

**Advance Questions for General James E. Cartwright, USMC**  
**Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Defense Reforms**

**You previously have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Commander, U.S Strategic Command.**

**Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified to the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for the position of Commander, U.S Strategic Command?**

*No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our combatant commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.*

**Do you foresee the need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

*I do not believe that changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, I am aware of ongoing reviews. If confirmed, I will study these efforts and provide my best military advice.*

**Duties**

**What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*None at this time.*

**Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, as it pertains to the powers and duties of combatant commanders?**

*None at this time.*

## **Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

*Thirty-six years of military service, to include diverse operational and staff assignments, have given me the background and experience to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Joint Staff Director Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, I evaluated major acquisition programs and budgets and gained invaluable insight into the capability requirements development process. As Commander, United States Strategic Command, I have been responsible for the global command and control of United States strategic forces and worked to deliver a broad range of strategic capabilities and options to the President, Secretary of Defense and geographic Combatant Commanders. My years of operational and strategic experience have given me the skills required to look to the future and assess the mix of capabilities to prevail as we move into the future as a Nation.*

## **Relationships**

**Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

*As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him and other such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.*

*Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties include serving as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.*

*As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman may submit advice or opinions to the Chairman in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council or the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman submits such opinion or advice at the same time he delivers his own.*

*The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may also individually or collectively, in his capacity as a military adviser, provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request.*

## **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

*Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Deputies Advisory Working Group with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to work key resource and management issues for the Department of Defense.*

## **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to building a close and effective working relationship with the Chairman.*

## **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

*Title 10, United States Code, and current Department of Defense (DoD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

## **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

*With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.*

## **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

*Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.*

*The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.*

*Of particular interest, the Under Secretary of the Air Force acts as the Executive Agent for Space Program procurement, which is especially important to the Vice Chairman in the role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. If confirmed, I recognize the importance of working closely with this senior official on vitally important space programs.*

## **The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

*As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. With respect to Title 10 responsibilities, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.*

*Secondly, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.*

## **The Combatant Commanders**

*The Combatant Commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman's duties in the latter's absence, he relates to the Combatant Commanders as if he were the Chairman.*

## **The Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan**

*As an officer serving in an agency outside the Department of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates to the Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan through the Secretary of Defense.*

## **The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security**

*The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council along with the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security. In this capacity, we will work together to oversee and coordinate the nation's nuclear weapons policies to include the safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons and proposed new weapons programs.*

## **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that you would face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*Winning the global War on Terrorism is the nation's highest priority and our most pressing challenge. In this struggle, our armed forces play a leading role in protecting the Homeland; attacking and destroying terrorist networks; and countering ideological support for terrorism –which is the decisive element of the U.S. Government War on Terrorism Strategy.*

*Major challenges include building partnership capacity with partner countries which reduce and defeat the threat of violent extremism, and also attempting to resolve “whole of government” issues in this campaign, to integrate all instruments of National power, influence and capability.*

*It is more efficient and effective to engage partner nations and make investments to shape the security environment and deter violent extremism than to commit U.S. forces in contingency operations. Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere demonstrate the importance of building the capacity and capability of partners and allies to better secure and govern their own countries.*

*A major challenge we face in Iraq is to be able to rapidly recognize and exploit new opportunities to make the reduction in sectarian violence and security self-sustaining.*

*With regard to whole-of-government issues, we should continue to move forward in a collaborative effort to develop the right interagency mechanisms and authorities to better integrate all instruments of national power, influence and capability and to meet critical national security needs.*

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

*If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive, enable partner nations to counter terrorism, deny WMD proliferation and increase our capacity for consequence management.*

*In addition, we will continue to defeat terrorists and their organizations, counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations and contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.*

*As a nation, we should defeat violent extremist groups through the disruption of transnational violent extremist networks, increases in partner nation capacity and advances in government legitimacy until terror groups pose only a local threat and are incapable of attacks on the U.S. homeland, U.S. vital interests, or regional stability. Once these conditions are established, we can conclude combat operations and transition to an advisory role.*

*We should further aim, through this advisory role to support foreign internal defense, deny the migration or expansion of violent extremist groups through continued increases in partner nation counterterrorism capacity and information sharing; by countering ideological support to terrorism; and by producing a long term development plan to reverse the underlying conditions that foment discontent. Once our partner nations achieve overmatch against terror groups, we can reduce our advisory presence to normal bilateral and regional status.*

*We should support our partners through information sharing, cooperative counterterrorism operations and countering ideological support for terrorism. While the Department of Defense is not the lead federal agency for this effort, the military can contribute significantly through security operations, humanitarian assistance, military to military contacts, and the conduct of operations and military information operations.*

*We owe it to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to leverage all instruments of our defense arsenal to defeat our adversaries. In this regard, there have been some recent innovative steps to building partnership capacity, such as the Section 1206 authority that allows the Defense and State Departments to more rapidly train and equip partner military forces.*

*We must continue to build on the success of Section 1206 by enacting the Building Global Partnerships act, which will help us meet critical national security needs.*

If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would be the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC has the responsibility to validate Service requirements. As the Services transformation initiatives have matured, some have been approved for system development and demonstration (SDD) even though it appears that some programs lacked the technical maturity the programs require to transition into SDD.

**What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to serve as the chairman of the JROC?**

*In my previous assignment to the Joint Staff as Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J-8), whose missions include serving as JROC Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), I gained insight into the internal roles, missions, responsibilities and processes of the JROC. As Commander, USSTRATCOM, I gained a new and invaluable perspective into how the JROC interacts with combatant commands. These most recent assignments provide me with unique experience and expertise to fulfill the role of chairman of the JROC.*

**How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?**

*The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is engaging the acquisition and programming communities earlier in the requirements process to improve JROC decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition programs. The JROC is performing an enhanced assessment of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks. These assessments ensure that warfighter requirements are realistic and that cost and schedule risks are reasonable. The JROC also considers overall affordability of a weapons system before approving performance requirements.*

**What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC?**

*The direction for the JROC that Admiral Giambastiani charted is sound and I intend on building on the work already accomplished. Specifically, I am referring to the "JROC Initiatives". These initiatives collectively assist the JROC in making better informed fiscal decisions, conducting more comprehensive assessments of the Combatant Commanders' warfighting issues and bringing stakeholders from the Department and Interagency to the JROC to solve appropriate issues. My vision for the JROC is one that gets the JROC ahead of strategic issues. One initiative in particular is the list of Most Pressing Military Issues (MPMI), which serves as a focusing construct for issues that come before the JROC. The MPMI, which include items such as "improve interagency coordination and planning to develop strategies to assist nations at strategic crossroads" and "improve information sharing to support operational forces and mission partners by improving bandwidth and information sharing tools" to name two,*

*enable the JROC to provide priority guidance in solving combatant command and Department issues.*

**What changes, if any, would you recommend in the membership of the JROC?**

*The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the membership of the JROC is correct in order to provide an independent military voice. However, I would strongly support the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as advisors, from across the Department and the Interagency, to inform the JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. The incorporation of senior civilian leaders as advisors to the JROC is important, and will continue if I am confirmed as the Vice Chairman.*

**Do you believe the current JROC process has been able to adjust satisfactorily to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based, approach in determining requirements?**

*The JROC has adapted well to Capabilities Based Planning (CBP). Using a capabilities methodology during the Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget build, the JROC influenced the redistribution of \$5.2 billion in support of our Combatant Commanders. Additionally, the JROC used a CBP approach in developing the list of Most Pressing Military Issues (MPMI) which allows the JROC to get ahead of strategic issues for the Combatant Commanders and the Department. However, we have room to improve, particularly through increasing the linkage of Joint Experimentation and Joint Concepts to acquisitions through the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS).*

**Do you believe that the quantity of items required is appropriately addressed in the JROC process, so that the capability delivered by the item is present in appropriate numbers?**

*Yes. When the JROC approves the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the JROC approves the quantity of items needed to achieve the Initial Operation Capability and Full Operation Capability. The JROC's approval of a CDD is carried forward to the Defense Acquisition Board where the Defense Acquisition Executive makes the final decision on units to be procured.*

