Advance Policy Questions for Thomas P. D'Agostino, Nominee to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

Duties and Qualifications

Will the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security change or remain the same if you are confirmed for the position, and if there are any changes proposed, what are those changes?

If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I expect the duties of the position to remain the same as they have been, at least for the near-term. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to clarify those duties and modify them, if appropriate. I am not aware of any currently proposed changes to the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

The duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security are clear—to lead the men and women of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in their efforts to ensure America's nuclear security. My background and experience is well suited for these duties. As an officer in the U.S. Navy, I was selected by Admiral Rickover and trained as a nuclear submarine officer. In this capacity, I managed technically complex, high-hazard operations on nuclear submarines. This training instilled a commitment to quality, discipline, and integrity that are so important when dealing with nuclear operations. After over eight years on active duty in the submarine force I continued to serve in the national security arena as a Naval Reserve Officer, as a propulsion systems program manager for the SEAWOLF (SSN21) submarine, and in a variety of positions in the Department of Energy. My background within the Department of Energy includes a wide variety of both technical and management positions; in the areas of tritium reactor restart, as Deputy Director in the Office of Stockpile Computation, as the Deputy Director for Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Simulation, as the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration in the Office of Defense Programs, and most recently, as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, leading the $5 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program. I was recently asked to serve as the acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, coincidental with the submission of FY 2008 budget request to the Congress and accompanying testimony. This quickly educated me about the details of other programs in NNSA such as Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. If confirmed, I would continue to learn more about the scope of the NNSA's nonproliferation expertise and responsibilities, but I believe my background and experience are well suited for the role of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

I earned a Masters in Business-Finance from John Hopkins University and a Masters in National Security Studies from the Naval War College. I have almost

31 years of service in both the U.S. Navy and as a civil servant. I have attained the rank of Captain in the Naval Reserve. All of my professional experience has been focused on service (military and civilian) in support of our national security. I am privileged to have been able to serve my country and am confident that this combination of service and education qualifies me to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

The importance of the position of Under Secretary of Nuclear Security demands that anyone who holds that position must always be abreast of current developments in not only nuclear security but also national security as a whole. I believe I am aware of the scope of the duties of the position, but expect to focus my near-term efforts on broadening my knowledge base of initiatives outside of NNSA's Defense Programs.

As I have stressed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, good communication within the NNSA and with our colleagues in the Department of Energy, with the Congress, with the Department of Defense and with other stakeholders is essential. Clear and effective communication is a primary key to success in any organization, and even more important with an organization that is large, geographically dispersed and that manages complex technical operations. I would look to increase the amount of time I spend talking to all levels of management, technical and support staff, in headquarters and the field.

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties and functions, if any, do you expect that the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for you other than those described above?

I am not aware of any additional duties and functions that the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for me, other than to efficiently and effectively manage the operations of NNSA. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to clarify his expectations.

Relationships

If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying out your duties:

The Secretary of Energy

I will work with the Secretary as I have as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the period I served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have come to understand the Secretary's leadership style quite well while serving in these positions. His door has always been open to me and I look forward to working with him on cross-cutting issues for NNSA and the Department.

The Deputy Secretary of Energy

I will work with the Deputy Secretary as I have as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the period I served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have become familiar with the Deputy Secretary's his leadership style while serving in these positions. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department's Chief Operating Officer and we have regular interaction on cross-cutting NNSA and Departmental issues.

The Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration

The Deputy Administrators are the direct reports to the Administrator of the NNSA. These individuals bring a great wealth of knowledge and policy expertise in their assigned areas. I know all of the current Deputies and Associate Administrators very well and look forward to leading them if confirmed. It's critical to the organization's success that I have complete trust in these individuals in order to carry out the NNSA mission.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Mr. Kenneth J. Krieg, is also the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), which is the focal point for the relationship between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense. The NNSA Administrator is DOE's NWC member and deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on nuclear security issues.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), which is the focal point for the relationship between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense. The NNSA Administrator is DOE's NWC member and deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on nuclear security issues.

The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force

Relationships with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force are important to issues related to nuclear security. The NNSA generally deals with the uniformed Services more than the Service Secretaries through the Nuclear Weapons Council system. As a former Navy officer and current political appointee, I am well aware of the importance of civilian control of the military. If confirmed as an Undersecretary, I would seek to nurture relations with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.

The Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General James E. Cartwright, is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. The NNSA Administrator works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a wide variety of significant nuclear weapons issues such as the annual assessment of the safety, reliability and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. I have established a good working relationship with General Cartwright in my current job and look forward to continuing that relationship if confirmed.

The NNSA will continue its current close cooperation with Northern Command, primarily in the area of Emergency Operations. We have worked closely with NORTHCOM on exercise planning and have been full participants in both the Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield series of exercises. In fact, during last December's Vigilant Shield exercise the NNSA assigned a liaison officer to the NORTHCOM Headquarters in Colorado Springs for the duration of the exercise. We will continue this effort to ensure full and integrated operations in the case of a real emergency.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

The Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is included in our overall support to and coordination with the DoD in a number of areas. As part of our support, we have provided a full-time resident liaison to Special Operations Command to facilitate access to the unique capabilities of DOE's national laboratories and to enhance the already close working relationship with DOE and NNSA.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will make sure that DOE's unique nuclear capabilities, skills and assets are available to the Department of Defense or any other federal entity.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Standing and Safety Committee, the flag officer or Senior Executive Service "working level" group in the Nuclear Weapons Council system. In my experience, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and his Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator have more regular contact with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense than the NNSA Administrator, but I would encourage close coordination with the Department of Defense at all levels within the NNSA and DOE. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in the NWC system, so I view the NNSA's relationship with that office as vitally important. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency also reports to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, so if confirmed, I expect to work with

the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on matters generally outside the NWC system, such as nonproliferation.

