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**Advance Policy Questions for Joseph A. Benkert
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs
Submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee 24 June 2008**

Defense Reforms

The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms can be summarized as: strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

1 Do you agree with these goals?

A: Yes, I agree with these goals.

2 Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

A: No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Duties

3 What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs?

A: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD/GSA) is a new position, created to centralize DoD's policy apparatus for dealing with global threats and the tools we have to address those threats. In this capacity, the ASD/GSA is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for development and execution of strategies, policies and procedures on the following matters: building partner nations' capacity to maintain security and stability; overseeing security cooperation and foreign military sales programs; countering transnational threats including narcotics and WMD proliferation and related networks of contraband; security of U.S. technology; maintenance of coalitions in support of multinational operations; policies for humanitarian and disaster assistance; recovery of U.S. personnel and POW/MIA issues; and detainee affairs.

4 Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?

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A: If confirmed, I anticipate that the Secretary would direct me to manage the Global Security Affairs organization, including the day-to-day tasks associated with the duties noted in my response to the previous question. He would likely ask that I provide him and the Under Secretary for Policy with policy recommendations on issues within my area of responsibility, and that I monitor and provide policy advice on operations with these areas. I would also expect the Secretary to ask that I represent him and the Under Secretary for Policy in the interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing with my assigned areas of responsibility

5 What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs? What challenges has the reorganization created for carrying out those functions and duties, and if confirmed, what steps would you take to address those challenges?

A: The reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy created the office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. The functions of this new organization were performed previously by disparate elements of the Policy Organization. The purpose of creating ASD(GSA) was to place under a central management structure the Policy specialists who address many types of global threats - for example, counter narcotics, proliferation and detainees, and the policy tools to address those threats. These tools include the security assistance and building-partnership capacity programs implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the personnel recovery and accountability activities of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Organization, and the technology security activities of the Defense Technology Security Administration. This Defense Agency and two Defense Field Activities, respectively, were also realigned under the new ASD(GSA) as part of the reorganization.

Centralization of DoD's policy makers who work on global issues has broken old stovepipes of information and permitted better synchronization of DoD policies and activities. For example, we are better able to coordinate building partnership activities with the work of counternarcotics and combating WMD programs by having all of these activities report to a single Assistant Secretary. The span of responsibilities for this new organization is admittedly broad. If confirmed, one step that I will take to mitigate this factor is to seek to ensure that all key leadership positions in the organization are filled.

Relationships

6 What do you see as the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Combatant Commanders

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Director, Defense Technology Security Administration

A: If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain close working relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Combatant Commanders. I would expect to maintain a close relationship on programs related to combating WMD with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office, and the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration to the through the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs.

The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy, as appropriate. Examples of this coordination would include working with the Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, and Homeland Defense and Americas Security in their areas of

responsibility to synchronize building partnership capacity activities and countering global threats; and working with the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on combating WMD terrorism.

Qualifications

7 What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position? JOE: I SKETCHED IT OUT

7. **A:** *I believe that I am qualified for this position, if confirmed, by virtue of leadership experience in a broad range of organizations responsible for national security policy, program formulation and implementation; and a broad base of substantive knowledge regarding U.S. national security priorities and issues.*

I have served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs since December 2006, when the organization was established. I managed the establishment of the organization and its day-to-day affairs, and in the absence of a duly appointed and confirmed Assistant Secretary, have performed many of the non-statutory duties of the Assistant Secretary. I believe that I am well versed in GSA's issues and in the requirements to lead the organization.

Since 2003, I have served in the Department in several civilian leadership positions. I assisted in establishing the Coalition Provisional Authority's Washington organization and served as its Deputy and Chief of Staff. Upon the CPA's dissolution, I led the stand-up of a follow-on organization to support the Department's role in Iraq reconstruction and stabilization programs and activities. Prior to my current position, I served as the acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

In my current and previous positions, I have testified before Congress on issues under my responsibility, and have established effective working relationships with DoD and interagency counterparts.

Prior to my civilian service, I was a career Navy officer with leadership experience in command at sea and in Washington. As a naval officer, I had over three years of experience in the OSD Policy organization as a senior military assistant and as the Director of European Policy. I also served earlier in my career as a legislative liaison officer for the Department of the Navy, which I believe has facilitated working with the Congress since then.

Major Challenges and Problems

8 In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs?

A: If confirmed, I expect to be confronted with at least four primary challenges during my tenure. First, the Office of Global Security Affairs (GSA) needs to consolidate and institutionalize the "toolkit" of programmatic and related options available for advancing the Department's strategy of building partner capacity. Second, we will need continued focus on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the connections between the combating WMD and counter-terrorism missions. Third, we need to continue to focus on transition paths for current detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, I believe we can drive improvements in our understanding of how various networks of transnational threats might intersect or converge, and how to address these threats to U.S. national security.

9 Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

A: If confirmed, I will continue the work I have begun while Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary with respect to rationalizing processes for security cooperation development. Our system is currently not as flexible as it should be for post 9/11 challenges and we can use the GSA structure to improve. I also believe we need to continue to develop new processes to ensure better integration within DoD of the combating WMD and counter-terrorism missions. With respect to the challenge of "networked threats," we are truly in a learning mode. We have been working with various policy and intelligence elements of the Department to help define this new mission space, and GSA will host a conference along with the National Counterproliferation Center and the Monterrey Institute this autumn to broaden participation in this effort.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority ("Section 1206") and the security and stabilization assistance authority ("Section 1207").

10 What are DOD's strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

A: The Department's objectives for building partner capacity are tied to our broader regional and functional objectives for each of the regional and functional combatant commands as prescribed by the National Defense Strategy and the Guidance for Employment of the Force. Our intention is to build a network of like-minded, capable security partners who face mutual security threats and can operate alongside, or in lieu of, US forces to combat these threats. Because U.S. forces and resources are finite, and given the nature of the threats we face, it is essential that we work to build partner capabilities to effectively counter evolving security threats.

DoD guidance documents, strategies, and operational and contingency planning now reflect the reality that providing security must be a cooperative endeavor conducted by,

through, and with our partners. As Secretary Gates made clear in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement – irrespective of the capacity of other departments – and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality. The Department of Defense would no more outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.”

11 What is your understanding of the purpose of the global train and equip authority, and what is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

A: I believe the Global Train and Equip authority, commonly known as “Section 1206” authority, is an important new tool for building partner-nation operational capacity. By law, the purpose of the global train and equip authority is two-fold. Any program conducted under this authority must build the capacity of partner nation security forces to either (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2) participate in or support military and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. For either purpose, DoD’s focus is the same: build operational capacity that meets US-identified partner capability gaps that, if filled, may reduce near-term stress on US forces and the long-term risk of US military intervention, as partners increasingly address threats within their borders and become security exporters.

