Advance Questions for William Ostendorff
Nominee for the Position of Principal Deputy Administrator
National Nuclear Security Administration

Duties

Section 3213 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (NNSA Act) states that the Principal Deputy Administrator shall be appointed "from among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the Administration in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States."

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

My background and experience are well suited for the performance of duties as Principal Deputy Administrator. In 1975, I was personally selected by Admiral Rickover to serve in the nuclear power program and did so for over twenty years as a career submarine officer. I have served on six nuclear submarines, with sixteen years of sea duty, with significant responsibilities for both the operation and maintenance of nuclear reactors and for the operational readiness of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Having served as the Engineer Officer and Commanding Officer of nuclear attack submarines, I have years of experience in dealing with complex nuclear issues, a background that is directly relevant to the technical duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator.

In the area of organizational management, I have had two significant leadership positions in the Navy that are relevant to the Principal Deputy Administrator position. First, I have served as the Commanding Officer of a nuclear attack submarine squadron with responsibilities for eight nuclear attack submarines, a floating drydock, and a support staff encompassing over 1200 individuals. Working with my staff, our job was to help the individual submarine commanding officers and their crews achieve success by providing tailored training, mentoring, and maintenance support. Second, I served as Director of the Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval Academy, responsible for five academic departments and over 160 faculty, over two-thirds of whom had Ph.D.'s in mathematics or science. Both assignments required the clear articulation of policy and effective, routine communications on many fronts, a role I see as integral to the Principal Deputy Administrator position.

Finally, for the past three and one-half years, I have served as counsel for the House Armed Services Committee as the staff director for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee where I have gained a deep appreciation for the issues facing both the NNSA and the Department of Energy, as well as the role of congressional oversight.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

While I am confident that my experience has prepared me for the duties of Principal Deputy Administrator, I recognize that if confirmed, I will have much to learn. From day one on the job, I would spend a significant amount of time learning about both the organization and its people, at headquarters and at the site offices, in order to become a better leader and manager. One concrete action that I intend to focus on if confirmed would be to establish and sustain clear and unambiguous communications with a number of entities: the NNSA federal workforce; the contractors who operate the production plants and the national security laboratories; the Department of Energy; other federal agencies; state and local governments and communities, and the Congress. I have spent years at sea "walking around" talking to sailors in my crew--I expect to build upon that practice if confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator.

Section 3213 also states that the Principal Deputy Administrator "shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the Administration."

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would prescribe to you?

If confirmed, my overarching responsibility would be to work with the Administrator to provide solid leadership and management within NNSA. As Principal Deputy, there are a number of duties that I anticipate the Administrator would assign to me:

- Serving as the Chief Operating Officer of NNSA, responsible for the day to day operations of its staff both at headquarters and at the site offices, including leading the federal workforce in overseeing the administration of the management and operating contracts for the nuclear weapons production facilities and national security laboratories.
- Serving as the first line manager for NNSA senior managers in headquarters and the field.
- Leading the Management Council (senior headquarters and site managers) and working with the council to coordinate activities between Headquarters and site offices.
- Serving as the Central Technical Authority for NNSA.
- Serving as the senior NNSA liaison with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Major Challenges and Problems

What is your understanding of the role that you will play in the overall administration of the NNSA, in the event that you are confirmed?

In the event that I am confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would expect to run the day-to-day operations of NNSA for the Administrator, working with the NNSA headquarters and site office personnel to execute NNSA's mission. I see an essential aspect of that role as working directly with NNSA's Deputy and Associate Administrators, and with the NNSA site office managers.

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy Administrator?

The first is the leadership challenge of ensuring that NNSA management works together as a smooth, effective team on a daily basis to execute NNSA's national security mission. This requires both the clear articulation and consistent execution of the role of federal oversight at headquarters and in the field. I believe it essential for senior NNSA leaders to continually invigorate the highly talented federal workforce with a purposeful sense of mission and esprit de corps.

Second, the recurring safety and security incidents in the complex are of significant concern. One significant component of this problem is directly related to the first challenge, which is exercising the role of federal oversight as intended when NNSA was created. Other factors have been noted in a number of both internal and external reviews. The protection of special nuclear material and nuclear weapons design information against physical and cyber security threats goes to the core of NNSA's mission and is an on-going challenge.