The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) works with the NNSA's Offices of Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Emergency Operations on a number of issues, ranging from individual weapon system Project Officer Groups to hosting DTRA-sponsored work at NNSA sites and collaboration on nonproliferation issues. If confirmed, I would expect the Deputy Administrators for Defense Programs and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to work most directly with the Director of DTRA, but I would maintain contact with the Director, as well.

The Director of National Intelligence and other senior leaders of the Intelligence Community

The Department of Energy is a member of the Intelligence Community. Within DOE, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has primary responsibility for the Department's interactions with the Director of National Intelligence and other Intelligence Community components. Each of the NNSA national laboratories maintains a Field Intelligence Element (FIE) that carries out analysis and technical work to fulfill DOE's intelligence responsibilities.

If confirmed, I will continue to give my strong support to this cooperation and ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to have excellent access to the NNSA labs through the existing Intelligence Work-for-Others process.

Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for nuclear homeland security matters

NNSA has a close working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at all levels. I will continue to draw upon these working relationships and try to improve upon them through closer coordination on matters affecting the Nation's security.

I assure you that my staff and I, particularly my Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations, will continue the cooperative relationships we have built since the Department of Homeland Security was created. For example, we will continue to work closely in updating the National Response Plan (NRP) to define and refine the Federal government's responsibilities in the event of radiological or nuclear emergencies and incidents. Our two organizations will continue our good work on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Preparedness System, and the comprehensive Homeland Security Exercise Program where we test our abilities to respond to many types of incidents in addition to radiological and nuclear emergencies. We will continue to work closely with DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) as partners to

assess the Nation's radiological or nuclear vulnerabilities and risks, to mitigate radiological or nuclear threats, and to develop a robust technical nuclear forensics capability in cooperation with DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC).

Finally, we stand ready to execute our responsibilities under the National Response Plan to deploy our Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) and fulfill our responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act for domestic radiological or nuclear events. For example, should an improvised nuclear device be discovered in the United States, we would give our full support to the Department of Homeland Security as the overall incident manager and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead law enforcement agency. We have worked hard to forge these cooperative relationships and I can assure you that we will continue this collaborative approach.

Officials in the Department of State with responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation matters

NNSA works closely with the Department of State in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and, if confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I would continue to do so. For instance, NNSA works in close concert with State to forward the goals of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NNSA also supports State as it interfaces with the IAEA through the technical expertise within our national laboratories to work on the toughest nuclear nonproliferation issues we face, including Iran and North Korea.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

There are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in the upcoming years, and NNSA is working to intensify efforts on the most difficult issues by creating a small number of Special Focus Areas.

- The future of our nuclear weapons stockpile and how that shapes our plans for Complex 2030.
- The role of Federal oversight, especially in the areas of nuclear safety and cyber security.
- Moving forward smartly and effectively in the consolidation and disposition of special nuclear materials.
- The vision of the future for our national security laboratories.
- Enhancing project management within NNSA.
- Enhancing NNSA's future as an Employer of Choice.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If I am confirmed, I will lead the effort recently initiated by the Acting Administrator by setting clear expected outcomes, identifying expected deliverables, and establishing timeframes for execution. Integrated Action Teams, led by senior executives, have been formed for each Special Focus Area to deliver on what needs to be done and to ensure completion. I will empower the team leads to have the appropriate resources and decision-making authority in their areas, and I will personally engage with each of the teams on a regular basis to stay informed of progress and eliminate any obstacles I can.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I will commit my personal involvement and that of the management team at the NNSA to set aggressive but realistic time lines for all of these areas. Some of these areas have firm time lines already, such as a Record of Decision (Fall 2008) for our Complex 2030 effort and plans to remove all Category I and II special nuclear material from Sandia National Laboratories in the next year and from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by 2014. Firm time lines will be established for those areas that do not yet have them, and NNSA management and staff will be held accountable for completing actions in a timely manner.

Please explain the importance you place on continuing to ensure a unique organizational identity for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and what steps you would take to ensure such an identity if confirmed?

It is very important to ensure an organizational identity for the NNSA. In my experience in leadership and management over the past 30 years, organizations are most effective when there is a clear mission, clearly defined responsibilities, and when members of that organization understand where they fit in to accomplish that mission. When I was named acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I was concerned with the organization's reputation and the efficiency of the program. Soon after formally take over the Defense Programs organization I established the organizational theme of "Getting the Job Done!" and identified a specific list of deliverables that would be accomplished within the following two years. These deliverables are challenging, important, and help focus the Defense Programs organization (both federal employees and contractors across the nuclear weapons complex). To date, the theme of "Getting the Job Done!" has permeated the organization and has led to a focus of priorities and resources to ensure that all those in Defense Programs know what is expected and where our priorities lie. The "Getting the Job Done!" accomplishments by the NNSA included: delivering the B61-ALT357 first production unit; extracting tritium for the first time in over a decade; completing plutonium aging studies in pits; and just recently announcing that we have increased the rate of nuclear weapons dismantlements by 50 percent over last year's level four months ahead of schedule.

