if confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy; a lot of policy challenges in Asia involve resources and expertise that are distributed across the functional portfolios of OSD. Examples of this

coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism and Pakistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on counter-narcotics, nuclear and security assistance matters.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

I believe there are six major challenges in Asia and the Pacific that the next ASD (APSA) will face. First, in Afghanistan, the Afghan government needs support to counter and defeat the insurgency. Second, North Korea's conventional military threat, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation activities are a threat to regional security. Third, China's military buildup may be tipping the stability balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the region at large. Fourth, there are a lot of challenges that could slow down or derail the alliance transformation and strengthening of our important security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Fifth, a conventional or even nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India would be a disaster. Finally, in Southeast Asia we face challenges in sustaining defense reforms and democratic consolidation, as well maintaining effective counter-terrorism cooperation.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Strategies for dealing with these challenges are largely in place at the Pentagon, among the U.S. interagency, and in agreements with our partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as principally one of careful, sustained execution of these strategies rather than devising new initiatives. In Afghanistan, my principal focus would be on supporting coalition efforts to train and equip Afghan security forces, as well as integrate both the military and governance elements of the counter-insurgency. This also includes working with Pakistan to eliminate safehavens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Regarding North Korea, I would work with the Department of State and regional partners to press North Korea to meet its commitments – including denuclearization - as agreed to during the Six Party Talks, while maintaining the capability to deter potential North Korea military threats and countering proliferation activities. With regard to China, the strategy is one of careful, measured military engagement with the Government of China and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), pressing for transparency while also sustaining our military capabilities to fulfill our defense commitments in the region. In order to sustain the realignment and transformation processes already underway, we need to review progress constantly and resolve challenges in the bilateral relations with both Tokyo

and Seoul: these are complex, multi-stage projects that require sustained political and budgetary support on both sides of the Pacific. In South Asia, I would work with the Department of State to promote confidence building measures between India and Pakistan while continuing to develop our bilateral security relations with both nations. Finally, in Southeast Asia I would sustain and expand our relations with regional militaries (Burma notably not included) to promote regional security, defense reforms and respect for human rights.

Global Defense Posture Review

Perhaps more than in any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U.S. Pacific Command are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of U. S. Pacific Command to execute its operational contingencies, and did the Global Posture Review appropriately take this into account?

Forward basing remains a key element of United States security strategy in the Pacific. This was borne out in the Department of Defense comprehensive review of U.S. global defense posture from 2003-04, which took into account the contingency and steady-state needs of our forces regionally and globally. This review examined operational needs within and across the theater, and emphasized transforming our host-nation relationships, as well as changing the footprint of facilities and forces in the region to deal with future security challenges more effectively.

What do you see as the implications of the proposed global force structure changes with respect to the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Korea and Japan?

I believe our posture changes in Korea and Japan are strengthening our alliances and better positioning U.S. forces. By relocating U.S. personnel, we will remove long-standing host-nation concerns such as noise and encroachment without compromising their missions. We will also improve and enhance our mutual defense infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large investment projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan.

What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in posture will have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

These posture changes increase our flexibility to respond when and where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen our overall capacity to deter coercive and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region.

Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and strike capabilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground forces) forward in the Pacific as well

as strategic mobility and command and control (C2) support from the United States -- all of which are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-defense in contingencies. The United States has global responsibilities, and the changes to our force posture are a reflection of these responsibilities. These posture changes are not directed against a particular country or contingency. Rather, we believe that by being clear about our interests and supporting our allies and partners, conflict can be avoided.

The Army is planning to add 65,000 personnel to its permanent force structure over the course of the Future Years Defense Program, including the creation of six additional active-duty combat brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing to add 27,000 personnel over the same period.

Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units should be assigned to commands located in the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility in order to meet Pacific Command's requirements?

The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps would allow us to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the optimum mix of forces to execute the National Military Strategy and its Asian components. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and others in the Department of Defense to determine if and where additional forward deployed forces in Asia might make sense. Before I would provide my recommendation to Department of Defense leadership, we would also want to consult closely with our allies and regional partners, given the complexity of the existing alliance agreements and the challenging roadmap for long term execution of the realignment plans.