The third challenge is advancing the transformation of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex. Complex 2030, the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure, is critical to national security. The process is currently underway to complete a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Complex 2030 in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Nuclear Weapons Council also recently announced their selection of a design for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). RRW design definition and cost studies will help inform the Administration and Congress as to how to proceed for the future in a manner consistent with the RRW program objectives contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. I would expect to thoughtfully evaluate the results of both the Complex 2030 NEPA process and the RRW design definition/cost studies as NNSA moves forward with plans to transform the complex.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If I am confirmed, I would seek to instill a sense of enthusiasm and dedication to the NNSA mission as Principal Deputy Administrator. NNSA, both at headquarters and at the site offices, has a tremendously talented workforce. I see my role as working with the NNSA leadership team to ensure that there are clear standards and expectations for the federal workforce in performing its oversight function and then to get out and "look and listen" to see how things are going based on both my observations and those of the Administrator.

With respect to safety and security, I have already noted the importance of federal oversight. I will also add that careful, objective monitoring of the performance of the management and operating contractors is critical to improvement in these areas. Holding contractors accountable for adherence to standards is integral to the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Administrator. In the area of protecting our nuclear weapons design and other sensitive national security information, I would expect to carefully evaluate federal staffing at the site offices to ensure they have personnel with the requisite technical and security backgrounds to perform effective oversight of security practices. I would also anticipate reviewing NNSA security policies to see where they may be improved.

With respect to working with NNSA leadership on advancing complex transformation, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the PEIS and RRW evaluations were thorough and kept on schedule. I would also work to ensure that the processes evaluating Complex 2030 transformation (including the associated NEPA process) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead are transparent (consistent with security requirements) and that the communications strategy is both precise and closely coordinated with the Department of Defense. This strategy requires ensuring that the congressional committees are kept informed and that NNSA is responsive to questions and concerns.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator?

I believe that being successful as the Principal Deputy Administrator will require clearly communicating to the federal workforce what is expected of them and ensuring that they have the right cadre of skills and appropriate resources to perform their oversight mission. I also consider as essential the building of a work environment where all personnel feel that they are part of a team performing a mission vital to national security.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I would immediately work to establish myself as an effective leader within NNSA. A first step here would be to meet with the federal workforce, both at Headquarters and in the field, to learn more about NNSA and how it executes its mission. Another critical management step is to foster clear and effective communications, both

within NNSA headquarters and with the field offices, to establish an environment where all are working together as a member of an integrated team. Reviewing the safety and security posture and associated corrective actions underway is an urgent task and one that I would hope to have a firm grasp of within three months of assuming responsibilities as Principal Deputy.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Administrator?

If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on ensuring that the federal workforce is effectively performing its oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly executing its mission, especially in key mission areas such as physical and cyber-security. I would anticipate reviewing how the site offices assess contractor performance as well as how this assessment and other contractor performance information is communicated to and evaluated by headquarters. This review also would require a careful evaluation of whether the resources within the federal workforce, especially in technical and security areas, are adequate to perform the oversight mission. Along with the review of site office oversight, I would expect to assess how clearly headquarters communicates its expectations on what is expected of oversight to the site offices as well as what headquarters can do to better mentor and support the site offices.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs with the following Officials:

A. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy

Under the NNSA Act, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, can direct the activities of NNSA. In addition, the Secretary sets policy for NNSA and NNSA implements it. Under the Department of Energy Organization Act, the authority of the Secretary may be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Energy. As Principal Deputy Administrator, I expect the Administrator would rely upon me to work directly with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on issues in their areas of responsibility. Although the NNSA Act establishes a clear chain of command between the Administrator and the Secretary (or Deputy Secretary), it does not limit my ability or responsibility to communicate, cooperate, and coordinate with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and other senior officials in DOE.

B. The Administrator of the NNSA

The Administrator is the direct supervisor of the Principal Deputy. He sets priorities for the Principal Deputy and serves as the common superior to resolve any disputes between the Principal Deputy and the other Deputy Administrators. He is also responsible for ensuring that NNSA achieves the missions and priorities set by the Secretary.

C. Other Deputies in the NNSA

The other deputies are direct reports to the Principal Deputy who is their first line supervisor providing coordination, integration, and oversight of their performance.

D. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

The Principal Deputy works with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) in ensuring that NNSA supports and facilitates the cleanup of legacy waste and contamination at NNSA sites. The Principal Deputy coordinates EM's work at NNSA sites with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

E. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs also serves as the Executive Secretariat for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The NNSA representative to the NWC is the Administrator and, if confirmed, I will, along with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, provide support to the Administrator in this critical role. The Assistant also chairs the subordinate committee to the NWC known as the Standing and Safety Committee which reviews nuclear weapons safety issues and makes recommendations to the NWC. The NNSA Office of Defense Programs has personnel who serve on the Standing and Safety Committee.

F. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is a joint DoD-NNSA body established to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two agencies in fulfilling their dual responsibilities for nuclear weapons stockpile management. The Administrator is NNSA's representative to the NWC, which is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The Principal Deputy supports the Administrator in his role as a member of the NWC and may act on his behalf with the Chairman of the NWC in the Administrator's absence. As Chief Technical Authority within NNSA, the Principal Deputy may interact with the NWC on technical issues.

G. The Commander of United States Strategic Command

The Commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the central customer at the Department of Defense for the work of NNSA. Along with the three national security laboratory directors, he provides his judgment annually on the certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile along with the Nuclear Weapons Council to the Secretary of Defense. I expect the Administrator would direct me to support routine interactions with the Commander of STRATCOM and his staff regarding military requirements and stockpile size and composition.

H. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements is **t**he Air Force directorate with responsibility for policy and strategy for Air Force nuclear weapons operations and requirements, including arms control activities ranging from treaty negotiation support to implementation and compliance. The current incumbent is Lieutenant General Carrol Chandler. This office is the Air Force lead for activities to counter the proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapons directorate of the Navy is divided into policy and technical organizations. The policy organization is the Strategy and Policy Branch within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Rear Admiral Philip Cullom is the current incumbent. He serves as the principal advisor on national/naval policy matters and National Security Council (NSC) policy issues; and to advise and implement national policies with respect to nuclear weapons, strategic programs and arms control initiatives. The Navy's nuclear weapon technical organization is Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), currently led by Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson. The Director of Strategic Systems Programs is responsible for all research, development, production, logistics and support of the Navy's Trident Missile Weapons Systems.

I would expect to have on-going working relationships with these service offices, primarily through the NWC's Standing and Safety Committee.

I. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations

The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the corporate management and oversight of NNSA's facilities management policies and programs, project management systems, and office of environmental projects and operations. I would expect daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight and to resolve any issues that may arise between Headquarters and site managers, and to ensure the vitality of the industrial and laboratory infrastructure of NNSA. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the

establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.

J. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration

The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the overall business management aspects of the NNSA enterprise by providing for the financial, procurement and acquisition, human resources, information technology and day-to-day business operations of NNSA. The information technology function also includes certain responsibilities for cyber-security practices within NNSA. I would expect daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight, address concerns, and resolve any issues that may arise between Headquarters and site managers. I would expect to work closely with this Associate Administrator on staffing of the NNSA headquarters and site offices with properly qualified individuals as well as management of the Future Leaders Program. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.

K. The DOE Director of Health, Safety and Security

The Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer advises the Deputy Secretary and Secretary on all matters related to health, safety and security across the Department of Energy complex. This Office is responsible for policy development and technical assistance, safety analysis, corporate safety and security programs, education and training, and conducts independent oversight and investigations. With these broad responsibilities, if confirmed, I would expect to have regular contact with the Chief of this office. For instance, this office conducts comprehensive assessments of the security posture, both physical and cyber-security, at individual NNSA sites. I would anticipate a very close working relationship with the Chief in order to gain an external, professional perspective of how NNSA is doing in those areas he oversees and equally as important, how can NNSA improve its own internal practices in these vital areas.

L. The Undersecretary of Energy for Science and the Director of the Office of Science

I believe it is important to have a proactive working relationship with the Undersecretary of Energy for Science and the Director of the Office of Science. The DOE Office of Science is the single largest supporter of basic research in the physical sciences in the United States, and manages ten world-class laboratories. If confirmed, I would expect to cooperate with the Undersecretary to leverage work between the science and national security laboratories on disciplines of common interest such as high speed computing, high energy physics and

materials sciences. As Principal Deputy Administrator and Chief Technical Authority, I expect the Administrator would rely upon me to work directly with the Undersecretary of Energy for Science on issues in his area of responsibility.

M. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

If confirmed, I would expect that the Principal Deputy would be the senior liaison with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board on all management issues with NNSA. The Board serves a vital statutory oversight function for the NNSA complex, a role that I have come to value as a congressional staff member conducting oversight of NNSA. I would expect to have a very close relationship with the Board and to foster a positive sense of cooperation between senior NNSA management and the Board.

Management of the NNSA

What is the role of NNSA's Management Council and, if confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Council?

The NNSA Management Council provides a formal mechanism to help NNSA top managers deal promptly with cross-cutting issues and to identify opportunities for synergy across NNSA. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would be the lead official for all Management Council activities, and as such, would strive to ensure that all NNSA programs and activities are carried out in the most efficient and effective manner possible. In this capacity, I would keep the Administrator fully informed on all Council activities and make sure that the work of the Council is carried out in full consonance with his overall management objectives and policies.

Weapons Programs Work Force

If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the NNSA workforce?

If confirmed, working to retain and develop critical nuclear weapons expertise will be one of my highest priorities. The design and most other aspects of nuclear weapons require highly specialized skills that are not found outside the nuclear weapons complex but must be built on a foundation of advanced education. NNSA sites often invest years in additional training of employees. The applied use of these unique skills has proven to be the best method for both developing and then maintaining the skills within the workforce. NNSA must continue to develop its future workforce through knowledge transfer. The most efficient and reliable approach to achieve this objective is by having new hires work side-by-side with experienced specialists.

With respect to design capabilities, the laboratories have had efforts in place for some years to develop newly hired physicists and specialists in related fields into designers. For a few years, the new hires are integrated into existing teams, staffed and led by experienced designers. My understanding is that this approach has been successfully employed to develop a new cadre of designers as evidenced by the successful participation of early career designers in the Reliable Replacement Warhead designs at the laboratories.

If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are maintained in NNSA?

In 2006, NNSA committed to re-establishing an interagency effort to identify critical skills as a step towards gaining a clearer picture of the relative supply and demand for these highly trained personnel. NNSA has reached out to other agencies and to the private sector for data on these critical skills. The emphasis is on identifying those skills that are at highest risk and which, if lost, would have the greatest consequences for the ability of the laboratories and plants to carry out their missions. If confirmed, I will work within NNSA to continue and expand on this work.

In your view, what are the critical skills that are needed in the NNSA?

I understand from the NNSA that there is concern regarding the majority of the critical skills needed to support the nuclear weapons program. In 2004, the National Science and Technology Council Interagency Working Group on Critical Workforce Needs, led by the NNSA, collected data across the defense, homeland security, and intelligence communities on hundreds of critical skills and the expected difficulty in finding U.S. citizens with those skills over the next five to ten years. NNSA identified almost 400 critical skills across all laboratories and plants. NNSA has continued to make progress in developing a methodology to use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future due to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens.

NNSA experts in the field expressed some degree of concern regarding about 80 percent of the skills identified by NNSA, and significant concern regarding 50 percent of the skills identified. The concerns arise from the anticipated retirement of critically skilled workers, mainly scientists and engineers, over the next few years and the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in relevant fields. Earning a Ph.D. in these fields takes seven to ten years, and laboratories and plants often invest another two to three years in on-the-job-training. These long lead times complicate the hiring of replacements for retiring specialists.

Safeguards and Security

One of the biggest initiatives of the Department of Energy and the NNSA over the past several years has been to implement the various changes to the design basis threat (DBT) standard.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to help ensure the NNSA meets the new DBT in a timely fashion?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA meets its commitment to stay on the approved schedule for DBT compliance, stay focused on finding innovative security solutions and continue to make progress in meeting the complex transformation goals. Meeting the new DBT will require proactive steps to work with the Department to consolidate special nuclear material in a timely and responsible manner, to complete construction projects on time and on budget, and to fully understand the impacts of any security related funding shortfalls at individual sites.

How should the NNSA maintain an appropriate balance between adding security personnel and investing in force multiplying technologies and infrastructure in this area?