This established identity is working in Defense Programs and will work in the NNSA. The key is to focus on mission priorities, ensure that all members of the organization understand the goals and where they fit in to accomplish the results.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish to address the issues that would confront the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

If confirmed, the broad priorities that I would establish to address the issues that would confront the NNSA and me personally are in the areas of safety, security, federal oversight, and mission success. I plan to set clear program expectations and then focus on these broad areas by ensuring that everyone, both those within the NNSA and those that partner with us and benefit from our success, understands what is expected and has the resources to complete their objectives.

Overall Management

Do you believe that there are any organizational structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if confirmed?

If confirmed, I plan to closely evaluate and implement changes that reinforce line management oversight. The current NNSA structure was a radical departure from the Department's previous regional model, which was in place for 60 years. The NNSA approach of strong site offices places authority and accountability directly at the sites where work is actually performed. Now, five years later with our policies and governance models having matured, it is time to look at refocusing policy expertise to strengthen our direct line management functions. To that end, I hope to review and right-size all Headquarters advisory and oversight functions based on mission need and rigorous workforce analysis.

On December 20, 2002, NNSA announced a plan to restructure its management, including a 20 percent reduction in federal personnel in five years. That five-year period will be up in December 2007. Have these goals been achieved? If not, why not?

Yes, NNSA achieved its personnel reduction goals ahead of schedule at the end of FY 2004.

The reengineering effort for Federal personnel was working in two directions simultaneously: reducing and streamlining most sites and field locations, while at the same time increasing line-program areas experiencing major mission growth. For organizations involved in this reengineering (NNSA Service Center, headquarters, and the eight site offices), there was a reduction of 383 FTEs, which represents a reduction of 20.5 percent. At the same time, the programs exempt from reengineering -- Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Emergency

Response -- were increased by 43 FTEs, about 15 percent. The net change in NNSA's federal staffing from 2002 to 2004 was a reduction of 17 percent.

NNSA has continued its aggressive efforts in workforce restructuring and is now ready to embark on the next phase of reengineering that will further adjust program staffing in line with future missions, and assure the transition of critical skills in the next several years when a "bow wave" of retirements is expected.

Do you believe that the expertise of Department of Energy personnel serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed?

I believe that the success of the NNSA is very dependent on the experience and support of all Departmental employees. NNSA's record of accomplishments and our ability to quickly address operational shortfalls in Human Capital, Financial Management, Information Technology, physical and cyber security, acquisition management as well as environmental health and the complexities of our management issues would not have been possible without the ability to leverage Departmental assets as we do. If confirmed, I will continue to seek access to Departmental talent in order to best serve our mission and avoid costly duplication of effort.

Specifically, what expertise do you believe would be helpful and how will you utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?

I believe that the most critical expertise is the independent oversight provided for safety, environment, and security -- both physical and cyber security -- as well as independent cost estimating and construction management. All of these disciplines are critical to NNSA and the Department's success. If confirmed, I intend to strengthen their involvement in our five-year program planning and execution process.

Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if confirmed, to draw on that expertise?

There are no limitations on the authority of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security to draw upon the expertise of Department of Energy personnel serving outside of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for assistance in achieving NNSA's mission and fulfilling its responsibilities. Of course, the Under Secretary's authority to draw on such assistance is, as it is in other matters, subject to the ultimate authority of the Secretary to direct all officials within the Department of Energy and to establish priorities for NNSA and all other organizations within the Department.

In the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Energy intelligence function was combined with the counterintelligence functions of the NNSA and the Department of Energy into one single Departmental office.

How is this change working in your view?

NNSA continues to receive excellent support from the combined counterintelligence organizations. In fact, the organizational change has brought about greater synergy and the NNSA is receiving the benefits of the consolidation.

Are there any issues that are not being addressed or addressed in an insufficient manner?

No.

Would you recommend any changes to the combined organization?

At this point in time, I would not recommend any changes to this combined organization if confirmed.

What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of the Department of Energy and what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing such rules, regulations, and directives?

NNSA must comply with rules, regulations and directives issued by the Secretary of Energy. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Security is responsible for ensuring that NNSA and its contractors comply with these requirements. Some rules and regulations provide specific exemption procedures that NNSA can invoke if the Under Secretary concludes an exemption is warranted. In addition, the DOE Departmental Directives Program Manual provides a general exemption procedure that allows NNSA to deviate from DOE directives requirements. The Manual also permits Departmental elements, including NNSA, to issue "supplemental directives" that may be used to implement requirements in directives, assign responsibilities and establish procedures within a particular Departmental element. Finally, under the NNSA Act, the Under Secretary has the authority to issue NNSA-specific policies, "unless disapproved by the Secretary."

NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. However, security lapses, particularly at Los Alamos, have continued to occur. Section 3212(b)(10) of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act provides that "the Administrator has authority over, and is responsible for all programs and activities of the Administration, including administration of contracts, including the management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories."

If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?

