

**Advanced Questions for General William E. “Kip” Ward, U.S. Army  
Nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** As the Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), I have witnessed first-hand the importance of a broad, global perspective complemented by an integrated, joint approach that synchronizes military activities and complements them with other instruments of national power, nongovernmental agencies and our allies. At EUCOM headquarters the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) presents a model for combined, interagency cooperation. Every military service that makes up the Command works closely with a representative from the Department of State, Justice, Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and intelligence agencies to provide for the effective coordination of the interagency effort.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

**GENERAL WARD:** If confirmed, I will be carefully examining what modifications might be appropriate for this new unified command structure as AFRICOM evolves.

**Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes.

**Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?**

**GENERAL WARD:** If confirmed, I will carefully examine what modifications might be appropriate for this new unified command structure and will inform the Department and Congress, as appropriate.

**Relationships**

**Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship**

**of the Commander, U.S. Africa Command to the following offices:**

**The Under Secretaries of Defense**

**The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**The Director of the Joint Staff**

**The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

**The Service Chiefs**

**The other combatant commanders**

**The Secretary of State**

**The respective U.S. chiefs of mission**

**The respective U.S. defense attachés**

#### **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

**GENERAL WARD:** A direct command relationship between the Under Secretaries of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander does not exist. However, I anticipate that the AFRICOM Commander will regularly interact, coordinate and exchange information with the Under Secretaries of Defense on issues relating to African affairs. The Commander should directly communicate with the Under Secretaries of Defense on a regular basis.

#### **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

**GENERAL WARD:** There is not a direct command relationship between the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the AFRICOM Commander. The AFRICOM Commander and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense will work together on issues concerning Africa.

#### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman will transmit communications between the National Command Authority and the AFRICOM Commander as well as oversee the activities of the Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between a unified commander, Interagency and the Service Chiefs. The AFRICOM Commander will keep the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the AFRICOM AOR. The Commander will directly communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

#### **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**GENERAL WARD:** There is not a direct command relationship between the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, the AFRICOM Commander will keep the Vice Chairman informed on all significant issues regarding the AFRICOM AOR. The AFRICOM Commander also advises the Vice Chairman in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, co-chair of the Defense Advisory Working Group, and a member of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council specifically on all joint issues that address present and / or future joint warfighting capabilities.

#### **The Director of the Joint Staff**

**GENERAL WARD:** There will be no direct command relationship between the Director of the Joint Staff and the AFRICOM Commander. The AFRICOM Commander will work with the Director of the Joint Staff on issues related to Africa.

#### **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are employed by AFRICOM. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM.

#### **The Service Chiefs**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the organization and readiness of each respective service branch and for advising the President. However, the Service Chiefs do not have operational command authority. The AFRICOM Commander will rely upon each of the Service Chiefs to provide properly equipped and capable forces to accomplish missions in the AFRICOM AOR.

#### **The other combatant commanders**

**GENERAL WARD:** Once AFRICOM reaches Full Operational Capability (FOC), there will be a series of agreements between AFRICOM and EUCOM with regards to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Israel, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco). There will also be unique Commander-to-Commander agreements and memoranda concerning Egypt, Yemen and Gulf of Aden (between CENTCOM and AFRICOM). Formal relationships between the AFRICOM Commander and the geographic and functional Unified Commanders, like the other Unified Commanders, will derive from command authority established by title 10 USC, section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions.

#### **The Secretary of State**

**GENERAL WARD:** While there will be no direct command relationship between the Secretary of State and the AFRICOM Commander, there will be an expectation of a close working relationship between the Secretary of State and the AFRICOM Commander. Because AFRICOM is focused on Title 22 activities, there is an expectation that AFRICOM will have a much closer, more integrated working relationship with the Department of State.

#### **The respective U.S. chiefs of mission**

**GENERAL WARD:** There will be no formal command relationship between the AFRICOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for the nations of the AFRICOM AOR. In a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating and supervising all U.S. Government elements in the host nation. The AFRICOM Commander will coordinate and exchange information with U.S. Chiefs of Mission regularly on matters of mutual interest, to include engagement activities with partner militaries. In addition to the regular exchange of information with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission, it is likely that just as the Commander and Deputy Commander for EUCOM hosted regional conferences, so too might the AFRICOM Commander. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

#### **The respective U.S. defense attachés**

**GENERAL WARD:** There is not a direct command relationship between the respective U.S. defense attachés and the AFRICOM Commander. Military protocol will be exercised between the U.S. defense attaches and AFRICOM, as appropriate.

## **Qualifications**

**If confirmed, you will be the first Commander of the newly established United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

**GENERAL WARD:** I have been fortunate to serve in a number of positions that have helped prepare me for these duties – foremost among them is my service over the past sixteen months as the Deputy Commander (DCOM), U.S. European Command. In this position I had the opportunity to work with our partners in Africa and understand some of the challenges these nations face in providing security for their people, modernizing their militaries, eliminating corruption, and ensuring overall transparency in their governments. My assignment as United States Security Coordinator, Israel - Palestinian Authority allowed me to glean a unique perspective into the inner workings of the Department of State, which will be very useful given the interagency construct of this new command. Working as Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Egypt I served as a member of the Country Team under Chief of Mission authority. This experience provided me tremendous experience in the areas of security cooperation and assistance, which I will apply across the continent of Africa.

Between service as a Brigade Commander of the 10th Mountain Division during RESTORE HOPE on the Horn of Africa, followed by a tour as Commander, Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I gained hands-on experience in the conduct and management of post-conflict stability and humanitarian relief operations which are complex and dynamic. While the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR), I learned a great deal about the importance of the U.S. Army's presence in Europe and its engagement activities with NATO and partner nations in Europe. Each of these positions brought to light the need for close coordination, not only between AFRICOM and its neighboring unified commands, but also among AFRICOM, EUCOM, the African Union, and NATO.

I believe all these experiences are relevant towards understanding the nature of the security situation in Africa and effectively partnering with the Africans as they develop and implement solutions. A fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander's engagement should include careful consideration of what our partners need from the U.S. to help them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM focused on security cooperation activities with African nations, so too will AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to help solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a bright future full of promise and opportunity.

## **Major Challenges**

**In your view, what are the major challenges and opportunities that would confront you as the first Commander of AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** A fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander's engagement should include careful consideration of what our partners need from the U.S. to help them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM focused on security cooperation activities with African nations, so too will AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to help solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a bright future full of promise and opportunity for Africans everywhere. I see the establishment of AFRICOM as a wonderful opportunity to efficiently and effectively apply the elements of U.S. national power in ways that help the Africans develop and implement their solutions to African concerns. Establishing a new command and transferring responsibilities to it is complex. Three unified commands and USAFRICOM's Transition Team have been working as a team to ensure no disruption or confusion in the execution of on-going Department of Defense efforts in Africa.

**If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and opportunities?**

**GENERAL WARD:** My goal is to make the transition of operations and activities to AFRICOM's responsibility as seamless as possible. I will reinforce the excellent work currently being done on the continent and the strong relationships already established. All three combatant commands have had extensive and positive experiences working with Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and various NGOs. AFRICOM's exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance efforts across the continent must occur in ways that demonstrate value-added through its existence.

**Most Serious Problems**

**What do you anticipate to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** USAFRICOM's contributions will be seen in terms of how it directly contributes to the stability, security, health, and welfare of the regional institutions, nations, and people of Africa. It will be measured in terms of the strength, viability, and sustainment of the programs it will be expected to carry out on behalf of the U.S. government. Securing adequate resources to conduct those programs will be one of my top priorities as commander of AFRICOM.

**What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Any actions taken should be premised on better facilitating the activities of the U.S. Interagency. Additionally, USAFRICOM's value added will come by listening to the needs of our African Partners and helping to find solutions by working with the African Union and its African Regional Economic Communities (REC), our European allies and other partners and friends with a strong interest on the continent.

**Origin and Mission of U.S. Africa Command**

**Please discuss the role that you have played in the intra-Department of Defense discussions which led to the creation of AFRICOM.**

**GENERAL WARD:** I participated in initial briefings to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff concerning the potential impact on missions and activities of EUCOM's portion of the proposed AFRICOM AOR.