NNSA has maintained its security police officer staffing at about 2,400 persons in spite of significant increases in the Design Basis Threat Policy in 2003, 2004, and 2005. This is due to the deployment of early warning and detection systems around key facilities, the use of barriers to delay adversaries, providing hardened structures for key materials, and providing its protective forces with more reliable and lethal weapons systems and improved training. I think the real key to achieving further efficiencies in the NNSA physical security mission rests in the ability to reduce the overly large footprint of the nuclear weapons complex and to make strategic investments in new facilities that are built with today's security requirements in mind. One of my primary endeavors, if confirmed for this position, will be to help lead NNSA in its efforts to make the Complex 2030 vision a reality.

In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons program?

At this point, I think NNSA has made reasonable progress in developing robust physical security programs to defend against outside attacks. Continued investment in infrastructure security upgrades and complex transformation efforts will further enhance the physical security posture of the complex. The "insider threat" is one I would want to explore more fully. I understand that the Department will focus the 2008 DBT policy review on the insider threat and if confirmed, I will ensure NNSA is a strong contributor to this review.

From my congressional committee oversight work, I have concluded that there are perhaps more "unknown threats" in the cyber area than in that of physical security. I am aware that NNSA is reviewing cyber security protection requirements and using a risk-based approach to determine what is the necessary amount of funding for cyber protection. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the NNSA Chief Information Officer and the Department to evaluate the NNSA readiness and required funding to counter current and future cyber security threats.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program's progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

The fact that there has not been a technical need to recommend a nuclear test since 1992 is a testament to the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to date. However, one cannot overstate the importance of ensuring that the annual process to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile is based on a solid scientific foundation involving robust peer review and uncompromising integrity. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work hard to ensure that the key programs supporting the Stockpile Stewardship Program receive top-level management attention so as to stay on cost, on schedule, and meet program requirements.

In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

In my opinion, the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program all lead back to meeting commitments, both near-term and long-term. Near-term, I see that NNSA has an ambitious set of goals such as resuming tritium production, accelerating warhead dismantlements, and delivering First Production Units for the B61 and W76 Life Extension Programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure resources are balanced to keep our commitments to the Department of Defense, Congress, and the public. Long-term, the NNSA has a serious challenge in keeping the right set of skilled workers at the laboratories, production sites, and in the federal workforce. Keeping the workforce engaged and exercised will be essential in sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing.

Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

Yes, I fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which are 1) to sustain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; 2) to maintain a

fully capable, agile, responsive nuclear weapons complex infrastructure; and 3) to conduct research and development activities to ensure U.S. leadership in science and technology. If confirmed, I look forward to playing a key role in shaping the future of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

The NNSA and the Department of Defense have recently made a decision to explore the feasibility of a new design for use as a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).

Do you support the idea of a RRW and in your view how would such a program further nonproliferation goals of the United States?

Yes, I fully support the goals of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, and believe it furthers nonproliferation objectives of the United States in a number of ways. RRW should reduce the likelihood that the U.S. would have to resort to nuclear testing in the future. Additionally, RRW could allow further significant reductions in the number of total U.S. nuclear warheads. A strong U.S. nuclear deterrent will also assure our allies that are not nuclear weapons states that the U.S. can provide their nuclear deterrent, obviating their need to develop and deploy nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Posture Review and the Future Complex

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in January 2002, contained the Administration's plan to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 by the year 2012. These reductions were included in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2003, know as the Moscow Treaty.

Will any nuclear warheads be dismantled as a result of the NPR and the Moscow Treaty?

The Department of Defense and Department of Energy have developed a plan that achieves President Bush's goal of 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. The President's direction results in dramatic cuts to the stockpile that existed when he took office, and leads to a significant increase in total weapons available for dismantlement. While there are no provisions in the Nuclear Posture Review or the Treaty of Moscow mandating specific dismantlement of warheads, the NNSA has significantly increased dismantlements.

With the large number of refurbishment and other life extension program activities planned over the next six years, including the possibility of a reliable replacement warhead, is there enough facility capacity and are there

sufficiently qualified personnel in the NNSA workforce to also take on a large increase in dismantlement during the same time period?