My assessment is that “Section 1206” has a solid implementation track record. Although the program is only in its second full fiscal year of implementation, it is in many ways already a model of interagency cooperation. The program requires both State and DoD to formally approve each proposal, both in the field and in Washington, DC. The approach recognizes DoD’s core military requirement for operational partners, while simultaneously recognizing the State Department’s core competency in ensuring that all actions are in accord with US foreign policy, international agreements, human rights vetting and other legal requirements. There has been an enthusiastic response from Embassies and COCOMs, culminating in program requests. I thank the Committee for extending and expanding this authority in its draft NDAA for FY 2009, and will work to ensure our processes and guidance fully reflect Congressional intent.

12 What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

A: The Global Train and Equip authority, as noted previously, fills two very specific requirements to build capacity to counter terrorism and instability. These purposes can complement other DoD and USG authorities, but also serve discrete needs apart from them.

DoD counternarcotics authorities allow DoD to support USG efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. While some regions of the world – notably Latin America and

southwest Asia – face significant counternarcotics challenges, the threat of terrorism exists there as well, and terrorists seek to exploit many of the same gaps used by those who seek to smuggle drugs across our borders. 1206 is deliberately designed to build capacity to meet such transnational threats early, before they metastasize into more significant problems.

I strongly support Congressional desire to keep these programs separate and distinct, using them only for their legislatively-directed purposes. The best way to ensure 1206 programs meet defined counterterrorism or stability operations needs is to tie them directly to objectives established in the Department’s planning guidance. In my current capacity as PDASD, I have tasked my staff to review 1206 and CN proposals together to identify potential overlap in individual programs, and to ensure 1206 guidance reflects that projects are only appropriate when the proposal’s primary mission is counterterrorism or stability operations, not to backfill lower priority CN needs. Proposals are deconflicted by individual country teams, which must follow 1206 guidance that requires deconfliction with FMF. Once submitted, this deconfliction is validated by Department of State.

13 What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?

A: I believe that 1207 fills an urgent gap in the State Department’s ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction assistance. Secretary Gates made clear in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee the Department’s view of the purpose of “Section 1207” authority: bringing civilian resources to bear in complex security environments where their expertise is needed. In his words: “A touchstone for the Defense Department is that 1207 should be for civilian support for the military – either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.”

In my view, the 1207 authority’s utility has been growing. We have made progress in improving the coordination with the State Department and Congress, importing several 1206 implementation “best practices” that have proven themselves valuable. Program quality and execution have improved. Since its inception, improved DoD and State coordination has led to the identification of more programs that met the legislation’s intent, and in Fiscal Year 07 State and DoD ultimately approved programs totaling virtually all of the authority. It is likely that the full authority will again be used in FY08.

14 What is the process by which the Department of Defense reviews requests from the Department of State for security and stabilization assistance funding?

A: Section 1207 projects must originate in the field, and require formal concurrence from both the relevant Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander. Once finalized in the field, DoD, State, and USAID review projects simultaneously.

Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power” – civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

15 If confirmed, what actions would you take to expand the Government’s resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?

A: Advancing Secretary Gates’ efforts to expand “soft power” tools is a key element of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs’ mission. If confirmed, I would continue to advance this agenda, including:

- (1) Continued focus on the utilization of “Section 1207” security and stabilization assistance authority;*
- (2) Continued advocacy for increases to State and USAID’s topline, as well as support for State’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative;*
- (3) Overseeing the implementation of the Congressionally-mandated study of the National Security Interagency System, the Interagency elements of the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, and advising the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on additional interagency initiatives or requirements;*
- (4) Seeking additional ways that DoD can effectively support USG initiatives led by civilian agencies, including counternarcotics, public diplomacy, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance and disaster response; and*

I would add, however, that only Congress has the authority to significantly expand the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power” and civilian agency capacity to engage, assist, and communicate with our partners. If confirmed, I stand ready to work with you on legislative initiatives to address this challenge.

16 In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

A: As Secretary Gates said during his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University last November, "if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad." The threats we face today require that we strengthen our capacity to use “soft” power and to

better integrate it with “hard” power.

An essential element of DoD's role vis-à-vis other agencies in the exercise of the instruments of soft power is that the department remain supportive of those agencies with appropriate statutory authority and core competencies in foreign policy (State), development and humanitarian response (USAID). For example, we are working closely with State and other agencies to provide assistance as available and appropriate in support of the national security strategy. Such involvement may include providing logistical support and expertise to State/USAID leadership in response to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis. We are working closely with State and other agencies to promote multi-agency coordination and cooperation to develop more comprehensive approaches to problems before they become crises.

17 In your view, which department should have the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy?

A: The State Department has had and should retain the lead in setting US Government security assistance policy. In developing processes for new tools like Section 1206, and reforming processes for traditional tools like FMF, both Departments have taken additional steps to enhance collaboration and jointly formulate plans and programs, while fully respecting the State Department’s primacy in security assistance.

Global and Emerging Threats

The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs includes responsibilities for formulating strategy and policy for countering global threats and emerging threats.

18 What are the global and emerging threats that you believe pose the most significant challenge to our security, and what approach would you take, if confirmed, to address these threats?

A: For the foreseeable future, I believe that our nation will face an environment defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. Violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and its associates reject the rules and structures of the international system. Their adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power. These extremists opportunistically exploit respect for these norms for their own purposes, hiding behind international norms and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to subvert them when it does not.

Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to violent extremists and international criminal networks frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity.

Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security. If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states.

A particular concern in this environment is the potential for proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear). Weapons of mass destruction in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.

Addressing the problem will require effective international partnerships and cooperation, and creative approaches to prevent proliferation and deny armed sub-national groups the opportunity to gain footholds in ungoverned spaces.

19 How do you believe we can most effectively reduce or minimize proliferation of the technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery?

A: To reduce or minimize proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, overlapping multilateral and national tools are the most effective approach. This is not a threat that can be solved by any one country or process alone. The treaties on WMD (NPT, CWC, BWC) provide the legal underpinnings of preventing the proliferation of WMD. In conjunction with this legal basis, the export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group for CW and BW technologies, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) provide a common basis for countries to work together. To stop WMD/missile-related shipments (whether to state actors or non-state actors), over 90 countries are working together through the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict such threatening movements of dual-use goods before they get to proliferators. The UN Security Council has addressed the problem through resolution 1540, which requires all countries to take steps against WMD/missile proliferation, to include export control laws in these areas. In addition, to specifically address the Iranian and North Korean threats, the UN Security Council has adopted resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803. To stop the financial aspects of WMD/missile proliferation, the President has implemented Executive Order 12938.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been described by Lieutenant General Metz, Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization, as a strategic weapon and one that we should expect to see in future wars. The United States has already seen IEDs proliferate from Iraq to Afghanistan, and there are reports about IEDs being used against Ethiopian forces in Somalia.

