

**Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA
Nominee for Commander, United Nations Command/Commander, Republic of Korea –
United States Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea**

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

The current transformation of DOD – the largest since WWII, as prescribed in our national defense and military strategies and quadrennial defense reviews since 2001, was in many ways enabled through Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act of 1986 – in this regard I would assess that the provisions continue to remain relevant and effective. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the conduct of our joint operations and make recommendations as required. It is imperative however, to apply similar reform to interagency authorities and relationships – we must apply and integrate effectively all elements of our national power to the challenges that face the nation today and tomorrow.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

The emerging strategic environment presents more complex asymmetrical challenges, regionally and globally, that demand broader and more integrated cooperation of agencies within our own government, and with those of our partners around the world. The employment of all elements of our national power, and that of our partners, must be applied in an integrated fashion. . We should seek to continue efforts such as Beyond Goldwater Nichols, the Project for National Security Reform, and Project Horizon, so we can codify a framework of interagency authorities, relationships, and capabilities that more effectively bring to bare all elements of national power to strategic challenges facing us now and in the future.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

The Commander, United Nations Command (CDRUNC), serves as commander of an international command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDRUNC acts in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and directives. The CDRUNC also acts in accordance with directives from the US government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, keeping CDRUSPACOM informed. The CDRUNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of forces, conduct of combat operations and acceptance and integration of UNC member nations' forces during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.

The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a binational command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeat an external armed attack. In this position, he is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the ROK-US Military Committee, which acts as the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S. national authorities. The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and in the US/ROK Military Committee Strategic Directive No. 2.

The Commander, United States Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA), as a sub-unified commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible for all duties and functions associated with Title 10, United States Code, the Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the U.S. with the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

The situation in Korea reflects all aspects of both the asymmetrical challenges of the new strategic environment, and our need to transform plans, posture, capabilities and relationships with our partners and allies to better meet those challenges. Our alliance in Korea is one that is transforming into a broad strategic relationship that has peninsular, regional, and global components to better meet each of those challenges. I have served in Korea at times when we focused predominately on the traditional and symmetrical threat of North Korea, and I am very familiar with that aspect of the threat that remains on the peninsula. I have also served in a number of Peace Keeping and Multinational assignments that would be beneficial in my role as UNC Commander, and would also allow me to develop further our global partnership with the ROK - a steadfast and significant contributor to stability and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, my positions on the Joint Staff provide me the background and expertise on the transformation of our military to meet traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that face us today and tomorrow -- and North Korea is a prime example of a threat that has evolved asymmetrically over the last few decades. This experience positions me well to continue assessment, integration and implementation of plans to transform the alliance with South Korea and maximize the strategic relevance and value of that alliance. If confirmed, I will effectively apply US policies and strategies with our ROK Ally, and will provide valuable assessments and recommendations to our defense and national leadership to better shape those policies and strategies.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct in-depth discussions and assessments with key personnel and analysts from relevant ROK and U.S. government agencies as well as non-governmental specialists. Throughout my time in command, I will continue this dialogue with ROK and U.S. leaders to improve my understanding of all aspects of the evolving situation within the Korean theater.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. CDR UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, USMACV, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated binational ROK-U.S. document provides further guidance on CDR CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Title 10, United States Code, and current directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Title 10, United States Code, and current directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions within their areas, and may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, United States Code provides that, subject to authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unique and specified commands.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services, under Title 10, United States Code. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. They also provide military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The other combatant commanders, especially the Commander, United States Pacific Command

COMUSKOREA, as commander of a sub-unified command of USPACOM, reports directly to the Commander, USPACOM, on matters directly pertaining to U.S. Forces Korea areas of responsibility. CDR UNC and CDR CFC keeps the Commander, USPACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

The major challenges include maintaining readiness and deterrence, while implementing the transformation of U.S. forces in Korea and implementation of the plan to transfer wartime operational control to the ROK. Readiness of U.S. forces will be my primary near-term focus if confirmed for this position. The ROK-U.S. Alliance must be "ready to fight tonight" due to the proximity and lethality of the threat. A highly trained and ready force provides stability and mitigates risk. Sustaining readiness requires tough, realistic training; appropriate levels of manning and modern equipment; training infrastructure; and a quality of life which supports and sustains our people. I am personally committed to ensuring that the combat readiness of our forces in Korea.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, I will ensure that our forces remain vigilant and well-prepared, by maintaining readiness and rigorous training and exercises. If confirmed I will immediately review these elements to ensure that we are as strong and as ready as we can possibly be. I will devote myself to maintaining the strong Alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. A strong, healthy and capable Alliance is necessary to meet the challenges we face on the Korean Peninsula. Should deterrence fail, combined forces must be, and will be, ready to defeat North Korean aggression.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to U. S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks and the ongoing disablement of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor facility, North Korea's historical opposition to meaningful reform and its long-term pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and global stability. In addition to North Korea's nuclear threat, its missile program, coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned conventional force, continues to present significant challenges. All elements of US and partner national power are must be applied to achieve our Combating WMD objectives. Non-proliferation diplomatic efforts, such as the Six Party Talks negotiations, in addition to Counter-proliferation, and Consequence Management plans, capabilities, and posture, are part of a comprehensive strategy to combat WMD. We must maintain readiness across this spectrum and employ our capabilities consistently and appropriately.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