Last year, the NNSA provided a dismantlement plan to Congress that identified for dismantlement warheads that were in excess of stockpile requirements. Through efforts such as the Pantex Throughput Improvement Plan, the NNSA has significantly increased weapon activities using available capacity. This has ensured the critical enduring stockpile work for life extensions and surveillance can be completed while significantly accelerating dismantlements. The NNSA has determined that it can successfully achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will evaluate how well the complex achieves its dismantlement objectives and work to ensure the sites are properly resourced for this key task.

In your view, would NNSA be able to manage an accelerated implementation of the Moscow Treaty if directed to do so?

The Moscow Treaty does not specifically identify a required dismantlement rate; it only addresses limits on the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The NNSA has already significantly accelerated dismantlements. However, there are limitations on how many operations can be done at Pantex. The current workload plan that factors in surveillance, life extension programs, dismantlements, pit packaging, and other required operations at Pantex maximizes available throughput during the next several decades. Significantly increasing the dismantlement rates at Pantex would impact accomplishment of the critical work that supports the safety, security and reliability of the enduring stockpile. Additionally, there are capacity limits across the complex on shipping, storage, component dismantlement, and material disposition that constrain total dismantlement throughput. If confirmed, I would work with Defense Programs to optimize the workload across the nuclear weapons complex, to include evaluating possible further acceleration of dismantlements.

The NPR stated as one of its priority goals achievement of a reinvigorated infrastructure across the nuclear weapons complex.

With competing budget priorities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as directed stockpile work, safety and security, and maintenance and recapitalization, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure the infrastructure continues to be consolidated, revitalized and well-maintained?

I support the NNSA's "Complex 2030" transformation goals. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work with the Administrator in optimizing the NNSA budget to achieve complex modernization and consolidation. If confirmed, I will demand accountability of NNSA personnel, both contractor and federal, as we meet near-term commitments and I would work with Congress to ensure appropriate funding for nuclear weapons complex and stockpile transformation. As Counsel to the House Armed Services Committee,

I am well aware of the limited resources available and the need to make tough decisions on competing priorities.

What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve management of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex?

I am aware generally of NNSA's initiatives to improve management of the nuclear weapons complex primarily through transforming the contract relationship with its management and operating contractors. If confirmed, and after conducting my own review of these initiatives, I would expect to continue efforts to include greater uniformity and accountability in contracts, include multi-site incentives in contracts that enhance total enterprise objectives, and provide for more effective integration across the nuclear weapons complex. As the complex is transformed to be smaller, more efficient and more affordable, accurate and timely communication of expectations, progress and issues is essential. I see one of the key roles of the Principal Deputy Administrator is to ensure that the NNSA contracts with the sites throughout the complex are well-managed and professionally executed.

The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board recommended several options to consolidate the weapons complex of the future.

If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the consolidation options being evaluated by NNSA, to ensure that modernization of facilities is being complemented by consolidation of materials and facilities as appropriate?

I am familiar with the nuclear weapons complex transformation options and material consolidation initiatives being considered by both the NNSA and the Department. If confirmed, I commit to continue to review these options as part of NNSA management; successful complex transformation and consolidation of both materials and facilities are fundamental to the success of the nuclear weapons program, and I would make them among my highest priorities as Principal Deputy Administrator.

Do you have any views on additional options that the NNSA could or should consider or evaluate that would ensure the most efficient complex of the future?

Many decisions on complex transformation must await completion of the National Environmental Policy Act process and the formulation of detailed cost studies for various transformation alternatives. I understand that during the recently completed scoping process, NNSA received nearly 33,000 comments on its environmental impact statement (EIS) for complex transformation and is considering those comments in preparing the draft EIS, which, when issued, will provide another opportunity for public review and comment. If confirmed, I would commit to conducting a thorough review of the EIS process and outcomes

to ensure that decision-making going forward is well-informed and transparent. I would anticipate working closely with the NNSA staff to carefully review the cost studies and the underlying assumptions associated with the various transformation options.

There has been some criticism that the options being considered by the NNSA, as part of the Complex 2030 Environmental Impact Study (EIS), will result in modernization in place and no facilities consolidation.

If confirmed, and after you have a chance to review the options in the EIS, if you believe that there are additional options that should be included in the EIS would you inform the committee?

Yes, if confirmed, and if I believe there are additional options for Complex 2030 that should be included in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, I will inform the committee. My understanding is that, based on comments it received, NNSA is expanding the range of transformation alternatives it will analyze in the EIS.