20 What do you believe the Department should do to counter the spread of IED technology?

A: *The Department's Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) continues to develop new, innovative ways to rapidly find, develop and deliver emerging capabilities to counter IEDs and the transnational networks that facilitate the funding and building of IEDs. The Department is also focusing on operational initiatives that disrupt IED networks, including tracking financiers, trainers and the supporting infrastructure.*

I believe that limiting the availability of components, and effective policing action to find the terrorist cells before they act, are the most effective measures against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Limiting the availability of components, through export controls and other means, is however difficult. For example Terrorists can pick and choose from a large variety of fusing mechanisms, which can range from very simple such as a hand held switch or a pressure plate switch to more sophisticated methods such as cellular telephones or other commercially available communications devices.

Combatant Commands and the Interagency

If confirmed, you will play an important role in developing interagency coordination with the Department of Defense. Two of the Department's geographic combatant commands – U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command – are in the process of developing and implementing an interagency model that incorporates into their respective command structures personnel from other agencies of government. Both commanders have touted this interagency approach as a model for the future.

21 What is your opinion of these new interagency models for these two combatant commands?

A: *Both of these efforts are evolutionary in nature. We are working closely with the State Department to develop new structures in an attempt to deal with new threats and challenges. The goal is to promote interagency coordination in such a way that we can better prevent rather than simply react to problems before crises, and crises before they become catastrophes.*

22 Do you believe the other agencies of government, particularly the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), will be able to provide adequate support for these interagency commands?

A: *We continue to work with both State and USAID in meeting the evolving staffing requirements. The intent of this approach is to achieve a level of State and USAID participation so that the commands can better support State's lead in foreign policy and USAID's lead in development. The intended purpose is for improved interagency cooperation and coordination that remains supportive of the statutory lead roles as well as core competencies of both State and USAID.*

Strategic Framework Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq

23 What is the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, if any, in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework Agreement and a status of forces agreement with Iraq?

A: The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs does not have a direct role in the negotiations of a Strategic Framework or the status of forces agreement with Iraq. We review and provide suggestions regarding specific aspects of the negotiations that relate to matters under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.

24 What is your understanding of the basic authorities that the United States is seeking as part of these agreements, absent which we would not sign the agreements?

A: Global Security Affairs does not have a direct role in the negotiations; nor were we part of the interagency discussions developing U.S. negotiating strategies.

Coalition Support Funds

Since 2001, the Department of Defense has provided billions of dollars in Coalition Support Fund payments to reimburse key partner nations for support provided to U.S. military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

25 What is the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, if any, in overseeing the use of Coalition Support Funds?

A: The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the applicable Combatant Commander have primary responsibility for administering Coalition Support Funds activities. The role of ASD(GSA) is to assist in resolving issues when necessary.

26 What is your assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds? What steps, if any, would you recommend for improving this process?

A: My assessment of the process for reviewing claims presented for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is that it appears to work reasonably well. I understand that timely submission of requests for reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds is a factor, but the responsibility of our coalition partners.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

27 Do you support accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

A: Yes, I support the United States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

28 In your view, would ratification of this convention be in the national security interest of the United States?

A: Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, and will serve the national security interests of the United States, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. As the world's foremost maritime power, our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. By joining the Convention, we provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

The United Nations Mission in Darfur is suffering from a variety of equipment shortfalls, which have essentially made it impossible to deploy additional peacekeepers to this region. Some have argued that the Department of Defense, despite the demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, ought to provide the helicopters, trucks, and lift needed to make this mission a success.

29 In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions?

A: The U.S. Government is the largest contributor of financial resources to UN peacekeeping missions in general and to Darfur in particular. DOD has over 30 U.S. military personnel assigned to multiple peacekeeping missions. In partnership with the State Department, DOD provides training, financial resources and, when required, lift to countries contributing troops in Darfur and other UN peacekeeping missions. In my view, current DoD involvement in supporting UN peacekeeping missions is consonant with U.S. interests in those missions.

30 Would you support the DOD providing a greater level of support to U.N. peacekeeping missions and specifically to the mission in Darfur?

A: DOD recently approved assignment of eight U.S. military personnel to serve in Darfur. The Department is in the process of adding DOD staff officers to the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq and to the mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. I would support a comprehensive review of U.S. military personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping missions to ensure appropriate distribution and representation.

In partnership with the State Department and other USG agencies, DOD has been actively involved in efforts to identify countries with the capacity to fill critical UNAMID shortfalls such as helicopters and other enabling capabilities. We are making progress with particular countries such as Jordan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia. We are currently researching the availability of financial resources to assist these and perhaps other countries in their efforts to meet UN specifications.

31 Would you support NATO providing a greater level of support to the UN mission in Darfur?

A: Secretary Gates has made clear his position that Afghanistan must remain a top NATO priority. There have been substantial challenges meeting operational requirements in Afghanistan. I would not advocate any NATO involvement in Darfur that might jeopardize the Alliance's capacity to fully support operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the UN mission in Darfur was conceived as an African Union – United Nations hybrid operation. The Government of Sudan (GoS) agreed to the presence of a UN mission on its soil with the understanding that it would consist primarily of African forces, and has consistently obstructed the involvement of non-African and particularly Western countries. I would support specific UNAMID contributions from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries that did not conflict with priorities in Afghanistan.

Global Force Posture and Management

Relocation of Forces to Guam

32 What is your assessment of the implementation to date of the agreement between the United States and the Government of Japan to relocate a substantial portion of our Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam, and what is your assessment of the prospects for the ultimate success or failure of this effort? What do you see as the major obstacles to the full implementation of this agreement?

A: The US and the Government of Japan are committed to implementing the Realignment Roadmap for force posture changes in the Pacific as negotiated. The Roadmap addresses both the realignments from Okinawa to Guam and an interconnected set of realignments of US forces within Japan.

Both sides have done extensive planning for these relocations, including initiation of the required environmental impact analysis on Guam. DoD is working with our interagency colleagues on ways to improve Guam's capacity to absorb the volume of construction the program envisions. The Realignment Roadmap makes the Guam relocation contingent upon the Government of Japan successfully relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa prefecture to a new facility adjacent to Camp Schwab. To that end, the Government of Japan has initiated an environmental impact study for that.

The Government of Japan is currently building its next budget (April 2009-March 2010), and we are in discussions with the Government of Japan regarding the Guam

construction programs that budget would cover as part of Japan's \$6.09 billion total commitment for the Guam relocation. Overall, both governments remain committed to this complex effort and the prospects for success remain good.

Headquarters for Africa Command

It appears that few nations in Africa are eager to see a permanent U.S. military presence on their soil. In the near term, the Department is establishing a headquarters for the Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

33 Do you believe an Africa Command is viable over the long run if we cannot reach an agreement with a host nation in Africa to establish a headquarters for that command on the African continent?

A: Viability of the new command is not necessarily determined by location; there are examples of unified command headquarters located both within and outside of the regions for which they are responsible. At present DoD has opted to put aside the issue of a location for an on-continent HQ while it conducts an analysis of the logistical and personnel footprint required to support the new command.

Control of Special Operations Forces

There has been disagreement among senior military leaders in recent years about whether Special Operations forces should be a globally managed force that is largely based in the United States under the control of the Special Operations Command, or whether some portion of these forces should be stationed in, and under the control of, regional combatant commands.

34 What are your views on this matter? What do you believe maximizes our military capability and builds the best relationships with partner nations?

A: Under DoD's Global Force Management (GFM) system, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a globally managed force. Under this system, USSOCOM manages the deployment of its forces around the world, regardless of their source location. SOF units with a particular regional focus are routinely deployed to operate with or train partner nation units in theater. Once in theater, they are employed under the command of the unified combatant commander in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted. This system gives DoD the strategic flexibility to use such units for other operational assignments outside of their primary area of responsibility – as is the case of the situation in Iraq today.

The majority of SOF units are based in the US. SOF units stationed overseas are assigned to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, but are also globally available under the GFM system. This overall arrangement for managing SOF provides the Department with the ability to allocate capability against the full range of demands, and sustain the necessary partnerships to conduct special operations globally.

“Permanent” Bases

In a written response to a question for the record in connection with your testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee last year, you provided a definition of “permanent” versus “enduring” bases.

35 Would you agree that your response indicates the difference between the two is not a function of the length of time that United States forces maintain a presence at the installation in question, but rather depends on how robust that United States presence is, such as whether forces are permanently stationed or only assigned to that location on a rotational basis, or whether such tours are accompanied and the installation provides the family support facilities necessary to support accompanied tours?

A: “Enduring” is a term often used to describe a location where the US intends to develop and sustain a long-standing host-nation relationship and from which DoD expects there to be long-term demand to support critical missions. “Permanency” is generally a function of the nature of the footprint at a location – e.g., we tend to describe as “permanent” those locations with permanently assigned forces, substantial infrastructure, and dependents and family support facilities. In that sense, “permanent” generally would mean a very robust presence. It is often the case that locations described as “permanent” are also considered “enduring” in terms of host-nation relationship and mission needs.

36 Does the Department of Defense use the term “permanent bases” in its internal decision-making processes? If so, what meaning does that term have inside the Department of Defense?

A: DoD uses a three-tiered lexicon for facility types: Main Operating Bases, Forward Operating Sites, and Cooperative Security Locations. How specific locations are designated using this lexicon is a function of the nature of the host-nation relationship, the activities and missions the location supports, and the physical footprint at a location.

Enduring Presence at Baumholder, Germany

The Department recently decided to maintain our base at Baumholder, Germany, as an “enduring” base in support of our global strategy and of U.S. Army forces in Europe.

37 What units does the Department envision retaining at Baumholder, and how would the training areas at Baumholder be used by such forces or by other U.S. forces stationed in, or rotating through, Europe?

A: Support units, or “enablers” (e.g., military police and sustainment units), will likely be the predominant force presence at Baumholder over the long-term. USEUCOM and its Army component are finalizing plans that identify the types of units to be stationed there and the nature of training activities to be conducted.

38 In your opinion, is the change in the status of the Baumholder indicative of a larger reassessment of the ground force posture in Europe?

A: No. Since 2004 when the initial footprint requirements for a military presence in Germany were identified, the Department has determined that it would not have enough basing capacity in Germany to meet its needs if Baumholder were closed. Estimates of future footprint capacity needs are based upon emerging force structure changes (based on the new modular Army brigades), the need for additional support units, and evolved infrastructure requirements tied to supporting these other changes.

39 Does this change signal a departure from the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy announced by the President in August 2004?

A: No.

Change in Status of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

The Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, has advocated for the authorization to increase the number of, and length of accompanied tours for U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea in order to provide a more stable U.S. military presence on the peninsula.

40 In your view, what are the costs and benefits to this request?

A: As Secretary Gates stated recently, DoD is interested in pursuing the approach of extended, accompanied tours in Korea. The benefits of normalizing tour, include improved continuity, stability, and readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge.; as well as reduced costs and an overall savings as the number of Service member moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations. The military departments are conducting detailed assessments to determine the best way to implement this initiative over the course of the next 10 to 15 years.

41 In your opinion, would this increase require a renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement with the Republic of Korea?

A: DoD must conduct further detailed assessments to determine the full implications of the initiative, to include any possible impacts on agreements provisions. However, the initiative to normalize tour lengths in Korea has the broad support of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Host Nation Burdensharing

42 How would you assess the current trends in burden-sharing arrangements and residual value recovery with nations currently hosting U.S. forces?

A: *Burden-sharing arrangements with host-nation partners should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Key factors affecting these arrangements include the context of regional political-military and operational dynamics, the nature of the specific host-nation relationship, and related U.S. presence goals.*

Residual value recovery policy is managed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L).

43 Is the willingness of host nations to share in the costs of basing U.S. forces increasing or decreasing?

A: *As I indicated earlier, I am reluctant to generalize about host-nation cost-sharing for the U.S. presence globally. As the Department realigns its defense posture globally, it continues working with host-nation partners to develop suitable arrangements for supporting long-term U.S. presence goals. In many cases host-nation consultations and negotiations that determine cost-sharing arrangements are still ongoing.*

44 If confirmed, what would you do to maintain a healthy burden-sharing and residual value recovery program?

A: *If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department continues pursuing global defense posture changes with our allies and partners that strengthen our access relationships and forward capabilities. In pursuit of these two aims, I would certainly work to make burden sharing an important element of our negotiations with potential host-nation partners.*

Counternarcotics

The Department of Defense has been involved extensively in counternarcotics missions for many years, involving both active and reserve component forces.

45 In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in interdicting illegal drugs bound for the United States, in reducing drug cultivation, and in reducing demand?

A: *The counternarcotics (CN) authorities and responsibilities assigned to the Department of Defense (DOD) by law provide useful and flexible ways to support the National Drug Control Strategy, as well as achieve national security goals around the world. DOD conducts CN activities in support to U.S. local, state and federal counternarcotics agencies, as well as foreign counternarcotics forces. In many cases, this support is carried out by DOD-sponsored Joint Task Forces and Joint Interagency Task Forces, several of which have increased their international liaison and operational coordination roles.*

46 In recent years, the Department has shifted its focus from interdicting illegal drugs bound for the United States to interdicting illicit trafficking (including trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, and money) bound for the United States. What is your opinion of this expanded focus?

A: As it has become increasingly apparent that the global illegal drug trade has connections to terrorism, financial crimes, corruption of governmental systems, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, major gang networks, insurgency and instability in many places worldwide. As a general premise, illicit trafficking, whatever the commodity, undermines partner nations' authority and government structures; and provides transnational criminal organizations and terrorists revenue to purchase weapons and plan operations that threaten U.S. security interests. By widening the Department's focus to trafficking networks -- drugs, weapons, people or money -- the Department provides critical support to undermine transnational networks that threaten the nation.