The October 2006 nuclear test at the Punggye facility supported previous assessments that North Korea had produced nuclear weapons. Prior to the test, it is assessed that North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. According to recent assessments, North Korea pursued a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) capability at least in the past, and the Intelligence Community (IC) judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues today. If fully developed, an HEU capability could provide an alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of its plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. The IC remains uncertain about Kim Jong-il's commitment to full denuclearization, as he promised in the October 2007 Six Party agreement.

North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external sales. With its test of an intercontinental ballistic missile that can possibly range the western United States, conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, North Korea's missile development program present a threat which can not be ignored.

What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

Despite economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5 million reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. and ROK standards, its military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over 13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat. Seventy percent of North Korea's ground forces are located within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. North Korea still has the capacity to inflict major destruction and significant military and civilian casualties in South Korea, with little to no warning.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

If confirmed, I would encourage both the U.S. and ROK to sustain the ongoing transformation initiatives and capabilities enhancement programs. This includes implementation of the Strategic Transition Plan, signed by General Bell and the ROK CJCS in June 2007, which establishes a roadmap to achieve OPCON transition in 2012, while maintaining an effective deterrent and warfighting capability. Our transformation and realignment initiatives ongoing throughout the Pacific, enhance deterrence on the peninsula, in the region, and align us more effectively globally – we must continue these efforts.

Ballistic Missile Defense Priorities

The current Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, recently testified that there is a current need for additional PAC-3 missile defense systems to counter North Korea's missile inventory.

What is your assessment of the missile defense priorities of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?

PAC-3 PATRIOT Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. However, there is a significant shortage of PAC-3 missiles currently available on the peninsula to counter the North Korean missile threat.

The Republic of Korea does not currently possess a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability that can fully integrate with U.S. BMD systems. The ROK recently announced plans to purchase eight Configuration-2 PATRIOT firing units. When fielded, these firing units will possess a localized theater ballistic missile defensive capability for key sites.

In the near term, the Republic of Korea must develop a systematic missile defense solution to protect its critical civilian and military command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers. South Korean military and civilian facilities are currently highly vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks.

What missile defense systems and capabilities do you believe are needed in the near-term to meet the operational needs of these commands?

Continued production of PAC-3 missiles and development of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Airborne Laser, and AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense are needed to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability to required protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK has announced plans to purchase much needed Configuration-2 PATRIOT firing units and will begin the process of integration with U.S. BMD systems.

North Korea-POW-MIA Recovery Efforts

From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American service-members who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.

In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American service-members found in North Korea? If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume such cooperation?

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean War remains and provides DoD oversight over the entire personnel accounting process. The United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging operational and logistics support to remains recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts repatriation ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at the joint security area at the end of each operation.

Once national policy makers determine that conditions permit reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. negotiating team. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North Korea.

If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart cooperation with North Korea on the POW-MIA remains recovery program?

National Policy makers will decide when to restart remains recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the United Nations Command will continue to play a key role in supporting remains recovery operations in North Korea.

Military-to-Military Relations

In your view, what is the value of military-to-military relations, in general?

Military-to-military relations are an essential part of establishing and maintaining overall relationships with our partners. They help to develop mutual respect and facilitate security cooperation amongst partner nations to better meet challenges that impact our common national interests and values. Additionally, often from our military relationships emerge stronger socio-political and economic ones – as recently symbolized by our US-ROK Free Trade Agreement, signed on June 30th, 2007.

Military-to-military relationships with countries that present significant security and stability challenges, as in the case of North Korea, are mandatory and critical to crisis management and tension reduction.

What is your assessment of the current climate in military-to-military professional relationships and interoperability at all levels between U.S. and ROK forces?