While there have been some high-visibility security lapses within the NNSA since its establishment, I believe we have made significant progress in improving the

physical and cyber security of our nuclear weapons complex. The Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA Chief Information Officer have both brought increased formality to the headquarters management of their security programs and we are seeing improvements. If confirmed, I intend to strengthen our Federal line oversight of security to establish common expectations by which we exercise our legal and contractual authorities to ensure the security of our critical national security assets. I also intend to continue the strong partnership we have with the Department's Office of Health, Safety, and Security and the Department's Chief Information Officer to develop the policies and rules necessary for effective security systems.

If confirmed, what policies would you institute to improve the manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with security matters?

There needs to be a formal process for establishing clear security performance expectations down to the lowest level of the organization, then holding people and organizations accountable for meeting those expectations. My approach to addressing these issues would be to continue the work we have already started, which is to put greater emphasis on our capabilities to actively manage the security program. This approach has four major thrusts:

- Reducing the number of security areas and operations will allow us to focus our attention and resources on revitalizing the protection system components that provide the foundation for good security.
- Ensuring that we have a highly qualified Federal staff, in the right numbers, to actively manage and oversee the NNSA security program.
- Promoting stronger functional accountability within the security program by creating stronger lines of authority and accountability between the HQ and the field.
- Providing comprehensive oversight of field security to assess contractor performance against the expectations – rewarding good performance and providing penalties for ineffective performance.

I am very pleased to report that we have made significant progress in our security management and oversight capabilities, and we have developed some very promising approaches. For example, we have established peer reviews and Performance Assurance Assessments for improving the interactions and collaborations between the sites and HQ. I am confident that these initiatives will result in better performance expectations and a much stronger security program. If confirmed, I would actively work with the Principal Deputy to ensure these focus areas are fully developed and implemented.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs

What do you see are the highest priorities of the nonproliferation programs at NNSA?

The highest priorities in the nonproliferation programs are to fulfill the President's commitments made under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative to complete nuclear security upgrades at Russian facilities by the 2008 deadline. Another priority is the repatriation of high enriched uranium from around the world to more secure locations in the US or Russia, and the conversion of HEU-fueled reactors to use LEU fuel. In addition to these specific challenges, the nation faces emerging threats of the sort presented by a nuclear-capable North Korea and an Iranian regime apparently bent on acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. We must continue our efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by helping other countries better secure their nuclear materials, eliminating excess materials, preventing the export of sensitive technologies, engaging foreign scientists with meaningful work in peaceful commerce, and by detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.

While the bulk of the nonproliferation programs at NNSA continue to be focused on the states of the former Soviet Union, a growing number of programs are focused on states other than the former Soviet Union. Do you believe that there are additional opportunities for cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union? If confirmed what would be your priorities in these areas?

NNSA does work in nearly a hundred countries around the globe. Many of our efforts -- Megaports, Sister Labs, Safeguards, Export Control, and certainly our Global Threat Reduction Initiative -- are all aimed at working with other nations to increase their capacity, and thus our own, to deter, prevent, detect proliferation of WMD materials, technology and expertise. If confirmed, I would expand these bilateral and multilateral programs where necessary to achieve the purpose for which they are intended – to protect this nation as far from US shores as possible.

What do you believe is the greatest challenge in the nonproliferation programs with Russia?

NNSA's programs with Russia have been, on the whole, very successful in the past several years. We have created an environment of mutual trust and understanding with our Russian counterparts, and high level attention, such as the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, have helped us accelerate our efforts in selected, critical areas. The nature of our relationship with Russia has transitioned from a donor-recipient relationship to one of partnership. They are planning on playing an ever larger role in financing portions of some of these nonproliferation efforts, and we are eager to work with them in areas associated with expanded use of nuclear power. We see them as strong partners in this arena. Our biggest remaining challenge is to completely transition some of the bilateral assistance

programs (such as MPC&A) to full Russian funding and to ensure that those programs receive the Russian commitment, funding and budget attention required.

In your view what are the three greatest unmet nonproliferation problems? Would you propose to address these needs if confirmed? What resources or cooperation would you need to meet such needs?

North Korea remains one of the largest nonproliferation problems we face. We have expertise in our complex that stands poised to work with the State Department and the IAEA should agreement be reached to dismantle North Korea's nuclear facilities. Until that time, we must be vigilant in preventing North Korea from exporting its nuclear material, technologies and know-how to others, including terrorists. We can do this by helping those in the region improve their detection capabilities, helping to train border guards and other officials to recognize dual-use technologies, and by strengthening the export control regime worldwide. A second challenge remains the sheer amount of nuclear and radiological material that exists all over the world. There is an urgent need to reduce the amount of excess material, to convert research reactors that use HEU to LEU, and to ensure that a renaissance in nuclear power does not also result in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Better export controls, strengthened safeguards technologies, a Reliable Fuel Supply, GTRI and GNEP all play an important role. Finally, we need better detection capability. So we need to focus more of our R&D effort on novel approaches to standoff nuclear and radiological detection that will not impede trade flows or impose unnecessary burdens on the world's commerce.

Megaports

NNSA has worked to expand the Megaports program as quickly as funding and agreements with host countries are available. What are the current limiting factors in further acceleration of the Megaports program and, if confirmed, how would you address these factors?