**Please discuss the role that you have played in the ongoing discussions with the AFRICOM implementation team and transition team.**

**GENERAL WARD:** On behalf of the EUCOM Commander, I served as a member of the Executive Committee monitoring the development of the AFRICOM Implementation Guidance that formalized the parameters, requirements, and timelines for the Transition Team's activities. I monitored the progress of the Transition Team and ensured that the Transition Team had adequate facilities prepared in Stuttgart so they could perform their mission.

**What is your understanding of the mission of AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. AFRICOM leads the in-theater DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. government and international partners, AFRICOM conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.

**What do you believe to be the pros and cons of establishing this new combatant command?**

**GENERAL WARD:** I believe the establishment of AFRICOM will add a more unified focus to the continent. Furthermore, the elimination of Unified Command Plan boundaries within Africa will position AFRICOM well to establish strong and lasting habitual relationships with our African partners (especially with the African Union), allies, and international organizations operating on the continent.

There are two aspects of one primary “con” associated with the creation of AFRICOM – the first is related to managing expectations of the benefits realized with a U.S. Headquarters locating to the Continent. The other aspect is managing the perception that a U.S. military headquarters signals a heavy handedness to the continent.

**Organizational Structure and Chain of Command**

**According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, no final decisions have been made on the organizational structure and chain of command of AFRICOM.**

**Please discuss how you envision the two Deputy Commanders – one DoD-appointed and one State Department-appointed – functioning?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Commander of AFRICOM will have two deputies: the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (filled by a senior Department of State Foreign Service officer) and the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (filled by a military flag officer). Both positions are 3-star equivalents and peer equals. Each will have primary spheres of responsibility to work in conjunction with the other. Since a State Department official cannot exercise military command under Title 10, USC, the Departments of Defense and State agreed to the title of "Deputy to the Commander" instead of "Deputy Commander" to ensure parallelism between both positions without implying that both positions have military command authority.

The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) will be responsible for directing the command's civil-military planning and programs, with emphasis on aligning USAFRICOM activity with that of other U.S. Government departments and agencies carrying out U.S. foreign policy. The Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) will be responsible to implement and execute the command's activities, including those planned and programmed by the DCMA.

**What responsibilities do you expect each deputy commander to have under his or her jurisdiction?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The DCMA will be responsible for AFRICOM policy development, resourcing, and program assessment. The DCMA will direct the command's plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian mine action, disaster response, and security sector reform.

The DCMO will be responsible for USAFRICOM operational implementation and execution. Additionally, the DCMO will exercise combatant command authority under Title 10, USC in the Commander's absence.

Because we wish to integrate activities and eliminate 'stovepipes', both Deputies necessarily will collaborate and coordinate with each other on activities within their respective portfolios. To that end, they share responsibility to develop USAFRICOM partnerships and capacity through the planning and execution of contingency and other operations (such as non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster response and peace support); joint and combined training and exercises; foreign military training and professional development; security assistance, and security sector reform.

**What authority, if any, will the State Department/Civilian Deputy have over military personnel?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Both the civilian Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) and the uniformed Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) have the authority to direct activities within their appropriate areas of responsibility. Both Deputies will have supervisory authority for civilian and military personnel in those subordinate offices and directorates for which the Deputies are responsible. Because the civilian DCMA cannot hold military command authority under Title 10, USC, the military DCMO will exercise Combatant Command in my absence. The Departments of Defense and State are comfortable with this arrangement.

Because USAFRICOM will have non-Department of Defense personnel 'seconded' or 'detailed' to the command as well as others serving in a traditional liaison role, the command, Department of Defense and the appropriate corresponding department of agency will need to establish agreements regarding the relationship between the command and the integrated non-Department of Defense staff member. We envision a similar arrangement to that already in place between the Departments of Defense and other departments and agencies for the Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) and the representatives to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). I do not believe that any statutory changes are necessary to support either position.

**What authority, if any, will the DOD/Military Deputy have over civilian personnel?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Interagency civilian personnel assigned to AFRICOM will have authorities established in agreements between the DoD and the respective agency.

**Do you believe any statutory changes are required to facilitate the proper functioning of these deputy commanders?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Departments of Defense and State have carefully reviewed the roles, functions and responsibilities of both Deputies and are confident that current authorities under Title 10 USC are adequate to support the respective duties and responsibilities for AFRICOM. AFRICOM will be in a better position to evaluate statutory sufficiency and, if appropriate, recommend any revisions or changes in the coming months.

**If confirmed, will you maintain on your staff the position of a State Department Political Advisor (POLAD)? If so, why? If not, why not?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. I view the roles and responsibilities of a senior policy advisor (POLAD) as vital to the successful completion of the commander's mission. These include providing advice on political ramifications of plans, operations, and crisis response; assisting in representation with U.S. Ambassadors and foreign officials within the area of responsibility; and keeping the commander informed on relevant authoritative foreign policy guidance. The addition of the DCMA position in AFRICOM will not duplicate these responsibilities.

**Other U.S. Combatant Commands are staffed by permanently assigned active-duty and civilian personnel. It is the committee's understanding that the Department plans to follow the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) staffing model and use, almost exclusively, short-term rotational personnel to staff the AFRICOM Headquarters.**

**In your view, do you think this staffing model is the most effective one, and if so, why?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Permanently assigned active duty and civilian personnel will be assigned to AFRICOM.

**In briefings provided to the committee, the Department has indicated that civilians from a number of U.S. Government departments and agencies will be detailed to AFRICOM.**

**What role do you envision these individuals playing in the daily operations of AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM's guiding principle will be to ensure coordination of its activity with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and, as appropriate, with foreign governmental, international, non-governmental, private and profit organizations, at early stages of the planning and execution cycle. In order to enable this coordination, AFRICOM headquarters and intent is to have an integrated staff of permanently assigned DoD (military and civilian) and non-DoD U.S. Government department and agency personnel, as well as liaison officers and staff from foreign military and civilian organizations and AFRICOM liaison personnel with duty at selected external organizations.

Non-DoD U.S. Government department and agency staff positions within AFRICOM headquarters will be at three levels: senior leadership and management positions (such as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and the directors or deputy directors of headquarters offices or directorates); senior experts in advisory or liaison capacities (such as the Foreign Policy Advisor, the Development and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, and the senior Treasury Department representative), and subject-matter experts integrated into staff positions throughout headquarters offices and directorates.

Senior expert advisors and liaison officers will represent their parent organizations to AFRICOM, advise the Commander and staff regarding parent organization and functional issues, communicate AFRICOM and parent organization issues across functional activities, and fully participate in AFRICOM headquarters planning and execution support. They derive their authority from their parent organizations.

Subject-matter experts from non-DoD U.S. Government departments and agencies will be detailed or 'seconded' to AFRICOM. These subject-matter experts are embedded within the headquarters staff at the directorate level and below in both supervisory and action officer positions after coordination with the providing organization. They derive their authority from the AFRICOM Commander as exercised within the organizational structure. Embedded officers will be fully qualified to assume the duties and responsibilities of the position prior to joining the AFRICOM staff. These officers contribute unique perspectives at the inception of AFRICOM planning and ensure that AFRICOM activities are compatible and integrated with those of other U.S. Government departments and agencies.

**Will U.S. Ambassadors to African countries maintain chief of mission authority over all U.S.**

**government activities in the countries to which they are posted, including military relations, once AFRICOM is in place?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. U.S. Ambassadors will maintain chief of mission authority over all U.S. government activities in their countries. As AFRICOM Commander, I will ensure that my senior subordinate leaders, and my representatives in Embassies (Office of Security Cooperation Chiefs) and I will ensure all military relations, activities, etc. are closely coordinated with Country Teams. We will closely coordinate all our activities with Embassy Chiefs of Mission.

**In your opinion, how will AFRICOM differ from other regional combatant commands?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The President directed DOD to establish AFRICOM, whose focus will be to build a stable security environment that will enable Africans to pursue broader goals, such as economic security. We believe that the security aspect – one part of the “three-pronged” approach – should be accomplished under U.S. Department of Defense leadership. AFRICOM will support the other two prongs, with the State Department conducting diplomacy, and the Agency for International Development carrying out development work. AFRICOM will also have elements and personnel from a variety of government organizations, which will enhance its ability to provide support in these areas.

**If confirmed, would you recommend that AFRICOM include service component commands in a manner similar to other regional combatant commands?**

**GENERAL WARD:** I believe the eventual structure of the service components should be a reflection of the scope of missions assigned. We are still developing the concept of service component commands for AFRICOM.