The current military relationship is one of mutual respect and trust, bolstered by the very professional nature of both of our militaries. ROK officers regularly attend our professional development schools and U.S. officers do the same in ROK schools. U.S. doctrine not only forms the basis of our combined defense system, epitomized by the Combined Forces Command, but it is also the basis for much of the ROK's military doctrine. Our doctrine also allows us to operate effectively with partners through independent parallel command structures, as we will achieve with the Republic of Korea in 2012, and in multinational command structures as what currently exists under United Nations Command or in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. In large part, this is of great credit to the professionalism, training, expertise, and experience of the ROK military. ROK and US forces have exercised and operated together for over fifty years, providing a foundation of shared experience that solidifies a professional bond that only continues to grow and will flourish under any command relationship. This has been proven time and again in our

relationship on the peninsula, and in our relationship with the ROK military as strategic partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Operationally, while interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces has improved, there are issues that must be resolved. For instance, advanced U.S. warfighting capability has resulted in greater employment of precision guided munitions. The ROK military needs to invest to balance its ability to put airborne weapons on target to provide more effective use of these assets. Many similar interoperability issues have been identified and the ROK military endeavors to resolve these matters. If confirmed, I will assess interoperability further and seek to reduce, if not eliminate, any interoperability shortfalls.

What would be the value, in your opinion, of military-to-military relations with North Korea?

The United States and North Korea currently maintain limited relations through representatives of the United Nations Command side of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and the (north) Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. This channel gives the U.S., through the UN Command, an opportunity to discuss any issue of relevance, but is limited by North Korea's intransigence toward meetings on substantive issues. These relations are vital to maintaining the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Issues of an administrative and operational nature must be worked out through the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. This is a consistent and proven channel with which the two countries can and do maintain military communications.

If confirmed, what, if any, action would you take to increase the quality and quantity of military contacts between the United States and North Korea?

The starting point for improvement in U.S. and North Korean mil-to-mil contacts is North Korea's return to active participation in Military Armistice Commission (MAC) General Officer Talks, as called for by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. In 1991 North Korea unilaterally stopped participating in these talks. General Officer Talks between the UNCMAC, which includes a U.S. General Officer, and the Korean People's Army at Panmunjom can provide an opportunity and appropriate level for discussing matters of mutual military concern.

Republic of Korea (ROK) – U.S. Alliance

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?

The current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is governed by the Mutual Defense Treaty as entered into force from November 1954. In particular, the treaty's requirement that both the U.S. and ROK maintain and develop appropriate means to deter and, if deterrence should fail, defeat an armed external attack continues to serve as the cornerstone of the relationship. Both the U.S. and the ROK remain fully committed to the treaty's provisions and the mutual defense of both nations. We are also an alliance that is currently evolving into a broader strategic partnership based on common interests in the peninsula, region, and world.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

If confirmed, I will ensure that I maintain the strong U.S.-ROK security relationship that has preserved stability, promoted democracy, and deterred external aggression for the past 55 years. I will also continue to help develop our alliance into a broader strategic partnership that is reflective of our two nations' common interests and concerns in the region and globally.

What is your assessment of ROK war fighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training of their personnel?

Answer is combined with the response to the question below.

What is your assessment of ROK current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for commanding and controlling the war fighting, readiness, and operations of their own forces in wartime (“OPCON Transfer”)?

The ROK military is fully capable, highly professional and competent. The ROK currently exercises daily command and control of all of its 677,000-man armed forces, and is working to assume primary responsibility for the lead role in its defense in 2012.

ROK Defense Reform 2020 plan will create a more modern and agile fighting force. The ROK military modernization goal is to develop a self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force. As a result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK plans to reduce its total (active and reserve) Army ground forces by approximately 45% over the next 12 years leading up to its target date of 2020. The overall active and reserve forces will be reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million.

In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense determined that South Korea will assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012. The ROK military will assume responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime for the first time since the end of the Korean War. The ROK will form a national warfighting headquarters provisionally described as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new joint warfighting command provisionally described as Korea Command (KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK JFC. The current U.S.-led combined warfighting command, Combined Forces Command, will be disestablished. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. and ROK combined capabilities continue to maintain a strong and credible deterrent, and remain highly capable, should deterrence fail, of defeating a North Korean attack quickly and decisively during the transition period.

Domestic Politics in the Republic of Korea (ROK)

In the last decade, domestic opinion in the ROK with regard to the American presence and relations with the North Korea has increasingly split along generational lines, with younger Koreans being more skeptical of relations with the United States while the older generation is much more content with the status quo.

If confirmed, how would you see your role and responsibility in the light of these changes in the ROK body politic?

