

Advance Policy Questions for Honorable Preston M. Geren
Nominee for Secretary of the Army

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change in the operation of the Department of Defense (DoD). While I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-service and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

This milestone legislation has served our nation well for more than two decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with the Congress to determine whether the Act should be revised to better address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges confronting the Military Departments in today's security environment. I also assess whether the law might be modified to more effectively allocate roles and responsibilities among the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders the Military Departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One particular issue that merits review is accountability for conduct of deployed forces.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have a varied background in public service and a wide range of experience that is well suited to this position. I served four-terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing the Twelfth Congressional District of Texas, and for much of that time I was a member of the Armed Services Committee. In that position, I worked directly with other Members of Congress and DoD on issues of significant interest to the Military Departments and the American people. I came to the Department of Defense in 2001, where I have held several staff and leadership

positions. Serving as Acting Secretary of the Air Force gave me an appreciation of the challenges, capabilities, and achievements of another Department. That perspective has been very useful in discharging my duties with the Army. As the Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Army, I developed an appreciation for, and a deeper understanding of, the unique demands and challenges facing the premier land force on the globe. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve the Army and this Nation. If confirmed, I pledge my best effort every day to be worthy of the trust placed in me by the President and the Senate, and to uphold the proud tradition of selfless service that characterizes the United States Army.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army?

The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all functions of the Department prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army, as set forth respectively in section 3013 of title 10, United States Code, or in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Secretary of the Army?

At this time I have no specific recommendations for change. However, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with Army leaders, others in the DoD, and the Congress to pursue opportunities for improvement. And I will not hesitate to recommend changes that I believe are in the best interests of the Army.

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect that Secretary Gates will prescribe for you?

As he has done with other Service Secretaries, Secretary Gates may prescribe additional duties that support him in carrying out his duties and responsibilities to ensure that the Department of Defense successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it has been entrusted. At this time, I am not aware of any additional duties Secretary Gates may be considering. However, if confirmed, I will carry out any additional duties to the best of my ability.

What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Under Secretary of the Army?

The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. The Under Secretary is the Secretary's principal civilian

assistant and advisor on issues of critical importance to the Army. If I am confirmed, and a new Under Secretary of the Army is nominated and confirmed, I will review the current assignment of functions, responsibilities, and duties within the Army Secretariat and determine the capacities in which the Under Secretary can most appropriately support my efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is efficiently administered in accordance with law and the policies promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

The Army is faced with many major challenges, including providing proper support to Soldiers and Families in time of war, enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals just to name a few. A major challenge will be to modernize our Army to meet the extraordinary security challenges of the 21st century, no matter when and from where such challenge arises. Equally important is establishing strategic depth, the ability to respond to all challenges the Nation faces. Additionally, the Army must transform its support infrastructure and integrate Base Realignment and Closure decisions. Finally, our increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on Soldiers and their Families. We must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service. We must not shrink from our responsibility as a Nation to care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded in the service of our nation – and we must do better for those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). Much has been accomplished to ensure that we meet this solemn obligation, yet much remains to be done. We owe our wounded nothing short of the very best medical care that our nation can provide.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with members of this committee, the entire Congress, the president, and Secretary Gates. I am committed to maintaining the Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am confident of success. On many of these issues we have already made great strides, particularly on the medical front. Where I can make administrative decisions, I will act. If legislation is required, I won't be shy about coming to you.

I will also join with Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization efforts; completing the transition of the reserve component to an operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative effects of five years at war.

Of special interest to me will be addressing the challenges facing the very essence of the Army, the center of our formation – Soldiers and their Families. The strain of multiple deployments demands that we step up our support to Families. So I will work to further develop and implement the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) to provide better health care for our Soldiers and their Families, and continue working to develop better ways to deal with PTSD and TBI.

Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments

Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Recently, unit deployments have been extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months.

What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?

In this period of high operational temp, we must closely monitor the condition of our Soldiers and their Families. Army leaders, officers and NCOs must pay close attention to the mental and physical condition of their Soldiers and address issues as soon as they arise. These leaders are the front line in ensuring we understand the condition of our Soldiers and respond accordingly. Other indicators lag the awareness of those leaders. But, there are other indicators we watch closely. The high reenlistment rates we have experienced and continue to experience over the course of this conflict indicate that the morale of our Soldiers remains strong. Additionally, Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion rates, absence without leave, drug use, and courts-martial, have remained steady over the last few years. However, other indicators are deeply troubling and offer cause for concern, such as the increase in divorce and suicide rates.

For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

The Army will not be able to maintain its current level of commitments indefinitely without significant adjustments. The stress on the force is a major concern to all leaders in the Army and we are constantly monitoring and adjusting recruiting and retention incentives to keep pace with operational demand and Army transformation. The Army has taken action to mitigate these concerns by growing the size of the force, better utilizing the Reserve Component, rebalancing military to civilian conversions, and monitoring the time individual Soldiers spend at home between deployments. We also must do more to support the Families of Soldiers who are shouldering the burden of multiple deployments. Family support programs must be improved.

Army Budget Share

The Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30% and the Army around 25%. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25% of the Army's budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38% in the Navy and 43% in the Air Force. And further, the Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17% , as compared to 33% for the Navy and 35% for the Air Force. The result is that "the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats."

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

In spite of rising budgets for the Army, the Army continues to work to address shortfalls in equipment and infrastructure that have accumulated over many years. In order to properly prepare for the future threats the Army must work to build in our non-deployed forces full spectrum readiness and strategic depth. The Army must achieve improved levels of readiness in our non-deployed forces or accept a force with sub-optimal capability. We also are working to make overdue investment in housing and facilities. We have made great strides over the past three years in fixing our equipment readiness challenges and need your continued support.

What specifically have you done as Under Secretary of the Army and what do you intend to do if confirmed as the Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?

I have made matching Army resources to strategic requirements a central theme during my tenure as the Acting Secretary of the Army. Working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget during the development of the President's FY08 Budget, the Army received increased funding levels for Fiscal Years 2008-13. If I am confirmed as Secretary of the Army, I will continue to ensure we are good stewards of our Nation's resources, and continue to work closely with members of this committee, the Congress, and the Administration to remedy Army readiness issues that result from previous funding shortfalls in the investment accounts.

Have you discussed this problem with the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense? What is your understanding of what, if anything, they intend to do to address this discrepancy?

While building the President's FY08 Budget, we shared the impact of these funding shortfalls with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We effectively communicated and quantified challenges the Army faces in preparing for current conflicts and other emerging requirements. As a result of this collaborative effort the Army's resources were increased by more than \$7B per year. Secretary of Defense Gates is working with the Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy. Secretary Gates also is supporting the Army's modernization efforts.

Posture for the Future

Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades?

If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army is ready to meet the most likely future threats. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems will help posture the Army to meet those threats. We cannot predict threats with any certainty so we must build full spectrum readiness and strategic depth to ensure we are prepared for whatever may lie ahead. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

What other initiatives would you pursue in this regard if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

If I am confirmed, I will pursue initiatives that ensure the Army is postured to fight and win across the full range of military operations against a variety of opponents with differing capabilities and provide better support to our Army Families. The new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, is working with Army leadership to advance a list of initiatives that seek to achieve these goals. Among the top priorities is support for Soldiers and Families, including improved health care for Soldiers and dependents. Additionally, our disability system, built over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. In simplest terms, a Soldier who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. The Army is working with OSD to revamp this antiquated disability system.

Lessons Learned

What are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you would seek to address if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

Lessons learned from OIF/OEF have led the Army to improve its training for counter-insurgency warfare. On the homefront, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families and we are building programs to better support our Families. We must expand language skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions our Armed Forces are engaged in today. The Army must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, home station training, and institutional training, instilling and sustaining a warrior ethos in soldiers and leaders who are trained to be agile and adaptable. Detention operations have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to enhance our

capabilities in this area. With growth in the Army's force structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training resources from all Army Components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve Component (Army National Guard and the Reserve) is pulling, the Army needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve Component operational readiness with the domestic mission and requirements of the Guard and Reserve.

More specifically, what are the lessons learned concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend to address if confirmed?

The Army must build on its distance learning program to enable soldiers in the field the ability to train individually on skills otherwise not available when deployed. Further, the Army must take appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned is that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking steps to transition the LOGCAP contract from one to eventually three contractors to increase capabilities and generate competition. We must find ways to immediately respond to the stress and demands placed on our military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.

Post-Iraq Officer Retention Planning

After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – small unit actions where junior leaders are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives – may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly trained and experienced junior officers.

Do you agree that this is a potential problem, and if so, how would you address it if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

After the Iraq War, we may face the risk of losing the "best and brightest," combat-experienced officers and NCOs from our Army. We cannot allow the Army to drift in a post-conflict setting. This will require refocusing the Army, retaining the best and brightest Soldiers, and leveraging combat-experienced Soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as the Training and Doctrine

Command. If I am confirmed, one of my most important tasks will be to develop retention measures to keep combat-experienced Soldiers in the Army. We also must develop programs to better support Families in an expeditionary Army during a period of persistent conflict.

End Strength and Recruiting Goals

The Army's recruiting goal for fiscal year 2008 is 80,000 recruits, the same as in fiscal year 2007. The Army has told the committee that it expects to end fiscal year 2007 with over 518,000 soldiers after starting the calendar year with around 502,000. The Army then plans to grow the force in fiscal year 2008 by another 7,000 soldiers to end the fiscal year at over 525,000 soldiers.

How is the Army progressing in meeting its recruiting goals for this fiscal year? Is the Army on pace to meet its year-end goals?

The Fiscal Year 2006 End Strength was 505,400. I expect that the Army will meet and exceed its Fiscal Year 2007 recruiting goal of 80,000 Soldiers. Although the Army missed the monthly recruiting goal in May, for the year it remains ahead of requirements to achieve the Fiscal Year 2007 recruiting goal. We have added additional recruiters to help us meet our targets and are maintaining vigilance to quickly react to downward trends and indicators.

How can the Army increase its end strength to over 518,000 this year and over 525,000 next year without increasing its recruiting goal?

Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end-strength. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout Fiscal Year 2006 and the first half of Fiscal Year 2007, the Army has focused on retaining more initial term Soldiers and has seen attrition drop to record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength faster.

Has the Army changed its standards to achieve its recruiting mission and to meet its end strength goals?

The Army closely monitors indicators of quality in our recruits. Every Soldier who enlists in the Army has been screened to ensure they have the appropriate qualifications to perform his or her designated Military Occupational Specialty. The Army continues to use the Department of Defense quality marks as one measurement, while taking other steps to achieve results, such as reduction of training base attrition. The Army has experienced a decline in High School diploma graduates and an increase in Category IV recruits. These trends that must be monitored closely, but performance in those areas remain well above historical standards.

What is the current end strength of the Army today?

The End of Month May end strength for the Active Army was 507,459.

What do you project the Army's end strength to be at the end of this fiscal year?

The Active Army end strength is projected to be 519,800 at the end of this fiscal year.

In the past, the Army has asserted that, given recruiting challenges and training infrastructure, it can only grow its end strength by 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers per year. Is this still an accurate projection, or can the Army grow the force by more than 7,000 soldiers per year?

Growth of the Army beyond 7,000 per year is a factor of recruiting and retention. Each area has its specific challenges and requirements. For example, if we wanted to accelerate recruiting above 80,000 per year there would have to be an increase in recruiting resources and incentives, but also, basing, training, and equipment issues to address. Facilities such as barracks and developing training areas and ranges to accommodate the increased forces will take time to plan and construct.

Stop Loss Authority

How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under stop loss authority at the end of Fiscal Year 2007, in order to increase end strength to 518,000?

The Army uses stop loss to grow end strength, to maintain unit cohesion and to prepare and maintain units for deployment. We expect stop loss to account for 6,300 toward the Fiscal Year 2007 end strength of 519,800.

How many soldiers does the Army estimate it will retain under stop loss authority in Fiscal Year 2008 to achieve end strength of 525,000?

The Army expects stop loss authorities to account for 5,500 toward the Fiscal Year 2008 end strength of over 525,000.

What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through the out-years?

The Army, under the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is working to meet the Secretary of Defense's intent to reduce the use of stop loss as reflected in the January 19, 2007, announcement concerning "Utilization of the Total Force." The Army is currently developing a

plan for minimizing the use of stop loss. The Army has commenced a complete review of the Army's stop loss policy and is in the process of identifying ways to reduce the need for stop loss.

Army Pre-Positioned Equipment

The Army has long followed the dictates of the concept of "train as you fight." In some cases, however, units have had to fight on pre-positioned equipment that was less modern than that on which they had trained in CONUS.

What is your understanding of the effect on mission capability of operationally having to use equipment from pre-positioned stocks that is not as modern as that with which the unit regularly trains?

The equipment that has been drawn from the Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) met operational requirements. The pre-positioned equipment drawn combined with the Theater Provided Equipment met the combat capability required for the BCTs to which it was issued.

What changes to policies regarding use of pre-positioned equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?

The last four years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to deploy forces in support of COCOM requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. We must replenish the stocks with equipment that meets the needs of the modular force. I will review the underlying policy, but I am not aware of any changes needed at this time.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army pre-positioned equipment upon the withdrawal of units from Iraq?

APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has an APS Strategy 2013 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the Combatant Commanders. Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.

Equipment Availability

In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq likely to increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment availability for training?

The 5-BCT surge and 15-month troop extension in Iraq will delay some units' redeployment and postpone some equipment reset from Fiscal Year 2007 to Fiscal Year 2008 or Fiscal Year 2009.

The Army has plans in place to ensure these delays do not impact training or equipping of next to deploy units. This delay in retrograde and reset of approximately six BCT sets of equipment will result in some increased stress in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. Despite the projected increase in Reset activities in these years, adequate, continued, and timely funding for Reset will prevent a degradation of Army maintenance systems.

Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No Soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools and they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

All Soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks, special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar), and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so Soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our Soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored HMMWV fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our Soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence

systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

The Army has taken measures to overcome the impact on training of equipment shortfalls by creating training sets of equipment and rotating units through training. Congress has allocated \$17.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2007 supplemental dollars for the Army to reset the force. Over 70 percent of these supplemental funds have been obligated as of mid-April, 2007 and will allow the Army to double the workload at its depots. The number of tanks, Bradleys, and other tracked vehicles being overhauled is being quadrupled. While the use of training sets is not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat. If I am confirmed, I would continue these efforts. I would also work with the Administration and Congress to ensure that the Army develops budget requirements to better equip the forces at home station, between deployments, and to build strategic depth to support other contingencies that may be directed by the National leadership.

Equipment Repair/Reset

Congress provided the Army with \$17 billion in fiscal year 2007 to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment.

What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this impact?

The funding has helped prevent erosion of unit readiness and restores equipment to a desired level of combat capability necessary for a unit's future mission. The \$17.1 billion provides the resources to replace, repair, and recapitalize equipment for 24 brigade combat teams and support units. Contracts to replace battle losses are being put in place during Fiscal Year 2007, but most of the equipment will not be delivered to the Army until Fiscal Year 2008. The reset funding will meet the requirements to properly equip our deploying forces, but will not address all equipment shortfalls or equipment still committed overseas in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

Our depots currently are not operating at full capacity. They are operating at the capacity necessary to meet current requirements and available funding. Each depot's production capacity is being optimized by each equipment type/commodity. In Fiscal Year 20007 we have scheduled 130,000 items to be reset. Because of timely, predictable funding, we were able to expand output. We have scheduled an additional 25,000 items this year.

The 17.1B received in Fiscal Year 20007 works off all Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 20007 depot backlog and we do not need them to do more in Fiscal Year 20007 . The depots are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements for next to deploy forces. The Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental funding also allows reset of 24 BCTs within 18-24 months.

Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force and more retrograded equipment.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

Consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. Congressional support has given the Army the necessary funding to eliminate the current depot backlog. For instance, the HMMWV backlog is projected to be eliminated by March 2008. The capacity to fix equipment depends on funding, past procurement, depot production, and retrograde from theater. Due to the large amount of equipment in theater, funding for Reset must continue 2-3 years beyond the end of this conflict

What impact do you believe the President's decision to send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool of equipment available for non-deployed units to train with at home?

All units will be fully trained and equipped before going into combat. The Army will continue to be able to provide sufficient equipment for non-deployed Soldiers to properly train before deployment. However, we will continue to rotate training sets among units as we did before the surge. For example, the Army is moving Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAHs) between units to ensure pre-deployment training requirements are met at home station, while units in Theater are provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their combat mission. The Army is also addressing this equipping challenge by using reset to repair, replace, and recapitalize equipment, filling training requirements from new production, and requesting additional funding to purchase needed equipment.

What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland Security and disaster relief missions?

The plus-up has had no effect on Army National Guard units' ability to respond to and perform Homeland Security and disaster relief missions. Plus-up units are all Active Component and their equipment came from new production and other AC units, not from existing ARNG pools of equipment.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles

In your role as the Acting Secretary, you have been involved in the Army's evolving requirement for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles. A recent memo from you to Secretary Gates indicated that the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is 2,500, but that the requirement could be increased to 17,700. The U.S. Marine Corps has decided to replace all of its Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAHs) with MRAP vehicles.

Is the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles still 2,500 and, if so, is that number adequate to meet the Army's needs?

Buying the MRAPs we need to better protect Soldiers and getting them to theatre as soon as possible is our top near-term acquisition priority. The Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is much greater than 2,500 and Army leadership is working to determine the proper number. The Army has sent a high level team to theater to better understand the Theater request. The Army has committed the Supplemental funding provided by the Congress to acquire 900 MRAP vehicles and will field the first vehicles this Fall. We are working with the Navy and Marines to achieve the highest production rates possible, as soon as possible, for MRAPs.

U.S. Army Force Structure in Europe

A major drawdown of U.S. military personnel in Europe is underway. The heart of this proposal is a reduction of approximately 47,000 Army personnel and the relocation of three combat brigades from Europe to the United States. After that decision had already been made, the fiscal year 2008 budget proposes to add 65,000 soldiers to Army active duty end strength over the next five years. As part of this increase, the Army proposes to create six new light infantry combat brigades.

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, what would be your role and responsibility in the final determination of the permanent station location for each of the six additional brigades?

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, I would ensure the Army considers operational, fiscal, and environmental implications of force growth and ongoing realignments prior to determining stationing locations.

In your current role as the Acting Secretary, what criteria has the Army developed to assess locations for the placement of the six brigades?

The Army will use the best military value criteria, training capacity, power projection, logistics infrastructure and capacity, Soldier Well being, Cost and Growth Capacity and environmental considerations. The criteria are derived from the 2005 base realignment and closure analysis. We will ensure that our planning, analysis, and criteria meet all of the requirements included in the National Environmental Policy Act.

Do you believe the consideration of locations for the final determination of the permanent station location for each of the six additional active brigades should include Army Reserve and Guard installations in the United States?

The Army is in the initial stages of analyzing installation capacity and capability for supporting six brigade combat teams. Army Reserve and Guard installations in the United States are being considered.

Given the role our forces in Europe have played in operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, do you believe it would be in our strategic interest to base one or more of these six additional brigades in Europe?

Our current strategy which is the Global Defense Posture Realignment strategy calls for a shift to a more CONUS-based, joint and expeditionary Army and the Army plans to base the 6 new brigades in CONUS.

What is your current role as Acting Secretary of the Army in the decision of how many, if any, of these additional 65,000 Army personnel should be based in Europe, when do you expect this basing decision to be made, and what would your role be in making this decision if confirmed?

In my current role, I provide recommendations on global basing strategy and ensure the Army's recommended stationing decisions are consistent with strategic guidance and meet the requirements of the Combatant Commander. If confirmed, I would expect to continue providing my recommendations to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in these critical areas.

In your opinion, should the Department of Defense determine the location of the six brigades before making any irrevocable decisions to return property in Europe?

The Army is proceeding with analysis of the CONUS basing options for the six brigades consistent with the strategic guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Currently, there are no plans to utilize European options.

The training ranges at the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana are already fully utilized. If the ongoing drawdown from four heavy brigades to one Stryker brigade in Europe is fully implemented, it seems likely that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany will not be fully utilized.

Do you believe we should take the availability of this training range, and the cost avoidance of not building new ranges if we have an underutilized range available, into consideration in deciding whether or how soon to draw down our ground forces in Europe, and where to base the proposed six new brigade combat teams?

One of the Secretary of the Army's responsibilities is to ensure the responsible stewardship of all Army resources whether the resource is funding, equipment, or facilities. If confirmed as Secretary of the Army, any basing decision would include a complete analysis of resource requirements and availability.

Army Science and Technology

The Army invests in science and technology programs to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and future Army systems. The Army's budget request has included a declining level of investment in science and technology programs over each of the last four fiscal years.

What do you see as the role that Army science and technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

The Army's Science and Technology (S&T) program is the investment the Army makes in our future Soldiers. This program has to be as adaptable and responsive as our Soldiers in the field. The Army's S&T strategy should be to pursue technologies that will enable the future force while simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.

Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of investment in science and technology programs?

The Army's planned S&T investments seek to mature and demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our Soldiers the best possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.

What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value of Army science and technology programs?

The real value of S&T programs is measured by the increased capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted into systems and equipment and that equipment is provided to fully trained Soldiers. While technology is still in S&T, we use the standard DoD established Technology Readiness Levels to report when technologies are judged to be mature enough for successful transition to an acquisition program of record.

What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions?

The S&T community can support current operations in three ways. First, Soldiers are benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments. Using our Rapid Equipping initiative, we are seeking to field technologies as soon as possible to help in the war-fight. Second, the Army should exploit transition opportunities by accelerating mature technologies from on-going S&T efforts. Third, we should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T should providing limited quantities of advanced technology prototypes to our Soldiers deployed to the fight.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems and other technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally tested? (ATEC Lead)

Operational testing is of critical importance and one of the cornerstones of the Army's acquisition program. It ensures that the systems and technologies work not only from a technical aspect, but also from the perspective of how our Soldiers will use these systems around the world in actual operations. The Army has a systematic approach to test new systems under the conditions that replicate actual combat as much as possible. The Army partners the Army Test and Evaluation Command with the Program Executive Offices, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the Soldiers from various Army Commands to plan and execute very thorough operational tests. I fully understand the importance to the Army of operational testing and the impact it has on ensuring the right systems get to our soldiers. As Secretary, I will insist we conduct thorough operational tests so we understand how the system performs in the hands of our Soldiers prior to fielding.

Are you satisfied with the acquisition community's ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?

The Army constantly seeks more agility in addressing the anticipated and unanticipated operational needs of deployed forces. OEF and OIF have transformed the way we approach this topic. Acquisition community must always balance the need to fill requirements with the need to comply with laws and regulations. The biggest challenges for the acquisition community are retaining trained people, managing the interaction with requirements and testing communities, and managing complex programs that require high levels of oversight.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you have to speed the ability for the Army to provide operational forces with the specific systems and other capabilities that they request?

If confirmed, I will work to continue funding the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to rapidly increase mission capability while reducing risk to Soldiers and others. The REF equips operational commanders with off-the-shelf solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed and acquired quickly. The Army must also continue to develop, test, and evaluate key technologies and systems under operational conditions and rapidly field those capabilities that will enable our forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy. Additionally, a reexamination of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Acquisition Regulation (DFAR) and our acquisition processes should be undertaken to reflect the asymmetric, catastrophic, and irregular situations we are facing in the current environment.

Army Laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed war fighters and develop next generation capabilities?

If confirmed, I would encourage the recruitment and retention of the highest quality laboratory workforce. The Army has already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army. Despite tremendous pressures on resources to fund current operations and Army modernization we have struggled to sustain science and technology funding at roughly \$1.7 billion for the past several budgets. The Army promotes efficient use of these resources and effective laboratory management through multiple processes: peer groups, laboratory internal management reviews, Army Headquarters and cross-Service technology reviews, as well as input from subject-matter experts from industry, academia, and other government agencies.

Army Test and Evaluation Efforts

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's test and evaluation infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new systems and technologies are tested to verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?

The infrastructure today is fully meeting the current requirements of the Global War on Terror. Fiscal Year 2011 will be a challenge to ensure long term test and evaluation infrastructure. My intent is to address the test and evaluation infrastructure in next POM cycle.

Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap

A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken within the Army to achieve the goals of the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?

The Army has made great progress in the area of Language Transformation, and we are committed to the 4 goals of the roadmap:

1. Creating foundational Language and Cultural expertise in the officer, civilian and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.
2. Creating the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.
3. Establishing a cadre of language specialist possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (listening/reading/speaking)
4. Establishing a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

The Army is addressing language training across a broad spectrum of skill levels. Today, language training involves more than just making Soldiers into linguists; it involves giving Soldiers of all specialties basic communication skills that are needed in the contemporary operating environment. The Army is not making every Soldier a language expert, but giving them tools to succeed in the environment in which they will operate. For our language experts, the Army has set a high language proficiency goal of 3-listening, 3-reading, and 3-speaking. The Army increased Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Policy to encourage Soldiers to improve their existing proficiency and acquire new language capabilities in critical languages. We are also using online tools such as Rosetta Stone© as well as native-speaking role players in training scenarios to replicate the contemporary operating environment. Additionally, we have embedded the tasks of the Language Transformation Roadmap in a new chapter of Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, and language training is a part of our pre-deployment ARFORGEN model. One of our key initiatives was the creation of Military Operations Specialty 09L which recruits native foreign language speakers to be interpreters/translators. The Army is the only Service with a program such as 09L. We have trained and sent forward 377 trained interpreters in support of GWOT, as well as expanding the program to all components of the Army. These language experts as well as others such as our Foreign Area Officers are tracked by Army career field managers.

What is your assessment of an appropriate time frame within which results can be realized in this critical area?

This is a capability that we are building, and the fruits of our work through the Language Transformation Roadmap and other initiatives will take time to produce results. In the mean time, contract linguists and O9L Interpreter and Translators are vital to our capacity to surge language resources.

Army Management and Planning Process

Over the past several years, the Army's planning, programming and budgeting process has not kept pace with rapidly changing requirements. While this is more understandable for events like the Presidential decision to surge additional forces into Iraq, it is less understandable with respect to long-term program decisions such as the modular conversion of Army brigades or the more recent proposal to increase the size of the Army. It has become routine for the Army to submit "placeholders" instead of actual program plans in budget requests, and to purchase temporary facilities followed almost immediately by additional funding requests to buy permanent facilities to replace the temporary ones.

What is your assessment of the Army's management and planning process?

The Army planning, programming and budgeting process ties together strategic guidance with the capabilities required to carry out the National Military Strategy while working within the constraints of fiscal guidance. The Army manages mission requirements for resources and manpower over a five- to six-year period. The Army seeks to balance the need for both the current force and future force to ensure our Soldiers and their Families have the necessary capabilities, facilities and programs to meet their needs. However, no matter how well the staff plans for the future, there will always be unforeseen changes to requirements (especially in today's environment) and decisions made beyond the control of the Army. New plans require time to establish, and sometimes temporary solutions must be implemented. These temporary solutions and other lessons learned often lead to unexpected capability gains to Army formations engaged in combat. As the Army attempts to provide these new capabilities and lessons learned to our Soldier engaged in combat, timelines for decisions on emerging capabilities do not always match timelines associated with the planning, programming and budget process. Placeholders should be used sparingly, but they allow the Army to make the best decision on prudent use of available resources in this fluid environment.

In your view, does the Army have enough people with the right skills to manage the changes being attempted, or is the Army undertaking more organizational change than it is capable of accomplishing during a time of war?

The Army is transforming its processes designed to identify and eliminate wasteful practices while gaining greater efficiencies. The Army is attempting to garner savings to self-finance many of its initiatives, while sustaining our capabilities to meet the increasing demands of our

wartime missions. I believe the Army has the right group of people with the right skill sets to see the Army through these challenging times. The Army must, however, continue to provide the necessary training as new technologies and processes are made available to improve productivity and remain a relevant and ready force.

If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to improve the Army's management and planning processes, in particular for major force structure and program changes?

If confirmed, I will examine how we can make the process more adaptive to the changing environment, building upon the positive working relationships the Army has built with Department of Defense leaders. I believe improvements can be instituted to make the process more efficient. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy for Business Transformation to engage the Army staff in a concerted effort to identify and implement meaningful change and process improvements. In this effort, however, I would maintain a central focus on the readiness of the Army to fight the Global War on Terror.

Army Installations

The Department of the Army recently was criticized for substandard facility conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which in part led to leadership changes in the chain of command for the Center.

In your current role as the Acting Secretary, have you seen a change in how the leaders in the Department of the Army address the conditions and quality of facilities and installations throughout the Army?

First, I'd like to address the steps we have taken with Army Medical Action Plan to improve medical facilities. The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) has conducted a 100 percent review of Warrior in Transition barracks and identified corrective measures required to bring them up to standard. Additionally, the IMCOM has identified requirements for other buildings on installations that Warriors in Transition would use. Army-wide, Quality of Life remains a top Army priority to ensure Soldiers and Families have safe and adequate facilities to live, work, and train. The Army has made substantial progress in the last four years increasing Base Operations Support 41 percent and Facility Sustainment/Restoration and Modernization 15 percent. We have doubled our effort in Restoration & Modernization funding to \$200 million per year. Care for our Families is foremost in the Army's stationing and mobilization of Soldiers. The environment in which our Soldiers and Families live, work, and train plays a key role in recruiting and retaining the All-Volunteer Force. For example, 19,000 Family homes have been built or modernized under the Residential Communities Initiative. This is quality housing that our Families proudly call home. Although, we are still not doing as much as we would like in this time of war and constrained resources, we continue to make consistent and steady progress toward improving the installation services necessary to sustain the All-Volunteer Force

In your opinion, does the Department of the Army have additional problems with facility conditions across the Army aside from the ones identified at Walter Reed? If so, how serious are they?

We have identified shortcoming in other facilities across the Army and are working to address them. The Army is continuously challenged to balance facility sustainment, restoration and modernization projects to meet mission and life, health, and safety requirements. Facilities projects compete for funding and must be prioritized for execution over a number of years. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to ensure that our efforts to improve facilities for our Wounded Warriors, Soldiers, and Families are continued.

If confirmed, would you implement any additional programs or guidance to ensure our soldiers work and live in adequate facilities?

If confirmed, I would implement initiatives from three working groups which address issues in this area. One initiative, Enhancing the Quality of Support to Soldiers, Civilians, and Families, will develop a plan for improvements to installation services. Another initiative, Complete Reserve Component Transition, will complete the conversion to modular units and adjust and resource post-deployment policies and Family support programs to ensure care of Soldiers and their Families that are dispersed throughout the United States. A third initiative, Adapt Army Institutions to Support an Expeditionary Army at War, will provide initiatives to support Soldiers, Civilians, Families, and Wounded Warriors with reliable and standard levels of quality of life. Also, it will offer improved installation management systems to better align with ARFORGEN phases and mitigate the effects of repeated deployments. This would include improving services, facilities, and the military construction process.

Contract Support Functions

The Department of Defense has engaged in the privatization of many of its support functions. As a result, the Department now relies heavily on contractors to perform acquisition, budget, and financial management functions that are critical to the execution of the Department's mission. Senior DOD officials have informed the committee both formally and informally that, because of reductions in the acquisition work force, the Department now lacks the capability to effectively oversee the work performed by its support contractors.

Are you concerned about the extent to which the Army has become reliant upon contractors to perform critical functions? Are you concerned about the extent to which the Army has become reliant upon contractors to perform critical functions?

The Army is committing additional personnel and resources to provide the required level of contract administration on large contracts, particularly for the Army's contracting officers who support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another area of concern is a shortage of Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) within units to provide surveillance on service contracts in support of contingency operations.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that it has the resources it needs to provide effective oversight for its support contractors?

Working within existing manpower constraints, the Army needs to ensure that its limited contract oversight resources are organized and employed in the most efficient manner. In addition, it needs to continue to place appropriate management emphasis on COR training.

The privatization of functions previously performed by DOD employees now extends to many functions performed on the battlefield. As a result, many functions that were performed by DOD personnel as recently as the Gulf War have been performed by contractor personnel in the current conflict in Iraq.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has reached, or exceeded, an appropriate balance in providing for the performance of functions by contractors on the battlefield?

The downsizing of the Army in the 90's has increased the need for contractors to provide non-inherently governmental functions. The use of contractors is a force multiplier enabling the U.S. Army to keep soldiers engaged in core U.S. Army missions. Currently, there are an estimated 129,000 contractors in Iraq. They continue to perform a vital role performing services such as mail delivery, laundry and food services, water and ground transportation of goods, road and rail maintenance, construction, base operations, petroleum supply, and maintenance and technical support for high-technology systems. The Army balances the need to use contractors to provide critically needed services while using soldiers and DOD civilians to perform inherently governmental functions.

Where do you believe that the Department of Defense should draw the line between functions on the battlefield that can and should be performed by contractors and functions that should only be performed by DOD personnel?

DoD must maintain vigilance to ensure that only non-inherently governmental functions are contracted out.

Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield are subject to appropriate levels of control and accountability for their actions, or would additional regulation be appropriate?

With changing conditions on the ground, we must be vigilant to ensure that we maintain proper oversight over our contract workforce. I believe that existing controls are appropriate but must be re-evaluated regularly. In October 2005, the Department of Defense issued DoD Instruction 3020.41, entitled "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces," to address contingency contractor personnel. Section 6.1.3 states that "contingency contractor personnel fulfilling contracts with the U.S. Armed Forces may be subject to prosecution under Federal law, including but not limited to, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. 3261, which extends U.S. Federal criminal jurisdiction to certain DoD contingency

contractor personnel, for certain offenses committed outside U.S. territory.” The Department of Justice has responsibility for prosecuting violations of Federal law. Besides being subject to Federal Law, contractors must abide by the terms and conditions in their contracts. All Department of Defense contracts being performed in a Combatant Commanders Area of Operations require that contractor employees adhere to the policies and directives of the Combatant Commander.

Missile Defense

The Army has fielded the Patriot system and is upgrading all Patriot units to the most modern and capable PAC-3 configuration. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is being developed as a near-term system for defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

What do you believe is the Army’s proper role in fielding, operating, sustaining, and funding missile defenses, and how does that role relate to the role of the Missile Defense Agency?

As a member of the Joint team, the Army is responsible to field and operate land-based missile defenses as capabilities are made available by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Upon transition and transfer of land-based missile defense elements to the Army, the Army will assume responsibility for the operations and sustainment of these capabilities. MDA is responsible for research and development of missile defense capabilities and the Army is responsible for their operations and support of the land-based systems. The Army’s close partnership with MDA throughout the developmental process has enabled us to succeed in putting capabilities in the field and enabled us to achieve the interoperability of these capabilities with the other Services and our Allies.

Strategic Risk

Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

Strategic risk for the Nation must be considered from a joint perspective. As for the Army’s role in support of the National Military Strategy, the Army’s increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan limit Army resources available for other contingencies.

How would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

Strategic risk must be considered from a joint perspective. The Army can still meet strategic requirements to mobilize, deploy and employ its forces in support of national military strategic objectives; however, if the OEF and OIF demand does not decrease, the Army may require a longer timeline to provide resources to support a new contingency. The level of risk that the force faces today is increased, but the force remains capable of responding to an unforeseen surge requirement. We will continue to work with the Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce risk.

What impact, if any, do you expect the decision to increase Army forces committed to Iraq to have on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

Our Nation's strategies to respond to threats around the world involve all components of our Nation's defense, including all four Services. High utilization of the resources of one Service may require an adjustment in the role of the other Services. Army forces committed to Iraq do limit the Army's ability to meet other security obligations around the world. The decision to lengthen combat tours would be lengthened to 15 months reflects that increased demand; however, our nation's military is capable of meeting and defeating threats to the nation in support of current national and defense strategies.

How and over what period of time, in your view, will increases to Army end-strength reduce or mitigate this risk?

The Army's approved growth in end-strength will increase the Army's ability to respond to contingencies. We must grow the Army, and we are working to do that, adding 65,000 to the active duty force, 8,000 to the Guard and 1,000 to the Reserve over the next five years. But we must remain flexible as circumstances change to meet future demands. The "Grow the Army Plan" is based on lessons learned from the past five years and increases the strategic depth for the Army to meet global requirements of the long war. The growth will not be limited to BCTs. The growth will also enhance other combat capabilities (Patriot Air Defense), combat support (Military Intelligence, Engineer, and Military Police) and combat service support (Transportation, Quartermaster, Medical, Ordnance and Maintenance). The plan recognizes increased demands on the Institutional Army to recruit, train, and sustain the operational force. Adjustments must reflect growth in the operational force while we continue to seek efficiencies in the Institutional Army to reduce its percentage of the Army's end-strength.

What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

Adequate and predictable funding of modernization and transformation efforts are critical to mitigating this strategic risk. Policy and budgets must match the current strategy and demand.

We also must build the capacity of our international partners and allies as we cannot face these challenges alone. We must invest in partner nations who know the culture, language, and geography of our enemies. The President's budget includes vital funds for that effort. Additionally, rebalancing the forces in the Reserve component and fully transitioning the RC from a strategic reserve to an operational force will further mitigate risk.

Walter Reed Army Medical Center

You testified before the Committee at the Army posture hearing on March 15, 2007 and again at a joint hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee on April 15, 2007 regarding revelations of poor conditions for outpatient soldiers at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. At those hearings, you discussed the many ways the Army planned to address the issues at Walter Reed, including personnel changes, the creation of new offices to address the specific needs of wounded soldiers, and changes in the resources and facilities for outpatient care.

What is your assessment of the overall changes that have been made thus far at Walter Reed, and what more needs to be done?

I am encouraged by the accomplishments made by MG Gale Pollock, Acting Surgeon General, MG Eric Schoomaker, Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and his Deputy, BG Michael Tucker, over the past ninety days. They have shown a commitment to correcting deficiencies in the management of outpatient care, to include providing for the needs of the Families of our brave Soldiers. As a result of these efforts, along with others planned for the coming months, I am confident that our Warriors in Transition and their Families will to receive the best medical and restorative care and support services possible.

What specific changes have been made to address the issues of care and treatment for outpatients and their families?

The most important steps taken to date are the establishment at WRAMC of the Warrior Transition Brigade (WTB), along with the introduction of the concept of a "triad" of a primary care manager (usually a physician), a nurse case manager and a squad leader. The WTB provides the leadership structure necessary to allow our Warriors to focus on healing. Soldiers previously living in Building 18 now reside in high quality housing. Abrams Hall and the Mologne House, located on the WRAMC Campus, both provide telephone, cable television, and internet service in each Warrior in Transition room. As a result of the findings of the 2006 Army's Physical Disability Evaluation Transformation Initiative, WRAMC is beta testing a streamlined approach to Medical Evaluation Board processing, reducing the number of required documents from 38 to 18. Another accomplishment is the establishment of the Soldier Family Assistance Center (SFAC). At WRAMC, the SFAC is centrally located within the hospital and is designed to support the needs of Warrior family members. The SFAC is a concept that has worked with great success at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, and I believe will be of great benefit at WRAMC and to all Army Treatment Facilities. These and numerous

other improvements that MG Schoomaker and his staff have implemented at WRAMC are part of a comprehensive Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) that was first implemented in April 2007. I am confident that the Army is not only correcting the deficiencies at WRAMC, but is developing a comprehensive program to ensure that Warriors in Transition and their Families receive the best quality care and support possible at all Army Treatment Facilities.

If confirmed, what measures would you propose to minimize or mitigate the detrimental effects, if any, from the closure of Walter Reed as required by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Round?

The Army, working with the Department of Defense and Congress is seeking to accelerate the construction of the new center at Bethesda. The Army is committed that Walter Reed Army Medical Center will remain fully operational until the new center is fully operational. The ability to manage patient care functions between the medical centers appropriately and seamlessly, is facilitated by the ongoing functional integration of clinical services at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and National Naval Medical Center. The Army expects that all the major clinical services at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and National Naval Medical Center will be functionally integrated before the end of the current calendar year. Integrated clinical service provides active patient management spanning inpatient and outpatient at both institutions. When the transition from Walter Reed Army Medical Center to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center is completed, all of the lessons learned and the functional integration process will be fully implemented. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we maintain WRAMC at full operational capacity until the NNMC is prepared to provide medical care to our Soldiers.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components. The Committee is concerned that growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of Brigade Combat Teams, potential growth of the Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors will compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the Committee understands that the Army continues to direct conversion of military medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.

If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2008 and beyond?

If I am confirmed, I will undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, to include a review of authorities necessary to increase recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.

What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow?

To continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow, the Army needs to explore the use of special pays and retention bonuses for health care professionals and authority to appoint officers in the Army Medical Department with a reduced military service obligation. We also need to explore ways to improve TRICARE services for Soldiers and Families.

National Security Personnel System

Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our national security. However, DOD employee unions have strongly resisted the implementation of the proposed new system.

What is your view of the success of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) implementation within the Army so far, and if confirmed, what would be your expectation for continued implementation of NSPS within the Army?

The implementation of NSPS thus far is successful. More than 41,000 Army civilians have now been converted to NSPS. Implementation efforts have been well planned and managed and have incorporated a robust program of communication and training for Army managers and employees. The Army's first pay-for-performance rating cycle was also successful with employees receiving performance-based pay in January 2007. The NSPS performance management process resulted in greater communication between supervisors and employees to develop meaningful job objectives aligned with organizational goals and resulting performance ratings reflected the workforce's contribution toward achieving such goals. NSPS has allowed for increased flexibility in rewarding exceptional performance. Lessons learned from our implementation experiences are being used to adjust policy and training. An additional 29,000 employees are scheduled for conversion to NSPS during the November 2007 to February 2008 timeframe.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure broader employee acceptance of NSPS?

Management support and accountability are essential to employee acceptance. If confirmed, I will assure that managers are held accountable for communicating performance expectations, and that they provide fair and equitable ratings. Building consensus through communication and transparency is paramount to successful implementation. Therefore, the Army will maximize our unprecedented training effort to ensure that all participants understand the new system and their roles in making it successful.

Based on your experience, what are the critical factors for successful implementation of a total transformation of work force policies and rules, including performance-based pay?

Among the factors I consider critical are leadership commitment and support, and an educated and knowledgeable workforce. NSPS is a key pillar in Army's transformation plan and is integral to developing the right mix of people and skills across the Total Force. I will ensure all leaders are committed to NSPS and remain engaged in the successful implementation. Further, I will endorse a pay for performance system that is consistent, fair, equitable, and recognizes our employees based on their contribution to mission accomplishment.

If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the NSPS and what role would you expect to play in managing the NSPS implementation in the Army?

I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian management. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate actively the effectiveness and impact of the implementation of NSPS and will set that tone for the leadership in the Army as we continue to implement NSPS. The Army has established an NSPS Program Management Office that recommends Army NSPS policy, provides guidance, monitors implementation, and will keep me informed of progress and any issues that require my attention. These policy decisions are made with the guidance of an NSPS General Officer Steering Committee. In addition to the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in Army's annual workforce survey, on-site evaluations to assess program effectiveness are being performed which will provide additional implementation feedback and lessons learned. Finally, Army, along with the other services, works closely with the Program Executive Office, NSPS, on evaluation methods and tools that will be useful for monitoring NSPS and its acceptance. The Army will be able to consider DoD-wide survey and implementation results, and compare them to what we find through Army.

Management and Development of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management within the Army. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management fields. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned

with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. Those experiences will have been gained in the Army and in other military departments and agencies. There will be a systematic and progressive assignment pattern for executives that will lead them to positions of greater responsibility. I am committed to providing for the professional development and management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Office Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

Reserve Deployment and Mobilization

In recent years, reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?

I support the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve that will provide the rotational depth needed to meet our Global commitments and Homeland Defense and Homeland Security requirements. Our “Grow the Army Plan” is based on lessons learned and a thorough analysis of Combatant Commander requirements. As we transform and rebalance our Reserve Components they will enhance the Army’s strategic depth. The Army proposes to grow the Reserve Component by 9,000 by Fiscal Year 2012. As we grow the force, the ARNG will continue to transform to Brigade Combat Teams and rebalance its force structure to provide additional Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities. The USAR will continue to rebalance its Institutional force and to increase Combat Support and Combat Service Support operational force capacity.

What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?

The Army’s goal for mobilization of RC units will remain a one year mobilized to five years demobilized ratio. However, due to operational demand, some units may be remobilized sooner. In order to meet joint force requirements, the Army is adapting and implementing the ARFORGEN process. The goal of the ARFORGEN process is provide us a flow of ready forces to meet operational requirements and will provide predictability for our Soldiers, Families and employers. ARFORGEN, when fully implemented together with our RC utilization policy and our rebalancing initiatives should provide us with the flexibility and capabilities we need for our operational reserve.

Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

I support Army efforts to balance our capabilities within and across the Active Component, National Guard and Army Reserve to develop a total force that provides strategic depth and full-spectrum capabilities. The combined effects of growing the force, rebalancing and transforming to a modular force will posture the Army to meet the needs of the Nation by increasing Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support capabilities.

Army Family Action Plan

The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

If confirmed, meeting the needs of our Soldiers and their Families will be my highest priority. The Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) will play an important role in meeting this priority. The AFAP is a dynamic program which enables the military community to share and raise issues which are most pressing to Army Soldiers, civilians and Family members. This process further allows senior leadership to address and/or resolve issues brought forward or identified by these members of the Army community. AFAP is recognized and supported by Commanders and is the force behind legislative, regulatory, and policy changes as well as improvements to programs and services across the Services. Current funding and staffing shortfalls challenge the ability to provide sufficient support to Command, Soldiers, and Family Members. Army Community Service (ACS) programs and services are instrumental in alleviating Family member stress by building strong resilient families and increasing Soldier and family readiness. Compassion fatigue and burnout are beginning to impact staff, Family Readiness Group (FRG) leaders and leader spouses as they provide needed programs and services to Family Members. To address this concern, the Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command is developing and training Mobile Assistance Teams to relocate to installations to augment and provide respite. Additionally, to meet surge capabilities and address reintegration and reunion issues, additional Military Family Life Consultants are needed. These professionals provide consistent support and education to Soldiers and Families on dealing with the effects of deployments by developing positive coping mechanisms

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?

Army Community Service has worked extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, programming needs. The Army updates these plans quarterly to ensure centers are continually addressing staffing and resource requirements and are changing missions and strategies to meet mission and deployment surge capabilities. If confirmed, I would monitor

these plans to ensure that family needs are addressed as the Army grows and undertakes global restationing, BRAC, and extended deployments.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness?

Supporting families of our geographically dispersed Soldiers and Family Members poses special challenges but will be a high priority for me if I am confirmed. The Army has developed an Integrated Multi-component Family Support Network (IMFSN) to assist us in meeting this challenge. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of IMFSN and other programs to ensure that family support systems and services are accessible, consistent, and predictable for Guard and Reserve Soldiers, and Family Members during all phases of deployment. We do not have all the answers but we must engage with Reserve Component Soldiers and Families to develop programs that meet their needs. The welfare of the Army Family, active and reserve components, is critical to the health of the U.S. Army.

Mental Health Assessment Team IV

The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF.

Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increase stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

The Army is committed to providing our Soldiers the best mental health care possible. Indeed, we are now initiating an effort to recruit an additional 200 mental health professionals, to be based in CONUS and in theater. The Army plans other major changes as part of our comprehensive Army Medical Action Plan. Next month, the Army will roll out an extensive educational program on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury for all its Soldiers and leaders. This program consists of a standardized presentation commanders will use to inform and educate both Soldiers and leaders. The teaching materials and visual support products are in the final stages of development and are undergoing review by military and civilian health professionals. The Army also is developing proposals for establishing Traumatic Brain Injury and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Centers of Excellence to provide nationwide education and training to Army leaders, clinicians, Soldiers and their Families. Additionally, under current practices mental health assessments are conducted on all Soldiers prior to deploying, immediately upon redeployment, and three to six months following redeployment.

What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

The MHATs have many valuable findings, including: 1) the impact of deployment lengths and multiple deployments on soldiers' mental health; 2) the level of combat continues to be the main determinant of a soldier's mental-health status; 3) good NCO leadership is the key to sustaining a Soldier's mental health and well-being; 4) the suicide prevention program needs to be modified for the combat environment; and 5) there continues to be a perceived stigma for those that seek mental health care. The importance of leadership in the mitigation of mental health difficulties is one of many lessons that can be applied to future deployments. If I am confirmed, I will also reinforce the need to provide comprehensive and easily accessible behavioral health care, both in theater and at home.

Individual Ready Reserve Recall Policy

A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

Department of Defense IRR Policy mandates the separation within two years of IRR officers who have fulfilled their Military Service Obligation unless they elect to remain in the IRR. To date, over 10,000 IRR Officers have been notified that they have to make this election. Approximately 75 percent have been transferred to the inactive status list or separated. The Army is developing a policy applicable to the enlisted IRR population that will also transfer non-participants to the inactive status list until separation. The Army has clarified current mobilization policy in the Personnel Policy Guidance which is made available on the web and made specifically available to the IRR Soldiers via the IRR Soldier Portal, a website maintained exclusively for IRR Soldiers and their families.

What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

The Army has several initiatives to improve the IRR database. Two of the initiatives seek to improve IRR data reconciliation and control of the IRR population. These initiatives address methods to reset the force by conducting a systematic screening of all data records for non-mobilization assets, to include Soldiers passed over for promotion, those with security violations, physical disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse characterizations of service. Following such a screening, the Army would determine the appropriate disposition of individuals and process for final resolution those Soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service. When appropriate, these Soldiers are being separated. Additionally, the Human

Resources Command has processed over 20,000 existing bad addresses through a new contract with a credit bureau agency reducing the number of incorrect addresses from 35 percent to 10 percent on the database. Through these combined efforts, the IRR population has been reduced by approximately 25 percent to approximately 78,000.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

The IRR has served honorably and has been a critical element to fill shortfalls in the both the Active and Reserve Components. As of June 2007, the Army has mobilized 10,339 IRR Soldiers to augment the Global War on Terror. The IRR will continue to serve a critical role in the future. In accordance with the IRR Transformation Plan, the Army is taking measures to change the “cultural” attitude about the IRR from a strategic to an operational force. Those IRR Soldiers meeting operational readiness will be referred to as Individual Warriors with the ability to earn a reserve retirement through various opportunities targeted specifically at them for their active role in participating in the program.

Officer Shortages

A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the current shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

The current Army need to grow the officer corps is primarily due to increased requirements for Regular Army Competitive Category (ACC) captains and majors. These will increase from 23,500 in 2005 to nearly 30,000 by 2010. Retention rates are slightly below historical averages but account for a small percentage of the shortfall. Steps to address this shortfall are answered in the next answer.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next ten years?

If confirmed, I will continue the Army’s strategy to meet these added requirements by increasing lieutenant accessions and raising the selection rates for captains and majors. The Army has also called to active duty Reserve Component officers and accepted increased numbers of inter-service transfers of officers with the Blue to Green program, generating 1000 additional officers. The second part of the Army’s strategy is a proposal to retain officers who otherwise would leave active duty. The retention tools include a Captain’s retention menu of incentives including graduate school education, preferences for basing, and a \$20,000 Captain’s Critical Skills

Retention Bonus at a greater rate. The growth of Army requirements necessitates retaining mid-grade officers in critical skills. While unprecedented for the Army, bonuses to retain mid-grade officers are being employed very successfully by the Navy. If confirmed, it will be one of my most important tasks to fill our increasing demand for captains and majors by keeping our current force of combat-experienced junior officers in the Army.

National Guard Organization, Equipment, and Readiness

Legislative proposals introduced in 2006 and 2007, recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March, 1, 2007, and responses by the Department in response to these calls for change are all currently under consideration.

How do you assess the changes in the roles and mission of the National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau?

The past four and a half years of war and emergencies at home have demonstrated the degree to which the Nation relies on the National Guard. As we have increasingly utilized the National Guard at home and overseas, it has become clear that the National Guard must be organized, trained, and equipped to serve as an integral part of our operational force, not a “strategic reserve.” The Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the Reserve Component leaders are working together to provide greater predictability and support for our Reserve Component Soldiers, their Families and employers. In support of these missions and the Defense Secretary’s new policy, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is working with the Governors, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, as well as other federal agencies when National Guard forces are supporting those agencies. We rely on the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to act as our key link to and advisor on matters pertaining to the National Guard. It is a testament to the inherent flexibility of the current organization of the National Guard Bureau that not one mission has been unexecuted in this environment of high-demand, dual-purpose requirements, and I would expect that extraordinary performance to continue.

Do you think that the current Army processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard? What is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

It has been my experience as the Under Secretary that the current Army planning, programming and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army – the Active Component and the Reserve Components (RC). The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the RC. The Director of the Army National Guard and Chief, National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand RC requirements and so that there is full transparency

resulting in an improved total force. As a result, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Director of the Army National Guard have maintained a “One Army” perspective and spirit. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Active and Reserve Component will continue to work in concert to provide the land component capabilities our Nation needs.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that leaders from the National Guard are included fully in budget planning, negotiations, and execution. As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I work closely with National Guard leaders and will continue to do so. Further, as the Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged with the leaders of the Guard and Reserve, the Secretary of Defense and the other Military Departments in an effort to implement or incorporate several of the goals and improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or have been recommended by the Commission. One of those improvements is to amend the Charter to specify that the Chief, National Guard Bureau will also serve as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters involving planning, operation, and integration of non-federalized National Guard forces, and other matters as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate. If confirmed, I will work in full partnership within the Department of Defense to assess the way ahead for the National Guard.

What is your view of the appropriate role of the National Guard Bureau vis-a-vis the Army, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff?

As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged with the Secretary of Defense, National Guard leaders, and the other Military Departments in an effort to implement several of the goals and improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or have been recommended by the Commission. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Defense and the Army are in the process of implementing the proposals attached as Exhibit A to these questions.

Space

The Army has recently restructured its program executive office for air and missile defense to include Army space efforts, and issued a new Army space policy.

Are you satisfied that current Department of Defense management structures adequately support Army equities in space?

I believe that there are opportunities for improvement. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System helps to ensure all Service equities are addressed but is too slow and cumbersome when applied to unique space systems. The establishment of an Executive Agent for Space is a positive development to bring together these inherently joint and interagency

capabilities but the current processes are immature. These processes will continue to evolve and will further enhance the Army's equities in space.

Are you satisfied with the current level of effort in the Army related to space programs? Do you believe these efforts have the right focus?

As the importance of space programs increases across the DoD, we need to continually keep pace within the Army to ensure that we fully leverage these capabilities. Some of our capabilities are one of a kind, and we are working to ensure we can maintain the capabilities needed to support our forces. The Army's Senior Space Council, comprised of two- and three-star generals with vested interests in space, monitor Army efforts related to space programs and are chartered to ensure Army space needs are addressed. In addition, the Army is developing a cadre of Space professionals by leveraging joint education resources.

The Army currently defines its space career field as a subset of the information technology career field. Do you believe the information technology career field structure is adequate to support Army space interests?

Although Space Officers are managed in the Information Operations technology career field, they are individually managed by a dedicated Space assignment officer. This structure ensures the space officers receive the necessary guidance and developmental assignments.

Do you believe that the space career fields of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be integrated?

While we continue to strive to achieve greater jointness and integration in space operations, I do not believe that the Services space career fields should be integrated. Addressing the Army only, I believe that we need a core of space professionals that deeply understand Army needs, doctrine, and operations.

Does the Army plan to assign personnel to the new Operational Responsive Space Office?

Yes, the extent and at what rank will be decided as the office design is finalized. The Army considers the ORSO a key emerging space office and is actively participating in the development and expects to play an integral part in the long-term operation.

Detainee Treatment Standards

Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

I fully support the policy set forth in the Deputy Secretary of Defense England's OSD July 7, 2006, memorandum.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Compliance with the humane treatment standards specified in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is fully consistent with effective U.S. military operations, and with Army values.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

The Army, as the primary force provider to CENTCOM, has developed a robust training program to ensure that all U.S. forces involved in detainee and interrogation operations are aware of their obligations under U.S. and international law, as well as the implementing DoD policies. All personnel receive the statutorily mandated annual law of war training from legal professionals. This training includes instruction on the humane treatment standards specified in Common Article 3. The Army has also developed detailed training programs for all personnel, military and civilian, deploying to perform detainee and interrogation operations. In addition, regular semiannual assessments of detainee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are conducted to ensure that operations are compliant with policy and doctrine. Additionally, the Army is developing an enhanced pre-deployment training program for officers slated for detention center operations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff, Army?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.

Implementation of Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/ Chief Financial Officer:
 - a. Utilized the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process to ensure that needed National Guard civil support capabilities identified by the Department of Homeland Security and validated by the Department of Defense are consistent with priorities established in the Defense Planning Guidance.

2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Commander, U. S. Northern Command, as required, the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command and the Commander, U. S. Southern Command, and with the support of the Director for Administration and Management and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau:
 - a. Revise the Charter of the National Guard Bureau. These Changes to the charter will ensure that the National Guard Bureau becomes the focal point for the National Guard matters at the strategic level, but will in no way diminish the title 10 statutory responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. The charter shall be amended to specify the following responsibilities and functions:
 - (1) The Chief of the National Guard Bureau serves as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters involving planning, operation and integration for the non-federalized National Guard forces, and other matters as the Secretary determines appropriate.
 - (2) Establish an advisory relationship between the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commanders for the United States, commensurate with the mission requirements of the combatant commanders.
 - (3) Provide for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to communicate directly with the heads of DoD components and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistants on National Guard matters, keeping the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force informed on communications as they pertain to their respective service.

- (4) Support the development and integration of operational concepts, capabilities and plans for National Guard domestic operations for the combatant commanders for the United States as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
 - (5) In accordance with applicable law, coordinate, support and monitor the employment of non-federalized National Guard forces with appropriate combatant commander, other federal agencies when the National Guard forces are supporting those agencies, and the National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters.
 - b. Initially, the revised charter will be prepared as a directive-type memorandum, pending publication of the charter in the DoD Directives System.
- 3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
 - a. Ensure that National Guard and Reserve general and flag officer have the opportunity to serve in joint assignments, obtain joint experience, and acquire joint assignments, obtain joint experience, and acquire joint qualifications to compete for positions for which the grade of Lieutenant general/vice admiral (09) or general/admiral (0-10) is authorized.
 - b. Ensure that the nomination process contains the requirements to consider National Guard and Reserve officers for assignment to commands and other senior joint and service positions at all combatant command and other senior joint and service positions throughout the command and staff structure.
- 4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the commander, U.S. Northern Command, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Chief, National Guard Bureau:
 - a. Draft an executive order establishing a Council of Governors to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security on homeland security issues, matters involving the National Guard of the various states, and other matters of mutual interest.
 - b. Submit an annual report to Congress describing those civil support requirements generated by the Secretary of Homeland Security and those validated as well as executed by the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments.

5. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, the chiefs of the Reserve components, the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Director for Administration and Management:
6. Revise the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Department of Homeland Security on the exchange of personnel. The revised MOA will ensure that Department of Defense personnel with significant knowledge and experience in National Guard and Reserve matters are detailed to the Department of Homeland Security and that personnel detailed from the Department of Homeland Security have the opportunity to enhance their knowledge of National Guard and Reserve capabilities. The exchange program should also include involvement in planning, training and exercises that could assist in validating requirements for federal civil support missions.