### **U.S. Policy Towards Africa**

**What role, if any, do you expect to play, if confirmed, in promoting U.S. public diplomacy in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will play a supporting role in advancing U.S. public diplomacy on the continent.

**What role, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to play in helping to coordinate U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, economic, and military goals and activities?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will play a supporting role in the advancement of U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, and economic goals. It will play the leading role in the advancement of U.S. military goals and activities.

**Some have asserted AFRICOM is simply an American effort to protect U.S. access to gas and oil; to fight terrorists and Islamic radicals; and to counter China’s interest and activism.**

**How do you respond to these assertions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will be primarily focused on conducting security cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, counterterrorism skills, and as appropriate supporting USG agencies and implementing other programs that promote regional stability.

### **Africa-Specific Security Challenges**

**Do you believe AFRICOM should address Africa-specific security challenges, such as preventing the use of child soldiers and countering the role of civil militias and other armed, non-terrorist elements in conflict-prone countries? If so, how?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We can help our African partners address these kinds of African-specific security challenges. Fostering a fundamental respect for the rule of law should not stop within the civilian realm. By capitalizing on our military relationships throughout the continent, AFRICOM will be able to work with partner nation militaries as a supporting role to the efforts of the Department of State in addressing these problems. By talking to African leaders and gaining an understanding of the depth and the nature of these problems, and using an interagency approach we can help build African capacities to deal with these challenges.

### **HIV/AIDS**

**How much success has DOD had in efforts to counter AIDS in African militaries?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Department of Defense (DoD) is a major player in the HIV/AIDS Interagency Country Core Team with focus on the foreign militaries. DoD prevention efforts are reducing the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and effecting behavioral changes needed to reduce HIV prevalence. In the past year, DoD reached 378,000 with prevention messages; counseled and tested 87,000; trained 2,500 on HIV policy, 9,000 peer educators, 2,400 medical staff; supported 280 counseling and testing centers, 50 laboratories, 26,000 on antiretroviral treatment.

**If confirmed, how, if at all, would you like to see such efforts increased or programmatically altered? If so, how?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will continue to build on current DoD efforts in Africa. We will continue our focus on prevention, capacity building, and support our foreign military in HIV policy development to ensure infrastructure is in place for HIV testing and counseling.

PEPFAR funding directed towards the foreign militaries has increased from \$9M in 10 countries in 2004, to \$43M in 20 countries in 2007. However, the Department of Defense Executive Agent for DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) efforts with the foreign militaries, the U.S. Naval Health Research Center, supports over 20 countries that are not receiving PEPFAR funding. DHAPP funding through Congressional plus ups to the Defense Health Program averaged \$3M annually. In 2007, DHAPP was unfunded resulting in uncertainties with DoD-initiated programs in these non-PEPFAR countries. Continued Congressional support will ensure DHAPP's continuity and program success.

**In your view, should this effort be lead by DOD or by other elements of the U.S. government?**

**GENERAL WARD:** DoD is a critical member of the Interagency team led by the Department of State, Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator that synchronizes the U.S. government response to HIV/AIDS

pandemic. DoD should continue to be the lead on the U.S. government HIV/AIDS prevention effort with the foreign militaries. The success of our partnerships with the African foreign military in the fight against HIV/AIDS will enhance national security and regional stability.

### **Development Agenda**

**What role would you expect AFRICOM to play in the area of humanitarian assistance?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will play a supporting role. The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing to humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. We recognize the significant role and capabilities of USAID as the principal U.S. agency extending assistance to countries responding to and recovering from natural or man-made disaster. The U.S. military may be involved when it provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance validates all such request for U.S. military assistance. Our role in this context will not change. We will play the supporting role when necessary and appropriate. The difference is that this command will be better prepared to respond to such eventualities and to do so better. We will have USAID staff within the command in order to help make sure that such responses when appropriate and necessary are well-planned and executed.

**What steps, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to take to enhance ongoing U.S. Government humanitarian assistance programs?**

**GENERAL WARD:** There will be a robust HA/DR branch within the command focused on Africa, which will include the participation of USAID staff. This will enable better planning and coordination of military support to humanitarian assistance efforts.

**In your view, what role, if any, should AFRICOM have in addressing ongoing political conflicts or humanitarian crises such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will take an appropriate role as directed by U.S. policy. A significant number of these existing crises will require active participation on the part of African organizations, countries, and leaders. AFRICOM will leverage traditional Theater Security Cooperation programs to develop African capacity and capability to respond to existing crises and hopefully prevent new ones from emerging.

**In what program or policy areas not strictly related to military matters, if any, do you believe AFRICOM should play a role?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in development activities than a traditional combatant command, in close coordination with agencies more directly involved in developmental activities.

**What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play in the area of development activities, which are overseen by USAID?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The command will play a supporting role, as required. We recognize that USAID is

the principal agency extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms; DOD plays a supporting role for USAID development and humanitarian objectives.

**How do you expect AFRICOM would function in countries without USAID missions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** In countries where there is no USAID presence, we would further strengthen our ties with the regional programs, work with the country team, as well as rely on USAID staff within the command to assist in the appropriate design, coordination, and execution of programs. USAID has three regional programs that cover many of the other countries where there are no missions. CJTF-HOA, for example, has been able to forge strong relationships throughout their area of operation with these regional programs in support of efforts in countries where USAID does not have a physical presence.

**How will AFRICOM coordinate its activities with those of USAID?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will provide one African focused organization to communicate and coordinate with USAID. USAID will have several staff based in the command in order to further facilitate communications and coordination, as well as to bring the necessary expertise. The establishment of the command will greatly facilitate USAID communication and coordination with the Department of Defense concerning Africa.

**U.S. Africa Command Headquarters**

**Since the Secretary of Defense announced in February 2007 the intention of the Department of Defense to create a U.S. military combatant command for Africa, there has been a great deal of debate of the location regarding this new combatant command.**

**What kind of headquarters structure do you believe is most appropriate for AFRICOM? A strong central location? A hub-and-spoke approach?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We are looking at all options and will determine appropriate options after additional analysis and dialogue with governments on the Continent.

**What are the potential overseas basing implications related to the establishment of AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We need to measure the acceptance of HQ locations in terms of the AU, sub-regional organizations, and individual nations – we need to be welcomed. Furthermore, our presence on the Continent implies a long term commitment. We will better understand this once additional analysis is concluded.

**Are permanent bases envisioned as part of the new command?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Permanent bases are not envisioned as part of the command.

**What criteria will be used to determine the size, location, and management of these locations, including the site of a permanent headquarters somewhere on the continent?**

**GENERAL WARD:** A site selection criteria was developed in coordination with the Department of State. Some of the criteria includes: political stability; security factors; access to regional and intercontinental transportation; availability of acceptable infrastructure; quality of life; proximity to the African Union and regional organizations; proximity to USG hubs; adequate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The transition team has used these criteria to narrow down potential sites. Those potential sites have been briefed to the Department of State informally and we have begun dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of those sites.

**What, if any, additional cooperative security locations does DOD hope to establish in Africa? What is the estimated cost of establishing and operating these locations?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Once established, AFRICOM will conduct in-depth analysis to determine if and where CSLs are required to meet logistics and Theater Security Cooperation engagement requirements across the African Continent.

**What, if any, plans does DOD have to expand the size of its military presence and/or facilities (temporary or permanent) at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM plans to utilize Camp Lemonier as an enduring Forward Operating Site. There are no current plans to expand the U.S. presence at Camp Lemonier. Once established, AFRICOM will conduct analysis to determine the appropriate level and capability of assigned personnel and facilities in order to meet strategic mission requirements.

### **Section 1206 Funding**

**Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, as amended, established a new program that gives the DOD the authority to spend, in coordination with the Department of State, up to \$300 million of its operations and maintenance funds to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations.**

**What is your assessment of the Section 1206 program's impact in the AFRICOM area of responsibility?**

**GENERAL WARD:** In FY06, \$11M of Section 1206 money was provided to build intelligence-sharing capacity for Pan-Sahel countries, along with maritime domain awareness systems for countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In São Tomé and Príncipe, a basic Regional Maritime Awareness Capability has been established. The full-up capability is on schedule for completion prior to 31 December 2007. The installation in Nigeria was delayed several months due to the recent change in government, but the program has resumed and is making progress. In the end, these nations will own, operate, sustain, and be able to propagate this capability without external support. This distributed partnership in maritime awareness will foster localized ownership of regionally and internationally shared maritime security.