If confirmed, my role and duties as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea will remain as described by appropriate

governing U.S., ROK-U.S., and UN documents. My requirement to maintain the Armistice; deter or, should deterrence fail, defeat external aggression; and discharge all Title 10 and Unified Command Plan duties and responsibilities will remain the same throughout my tenure, despite any changes to the ROK body politic. I would also add that an enduring, but transformed US presence in and alliance with South Korea is recognized by both nations as essential to our common interests – the transformation of our alliance keeps it a relevant and valuable enabler, not obstacle, to maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. President Lee in recent speeches supports enduring US presence on the peninsula, and has stated a desire to expand our relationship into a broader alliance reflective of our common interests on the peninsula, in the region, and globally.

Regional Posture

In your opinion, how should the U. S. employ its forces in Korea to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to military threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

Transformation and realignment of forces in Korea is not something that has occurred outside of DOD transformation and global defense posture initiatives, but a highly successful example of our strategy. Our ongoing bilateral transformation and realignment efforts in Korea and Japan – and the rest of the Pacific, ensure we maintain the right balance and integration of command and control, and capabilities in the region to meet bilateral defense obligations, enhance regional security cooperation, and better meet global challenges. U.S. forces in Korea should possess the capability to meet our mutual defense treaty commitments to the Republic of Korea, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to deploy forces to meet regional and global contingency requirements. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSKOREA) continually assesses force requirements on the Korean peninsula through CDRUSPACOM to the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will ensure that I gain a full understanding of the security environment on the peninsula so that I can provide my assessment and recommendations to continue proper shaping of our ongoing transformation and realignment efforts.

Consolidation of U.S. Forces

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphrey, South of Seoul. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation and United States military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey, Korea, as well. This relocation is to be largely funded by the Korean Government.

What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

Both the LPP and YRP are being executed simultaneously and are proceeding ahead. To consolidate 2nd Infantry Division, the U.S. goal is to close a total of 63 facilities and areas, comprising two thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, and totaling more than 38,000 acres., To date, the U.S. has closed 37 installations encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over \$500 million and returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Both sides are

working together to develop the land and construct the facilities under our internationally agreed plans to relocate U.S. forces in support of both U.S. and ROK national objectives.

What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

As part of the YRP signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004, the Republic of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of billions of dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to requirements, already spending nearly two billion dollars in pursuit of project goals. For our part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force, at a cost we estimate to be between one and two billion dollars. Regarding the relocation of the 2ID under the LPP, the United States intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the two consolidations will be approximately \$2.4 billion.

Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs

Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements.

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?

In principle, both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea agree to the goal of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied burden sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense position is that to achieve equitability, South Korea should share approximately 50% of U.S. costs of stationing forces on the peninsula excluding military pay. This year the ROK provided the United States with \$787 million in burden sharing funds, which is expected to offset approximately 43% of U.S. non-personnel stationing costs. While this year's contribution did not meet DoD's goal, the ROK and the U.S. continue to negotiate toward a more equitable level of burden sharing.

What priorities would you establish for U.S. forces in Korea to make the best use of these programs?

The next allied burden sharing agreement must be negotiated for a longer term than the two-year agreements of the recent past to provide stability and predictability for both sides. In that agreement, it is vital to the Alliance to achieve an equitable level of cost sharing as well as the ability for the command to apportion host nation funds into the agreed categories to meet command priorities. Over the next several years, as U.S. forces in Korea transform and consolidate south of Seoul, if confirmed, I will have to balance my construction priorities with labor and logistics requirements. Our highest priority will be to apply burden sharing funds against the requirement to move 2ID south of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan.

Training of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

In the past few years as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air Force units based on the peninsula has emerged as a significant concern.

Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close air support missions and other Air Force operations?

The ground training requirements for U.S. forces in Korea are currently being met. Current access to air-to-ground training ranges in the Republic of Korea has improved significantly in the past two years. Additional arrangements must still be made with the South Korean Government to further improve access; however, I understand USFK is pleased with the progress being made. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with our ROK ally to facilitate access that provides the training opportunities necessary to maintain the combat readiness of our entire force.

In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?

The current inventory and facility replacement plan for ground maneuver training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements. We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our air component. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ally to improve and modernize all available training facilities to ensure force readiness requirements are met.

Family Housing in Korea

The Commander of United States Forces in Korea has proposed to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea on accompanied tours, thereby increasing the number of families in Korea. This would require the construction of additional housing and community support facilities at U.S. installations in Korea.

To what extent, if any, do you believe the percentage of personnel sent to Korea on accompanied tours should be increased?

