

Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, U.S. Army
Nominated to be Assistant to the President/
Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan

Responsibilities

**What are the responsibilities of the position for which you have been nominated?
What will be your responsibility for analyzing and evaluating requirements and policies and making recommendations to the President about:**

- **increasing, sustaining, or reducing U.S. force levels in theater;
deployed force readiness, manning, equipment availability/cross
leveling/prioritization, modernization, and supply;**
- **operation and maintenance funding levels, prioritization and cash
flow necessary to support continued operations in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF);**
- **task distribution between and among federal agencies operating in
support of OIF and OEF; and**
- **command and control relationships between and among federal
agencies in support of OIF and OEF.**

Reply:

Position description:

Goal: Establish a full-time senior manager for implementation and execution of the President's strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan and to manage the interagency policy development process for Iraq and Afghanistan and to help develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Mission:

- To support our civilian and military leaders in the field, in turning the President's new strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan into a prioritized set of defined implementation and execution tasks with clearly assigned responsibility, deadlines, performance metrics (as appropriate), and a system of accountability to ensure progress toward accomplishing those tasks.
- To manage the process of implementation and execution of those tasks among Washington departments and agencies working through the appropriate Cabinet secretaries and Agency heads to help ensure full and prompt Washington support for accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for Iraq and Afghanistan.
- To manage the interagency policy development process for Iraq and Afghanistan policy and to help develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Authority:

- Report directly to the President as the Assistant to the President / Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. He is charged by the President to:
 - Request and receive from Cabinet secretaries and Agency heads information, personnel, and additional resources/assistance needed to carry out successfully the President’s strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - Receive and obtain fulfillment of requests from civilian and military leaders in the field for assistance and support in accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for Iraq and Afghanistan.
 - Provide “quick look” assessments on the issues identified by the President, reporting back to the President, and carrying out any guidance given by the President working through the appropriate Cabinet secretaries and Agency heads.
 - Investigate implementation/execution issues and problems on his/her own authority to identify and remedy the problems identified working through appropriate Cabinet secretaries and Agency heads.
 - Manage interagency policy development and helping to develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In summary, work at the direction of the President to execute policy and assist in the development of future policy within the established NSC process for both Iraq and Afghanistan, in direct support of the US officials in the field. In policy execution, emphasize setting priorities, focusing resources, following through, and adapting as conditions change.

Authority

What authority will you have to fulfill the responsibilities of the position to which you are being appointed? What will be the process for translating your analysis or evaluations of requirements, policies, and recommendations to the President into executable directives or orders for cabinet level officials and federal agencies to carry out? What is your authority to direct Federal departments or agencies to provide personnel or resources in support of U.S. operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will you be responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those directives and orders within the Executive Branch, and, if so, by what process will you do so? Do you believe that the authority of this position will be commensurate to the responsibilities and the objectives it is being given?

Reply:

- See position description above. The position is an advisor and coordinator, without directive authority beyond a small staff. In such a role, the ability to move policy forward has less to do with than other factors, such as: Presidential direction and support, acceptance by other policy Principals, broad commitment to a common cause, cultivated interpersonal relationships, personal integrity, and meaningful results.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the position to which you are being appointed to the following offices:

The Chief of Staff to the President

Reply:

- As one of several Assistants to the President, this position requires close coordination with the Chief of Staff.

The National Security Adviser

Reply:

- This position calls for close coordination with the National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional policies. Further, as a Deputy National Security Advisor, this position is part of the NSC structure and can call on the resources of the NSC staff.

The Deputy National Security Adviser

Reply:

- This position calls for close coordination with the Deputy National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional policies.

The Secretary of Defense, The Secretary of State, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reply:

- This position coordinates both policy development and execution with these principals of the National Security Council.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reply:

- When the VCJCS stands in for the CJCS as a principal of the National Security Council, this position coordinates both policy development and execution with the VCJCS.

The Commander, U.S. Central Command; The Supreme Allied Commander Europe; The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; The Supporting Combatant Commanders; The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Reply:

- This position is designed to support US military and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan primarily by coordinating with the Department Secretaries and employing the existing chains of command and authority between Washington and the field.

The Service Secretaries; The Service Chiefs

- This position is not intended to interact routinely with these officials. Any interaction would be through Department of Defense.