The FY06 1206 program also included the Multi National Informational Sharing Initiative (MISI), an information sharing capacity building program in Trans-Sahara Africa – specifically Chad and Nigeria. This program greatly enhances the partner nation's ability to respond to humanitarian crises and other threats. Additionally, the technology will allow greater interoperability among the UN, U.S., and African agencies positioned to address these crises.

For FY08, Section 1206 programs will play an even larger role because AFRICOM's Foreign Military Financing budget has been reduced to \$16M.

**Recent projects funded under section 1206 authorities have provided assistance, as part of the larger East Africa Regional Security Initiative, to Ethiopia and Chad, countries with poor human rights records and a history of suppressing political opposition.**

**Why is it beneficial to provide 1206 assistance to these countries?**

**GENERAL WARD:**

Security Cooperation programs remain the cornerstone of our strategy to promote common security, which ultimately supports national security objectives. Section 1206 authority is one of the many security cooperation programs used to build relationships with countries like Chad and Ethiopia that support U.S. strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

**If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess the relative costs and benefits of proposals for 1206 funding?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Successful Section 1206 proposals are conceptualized in collaboration with other U.S. agencies, meet urgent and emergent regional security needs, and compliment existing interagency security cooperation activities.

**Section 1207 Funding**

**Section 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to use or transfer defense articles, services, training, or other support to the Secretary of State to provide immediate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security in that country.**

**What is your assessment of the Section 1207 program's impact in the AFRICOM area of responsibility?**

**GENERAL WARD:** While there are currently no 1207 being executed in Africa, funds are being pursued for FY08 to support programs in Somalia, Mali, and Niger.

**Section 1208 Funding**

**In Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave DOD a two-year authority to train and equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators.**

**What is your assessment of this program?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Section 1208 authority gives us very important latitude in our pursuit of OEF-TS objectives in where more traditional security assistance and mil-to-mil engagement authorities don't readily apply. We are currently using the program to develop an indigenous intelligence capacity in Niger. This capacity will be focused in the northwest region of the country and will fill a critical capabilities gap of the Nigerian military.

**If confirmed, how would like to see the program used in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We would continue to use the program in a fashion similar to the concept we are implementing in Niger. We are developing similar concepts for specific regions of Mali and Mauritania, and are considering others in Chad and Nigeria. I believe the flexibility this authority provides will remain useful for OEF-TS in particular for a number of years.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

**Since July 2005, NATO has helped to provide air transport for peacekeepers and civilian police from African troop contributing countries into and out of Darfur. NATO also has also provided training to African Union officers, mainly on how to run a multinational military headquarters and manage information effectively.**

**How would you envision AFRICOM interacting with NATO on operations within the African area of responsibility (AOR)?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM could assist NATO efforts on the African continent by ensuring close coordination of U.S. contributions and capabilities to NATO operations and training. NATO is uniquely suited to allow AFRICOM access to European interests and capabilities and experience on the African continent. Where authorized and appropriate, AFRICOM can provide logistical support to NATO, professional military training and engagement in conjunction with and other security cooperation and outreach efforts. If confirmed, I will strongly support continued participation of NATO's on-going Mediterranean Dialogue with North African nations.

**United Nations Missions in Africa**

**The United Nations currently has six UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The UN also maintains over 50,000 peacekeeping troops and police in Africa, and this does not include the expanded UN Mission in Sudan.**

**What role do you see AFRICOM playing vis-à-vis these UN peacekeeping missions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** UN peacekeeping missions need professionally trained peacekeepers. The African Union's stated policy is to man as many African peace support operations with African peacekeepers. To support both of these objectives, AFRICOM will continue the work begun by EUCOM and CENTCOM in assisting in the training of African peacekeepers. AFRICOM will work closely with the State Department to train African peacekeepers through the State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.

**Would you advocate expanding the U.S. military's role in support of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The decision as to the USG's level of participation in any UN peacekeeping mission will be made at the highest levels of our government. If confirmed, my objective will be to build a unified command that will respond to the level of participation required to support UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

### **Global Peace Operations Initiative**

**In 2004, the President announced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The goal of the initiative was to train 75,000 peacekeepers.**

**What role do you believe AFRICOM should have in support of this initiative?**

**GENERAL WARD:** With State Department as the executive agent, GPOI expects to train approximately 40,000 troops in AFRICOM's area of responsibility. AFRICOM will continue involvement in GPOI and ACOTA programs through existing coordination mechanisms with State Department-hosted GPOI steering conferences. Given Title 10 and 22 funding guidelines and current operations tempo, AFRICOM will also continue to provide small military teams for special mentoring assistance to State Department-contracted ACOTA training events.

**What is the prospective role of AFRICOM in ensuring that GPOI is successful in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The State Department's ACOTA program, as the GPOI peacekeeping training arm for Africa, is highly successful and is increasing its program strength and effectiveness on the continent. AFRICOM will aggressively work with State Department to resource military mentors for ACOTA training events, and will continue to reach out to European nations interested in partnering with peacekeeping training.

**In your opinion, how quickly should GPOI be able to provide basic deployment equipment packages to countries that are willing to deploy troops immediately to current peacekeeping operations, as in Darfur, but lack the resources to do so?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Through the ACOTA program, State Department maintains standing contracts to provide training equipment for long-term self-sustained training. These contracts also provide basic trainee equipment packages for individual soldiers. These packages can be used during peace support operations deployments. Operational deployment-specific equipment falls under non-ACOTA GPOI funding. However, the equipment needs of Troop Contributing Countries for peace support operations in Darfur and other anticipated operations dwarf GPOI's ability to provide the magnitude of equipment required to satisfy United Nations Contingent Owned Equipment requirements.

**In your opinion, are GPOI training efforts providing well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations?**

**GENERAL WARD:** I have personally witnessed the effectiveness of ACOTA training in Rwanda as they prepared for their deployment in support of the AU mission in Darfur. The troops I observed were well-trained and well-equipped.

U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping training is responsible for the majority of the approximately 17,000 African peacekeepers serving in on-going peace support operations. Most partners have incorporated ACOTA trainers into their long-term training programs to monitor and observe indigenous training provided by GPOI-trained instructors. The ACOTA program provides training and certifies instructors, which will be critical for future United Nations Chapter VI and VII peace support operations.

### **Technology Support for AFRICOM Missions**

**The defense research and technology community has developed a number of capabilities that are potentially supportive of AFRICOM's missions - including vaccines to combat infectious diseases, language translation systems, and cultural modeling and simulation tools and war games.**

**What specific technology-based capabilities do you feel need to be developed or improved in order to best support AFRICOM's missions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** There are several capabilities that need to be developed to best support AFRICOM missions. As stated earlier, promoting stability among African nations will be a priority for AFRICOM. The size of Africa, the length of its coast line, and the limited interior infrastructure challenges the African nations in their ability to maintain adequate air, land, and maritime awareness. To help address this shortfall, I would like to see development of technologies that provide adequate national and regional awareness of borders, coast lines and air corridors. To support regional cooperation, I believe we need to develop technology that allows for the national information collected to be shared regionally. For these technologies to be adopted by African nations, they need to be affordable, robust, and easy to use.

Another major technology challenge for AFRICOM will be the requirement, while responding to disasters or contingencies, to deliver large amounts of humanitarian supplies and/or peace keepers quickly. The current U.S. strategic lift system is limited in its capability to deliver forces and support to areas that lack mature logistical infrastructure. Technologies that would deliver units and supplies anywhere in Africa within 3 to 5 days, independent of air and sea ports or a road network, would allow AFRICOM to be responsive to shaping opportunities by providing pre-hostility support, or reaching victims of a natural disaster without having to wait for seaports, airports, or roadways to be cleared or repaired.

**If confirmed, how would you work with the defense research and acquisition community to ensure that they are aware of those needs and supportive of AFRICOM's missions?**

**GENERAL WARD:** EUCOM has already actively engaged the research and acquisition community to develop solutions for Africa-related capability shortfalls. The community is aware of the requirement sets required to support AFRICOM missions. These Concept Development and Experimentation efforts and initiatives will ultimately transfer to AFRICOM according to individual transition strategies.

#### **Technology Cooperation with Africa**

**The Department of Defense makes use of international research and technology cooperation both to increase military capabilities, especially for coalition and multinational operations, and to expand and improve ties to friendly nations. Examples include work on advanced technologies with South Africa and cooperative research activities in Egypt and Kenya.**

**What opportunities do you see for the Department to expand its research and technology cooperation activities in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The U.S. has developed R&D relationships with several African nations and AFRICOM will seek to lead continued U.S. efforts in this arena. In our quest to develop "African systems for Africans", it behooves us to partner with national industries to jointly develop technologies/systems to meet their requirements. Our African partners have a strong desire to operate and maintain their own systems, without any outside influences. Early R&D and acquisition partnering will help facilitate initial African acceptance and set the foundation for long-term transition to African owned and operated systems.

**What benefits to AFRICOM's ability to accomplish its missions might be accrued if the Department enhances its technology cooperation activities in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Building Partnership Capacity within the African regions is central to AFRICOM's strategic vision. By providing innovative technology, new concepts, and mentoring to aid information sharing, we directly influence security and stability of partner nations and surrounding regions.

### **Interagency Coordination**

**National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) assigns the Department of State the responsibility to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD 44 also states that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction and stabilization contingency plans and missions will be coordinated with U.S. military contingency plans to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations.**

**Are the new organizational constructs envisioned for AFRICOM, in whatever form is eventually decided upon, going to be able to adequately address capacity shortfalls in non-DOD organizations?**

**GENERAL WARD:** It will not be the specific task of AFRICOM to identify the capacity shortfalls in non-DoD organizations. The envisioned organizational construct for AFRICOM should provide insight into the coordinated capacity of various organizations in meeting our shared objectives.

**If not, what other steps are needed, in your view, to address this issue, and how should they be accomplished?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The purpose of USAFRICOM is to more appropriately organize the DOD to serve the continent of Africa due to its growing strategic importance. AFRICOM will provide a single point of response for DOD when it comes to African challenges.

**What do you foresee as the main bureaucratic or logistical obstacles to the success of the interdisciplinary- interagency approach planned for AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Once full and complete mission analysis is accomplished with an approved mission statement for AFRICOM, the work to enter agreements and assign resources to implement the multi-disciplinary approach will take greater shape..

**How do you plan to address these obstacles?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We have been working to develop agreements to share with various agencies and departments that may want to join the AFRICOM team. We continue to reach out to our interagency partners to conclude agreements.

**U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) formed Interagency Directorate (J9) to spearhead coordination between its interagency partners and to address quickly emerging challenges facing Central and South America and the Caribbean. Some of the command's interagency goals include: improving synchronization of operations and activities between USSOUTHCOM and other**

**U.S. Government organizations operating in this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and efficient command, engage interagency partner decision-makers, and integrate personnel from these agencies on a full time basis into the USSOUTHCOM staff. This model and its purpose seems consistent with the intentions of AFRICOM.**

**What is your assessment of the J9 model? Do you believe it would be appropriate for AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** We have looked at SOUTHCOM's J9 model and have already begun to incorporate some of the good ideas of the J9 into the Partnership Division of our Outreach Office. For example, we are designing our Partnership Division as the "portal" to AFRICOM for the interagency and outside partners, similar to what SOUTHCOM has done with its J9. We have also met with members of NORTHCOM's JIACG to hear the lessons they learned while standing up their JIACG.

### **Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership**

**The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led initiative that seeks to eliminate and prevent terrorist sanctuaries in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa.**

**Would you include this program as a part of AFRICOM's stability operations?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. Military power alone can not address the myriad of issues facing the African continent today. The USG will need to mobilize all facets of national power to counter the spread of instability by assisting our partners overcome the economic, political, and environmental conditions that have historically weakened their institutions, thereby allowing African nations to concentrate on the needs, aspirations and desires of the people. Only through the building of sustainable relationships fostered by programs like the TSCTP which fuses the capabilities of multiple USG agencies together can we build the cooperation that will assist the African states in the development of a stable and prosperous Africa. To contain and ultimately eliminate violent extremism in the Trans-Sahara the conflict will not be waged on the battlefield, but on the airwaves and in the hearts and minds of the Trans-Saharan populace. TSCTP has broadened its focus to take the battle to the enemy on the social, economic and political fronts. Spurring economic development, expanding educational opportunities, building health clinics, providing food assistance and promoting good governance are all combined to be part of a long-term public diplomacy and development campaign against radicalism.

**How do you expect the TSCTP program will be coordinated among DOD, State and USAID participants within AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** As an established program, TSCTP continues to demonstrate the value of forging new processes in furthering cooperation among the entire USG inter-agency community, not just that between DoD/DOS & USAID and I anticipate that it will continue to utilize the methods that presently exist. It is my desire that this program will continue its great work at AFRICOM as it is presently doing for EUCOM and will be a template for other inter-agency cooperation programs within AFRICOM.

**What role do you foresee for the African Union or other African organizations in stability operations in Africa, and how can the new command best facilitate that role?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The nations of Africa and the organizations they have formed to promote security and cooperation on the continent will carry the lion's share of the burden when it comes to stability operations and indeed all missions in Africa. AFRICOM is in a prime position to assist building the military capabilities of those nations that strive to take on greater regional responsibility through military to

military training and exercises. Additionally, when directed, the command will be prepared to support African led operations, such as the airlift provided for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In general, by being a committed and focused partner, the new command will work with African nations and their organizations as they shoulder the demands of maintaining security and prosperity on the continent.

**What role, if any, would you expect AFRICOM to play in helping determine how agency resources will be allocated?**

**GENERAL WARD:** It is the intent of AFRICOM to work with our inter-agency partners in ensuring full transparency of each of our programs, thus leading to increased harmonization and effectiveness of our collective efforts.

### Intelligence Issues

**In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, which created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and charged it with conducting “strategic operational planning” to combat terrorist threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. NCTC has taken the lead on developing the National Implementation Plan, a detailed, inter-agency plan for combating terrorism, which assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies across the government.**

**What is your understanding of the role of the NCTC with respect to AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** With regard to AFRICOM, the NCTC develops strategic guidance and the national, interagency objectives and tasks on counter terrorism matters which AFRICOM, along with our interagency partners on the continent, are responsible for implementing.

**How will AFRICOM’s responsibilities for integrating military and civilian planning interface with NCTC’s responsibility for integrating military and civilian planning?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM, along with these other Departments and agencies, has an obligation under NSPD-46 to work together very closely to ensure that all of our plans and activities are coordinated, synchronized and mutually reinforcing. It will be my priority to ensure that AFRICOM planning is fully coordinated and integrated with our interagency partners. The AFRICOM staff structure and integration of interagency personnel in the Command is designed specifically toward this end.

**How are the specific agency roles and responsibilities outlined in the National Implementation Plan integrated with AFRICOM's efforts to bring stability to Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** A key underpinning for a more stable Africa is to encourage all segments of the population to reject terrorism as a political instrument. This requires that we build the trust and confidence of African governments and populations that only comes through the development of habitual relationships and implementation of programs and initiatives which promote secure environments and political and economic stability. It necessarily requires US involvement across the diplomatic, information, military and economic spectrum by the various US Departments engaged in Africa. Such engagement is already occurring. However, for AFRICOM’s efforts to be most effective, and for our collective interagency efforts to be mutually reinforcing in promoting stability, we must plan and implement our programs with a

high degree of routine coordination and full knowledge of programs and capabilities all Departments bring to the African continent. How we integrate AFRICOM's efforts with our interagency partners will be through the development and implementation of specific CT and security cooperation plans which are fully coordinated with the other agencies and their planning efforts.

### **Non-Governmental Organizations**

**Africa has one of the most largest and most mature non-governmental organization (NGO) communities in the world. In many cases, the NGOs are the first responders in Africa.**

**If confirmed, how would you expect to coordinate AFRICOM's operations with these organizations?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will establish a robust relationship with the U.S. Agency for International Development. AFRICOM will reach out to the NGO community in Africa through our Partnership Division in our Outreach Office. As we establish and maintain these key relationships we will continue to coordinate our efforts with USAID representatives within the command. We have learned from our recent efforts in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in Africa that there is a broad range of NGO and community-based activities taking place. These activities bear significant short-term and long-term results.