In the legislative proposals the Committee received from the Department of Defense for the upcoming fiscal year, the counternarcotics program requested a significant expansion in the number of countries eligible to receive support from the Department, including an expansion to West Africa.

47 In your assessment, is the drug trafficking threat from Africa sufficient enough to justify a major expansion of the counternarcotics program into West Africa?

A: Africa, especially West Africa, has seen a dramatic increase in drug smuggling and associated corruption and intimidation that turns weakly-governed areas into nearly ungoverned spaces. Currently, the threat of the expanding illicit drug trade threatens Africa's fragile future. Working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities, while partnering with European allies, is one way to approach the dilemma. Additionally, profits realized by Colombian narcoterrorists in Africa, sustain continued assaults against the government of Colombia and others in the Western Hemisphere.

Counternarcotics, Counter Proliferation, and Global Threats

You have responsibility for counternarcotics, counter proliferation, and nonproliferation activities. A growing concern is the connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists.

48 What actions do you believe are appropriate to identify, track, and stop funding sources that could be used by terrorists to obtain nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction weapons or equipment?

A: I agree that there is concern over the possible connection between narcotics trafficking and terrorists, and that undermining an adversary's ability to finance hostile activities against U.S. interests is a critical priority for the Department. The Department supports counterthreat finance interoperability with other government agencies to

achieve national security objectives. If confirmed as ASD for GSA, I will be responsible for developing the Department's counterthreat finance policy guidance and developing counterthreat finance requirements. It is critical to develop and include integrated capabilities designed to exploit financial networks that support activities that are hostile towards U.S. interests. The Department will work in coordination with other U.S. government agencies to counter adversaries' funding networks and undermine terrorists' ability to obtain nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Counterdrug/Counterterrorism Missions

Special operations forces have been deeply involved in training forces in Colombia to conduct unified counterdrug - counterterrorism missions.

49 In your view, what has been the success of training missions in Colombia?

A: In my view DoD's training has been successful. The Colombian military and police forces are achieving battlefield superiority over illegal groups that traffic in drugs and have terrorized Colombia's people and threatened its sovereignty. US SOF counter-narcoterrorism training missions have been instrumental in helping the Colombian military and national police gain professional skills, improve combat techniques, and develop tactics and procedures. Equally important, SOF training has resulted in intangible results such as increased respect for human rights, an appreciation for civil-military operations, and professionalization of the force.

50 Are these appropriate missions for U.S. special operations forces?

A: These missions are appropriate and beneficial for US SOF. By undertaking these training missions, US SOF increase their proficiency at working with foreign partners to conduct their core missions of Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense.

51 What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug-training missions worldwide provide to special operations forces?

A: These training missions provide a realistic scenario for US SOF to hone their skills such as: teaching through interpreters; organizing, training, equipping and leading an indigenous force; and operating in austere environments not easily replicated in training locations in the US.

Detainee Affairs

52 Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DoD directives, regulations,

policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

A: *Yes.*

53 Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program?

A: *Yes.*

54 Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which US soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

A: *Yes. Humane treatment is the bedrock principle of DoD policy, regulations, and detention operations. By treating all detainees humanely, we hope that our adversaries will reciprocate with our service members. It should be noted however that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not bound by international regimes, and have demonstrated a profligate disregard for the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the Department remains steadfastly committed to its obligations under the law of armed conflict, and detains members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban within its custody and control humanely and consistent with international standards of treatment.*

55 Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for US forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

A: *Yes.*

In the past year and a half, Task Force 134 in Iraq has made significant changes to the way in which detention operations are conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.

56 What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq over the past year and a half?

A: *In order to be successfully integrated into an effective counterinsurgency campaign, detention operations in Iraq have moved beyond simply detaining individuals that remain a security threat to Coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. Besides removing insurgents from the battlefield, successful detention operations now focus on successfully reintegrating and rehabilitating detainees so that when they are released, they will not re-engage in hostilities.*

Task Force 134 has adopted a number of measures, called counterinsurgency inside the wire, which focus on these reintegration and rehabilitation efforts. These lessons learned have included more thorough screening of detainees so as to isolate the extremists elements from more moderate Iraqis, family involvement and visitations, and voluntary educational and vocational programs, including voluntary exposure to moderate Islamic teaching, so as to better equip detainees to find jobs upon release and help them resist extremist influences.

57 What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into the Department of Defense's doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?

A: Each theater of operations will have some unique detention requirements, tailored to the nature and scope of operations. However the Department is applying lessons learned from detention-centered counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and incorporating best practices in Afghanistan. For example, the Department is planning to implement voluntary educational and vocational training programs at Theater Internment Facilities in Afghanistan. The Department is also examining ways to incorporate some of these practices at Guantanamo, such as expanding family contact through telephone calls.

Building on these successes will require a review of DoD's internal directives and policy guidance as it pertains to detention, and issuing or modifying new guidance as appropriate.

DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

The CTR program has several key objectives including: (1) reducing strategic nuclear weapons; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and fissile material; (3) eliminating and preventing biological and chemical weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging military reductions and reforms to reduce proliferation threats.

58 In your view, how has the CTR program benefitted U.S. national security?

A: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has reduced the threat of WMD proliferation by securing possible sources of WMD, destroying or deactivating threat systems, and improving the capability to detect and interdict WMD or related materials in transit. CTR's "scorecard" during the 16-year history of the program speaks for itself: 7292 warheads deactivated with CTR support; 1529 ICBMs and SLBMs eliminated; 796 silos eliminated; 131 mobile ICBM launchers eliminated; 155 strategic bombers eliminated; 906 nuclear Air-to-Surface missiles eliminated; 456 submarine launch tubes eliminated from 30 missile submarine which were eliminated by CTR. In addition, a fissile material storage facility was constructed in Russia which we believe is being loaded with plutonium derived from dismantled weapons; CTR has have provided inventory control and physical security for Russian warhead storage sites. The forgoing

comprises key elements of the “scorecard,” but do not include CTR’s work in WMD border security and bio-security.

Many of these activities were initially conducted during a period when cooperating governments were unable to provide adequate security for the weapons and related systems. Thus, the data reflects not merely specific weapons or delivery systems eliminated, but rather elimination of threats which in many cases were vulnerable to misappropriation.

In addition to the “scorecard” data, CTR has also provided a vehicle for cooperation with governments with whom communication with the U.S. was sometimes tense in other venues. The value of maintaining areas of cooperation on difficult issues is difficult to measure but no less intrinsic. Moreover, CTR specifically and U.S. national security interests more broadly have benefited greatly from the willingness of its founders, Senators Nunn and Lugar, to continue being emissaries for WMD non-proliferation cooperation.