**As you likely know, the outgoing Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted policies and program directed at helping manage undesirable cost growth in certain major weapons systems. One example is an initiative that imposes cost growth flags for “JROC Interest” programs different from those triggered by Nunn-McCurdy. Another example is an initiative that provides for expanded participation of other stakeholders in the resource allocation process, in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Still another example is an initiative that sought to achieve greater involvement by the combatant commanders throughout the requirements process.**

**To what extent would you support and continue implementation of these, and any other such, initiatives?**

*I would support the continued implementation of the full package of JROC initiatives previously instituted as they enable sound, strategy driven decisions.*

*Additionally, these initiatives:*

- *Establish priorities for the Department*
- *Ensure resource informed and constrained decisions*
- *Establish a process that is accountable and repeatable*
- *Align and synchronize processes throughout the Department*
- *Facilitate timely delivery of capabilities to the Joint Warfighter*
- *Provide guidance on the Most Pressing Military Issues*
- *Better capture the COCOM's requirements and voice for future warfighting capabilities.*
- *Bring stakeholders from across the Department and interagency to the JROC to solve issues*

**What principles would guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of, other such stakeholders in the JROC?**

*The guiding principles associated with JROC participation include:*

- *Provide independent military advice to our civilian leaders. To preserve the independent nature of this advice, the voting membership of the JROC has been limited to the Nation's Senior Warfighters responsible for training, manning and equipping our force.*
- *Promote participation in the JROC process from across the enterprise by informed stakeholders to ensure appropriate context and comprehensive recommendations are provided to the JROC.*
- *Promote utilization of Senior Warfighting Forums, (SWARF) composed of the COCOM Vice Commanders to identify current and future warfighting operational requirements.*

**Are there other such initiatives instituted by the outgoing Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?**

*Though still a pilot program, the Tri-Chaired Concept Decision initiative may provide tangible benefits in the acquisition reform arena by decreasing acquisition risk through the implementation of a corporate investment decision process.*

**The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (otherwise referred to as “the Kadish Report”) recommended reviewing and modifying applicable regulations to require JROC approval to conduct Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) in an environment other than that which was defined and documented in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) at the Milestone B decision. The Test and Evaluation community agrees that IOT&E requirements are defined by the TEMP, but takes the position that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the service test agencies – not the JROC – are the appropriate arbiters of what the TEMP requires. What is your view of this issue?**

*I would agree with DOT&E and the Service test agencies that they are the experts on how a system should be tested based on the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) in the Capabilities Development Documents (CDDs) that the JROC validates.*

### **Acquisition Management**

**Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?**

*I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation and acquisition management process is effective. The processes themselves are continuously improving in meeting future joint warfighting needs. We are working on improving the responsiveness to the immediate and near term joint warfighting needs through the Services and joint urgent needs processes.*

**The Committee has proposed various changes to DOD acquisition procedures that are included in title VIII of S. 1547, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Sections 801 through 805 would address major defense acquisition programs. If confirmed as the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would head the requirements community in helping the Department analyze and approve major defense acquisition programs.**

**What is your opinion about whether these provisions, if enacted, would help the Department reform how it buys major weapons systems?**

*I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in detail, but if confirmed, I will work with the committee to enact the best legislation possible to improve acquisition procedures.*

**Which of these provisions, if any, do you have concerns about and why?**

*I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in detail, but I am concerned that Section 801(a) would define "substantial savings" for multi-year contracts and unnecessarily limit the contracting options available for large programs where significant taxpayer dollars could potentially be saved.*

**In February 2007 the Secretary of Defense submitted a report to Congress entitled "Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress".**

**If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth in that report that directly involve the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, in particular, the Tri-Chair Concept Decision initiative?**

*If confirmed, I will fully support the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth in the February 2007 "Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress" that directly involve the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, in particular, the Tri-Chair Concept Decision initiative pilot program. I believe this initiative shows promise in improving strategic investment decisions for potential major acquisition programs.*

**Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?**

*There are a few other initiatives discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that should be productive in achieving acquisition reform. One is the Requirements Management Certification Training Program being developed for military and civilian requirements managers with responsibility for generating requirements for major defense acquisition programs. This training will produce a consistent understanding between the warfighters, the acquisition community, and the resourcing community to improve delivery of capability to the warfighter.*

*I also view the JROC initiatives that provide enhanced assessments of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis on affordability, and the “watch list” to monitor program cost baselines as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition management and fielding capability quicker.*

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

**If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.**

**What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

*If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my membership on the Nuclear Weapons Council in my new role as Vice Chairman.*

*My priorities will be ensuring the national security interests of the United States continue to be met with a stockpile that is safe, secure and reliable; improving the responsiveness of our national security infrastructure; and working with Congress to implement the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.*

*Together these initiatives will allow us to achieve effective deterrence at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements, and fulfill our obligations to allies with a safe, secure and modern arsenal.*

### **Joint Officer Management**

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued his vision for Joint Officer Development in November, 2005. The Secretary of Defense approved a Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education in April, 2006, and published the Department of Defense Joint Officer Management Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan on March 30, 2007.**

**Is the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Joint Officer Development consistent with your views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?**

*It is consistent – the premise of Joint Officer Development (JOD) vision is to have a competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning...in a joint context. The goal of JOD is to ensure we have the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for joint command and staff responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue to enforce the foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our officers are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters, and will remain*

*committed to increase levels of joint competency and joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.*

*If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of the JOD as it is written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews. I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.*

**What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you hope to achieve?**

*The Strategic Plan modernizes joint officer development and management in the 21st century. Today's military is actively and decisively engaged in joint operations to an extent we never imagined. The joint force management infrastructure must be as dynamic as the environment in which the joint force operates to ensure we have the right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced officers – the Strategic Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's robust environment.*

*If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in NDAA 07, to develop the flexible joint manpower structure we need to meet the ever-changing military environment. The Strategic Plan led to legislative changes enabling the new Joint Qualification System (JQS) - the JQS will be responsive to the warfighters in multi-Service, multi-national and interagency operations and produce the number of fully qualified and inherently joint officers we need. It builds on Goldwater-Nichols' traditional path to joint qualification and opens up the aperture by better recognizing the accrual of joint experience. Leaders developed through this new process will become our future joint leaders and strategic thinkers.*

**What do you consider to be the primary strengths and weaknesses of the requirements for joint professional military education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?**

*The Goldwater Nichols Act correctly established Joint Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as the standard for today's joint professional. For the past twenty years, officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation. While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA 07 to "Joint Qualified Officer."*

*Joint education remains central to the development of Joint Qualified Officers – the strength of joint education is that it is at the heart of joint officer development and is a major pillar of the Joint Learning Continuum that also includes individual training, experience, and self-development.*

*I understand the Chairman's responsibility under Title X, to ensure the necessary joint training and education of the Armed Forces to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and preparedness to conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense is critical to the defense of our nation.*

*The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in delivery of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II – with the size of our current military officer force today, the number officers requiring JPME II far exceeds our capability to educate all officers at the JPME II level. We do have the ability to provide every officer, both Active and Reserve Component, the opportunity to receive JPME Phase I credit, and have been granted, thanks to the Congress' approval, expansion of Phase II Joint education to the Senior Level Colleges' in-resident programs.*

**What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint specialty officer?**

*Both education and experience are critical to joint officer development. I believe that our system must be flexible enough to provide selected officers a tailored mix of the joint education, training and assignment opportunities they need to gain the experience and achieve the competency-level an organization requires to effectively fill critical joint positions.*

### **Rebalancing Forces**

**In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the active and reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department “needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process.”**

**What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?**

*The Secretary's vision encompassed three principal objectives: rebalance the active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make the mobilization and demobilization processes more efficient.*

*We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation and apportionment of U.S. military forces to the combatant commands. The Global Force Management Process provides comprehensive insight into the total number of U.S. Forces available in our inventory forces and helps us match requirements with available forces. Sourcing solutions are developed and then approved at a quarterly Global Force Management Board designed to ensure the best options are selected to achieve desired effects.*

*Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM concerning reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and deploy reserve forces in the most effective manner possible. The Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global Force Management process. As part of this process, every reserve deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of manpower – civilian, contractor or volunteer.*

*Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The Reserve Components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.*

**What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?**

*The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities we will need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate balance between the Active and Reserve Components, while maintaining sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and between, the Active and Reserve Components with the expressed purpose of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve Component sources must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements.*

*Not since World War II has the Department of Defense called on the Reserve Components to perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve Component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call. However, maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to train and equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard remains a Total Force imperative.*

## Health Care Benefits

In May, 2007, The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care issued an interim report concluding that "To sustain and improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways." Among other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired pay.

**What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?**

*Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our military service members.*

*The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work. DOD health care costs will grow from a projected \$38B in 2008 to more than \$65B by 2015. Because the Sustain the Benefit proposal was not approved, we are faced with a \$17.4B budget deficit across the FY 09-13 POM. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as they lead the Department's ongoing effort to promote efficiency in both our direct healthcare and purchased care programs.*

*The Task Force on Military Health Care's final report will be released in December. I look forward to reviewing those recommendations and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to sustain the benefit.*

**If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military personnel, including retirees and their families?**

*We need to maintain a system that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our military members, retirees, and their families.*

*If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will also continue to support close cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service.*

**How would you assess the impact of health care benefits on recruitment and retention of military personnel?**

*The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-quality, all volunteer force is dependent on our ability to continue to attract and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation. Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.*

**What role should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as opposed to the service chiefs, play with respect to health care benefits?**

*The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Title 10 responsibility is to provide military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he will support the Services and the Department as they evaluate benefit programs. The Service Chiefs have a direct function within their respective Departments in the delivery of health care services in addition to offering appropriate advice as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

### **Mental Health Issues**

**The final report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health issued in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a "critical failure" in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, "Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma; leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the service members they lead."**

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure address the stigma associated with mental illness in the military?**

*The stigma associated with mental health illness is an issue in both the civilian community and the military. If confirmed, I intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we overcome this impediment and expect leaders at every level to follow suit.*

*We have already started to address this issue within DOD. The Services have implemented multiple initiatives to try to build resilience, prevent adverse effects of combat stress and provide increased access to mental health services, including initiatives such as embedding mental health personnel in our deploying units and performing post deployment health assessments and reassessments.*

*DOD currently has formed a "Red Cell" to look at over 365 recommendations from the Mental Health Task Force report as well as several other reports. We are developing a plan of action to address each of these recommendations. This action plan will be reported to Congress within the next 60 to 90 days and I would work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veteran's Affairs and other federal and civilian organizations to see that the our service members and their families psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.*

**What is your view of the need for revision to military policies on command notification and self-disclosure for purposes of security clearances?**

*Secretary Gates recent announcement that the military security clearance process will no longer include questions about mental health care history is a significant step in attempting to remove the stigma of receiving mental health care among military members, particularly in a time of war when combat stress is impacting many of our service members.*

### **Sexual Assault in the Military**

**In response to a Congressional requirement for formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual assault.**

**What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring progress within the military services and the combatant commands' areas of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a "zero tolerance" policy relating to sexual assaults?**

*As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (JTFSAAPR) team, the Services and OSD. This ensures that the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational environment.*

*The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that occur in the US Central Command area of operations. The Joint Staff also provides assistance to Combatant Commanders during the development of their internal procedures; serves as a liaison staff to address Service policy issues that might impact a commander's ability to conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint environment.*

**What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?**

*Prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and enforced.*

### **Independent Legal Advice**

**During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Chairman's legal advisor, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Judge Advocates General of the services and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.**

**What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman's legal advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Joint Staff?**

*I view the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Legal Counsel as having responsibility for providing independent legal advice to the Chairman in his role as principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal issues. Given the Chairman's role as spokesman for the combatant commanders, the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant commander's legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the Chairman's legal counsel to provide his best independent counsel.*

**What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of the services to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff?**

*I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff.*

**What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?**

*As with the service Judge Advocate Generals, staff judge advocates should also provide their best independent legal advice to their commanders. With regard to military justice in particular, convening authorities must at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates.*

## **Women in Combat**

**The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.**

**What is your assessment of the performance of women in the armed forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military, since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?**

*Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the U.S. Armed Forces around the world and they are performing magnificently and with distinction. From crewmembers, technicians and commanders, to pilots and military police, women will continue to play a critical role in the defense of our Nation as officer and enlisted functional experts in a variety of specialties.*

**Given the nature of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Army's on-going effort to reorganize to become a more modular, flexible, combat force, is the time right to conduct a comprehensive review of the policy, regulations, and law pertaining to the assignment of women in the armed forces?**

*The flexibility exists within current law and policy to allow the Services to review their programs based on their circumstances. I do not see the need for a comprehensive review at this point.*

**Does the Department of Defense have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to the assignment policy for women when needed?**

*Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes to DOD assignment policy for women. The law recognizes that DOD and the Services will need to constantly assess the role of women and the dynamics of the constantly changing battlefield. The law and DOD policy also allows the Services to impose additional restrictions based on Service unique mission requirements.*

**Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?**

*The current DOD policy recognizes that women are an integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed to address changes to the operational environment; no policy changes are needed at this time.*

## Commission on National Guard and Reserves

**The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that the National Guard Bureau should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve of National Guard officer at all times.**

**What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?**

*I'm in complete agreement with the Secretary of Defense's memo dated 10 May 2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20 of the Commission's recommendations and the proposed alternatives for the others.*

**What is your view of the appropriate role of senior reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the combatant commanders?**

*Reserve component officers should be embedded not only in the upper echelons of the Joint Staff, but throughout all of the COCOMs to ensure best utilization of the total force.*

*If confirmed, I intend to actively consider all possible candidates, including reserve component general/flag officers for billets at all COCOMs, as recommended by the Commission.*

**What is your view about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What is your rationale for this opinion?**

*I fully support pending legislation to elevate the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star position. I agree with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not need to be a member of the JCS. The Chief of the Guard Bureau should be invited to participate when Guard equities are addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, the CNGB will have full access to me and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.*

## Reliance on Reserve Component

**The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components, however could have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of Guard and Reserve personnel.**

**What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in the Guard and Reserve?**

*The men and women of our Active and Reserve force are performing superbly in the Global War on Terrorism. However, the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern, and we are working hard to deal with this issue. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve Components come from units that have deployed for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - clearly, these service members understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide support for their families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and retention.*

*To decrease demand on the Reserve Component, the Department has several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on the Guard and Reserve including 1) rebalancing of forces, 2) modularization for a better deployment rotation base, 3) new training and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total time away from home, and 4) increases in the Active Component.*

*The men and women of our Active and Reserve force are performing superbly in the Global War on Terrorism. However, the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern, and I understand that the Department is working hard to deal with this issue. Secretary Gates redefined the mobilization policy when he issued the "Utilization of the Total Force: memorandum on 19 January 2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the following:*

- 1. setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of twelve months for reserve component units*
- 2. mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual basis*
- 3. establishing a planning objective with a ratio of one year of mobilization followed by five years of "dwell time"*
- 4. establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for incentives to members required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or be extended beyond established rotation policy goals*
- 5. reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstance*
- 6. minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.*

*Implementing these six areas will provide increased predictability for our Citizen Soldiers, their civilian employers and their families.*

*Readiness within the Reserve Components continues to be strong within the community based forces. We will continue to monitor recruiting and retention in both our Active Component and Reserve Component forces.*

**What missions, if any, do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?**

*The Reserve Components must be able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, and reflect their parent services total force capabilities. The Nation has made a tremendous investment in its military members. These highly trained individuals who, if they choose to leave the active components of their services upon completion of their obligated commitment, can re-serve America in their specialties in the Guard and Reserve, if these components mirror the full capabilities of their services.*

*However, the members of the Reserve Components have developed considerable expertise in the defense of the homeland, to include maritime security, air sovereignty, and civil support, and are uniquely prepared to lead and assist in the command, control, and direction of these missions. As such, serious consideration should be given to placing Reserve Component leaders in command at NORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and all other domestic security missions as is currently being done with the command of 1<sup>ST</sup> Air Force.*

### **End Strength of Active-Duty Forces**

**In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?**

*The overall force level is not completely representative of the impact of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on the forces. However, the key point is the matching of capabilities to mission requirements. Capability demands change based upon different phases of the operation. Within this context, ground forces are the largest aggregate of forces in high demand. The Services, Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their force structure recommendations. As such, the Army and Marine Corps have planned growth that is consistent with the future demands expected to be placed on our ground forces.*

**How do you assess the progress made to date by the services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian employees or contractors?**

*The conversion from military to civilian manpower has been ongoing for some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the result of collaborative reviews and analyses between OSD and the Services. From these come Program Budget Decisions that implement the conversions. This process has been effective and, as it is collaborative with the Services, I believe it is working toward an effective balance of personnel helping to accomplish the Department's mission.*

**What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles and missions?**

*As we continue to shape our force in response to the changing roles and missions around the world, there will continue to be adjustments to where we posture our forces. If confirmed, I look forward to being a key advisor as the Department continuously evaluates the global environment and determines the appropriate placement of our forces to assist in carrying out our Nation's global engagement strategies. Additionally, I look forward to playing a role in helping determine the Service and Department of Defense's priorities for development and acquisition of new technologies. Improving capabilities through technology is important and can result in manpower savings.*

### **Recruiting and Retention**

**The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly motivated commissioned and non-commissioned officers is influenced by many factors, and is critical to the success of the All Volunteer Force. While retention in all the services has remained strong, recruiting data in 2007 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard in meeting monthly recruiting goals. The active-duty Army in particular is facing difficulties, failing to meet its target for May and June.**

**What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting?**

*The basic elements of successful recruiting continue to be: tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation; offering America's best and brightest the chance to serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity for young men and women to achieve skills, education and experience.*

**What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve recruiting for the ground forces?**

*We are very grateful for the tools that Congress has provided (such as increased recruiting bonuses and raising the maximum enlistment age) because they are proving valuable to our recruiting efforts. The dynamic recruiting environment will remain very competitive, and the Services continue to explore methods to improve recruiting production. We look forward to the continued support from Congress to give the Department the flexibility needed to adjust as needed to meet this critical mission.*

**How can the Department better target and reach the “influencers”—the parents, teachers, and coaches who influence our young men and women, and their career choices?**

*In order to compete with an improving economy, in an era when the main influencers of our youth – parents, teachers, coaches, etc – are less inclined to recommend military service, it will take the entire Department and our Nation’s senior leaders working together collectively to ensure that the American people understand and appreciate the critical importance that our All Volunteer Force provides to our Nation.*

**What do you consider to be the most important components in the success of all the services in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and non-commissioned officers?**

*Superbly trained, well equipped, and highly dedicated Americans have always been our Nation’s ultimate asymmetric advantage. Our ability to recruit these individuals is certainly critical to our success, but of equal importance is our ability to retain these experienced professionals. Our military has been successful at retention because of its tradition of service, strong leadership at all levels, and support by the Nation. Therefore, the most important components of retaining our professional force are: (1) Believing that the Nation values the service and family sacrifice of all service members, (2) Strong leadership and mentorship, (3) Personal and professional development opportunities, (4) Opportunities to lead and grow at every level throughout their careers, and (5) Competitive compensation, benefits and incentive packages that reward their service and provide a good quality of life for their families. As with recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by Congress as they are critical to continued success in the retention of our force.*

**In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an all volunteer force?**

*The All Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34 years. It provides a force that is intelligent, motivated, and more dedicated and more inclined to stay than the force I saw as a young officer. Most importantly, it represents the society that it protects. While there have been some isolated challenges in recruiting in the recent past, thanks to the dynamic cadre of trained recruiting professionals and the tremendous support of*

*Congress, the All Volunteer Force should continue to provide the Service members needed to support our Nation.*

## **Iraq**

**What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?**

*Approximately six months into the execution of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ), all surge forces have been in theater for one month and are conducting combat operations. Coordinated offensive operations in Diyala Province and the Baghdad belts have begun to disrupt Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and erode terrorist freedom of operations.*

*Tribal, anti-AQI measures in al Anbar have sustained popular rejection of AQI and reduced violence in the province sufficiently to begin programs improving essential services and providing jobs. The coalition and the Iraqi government are expanding engagement to exploit similar tribal movements in other provinces to reject terrorism and promote stability.*

*Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to establish the kinds of trends the surge seeks to create. General Petraeus will report on his assessment of progress in September, and we should allow him that time to develop the situation and provide his assessment and recommendations.*

*However, we do have initial indicators. Encouraging trends thus far include overall reductions in civilian casualties, murders, and sectarian violence in Baghdad compared to pre-FAQ levels as well as significant decreases in suicide and VBIED high profile attacks over the past three months..*

*Substantial security threats remain. Iraq-wide, the consistent reductions in violence in Anbar province are matched by increased attacks in Iraq and Diyala. High-profile attacks have decreased since the beginning of FAQ, but remain too high. AQI uses high profile attacks to damage key infrastructure such as bridges and mosque and to, cause high numbers of casualties to stoke sustained sectarian violence.*

*Despite a small spike in attacks in the wake of the 13 June Samarra Golden Mosque bombing, Iraq appears to have avoided the spiraling violence it witnessed after the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing.*

*Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are growing in size and capability while continuing to conduct operations alongside Coalition forces. The ISF still face many challenges including their sustainment capabilities and manning levels – but they are facing these with our assistance while continuing to fight the extremists and terrorist who threaten the future of their nation.*

*A nascent governmental structure and immature political institutions have slowed economic growth and hampered ministerial capacity.*

**From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?**

*We entered this conflict without a centralized, coherent counter-insurgency doctrine. We've fixed that problem, and General Petraeus is using that doctrine now. Using the model of "clear, hold, build", we've learned that the ground commander must have the appropriate force levels to be able to hold the ground once it's cleared.*

*Further, we've learned that, in order to build, commanders must engage local leaders and make them part of the solution. In the more rural areas, that means the tribal sheikhs. Indigenous forces are perceived as more legitimate, which makes them more effective. We're seeing evidence of this in the Al Anbar province now.*

*We've learned that our enemy is incredibly adaptive; therefore, we must be as well. From tactics to equipment, we must be able to quickly alter our methods to meet a rapidly-changing environment. This not only applies to ground units, but to service institutions and our industrial base as well.*

*We must better understand the environment in which we will operate. Iraq is a complex country, ethnically, religiously, and culturally. That complexity must be taken into account at all levels. At the tactical level, we've learned that the actions, or lack thereof, on the part of junior leaders can have a strategic impact.*

*Accordingly, we have adjusted our junior and mid-grade officer, non-commissioned officer, and individual training programs to ensure that the leaders and troops conducting these operations are prepared for the environment in which they operate. We have also created more realistic training environments for deploying units.*

*Finally, I also believe we've learned that this type of conflict requires a whole-of-government approach. This fight is not just a DoD fight. It takes all the elements of national power – the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury – to succeed in this complex environment.*

**What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact?**

*We have not integrated all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq. Often, particularly in the early going, our military, political, economic, and information powers were not well synchronized. This resulted in missed opportunities and created difficulties that we are still dealing with today.*

*Disbanding the entire Iraqi Army robbed the GoI of what might have been a valuable asset for reconstruction and provision of services to the Iraqi people. Furthermore, this action provided a recruiting pool for extremist groups.*

*The manner in which De-Ba'athification has been pursued has been more divisive than helpful and the process demands reform.*

*We attempted to transition to stability operations with a force that did not have the requisite manpower to do so. Thus, we gave way to a rapidly-building insurgency and yielded the initiative to terrorist organizations.*

*Our plus-up of forces is intended to isolate Baghdad and the belts around it, reestablish a dominant security posture with ISF and coalition forces, and provide the space for political and economic growth to take place.*

*We did not tell our story to the Iraqis, regional audiences, or the American people. Modifying public affairs and public diplomacy institutions to better deliver messages to the Iraqi people should have been conducted.*

**What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?**

*Redouble our efforts to support the GoI in establishing the security, stability, and long-term good governance required to forge political agreements that build momentum for larger political settlements and eventual reconciliation. Our political strategy to achieve a political solution is key and our military efforts must provide the supporting effort to achieve the needed political solution.*

*Develop effective and self-sufficient Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and transitioning responsibilities to Iraq's government as conditions allow. This should give its people additional confidence to build and sustain institutions.*

*Provide security to the people of Iraq which will allow the space necessary for the GoI to make necessary political and economic progress.*

*Convince Syria and Iran to work toward stability in Iraq – and change their behaviors that promote instability in Iraq.*

*Support, via the International Compact and other economic initiatives, near-term job creation programs, a significant expansion of micro-credits, along with rehabilitation of viable state owned enterprises that can open for business quickly is necessary.*

*Help the GoI build upon the impacts of moderates devoted to a stable Iraq through engagements with elements of Iraqi society that reject extremism and terrorism. Engagement and inclusion of moderate elements will build the foundations necessary for eventual nation-wide reconciliation.*

*We must have the needed authorities to continue Coalition operations in Iraq beyond 2007. Another UNSCR, with authorities similar to those of 2007 will be necessary.*

**Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?**

*The majority of problems in Iraq require a political solution. The most contentious issues are part of an overall settlement and not individual issues in isolation. However, military force is necessary to create the stability needed to foster dialogue and genuine political progress.*

*We must be ready to seize upon improving security environments with our political and economic teams to take advantage of fleeting windows of opportunity.*

*However, there are elements in Iraq, specifically AQI and some Shi'a extremists that can, and will, be dealt with by only military force.*

*Diplomatic efforts, similar to those made in the political spectrum, must be reinvigorated with Iraq's neighbors. Support to terrorist efforts in Iraq must be eliminated if success is to be achieved in the near term.*

*The bottom line is that the military dimension supports the political dimension, which must take the lead in our strategy to succeed in Iraq.*

**Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?**

*Yes. Compromise is key to advancing solutions to the political issues facing Iraq. It is important for Iraqi politicians to acknowledge and embrace that politics is not zero-sum game and may appear only marginally helpful in the short term, but produce more prosperous long term benefits.*

*Political party leaders must be willing to compromise on individual aspirations for the benefit of all Iraqis. We must limit the negative impact associated with such decisions; ensure that all parties are aware of the compromises made by opponents, and enable political leaders to reach compromises in ways that maintains dignity.*

*Thus, the Government of Iraq must advance toward inclusion by passing key legislation on reconciliation, sharing of oil and gas revenues, and provincial powers. Further, holding timely provincial elections and passing constitutional amendments on the matters agreed upon last year would reduce incentives for violence.*

*Addressing all of these issues as parts of a larger question, rather than trying to tackle each in isolation, will have the best chance of success and is likely to yield the most favorable outcomes for all concerned.*

**Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?**

*Baghdad is the centerpiece of the political solution we seek – its percentage of the populace, sectarian mix, and symbolism are inescapable for the entire nation and region.*

*Baghdad, and the area, or belts, immediately surrounding the capital city, is key terrain on the strategic landscape and must be controlled to achieve enduring political gains. That said, security is achieved in part due to political compromises and accommodations competing factions make.*

*Proactive work by the U.S. government to achieve diplomatic and political solutions, while efforts to achieve military security objectives are ongoing, will likely combine to produce the overall effects we desire.*

*However, Iraq is a complex country with complex challenges. Some problems manifest themselves at the national level while others have local underpinnings. We cannot afford to limit our approach to simply Baghdad.*

*Current coordinated Coalition and ISF offensive operations in Diyala province aim to quell violence outside of the capital in another important area with a diverse population.*

**What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?**

*Iraqi leaders must embrace non-violent measures to achieve their goals. Further, they must be willing to politically compromise for the good of all Iraqi citizens.*

*The U.S. still has significant leverage to bring key players to compromise, including diplomatic initiatives, economic and assistance incentives, selective use of military force, and publicity and information gathering and sharing.*

*Our allies, both in the region and around the world, can also provide some needed leverage. The United Nations must also be fully engaged in these measures.*

**What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?**

*Prospects for compromise are marginally better, but linked to security conditions. A stable environment is necessary for dialogue, negotiations, and compromise.*

*The recent return of the Sadrist and Tawafuq blocs to the Iraqi parliament reflect a significant compromise of powerful political factions and is a positive step toward the Government of Iraq's reconciliation efforts through key Parliamentary legislation on sharing of oil and gas revenues and provincial powers.*

*Passing this legislation will go a long way to reducing and defeating sectarian violence and the insurgency.*

**What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?**

*I was not involved in the development of the new Iraq strategy.*

**With regard to the recent "surge strategy," what role will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?**

*As Vice Chairman, my role is to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense on the progress of the operation based on my interaction with the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, General Petraeus, other members of the JCS and our intelligence agencies.*

**What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?**

*We are demonstrating success in Baghdad today. We have made significant progress toward breaking the cycle of sectarian violence that had been growing last year. Sectarian violence is down below pre-surge levels. Attacks on civilians and civilian casualties in Baghdad are down below pre-surge levels and show a downward trend.*

*The numbers of high-profile attacks are down as well. And we are rooting out terrorist cells that have entrenched themselves in the city.*

*There are still challenges with security in a city as large as Baghdad and one that has gone through so much. But we are seeing success. Is Baghdad completely secure at this time? No, not entirely. It has only been one month since the last of our additional brigades arrived in Iraq.*

*We have provided the commanders on the ground additional resources and we should provide them the time they need to apply those resources to create the stability and security needed for political progress.*

*We will have a better idea of how well our new strategy is working in September, but it will still take more than a couple of months to see the political and economic results our current security efforts are designed to support. 8-12 months is probably a much more reasonable timeframe.*

**If confirmed, how would you craft an “exit strategy” for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long term?**

*I would characterize our strategic approach going forward in different terms. “Exit strategy” implies withdrawal from Iraq entirely. It is more likely that we will forge an enduring strategic relationship with Iraq that will see a U.S. presence for some time to come, although that presence may well be at lower force levels. In my judgment our strategic interests in Iraq and the region will require a national commitment for some time to come, although the nature of that commitment will certainly evolve. .*

*We should develop our strategy in conjunction with the other key members of the national security team, to include the State Department, Treasury Department, the Justice Department, among others, to insure that all elements of our national power, diplomatic, economic, and informational, are all operating along with the military instrument, with a shared understanding of the plan.*

*Going forward, we must achieve the right balance between force levels, their mission, and the situation on the ground from start to finish.*

**What is the state of planning for such an “exit strategy?” If none has begun, will you require that such planning begin?**

*If confirmed, I believe that detailed planning for all likely contingencies should be undertaken and would recommend the effort begin, if it is not already in progress. It is the duty of the military to provide the best possible military advice for any contingency to the President.*

**What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment of the capability of Iraqi Security Forces to take on more of the security responsibilities?**

*If confirmed, I would continually assess the progress of the Iraqi Security Forces, especially regarding the funding and equipping status. We must continually work with the Combatant Commander, Admiral Fallon, to ensure he is properly resourced to enable the Iraqi Security Forces to assume more responsibility of the security of their country.*

**What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al-Qaeda in al-Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this regard?**

*While not directly involved in my current assignment, I understand Coalition Forces are not arming Sunni militias; however, we are supporting and augmenting local Police Support Units (PSU) in various provinces. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the Iraqi counterinsurgency as demonstrated in Anbar, which has witnessed an 80 percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last year. We should continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown police and security forces in Iraq.*

**What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?**

*Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in theater. Items of military value will be retrograded IAW applicable Military Regulations.*

*Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of action. If not sufficient, we'll then consider transfer to the Iraqi Army.*

*Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade since being deployed to theater (e.g. Up Armored HMMWVs, Medium and Heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.*

*There are some other types of non-military equipment managed by contractors (e.g. generators, living trailers, tents, etc). These will also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF-I Framework OPORD.*

*Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also be screened for transfer/donation IAW Annex D of MNF-I Framework OPORD.*

**In the fiscal year 2007 defense authorization and appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.**

**Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?**

*It is not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic relationship with the Iraqi government, as it does with many governments in the region and around the world.*

**If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?**

*Any construction we undertake should be for the temporary basing of our forces. We should, however, continue to engage the GoI on a long-term security relationship. Any basing decisions will be made at the request of the GoI.*

**Is the United States military capable of sustaining present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force?**

*Our current force levels, or "surge", were intended to be a sustained increase in forces, but not one without an end. As we achieve the conditions necessary to adjust force levels, we will work with the Commanders of MNF-I and CENTCOM to redefine missions appropriately. We see no extension beyond 15 months for any forces on the ground – as General Petraeus announced in Iraq recently.*

*I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the President my best military advice as our campaign progresses regarding our missions and the appropriate force levels necessary to achieve them. The strain on the services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps - our service men and women, and their families - has been and will remain one of many operational considerations that influence our strategy.*

**Are you concerned about the negative impact of the perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its western allies?**

*I am concerned about negative perceptions, especially when they are not based on the facts.*

## Afghanistan

**What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for a democratically elected government to function?**

*Based on the progress we have made to date with the army, and are beginning to make with the police, the Afghan National Security Forces should be able to provide a secure environment that will allow the government to succeed.*

*The Afghan National Army is the first successful national institution in Afghanistan in decades and enjoys considerable support and respect from the Afghan people.*

*With continued effort and support from the U.S. government and the international community, both institutions will be a positive contributor to the fledgling Afghan democracy.*

**What, if any, types of military assistance would you recommend in addition to current efforts?**

*We have not yet met the minimum requirements stated in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. Continued diplomacy at the highest levels will be required to address shortfalls and caveats, which would make the troops we have much more effective. The most critical shortfall is training teams (OMLTs) for the ANA.*

**What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take in the near-term to improve the lives of the Afghan people?**

*Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan's ability to protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of many vital institutions.*

*We have a need for trainers to support the ANA and ANP, ministerial level mentors to develop Afghan government capacity, and the ability to execute critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power, and rural development.*

**News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO airstrikes. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of civilian deaths in Afghanistan?**

**Should international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?**

*I am deeply concerned that reporting that is not balanced may undermine our efforts. As far as the steps to be undertaken, I will echo what is already being expressed by the operational commanders involved:*

*There are three key elements to this issue, which include:*

- 1. Ensuring clear measures exist to mitigate the risk to civilians*
- 2. Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are completed in a timely manner, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions, lessons and investigations when warranted*
- 3. The need for consistent, cohesive public messaging in Kabul, Brussels, and nation capitals of what happened and why.*

## **Pakistan**

**In your view, what military means can and should the United States employ to fight terrorists based in Pakistan?**

*At this time, I think Pakistan is doing as much as we can reasonably expect in the border regions and elsewhere. On 11 July, Pakistan forces stormed Islamabad's Red Mosque to end an eight-day siege in which Islamic extremists had barricaded themselves in the Mosque.*

*The Taliban reacted to the assault by calling for the renunciation of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement. Pakistan is now dealing with the fallout of that battle, and has sent additional troops into the Tribal Areas as the Taliban have launched a series of bombings which have killed nearly 300 people in the days following the assault on the Red Mosque.*

*Cooperation among the U.S., NATO-ISAF forces, and the Government of Pakistan on both sides of the border is critical. For example, the Tripartite Commission and the Border Security Subcommittee meetings are important to enhancing this cooperation. The U.S. needs to stay engaged in these meetings and continue to help bring all sides together in a spirit of coalition cooperation and trust.*

*We continue to look at ways that U.S. and coalition forces can improve interoperability and coordination along the border to reduce cross-border incursions by extremist elements.*

## Iran

**What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?**

*Iran is one of the most important regional actors with regard to Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East region, and therefore must be taken into account as we execute and develop future policy.*

*I fully support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include UN actions (both sanctions and financial measure), regional initiatives, and international pressure.*

*I fully support DOS Gulf Security Dialogue initiative to reassure our regional partners. This includes military aspects such as building partnership capacity building, border security, missile defense, and proliferation security initiatives.*

**Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?**

*Regardless of the security situation in Iraq, if U.S. and coalition are prematurely withdrawn, Iran would have unimpeded access, and influence in Iraq. It is difficult to predict what effect this will have in the region. Perhaps most troubling is the potential for continued displacement of ethnic and religious groups.*

**In your view, does Iran pose a near term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected nuclear weapons programs?**

*While these programs will not threaten the homeland in the near term, they are on a path to threaten the United States and we should not wait until the threat has matured to address it. Iran's posturing can also threaten U.S. interests in the region.*

**If you believe either of these programs pose a near term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?**

*We should continue to support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include UN actions, regional initiatives, financial measures, international pressure.*

*We should encourage Iran to fulfill its responsibility with regard to international agreements to the Non-proliferation Treaty and the additional protocol.*

*We should initiate the fielding of defensive measures for the homeland, our forward deployed forces, friends and allies.*

**Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?**

*Iranian malicious activities throughout the region through the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing weapons, technology, training, and finance to these proxies.*

*I am concerned Iran's continued destabilizing activities will impact stability and potentially impact the regional economy.*

*It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies, by continuing to build partner capacity, and land and maritime security to counter Iranian influence in the region.*

*If confirmed, I will continue to work closely and coordinate with all applicable USG departments to ensure our policies toward Iran take a regional approach.*

## **Colombia**

**What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U. S. military in Colombia?**

*The most appropriate role for the U.S. military is to continue to address systemic deficiencies in the training and employment of the Colombian armed forces. Under the leadership of President Uribe, Colombia has made important strides towards defeating the narco-terrorists.*

*The Government of Colombia and the Colombian Armed Forces have primary responsibility for bringing security and the rule-of-law to their sovereign nation.*

*The Colombian security forces and state intelligence services are best suited to sift through the complex maze of local allegiances. They are also best equipped to leverage the cooperation of local communities.*

**What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?**

*The Colombian armed forces have progressed well over the last few years. U.S. training and equipment as well as intelligence support and planning advice have contributed significantly to this progress.*

*The Colombian military's (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now called Plan Consolidation the largest in the nation's history, continues to pressure FARC in its base areas. The COLMIL has captured key nodes and dominates mobility corridors, denying FARC access to support and population. A number of FARC, ELN, and AUC high value*

*targets have been killed or captured. Colombian police are now present in all 1,098 municipalities.*

*Colombia's 2007 defense budget is 5.8% of GDP as compared to 2006 when it was 5.4% of GDP. This represents a 12% increase in defense expenditures, from \$7.11B to \$7.96B. Since President Uribe took office, the Colombian Armed Forces have recruited over 100,000 new members. Finally, over 30,000 members of the illegal armed groups have demobilized.*

*This is all good cause for validated optimism. The COLMIL has made significant progress fighting narco-terrorists, and their rapid expansion has enabled the government of Colombia to reestablish control of its territory and restore government presence and services.*

*While the COLMIL is more "forward-leaning" than ever, their mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups primarily FARC resort to new tactics in order to undermine the government's democratic consolidation plan.*

*Despite COLMIL successes, the permanent presence of security forces in areas previously held by the FARC is the only way to guarantee their eventual defeat. Only sustained efforts against all illegal armed groups will eventually win the peace.*

### **U.S. Relations with Russia**

**U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of issues. If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or are there any other actions that you would recommend be taken?**

*The U.S. and Russian militaries have made progress in the area of military cooperation since 2003 when Presidents Bush and Putin directed their respective military chiefs to focus on creating the capacity to conduct combined military operations for future missions.*

*This progress has been steady and tangible and sets a positive tone for other constructive security cooperation with Russia.*

*This cooperation has been personally directed by the U.S. and Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has yielded results.*

*I believe that military-to-military programs would continue to benefit from this level of oversight as the Checklist process has overcome bureaucratic obstacles that had previously been insurmountable.*

*While military cooperation positively influences the broader bilateral relationship, political and economic considerations will continue to play a key role in the emergence of constructive strategic relations. As Russia seeks a greater world leadership role, we should encourage their constructive participation in both governmental initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, and non-governmental initiatives, such as the Clinton Global Initiative. In the end, we stand a better chance of addressing some of the core issues that breed conflict as partners with Russia.*

**In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas, such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs, where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?**

*It is essential that we continue to encourage the Russian Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to both our nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This includes in the arena of missile defense.*

*I would also highlight the importance of enhancing our counterterrorism cooperation with Russia given the extremist threats facing both our societies.*

*Nuclear reductions, as agreed to with the Russian Federation in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), should continue in a predictable and transparent fashion with our Russian partners, in such a way that builds trust and confidence in how we manage our respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.*

*I would also maintain that space programs offer a potentially fruitful and mutually beneficial area for combined work; we will continue to seek out joint programs on which we can cooperate, given the advanced technological capacities of both our nations.*

*The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which seeks to build collective and individual capacity to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism, is another example of how we can cooperate. In a joint statement issued last month by U.S. Assistant Secretary John C. Rood and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, the participants indicated they were pleased by the large increase in participation in the Global Initiative at this meeting. Expanded participation by the international community will help combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen our capacity to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by terrorists.*

## **Stability and Support Operations**

**Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.**

**What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?**

*Planning for post-conflict scenarios is a very high priority for the Department.*

*Stability operations are now a core U.S. military mission, with priority across the Department comparable to combat operations.*

*The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-conflict scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of DODD 3000.05, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.*

*Full implementation will take years, especially as DOD partners with civilian departments and agencies to develop new whole-of-government planning and execution capabilities.*

**How can the Joint Staff better implement the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?**

*The Joint Staff assists the Office of the Secretary of Defense in supervising the implementation of the new directive by the Services and Combatant Commands.*

*During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building & sustainment, and the provision of forces. The Joint Staff should also provide analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and progress of stability operations.*

*The Department can better implement DODD 3000.05 and National Security Planning Document (NSPD)-44 by strongly supporting the budget requests of our civilian partners, especially the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as they develop and provide a civilian expeditionary capability that will be able to effectively prepare for, plan and conduct post-conflict and stability and support operations.*

**What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

*Post-conflict planning and post-conflict training are essential.*

*The USG requires a whole-of-government approach in order to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations.*

*The USG has shortfalls in civilian expeditionary capability, which is required to assist a post-conflict state in the reconstitution its governance, essential services, economy, rule of law, and so on.*

*The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is making progress in this area and its work in developing a civilian response capability is fully supported by DOD.*

### **Counter-Drug Operations**

**In your view, what technologies and tactics need to be developed to improve the United States military's counter-drug operations and assistance to other countries?**

*Success in counter-drug operations depends on the synchronized application of all elements of U.S. national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.*

*The U.S. military must act in conjunction with the Department of State, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our international partners.*

*The goal is to assist willing nations in the source and transit zones to build their own internal capacity for combating the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.*

*The U.S. military should continue to provide support across a broad spectrum of counter-drug operations. Specific military assistance includes unit training for host nation counter-drug forces, providing aviation support, intelligence analysis and providing military equipment.*

*While there can be some gains by developing new technologies and tactics, the U.S. should focus on broadening and expanding its international partnerships in combating drug trafficking.*

### **Reductions in Nuclear Weapons**

**The United States has made a commitment to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.**

**Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should capabilities and**

**requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?**

*Yes. I am confident that working with Congress we can reduce both the operationally deployed weapons and the total number of weapons in our stockpile. In 2001, the President directed that the United States reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons by 2012 – a two thirds reduction.*

*We can best achieve the goal of reducing the total number of weapons in our stockpile by developing a responsive infrastructure and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Together they will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent with the lowest number of weapons necessary for national security.*

*If confirmed, I will work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and Combatant Commands to evaluate our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down U.S. nuclear forces.*

### **Integration of Space Programs**

**Previously, the Under Secretary of the Air Force was designated as the Executive Agent for Space, which included being director of the National Reconnaissance Office. This integration of white and black space was one of the recommendations of the Space Commission.**

**What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both sides of the space community?**

*I agree strongly with the need to integrate black and white space. We have been working this issue very hard for some years now. Members of both communities participate in a number of joint bodies; we are developing joint programs, and at senior levels have very tight relationships. We have completed a virtual integration of our operation centers and now have a common Deputy Commander in place to ensure coordinated and synchronized operations. No process is perfect; there is always room for improvement. But I believe we have been very successful and anticipate that our success and close working relationship will continue.*

## Space Program Management

**In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established.**

**How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?**

*While I am encouraged by the improvements that have been made to the space systems requirements and acquisition processes over the last several years, the space systems requirement process could be further improved with additional collaboration and coordination between the DoD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the DNI's intelligence community Mission Requirements Board. This would result in increased vigilance and scrutiny of the space requirements process. Additionally, where appropriate, adoption of commercial practices could help to reduce the requirements approval time.*

**In many circumstances space programs take many years from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly out dated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.**

**How in your view can this cycle be addressed?**

*This cycle can be addressed by reducing the complexity of space craft and lift vehicles, designing smaller, lighter single-purpose satellites rather than complex multi-purpose satellites which must be sub-optimized to perform a variety of missions, by adopting commercial practices to streamline the design and manufacturing process and by pursuing a "block build" strategy that allows for infusion of new technology as programs progress.*

## Operationally Responsive Space

**Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?**

*I support the concept of Operationally Responsive Space. The concept is intended to rapidly deliver space capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders. This will enable the warfighter to integrate space capabilities when and where needed to produce the desired effect. ORS strategy includes rapid exploitation of new or innovative space technical and*

*operational capabilities, augmenting space capabilities in time of crisis, and reconstituting capabilities when required. ORS is presently in the experimentation and demonstration phase. During this time we are using small satellites called TACSATS to help inform the ORS concept of operations.*

### **Prompt Global Strike**

**As the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, developing a conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability has been a priority for you. If confirmed you would continue to have a role in the requirements development process for such a capability.**

**What is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?**

*I envision an evolutionary strategy designed to yield a range of prompt, non-nuclear kinetic alternatives for dealing with time - sensitive or fleeting, high - value targets that are beyond the reach of other conventional forces due to time and/or distance, where the cost of inaction would be high.*

**Would you envision multiple different types of systems being developed?**

*Potentially, yes. We are currently reviewing a number of concepts proposed by the Services to fill this capability gap. Our evolutionary strategy will focus on delivering increasing capabilities over time.*

**How would you ensure that the capability developed is not mistaken for a nuclear system?**

*We take the risks of misinterpretation seriously and are actively engaged with others to develop transparency and confidence building measures, drawing on our years of experience with other multi-role systems such as the air launched cruise missile or tactical land attack missile. As we pursue prompt global strike capabilities, we will fully explore delivery system attributes such as basing and other unambiguous signatures to further reduce these risks.*

**Does the Administration's decision not to extend the START Treaty have any impact on development of a prompt global strike capability?**

*It will provide greater flexibility to pursue prompt global strike solutions, while simultaneously seeking to preserve appropriate confidence building measures. In the end, we seek new systems that contribute to national security and reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons.*

## Reliable Replacement Warhead

The proposal for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) included in the fiscal year 2008 budget is for authority for an early phase in the nuclear weapons development. Three of the relevant congressional committees have recommended that the RRW proceed with phase 2A development only, and the fourth committee recommended no funding for the RRW. Work in phase 2A would, if eventually approved and funded, begin to provide some understanding as to whether RRW could meet the programmatic goals established for it.

**One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear weapons testing. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes. The RRW is specifically designed to provide greater reliability and design margins than those currently in our stockpile. RRW will allow the United States to manage the risks of the 21st Century while reducing the likelihood of returning to nuclear testing to certify reliability. If this goal cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.*

**One of the goals is that it would enable additional reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes. The introduction of RRW will allow us to retire weapons that are currently being retained in our stockpile to provide reserve capability in the event of a technical failure in the operationally-deployed force. A challenge we face today is that our Cold*  
Page 46, under the section Reliable Replacement Warhead, 1st answer:

*War legacy weapons move farther away from their original design specifications with each successive service life extension.*

*RRW will reduce the need for continued updates to these legacy systems and will allow us to retire increasing numbers of them from our stockpile.*

*RRW is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in our nuclear deterrent capability while sizing our stockpile to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment. If these goals cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.*

**One of the goals is that it would increase security and safety of nuclear warheads. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes. RRW will make U.S. nuclear weapons safer and more secure against unauthorized use given the security threats we face today and will face in the future. RRW will incorporate state-of-the-art security features that cannot be retro-fitted to older weapons. Additionally, RRW designs will provide more reliable performance margins than those currently in the stockpile, will help retire hazardous materials found in legacy weapons, and will be less sensitive to incremental aging effects and manufacturing variances. If this goal cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.*

## **Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile**

**As Commander of U.S. Strategic Command you were involved with the annual surveillance process for the nuclear weapons stockpile.**

**In your view is the current stockpile safe, secure, and reliable?**

*Yes. Our stockpile stewardship program ensures the current stockpile is safe, secure and reliable. However, as the Cold War era stockpile ages, our ability to certify the stockpile in a non-testing environment will be increasingly challenged.*

*The RRW program will allow us to meet the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century with a stockpile that is increasingly safe, secure and reliable while reducing the likelihood of a return to nuclear testing.*

**As Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, you worked closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its stockpile stewardship program.**

**In your view is the stockpile stewardship program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile now and over the long term?**

*Yes. The stockpile stewardship program has been instrumental to our ability to ensure a safe, secure and reliable stockpile while observing our moratorium on nuclear testing.*

*In the longer term, it is critical that our infrastructure, including the national laboratories, maintain the critical nuclear skills needed to meet the nation's strategic requirements.*

*RRW will allow us to preserve our strategic nuclear capability with a safe, secure and reliable stockpile while furthering the goals of the stockpile stewardship program.*

**In your view is the stockpile stewardship program capable of supporting design, engineering, development, manufacture, and deployment of an RRW?**

*Yes. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversees the stockpile stewardship program and ensures the safety, security and reliability of our existing stockpile.*

*All aspects of the nuclear enterprise – the design teams at our national laboratories, the manufacturing production facilities, and other key parts of the Departments of Energy and Defense – will work together to support the design, engineering, development, manufacture, and deployment of RRW.*

## United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

**In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.**

**Do you support U. S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

*Yes. I support accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention protects and advances the national security, economic, and environmental interests of the United States.*

**How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

*As the world's preeminent maritime power, leader in the War on Terrorism, and the nation with the largest exclusive economic zone, the United States should accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.*

*The Convention codifies navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces. It supports our maritime maneuverability and mobility on, over, and under the world's oceans.*

*The Convention furthers our National Security Strategy and enhances our position as a global leader in maritime affairs.*

## Treatment of Detainees

**The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.**

**What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody and to ensure that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment?**

*The Department of Defense has policies in place to require compliance with U.S. law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DoD custody. In a July 7, 2006 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all components of the Department of Defense to treat detainees in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 2006 Department of Defense Directive (2310.01E) governing the Department's Detainee Program requires that all persons subject to the Directive to apply, at a minimum, the standards of Common Article 3 to detainees in the custody of*

*the Department of Defense. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 also prohibits the use of any interrogation technique not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation with any person in the custody of the Department of Defense. That Manual has been revised, it is public, and it binds the operations of the Department of Defense.*

*With regards to detainee treatment, we acknowledge mistakes have occurred in the past and we have learned valuable lessons in the U.S. military. We have worked hard to ensure Commanders demand the humane treatment of all detainees at all locations.*

*United States military personnel engaged in detention operations are required to comply with U.S. domestic law, the Law of War, and our international treaty obligations including the Prohibition on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.*

### **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires operationally realistic testing of each block of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).**

**Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function successfully the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be operationally effective?**

*Yes*

**Do you believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective?**

*I believe there are two attributes that should be considered in the operational deployment of BMDS; will it be operationally effective, and/or will it affect the adversary's behavior? I believe the decision to deploy BMDS is operationally sound.*

**Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?**

*Yes*

**If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally realistic testing?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the Military Services, and the combatant commands to ensure operationally realistic testing is accomplished.*

*We will conduct each test so that it continues to build on the knowledge gained from previous efforts and adds challenging objectives, with the goal of testing the system under increasingly realistic circumstances to meet the needs of the warfighter.*

**The military is supposed to play an important role in helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the combatant commanders for their operational plans.**

**What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including such elements as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military departments?**

*The military should have, and has, a central role in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs of our ballistic missile defense forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide military advice and oversight of requirements and force structure. The combatant commands integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities into operational plans and help formulate requirements.*

*The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, as a component for United States Strategic Command, conducts planning, integration, coordination, and global synchronization in support of the geographic combatant commands. The Military Services and the Missile Defense Agency provide resources, support, and leadership to all elements of the ballistic missile defense system.*

**If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and operational plans of the combatant commanders?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency and United States Strategic Command as they continue to collaborate with the Military Services and combatant commands to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met, to include training, testing, wargaming, and conducting realistic exercises and simulations, to improve the capability and reliability of the missile defense system.*

**Section 223 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that “it is the policy of the United States that the Department of Defense accord a priority within the missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse defense system, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, the Patriot PAC-3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems.”**

**If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and acquisition of missile defense capabilities?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the Military Services, and the combatant commands to ensure the development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats that we face today and will continue to face in the future.*

### **Future of NATO**

**Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in Iraq.**

**In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?**

*NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to transform from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But transformation is not an end-state – rather, it is a steady state. NATO’s greatest opportunities – and challenges – lay in its ability to continue to transform in the coming years.*

*Most critically, NATO must develop its role in the Comprehensive Approach, the whole-of-international community approach that will ultimately deliver the results needed in Afghanistan.*

*NATO’s military forces cannot alone provide the long-term solution, but must play a role together with other actors in the international community, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and other appropriate Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s).*

*In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Gaps in critical modern capabilities, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, helicopter support, and theater ballistic missile defense will need to be addressed as well.*

*Enlargement of NATO and expanding Alliance relationships with partner nations of all types will also present NATO with challenges and opportunities. Shaping how NATO engages with partners, from the Mediterranean Dialogue to global partnership initiatives, will in turn set the stage for future Alliance initiatives critical to Allied security.*

*These opportunities will not come cheaply – which is perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most allies spend incredibly little on defense, especially considering the large political commitments they have made. Transforming national militaries while also contributing them to on-going Alliance operations far from home is an expensive prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to the future success of NATO.*

**Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?**

*That is a political question that will have to be answered by each of the 26 NATO Allies.*

*For the United States, that question will be decided by the President and the Congress.*

*At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, allies stated that at the 2008 NATO Summit they will be prepared to extend invitations to those aspirants who meet NATO's performance-based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.*

**What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the US and other NATO member nations?**

*Most allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to Alliance operations within existing capabilities.*

*Many allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key elements cancelled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or less capable, than needed.*

*The bottom line is that all but a very few allies meet the agreed-upon 2% of GDP allocated for defense spending – if this target was met, across the board, almost all transformational and operation requirements could be met.*

**What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?**

*Progress has been made within the context of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC); however, I believe that this body can play a dominant role in mitigating the threat of a renewed confrontation between NATO and Russia. Its full potential has yet to be realized.*

*The NRC could play an integral role in addressing key strategic issues to include:*

- *NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East,*
- *Better orchestrated cooperation in regional stabilization and reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan),*
- *Managing Russia's reaction to possible NATO enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about U.S. and NATO activities in Europe and Central Asia*
- *Determining how to best facilitate Russia's fulfillment of its "Istanbul Commitments" in withdrawing military forces from Moldova and Georgia.*

*Long term goals would be to:*

*1) Improve NATO-Russia politico-military cooperation, both in Europe and globally, including cooperation in missile defense*

- *Military-to-military engagement between Russia and NATO, while still progressing with interest at the military level, is considerably hindered by Russian political constraints. The Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that Russia signed in April 2005 was recently ratified by the Duma. This SOFA could open up several new areas of practical cooperation.*

*2) To help manage allies' concerns about a resurgent and assertive Russian Federation and remind them of the importance of united pushback against Russian behavior when needed; and*

*3) To influence positively Russian public attitudes toward NATO, promote democratic and defense reforms within Russia, and encourage "normal" relations between Russia and its neighbors in Europe and the Former Soviet Union.*

### **Special Operations Command**

**The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) relies on support from the services for their "service common" equipment, which they modify using their Major Force Program-11 budget. Often, however, SOCOMs acquisition needs are not always adequately prioritized by acquisition boards and by the services.**

**What is your view on the appropriate relationship between SOCOM and the services and SOCOM and the acquisition boards?**

*The current relationship and alignment of SOCOM is appropriate, and I believe fosters their ability to ensure their most pressing needs are met. The Services work hard*

*to ensure they understand SOCOM needs and to provide the "service-common" equipment. SOCOM has their own acquisition boards and processes for SOCOM-unique equipment and that works well. In addition, they have a seat at the appropriate AT&L acquisition forums when they have specific issues or equities and that appears to be working well. At this time, I am not aware of any specific SOCOM requirements which have been hindered by the current relationships and processes.*

**What, if anything, can and should be done to ensure that SOCOM's acquisition needs are better met than they are to date?**

*I believe SOCOM is well postured to advocate and procure systems to fill their needs. They are actively engaged with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and, when needed, the JROC facilitates SOCOM issues and needs through various processes such as the Combatant Commander Integrated Priority Lists and Capability Gap Assessments. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs Defense Acquisition Boards and can help facilitate and advocate on their behalf.*

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

*Yes*