### **Stability Operations**

**DOD has established policy designating stability operations as a core U.S. military mission and directing that they [stability operations] be prioritized comparable to combat operations. The directive implementing this policy assigns the Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands the responsibility to engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate.**

**What type of guidance and specific steps do you believe are necessary for combatant commanders to effectively coordinate and integrate planning with State, USAID, other U.S. agencies and organizations, and multinational partners?**

**GENERAL WARD:** I think we agree with the premise that there needs to be better interagency cooperation that facilitates the use of all aspects of national power. This involves more than just establishing headquarters, it involves a campaign based, comprehensive approach in which all interagency players are involved in complex planning and execution. A campaign, by definition, is a number of disparate actions and activities that are coordinated to realize a singular end state. Campaigns require authorities and funding- which come from the Executive Branch and Congress.

Stability operations planning must be accomplished from inception by a full interagency team. This prevents planning in a vacuum and avoids the situation where a finalized and signed plan is passed on to a partnering USG agency which cannot fulfill the roles and responsibilities assigned in the plan. Finally, field outreach to the embassies, USAID staff, and staff of other USG agencies will aid significantly in coordination.

**What steps, staff, and resources are needed to establish an interagency team within AFRICOM that can routinely and actively contribute to DOD's operational planning?**

**GENERALWARD:** We need people across the interagency assigned to AFRICOM willing to be consistently engaged in the planning process- instead of a military staff with interagency representatives only for perfunctory planning, AFRICOM needs experienced interagency planners.

Another way of approaching this issue is to establish an interagency planning school or curriculum which looks at campaign planning from the interagency perspective. From there, we need to codify a process for interagency campaign design. This process needs to be a cooperative effort that goes beyond DOD. My hope is that this concept will engender a productive dialogue the produces effectual change that the military and our interagency partners can make in order to improve interagency cooperation and teamwork. The Joint Staff J7 is now looking at the idea of "Mission-Centric Planning," a promising recognition of the role that individual Country Teams can - and ought to - play in operational planning.

**If confirmed, how would you address the challenges associated with sharing information between DOD and non-DOD partners in policy, organizational structures, training, or other measure within the control of the Combatant Commander?**

**GENERALWARD:** The key to solving the information sharing challenges is to get the right representatives from other USG agencies at the AFRICOM table; developing the mission focused teams with wide spectrum expertise from across the interagency and when needed facilitate reach back to home and field offices. For those key USG agencies not represented at AFRICOM, I would aggressively seek to bring in the appropriate out of area representation.

This is an area where non-DOD partners have to be taken on their own terms. The DOD has much to gain and to offer in the information sharing arena. As other non-DOD agencies often operate in a more decentralized manner, DOD can utilize its expertise in information gathering and synthesis to provide our interagency partners a regional and multi-agency picture. This may directly benefit the Country Teams and other organizations as they can see the actions outside of their traditional areas of focus. The DOD will benefit from the vast regional expertise and subject matter experts that the other government agencies bring to the table. We also must recognize our partners' requirement for information, which may well be in different formats and categories, and work on developing common data bases which meet both DOD and non-DOD needs.

**If confirmed, what specific actions would you expect to take to facilitate greater understanding of the planning process and capabilities between DOD and non-DOD communities involved in stability operations?**

**GENERALWARD:** Planning and planning expertise are key to successful operations in the DoD. As a result, attending planning courses is a vital requirement for DoD planners. We need to significantly expand available seats in planning courses, so that personnel for USG agencies partnering with the DoD can attend these courses and obtain the necessary level of planning expertise. Again, the development of an interagency planning course might help in this area.

In addition, I would include DoS, USAID, and others in TSC planning exercises and encourage AFRICOM staff to participate in the planning exercises of DoS, USAID, and others.

**How do you believe the significant differences in the capacity of non-DOD organizations to engage in stability operations could best be addressed?**

**GENERALWARD:** First, we must assess the planning and execution capabilities of other USG agencies, since planning capacity of USAID and other agencies is sometimes underestimated. Second, develop common training modules, including interactive joint exercises, which will help build capacities in areas lacking by other agencies including emphasis on lessons learned from previous stability operations.

A second issue is that non-DOD organizations, both government and private, are structured so as to optimally meet the requirements of their particular tasks, usually very differently than DOD organizations. At the operational level, for example, the major overseas planning entities for DOD are the geographic commands, whereas for the Department of State and most other U.S. Government agencies these entities are the Country Teams in each host country.

We in DOD should not expect that the solution to interagency cooperation in Stability Operations lies in making the rest of the U.S. Government look like ourselves. In many aspects of stability operations DOD would be the supporting agency, and we thus need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of non-DOD agencies and concentrate how we can gain greater synergy by working together. The real strength of the COCOMs, the ability to plan and execute *across* international boundaries on a regional basis, is a natural complement to the strengths of other U.S. Government agencies represented in the Country Teams to cooperate in furthering common U.S. goals *within* international boundaries.

One of the ways, that COCOMS can overcome the problems, and build real synergy in Stability Operations, is to organize itself so as to be able to work most effectively with non-DOD agencies. AFRICOM intends to be a leader in developing this concept. This is a work in progress, but I am convinced that we are on the right path for the future.

### **Article 98**

**The State Department and DOD have been limited in their ability to engage with some African nations because bilateral “Article 98” agreements, which protect American citizens from the International Criminal Court, have not been secured.**

**What is your assessment of the impact of the inability of the U.S. to provide foreign military assistance to countries with whom we have not been able to negotiate Article 98 agreements?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM’s anticipated area of responsibility (AOR) will consist of over 50 countries. While only a handful of those countries are currently adversely affected by the lack of an Article 98 agreement, two of the most important regional powers, South Africa and Kenya, are included. The other affected countries are Mali, Namibia, Niger, and Tanzania.

De-linking IMET with ASPA sanctions was a positive and critical step in rebuilding these relationships. However, with ASPA sanctions blocking foreign military financing (FMF) for these countries, bilateral sanctions are causing both direct and indirect adverse effects, and these effects spread to other areas of U.S. interest.

In South Africa the bulk of the FMF credits of \$6M (2002) were applied to cases to support the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) C-130 fleet for parts and training. The suspension of FMF support to South Africa played a part in their decision to modernize their lift fleet with the Airbus M400 over the C130. The effect will continue to be felt for decades to come as defense contracts are lost to other countries, affecting both our defense industry and our overall interoperability with the most powerful nation on the continent. In Kenya, the prohibition on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is causing our support for their F5 aircraft to close. CENTCOM’s intent to support Kenya’s desire to modernize their Airborne, special operation forces, and counter terrorism elements will also not be executable due to a lack of Foreign Military Financing.

### **Disaster Response**

**For each of the past several years, the continent of Africa has experienced a number of major natural disasters. Most recently, we have seen flooding in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. DOD has responded in a limited way.**

**Should DOD’s role in responding to such disasters change with the standing up of AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** DOD has an excellent working relationship with USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We plan to have an LNO from OFDA in our Command structure. Although I do not see our role in support of OFDA, as the lead Federal agency for disaster response, changing, I do see our

ability to plan with and improve our capability to provide support to OFDA greatly improving with the stand up of AFRICOM, and given necessary resources to respond are provided when requested.

**In some countries, a natural disaster compounds a political conflict, thereby exacerbating existing security and humanitarian conditions.**

**To what extent do you believe AFRICOM should step in to facilitate humanitarian aid?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM can call upon the unique capabilities of the U.S. military to address a wide variety of issues resulting from natural disasters or complex humanitarian emergencies. As a part of AFRICOM's interagency approach to issues in Africa, I will follow the lead of the U.S. Chief of Mission for the affected country, coordinating with and supporting his/her efforts. At the same time any assets that are made available to the issue will also be coordinated and vetted with OFDA.

### **Human Rights**

**In your view, does the U.S. do enough to train African militaries on matters such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role of the civilian-controlled military in a democracy?**

**GENERAL WARD:** In my current position as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, I have observed the serious effort that the Departments of Defense and State devote to these issues as we work together in training African militaries. For example, the State Department funds International Military Education and Training programs that are implemented within U.S. embassies by military officers assigned to our Offices of Defense Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices. Foreign military members and units proposed to receive USG funded training undergo a "vetting procedure" to review the backgrounds for human rights violations. This vetting occurs for all security assistance programs and military training programs. The State Department's African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which often includes U.S. military trainers, and Defense's Africa Center for Strategic Studies programs both 'vet' proposed trainees. During ACOTA training events, human rights, rule of law, and the role of a civilian controlled military in a democracy are all topics that are emphasized as the USG trains African peacekeepers.