59 What is your view of the CTR program’s chemical and biological weapons elimination efforts?

A: CTR’s chemical weapons elimination efforts marked a milestone in 2007, when Albania became the first State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention to complete elimination of its declared chemical weapons stockpile. This effort was completed with CTR assistance. In 2008/9, CTR’s chemical weapons elimination efforts will mark another milestone with commissioning of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye, in the Russian Federation. CTR is committed to successful completion of this project, which has had a very complex history. CTR will remain well-positioned to conduct chemical weapons elimination work, or related activities, over the long term due its ability to draw on expertise of the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps and Chemical Materials Agency.

CTR’s biological weapons elimination work is based currently on a flexible model which incorporates bio-security, dangerous pathogen surveillance, cooperative research, and disease reporting/information sharing. It is titled formally the “Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP).” BTRP can be adapted to meet the needs of new partner nations, or to limit the risk DoD chooses to take on. BTRP is the fastest growing area of the CTR program, reflecting the threat posed by weak bio-security worldwide.

60 Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U. S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., the State Department and the Department of Energy?

A: Yes. Examples of CTR’s coordination can be found in the area of nuclear warhead security in Russia and the bio-security area. With respect to nuclear warhead security, CTR and a companion program at the Department of Energy have coordinated closely to accelerate U.S. efforts to complete work by the end of calendar 2008. That work is

proceeding on schedule with robust communication between CTR and DoE to resolve problems or pursue opportunities. With respect to bio-security, CTR staff has participated fully in an interagency effort led by the Department of State to develop a global strategy for coordination of U.S. bio-security and related assistance.

For fiscal year 2008, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program received additional funding and new authority to conduct threat reduction activities outside of the former Soviet Union.

61 What actions have you taken to implement this new authority?

A: The Department appreciates the streamlining of CTR authorities, as well as the initial allocation of \$10 million for FY2008 that was provided for activities outside states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). During my April 12, 2008 testimony to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, I noted that the program was evaluating potential programs in several countries outside the FSU with the goal of developing in 2008 CTR activities with those countries that could begin in 2009. If confirmed, I would offer to brief the Committee on the results of our evaluation and the way ahead.

Expansion of CTR outside the FSU has received much focus, but I should also note that 2008 is a year of intense activity for CTR inside the FSU: the complex Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility and nuclear warhead security projects in Russia will conclude this year; non-proliferation activities in Kazakhstan are being accelerated; and entirely new bio-security engagement activities are beginning in Armenia and Turkmenistan.

62 Are there any impediments that you have encountered in implementing this new authority and if so what are those impediments and what is your plan for addressing any such impediments?

A: New initiatives in a program like CTR are inherently labor intensive to develop. Therefore, a principal impediment has been prioritizing among CTR activities. We have added additional staff to help with this reprioritization. We also appreciate Congressional support for streamlining CTR authorities which will help improve flexibility and efficiency in operation of the program.

63 In your view, what are the key opportunities and challenges over the next five years that the CTR Program should address?

A: Among the specific opportunities or challenges that I see in the next five years for CTR are the following: (1) adapt CTR's non-proliferation policy goals and program business practices to be able to function effectively outside the Former Soviet Union; (2) add a more flexible, rapid mode of operations should circumstances warrant, but without overlapping with the State Department's Non-Proliferation/Disarmament Fund; (3) move CTR's relationship with the cooperating countries from an assistance-based model to one of partnership.

More broadly, since its inception, CTR's priority has been to address WMD and related materials "at their source." This is the most reliable means of dealing with the threat posed by WMD proliferation. In 2004, with the 2001 terrorist attacks in mind, CTR added the problem of WMD and related materials "on the move" as a goal to be addressed. For CTR, this has meant undertaking new activities in the area of WMD border security and expanding its bio-security work. CTR will always be ready to address WMD at the source. However, expanding the program's impact on non-proliferation priorities will demand continued creativity with the challenge of WMD "on the move."

Clearly the Russian economy has changed since the creation of the CTR programs, as has the nature of the U.S.- Russian relationship.

64 In your view, how should these changes be reflected in future of U.S.-Russian programs under the CTR program?

A: As I testified on April 2, 2008, I believe it is important to remember that CTR in Russia remains in the U.S. interest. However, CTR's role in Russia is changing as the Russian economy has improved and progress has been made on the initial programs of accounting for and securing the vast complex of Soviet-era WMD. CTR's role in Russia is declining today as Russia has new resources to fulfill its legal and other responsibilities. In 2008, more CTR funds will be obligated for activities outside Russia than inside Russia. This milestone begins a trend in CTR's program plan which will continue. Our goal is to fulfill promises and contracts that the CTR program has made in Russia, but also to shift our relationship to a different footing.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia co-chairs, is an example of Russia bringing its own expertise to the worldwide fight against WMD. We could envision the relationships built through CTR being leveraged for cooperative Russian-U.S. efforts to combat WMD in other countries.

65 What is your view of the advantages of the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement from a nonproliferation perspective?

A: In my view, the recently signed U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement may have a benefit in the non-proliferation area, in that it helps codify cooperation with agencies of the Russian Federation which also have responsibility for security of some nuclear materials. At a time when U.S. - Russian relations are complex, new venues for cooperation can be helpful in a mission as broad as non-proliferation.

Arms Control

Arms control has been a prominent feature in U.S. security policy in the past, but clearly the international security landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade.

66 What is your view of the current arms control efforts and the proper role of arms control in U.S. national security strategy?

A: Arms control remains an effective tool for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies nonproliferation and arms control as one of its three principle pillars, and as such, calls for the enhancement of arms control measures to impede proliferant states and terrorist networks. The National Strategy also calls for compliance with existing nonproliferation regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Agreements such as these not only call for the complete destruction of certain classes of WMD, but also possess the framework for addressing emerging threats.

67 What opportunities exist for advancing arms control with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery?

A: The US is currently leading international efforts to agree to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which would ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes. If ratified by all countries, this treaty could be a major step forward in nonproliferation and arms control. The Department of Defense supports current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition to negotiation of an FMCT, full implementation of the NPT, CWC, and BWC, along with efforts at universalization of these treaties, would contribute to security and stability. We are also working with the Department of State to conclude a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Export Control

68 Do you believe that a review is necessary of the implications for the U.S. satellite industry of retaining or removing satellites from munitions list for export purposes and the range of satellite and satellite components that are controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations?

A: The Department of State, which has the statutory authority for administering the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, including items on the U.S. Munitions List, would need to determine that such a review is necessary. If a review was initiated, the Department of Defense would assist in providing technical expertise and programmatic insight needed to determine whether the export controls protect U.S. national security.

69 If so, what questions should be addressed in such a review?

A: The scope of any review would be determined in coordination with the Department of State.