In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, and democratic countries in the world. Unfortunately, the U.S. still rotates Servicemembers on one year unaccompanied assignments as though South Korea remains an active combat zone. While supporting other long-term contingency operations, the U.S. needlessly contributes to family separations with the current one year unaccompanied rotation policy in Korea. Additionally, the ROK-US Alliance is emerging into a broader strategic partnership and it is in our mutual interests to maintain enduring, but transformed presence on the peninsula – more reflective of that partnership. Normalized tours offer many benefits and contribute greatly to enhancing our broad strategic alliance with Korea. We should maximize the number of accompanied tours and normalize U.S. Servicemember tour lengths in Korea to three year family accompanied tours and two year unaccompanied tours for our married and single Servicemembers, similar to our policies in Japan and Europe. This new policy can be implemented with an infrastructure expansion plan over ten to fifteen years, with costs being supported by burden sharing contributions from the Republic of Korea.

The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge. The end-state will result in reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the number of Servicemember moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations.

Quality of Life

Through recent investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making Korea an “assignment of choice” for U. S. Forces.

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

I believe the three most essential elements supporting military life in any assignment are quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. General Bell made tremendous efforts to make improvements in these areas for our Servicemembers. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate, as my predecessors have, for the best possible conditions for all three so that our men and women have the quality of life that they deserve while serving so far from home.

Korea Assignment Incentive Pay

Assignment incentive pay was approved in 2003 for soldiers who agreed to extend their tours of duty in Korea. Since that time, payment of an overseas cost of living allowance was also approved.

In your opinion, is eligibility for assignment incentive pay for duty in Korea still necessary and cost-effective?

With the authorization of a cost of living allowance (COLA) and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) in Korea, pay disparity for our Servicemembers in the ROK has been greatly improved. By extending tours through AIP, we improve readiness and increase stability. From a fiscal standpoint, the incentive pay a Servicemember receives for extending his or her tour is less than the costs borne by the government to move two Servicemembers (one to Korea, one from Korea). The combined effect of reduced PCS costs, increased readiness and greater stability in Korea is a win/win situation. AIP has been a huge success with over 19,000 Soldiers and Airmen signing up for incentive pay with an estimated net savings of \$112 million in reduced PCS costs. However, while AIP has been a major success from a fiscal perspective, for our unaccompanied Servicemembers—over 80% of our authorized force in Korea—accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to stay longer in Korea, we should focus on enabling Servicemembers to bring their families to Korea and establish a more family oriented environment. With tour length normalization in Korea, in accordance with DoD overseas basing policies such as those in Europe and Japan, we could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program.

Medical Care for U. S. Forces in Korea

One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high-quality medical care for service-members of all military branches and their families.

Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges. Reforms proposed have included: (1) establishment of a joint military medical command for Korea to streamline command and control of health care delivery for all personnel, (2) development of a managed care support contract for Korea, and (3) offering a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.

If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the management and delivery of health care services in Korea?

Quality health care is essential for all Servicemembers, regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important for our Servicemembers who serve in Korea—thousands of miles from home. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the availability of quality health care for our Servicemembers and their families.

What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding support to non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered and revised by the Department of Defense?

General Bell has made extraordinary strides for non-command sponsored family members by ensuring access and availability of the full range of services, entitlements and privileges for all dependent family members who reside with their military, DoD civilian employee, or invited contractor sponsor in Korea. If confirmed, I will continue General Bell's efforts by placing special emphasis on critical areas of support for Servicemember families such as TRICARE medical and dental programs as well as tuition assistance for dependent children. This may require addressing current DoD policies on non-command sponsored dependents.

Sexual Assault

What is your assessment of the progress that the Army has made in the last two years in the promulgation of policy on sexual assault, and what do you think will be your biggest challenge in achieving the changes in programs, training and implementation if confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea?

I believe that the Army has made great strides in ensuring the promulgation of its policy on sexual assault. General Bell has made preventing sexual assault a priority, as well as his policy which is to eliminate any occurrence of this crime within United States Forces Korea. If confirmed I will maintain General Bell's command focus upon awareness and prevention of sexual assault.

Prevention of Human Trafficking

Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U. S. military forces, Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.

What effects on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking have changes in U. S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

Changes in U.S. policy have decreased the incidents of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea. General Bell has instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding prostitution and human trafficking within United States Forces Korea. The current USFK strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement has been a success, and, if confirmed, I will continue this approach.

What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

I believe that the Uniform Code of Military Justice and extant military regulations are sufficient to ensure the efficacy of the zero tolerance policy. I would be willing to offer any recommendations to this committee should I see the need to do so in the future.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

If confirmed, I will continue General Bell's zero tolerance policy and strategy of awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement. I will maintain command focus to further enhance the policy's effectiveness.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.