**If confirmed, would you expect to create an office within AFRICOM to monitor and coordinate human rights issues?**

**GENERAL WARD:** If confirmed, I expect to very closely analyze the command structure of AFRICOM taking into consideration the new expertise provided by incorporating interagency staff, before making a formal decision on establishing a specific office to monitor human rights issues.

### **Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa**

**What is your view of the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa to the United States?**

**GENERAL WARD:** There are a number of key reasons behind the "strategic importance" of the HOA to the US. African countries are plagued with internal and external tensions which have prevented economic growth and political stability. The U.S. inter-agency efforts combined with the CJTF-HOA presence helps to prevent regional conflict leading to a more stable environment.

HOA, like the other regions in Africa, represents the next frontier of global economic development and competition. Development of new markets and new resources not only supports the U.S. economy, but creates prosperity in a historically poor region, ameliorating the underlying causes of instability and conflict.

Much of the world's oil flow and other critical mineral resources pass through international waters near the HOA coast. It is vital for the U.S. to prevent disruption of these global superhighways.

Historically, extremists have sought refuge in the HOA sub-region. Not only do they present a threat to the US-African partnership aimed at pursuing political stability and economic prosperity, but from the HOA it can be exported to other parts of the world. It is again of key strategic importance that we do all that we can to prevail against such a threat.

**With the standing up of AFRICOM, do you believe the U.S. can play a more significant role in this subregion, particularly in a country like Somalia? If so, how?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The standing up of AFRICOM will further contribute to the current CJTF HOA efforts aimed at promoting regional stability by bringing a more focused and coherent interagency effort in the region.

With regard to Somalia, CJTF HOA's military assistance to the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) deployed in support of the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia provides a good example of the significant role AFRICOM can bring to support a resolution for the Somalia conflict.

CJTF HOA supported the African Union's logistic planning efforts to deploy the UPDF to Mogadishu, facilitated medical training for the UPDF and worked with a Non Government Organization (NGOs) to provide medical supplies to the UPDF for direct assistance of the citizens in Mogadishu. CJTF HOA also facilitated training for UPDF marine forces in Kenya prior to their deployment to protect the Mogadishu Seaport.

AFRICOM's focused attention on the HOA region and interagency staff composition will facilitate a wide range of opportunities for assistance to the African Union's efforts in the region using African solutions to African problems.

**Maritime Security**

**Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on the coasts of West and East Africa. In the west, northern migration to Europe and the Gulf of Guinea are the challenges and, in the east, pirating in the major shipping lanes and transporting of terrorists to and from the Middle East are the challenges.**

**What is your assessment of EUCOM's efforts to combat maritime threats in the west?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Africa presents some unique challenges in the maritime security environment. The West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea regions of Africa are areas which clearly demonstrate the complexity of maritime challenges present around the continent. In each of these regions, problems such as illicit or criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and trafficking, occur on a routine and regular basis. The common challenges in both of these regions highlight the extent of the problem, and identify some of the various attributes that must necessarily be addressed if a comprehensive maritime security solution for Africa is to be provided. In the end, African solutions for African challenges will yield the best results.

EUCOM is actively working with the Gulf of Guinea countries, through Navy Europe (NAVEUR), to help them address their maritime threats. The African Partnership Station (APS) program, about to launch, will be another effort to help the Gulf of Guinea nations combat their maritime threats.

**What is your assessment of U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) efforts to combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The Horn of Africa region has unique maritime security challenges that include problems such as illicit/criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and trafficking, which occur on a routine and regular basis. The challenges extend beyond the Horn of Africa and include the entire West Indian Ocean region of Africa. With over 4750 miles of coastline and only 25 boats to provide maritime security, the region possesses virtually no capability to interdict fishery theft, piracy, narco-trafficking, or any other illicit activity in the maritime domain when it occurs.

CENTCOM's efforts to combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa, Naval Forces, Central (NAVCENT) and the Coalition Task Force, CTF-150, working with the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, CJTF-HOA, have been focused on assisting the Africans to combat terrorism, piracy, narcotic trafficking, and other illicit activity. Through maritime interdiction operations, developing maritime domain awareness, and providing mil-to-mil training, both Task Forces have been working towards building regional capacity through bi-lateral and multi-lateral engagements in the Horn of Africa region. Presently, both the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean region lack significant naval forces, coastal security forces or security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic deterrent. CENTCOM, through the efforts of CTF-150 and CJTF-HOA, has made great strides to assist the region in combating the threat while helping the region strengthen its ability to fully maintain its maritime security. AFRICOM will continue to build on these efforts and look to add value where needed to lead toward African solutions for African challenges.

**What role do you expect AFRICOM to play in efforts to combat maritime threats in and around Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM will build upon the existing efforts to assist African nations to build capacity in the areas of maritime security and safety, specifically, in the Gulf of Guinea region, the Horn of Africa, and the West Indian Ocean region. AFRICOM will add value to these efforts, maximizing the resources that the Interagency, non-government organizations, our international partners and our African partners already bring to the continent.

**Egypt**

**It is the committee's understanding that Egypt has been given dual status in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.**

**What is your understanding of how this dual status in two geographic AORs will be implemented?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Operationally and administratively Egypt will be part of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. However, AFRICOM will have the ability to work with Egypt on Africa-related issues.

**For instance, how would issues related to U.S. Foreign Military Financing associated with Egypt be coordinated by the two commands?**

**GENERAL WARD:** CENTCOM will have responsibility for the coordination of foreign assistance programs for Egypt. There will be little change in how security assistance and combatant command programs in general would be managed with Egypt once AFRICOM reaches final operating capability.

## **African Union**

**In December 2006, the State Department established an U.S. Mission to the African Union (AU). The purpose of this mission is to forge a strategic partnership with the AU that will further peace, stability and prosperity throughout Africa. In March 2007, you visited with AU officials about a number of issues, including AFRICOM.**

**In your assessment, is the AU receptive to the AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. The AU's strong support of communications exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR is an example of the positive development between the African Union and the USEUCOM. In addition, over the last few years EUCOM has provided the AU advice, mentoring and tactical expertise as the AU developed the concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for Command, Control, and Communications and Information Services (C3IS) which will support the African stand-by forces. These programs will continue under AFRICOM, fully endorsed by the AU.

**Do you believe the AU will be receptive to U.S. assistance in the form of training and advisory and technical support to the development of an African stand-by force?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. The African Union's stated policy is to man as many African peace support operations as possible, sourced in large part through Africa Standby Forces, which the AU intends to certify for initial operating capability by 2010. To assist the AU in reaching its goal, AFRICOM will assume sponsorship of on-going command and control infrastructure development and liaison officer support, continue to resource military mentors for peacekeeping training, and develop new approaches to supporting the AU and African Standby Forces.

## **Libya**

**Over the past few years, the United States' relationship with Libya has improved dramatically.**

**In your assessment, what should be the nature of our military-to-military cooperation with Libya?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Libya's continuing transformation to responsible governance and normalization in its relationship with the international community shows a level of commitment by its leadership that necessitates a deliberate, measured pace of engagement between our two militaries. Initial activities align with U.S. Country Team initiatives to highlight American goodwill, and to assess with Libyan military leaders where we can best assist and collaborate to enhance their current capabilities.

We have made steady progress with Libya since restrictions under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were modified in February of this year. However, removal or waiver of legislative restrictions imposed under Section 507 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-112) would provide additional opportunity to positively influence our relationship with the Libyan military through English language training and other International Military Education and Training (IMET) program opportunities.

**In your opinion, is Libya's non-participation in the Trans-Saharan Counter-terrorism Program a liability for the program?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Libya's eventual inclusion in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) will add value to the program. But, I do not view their current absence as a liability. TSCTP focus is much more on the Sahel countries that have less capability than Libya or the rest of the Maghreb.