As you are aware, the Megaports Initiative has expanded quickly over the past two years. There are 21 agreements in place for cooperation on this important nonproliferation program. We have been well supported with funding, especially with the recent FY07 supplemental of $72 million. We are continuing our outreach efforts with host governments and expect to complete additional agreements soon with Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey and Yemen. The greatest limiting factor in the Megaports program is the fact that we cannot simply drop into another country and set up radiation detectors wherever we think they are required. We need the assent and cooperation of foreign partners, including both foreign governments and private port operators. Issues of national sovereignty, data-sharing arrangements, and concerns about potential operational impacts at foreign ports all play a role in our ability to move this program forward. The Megaports program has been very successful thus far and appears to be poised for further successes.

The Megaports program is coordinated with other work that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is carrying out in foreign ports. In your view are there opportunities to improve cooperation with DHS?

NNSA has developed a close working relationship with DHS and its various components, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The link with CBP is crucial to coordinating our Megaports Initiative with DHS's Container Security Initiative. We are also working closely with DNDO in the development of a global nuclear detection architecture, and in evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection technologies. NNSA's success is clearly linked to that of DHS in these important areas. NNSA is a critical partner in this relationship with our experience and expertise in international nuclear nonproliferation programs, nuclear materials and weapons science, and implementation of international security projects. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will continue this close partnership with DHS.

One of the continuing challenges to the Megaports program, as well as other programs designed to detect nuclear and radiological materials, is that the materials that could pose the greatest risk, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are the most difficult to detect. NNSA has the responsibility for basic detection research and development programs. While other agencies, such as DHS, have responsibility for near term development efforts, the Department of Defense has responsibilities as well.

Are the various detection efforts fully coordinated, or do you believe that additional efforts at coordination are needed?

I understand that NNSA's nonproliferation research and development work has broad applicability to a number of federal agencies. If I am confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will make an effort to focus on NNSA's research and development, as well as the coordination process with other Federal agencies, and see if additional efforts of coordination might be needed.

Nonproliferation Research and Development

In addition to the detection technologies mentioned above, NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of research and development efforts.

If confirmed what would be your nonproliferation research and development priorities?

I firmly believe that one of this nation's great treasures is its scientific and technical capability, a significant portion of which resides in our National Laboratory system. Should I be confirmed, I would direct our nonproliferation R&D program to continue its coordinating efforts with other appropriate elements of the Federal government in developing novel approaches to the problem of

standoff detection of nuclear weapons-related materials. I would also seek improved capabilities for rapid post-event attribution and analysis.

Do you believe that there are research and development areas that need more attention or funding?

As to funding, the President's request for nonproliferation research and development funding represents an appropriate balance between needs and resources. However, to the extent that our policies and requirements change with world events, I would certainly reassess the need for additional resources as required. As to specific areas of attention, should I be confirmed, I would direct our nonproliferation R&D program to continue its coordinating efforts with other appropriate elements of the Federal government in developing new and novel approaches to the problem of standoff detection of nuclear weapons-related materials. I would also seek improved capabilities for rapid post-event attribution and analysis.

Fissile Materials Disposition

The United States and Russia have each committed to the disposition of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium so that it will not be used for weapons purposes. This is a very expensive program and has had many difficulties associated with it.

What is the current status of the U.S. and Russian efforts to agree upon a mutual date to complete disposition of the respective 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium?

Russia has proposed to dispose of its 34 metric tons of weapon grade plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel primarily in the BN-600 and BN-800 fast reactors. Because this proposed disposition scenario is consistent with its national energy strategy, for the first time, Rosatom has proposed funding a significant portion of the program itself. Our view is that this commitment should be perceived as a major success.

NNSA is currently working with Russia to define the details of the Russian plan in order to ensure that appropriate proliferation concerns regarding fast reactors are addressed and we expect to reach agreement later this summer. Our current estimate is that both sides will complete disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapons grade plutonium in the 2035-2040 timeframe.

What plans are there to dispose of additional amounts of weapons grade plutonium?

The Department is currently evaluating the cost and technical feasibility of using the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina for the following potential missions: 1) to dispose of up to 9 metric tons of impure plutonium currently proposed for disposition in DOE's planned small-scale Plutonium Vitrification process; 2) to dispose of additional weapons grade plutonium (beyond the 34

metric tons) expected to be declared surplus as plutonium requirements are reevaluated and dismantlements accelerated in connection with transformation of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and 3) to fabricate start-up fuel for fast reactors in support of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, once a decision on the fuel form for fast reactors has been made.

Weapons Programs Personnel

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce?

Retaining and developing critical nuclear weapons expertise is essential to the long-term vitality of the nuclear weapons program. As Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I am personally involved in a number of specific steps designed to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I would look to the NNSA management team to continue this work, with my continued personal involvement. Some specific steps we are currently taking include: 1) participation of early career designers in the Reliable Replacement Warhead designs at the national laboratories; 2) re-establishing an interagency effort to identify critical skills as a step towards gaining a clearer picture of the relative supply and demand for our highly trained personnel; 3) refining the methodology to use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future due to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens; 4) utilizing the NNSA Future Leaders Program, where new college graduates with engineering and business administration degrees are recruited to work at the NNSA in management-track positions; 5) fully supporting work such as the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills, led by Admiral (retired) Henry Chiles.