Facilities and Infrastructure

Upon its creation, NNSA inherited an infrastructure in need of significant repair and modernization, particularly at the nuclear weapons plants. At the request of the Department of Energy, Congress, in section 3133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2002, established the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP).

Although FIRP appears to be making good progress in revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure through elimination of maintenance backlogs, what recommendations would you make to ensure that current and future maintenance activities, under the Readiness in the Technical Base and Facilities program, are in line with industry benchmarks when FIRP is terminated, so that no additional extensions of FIRP are required?

I understand that the NNSA is committed to maintaining its facilities and infrastructure consistent with industry best practices. The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program has taken some significant steps to better align facility operations and maintenance activities with industry practices in preparation for the end of the Facilities Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP). RTBF and FIRP are working on enhancing the corporate facility condition performance measure to formalize new sustainment strategies for both categories of facilities which includes a national Work Breakdown Structure. One key aspect of efficiently allocating maintenance resources is having a clear understanding as to what happens to individual facilities as the complex is transformed- NNSA cannot afford to refurbish outdated buildings that may not be part of the future complex. If confirmed, I commit to working with the various

offices within NNSA to fully integrate facility maintenance plans and priorities with transformation plans.

The Department of Energy and the NNSA have begun to explore the possibility of using third party or other alternate financing options for construction projects.

If confirmed, would you commit to carefully review any NNSA proposal to undertake construction projects with funding approaches that deviate from the traditional line item funding approach?

Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA conducts a rigorous, detailed, and formal review and analysis of any third-party or other alternative financing proposal for construction in accordance with the procedures established by the Deputy Secretary for such proposals. To be approved, these proposals must demonstrate that they represent a sound business decision and are in the best interests of the Department and the taxpayer.

In addition, would you commit to keep Congress fully informed of any such proposals, to fully coordinate any proposal with the Office of Management and Budget, and to ensure that any such proposals include a business case documenting that any alternative financing approach is in the best interests of the taxpayer?

Yes. I will keep Congress fully informed of any such proposals and fully coordinate any proposals with the Office of Management and Budget, in accordance with the Department's policies. I will ensure that such proposals represent a sound business decision in the best interests of the NNSA and show a clear financial advantage to the taxpayer.

One of the goals of the effort to modernize the nuclear weapons complex is to reduce the number of square feet of building space.

As the NNSA proceeds with construction projects in the future would you commit to support the goal and work to include in the total project cost of any new facility the disposition of any buildings or facilities that are being replaced?

If confirmed, I will commit to work within NNSA to keep Congress fully informed of plans for Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of old facilities being replaced by new facilities, or for D&D of an equivalent amount of excess space if the replaced facilities can be refurbished in a cost effective manner. Reducing the footprint of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex is an important component of the Department's preferred approach to complex transformation known as Complex 2030. I understand that current NNSA practices do not include disposition costs for old buildings in the total project

costs for new replacement facilities. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing NNSA practices in this area.

Environmental Restoration and Waste Management

What responsibility do you believe the NNSA should have for funding, managing, and disposing of its current and future hazardous waste streams and environmental restoration?

Environmental restoration at the NNSA sites addresses cleanup of legacy contamination and waste. This work is funded and overseen by the Office of Environmental Management, and performed by NNSA contractors. It is NNSA's responsibility to assure that this work is performed in a safe, cost effective manner that meets regulatory requirements, and to ensure that such activities are appropriately integrated with other ongoing site mission activities.

As to future waste streams, these are the responsibility of NNSA. NNSA is also responsible for ensuring that current operations comply with all environmental requirements.

What specific steps do you believe the NNSA should take to negotiate programmatic responsibilities for environmental activities between the NNSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management?

Presently, DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) provides funding to NNSA sites for the EM work scope. This work includes legacy cleanup activities and the disposition of legacy waste. EM defines the scope of work and budget for projects at NNSA sites based on input and recommendations from NNSA. However, NNSA maintains authority, direction, and control as the landlord and contracting authority for EM work conducted at NNSA Sites. NNSA directs and executes the program through its management structure and Management and Operating (M&O) contractors. NNSA then reports to EM on project performance against the baseline and milestone schedules. This approach is consistent with the NNSA Act and budget direction from the Congress.