Counter Proliferation and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

70 If confirmed, what would be your role, if any, in policy formulation and implementation of the PSI?

A: I would be an active participant in the interagency policy formulation for PSI. In addition, I would provide guidance and oversight to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Counternarcotics, and Global Threats, who leads U.S. Government efforts in PSI's Operational Experts Group. The PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from twenty PSI participating states, meets regularly to develop operational concepts, organize the PSI exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue cooperation with key industry sectors. The OEG works on behalf of all PSI partners and strives to share its insights and experiences through bilateral and multilateral outreach efforts.

71 In your view, what are the benefits of the PSI?

A: First, PSI channels international commitment to stopping WMD-related proliferation by focusing on interdiction as a key component of a global counterproliferation strategy.

Second, PSI provides participating countries with opportunities to improve national capabilities and strengthen authorities to conduct interdictions. PSI partners have developed and sustained one of the only global, interagency, and multinational exercise programs, conducting over 30 operational air, maritime, and ground interdiction exercises involving over 70 nations.

Third, PSI provides a basis for cooperation among partners on specific actions when the need arises. Interdictions are information-driven and may involve one or several participating states, as geography and circumstances require. By working together, PSI partners combine their capabilities to deter and stop proliferation wherever and whenever it takes place.

72 Have the participants in the PSI actually interdicted a shipment of items associated with weapons of mass destruction that were being shipped illegally? If so, please provide examples of these actions including what nations participated and the legal authorities utilized to interdict the shipment and under which it was determined that the shipment was illegal.

A: PSI partners define "interdiction" broadly, as any action, based on sufficient information and consistent with national authorities and international legal frameworks, that results in the denial, delay or disruption of a shipment of proliferation concern. Shipments of concern may be transported by air, sea, or land.

The United States has worked successfully with multiple PSI partners in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to WMD and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. Details of specific successes are classified, and could be provided in a separate briefing.

73 How is funding to support PSI efforts, including exercises, determined and allocated and to what entities is such funding provided? What is the source of the funds and the amount utilized for PSI activities in fiscal year 2007 and planned for in fiscal years 2008 and 2009?

A: PSI is not budgeted currently in a traditional, programmatic sense. The PSI was conceived as a flexible, adaptive initiative that leverages existing capabilities, activities, authorities and resources rather than creating new ones. For example, PSI-related interdiction scenarios are often injected into existing military exercises, as was the case with US SOUTHCOM's PANAMAX 2007 exercise. DoD's PSI activities are funded out of existing budgets, such as Operations and Maintenance when a U.S. vessel executes a "hail-and-query." As a result, we have not previously tracked PSI expenditures separately. However, in response to legislative requirements, GSA staff is preparing a more detailed analysis of PSI funding.

In addition, beginning in 2007, the Department requested funding specifically for support to Combatant Commands for PSI-related activities. The 2008 request is \$800,000.

74 Is funding or in-kind assistance provided to international partners? If so please provide a list of countries which have received assistance and the nature or amount of the assistance provided on an annual basis?

A: The Department has not provided funding or in-kind support to international partners specifically for PSI. I understand that the Department of State has provided financial support to PSI partners under State authorities.

Cluster Munitions

Last month more than 110 countries, including the United Kingdom -- but not the United States -- approved the text of an agreement banning the use, production, and sale of cluster munitions.

75 What is your view of the treaty on cluster munitions?

A: Cluster munitions are effective weapons, provide distinct advantages against a range of targets and can, against some targets, result in less collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure than unitary weapons. The Oslo Convention's ban on cluster munitions, if we were to join it, would result in a capability gap for indirect fire of area targets that would require an increase other resources and could put at risk our airmen and ground forces.

The U.S. shares the concerns about unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by the use of cluster munitions. In July, at the next negotiation session of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States will work to complete a new cluster munitions protocol. The CCW includes all of the major producers and users of cluster munitions, many of which will not sign the Oslo Convention; thus, an agreement in the CCW is likely to have a greater practical effect. We have called for completion of a new cluster munitions protocol by the end of 2008.

76 What impact do you believe U.S. opposition to the cluster munitions treaty will have on our relations with other nations who support the treaty and on future operations with coalition partners?

A: The Oslo Convention contains specific provisions that would allow parties to the Convention to cooperate militarily and to operate with non parties such as the United States. Military cooperation and operations includes transit of and storage of cluster munitions on the territory of countries that accede to the Oslo Convention. Without a single, broad interpretation of these provisions, the U.S. ability to uphold treaty commitments and for countries to participate with us in international peacekeeping operations could be in jeopardy. We believe that all countries that accede to the Oslo Convention can agree on a single, broad interpretation which provides for needed interoperability.

Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Personnel

Recovery of remains operations in North Korea are a humanitarian effort, and arguably should not be tied to the larger political and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its inception in 1996 until its suspension in 2005, this program was seen by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is critically important to the families of these missing service members.

77 What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North Korea?

A: The Department temporarily suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to concern for our personnel during a period of heightened tensions between the U.S. and North Korea; however, we are prepared to return once conditions are appropriate. The Department will ensure that before any personnel conduct future remains recovery operations in North Korea we have taken all possible precautions to ensure their safety. These precautions will include access to urgent medical care if required, and availability of adequate communications systems. Additionally, the Department will require North Korea to permit our teams access to key sites where suspected remains may be recovered.

78 Does the Department intend to wait until pending political and nuclear issues are resolved before approaching North Korea about the resumption of recovery operations?

A: As the Secretary wrote in his 21 May, 2008 letter to Chairman Levin, the Department shares the desires of families and veterans to resume remains recovery operations in North Korea, and we are prepared to do so at the appropriate time. Unfortunately, we cannot predict when conditions will be conducive to resuming discussion on this humanitarian program. We are monitoring the situation closely. As soon as we believe it is appropriate to reengage with North Korea on these recovery efforts, we will ensure that Congress is informed. As you know, the Six Party Talks are currently at an especially sensitive point. Should we deploy U.S. personnel in re-stated recovery operations, their efforts could be put in jeopardy if the talks fail.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reported to Congress last year on the organization, management, and budgeting of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). The report essentially supported the status quo.

79 What is your view of the organization, management, and budget structure of JPAC?

A: I believe JPAC's current organization, management, and budget structure aligned under PACOM and funded by the Department of the Navy meets its current needs and requirements. The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has formed a Senior Study Group comprised of principals within the POW/MIA personnel accounting community to study continually this and other issues within the personnel accounting community.

80 Is JPAC sufficiently funded to maximize progress in identifying the remains of missing service members?

A: JPAC is fully funded for its approved missions and its current operations tempo, which includes fielding 70 worldwide missions per year. Their biggest challenge has been insufficient workspace. The JPAC commander has taken action to increase work space, which will enhance their ability to establish identifications. The PACOM Commander has ranked the JPAC MILCON in his top requirements; design begins in FY09, and construction begins in FY10. Additionally JPAC is working with the military and civilian human resource offices to increase their percentage of assigned personnel. These actions will allow the command to be more effective in accomplishing its mission.

Although JPAC is sufficiently funded to maintain its current operations tempo, if JPAC is able to resume operations in North Korea, the organization will require additional funding. JPAC's latest estimate for FY09 is that an additional \$15.1 million would be required to resume operations. That estimate could change depending on market conditions when operations actually resume. We will keep the committee apprised of any changes in that assessment.

81 Has the Department considered moving JPAC and its forensic capabilities to the mainland United States? If so, what were the results of that consideration? What are the obstacles to such a move?

A: The Department continues to look at a number of options to increase JPAC's forensic remains identification capacity, to include another laboratory on the mainland, still under the command of JPAC and focused only on identifying remains. This is only one option under consideration, however. Currently, the JPAC Commander is evaluating ways to improve the recruitment and retention of anthropologists and archaeologists, to include increasing pay and incentives, but the organization is still collecting data on these matters, and will make recommendations after evaluating the data.

A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study recommended that the Department undertake a formal needs assessment of the workload of the Defense POW/MIA Office to determine both what resources are needed and how they can best be allocated among the various mission areas.

82 Has the Department performed a formal needs assessment as recommended by the GAO? If not, why not, and if so, what were the results?

A: In August 2007, OUSD Policy contracted with a private organization to analyze the current distribution of staff, identify areas for revised manpower distribution, and offer recommendations to improve the capacity of DPMO to meet mission objectives. The analysis included a review of, and recommendations for, the most effective use and distribution of civilian, military and contract personnel.

The organizational assessment, which also included a needs assessment, was completed on December 28, 2007. The assessment recommended increased staffing for the operational support and personnel recovery mission areas. DPMO documented the recommended staffing requirements in developing the Department's FY 10-15 program

83 What is DoD doing to ensure sufficient outreach to family members to collect reference samples and that adequate resources are allocated to family reference sample collection? How will DoD ensure that it has collected as many family reference samples as possible?

A: We have 67% of family reference samples from Vietnam War families. For the Korean War, we have samples for 61% of all losses, but we have employed a strategy that prioritizes collection on losses in certain key areas. As a result we have 90% of the reference samples for those lost in the principal areas where JPAC operated in North Korea and between 84-90% of samples in areas where North Korea unilaterally recovered and repatriated a large number of remains that we are still working to identify. For World War II, our approach is to collect family reference samples for specific aircraft crews or casualties in individual engagements where we have recovered remains, and there too our methods have proven successful.

One of the major methods DPM uses to solicit for reference samples is through our Family Update program. Annually, DPMO holds eight Family Update meetings in cities around the nation. More than 40% of families at these meetings are first time attendees. DPMO will continue to explore creative ways to increase family reference donation.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is a significant global humanitarian problem. If confirmed, you would serve as the focal point for Secretary of Defense's policies of interest within OSD.

84 What do you believe to be the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in supporting U.S. government policies to prevent human trafficking?

A: Per DoD Instruction 2200.01, it is DoD policy to: oppose prostitution, forced labor, and any related activities that may contribute to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons (TIP) as inherently harmful and dehumanizing; deter activities of DoD Service members, civilian employees, indirect hires, contract personnel, and command-sponsored dependents that would facilitate or support TIP, domestically and overseas; educate all Service members and DoD civilians annually on the worldwide trafficking menace, national TIP policy, overseas theater TIP policy, and attendant personal responsibilities consistent with DoD core values and ethical standards; increase efforts by commanders and military police worldwide, within their authorities, to pursue indicators of TIP in commercial establishments patronized by DoD personnel, place offending establishments off-limits, and provide support to host-country authorities involved in the battle against TIP.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness serves as the DoD Combating Trafficking in Persons Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and develops overall policy and provide guidance for the DoD CTIP program. The Office of the ASD/GSA supports DoD efforts to combat TIP by representing the Department in the annual U.S. Government TIP sanction review process and working closely with the Office to Monitor and Combat TIP at the Department of State.

Piracy

Piracy is a major problem that affects U.S. interests. Some of the world's key shipping lanes and offshore oil operations, for instance, off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Guinea, and in the Strait of Molacca have seen numerous incidents of piracy. The U.S. Navy and our allies in Europe have played an active role in protecting the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia in recent years.

85 What do you believe to be the appropriate role for the Department of Defense in preventing and responding to the growing problem of piracy?

A: *The President's Piracy policy of June, 2007, provides that "The United States strongly supports efforts to repress piracy and other criminal acts of violence against maritime navigation. The physical and economic security of the United States -- a major global trading nation with interests across the maritime spectrum -- relies heavily on the secure navigation of the world's oceans for unhindered legitimate commerce by its citizens and its partners. Piracy and other acts of violence against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of communication, interfere with freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermine regional stability."*

The policy calls for a multifaceted approach to piracy involving the missions and capabilities of various U.S. agencies, and the international community, in addition to DoD: "Piracy repression should include diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, law enforcement, and judicial actions. Effectively responding to piracy and criminal activity sends an important deterrent message and requires coordination by all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in order to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice in a timely manner." As this policy recognizes, DoD plays an important, but not the sole role in preventing and responding to piracy through the combined operational capabilities of our forces, and our coalition allies.

Global Food Crisis

One of your responsibilities will be to serve as the focal point for policies of interest relating to the Department of Defense's response to international health crises and humanitarian disasters. By all accounts, the world is in the midst of a decline in the availability of food and an increase in the price of food. Should this global food crisis continue, it is likely that the Department of Defense will be called upon to assist in a variety of places around the world.

86 In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in providing relief to this crisis and other resource crises around the world?

A: *The Department of Defense has varied capabilities to assist in crises of different kinds, as was demonstrated during the December 2004 response to the tsunami in Asia. I would expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on an appropriate role for a hypothetical event that has not occurred.*

Humanitarian Disaster

In international humanitarian crises where the United States provides relief, the Department of Defense is often called upon to play a major role.

87 What do you see as the primary challenges for the Department in providing such relief, and what do you believe is the appropriate role for the Department in providing humanitarian relief?

A: *Again, I would expect the Department to respond to any crisis in conjunction with other elements of the U.S. Government, but it is difficult to comment on challenges for a hypothetical event that has not occurred.*

In general, DoD, through its Combatant Commands, participates in Foreign Disaster Relief efforts 1) when directed by the President, 2) with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and 3) in emergency situations in order to save lives. DoD plays a key role in disaster situations by offering unique assets for timely and effective response to foreign nations that request assistance. The Department also plays a key role in any overseas disaster relief effort when civilian authorities become overwhelmed as evident during the Indonesian Tsunami (2005), Pakistan Earthquake (2006), Hurricane Felix-Nicaraguan relief efforts (2007), Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh (2007), and Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008).

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

88 Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

A: *Yes.*

89 Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs?

A: *Yes.*

90 Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

A: *Yes.*

91 Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

A: *Yes.*