**Liberia**

**The United States and Liberia have long enjoyed a special relationship, dating back to the 1820s when the first group of settlers arrived in Liberia from the United States. Liberia now counts the United States as its strongest supporter in its democratization and reconstruction efforts. It has been reported that Liberia has expressed a strong desire to be considered as one of the hubs of the new AFRICOM.**

**What role do you envision for Liberia in AFRICOM's planning?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The democratization and reconstruction programs in Liberia are critical to restoring stability in that country and the West Africa region as a whole. The United States Government, in conjunction with other nations, multi-national organizations, and NGOs, is committed to contributing to Liberia's continued transition from a post-conflict society to a stable democracy. AFRICOM, along with Department of State, USAID and other key agencies will play a role in supporting the U.S. Government's commitment to Liberia's reconstruction. The cornerstone of Liberia's effort to rebuild its national defense is the U.S.-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) program. To secure Liberia's peaceful security environment, the United States is funding the creation of a new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) by training and equipping a 2,000-soldier force. The goal of the U.S. is to complete the rebuilding of the new AFL forces in time for the UN's peacekeeping mission to begin its drawdown of forces in 2009. AFRICOM, in close coordination with the efforts underway through the DoS, will continue to promote peace and security within its programs and authorities.

**Maghreb/North Africa**

**Partially isolated from the rest of the continent by the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara, the Maghreb has proven to be a significant counter terrorism challenge for the United States. The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership has attempted to build the capacity of these northwest African nations to conduct counter terrorism operations.**

**In your opinion, are U.S. efforts in this region adequate? Should DoD be doing more?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The continued growth of Al-Qaeda's influence in North Africa indicates that U.S. efforts in the region should be sustained. In the Sahel, DoD is providing as much capacity building assistance as those countries either desire or can effectively absorb.

However, we continue to seek ways that we can assist and enhance capabilities of nations in the region. One specific area of success has been the growing synergy between EUCOM's Trans-Sahara Partnership (TSP) and DoS's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) where we are discussing planned programs and activities within the Interagency in an effort to build upon each other's success and avoid duplication of effort or efforts at cross purposes. AFRICOM can achieve more by working in a more coordinated and coherent way with the USG Interagency, NGOs, and other partners seeking to advance peace, stability, and security in Africa.

**How would you assess Libya's efforts to prevent terrorist and criminal groups from exploiting remote territories in light of the country's persistent inability to prevent large numbers of economic migrants from crossing its borders?**

**GENERAL WARD:** As I understand, Libya faces some challenges in this regard, as do most of the Maghreb and Sahelian countries. This highlights the importance of positive engagement and influence with Libya.

### **Darfur, Sudan**

**More than three years of fighting in Darfur have destroyed hundreds of villages, displaced 2.2 million people and led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. If confirmed, you would be one of the U.S. Government's most senior military advisors on matters relating to the crisis in Darfur.**

**What is your assessment of the situation in Darfur and what recommendations would you provide to your leadership as commander of AFRICOM given the circumstances as they stand today?**

**From a military perspective, what is the proper role for the United States and NATO to play in assisting the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid mission and in supporting the pursuit of its mission?**

**GENERAL WARD:** The United States remains actively engaged in helping to resolve the crisis in Darfur through humanitarian assistance, support of the political process, and logistical assistance to the African Union and the United Nation's support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its transition to a United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As part of the USG Interagency effort, we actively plan for diplomatic and military contingencies to pressure the Sudanese government to allow a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Through outreach to troop contributing countries (TCC) and with UN, AU, and our partners, we are working to ensure that this hybrid force will be deployed quickly and effectively with sufficient political and military support to successfully bring peace to the war-torn Darfur. DOD must continue to play its supporting role to ensure the timely deployment of PK forces and provide logistic and planning.

### **South Africa**

**South Africa has stated publicly its opposition to AFRICOM and has indicated that it will not host AFRICOM personnel.**

**If confirmed, how would you intend to address South Africa's concerns regarding AFRICOM, particularly given that country's position of influence in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** South Africa is a continental leader and has a key role in the development of Africa. If confirmed, I intend to find areas of common interest to develop a relationship built on trust and mutual support. The resumption of International Military Education and Training (IMET) last year, after a four year suspension due to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions, was a positive step forward. Ongoing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) training and a scheduled medical exercise in 2009, will provide additional opportunities to strengthen our bi-lateral relationship. Lastly I will continue direct dialogue with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and South African leaders both civilian and military on the role and mission of AFRICOM.

## China

**In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with African militaries had on those militaries and on U.S. security interests?**

**GENERAL WARD:** China's military involvement on the African continent includes military education and training in China, military sales to African countries to gain access to markets and resources, and roughly 1300 peacekeepers that support all seven UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in Africa. To date, China's military involvement has not had any discernable impact on U.S. security interests in Africa. Addition of new Chinese military equipment may pose unforeseen future interoperability challenges.

**Do you foresee China's growing energy demands affecting security developments in Africa?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Africa is growing in military, strategic and economic importance in global affairs. We are seeking more effective ways to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises, improve cooperative efforts to stem transnational terrorism and sustain enduring efforts that contribute to African unity and bolster security on the continent.

## Nigeria

**Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crisis since gaining independence in October 1960. Nigeria is one of the United States' key strategic partners in Africa. The country is Africa's largest producer of oil, and is America's fifth largest oil provider. As the continent's second largest economy, Nigeria's stability and prosperity affect not only those in the market for Nigerian oil, but the entire region. On the military side, Nigeria has a 76,000 member strong military. Before the lifting of sanctions by many Western nations, Nigeria had turned to China, Russia, North Korea, and India for the purchase of military equipment and training.**

**What constructive role do you believe AFRICOM can play in this fragile country?**

**GENERAL WARD:** AFRICOM looks forward to opportunities with the new Yar'Adua administration to enhance the relationship between our two countries. Early indications are that the new leader is demonstrating a bold willingness to address corruption and economic development. We see Nigeria as a key regional partner. The United States and Nigeria are now moving forward on common initiatives such as peacekeeping training, Regional Maritime Domain Awareness, and consultations with other international partners on energy security in the Niger Delta.

In addition to the typical security cooperation activities like International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, there are two major initiatives in which DoD plays a major role. Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) is the military component of the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This program seeks to reduce ungoverned space that might be exploited by terrorist groups and mitigate the influence of extremist ideologies. In Nigeria, OEF-TS has concentrated primarily on development and humanitarian assistance in Northern Nigeria as part of the embassy's Muslim Outreach Program, as well as strategic communications. Now that the elections are over we stand ready to broaden and deepen OEF-TS activities to include training and equipping CT forces and encouraging intelligence sharing with other TSCTP partners.

DoD also participates in the quarterly meetings with the Government of Nigeria on development and

security in the Niger Delta. While there is no military solution to the Niger Delta's problems, security can enable development and political dialogue. DoD's contribution to this effort is primarily in coastal and maritime security, as well as initiatives aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. The cornerstone of DoD efforts is a multi-million dollar program known as the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) funded partially under 1206 Authority.

AFRICOM should also integrate its efforts with the West African regional organization, Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS) headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. Over the past decade, Nigeria provided over 45 percent of ECOWAS' military troop contributions for peacekeeping missions. Through FY-08, DoD will support the comprehensive training and equipping of additional Nigerian peacekeeping battalions with mentors and advisors.

### **Climate Change**

**During a recent visit to EUCOM, committee staff was briefed on the security threats in Africa. One of the items discussed by personnel from EUCOM's J2 Directorate was the impact of global climate change.**

**What is your assessment of the threat posed to Africa by climate change?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Climate change could exacerbate current instability in Africa in a number of ways. Droughts, floods, and other effects of climate change could lead to future crop failures, massive refugee flows, and significant damage to African economies and societies. The chaos and desperation of these tragedies could help undermine governments, increase civil unrest, and promote extremism in a number of countries.

**What are the national security implications for the United States?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Climate change could pose a serious threat to U.S. national security interest in Africa. Some countries could be pushed into greater instability as a result of floods, droughts, or other catastrophes brought on by global climate change. Unstable areas provide the perfect recruiting ground for terrorist groups seeking new blood for their war against the West. Devastating storms in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, might damage the region's oil infrastructure, leading to disruptions in oil production and higher oil prices for the global economy.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. I fully recognize and understand the importance of Congressional oversight as it is clearly outlined in the Constitution of the United States.

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. Although the President is my Commander-in-Chief, and he and the Secretary of Defense constitute my chain of command, I recognize that my oath is to the Constitution. That document clearly divides responsibilities with regard to defense between the Executive and Legislative branches. For both the Administration and the Congress to execute their respective responsibilities appropriately, it is incumbent upon me to be honest and forthright with both while offering my best military advice.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, AFRICOM?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes. That is an inherent part of my responsibilities as outlined above, and I will be happy to appear when called.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

**GENERAL WARD:** Yes.