If so, to what extent do you believe these additional forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?

If confirmed, I would need to review specific proposals before making a recommendation. In general, I believe that these deployment decisions should be driven principally by the evolving and potential threats in Asia, as well as by the Department of Defense contingency plans and their training requirements. Currently, I believe that U.S. force levels in Korea and Japan – as agreed to under our ongoing alliance transformation discussions – represent an appropriate posture for U.S. defense needs. Going forward, we should continually evaluate other options – including stationing those forces elsewhere in the world, or in the United States and its territories.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to U. S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

Even as the North and South negotiate with each other to reduce tensions, the DMZ remains heavily fortified, and two of the world's largest conventional military forces face each other across that line. The United States also has 28,000 troops on the Peninsula and is committed to the defense of the South in case of an attack by the North.

The Department of State is the lead on the Six Party Talks mechanism, and it appears that some progress has been made. The proof is in the implementation, however; and the next major milestone is North Korea's full declaration of all its nuclear facilities, materials and programs by the end of this year.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea is a serious threat to the United States and to the rest of Asia. The North's missile capabilities allow it to strike all of its neighbors and the United States. North Korea exports missiles to the rest of the world. North Korea now has a demonstrated nuclear capability and has made veiled threats of proliferating nuclear capabilities.

Do you believe that Kim Jong Il would be willing to give up North Korea's nuclear weapons and facilities? If so, under what conditions?

I do not know whether, or if so under what conditions, Kim Jong-il and the North Koreans would be willing to give up their nuclear weapons, programs, and facilities.

Republic of South Korea (ROK)

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship is currently undergoing significant change.

Please describe the state of the current U. S. security relationship with South Korea.

Our Alliance is over a half-century old and it remains strong, reflecting the common values and aspirations of our peoples. The North Korean nuclear and conventional threat remains the focal point of our Alliance's deterrent and defense posture. I believe the Republic of Korea's troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have made significant contributions to the global war against terrorism. Korea has also made peacekeeping contributions to the UN Mission in Lebanon. South Korea's

commitment to reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects our shared concern for freedom in other parts of the world.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

First, we must complete the realignment of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Execution of this complex task will alleviate much of the friction between U.S. forces and Korean citizens, while still providing the necessary levels of deterrence and defense readiness and posture. Our Korean partner is committed to this task and is on track so far. Second, we must complete the historic transition of operational command (OPCON) in 2012, when Republic of Korea Forces will assume the lead role in the defense of their nation, backed up fully by the supporting role of United States forces. The ROK Armed Forces and USFK are engaged in the complex investments of equipment, training and facilities to prepare for this transition; so far, this process too is on track. Third, we must continue to assess the mutual benefits of this alliance and explain those benefits (and their costs) to our publics on both sides of the alliance.

Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned to Korea for two or three years of duty and the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer tours of duty?

General Bell, the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, has explained the merits of this proposal, and as far as I understand, it is consistent with the policy goals of the force realignment and our alliance with the Republic of Korea. Having said that, I believe the Department of Defense will also need to study the proposal to ensure that we have adequate resources to support the expansion.

Japan

How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with Japan?

Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in Asia. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious trade disputes. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated force transformation process that requires a lot of effort, money, and time. That process is still on track. On the other hand, Japan has been slow in expanding the role and missions of its Self-Defense Force. We have also had problems with the proper handling of classified information in Japan and are working together to prevent this in the future. If confirmed, I would work to keep the transformation process on track and seek to expand our cooperation in additional areas of mutual concern, such as missile defense.

What is your view of Japan's current level of contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Japan is wrestling with a fundamental re-evaluation of how to use its very capable Self-Defense Forces in international security missions. The overall trend has been forward, but slow. However, the decision to suspend support to OEF was a backward step, and a disappointment to members of the coalition and to many in Japan itself. Japan's refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean and Japanese participation in OEF were important both to the War on Terror and to demonstrate Japan's contributions to the region's future. Security and reconstruction operations are continuing, and we are working to mitigate the loss of Japan's refueling support. In terms of Japan's support for Iraq, Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces served in Iraq from February 2004 to July 2006. Its Air Self-Defense Forces continue to provide C-130 airlift support. Japan has also been a major financial contributor in support of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

If confirmed, what if anything, would you do to encourage greater Japanese participation in these operations?

If confirmed, I would urge the Japanese government to implement a new legal basis for continued participation in OEF that is consistent with the needs of the Coalition.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

The security environment in Asia is changing and we need a more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, with greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the Alliance, both regionally and globally. Cooperation should range from missile defense to increased joint training opportunities – in Guam for example.

In the interest of increased security cooperation among Asian democracies, what steps, if any, should Japan take to address outstanding grievances with its neighbors?

I believe it is important for Japan to cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security cooperation. By working with other U.S. allies and friends in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally.

China -- Relationship

Many observers believe that one of the key national security challenges of this century is how to manage China's emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power.

How would you characterize the U.S. relationship with China?

I would characterize the U.S.-China security relationship as complex, with some elements of cooperation and others of potential competition. The military aspect of the relationship is embedded within an even more complex set of political and economic relationships between Washington and Beijing, and fundamentally colors our security relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Southeast Asian nations, and Taiwan. Our task at the Department of Defense is to expand the cooperative aspects of the military relationship where it builds confidence and avoids misunderstandings, while also preparing to deter or counter points of security competition.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

I would assess current U.S.-China military-to-military relations as generally positive, with some signs of progress, sometimes lacking in transparency, and marred by incidents such as the ASAT shot in January 2007, the broaching of a Song-class submarine near the USS Kitty Hawk in October 2006, and the Kitty Hawk port denial in November 2007. I understand and support the statutory limitations on U.S.-China military exchanges provided for in Section 1201 of the FY 2000 NDAA.

How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

I assess the current cross-Strait relationship between China and Taiwan as tense but relatively stable. In order to help prevent miscalculation by either side, I support U.S. policy of being committed to a peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan problem in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I support the President's stated policy of one China, based upon the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. If confirmed, I would oppose any unilateral acts by China or Taiwan to change the status quo, as we define it.

From a defense perspective, I believe the best way to prevent miscalculation by either side is to remain firm in our commitments to Taiwan, while maintaining a candid, constructive relationship with the PRC. A strong Taiwan is more capable of engaging in political dialogue with the PRC and resisting coercion.

China recently denied permission to U.S. military ships for port visits to Hong Kong and for U.S. vessels to take refuge in Chinese ports or waters during inclement weather.

What is your view of the causes of these Chinese denials, and what, if anything, can be done to ensure that this does not happen in the future?

We raised our concerns with the Chinese, and have not received a coherent official explanation, as far as I know. This was an unfortunate decision by China and ran counter to well-established norms of maritime behavior.

Better communications with the Government of China and with the PLA, such as by implementing the long-delayed direct Defense Telephone Link (DTL), and more substantive bilateral exchanges – especially under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement – may help to avoid such problems in the future, but they certainly cannot ensure they don't happen again.

On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with a U. S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U. S. personnel and resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot.

Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you believe may be necessary?

During the most recent round of U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks, both sides agreed to conduct a joint maritime Search and Rescue Exercise, which was completed in November 2006. The value of this type of exchange is that it creates a forum in which each side can gain a better understanding of how the other would respond in the event of a disaster at sea. These types of events can also help to improve the safety of sailors and airmen operating in close proximity to each other by promoting within the Chinese armed forces patterns of behavior that favor safety and adherence to international norms.

In your view, is there the potential for similar dangerous incidents with China to occur at sea or elsewhere?

This could happen again. Aggressive navigational practices by Chinese vessels and aircraft cause concern for the safety of air and maritime forces operating in proximity of each other. If confirmed, I would continue efforts already underway to send a clear and consistent message to China that such aggressive practices are dangerous and that China should respect the freedoms and rights guaranteed to all states under international law for the use of sea and airspace.

If confirmed, what policy direction, if any, would you recommend to the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, to prevent such incidents?

It is essential that all Department of Defense Components, including U.S. Pacific Command, continue to conduct crisis management training to ensure communication and coordination mechanisms are in place. We will continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to stress the importance of maritime safety with China. We have also engaged in what I call “fire drill” training in OSD in order to better cope with such an EP-3 type incident should it occur again.

China – Military Modernization

China's economy is growing by as much as ten percent per year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization.

In your view, what is China’s intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

I am deeply concerned about China’s military buildup – I prefer “build-up” to the term “modernization.” China’s publicly announced defense budgets continue to grow at rates that exceed growth of the overall economy, reaching over \$46 billion in 2007. Actual expenditures in 2007 could be as much as \$85 billion to \$125 billion. China continues to invest heavily in strategic weapons, power projection, area denial, and asymmetric warfare. China appears focused in the near-term on generating capabilities for potential Taiwan contingencies, including those that would involve U.S. intervention. Over the long term, China’s military buildup suggests it is building capabilities to deal with a broader variety of contingencies in the region. We have very limited insight into China’s intent behind this build-up of capability.

China - Anti-Satellite Test

On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community.

What is your view of China’s purpose in conducting this test?

We do not know what China’s purpose was in conducting this test. In the absence of explanations by the PLA or the Government of China, we must view the January 2007 ASAT test in the context of China’s broader military build-up, which includes enhanced capabilities for anti-access and area denial. This could be part of a strategy to develop a full range of ASAT capabilities, including ground-based lasers and jammers.

What do you see as the implications of this test for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

If deployed, China’s direct-ascent ASAT could hold U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit at risk and eventually satellites in higher orbits, including the Global Positioning System and other warning systems. The test was inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in space exploration and raises concerns about the credibility of China’s declaratory statements against the weaponization of space. The United States reserves the right to defend and protect its space systems. A broad range of diplomatic and military options are required to meet the challenges posed by China’s counterspace capabilities – including its ASAT systems.

What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space?

I support U.S. long-standing national policies of supporting the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to prevent those that would do us harm from using space for hostile purposes.

U.S.-China Proposed Dialogue on Nuclear Weapons

A delegation led by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Edelman proposed in recent talks with officers of China's People's Liberation Army to begin a "dialogue" on nuclear weapons and strategy. According to Pentagon spokesmen, the Department has not defined the exact scope or desired objectives of such a dialogue.

Do you believe such a dialogue can be carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which prohibits any military-to-military exchange or contact with representatives of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China in twelve specific areas including, specifically, nuclear operations?

I believe that such a dialogue, if appropriately constructed and effectively managed, can – and must – remain within the statutory limitations on U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges, as provided for in Section 1201 of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act.

Taiwan

What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

I believe priority areas include: hardening of critical infrastructure; ensuring increased munitions are available to counter the threat; and an advanced integrated air and missile defense. The United States and Taiwan will continue to work together to review defensive needs considering the current and projected PRC threat.

What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?

The United States is closely monitoring the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's defense needs, and we are well aware of the increasing capability of the PRC military. Regional stability depends on a strong Taiwan. Taiwan must be able to deter PRC coercion, and the best deterrent available to Taiwan is a strong defensive military.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty allies in East Asia and is a committed bilateral and regional partner in combating terrorism. Our alliance remains strong and the Philippines remain crucial to the United States and to regional stability in general. I believe our top two priorities with the Philippines are counterterrorism cooperation and defense reform.

What is your view of the effectiveness of the special operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

The Philippines faces terrorist threats from Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Communist New People's Army (NPA). The Joint Special Operations Task Force is working effectively by, through, and with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to provide assistance in an indirect manner that is consistent with Philippine Constitutional restrictions on foreign forces.

What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

The established current policy guidelines are clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement that guide our bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. The Philippine Constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism?

Although I would defer to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on this question, I believe that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States and our allies in tracking and combating global terrorist networks in the region, particularly against the Jema'a Islamiya wing of the jihadi threat.

Is it your understanding that the Indonesian Government is cooperating in the investigation into the murder of two American school teachers and one Indonesian school teacher in an ambush in Papua in August 2002?

Yes. Secretary of State Rice reported to the Congress in February 2005 that the Indonesian Government and Armed Forces were cooperating with the FBI's investigation into the Timika murders. In 2006, suspects in the case turned themselves in to the FBI and were subsequently put on trial in Indonesia. The defendants were found guilty of the murders in November 2006, and the lead defendant was sentenced to death.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia?

Current military-to-military contacts with Indonesia are positive and expanding. If confirmed, I would work for the continued normalization of our defense relations with Indonesia. I believe that enhanced military contacts with the Indonesian military can help cement the recent progress we have seen on human rights, particularly in conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua, maritime security and military reforms. I also appreciate Indonesia's contribution to peacekeeping operations – including Lebanon. Going forward, I would like to see our military-to-military contacts with Indonesia deepen through a series of regular, predictable exercises and engagements.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contacts, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

The pace of military reform remains slow but steady. Some of the “less difficult” reforms - separation of the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training - have already taken place. The orderly TNI withdrawal from Aceh and progress on the planned divestiture of TNI businesses by the end of 2007 are evidence of ongoing reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law formally codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian government. Continued “hard” reforms that we must continue to push for include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully “on budget”, and continued professionalization of the TNI officer corps.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I would sustain our efforts of encouraging professionalism within the military in terms of both human rights respect and accountability, through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance and military training programs.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U. S. - India military-to-military relationship?

The U.S.-India military-to-military relationship is positive and getting stronger, based on a perceived confluence of strategic interests on both sides. In the past six years, our defense ties have become increasingly robust, with frequent bilateral exchanges and dialogue, a slate of increasingly sophisticated annual military exercises, and potential for expanded defense trade. We anticipate that India will continue to promote security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond through its disaster response, maritime security and peacekeeping efforts.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, there are a number of areas I would like to build on in the relationship with India. First, we would like to work with India to strengthen our mutual capabilities to fight terrorism. Second, we would like to strengthen our maritime cooperation with India, to promote our mutual objectives in coping with disaster response, piracy, proliferation, terrorism, and energy security. The United States and India also have a common goal of ensuring the free flow of commerce through key sea lanes. The third priority should be to build our defense trade relationship with India. The United States is a new entrant into the Indian defense market and we see defense sales as a way to promote interoperability, promote people-to-people contacts, and strengthen the strategic relationship. Our fourth area of emphasis will be to deepen our already robust military-to-military relationship with more sophisticated exercises. Finally, we would like to move our cooperation forward on missile defense by engaging the Government of India in policy discussions and joint collaboration on technical projects.

What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

I believe these armed groups share some common objectives and ideology, as well as drawing from a similar (though not identical) pool of recruits and receiving support from similar (though not identical) sources.

What, in your view, is the effect, if any, of the fact that there is currently no civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

It doesn't help our security relationship that the cooperation agreement appears currently stalled. But we do not believe that defense cooperation with India depends on the outcome of the civil nuclear agreement.

International Coordinator for Afghanistan

In September, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged that an “international coordinator” be appointed to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan.

Do you agree that there is a need for greater coordination of the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan?

Yes, I agree that there is a need for greater coordination of the international community efforts in Afghanistan. Some 72 countries and international organizations are currently working in Afghanistan to help the government and the Afghan people, so coordination is a challenge.

Economic, governance, and security assistance must be thoroughly integrated and support the long-term national development strategy of the Government of Afghanistan.

Would you support the appointment of an international coordinator to oversee and coordinate these efforts?

Yes; a senior international coordinator, if chosen properly, would be helpful in ensuring complementary efforts within the international community and that our efforts are supportive of the Afghan government. An international coordinator could play an important role in identifying requirements and raising awareness about the needs of Afghanistan.

Security in Afghanistan

An August 2007 United Nations report found that the security situation in Afghanistan has “deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007.” At the same time, there continue to be shortfalls among NATO members in meeting the mission requirements for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, particularly in maneuver battalions, helicopters and the operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) for training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan? Do you agree that the situation has deteriorated through 2007?

The security situation in Afghanistan remains challenging. I am not sure that the overall security situation has deteriorated through 2007. It is not clear whether the increased number of violent incidents is due to a stronger insurgency, or more aggressive and comprehensive actions taken by the ANSF and ISAF forces.

Still, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan have been unable to hold some areas that they have cleared with military operations. Therefore, ISAF and more importantly the Government of Afghanistan have not capitalized consistently on initial successes by extending governance and delivering services that would transform the political environment and lead to long-term success. In the long run, the Government of Afghanistan must offer greater prospects for sustained security and livelihood than the insurgency; military operations are providing a window for expanded governance.

What do you believe can and should be done to induce ISAF countries to provide the additional forces, training teams, and equipment needed to meet mission requirements in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in OSD/ISA to press ISAF and other coalition members to provide additional forces and equipment for Afghanistan. It is an exercise in persuasion: the legislatures and publics in ISAF contributing nations must be made aware of how victory in Afghanistan is a common, vital interest. Responsibility for this persuasion rests primarily with the Government of Afghanistan and by the governments of our coalition partners. We can play a supporting role. Secretary Gates made this point to our NATO allies in November at the Noordwijk Ministerial and again last week in Edinburgh.

Are there changes to our strategy in Afghanistan that you would recommend to improve the security situation?

I believe we have the right strategy in Afghanistan for long-term success, focusing on enabling the government of Afghanistan to provide governance and security as the insurgency is put down. If confirmed, I would focus on the execution of this strategy, making sure that we and our ISAF allies and other international partners provide sufficient resources in a timely, appropriate, and coordinated manner.

Afghanistan - Reconstruction

What is your assessment of the relationship between reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and achieving the U.S. objective of a stable, self-governing democratic Afghanistan?

I believe that reconstruction and development are absolutely critical to achieving our strategic goals in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan to be stable and self-governing, it must attract the loyalty of its citizens by providing economic opportunity; to sustain its provision of core government services, especially the security services, the Government of Afghanistan needs tax revenues from a thriving economy.

Since 2001, the USG as a whole has provided over \$7.6 billion in reconstruction and development assistance to Afghanistan. We will provide over \$2.3 billion in FY08. About 40 percent of this aid has been devoted to infrastructure projects, primarily roads and power.

Afghanistan – Counterdrug Efforts

What is your assessment of international and U.S. counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan? Do you believe that NATO and the United States military are doing enough to help the Afghan government to tackle this problem? If not, what do you believe we should do?

Overall poppy planting and opium production are way up in 2007, about 193,000 hectares and 8,000 tons respectively according to UN estimates, despite counter-narcotics efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. I believe the current five-pillared strategy for counter-narcotics in Afghanistan (interdiction, eradication, public information, justice reform, and alternative development) is the right approach, when all of the pillars are implemented comprehensively. I agree with the conclusions of the August 2007 review of our counter-narcotics strategy, which recommended that the United States should increase alternative development assistance and amplify the scope and intensity of interdiction and eradication operations; integrate drug interdiction operations into counterinsurgency (COIN) missions through a single planning and command and control structure; and develop greater political will for the counter-narcotics effort among the Government of Afghanistan, Allies, and international organizations.

Pakistan

Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan is doing enough to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?

No; Pakistan can do more to eliminate these safe havens in the FATA, and we must help them build the counter-insurgency capacity and the sustained political will to do so. We should remember that Pakistan has deployed 100,000 troops in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, has suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths in support of OEF objectives, and has captured and turned over more senior Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives than any other coalition partner. That said, Pakistan should end the state of emergency as President Musharraf has promised and conduct free, fair, transparent, and credible national elections in January. As long as the attention of the Pakistan military is diverted by internal security duties in support of the state of emergency, it is less able to focus time and energy on rooting out terrorist safe havens in the western border region.