Qualifications

You will be entering this important position at a critical time for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Reply:

- Throughout my 32-year military career, I have served repeatedly in operational assignments requiring interagency coordination including three tours on the Joint Staff in Washington, two tours in the Middle East, and peacekeeping duties in the Balkans. I have studied complex international crises over the past 20 years including taking an advanced degree from Harvard University and serving on the faculty at West Point with teaching assignments in this area.
- I have recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, including 2 years (2004-2006) as the operations officer (J3) for US Central Command and the last year as Director of Operations (J3) on the Joint Staff.
- I am professionally and personally committed to our troops and civilians in the field.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan? What plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Reply:

- The key challenge is to harness and integrate the resources of the Government to meet the needs of our leaders in the field, in both policy execution and policy development.

Most Serious Problems

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the interagency process that the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan is intended to correct? What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Reply:

- The purpose of this position is to build on the collective desire to promote our national security interests in the region being mindful of the challenges facing the men and women on the ground. In practical terms, this will mean taking a sober view of where we are now and focusing fully on the needs of Iraq and Afghanistan, even though there is a full range of competing global commitments. This position brings senior, full-time, dedicated focus on these two wars within the NSC staff.

Appropriate Grade

Do you believe that serving in the position to which you are appointed as a lieutenant general makes it more difficult to perform the functions of the office when dealing with cabinet officials and higher ranking officers? How do you intend to fulfill your responsibilities when dealing with officials of higher positions?

Reply:

- See earlier answer.

Iraq

What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq? From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Reply:

- One year into the Maliki government we face persistent violence, insufficient progress in governance and the economy, and unhelpful influences from Syria and Iran. I believe it is too early to draw up a list of strategic lessons from this ongoing experience; time will judge. This position is designed to focus on where we are now and how to forward to secure US interests.

What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact? What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Reply:

- I believe we must put the conflict in Iraq in a broad, regional context centered on long term US interests, including defeating al Qaeda, supporting our key regional partners, and containing regional threats.

What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year? Press reports indicate that you opposed the “surge” strategy during policy deliberations prior to the President’s decision. Is that true, and if so, why? Have events to date validated or invalidated your concerns, if any?

Reply:

- I participated in the policy review prior to the President’s decision to adjust course in January 2007. During the review I registered concerns that a military “surge” would likely have only temporary and localized effects unless it were accompanied by counterpart “surges” by the Iraqi Government and the other, non-military agencies of the US Government. I also noted that our enemies in Iraq have, in effect, “a vote” and should be expected to take specific steps to counter from our efforts. The new policy took such concerns into account. It is too soon to tell the outcome.

Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one? Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution? Do you believe that

quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Reply:

- There is no purely military solution in Iraq, nor is there a purely American solution. Ultimately the outcome depends on a political solution to rejecting violence and sharing power among all the parties within Iraq. Improved security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this to happen. Suppressing violence in Baghdad can provide time and space for a political solution.

What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?

What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe that will have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?

What is the present status of the Iraqi government's efforts to meet the political benchmarks, including the Constitutional Review Committee's recommendations; legislation on de-Baathification; legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources; legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections; legislation addressing amnesty; and legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program?

What is the present status of the Iraqi government's efforts to meet the political-military benchmarks, including ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces; establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan; and allocating and spending \$10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis?

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of political progress made by Iraqi leaders? Do you believe that the above listed political and political-military benchmarks are appropriate for that purpose?

What is the present status of the Iraqi government's efforts to meet the military benchmarks, including providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations; providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, to include the authority

to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias; ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law; reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security; establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; and increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently?

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of the progress made by Iraqi leaders on the military benchmarks? Do you believe that the above listed military benchmarks are appropriate for that purpose?

Reply:

- I believe the Iraqi Government intends to meet its commitments. Progress towards publicized benchmarks in the past 5 months, however, has been uneven. On the security front the Iraqis have made substantial progress on their commitments, while political and economic steps have lagged behind. This position is designed to keep us all focused on the same benchmarks, integrate the political-economic-military dimensions of the policy, and plan far enough in advance to account for various potential outcomes. Policy execution and policy development, of course, will rely heavily on inputs and assessments from the field.