I am very aware of the potential shortage of critically skilled workers at NNSA and our contractors due to impending retirements and the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in relevant fields, and realize there is no immediate fix for the situation. We need to continue to make working with the nuclear weapons program attractive to critically skilled workers, by offering competitive wages and benefits, but also by stressing the opportunities to contribute to national security by working with the best scientific tools in the world.

Do you support retaining the capability to re-manufacture every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near term? What are the most pressing re-manufacturing needs?

A key objective of stockpile and nuclear weapons complex transformation is to eliminate the need to retain the capability to re-manufacture every component expected to be found in the present stockpile. Some existing components are problematic to make or involve hazardous materials that we want to eliminate. I support changes to transform the current weapons complex. The most pressing

re-manufacturing needs are for nuclear components in weapons. Specifically in the near-term, we need more efficient ways to manufacture parts in secondaries produced at our Y-12 National Security Complex. For the long-term, we need to resolve inadequacies in our capability to manufacture plutonium pits consistent with meeting national security requirements.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

The Stockpile Stewardship program has successfully supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 15 years.

Other than the National Ignition Facility what other capabilities, if any, would be needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure and reliable without nuclear weapons testing?

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a highly integrated program that encompasses everything related to supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile so that it is safe, secure and reliable without nuclear weapons testing. The large variety of capabilities in the SSP are complementary and work together to add confidence in assessing the state of the stockpile as it ages and as we pursue stockpile transformation. The National Ignition Facility has never been seen as the only capability needed for stockpile assessment. Its benefits in the areas of inertial confinement fusion and ignition will aid greatly in our knowledge of nuclear weapons, but only in concert with other capabilities such as those offered by the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, the stockpile evaluation program, and other parts of the SSP. The Secure Transportation Asset and safety basis work are two areas of the SSP that could be overlooked at the expense of high-profile facilities, but they are essential for the entire program to function as designed.

In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship program fully coordinated with the Department of Defense?

In my view, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is well coordinated with the Department of Defense (DoD). Through the Nuclear Weapons Council system, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the DoD communicate priorities and requirements on a continual basis. While the DoD is not asked to "approve" every element of the SSP, the DoD is fully aware of SSP plans through regular briefings and information exchanges at levels up to and including the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The SSP only exists to fulfill the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements set by the DoD and endorsed by the President, so it is to DOE's benefit to have as full coordination as possible with the DoD, especially in light of limited resources and tough choices that need to be made about how best to transform the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop a new nuclear warhead to be a replacement for an existing warhead, without nuclear weapons testing. This effort is the reliable replacement warhead program (RRW).

Do you believe that the Stockpile Stewardship program is capable of meeting this new challenge in the coming years?

I fully believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program, as detailed in the FY 2008 budget request and supporting material, is capable of meeting the challenge of transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile through a Reliable Replacement Warhead strategy in the coming years.

If you are confirmed, and if during your tenure a problem arises in the RRW program that would require nuclear weapons testing, would you cancel the RRW program?

A fundamental premise of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program is that any replacement warhead would be certified and fielded without the need to conduct an underground nuclear test. The RRW program is intended to ensure, for the foreseeable future, the nation's ability to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile while minimizing the likelihood of having to return to underground nuclear testing. By relaxing Cold War design constraints (e.g., maximum yield in a minimum size/weight package), the RRW program will allow us to design replacement warheads that will provide the same military capabilities as the legacy warheads they replace, while incorporating improved performance margins, reduced uncertainties, and integration of advanced safety and security features.

In recent years, our stockpile surveillance program has discovered anomalies that could only have been resolved by a test during the era of nuclear testing. Today, we are able to resolve those anomalies through the use of our Stockpile Stewardship tools.

The increased margins in RRW systems would further decrease the likelihood of a technical issue requiring a test to resolve. Replacement warhead designs will be designed to provide more favorable reliability and performance margins than those currently in the stockpile, and will be less sensitive to incremental aging effects or manufacturing variances. It is anticipated that the RRW, designed with large margins, would be less susceptible to an anomaly or defect requiring testing than legacy stockpile warheads.

When do you anticipate the 2006 annual stockpile memorandum will be completed?

The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense are currently coordinating final formulation of the FY 2007-2012 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum. Staff within each Department have been working very hard to get the memorandum finalized, signed, and sent to the President. I anticipate it will be submitted to the President soon.

Nuclear Materials Consolidation

Maintaining nuclear weapons materials at sites dramatically increases security costs and requirements. The DOE and the NNSA have been working for many years to develop a materials consolidation plan to consolidate these materials at a smaller number of sites to reduce security costs. One of the sites that has been waiting for many years to move its nuclear materials is Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

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In your view, is it possible to move the material in the next twelve months? Is there capacity at the Device Assembly Facility or at Los Alamos National Laboratory or at the Savannah River Site to accept this material?

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has both excess materials and materials needed to support current mission requirements. There will be no significant security cost savings until both programmatic and excess materials are removed from the site. Some, but not all, of the excess material is packaged and ready for shipment. We can begin to ship excess materials offsite in FY 2008, assuming the availability of transportation assets and a receiver site. For most excess materials, the plan is to move the materials directly to the site where they will be processed for final disposition. The proposed disposition path for most of the excess material at LLNL is through the Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS has capacity to accept materials packaged in long-term storage containers, but very limited space to accept other packages.

Los Alamos National Laboratory has insufficient space to accept the LLNL excess material, and has its own excess materials that must be removed to make room for programmatic materials from LLNL. Excess materials could potentially be moved to the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site, but because of concerns about mission compatibility and extremely limited material handling/processing capabilities, DAF is not an ideal solution.

What is your understanding of the overall plan to consolidate NNSA material?

Most highly enriched uranium (HEU) materials have been consolidated to the Y-12 National Security Complex. NNSA plans to continue to dispose of excess HEU materials and consolidate remaining materials within a much smaller security perimeter at Y-12. NNSA is currently removing all Category I and II special nuclear materials (SNM) from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with completion expected later this calendar year. In the longer term, NNSA plans to

remove all Category I and II SNM from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by 2014, and from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by 2022. Excess materials will be removed from LLNL and LANL as storage and disposition capabilities are made available at receiving sites. Programmatic materials from LLNL will be moved to LANL, the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site, or other sites as appropriate. Long-term planning will not be finalized until after issuance of the *Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement–Complex 2030.*

In your view, are efforts to achieve consolidation of materials storage adequately coordinated between DOE and NNSA?

Coordination between DOE and NNSA on consolidation of nuclear materials has been very good. The NNSA has been working with the DOE Office of Environmental Management to schedule the removal of excess materials from Y-12, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. NNSA is coordinating with the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy to transfer sodium-bonded highly enriched uranium, currently stored at SNL, for consolidation with similar materials at Idaho National Laboratory. Similar plans are under development for consolidation of uranium-233 and plutonium-238 materials.

The major impediment to material consolidation is the availability of storage space and disposition processing capabilities. Coordination between all programs is essential to take advantage of remaining storage and processing capacity and capability. Development of new or replacement processing capability is also needed. NNSA is coordinating with other DOE program offices to assure that new processing capabilities have the appropriate capabilities and capacity for efficient disposition of materials, regardless of current program owner.

Secure transportation assets are managed within the NNSA for the entire DOE, but must be made available to support DOE materials consolidation actions. The highest materials consolidation priority within the Department is removal of special nuclear material from the Hanford Site. We will continue to work with all program offices to ensure mission-critical transportation support is available as required, and materials consolidation activities are supported as effectively and efficiently as possible.

Facilities and Infrastructure

The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) was established to address long-deferred maintenance backlogs in the nuclear weapons complex, particularly at the manufacturing facilities.

Is it your understanding that FIRP is on track to address the maintenance backlog on schedule by the end of 2013, as stipulated in law?

The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) is a well run program which continues to significantly improve the physical condition of the nuclear weapons complex. However, there remains a large backlog of deferred maintenance across the complex. Under the current financially constrained Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), the FIRP will be unable to fully meet its commitment to address the deferred maintenance backlog by the end of 2013.

In your view, has the Readiness in the Technical Base and Facilities program (RTBF) adequately addressed current maintenance issues or is a new backlog being created?

The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program is addressing current maintenance issues at our most important program facilities. However, our program infrastructure is aging and increased maintenance investment is required to maintain facility availability. To ensure the highest priority maintenance issues are addressed, RTBF program managers have worked with field elements over the last eighteen months to screen and prioritize over 5,000 program facilities into two defined mission dependency categories, consistent with Federal Real Property Council and Departmental guidance. The first category, Mission Critical, consists of those program facilities that are necessary to conduct mission work and complete program milestones. The second category, Mission Dependent (Not Critical), represents a larger number of support facilities needed to enable the completion of important program work. As a result of targeted investments from the RTBF program and the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, facility conditions for our Mission Critical facilities are in the good to excellent range as compared to industry standards, and our Mission Dependent facilities are in satisfactory condition. While challenges remain to minimize the maintenance backlog as we consider program changes that may present opportunities to shrink weapons complex footprint, the RTBF program is adequately structured and managed to ensure priority maintenance issues at our most important facilities are addressed in a timely manner.

In your view, what specific standards should be applied to ensure that the RTBF program meets current and future maintenance needs across the nuclear weapons complex so that additional scope is not added to FIRP?

Currently, NNSA is working with the DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management to consider additional standards and facility sustainment models that could be applied to ensure maintenance is adequately addressed for all DOE facilities. Given the age of many program facilities and known budget constraints, we may decide to increase maintenance backlogs at select NNSA facilities that do not have an enduring program need, but this will not result in increased Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program scope. During the next five years of the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan, pending program decisions related to long-term program requirements may also result in additional opportunities for consolidation of capabilities. As

program capabilities are consolidated, near-term maintenance backlog increases may occur until excess facilities and infrastructure assets are dispositioned.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance?

Surplus buildings are a concern for the NNSA. Total NNSA parametric cost estimates for decontamination and demolition (D&D) for the period of Fiscal Year 2006 to 2010 have been reported as approximately $530 million, with Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Y-12 National Security Complex as the largest contributors. D&D is a key to our continuing modernization of the Complex, and our commitment to worker safety and health.

NNSA has several efforts underway to address our inventory of surplus buildings. First, for our legacy contaminated buildings we work closely with the Office of Environmental Management, the departmental organization responsible for addressing unfunded environmental liabilities and for executing the work. Second, NNSA has had a very successful demolition program underway for most of this decade – the Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program. This well-run and cost-efficient program has to date achieved a footprint reduction of 2.7 million gross square feet. If confirmed, I will provide appropriate emphasis on ensuring that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance.

Would you support including the cost of tearing down those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost of any new construction?

Yes. Report language in the Fiscal Year 2005 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill specifically states:

"The costs of D&D for the facilities that are being replaced be included in the costs of all construction projects and identify such D&D costs clearly in the construction project data sheet."

I support this approach, and if confirmed, will continue to do so. Demolition is a key tool to reducing the size of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, streamlining operations, and assuring worker safety and health.

What is your understanding of the schedule for tearing down the old administration building at Los Alamos National Laboratory?

The Nuclear Security and Science Building (NSSB) project was completed on schedule and approximately $5 million under budget in 2006. The majority of the occupants of SM-43, the old Administration Building, have been relocated to the new facility. The majority of the SM-43 facility is now being transitioned toward disposition by wing closure, facility characterization, and disconnection of utilities. Because of the existing infrastructure at SM-43, including secure

networks, and in anticipation of other new space becoming available in the near future, a portion of the facility will be maintained for occupancy into FY 2008. Once the remaining personnel have been relocated, the entire facility will be closed and prepared for completion of Decontamination and Demolition (D&D).

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is currently in the process of placing much of the SM-43 facility in cold-standby as part of a phased approach to facilitate ultimate D&D. LANL will continue to use a small portion (~100,000 square feet out of a total of over 300,000 square feet) into FY 2008. Much of the staff (~700) has been moved to other facilities including the new NSSB. The current strategy is to empty the facility by the close of FY 2008 and complete D&D by FY 2011.

DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind buildings.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on time?

If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on ensuring that the federal workforce is effectively performing its oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly executing its mission. I, along with the Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, have identified six Special Focus Areas that we will use to drive the NNSA to improve its performance during the next 18 months. One of these six is to Integrate Project Management Best Practices throughout the NNSA. As part of this effort, I would anticipate reviewing the management of constructions projects in accordance with DOE O 413.3, to include identifying best practices and integrating lessons learned in our performance. This review would also require a careful evaluation of whether the resources within the federal workforce are currently adequate. NNSA has also recently strengthened its Independent Project Reviews to ensure that technical, safety, and security requirements are fully identified and integrated early into our construction projects and that lessons learned and best practices from other organizations, sites, and projects are implemented into our NNSA projects. These actions, along with others underway in the Department, will help ensure that we demonstrate improved performance in managing our construction projects.

What additional costing, project management and design skills do you believe are needed in the NNSA?

In the area of project management, I believe we have one of the best project management certification programs in the Federal government. We have certified over 60 individuals through this program. We do need to improve our ability to develop accurate cost estimates for our very complex projects. We rely heavily on our M&O contractors and our Architect Engineering firms to develop the designs for our facilities. The Federal job is to establish the facility requirements and to communicate those requirements clearly to the contractors who then design the facilities to meet those requirements. However, as part of the Deputy

Secretary's direction to integrate safety into design, we need to have our Federal employees participate more heavily in the design reviews that are conducted at various points in the design stage of our projects. I support efforts and policies that ensure contractors are designing the facilities to meet our requirements in a safe manner.

At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a construction project, and why?

Critical Decision 2, Approve Performance Baseline, is the point at which we establish the baseline for our projects, and that is the point in the Critical Decision timeline that I believe an Independent Cost Estimate should be performed. However, these types of detailed bottoms-up cost estimates are very expensive to perform and should not be performed on every project but rather reserved for those that are sufficiently complex or technically challenging such that there is significant value in conducting the cost estimate.

Operational Safety

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the design of new NNSA buildings?

If confirmed, I intend to have NNSA follow the Department's standard, *Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design*. NNSA has been complying with the early draft of the new standard and will operate in full compliance with the final version when implemented. This new standard requires early identification of Safety Class systems and other safety related requirements early in the project life cycle, just after approval of Mission Need. These measures ensure that all safety requirements are articulated, validated and understood early in the project life cycle.

Subsequent to Conceptual Design, configuration control in accordance with nuclear safety rule requirements will ensure that safety requirements are updated as new information becomes available. Compliance with the nuclear safety rule and nuclear quality assurance standard helps to ensure requirements are accurately translated into effective design features, that these design features are constructed correctly, that operational procedures correctly implement that both the design features and operator requirements essential to safety, and that all maintenance and operating personnel are adequately trained.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear operational safety issues are identified by the Defense Nuclear Safety Board early in any construction design process and promptly resolved?

If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA federal employees and contactors continue to work closely with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) members and staff to ensure that all safety concerns are understood and promptly

resolved. Where such resolution is not possible, I will ensure that the issue is raised to the attention of NNSA senior management for action. I will not allow construction to begin on any phase of a nuclear project until I am satisfied that all pertinent nuclear safety issues are satisfactorily resolved.

Notification of Congress

If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will continue my practice of being open with Congress about issues and concerns affecting the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons complex. Management and staff from the Office of Defense Programs routinely brief Members of Congress and congressional staff on the state of the stockpile and complex, as requested on specific subjects and on their own initiative. It is important to note that the most useful and comprehensive briefings and notifications come jointly from the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, so Congress can get a complete picture of any concerns and how they affect not just nuclear warheads, but the overall nuclear security posture.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.