To what extent, if any, should U.S. military assistance to Pakistan be conditioned on the Government of Pakistan's progress in: 1) combating terrorism and; 2) on reinstating democratic government and abiding by democratic principles?

I agree with former Secretary of Defense Perry who once observed that such conditionalities are a "blunt instrument" that do not increase our influence or leverage with Pakistan, and may reduce it. Legislating conditionality sends a message that is contrary to the long-term partnership that we have worked hard to communicate to the Pakistanis.

Coalition Support Funds are not assistance, but a mechanism for reimbursements to a number of coalition countries for their actual logistical, military, and other expenses incurred in supporting U.S. military operations.

Section 1206 authority is a vital tool that allows Department of Defense and the Department of State to train and equip coalition partners for urgent missions. Using 1206 and other capacity building authorities to train and equip the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supports our strategy of rooting out safe havens for the Taliban and violent extremists.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is also an important instrument in our bi-lateral relationship, one that is supportive of our counter-terrorism objectives. FMF to Pakistan has supported its efforts to acquire weapons and equipment that have played a direct role in its efforts against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in the border region. FMF has also supported Pakistan's legitimate regional security requirements.

International Military Education & Training (IMET) allows mid-level Pakistani officers to be exposed to U.S. military education and culture, as well as to form relationships with counterpart U.S. officers. With the role that the Pakistan Army plays in its society, such relationships are critical to maintaining an open line of communication at times of crisis. IMET contributes to abiding by democratic principles by exposing Pakistani military officers to U.S. professional military education, including service under civilian authority and the role of the military in a democracy.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U. S. Pacific Command, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U. S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continue to be a very high priority. In 2005, the Department of Defense suspended U.S. cooperation with North Korea on recovery and identification of the remains of U.S. personnel, citing concern for the security of U.S. personnel in North Korea.

In your view is there any reason why we should not now resume cooperation with North Korea to recover the remains of U.S. personnel?

I agree that recovery of remains of our service members is a high priority. I believe that resuming joint recovery operations in North Korea hinges principally on progress toward denuclearization and normalization. Once North Korea has met these conditions, the Department of Defense would need to work with North Korea to ensure the security of our recovery personnel, gain access to sites that are of interest, and agree on appropriate costs of DPRK operations.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I would seek to reinforce the Department of Defense commitment to investigating, recovering, repatriating and identifying the remains of missing Americans from all conflicts in all theaters of operations in Asia.

If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, specifically with regard to recovery efforts in North Korea?

If confirmed, I will work closely with senior leadership within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other U.S. Government departments to support every reasonable effort to resume operations once the DPRK has established acceptable conditions.

Foreign Language Policy

In February 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

To your knowledge, how many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does the Department of Defense have in intelligence analyst positions? Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

I have been told that information regarding the number of Department of Defense intelligence analysts who speak Mandarin and/or Cantonese is classified; however, the Department of Defense is able to provide this information to the U.S. Congress in a classified forum. At the unclassified level, I can tell you that there are over 5,800 military personnel (officers and enlisted) with at least a basic capability in Mandarin and/or Cantonese. Of those, over 1,000 are considered proficient in Mandarin. I would like to see these numbers grow by increasing our investment in Chinese language skills for both civilians and military personnel.

In your view, how should the Federal Government expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

If confirmed, I would strongly support all efforts by the Federal Government to expand the language skills of both civilian and military personnel, including expanded language training, better use of "legacy" speakers, and higher expectations of language competency in key foreign assignments. As a Japanese speaker myself, I know how many years it takes to become competent in "hard" languages. Countries in

the APSA AOR use seven of the Department of Defense "top ten strategic languages," including Chinese, Korean, Russian, Hindi, Indonesian, Dari, Japanese and Arabic. Within the Department of Defense, we should encourage our service academies and ROTC students to learn languages. We should also continue to the process of inventorying both civilian and military legacy speakers. I support the idea of expanding financial incentives for civilians and military personnel to learn and maintain their language skills. The Department of Defense's Foreign Language Proficiency Pay for civilians and Foreign Language Proficiency Bonuses for military personnel are a step in the right direction.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes