

Advance Questions for Honorable Nelson Ford
Nominee for Under Secretary of the Army

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change in the operation of the Department of Defense (DoD). While I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-service and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

This milestone legislation has served our nation well for more than two decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with the Congress to determine whether the Act should be revised to better address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges confronting the Military Departments in today's security environment. It also may be appropriate to assess whether the law might be modified to allocate roles and responsibilities more effectively among the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Military Departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. One particular issue that merits review is accountability for the conduct of deployed forces.

Duties

Section 3015 of title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned?

If confirmed, I will serve as the principal assistant and senior civilian advisor to the Secretary of the Army and will support him in his leadership of the Department as he fulfills the

duties and responsibilities accorded him by law and regulation. I envision the Secretary will also assign to me specific duties and responsibilities that will support his efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it has been entrusted. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, I expect that the Secretary of the Army will designate the Under Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the Department with the primary management responsibility for business operations. I expect the Secretary to assign me such duties and responsibilities in my role as Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer the business operations of the Army effectively and efficiently, in accordance with the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will carry out my duties to the best of my ability, with honor and integrity.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

For most of my career, I have served in a variety of senior management positions responsible for financial management, policy development, program evaluation and productivity. I am currently the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), having been confirmed by the Senate in October 2006 after serving for two years as the Principal Deputy to the ASA(FM&C). Previously, I served in the Department of Defense as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy with responsibility for the financial management, policy development and program evaluation of the Defense Health Program. External to government service, I served as Chief Operating Officer for Georgetown University Medical Center and was a partner in Coopers & Lybrand. These experiences have afforded me the opportunity to understand how large organizations function, particularly within the parameters of plans, programs and budgets, to face and overcome challenges on a continuing basis. My work in financial management for the Army has afforded me the privilege of building strong, effective relationships with other senior leaders and staff within the Army, the other Military Departments, and the Department of Defense.

My experience with the Defense Health Program is beneficial to the Army, particularly at this point in time when we are working with the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs to provide quality, comprehensive care to Wounded Warriors and Warriors in Transition. In fact, most of my career has been in the health care field, which has given me a broad base of knowledge that benefits the Army in developing processes and policies to support a wide range of health care initiatives.

Further, I am familiar with the fiduciary responsibilities of federal officials, particularly those that are applicable to Army personnel, and feel confident that I can positively contribute toward establishing and maintaining management controls and high fiscal and ethical standards. Much of my experience has been in mission-driven organizations, both as a manager and Board member, so I understand the challenges of matching large and complicated missions in resource constrained environments. My experience includes organizational service in times of both growth and cutbacks, both of which are relevant for today's Army. I feel I am very well

prepared to continue leading from the strategic level and with the strategic capabilities the position of Under Secretary of the Army requires.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army?

I expect that there are. Although I am serving as Acting Under Secretary of the Army and look forward with confidence to performing the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army, any new position presents new challenges and opportunities for learning. Should the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with Army leaders, others in DoD, and the Congress, to pursue opportunities for improvement. I have to say though, that my experience for the past four years in the Army has significantly strengthened my knowledge of the Army, its history, its culture and its needs to continue to support the nation in its assigned missions.

Relationships

If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of the Army.

As head of the Department of the Army, Secretary Geren is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army will be close, direct, and supportive; my actions always will be subject to the Secretary's authority, direction, and control.

The Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is extremely important that all leaders of the Department of the Army, civilian and military, work closely together as one team as we face the many challenges confronting our institution. I anticipate that I will work closely and collaboratively with the Chief of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary's decisions throughout the Department of the Army.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the Department's strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs within their functional areas of responsibility, consistent with law, regulation, and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-to-day management and long range planning needs of the Army.

The General Counsel of the Army.

The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. His duties include providing legal and policy advice to all members of the Army as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the General Counsel and will actively seek his guidance to ensure that Army policies and practices are in strict accord with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him. If confirmed, I will work with the Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army's policies and to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff and communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the Department of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal adviser of the Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the next Under Secretary of the Army?

As the Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff have stated previously, the Army is out of balance due to current operational demands. Our increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on Soldiers and their Families. Part of regaining that balance is reducing the stress on the force caused by repeated, extended-duration deployments in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). Another crucial challenge is obtaining predictable and adequate funding. As the Army modernizes to meet the security challenges of the 21st century, while continuing the current operational pace as required by the Combatant Commanders, reestablishing our strategic depth will be a major effort requiring close collaboration with Congress.

The Army is faced with many other challenges, including providing proper support to Soldiers and Families in time of war, enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals, just to name a few. The Army must transform its support infrastructure and integrate Base Realignment and Closure decisions. The Army must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of Soldiers' service and provide high quality care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded, particularly for those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). Finally, the Army must transform Army contracting, growing leaders, increasing personnel and providing appropriate training in this critically important area.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will provide my assistance to Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization efforts; completing the transition of the reserve component to an operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative effects of five years at war. The strength of the Soldier is the Family, and in an All-Volunteer Force, we must remain committed to supporting our Soldiers and their Families through Installation and Soldier Readiness, and Soldier and Family Quality of Life. Of special interest to me will be leading the Secretary's effort to transform Army contracting, developing solutions to address the challenges facing the Department in this area.

If confirmed, I will focus on programs and efforts to reduce the stress on the Soldiers and their families. I will work closely with the Congress to ensure these programs are defined to meet the objectives and requirements in support of our National Defense. A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and the Army leadership. I share Secretary Geren's commitment to maintain the Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am confident we can succeed.

Army Budget Share

Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30% and the Army around 25%. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25% of the Army's budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38% in the Navy and 43% in the Air Force. And further, the Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17% , as compared to 33% for the Navy and 35% for the Air Force. The result is that "the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats."

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

Today's Army is out of balance. Our equipment, procured through Congress' vigorous support to the Army, has been used hard during this period of prolonged and persistent conflict. This means that we are using up equipment at a much faster rate than anticipated, requiring our Army to reset or recapitalize this equipment at an accelerated pace. This impacts ammunition stocks, maintenance depots, and manufacturing capacities, and is further complicated by America's shrinking industrial base. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force.

What do you intend to do if confirmed as the Under Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?

Foremost, it is imperative for us to receive supplemental funding in a timely manner to prosecute the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and provide our Soldiers with the equipment needed to meet current operational demands. If confirmed, I will continue to try to match Army resources to strategic requirements as I did when serving as the ASA(FM&C). During the build of the Fiscal Year 2009 budget, we worked closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget to help them better understand the Army's challenges. Additionally, we are examining the relationship of activities funded in the base budget and supplemental. We have identified requirements currently funded through the supplemental that would be more appropriately resourced in the base budget. We are looking forward to working within the Administration to ensure an understanding of what activities should migrate back from the supplemental to the base program. To ensure we are good stewards of the Nation's resources, I will continue to work closely with Congress and the administration to address the Army's current readiness issues that have resulted from previous funding shortfalls.

What is your understanding of what, if anything, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?

While building the President's Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, we explored the impact of budgetary shortfalls with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I believe we effectively communicated and quantified the challenges the Army faces in preparing for current and future conflicts and other emerging requirements. The Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

Posture for the Future

Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades?

The Army's future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

Do you believe that these initiatives are affordable within the projected Army budget?

Yes, Grow the Force and Modularity are affordable within the projected Army budget. These requirements reflect what is needed to restore balance in the Army. Our budget requests reflect our comprehensive plan to restore balance and build the full spectrum capable Army we need in the 21st century. The acquisition program anticipated for Future Combat Systems extends well beyond current budget planning timeframes but resources roughly in the amounts described in the long-range planning documents will be essential to modernizing Army equipment for future fights.

What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this regard if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?

As mentioned above, Secretary Geren and Chief of Staff Casey are working to advance a list of initiatives that seek to provide better support to Army Families. Of particular interest to me is our disability system, which having been built over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public servants and compromises the Army Values we pledge to uphold. A Soldier who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. I look forward to working with OSD and the Veteran's Administration to revamp this antiquated disability system.

The Government Accountability Office reported last year that the cost of the Army's largest acquisition program – the Future Combat System (FCS) – is expected to grow from the \$160 billion estimated in 2006 to between \$203 billion and \$234 billion (an increase of as much as 45 percent). Earlier this month, Secretary Gates acknowledged the existence of a substantial gap in funding for the Army's Global Force Initiative and testified that "it is hard to see" how the Department of Defense can afford to complete the Future Combat System.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army needs to take to control costs on the FCS and ensure that the system is affordable?

The Army can afford FCS. The cost estimates referenced above are the total costs for FCS, operating costs and procurement, over its lifecycle, a 27 year period (2003-2030). FCS procurement costs are substantially less and, even during the peak procurement period, are projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA) account. As the investment account is about a quarter of the total budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed 10% of the Army's budget in any year. The Army took steps in 2007 to adjust the scope of the program (from eighteen systems to fourteen), and slowed the pace of procurement. This program adjustment was designed to reduce the costs of fielding FCS to a more manageable level. Finally, we believe that FCS brigades will have lower operating costs than the legacy brigades they replace and will be more effective when deployed, providing significantly more "bang for the buck" once the program is completed.

Lessons Learned

What do you believe are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you would seek to address if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?

Lessons learned from OEF/OIF have caused the Army to adjust its training and equipment to fight an adaptable, determined enemy. On the home front, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army Families and we have had to build programs to better support our Families. We have also had to expand language skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions we are engaged in today and likely will be engaged in the future. The Army must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, home station training, and institutional training. Detention operations have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area.

With growth in the Army's force structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training resources from all Army Components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific training requirements, such as training to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve Component (Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve) is pulling, the Army needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve Component operational readiness with domestic missions and requirements.

More specifically, what are the lessons learned concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend to address if confirmed?

The Army needs to expand the force to its authorized levels as quickly as possible without compromising the quality of our recruits, and with the goal of reducing the length and

frequency of deployments. The Army must build on its distance learning program to enable Soldiers in the field to train individually on skills not otherwise available when deployed. Further, the Army must take appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) at Army installations to support full spectrum training. Units must have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the full spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the Contemporary Operating Environment. One equipping lesson learned is that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking steps to transition the LOGCAP contract from one to three contractors to increase capabilities and generate the competition necessary to reduce cost and improve service. We must find ways to respond immediately to the stress and demands placed on our military Families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.

What are the Army's lessons learned from detainee abuse incidents at Guantanamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan?

The primary lessons learned from the detainee abuse incidents are: first, we must clearly communicate through the establishment of standards, meaningful and realistic training, and constant vigilance, our commitment to ensuring that all Soldiers live up to our values and the law of war, regardless of the circumstances; and second, we must act to ensure that any Soldier who engages in detainee abuse is held accountable.

As the Executive Agent for the administration of DoD detainee operations policy, the Army continues to gather detention operations lessons learned for incorporation into Army and joint policy and doctrine. Another major lesson learned has been that DoD needs more detention operations force structure, particularly in the Military Police and Military Intelligence specialties. We continue to work with OSD and the other Services to assess and refine force structure needed to support the Combatant Commanders' detention operations missions with success.

Although our policies have always prohibited detainee abuse, Army detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to reflect the current operational situation. Policy and doctrine across the full spectrum of detention operations has been revised and published. Some key revisions include the designation of a single commander for detention operations, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for detainee care, custody, and interrogations, and finally, very specific guidance for identifying and reporting detainee abuse. New policy also mandates that our forces receive additional law of war and cultural awareness training. The Army has enhanced detention operations training for Soldiers, units, and civilians, not only as an annual requirement, but also institutionally and during pre-deployment.

Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments

Many Soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months.

What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal Year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted Captains' retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, has guaranteed retention of officers at historic rates through Fiscal Year 2010.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career Soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120-140% since Fiscal Year 2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army Reserve Soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110-120% of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that Soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that Soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

Our Soldiers and Families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends.

We see the following trends:

- The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of Soldiers and commanders.
- Overall Officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended upward from Fiscal Years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female Soldiers, and deployed Soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored "Strong Bonds" training program to help Soldiers and Families build and maintain stronger relationships.
- Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, awareness, and

testing programs.

- Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army's Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative intervention programs for Soldiers at the first sign of trouble. "Prevention of Alcohol Abuse" messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance abuse campaigns like "Warrior Pride."
- Rates for Absence without Leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of the Soldier's individual case.
- In Fiscal Year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-Fiscal Year 2001 rates.
- Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have declined steadily since Fiscal Year 2001. In addition to programs like "Strong Bonds," the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services that support Soldiers and their Families.
- The overall health of the Force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

The Army can sustain Iraq and Afghanistan deployments at the pre-surge levels as long as there is no additional growth in other global requirements. As demands reduce beyond the pre-surge levels, stress on the Army, our Soldiers and our Families will be reduced further, and we will be able to restore strategic depth and flexibility.

General Casey has stated that the Army is "out of balance." What is your understanding of this statement and what do you think can or should be done to correct that imbalance?

The Army's balance is the relationship between the demands placed on the Army and the ability to generate ready forces in a resource-limited environment, with an all-volunteer force. To meet current global demands, the Army has assumed risks in readiness and strategic flexibility that are not sustainable indefinitely. This imbalance stresses all of the Army – Soldiers, Families, and organizations – and impacts our ability to meet future challenges. Ultimately, current global operational demands in support of the Global War on Terrorism exceed the supply of forces that the Nation's strategic guidance requires. The Army is addressing the imbalance; but it will take both time and resources. The Army is moving closer to completing its capabilities transformation into a modular construct, while simultaneously

growing additional end strength. These actions will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force. As time between deployments (dwell) continues to increase, readiness will improve and the Army can move from primarily a Counter-Insurgency ready force to one ready for the full spectrum of military operations. Increased dwell will also reduce some of the stress on Soldiers and Families and safeguard the volunteer force. Any effort to restore balance, however, is dependent on full, timely, and predictable funding.

Soldiers' Post-Deployment Health Concerns

The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at Congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses available data on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.

The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our Soldiers after initial redeployment, redeployment, and long before they start preparing for their next deployment.

The Army has recognized that building Soldier and Family resiliency is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed “Battlemind” training products to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for pre, during, and post-deployment.

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all Soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with our new Soldiers and Leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

Mental Health Assessment Team IV

The Army’s mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and

training challenges being experienced in OIF.

Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health providers to care for Soldiers and Families in the United States. To date, we have hired 147 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements.

What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been utilized to create a training program known as "Battlemind," which changes the way the Army prepares Soldiers, leaders, and Families for high stress deployments.

TRICARE Fee Increases for Military Retirees

In its FY09 budget request, the Department of Defense assumed \$1.2B in cost savings based on implementing increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families.

What is your understanding of the Department's proposals for changes in TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?

The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard "working age" retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments for all beneficiaries (except Active Duty) on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total Defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between military

retirees and other Federal retirees.

What is your personal view of the justification for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

I support any reasonable strategy to protect the TRICARE program for our beneficiaries without jeopardizing Army readiness or modernization programs. Even with reasonable cost increases, TRICARE will continue to be among the most affordable and highest quality health plans in the country.

Stop Loss Authority

How many Soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under stop loss authority at the end of Fiscal Year 2008?

The Army expects to have 8046 Active Component Soldiers retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of Fiscal Year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve Components for September 2008 is approximately 6,000.

What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through the out-years?

Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of "one year deployed with two years at home." The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of "one year deployed with two years at home."

Reserve Deployment and Mobilization

In recent years, reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?

To respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders' requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing solutions. The Guard and Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) that are fully qualified and combat ready. They have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same is true for Reserve Component Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. The Army will

continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and Combatant Command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned mission.

What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?

The Army has made considerable progress in "total force" management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging Reserve Component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and readiness decisions.

Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments to the Reserve Components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and our Chief's initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining America's Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas.

Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In today's operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational demands are fully met.

Individual Ready Reserve Recall Policy

A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

The Army has implemented plans to optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR. This effort will improve individual deployment readiness levels and ensure timely availability. Additionally, we will maintain a reliable database of mobilization assets and promote a continuum of service by managing expectations throughout each Soldier's career life-cycle.

We are conducting annual muster events for IRR Soldiers. Select Reserve Soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters at local Reserve Centers to execute personnel updates and medical readiness evaluations and receive training briefings. Annual musters ensure that individual expectations are established and maintained. Soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for mobilization. They are educated on how to build upon a military career while assigned to the IRR. In Fiscal Year 2007, more than 8,400 IRR Soldiers were mustered, and over 720 IRR Soldiers transferred to the Selected Reserves (SELRES). The current plan is to muster 10,000 IRR Soldiers in Fiscal Year 2008 and to transfer roughly the same number IRR Soldiers to the SELRES as in FY07.

Our intent is to educate and raise awareness at the time Soldiers transition from active duty. Towards that end, Soldiers are counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR, to include an IRR Orientation Handbook we have developed and implemented. We provide this handbook to newly assigned IRR Soldiers to establish expectations and to provide key information regarding their assignment, annual requirements, promotions, and training opportunities, as well as information about continued service in the SELRES.

What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

The U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (Soldiers passed over for promotion or with security violations, physical disqualifications, determined hardships, or adverse characterizations of service); and separate those Soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized. These efforts have reduced the number of IRR Soldiers by a third and provided the Army with a more reliable database. For example, incorrect IRR addresses were the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are now at a 10-year low, with only about 9% of those ineligible for mobilization being excluded because of an incorrect address.

A DoD policy established in July 2005 mandated the discharge of officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO), unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR are transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date, approximately 10 thousand IRR Officers have been transferred to the Standby Reserve; 2,900 of these have been honorably discharged.

HRC developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW-VSP) for IRR Soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted through the website, reconciles discrepancies, and contacts Soldiers that require additional assistance.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

The IRR is very important to our attempts to restore balance in the All Volunteer Force. Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the service, and we continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR will continue to play a vital role in the Army's mission in the future.

Officer Shortages

After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – small unit actions where junior leaders are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives – may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly trained and experienced junior officers. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of 9,000 officers by Fiscal Year 2012. Nearly 6,800 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain and Major. To address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will produce nearly 5,000 additional officers by Fiscal Year 2009.

The Army instituted a pre-commissioning retention incentives program that is projected to increase by nearly 30% our retention of high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for additional active duty service. The Army has sought officers aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 officers from the inactive reserve and from the other services through the "Blue to Green Program."

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next ten years?

The Army has developed policies to retain our "best and brightest," combat-experienced officers and NCOs. We must not allow the Army to drift into a post-conflict mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-experienced Soldiers in

key and critical assignments, such as in the schools and battle labs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components. Medical support requirements caused by the stand-up of Brigade Combat Teams, potential growth of the Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel.

Do you believe that a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army is necessary and should be accomplished this year?

Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to name just a few.

What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow?

Policy initiatives implementing the authorities provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 are required in areas such as the authority to reduce mandatory service obligations from eight to two years in critically short health specialties. Further, the Department of Defense is currently developing and evaluating legislative proposals relating to enhanced direct hire authorities for civilian medical personnel. Finally, section 721 of the NDAA, which effectively prohibits the conversion of military medical and dental positions to civilian positions, constrains the Department's ability to meet changing requirements with Army civilian employee and contractor employee medical professionals and impacts Army plans to reshape its medical workforce better to meet operational medical requirements and the needs of our beneficiaries. We understand that this concern is being addressed by a USD (P&R) legislative repeal proposal.

Inter-Service Transfers

At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are working harder than ever to achieve recruiting goals, the Navy and the Air Force are planning for significant reductions in military personnel. Section 327 of Title 37, United States Code,

authorizes a \$10,000 bonus for certain inter-service transfers. Additional incentives may be necessary, however, to encourage "blue to green" transfers in order to retain sailors and airmen with valuable military training, skills, and experience.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for inter-service transfers?

The existing incentive system is achieving good results. To date, the program has produced over 500 officer inter-service transfers for the Army. These experienced professionals have been crucial to meeting our growing need for leaders, particularly in our combat units. It continues to be in our national defense interest to promote inter-service transfers. The Military Departments must work together to make this program a success.

Inter-service transfer financial incentives alone may not be sufficient to make the program succeed. Service-specific force shaping tools may need to be redesigned to support the effort. The requirement for the Army to recoup from a candidate for inter-service transfer any voluntary separation incentive the individual has received is a disincentive for an officer to transfer to the Army. The voluntary separation incentives, therefore, have had a negative impact on Army recruiting of officers from sister services by creating a greater incentive to leave the service than to transfer between services. However, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service now follows a policy of not recouping separation pay until the officer concerned qualifies for retired pay. This mitigates somewhat the disincentive of forced recoupment. An officer who receives separation pay and then transfers to the Army will repay that separation pay at the end of his/her active service via a monthly deduction from retired pay. Army G-1 supports this DoD recoupment policy, and will actively recruit separating officers from our sister services to offer them the opportunity to continue to serve their country.

If confirmed, and subject to the direction of Secretary Geren, I will continue to work with Department leadership and the Congress to identify and establish programs to attract quality personnel from the other services.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

The Secretary and the Chief have clearly stated that sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and Army Staff oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, which is now more than three years old. The Secretary, in

fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important effort.

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DoD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

Management and Development of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

Over the last ten years, the Army budget has almost doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the Army has remained almost unchanged.

Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future?

The Department of the Army projects a greater need for executive resource allocations in the near term. The need to convert General Officer billets to senior executive billets and the ever expanding mission of the Army has created a potential requirement for more senior executives.

The Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, controls the allocation of senior executive resources to all government agencies. Federal agencies can request additional senior executive allocations on a biennial or ad hoc basis, but there is no guarantee that such requests will be granted. This year, the Army was successful in obtaining additional executive resources for its most pressing requirements.

The Department is currently undertaking a study of executive resource allocations in response to Section 1102 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Congress mandated that the Department develop a strategic plan for shaping and improving the senior management, functional, and technical workforce, including an assessment of whether current allocations and position types meet all DoD needs. An interim report was provided by the Department on July 13, 2007. An update is due in April 2008.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense promulgated a new policy in October 2007, identifying the new requirements for executives for the 21st century. These new policies will be the foundational doctrine to guide and conduct the baseline evaluation of executive resources. The Army supports the Department's concept to leverage better career civilian executive leadership capabilities. The Army recognized this critical need several years ago, and set out to create a deliberate executive management system that will develop, grow and sustain executives who are prepared for a broader range of leadership, particularly in the joint environment, and who are exerting influence and supporting the most substantive national security matters.

Army Family Action Plan

The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army Families.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army Families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide Soldiers and Families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and services; health care; Soldier and Family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided to Soldiers and Families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our Families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to address Soldier-Family reintegration and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective

interface between Families and support programs.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?

The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of Families as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our Soldiers and Families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our Soldiers and Families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our Families' needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, deployment.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness?

The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet the needs of the Army's geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the guard and reserve services; wounded warrior program services; survivor support services; transition assistance services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the FY08 NDAA requires the Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish a reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain expected outcomes.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active-duty and reserve personnel and retirees.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our military Families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for Family and MWR programs by \$739 million with supplemental funds in FY08 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of Soldiers and Families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on in the form of higher prices.

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual Service members and their Families must still be met, particularly as Soldiers return from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are meeting the needs of Soldiers and Families and contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an \$85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers, Single Soldier Entertainment Centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving Soldiers and Families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest \$450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the quality of the lodging we provide our Soldiers and Families is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.

Reserve and National Guard Deployments

Deployments completed since the attacks of 9/11 of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve for a time significantly depleted the number of Soldiers available for involuntary mobilization under the Department's previous policy limiting involuntary recalls of Reserve personnel to 24 cumulative months. While this policy has changed, sensitivity about overuse of the reserve component continues.

How should the Army's reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?

The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have

demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and Soldiers in our Reserve Components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and Combatant Command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned mission.

What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills are found primarily in the reserve, such as civil affairs, military policy, and logistics?

The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan increases the Army end strength by 74.2K, a growth of 65K in the Active Component (AC), 8.2K in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1K in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). By the close of FY 2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 53.6K structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 88.7K spaces by FY 2013, bringing the Army rebalance total to 142.3K spaces. The combination of growth and rebalance addresses persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 47.4K; Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Operations Forces by 12.7K; Military Police by 7.4K, Military Intelligence by 4.5K, and Engineers by 11.8K. The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent shortfalls, and enable strategy.

Recruiting and Retention

What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach its recruiting goals by component in FY08?

I believe that the Army will reach its recruiting and accession goals for FY08. Both the Active component and the National Guard are above their recruitment targets to date. The Army Reserve, although short of its year-to-date recruiting goal, has met its overall year-to-date accessions goal (which includes IRR to TPU transfers and AC to RC missions). The current recruiting environment remains challenging. Not only are we competing with industry, but the qualified youth population of High School Diploma Graduates is dwindling. In addition, illegal drug use and poor physical fitness is on the rise, further limiting the qualified population. We continue to use the resources authorized and additional recruiters to assist in meeting our goal.

What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, Fiscal Year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career Soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120-140% since Fiscal Year 2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110-120% of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that Soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that Soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

Support for Army Families in the Rebasing Initiative

Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to CONUS installations and their surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both Soldiers and receiving communities?

The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age dependent growth.

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress approved \$266M in FY08 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting \$334M in FY09 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in FY10 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations.

What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges associated with rebasing are met?

The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005, Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, and Grow the Force. The Army's BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation deadline.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which \$560 million was reduced from the Army's BRAC budget.

I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the \$560 million decrement is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all aspects of the BRAC Law.

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and work with the Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.

Support for Wounded Soldiers

Wounded Soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to care for the wounded, including the Warrior Transition Brigade?

The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past twelve months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of thirty-five Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) at installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by more than 2,300 personnel who provide care and support to over 13,000 Soldiers and their Families. Although I believe these programs are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers and their Families.

How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?

The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when Soldiers transition to civilian status.

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal experiences can be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support Warrior Transition Units and are operated by the Army Installation Management Command—to receive education and training in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from

the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program, or AW2, which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured Soldiers and their Families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 Soldiers, 600 on active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with Soldiers and their Families to address and mitigate proactively any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to civilian life?

I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive civilian lives as proud veterans.

What is the Army's view of the Military Severely Injured Center?

I support any program that helps our wounded Warriors get back on the track to success. If confirmed, my efforts will focus on getting programs and services such as the Military Severely Injured Center and the AW2 Program fully integrated with each other so as to provide comprehensive, uniform support to all service members. To this end, I would work to see that the recently approved Department of the Army Office of Warrior Care and Transition integrates all of our Army programs into a streamlined and effective approach to care for Soldiers and their Families.

Reliable Reporting of Health Care Costs

In June 2007, a Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care, which was formed to evaluate proposed increases in TRICARE fees, found that financial statement information for the medical departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy are not auditable because of financial and information system problems, inadequate business processes, and internal controls. The same was true for DOD purchased health care, TRICARE operations, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. Together these comprise two out of three stand-alone financial statements for the Department's nearly \$40 billion a year defense health program.

During your tenure as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Budgets

and Programs, and also as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, what problems did you identify in the financial management of military health care programs, and what actions did you initiate, both for the Department as a whole and within the United States Army, to establish more effective internal controls on health care costs?

While serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy, I implemented performance-based budgeting to tie resource requirements to health care production under a prospective payment system. This system helps align resources to outputs instead of basing resources on costs. It is still being used successfully by the Military Health System to align incentives and control costs. Questions regarding the auditability of the defense health program focus largely on legacy financial systems that are not Federal Financial Management Improvement Act compliant and do a poor job of tracking program assets and liabilities. The cost of health care for Department of Defense beneficiaries is driven by the entitlement of our patients to extensive health care services. We worked with both the TRICARE contractors and the military departments to make sure that the amounts paid for those services were comparable to the prices paid by the Federal government's largest health benefit program, Medicare.

If confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army, what additional steps would you take to ensure and accelerate the reliable reporting of health care costs?

The primary responsibility of the Army in reporting health care costs is to make sure that the resources provided to the Army by the Defense Health Program (DHP) are managed according to the standards set by the DHP. While I believe that reporting to be both timely and accurate, any future improvements required would be the responsibility of the DHP.

In your view, is the Administration justified in seeking additional fee increases for military retirees before it corrects problems in health care cost reporting?

Yes. Although the DHP financial statements are not auditable, they do represent a reasonably accurate picture of the costs of the current benefit structure. I agree with the recommendations of the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care that additional fee increases are appropriate.

Fully Manning the Army's Warrior Transition Units

Full resourcing of the Warrior Training Units (WTU) is critical to the successful recovery of injured and ill soldiers.

What is your understanding of the current manpower requirement for the WTU's, and what portion of that requirement has been filled?

The current manpower requirements are based on U.S. Army Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) that were created for 35 Warrior Transition Units. There are currently 2,434 positions authorized for the WTUs. There are 2,509 personnel on hand, for a total of 103% of positions filled. This fill rate includes borrowed military manpower.

Have Reservists and National Guardsmen been mobilized to fill leadership positions?

Yes, Army Reservists and National Guardsmen have been mobilized to fill key leadership positions in the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs). A board was conducted to select Army Reservist and National Guardsmen as WTU Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, Command Sergeants Major and First Sergeants. All authorized U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard leadership positions are currently filled.

If confirmed, what level of priority would you accord the WTU's, and how would you monitor and resolve any problems in resourcing that occur?

Priority of fill is based on the three priorities established in the Army Manning Guidance. The WTUs are a priority 1 mission—the highest priority for fill. Other than providing units in response to Combatant Commanders' Requests For Forces, caring for our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers is our highest priority. Army leadership monitors WTU manning regularly. If confirmed I would resolve any problems in resourcing according to the established priorities of the Army.

Health Care Access for Soldiers in the WTU's

The Army has established special health care access standards for service members assigned to the WTU's, which should reflect the high priority assigned to these soldiers.

What is your understanding of the standards and how well they are being met at this time?

The Army has established standards to ensure the WTU Soldiers have expedited access to medical services. These standards assist in reducing the time our Soldiers are in a transition status, and help facilitate a quick return to duty or separation to active citizenship. The enhanced standards apply to WTU Soldiers receiving either primary or specialty care in our Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs). Over the past several months, the Army has hired new care providers and adjusted additional resources to meet these enhanced standards. We use an automated system to measure and track trends related to these unique access standards. The Army currently meets the new standards for approximately 80% of WTU appointments. This is below our objective of 90%. Additionally, the Army tracks access through a WTU satisfaction survey. This survey asks WTU Soldiers several questions related to their ability to access both

doctors and therapists. The most recent survey results indicate that approximately 75% of WTU Soldiers are satisfied with their ability to access medical care, a satisfaction level that is comparable to civilian benchmarks for access. A number of initiatives are on-going to ensure processes and resources align to meet the access standards and improve patient satisfaction.

If confirmed, how would you monitor performance on all standards, including health care, staffing and facility standards, as well as well as timely medical and physical evaluation board processing for soldiers assigned to the Army's WTU's?

Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to track short, near, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards.

Joint Acquisition Programs [ASA-ALT]

What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter?

There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a "joint" requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective.

Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems?

Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program costs.

If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition?

The DoD has an established process for the development and approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents, DODI 5000.2 stipulates

that joint service programs must be approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the USD(AT&L). Further, as the Services and DoD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the OSD leadership.

Requirements and Planning Processes

As rising personnel and operations and maintenance costs consume an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as competing demands for federal dollars increase in the future years, it is possible that the Army will have to address the challenges of modernization and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.

What changes would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation while at the same time reducing future force protection shortfalls?

Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed dramatically, requiring our nation's Army to reorganize, grow, re-station, and transform while fighting the War on Terrorism. These demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental appropriations.

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990's, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using the lessons from today's fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our Soldiers today and in the future.

Base Closures and Realignments

The military services are in the process of developing business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.

What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

The Army is responsible for executing both the Army's BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group recommendations, as assigned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). The Army has developed business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.

What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

The Army's priority is to complete the construction projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds (\$13B) will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.

The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington D.C. will present opportunities for both the local community and the federal government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans.

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?

If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.

What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?

I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress to execute BRAC 2005.

Technology Transition

The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the war fighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?

The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record and the laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The Army's key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing Global War on Terror, the Army has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured.

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter?

The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the Soldier. As discussed above, the Army's key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers.

We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are "discovering" technology opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation.

What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition

efforts?

The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's number one priority is force protection of our Soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize existing systems to ensure all Soldiers have the equipment they need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and Technology program, and from Future Combat Systems (FCS) development. I would field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams. FCS is the core of the Army's modernization effort and will provide our Soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our Soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world with full-spectrum capabilities.

Army Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories

Among the roles the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions.

Do you feel that the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel, and equipment to perform these missions?

Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T) investment at over \$1.7 billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to \$1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands.

What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?

The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.

What do you plan to do to address those deficiencies?

To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in 10 United States Code, section 2805, to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to \$2.5 million, with a \$3 million limit for unspecified minor construction.

The renewal will provide laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on Military Construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction.

Do you feel that the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly qualified technical workforce?

Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.

Chief Management Officer

Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 provides for the Under Secretary of each military department to be designated as the Chief Management Officer of the department.

What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities that you would assume, if confirmed, as Chief Management Officer of the Department of the Army?

Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Deputy Secretary of Defense as the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense and designates the Service Under Secretaries as Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments. This designation makes sense, and if confirmed to this position, I will discharge my duties in providing oversight and leadership across the broad range of the Army's business functions.

What priorities would you establish in your capacity as Chief Management Officer, and what would you hope to accomplish in that position?

Instituting a cost culture is essential to the success of the Army. Integrating cost as a variable in our decision-making process will help us ensure that scarce resources are used wisely and efficiently. Working with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, I would ensure effective execution of our enterprise architecture and modernization efforts across all business domains. I would ensure that progress is realized in implementing a comprehensive financial improvement and audit readiness plan to guide financial modernization activities.

If confirmed, would you expect to establish a strategic management plan for the Department of the Army?

Yes, if confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to develop a strategic management plan for the Army that is consistent and aligns with the Department of Defense management plan. The Army's enterprise architecture aligns with the Department's federated approach to business system modernization.

If so, what issues would you expect to address in that plan, and how would you go about addressing them?

If confirmed, I would ensure that progress is realized on the Army's three key financial improvement activities. The first is to complete development and fielding of General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) Increment 2. The second is to complete all testing, fielding, and organizational restructuring in support of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS). Our third key activity is to implement a pilot program supporting electronic payments for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq. I would work to ensure that progress is made in developing business system transition plans and that systems architecture aligns with the Department's Enterprise Transition Plan and Business Enterprise Architecture.

Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations

The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that "the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters." According to the Commission, "Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported and, most important, under-valued."

Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?

The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full agreement with the Commission's general recommendations for improvement. Indeed, many of the Commission's recommendations are consistent with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was Co-Chaired by Ms. Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson. To date, the Army has taken action on 21 of the 22 Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future expeditionary contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these concerns?

Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Mr. Geren has directed me to implement specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible.

The Commission report states that “The Army’s difficulty in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to the fact that there are no Generals assigned to contracting responsibilities.” The Commission recommends that Congress authorize “a core set of ten additional General Officers for contracting positions”.

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

The Army plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active force and civilian contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission recommendations. To that end the Army has approved and is standing up a two-star level Army Contracting Command (ACC) under the AMC, including two subordinate commands; a one-star expeditionary contracting command; and a restructured one-star level installation contracting organization. The Army is seeking additional officer authorizations to provide the leadership for those new commands as well as provide career path progression to help retain and promote much need uniformed leadership.

In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, or can the Army assign new General Officers to contracting functions without legislation?

There is flexibility to assign General Officers to contracting functions within the Army’s current General Officer allocations. The key question is, given the current optempo and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, does the Army need more General Officers to meet the leadership demands for the Force? The Army is working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess whether legislation to increase the number of General Officers to lead DoD’s future contracting workforce is the best way to meet the identified requirements in this area.

The Commission report states that “The number and expertise of the military contracting professionals must be significantly increased” to address the problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel.

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade while the number of dollars that we are executing in the Army has increased by more than 80 percent. The Army has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel

to support the full range of military operations.

What steps have you taken, if any, in your capacity as Acting Under Secretary to address this issue?

Contingency Contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army's modular force design even prior to the establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. An increase of 295 contingency contracting officers to fill this new force structure has already been approved. A further growth of 167 military and 804 civilians in the institutional Army is still undergoing analysis.

What additional steps do you expect to take, if confirmed?

As the point person for the Army Contracting Campaign plan, I plan to examine the entire contracting process in the Army, from requirements definition to the final receipt and payment for goods and services received. We will look at everything, from how we are identifying what we need to how we raise and train our young officers to become our future contracting experts. As best practices emerge from these efforts, they will be shared across the entire contracting workforce.

The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were “volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their deployment.” The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?

The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, hardships and contributions. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Administration to seek legislative changes.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?

The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits for

deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas.

The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’, so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering.

Do you agree with the Commission’s findings on this issue?

The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject “Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity.” In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DoD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.

The report states that Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) are an “essential part of contract management”, because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, “CORs are assigned as . . . an ‘extra duty,’ requiring no experience. . . . The COR assignment is often used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any training is provided. . . . Despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.”

Do you agree with the Commission’s assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and Afghanistan?

A Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall in Kuwait led by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the “eyes and ears” of the contracting officer and the customer and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority

across the Army.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

A standard, minimum training requirement has been established for Army CORs. They must complete the Defense Acquisition University on-line continuous learning module, “COR with a Mission Focus,” prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army personnel have completed this course.

Military Role in Domestic Emergencies

The shortfalls in the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.

In your view, should the Army have a more expansive role in responding to natural disasters?

Our Nation has been at war for over six years. Our Army—Active, Guard and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the “role” of the Army in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead federal agency.

In your view, what should the Army’s role be in responding to domestic emergencies, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks?

The Department of Defense and United States Northern Command have worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare for response to domestic emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component Command to the United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities for the continental United States and Alaska.

Northern Command is the Department of Defense’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Command collocates within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, other Government Agencies, state emergency responders, state Adjutant Generals, and potential base support installations.

When a domestic emergency, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, occurs, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with state authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass

Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, seventeen States have created federally funded National Guard Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the civil authority's ability to provide command and control, medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public affairs, and mortuary affairs.

What is your assessment of the Army National Guard's ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current equipment shortfalls?

The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond to state contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments.

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army – the Active Component and the Reserve Components. The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve Components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve Component requirements resulting in an improved total force.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over \$49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for Fiscal Years 2001-2013). Funding and equipment distributions are fire-walled: promises made are promises kept. For Fiscal Years 2001-2007, the Army resourced \$15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army National Guard, valued at \$17.5 billion – 36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.

What is your view of the recommendation of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves to provide Governors the authority to direct all military forces within their States when responding to domestic emergencies?

States have effectively responded to numerous disasters and have done well. A catastrophic domestic emergency will likely be a multi-state event overwhelming the ability of the state or states to respond. In that situation, forces from outside the disaster area, not burdened by an immediate danger to themselves and their families, are the best assets to respond.

While I understand the need to provide the Governors with access to military forces in response to domestic emergencies, I disagree with the means identified in the recommendation. A Governor's perspective is primarily his or her state. After use of local and state first responders, each Governor has Army and Air National Guard forces under state authority available to respond to state emergencies. Further, most of the states and territories participate in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact which enables them to provide additional support to each other.

When the Governors request federal assistance, the Department of Defense provides the military portion of that support to the designated lead federal agency. In the event of multiple, near simultaneous terrorist attacks, the federal government must maintain the flexibility and agility to employ forces to manage and sustain an effective response force.

Force Protection Programs

Over the past several years, the Army, with the assistance of the Congress, has spent billions of dollars on force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, up-armored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-improvised explosive device measures) primarily using supplemental appropriations.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army continues to support and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations provisions?

I appreciate the assistance of the Congress in protecting our Soldiers by supporting these critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of Soldiers will always be a high priority for funding. The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations—like force protection—have become enduring. As your question implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations go away. Funding from supplemental appropriations for enduring programs must move to the base program. So in addition to ensuring that Force Protection programs receive a high priority for funding within the Army, I will also advocate strongly that the missions assigned to the Army are resourced commensurately.

Equipment Reset

The ongoing requirements of the Global War on Terror have significantly increased usage rates on the services' equipment. As a result, we know there will be a requirement to "reset" the force not only as the current operations continue but for some time after they conclude as well. However, given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq, and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies are required.

Do you think that the Army's equipment reset program meets the requirements of the Global War on Terror, as well as the requirements for changing to a modular force?

The Army's reset program has been meeting the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90% for ground equipment and more than 75% for aviation equipment. The Army expects to have its BCTs fully equipped by 2015 and its combat support and combat service support units by 2019 provide it receives adequate funding.

In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk?

Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army's reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and open communication with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress, so that they clearly understand our requirements and the reasoning behind them.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested to meet the Army's requirements to provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military operations?

The development of the Army's reset requirements is driven by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which could be any mission along the spectrum of conflict from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements are a cost of war and should be entirely funded by supplemental dollars.

Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

Depots are not operating at maximum capacity but are operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde and funding will support. In peacetime, our depots expend approximately

12 million direct labor hours annually. Depots are currently executing 27 million direct labor hours and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot's production capacity is being optimized by equipment type and commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 90% or better for ground equipment and 75% or better for aviation, and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force, and more retrograded equipment.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

Timely and adequately funding is essential. It enables depots to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance equipment, and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several logistics initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time, and target certain equipment for direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.

Army Pre-Positioned Equipment

The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient pre-positioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, Army pre-positioned stocks are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options.

What changes to policies regarding use of pre-positioned equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?

No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) at this time. The last four years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to deploy forces in support of Combatant Command requirements and to adapt to changing strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders. Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS stocks with "modernized" equipment that meets the needs of the modular force.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army pre-positioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability?

APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic

flexibility and operational agility. The Army has developed “APS Strategy 2015” which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the Combatant Commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and contingent on available resources and operational requirements, the Army has an executable timeline within which to reset its APS sets in accordance with “APS Strategy 2015.”

Equipment Availability

Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No Soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

All Soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat Training Centers so Soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our Soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored HMMWV fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas

which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our Soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to in time to train before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq?

The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the Global War on Terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

In September 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) capped MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles - citing, in part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP's unsuitability in some off-road and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs, and if the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army's final requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again?

The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense to continuously re-assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while remaining good stewards of our nation's resources. Recently, based on input from Theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost 12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.

Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts?

The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against improvised explosive devices) with a capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorrow's force structure.

Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats.

Special Units for Stabilization and Training/Advisory Missions

On October 10, 2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that "unconventional warfare" will play in the Army's future as well as the need to organize and prepare for training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best handled by the Army's full-spectrum brigade combat teams (BCTs) and their supporting forces.

Do you believe that there is any merit in establishing special units - such as a Training and Advisory Corps?

Future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces will be addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation activities will emphasize special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.

A new small scale specialized force the Army is studying is the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group - Future, which would provide three 22 man security cooperation detachments working directly for the Combatant Command and conducting pre-conflict security cooperation training and advising. The Army is considering piloting the Theater Military and Advisory Group - Future in United States Army South.

Army modular forces are ideally suited to train and advise. For all these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their core function. For example, US Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. However, before Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, they must prepare for the unique aspects an advising mission entails. To that end the Army is creating an enduring advising institution. This institution will reside at Fort Polk and will have the capability to prepare individuals or units to serve as trainers and advisors.

Special Operations Command

The Special Operations Command, pursuant to the QDR guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special operators.

If confirmed, will you support USASOC's end strength growth?

If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33%. The Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special Operations forces is within programmed endstrength of 547.4K (active), 358.2K (National Guard), and 206.0K (Reserve). The growth in Special Operations forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.

What steps do you believe the Army should take to ensure that proficiency pays for language create the appropriate incentives to Army special operators to learn, improve and retain language skills?

The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force. The Army goal is to train our language cadre to the minimum level of 2 for language proficiency. Currently Active Component and Reserve Component Soldiers may earn up to \$400 per month per language depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum

rate of \$1000 per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation skills, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate for their primary language. This is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as "dominant in the force" and is not usually authorized for language pay for other Army Soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to Soldiers to maintain their proficiency.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Army?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes, to the extent of my authority.