With regard to the recent “surge strategy,” what role will you have in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to draw down/redeploy? What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?_How would you craft an “exit strategy” for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long term?_What is the state of planning for such an “exit strategy?” If none has begun, will you order that such planning immediately begin?

Reply:

- This position includes advising the President during the development of policy in Iraq as well as Afghanistan. This process will involve the Principals of the National Security Council and will be informed by assessments from the field.

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the capability of Iraqi Security Forces to take on more of the security responsibilities? What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?

Reply:

- Given the central role of development of the ISF in our strategy, I expect to monitor closely progress in its ability to assume increased responsibilities for the security of Iraq. This progress will rely heavily on assessments from MNF-I and

its subordinate, MNSTC-I, as well as from other outside experts such as the independent commission called for in recent legislation.

In the fiscal year 2007 defense authorization and appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq. Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq's oil resources? If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?

Reply:

- Is it not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic relationship with the Iraqi government, as it does with many governments in the region and around the world.

Afghanistan

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?

Reply:

- Overall progress is steady, but slow, and in parts, uneven. The Government of Afghanistan has limited capacity to influence events outside Kabul. The security situation is stable in some parts of the country, despite increased Taliban activity elsewhere, including the use of suicide bombings. NATO forces have set back the Taliban efforts to gain momentum in the south this year by preemptive offensive operations and the killing of the top Taliban commander, Mullah Dudallah Lang. Yet, the Taliban enjoy relative safe haven in the border regions of Pakistan.

What is the status of efforts to develop and field an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force? What is your assessment of the readiness of these forces to conduct independent operations?

Reply:

- Progress with the ANP is steady with a number of ANA battalions fighting effectively alongside NATO and US forces; however, they are not yet ready to operate independently. The ANP lag behind the ANA in all areas.

What is your assessment of the progress of counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan?

Reply:

- Our counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan are effective. Yet, we know that this is only dimension of this complex situation. An over-reliance on one measure – for example, precise counter-terrorist strikes – will not solve the problem. We must bring together the multiple strands of effective policy to have an sustainable, enduring impact.

Are NATO members providing a sufficient level of troops and equipment for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to carry out its security mission throughout Afghanistan? What can be done to address any shortfalls in troops or equipment needed to carry out NATO's Afghanistan mission and to eliminate any national restrictions on the use of troops contributed to this mission?

Reply:

- The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has identified shortcomings in NATO forces and national restrictions that inhibit the flexibility of NATO commanders to employ forces across Afghanistan. These issues are being addressed as priorities within NATO channels. While these shortcomings need to be eliminated, they do not jeopardize the mission.

Do you believe there is a military solution to the situation in Afghanistan, or does success in Afghanistan depend on a political solution? In your view, what additional military or other assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically viable nation? What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take to improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near-term?

Reply:

- As in all counter-insurgencies, the solution in Afghanistan will be political, not military. Most important at this stage is to bring increased coherence to the multiple dimensions of the mission -- governance, economic, and security -- by better integrating the NATO mission, the US missions, and the efforts of the international community.

Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban and Al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased two-fold, and in certain areas three-fold, since last September when the Pakistan Government signed an agreement with tribal elders in the Waziristan region ceding control over some border areas in western Pakistan. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan? In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent these cross-border incursions? What role do you believe U.S. forces should play in preventing cross-border incursions?

Reply:

- Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaeda have relative sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new position.

Afghanistan is in the Central Command's area of responsibility. EUCOM oversees the NATO ISAF force in Afghanistan. In your view, does this "seam" present any problems for the coordination and effectiveness of the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan?

Reply:

- The division of responsibilities between CENTCOM and NATO are clear. Coordination measures are in place and working.

News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths during the past few months resulting from U.S. airstrikes or counter-terrorism operations. It has also been reported that these civilian deaths have become a Taliban propaganda tool and generated tensions between U.S. commanders and NATO commanders who do not want to be blamed for deaths resulting from U.S. operations. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths may be undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to address this issue?

Reply:

- This is a serious issue that is central to the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan which intends to protect the people of Afghanistan. The NATO and US commands in the field take every measure to minimize the potential for civilian casualties; however, these measures cannot eliminate the risks completely. Also, the enemy employs deliberate tactics such as seeking refuge among civilians that complicate our efforts.

Counter-drug Strategy

In November 2006 the UN and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan, which included recommendations regarding the counter-drug policy. Have you read these reports? What is your opinion of their conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the effectiveness of international efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and trafficking? Do you believe that eradication is effective? Should international military forces have an explicit counter-drug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?

Reply:

- The counter-drug effort is an integral part of our strategy in Afghanistan, not only because the narcotics trade helps to finance the insurgency but because it undermines progress in nearly every dimension of our governance-economic-security strategy. I have reviewed the reports mentioned here and agree that a long-term, comprehensive approach is required. If confirmed, I will consider the counter-drug aspect of the campaign in Afghanistan as one element leading to overall success and seek to improve its integration with the other pillars of the strategy.

If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan? What would be the impact on the coalition counter-insurgency effort? What can DOD and the military do – via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other means – to support the counter-drug efforts of other agencies in

those areas? What is your view regarding the desirability and feasibility of licensing poppy cultivation to produce legal opiates, similar to programs in Turkey and India?

Reply:

- The tactics involved in countering the narcotics trade – eradication, targeting the drug lords, alternative crops, employing the PRTs, licensing cultivation, etc. -- must derive from the strategy that takes into account all dimensions of the campaign. Our challenge is to integrate more effectively these dimensions given the international division of responsibilities within Afghanistan. There is much work to be done here, mainly by civilian agencies rather than the military.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

In your view, what is the appropriate source of funding for the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan? Which department or agency in the Executive Branch should administer the funding and oversee the activities of the PRTs? Are current staffing levels for the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan sufficient? What will be your responsibility with regard to ensuring that U.S. departments or agencies are providing the appropriate military and civilian personnel to fully staff PRTs?

Reply:

- As PRTs are a cornerstone of interagency integration at the tactical level in Iraq and Afghanistan, their priorities, manning, funding and effectiveness will be a matter of concern to this new position. They represent a key means of extending support for governance and economic progress to the provinces and deserve priority attention.

In your estimation, how should determinations be made for PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan regarding what types of projects should receive the highest priority for development and reconstruction activities? Should PRTs give priority to small-scale efforts to repair and develop infrastructure which bolster short-term employment?

Reply:

- Project priorities should be set in the field to ensure close integration with the other elements of the campaign plan and account for local conditions that can vary widely from one province or district to another.

Pakistan

What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation? What is your assessment of the level of cooperation we have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?

Reply:

- Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaida have relative sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new position.

Iran

What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the region? Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region? Do you believe it is important to continue to engage Iran in discussions regarding improving the security situation in Iraq and to seek Iran's cooperation with respect to the situation in Iraq?

Reply:

- Iran is one of the most important regional actors with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore must be taken into account as we execute current US policy and develop future policy. This new position will require close coordination with other elements of the NSC and across the Departments to ensure our policies take a regional perspective that includes Iran.

Iraqi Refugees

The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3 million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. What is your assessment of the refugee crisis in Iraq? Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military and/or civilian agencies should play a role in addressing this crisis? Should the U.S. be doing more to track the movement of Iraqis who worked on weapons of mass destruction programs and to help them find legitimate scientific employment in Iraq or elsewhere?

Reply:

- Refugees are a major concern because of the human suffering involved, the potential for destabilizing neighbor states, and the drain of talent from Iraq. Primary responsibility for refugees lays with international organizations to which the US provides support.

Detainee Treatment Standards

Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DoD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Reply:

- Yes.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Reply:

- Yes.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective counter-insurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Reply:

- Yes.

How will you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Reply:

- Compliance by US forces with appropriate laws and directives is the responsibility of the US military chain of command. If confirmed, I would raise any issues of concern at the highest levels for appropriate action.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Reply:

- During my service as the J-3 to the JCS I have always honored my obligations to this Committee to offer testimony when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the Office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand that these principles have applied to all other active duty military officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior Administrations.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Reply:

- Yes. If, consistent with the limitations indicated in response to the question above, I were to testify before any duly constituted committee of Congress, any response I provided to a question, including a question seeking my personal views, would be truthful.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and

Afghanistan? Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Reply:

- Please refer to the answer above addressing the principles generally applicable to senior advisors to the President.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Reply:

- Please refer to the answer above addressing the principles generally applicable to senior advisors to the President.