I remain committed to successful execution of the EM-funded activities at the NNSA sites and effective integration of this work scope with our ongoing mission.

If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play in this process?

If I am confirmed, my role would be to ensure that NNSA and its contractors perform EM work at our sites in an effective and expeditious manner. It is my expectation that both my NNSA staff at Headquarters and at the NNSA sites will be able to work within the existing agreements and protocols to effectively

execute the work. However, in those instances where there are issues that cannot be easily resolved, I expect to be fully engaged in resolution. To that end, I will work both with NNSA, DOE, and state and federal regulators to develop appropriate solutions.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs

In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what improvements would you recommend?

In the policy area, I fully support NNSA's expansion of nuclear nonproliferation program activities outside the former Soviet Union and if confirmed, would work with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to advance these efforts. In the area of program management, I am aware of concerns from NNSA related to the challenges that arise from having to deal with two separate funding mechanisms – one for program activity and the other for program direction. I understand that NNSA believes the current funding arrangement creates an impediment in terms of personnel management, training, travel and information technology support. If confirmed, I would work with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to gain a better understanding of this management concern and develop proposed corrective action.

NNSA has significantly expanded its work in the Megaports program in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security.

If confirmed, would you commit to keeping the Congress fully informed as to the success of, as well as any problems with this cooperative relationship?

During my time working for the Congress, I have received briefings on the Megaports program. As for the Megaports program's cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I understand that NNSA has developed a close working relationship with DHS and its various components, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). NNSA has worked closely with CBP in coordinating the implementation of the Megaports Initiative with their Container Security Initiative. With DNDO, NNSA is working closely in the development of the global nuclear detection architecture and in their evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection technologies. NNSA's success is clearly linked to that of DHS in these important areas. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work with NNSA and DHS leadership to foster a close cooperative relationship.

If confirmed, I would commit to keeping Congress informed about the status and health of NNSA's relationship with DHS.

The NNSA has responsibility for the bulk of the Federal Government's basic research on radiation detection technologies as well as other nuclear technologies, such as those used in nuclear forensics.

If confirmed, would you commit to undertake a review of the nonproliferation research and development program to ensure that it is adequately funded and fully coordinated with the activities of other federal agencies?

I understand that NNSA's nonproliferation research and development work has potential applicability to a number of federal agencies. Should I be confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I commit to reviewing the NNSA funding as well as coordination with other federal agencies in the area of nonproliferation research and development.

Materials Disposition Program

The NNSA is responsible for implementing the United States commitment to the Russian government to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium. There are many issues and challenges facing the program including the fact that it is substantially over budget. In the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed DOE and NNSA to undertake an independent cost estimate (ICE) for the plutonium disposition program and facilities.

If confirmed, would you ensure that the Congressional direction is followed?

Yes. It is my understanding that DOE will submit its response to this requirement in the near term. If confirmed, I will do my best to ensure that the NNSA complies with the Congressional direction on the plutonium disposition program in a timely fashion.

National Ignition Facility

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is scheduled to achieve ignition by 2010. In order to accomplish this goal under current funding, much of the experimental work has had to be postponed.

If confirmed, would you commit to examining any opportunities that may exist to restore experimental work at the NIF in advance of ignition?

Yes, I support the goal of ignition at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and appreciate the value of NIF pre-ignition experimental work to the Stockpile Stewardship Campaign. I understand that the NNSA is working to increase opportunities for experimental work at NIF prior to ignition consistent with

completion of NIF on its current baseline, the ignition 2010 experimental campaign, and available budget. If confirmed, I will examine opportunities to restore experimental work in advance of NIF ignition.

Nuclear Weapons Testing

Do you support the current moratorium on testing?

Yes, I support the current moratorium on nuclear testing. Supporting a vigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program and the Reliable Replacement Warhead program should reduce the likelihood in the long-term that the U.S. would have to resort to nuclear testing in the future.

Do you believe that there is a need at the present time to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to support the current stockpile or to support new or modified nuclear weapons?

No. I understand from the NNSA and the Department of Defense that there are no foreseeable requirements that would lead to a recommendation for a nuclear test for technical issues, either to support the enduring stockpile or to support the Reliable Replacement Warhead program.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Administrator?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees in a timely manner?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes