

**Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq**

Previously Submitted Answers to Advance Policy Questions

Please provide any updates or modifications to the answers to advance policy questions that you submitted in connection with your recent nomination to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that you believe to be necessary to ensure that your views are fully and accurately reflected.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

The Commanding General of MNF-I commands forces within Iraq and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission. MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). MNF-I conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control (TACON) of non-U.S. Coalition Forces and OPCON of the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I). MNF-I is a strategic level command.

What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National Corps - Iraq?

The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting operations to restore order and security in Iraq.

The Commanding General of MNF-I has a wider responsibility. He is responsible for all strategic issues and the political-military interface, working with the US Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign to include security, governance, economic development, communication, and transition.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the Army and the nation from the tactical through the strategic level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded Soldiers from company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and

combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multinational Corps Iraq for the last 24 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into what is needed to command Coalition Forces in support of the strategic goals outlined by the US Mission Iraq. In particular, my recent tours of duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the complicated situation and requirements needed to be successful in our mission in Iraq.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

- Continually update my military and civilian chain of command of our analysis and assessment
- Stay connected with my subordinate commanders and higher headquarters
- Lead and challenge all of MNF-I to continue to learn, change and adjust to the environment, in order to attain our end state as quickly as possible
- Continually assess the progress of our campaign and make adjustments when necessary to ensure success
- Establish mechanisms to incorporate the lessons learned over the last five years
- Maintain focus on the warrior ethos *Always place the mission first; never accept defeat; never quit; never leave a fallen comrade*
- Demand high moral and ethical behavior by all US forces
- Be aggressive – tackle challenges as they arise and mitigate the risk involved

Iraq

What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

I believe we are in a significantly better position to achieve success in Iraq than we were in late 2006 and early 2007. The security situation is improved, with overall attacks, civilian deaths, and ethno-sectarian violence all down. Progress remains uneven and difficult challenges remain, specifically the continued presence of militias and Iran's malign involvement in training, equipping, and

funding these militias. Secondly, AQI maintains the capability to conduct high profile attacks in some areas, although their capability is diminished. They will continue to attempt to de-legitimize the Gol. Iraqi Security Forces continue to improve and are increasingly taking the lead. However, all of this progress is still fragile. To achieve long-term sustainable security tough work still remains. The gap between needs of the Iraqi people and the capacity of the government has been reduced, but is not yet self-sustainable by the Gol. The Iraqi government has begun to make progress on some very difficult issues and has passed some critical legislation, but implementation of this legislation is what is needed. There appears to be better cooperation among many political parties which has provided some unified positions across sectarian lines. However, Iraq's governmental capacity is still insufficient in many areas. Overall, we are moving in the right direction and progressing toward a stable and representative state in Iraq. However, for it to be sustainable we must continue U.S. involvement across all US Governmental agencies and continue to pressure the Iraqi Leaders to move forward economically, politically, and diplomatically.

What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

As U.S. forces in theater draw down, we must ensure that malign influences are unable to reestablish themselves through violence. ISF and Coalition forces must continue to protect the Iraqi people while continuing to build Iraqi capability and capacity. Even as we assist in providing security, we must enable Iraqi Security Forces to increasingly assume the lead in securing their country. They must expand their governmental capability and capacity. We must encourage and support political accommodation and reconciliation at both the local and national level. Finally, we must recognize that the challenges associated with internal and external stability and security in Iraq cannot be solved solely in Iraq. We must continue to engage with Iraq's neighbors and seek to get these neighbors to support political compromise and stability in Iraq.

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

In my opinion, the #1 threat to Iraq is the communal struggle for power. The struggle between Shia-Sunni, inter-Shia, inter-Sunni, Kurds, (et al.) with malign outside influences (predominately Iran and to a less degree AQI) trying to effect the outcome. Iran, through the support of illegal militias, AQI and other Sunni extremists (particularly in Northern and Central Iraq), poses the greatest threat to a lasting security. We must enable Iraqi security forces to increasingly take the lead against these challenges without creating significant risks to short and long-sustainable security.

There continue to be major challenges in the economic, political, and diplomatic realms. Gains made in security will be easier to preserve in an environment in which people have ready access to essential services and opportunities for

employment. In addition, local and national political reconciliation efforts must continue to move forward. The provincial elections slated to occur later this year and the national elections scheduled to take place in 2009 will be important milestones in this process. The Iraqi government must not only be representative, but also must continue to grow in capability and capacity. Finally, the Iraqi people continue to face challenges from countries in the region, as Iran provides lethal assistance to surrogates in Iraq and as Syria continues to take inadequate measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through its territory. Iraq's Arab neighbors must do more to reach out and engage Iraq in a positive fashion through concrete steps including debt relief and the establishments of embassies in Baghdad. I would seek to partner with the Ambassador and fully support his efforts to address these diplomatic and political challenges.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish and what actions would you initially take as Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

The gap between the Iraqi individual needs and desires and the ability of the Government of Iraq (GoI) to provide for those needs and desires still exists. The role of coalition forces is to support the GoI in building capacity to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi citizens. We will assist the GoI by working to make the communal struggle for power less violent, helping them to develop legitimate Iraqi institutions and mitigate the negative effects created by those trying to exploit the gap. MNF-I basic objectives will be:

- Provide security for the local populace
- ISF is professionalized and self-sustaining and is able
 - to move towards police primacy
 - to protect its borders
 - to maintain security with less and less reliance on coalition forces
- Assist the GoI in providing a more legitimate and capable central, provincial, and local government that has:
 - Credible and effective control with provincial and local civil institutions
 - is accountable to the people of Iraq
 - has established the rule of law
 - delivers adequate services
 - increases employment through economic development

Lessons Learned

How would you characterize the effectiveness of the military tactics employed by the division under your command in Tikrit in 2003? What were the results of those tactics and what lessons did you, the theater command, and the Army learn from that experience?

As is the case now, all areas in Iraq in 2003 faced significantly different challenges. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004, the 4th ID area of operations was the heart of the Sunni-Triangle and the Baathist Regime itself. This area of operations was probably most affected by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and potentially lost more than any other group in Iraq. They were the privileged—therefore, the regime change followed by the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, as well as the implementation of debathification measures by the interim Iraqi Government, put thousands upon thousands of military, education, medical and local government employees out of work. This created an extremely tense environment and a corresponding increase in reaction and violence to these decisions. In the fall of 2003 this was the most violent area within Iraq. From November to March of 2004, we were able to significantly reduce the level of violence through a combination of lethal and non-lethal means and re-establish stability throughout the region. During this time, the division captured nearly 20 of the top 55 high value targets to include Saddam Hussein in December of 2003. Additionally, we established standing provincial governments in Salah-ah-Din, At Tamim, and Diyala provinces and started several job programs as well as began numerous reconstruction efforts. In the beginning of 2004 through our transition of authority on 15 March 2004, we reduced the level of violence in the region to its lowest levels that have yet to be re-achieved. However we learned many lessons. It took us much too long to recognize the true nature of the insurgency. We did not have the capacity or expertise to fully understand the underlying cultural or tribal underpinnings of the region. We were unable to establish longstanding relationships and trust with the local tribal and religious leaders. We underestimated the relevance of justice and honor to the Iraqis and the necessity of creating honorable work not just jobs. Lastly, reconciliation had not yet become a viable concept. It took us four more years to see this take hold.

What were the major lessons you learned from your more recent experience as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, that are most applicable to the duties you are about to assume?

- Securing the population comes first
- Understand the complexity of the conflict – “COIN-plus”
- Fundamental concepts
 - Secure the people where they sleep
 - Give the people justice and honor
 - Make the people choose
- Integrate civilian and military efforts to “mass effects”. It is the combination of interagency and combined arms
 - Embedded PRTs with the BCTs better leverages the appropriate expertise and allows for increase integration and synchronization
 - Total integration SOF and conventional forces across the battlespace

- Improved significantly our overall intel capacity and our ability to synchronize the “INTs” at the lowest level – ISR integration is more critical than ever
- Knowing the threat isn’t enough ... understand the environment holistically
- “Aggressive pursuit” continues even after the threat recedes
 - Pushing the ISF as they grow in capacity and take on responsibility
 - Pushing governance and economic development as security improves
- Building ISF capacity – there is no substitute for partnership
- Empowering ground-owning commanders (decentralization of efforts)
- Importance of headquarters elements
- Importance of enablers as force multipliers and “risk mitigators”
- What leaders do makes a critical difference ... everyday, at every level
- Be first with the truth
- “Supporting the troops” involves funding OGAs – CERP is not enough

What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

1. Inadequate post-war planning to exploit the military success of the initial invasion. We underestimated/misunderstood the environment.
2. Disbanding of the Iraqi Army and further debathification efforts threw thousands upon thousands of Iraqis out of work.
3. It took us too long to recognize the insurgency and all of its underpinnings, which allowed extremist groups to establish themselves and gain passive support of the population.
4. We attempted to turn complete control over to the Iraqis too early when they did not yet have the capacity to govern or secure the population. This resulted in a significant increase in ethno-sectarian violence on that was exploited by sunni/shia extremist groups.

Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S. operations?

They all to some extent still effect our operations, but we have made adjustments at the strategic, operational, and tactical level which is the beginning to have an effect.

What corrective action, if any, will you take if confirmed?

I will ensure that we are a learning organization that is able to adjust its operations in order to meet the nation’s stated objectives. We will push the Iraqis to assume more control across the security, diplomatic, and governance lines of operation to include the investment of their wealth into their own country. We will continue to assess and analyze the strategic and operational environment and make adjustments.

During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?

If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions that you took in response to these incidents.

Unfortunately, due to the nature of our operations, allegations of detainee or civilian abuse occur frequently against both Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). For alleged abuse by US forces, I require that all allegations be reported through the chain of command to me. I also require that each allegation be thoroughly and impartially investigated, evidence gathered and evaluated. Each case of confirmed abuse is treated as misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adverse administrative procedures, or both. Each case is handled on its own merits at the appropriate level after due process is afforded to any Soldier accused of such conduct. Known victims of confirmed abuse are compensated as part of our counter-insurgency strategy and our moral obligation to do right by our host country's citizens. We take our lessons learned from such incidents and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as retrain our Soldiers in the importance of following the Law of Armed Conflict, respecting Iraqi civilians, and treating detainees humanely.

For allegations of abuse by ISF, I require that reports be made by US inspectors of Iraqi military, police, and detention facilities, as well as anyone in my command who has information of this type of alleged conduct. The reports are forwarded to the appropriate liaison authority who can engage the right Iraqi leaders in order for them to address the allegations of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse.

Role in Development of the New Iraq Strategy

What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President in January 2007?

After my arrival in Iraq in December 2006 as the MNC-I Commander, General Casey challenged me to take a look at different ways to break the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad. As a result of the assessment, we confirmed that Baghdad was the most important piece of terrain and ethno-sectarian violence, fueled by extremist elements was the primary cause of the problem. We conducted crisis action planning and through our assessment and analysis determined that we must first and foremost protect the population first in Baghdad and then the other ten cities. We also determined that there was an opportunity in Anbar to exploit some initial success that was created by the reconciliation efforts with the tribes. We developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to push coalition and ISF forces out into the neighborhoods in small Joint Security Stations (JSS) and combat outpost (COP). In the past we would clear areas but would not be able to hold these areas. We knew we must secure

the population; we must deny the enemy sanctuaries and eliminate the support zones in the so called Baghdad Belts. We then developed the operational plan and requested the surge forces. This plan was briefed to General Casey and the Secretary of Defense for approval, and later to General Petraeus upon his arrival.

U.S. Force Reductions in Iraq

The President has said that following the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July there will be a 45-day consolidation and evaluation period, after which an assessment of conditions on the ground would begin to determine when recommendations for further reductions in U.S. forces in Iraq could be made.

To your knowledge, aren't conditions on the ground in Iraq being continuously assessed?

Commanders at all levels continually assess, both formally and informally, conditions in Iraq.

If so, why is it necessary, in your view, to wait 45 days to assess the conditions on the ground and determine when to make recommendations?

The recommendation to reduce our forces by 5 combat Brigades and 2 Marine Battalions, back down to pre-surge levels was made based on our best judgment and analysis of many factors.

The environment in Iraq is complex and constantly changing across security, economic, and diplomatic lines. One of our key considerations is to ensure that we do not give back gains we have made. We learned the lesson the hard way in 2006. In order to make informed decisions it is important to understand the risk involved and how you can best mitigate this risk. This 45 day period following a 25 % reduction in combat brigades allows us to adequately and more accurately evaluate the risk and ensure that tactical, operational, and strategic risk mitigation techniques are sufficient.

Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

There is no purely military or purely political solution in Iraq. All four lines of operation—security, economic, diplomatic, and political—are mutually reinforcing and thus must be an important part of any long-term solution in Iraq. While the political line of operation, the effort to create political accommodation and good governance, is the main effort, it cannot be pursued to the exclusion of reinforcing efforts. We have seen in the past year that Iraqi leaders are more likely to make the type of compromise seen in February's legislative package when they and their communities are feeling more secure rather than less.

Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Compromise among Iraqi Political leaders is a necessary condition for any successful solution in Iraq.

What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?

We must continue to apply the right amount of pressure in order to ensure constant and consistent progress. I also believe constant communications between leaders in MNF-I and the Embassy with all Iraqi political leaders is essential. Iraqi leaders are under enormous pressure from internal and external sources and they have begun to make some progress with legislation as well as other areas. However, the importance of implementation will be the underpinning of long-term sustainable success, and we must continue to coach, teach, mentor, and pressure the Iraqi leadership along the way.

What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?

We must throw all means available; push, pull and convince Iraqi leaders that political solutions must be found by helping them find those solutions, coaching them, and urging them throughout the process. We must sustain our robust engagement, working with the government of Iraq to identify mutual interests amongst Iraqi leaders and convincing them to make the hard decisions that are in the best interests of security and stability in Iraq.

In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?

There is no simple metric or calculation that can give us a green or red light on further reductions. However, if confirmed as Commander of MNF-I, I will focus on a number of variables such as the level of security, level of threat, capacity of the ISF, capacity of the ministries, capacity of the provincial and local governments, economic development, and improvement of basic services. We will use a variety of objective and subjective systems. However, I will rely most heavily on my subordinate commanders' recommendations and my on independent judgment.

Intercommunal Conflict

You have noted that the conflict in Iraq has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the current threat is the intercommunal fight over power.

How has this changed the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?

Since liberation in 2003, the conflict in Iraq has been a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This has played out differently over time, with inter- and later intra-sectarian violence, and it is accompanied by a complex mixture of destabilizing forces such as terrorism, regional interference, and foreign-fueled proxy war. As Iraq progresses forward it will continue to be a complex problem set.

How would you recommend that military strategy adapt to this change in the nature of the conflict?

I believe our strategy in Iraq is well-suited to address this conflict over power and resources. As commander of MNC-I, I had a hand in the development of the Joint Campaign Plan. It addresses not just the manifestation of this conflict (security) but its roots (economic, political) and a comprehensive approach to address it (security, economic, diplomatic, and political). The strategy also involves directly addressing sectarian division, engaging with dissonant factions and individuals to bring reconcilable enemies to the realization that the best means of change is the political process and not armed conflict. We have also worked to bring together rivaling religious and political leaders to work together for their communities. Our efforts have been reinforced by the general population's increasing rejection of violence and those who would cause it. Although there is a long way to go, our strategy to address the conflict in Iraq is helping to enable progress by the Iraqi Government.

What is the appropriate role of coalition forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, particularly in southern Iraq?

The role of Coalition Forces is to support the elected government and help that government enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of arms. It is my sense that Iraqi leaders have largely begun to unite around the issue of disarming all militias, and we seek to support them in that effort.

Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.

In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at greater risk?

I believe the non-Muslim religious minorities are not at greater risk from the majority of Iraqis. However, there are extremist elements that target several groups to include non-Muslim religious minorities in order to maintain their own legitimacy.

Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?

Recent events in Basra and Sadr City indicate that low level Iraqi government officials and Iraqi Security Forces are at the greatest risk when traveling outside established safe zones.

If so, what is the appropriate role for the U.S. military in addressing their vulnerability?

The US must ensure that threat reporting and information is shared with Iraqi counterparts to ensure widest possible dissemination; this allows individuals (of all religions and sects) who are at risk to take property security measures.

Confronting the Militias

Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?

The Iraqi government has taken some critical steps in recent months toward confronting criminal militias. Prime Minister Maliki made the courageous decision in March to confront militia elements in Basra that were carrying out acts of intimidation and murder, threatening peace and the rule of law. Reports state that PM Maliki has become vocal in his stance that the government of Iraq must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of arms, and the government and ISF are attempting to enforce this point in Baghdad, particularly Sadr City. It appears the government is more willing to use its forces to confront militia elements. This must be followed by diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. However, this is only the first step in reducing militia influence. It will take a concerted effort over time to have long term success.

What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?

I will continue to work with the Iraqi government to assist them in confronting militias by using all the tools available to them (military, diplomatic, and humanitarian.) Coalition forces will continue to support and enable Iraqi forces in their kinetic and non-kinetic operations against militias through partnership and the use of coalition advisors.

What has been the role of American troops with respect to recent operations in and around Sadr City and in Basra?

It is my understanding that US support for the Sadr City and Basra operations has been generally in line with the support Coalition Forces regularly provide to Iraqi operations.

In Basra, working in coordination with the UK contingent in Multi-National Division – Southeast, the Coalition has continued to support Iraqi-led operations

with planning, some logistic enablers, close air support, and ISR. US and UK Military Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi units on the ground play an integral role in these support efforts.

It is my understanding that US forces in Baghdad are playing a more robust role in planning and executing operations in the Baghdad Security Districts than in Basra. They are conducting extensive surveillance operations in Sadr City and partnering with Iraqi units on the ground, using ISR and Air Weapons Team assets to conduct targeted operations in response to attacks originating in Sadr City. As typical in the “partner” phase of the lead-partner-overwatch transition to ISF control, Coalition forces operate alongside and in coordination with Iraqi Army, Special Operations, and Police units.

Performance of Iraqi Security Forces

As part of the new strategy in Iraq, the Iraqi government agreed to send three additional Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad.

How many additional Iraqi Army brigades have been deployed and participated in operations in Baghdad since January 2007?

In January 2007, the Government of Iraq (GoI) committed to providing sufficient forces to conduct operations in support of the Baghdad Security Plan (Benchmark #9 – Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq). In February 2007, the GoI established an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion rotation plan in support of Fardh al Qanoon to provide three additional brigades (9 additional battalions) of combat power to Baghdad. On 1 December 2007, the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the 11th IA Division completed force generation and assumed responsibility for battlespace within the Baghdad Province, allowing six of the rotational battalions to return home. The 4th Brigade of the 11th Division is scheduled to complete the force generation process in November 2008, which will allow the 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division and its battalions to return home to Anbar Province. 4/11 IA will fulfill the requirement to have three additional IA brigades permanently stationed in Baghdad (in accordance with Benchmark #9). Over the past year and a half, there have been as many as six additional battalions—above and beyond the requirement for three brigades—temporarily deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations.

How many additional Iraqi Army brigades are there now?

The 4th Brigade, 1st IA Division will remain deployed to Baghdad until completion of the force generation of 4th Brigade, 11th IA Division, thus fulfilling the requirements of the Baghdad Security Plan. Currently, there are six additional battalions deployed to Baghdad in support of ongoing operations in Sadr City.

How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi forces in the conduct of recent security operations in and around Baghdad?

It is difficult for me to comment on recent security operations since I have not been in theater for about 90 days. But when I was there, we were seeing steady progress in planning and execution at battalion and brigade level by the ISF. Progress is still not uniform, and there are still some significant NCO and officer shortages, as well as some small pockets of sectarian behavior.

As U.S. surge forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army brigades assuming the areas and missions of these units?

As local conditions vary, so does Iraqi force capability on the ground. In general, our intent is to thin out US presence rather than withdraw it from a given area. In many cases, we are spreading out our presence as troops leave and continuing to partner with ISF. In other cases, ISF units on the ground – to include Iraqi Police, National Police, and Iraqi Army elements – are assuming a greater role. Several provinces are scheduled to transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control in the coming months. The specific arrangement varies not only province to province, but city to city and in some cases neighborhood to neighborhood.

If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?

It is imperative that we preserve hard won gains. We must take an approach that allows us to preserve these gains by ensuring that Iraqi forces are capable and supported so they not only take responsibility, but are successful. In general, our intent is to thin out U.S. presence over time rather than completely withdraw from a given area.

In March 2008, the Iraqi Army launched a major offensive aimed at forcing the Mahdi Army out of Basra.

What is your assessment of the Iraqi government and security forces' strategic and operational planning and preparation for the operation in Basra?

It is very difficult to make an assessment from afar. From reporting, it appears Iraqi operations in Basra began much more quickly than originally planned and thus suffered initially from a lack of sufficient strategic and operational planning and conditions setting. But as operations have continued, with our coaching and assistance, Iraqi planning has seen growth in capability.

What is encouraging is that Iraq Security Forces demonstrated they have the ability to deploy over a division's worth of personnel and equipment across the

country and then employ them upon arrival—a feat which was not possible in 2006.

What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces' tactical performance during operations in Basra?

I have not personally observed these operations and can not make an accurate assessment.

In your view, did this operation accomplish the Iraqi government's strategic and the Iraqi security forces' operational objectives?

Through reporting, it is my view that it is too early to talk about operational or strategic success. However, it appears the militia's grip on Basra's neighborhoods has been affected, and significant caches have been found throughout the city. The operation appears to be garnering support from citizens of Basra, but any conclusions at this time about the operation's overall tactical and strategic accomplishments would be premature.

Command and Control

What is the command and control relationship between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?

Iraqi Security Forces in the Baghdad area receive all orders through national command channels, and U.S. forces operate under the command and control of Multi-National Corps Iraq. The relationship between these two chains of command is one of constant coordination and cooperation.

What concerns, if any, have you had about command and control relationships with Iraqi forces, and what have been the lessons learned in this regard over the last year of combined operations?

The issue of command and control relationships is an important one, and the most critical imperative has been to ensure unity of effort. Over the past year, we have gained a great deal of experience as a result of our partnership between transition teams and Iraqi units and our close cooperation at the tactical level. The operations of the last year particularly have reaffirmed the value of our training and transition teams. These elements have been critical in providing Coalition forces with situational awareness and in helping the Coalition to support Iraqi operations with enablers such as logistics, intelligence, and close air support.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

According to Field Manual 3-24, the new counterinsurgency manual, “twenty [soldiers or police forces] per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations.” Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000 - 130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However, the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces for Baghdad only provided for about 80,000 security forces.

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops has been and remains sufficient and if so, why?

While every commander would like additional resources, the 80,000 troops that were in or moved to Baghdad were sufficient given the political-military situation and phased conduct of operations. Counterinsurgency requires local security forces and not just Soldiers. At the same time, the Baghdad police were expanded and now have an authorization of over 39,000. In addition, it is important to recognize the security contribution of 30,000 Sons of Iraq assisting U.S. forces in Baghdad alone. As the Baghdad security plan has progressed, these forces proved to be sufficient to allow gradual but steady progress in efforts to clear and hold Baghdad’s neighborhoods. I would also add that the critical increase in the enablers such as ISR platforms, intelligence teams, and aviation, as well as many other enablers, has a significant impact.

What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine?

As the former commander of MNC-I, I can attest that risk assessment and planning to mitigate risk occur on a continuous process in Iraq. As operations in Iraq are considered and undertaken, commanders consider the risk to our own as well as Iraqi forces, as well as the risk of thinning our lines in areas which we currently hold. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that risk assessment occurs on a continuous basis.

Length of Iraqi Insurgency

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has said that 20th Century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted nine years.

How long do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last? Do you have reason to believe that this campaign will be shorter than the typical effort cited by General Casey?

I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will depend on a variety of factors about which it is very difficult to make judgments. While the support of the United States will be important for some time to come, ultimately the government of Iraq

must win this fight. Therefore, while the counterinsurgency campaign could last nine years, it is not necessarily the case that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.

Sustainment of U.S. Commitment

Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 140,000 troops at their current operational tempo?

Over the past few years, we have seen definitive indications that the force is strained. Stress on Soldiers and Units resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, readiness, and recruitment. However, the Army has a plan that will, with Congressional assistance, restore balance to our force. The Army has identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit and retain enough Soldiers to meet our end strength requirements. The Army also has received authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist in restoring balance to preserve our all volunteer force, restoring the necessary strategic depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to Combatant Commanders at pre-surge levels.

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its Soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained Soldiers into combat to meet the national strategy.

State of Training and Equipping of Iraqi Security Forces

What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces?

Over two-thirds of Iraqi Army units are leading security operations throughout Iraq, and over half of the police units of the Ministry of Interior are capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency operations. However, numerous challenges remain in logistics and other enablers. The single most important area that still needs improvement relates to shortages in the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

What is your assessment of Iraqi Security Forces progress toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?

Iraqi Security Forces have made important progress, but are not yet ready to assume full responsibility throughout Iraq on their own. Over the past 16 months, an increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled Iraqi Security Forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police, and this still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 73,000 soldiers and police through the rest of 2008. Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. Despite these gains, however, recent operations have underscored the considerable work that remains to be done in the areas of expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

Burden Sharing

What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and operations for its security forces?

The government of Iraq has a responsibility, and also the increasing capability, to assume the training, equipping, and operations costs for the Iraqi security forces. In 2006 and 2007, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund. Iraq is expected to spend over \$8 billion on security this year and \$11 billion next year. The trend of Iraq spending more for its own defense and the United States paying less will continue over time. However, it is important that this occur in a somewhat gradual manner rather than all at once to avoid major disruptions and delays in the development of more capable Iraqi Security Forces.

What are your views on the responsibility and ability of the Iraqi government to share the cost of combined operations with Multi-National Force-Iraq forces and stability programs throughout Iraq?

The government of Iraq is responsible for sharing the cost of security operations and stability programs throughout Iraq, and it is increasingly doing so. As an encouraging example, the Iraqi government recently allocated \$300 million dollars for the Coalition Forces to manage as Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds. This initiative has enabled Coalition forces to execute projects for the Iraqi people while the Iraqi government continues to build its own capacity to so.

Permanent Basing

In the fiscal year 2008 defense authorization and appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.

Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?

Yes.

Do you agree that it is important for the government of Iraq to assume greater responsibility for paying the costs of reconstruction throughout Iraq, including paying for all large-scale infrastructure projects?

Yes.

Force Protection

The Baghdad security plan distributed American units with Iraqi units over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.

What is the status of American forces' distribution to small local bases throughout Baghdad?

Coalition forces have nearly completed the establishment of planned stations and outposts in Baghdad. 53 of 55 Joint Security Stations (JSS) and 22 Combat Outposts (COPs) are established.

If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Force - Iraq, how would you ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a daily basis?

Force protection and sustainment of JSS and COPs is always a major concern. If confirmed, I will ensure constant assessments are made of our current force protection measures and constant adjustments are made to improve our operational, tactical, and technical measures of force protection; ensuring we do all possible for the protection of all U.S. and Coalition forces.

Airborne Intelligence Collection

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) issued a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement in December of 2006, for a large number of additional aircraft with imaging and signals intelligence capabilities. Since that Statement was issued, even larger requirements for such intelligence platforms have been articulated by commanders in the theater. It appears that the Department of Defense has been

slow to respond to these requirements, although recently the Air Force has “surged” a large number of Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to CENTCOM. However, this surge and other activities will not close the gap between available and required resources. The main problem appears to be that there are bottlenecks in fielding more UAVs in the near future, coupled with a reluctance to seek alternative aircraft to the UAV programs-of-record.

Do you believe that small manned aircraft acquired from the commercial sector could provide a practical near-term solution to CENTCOM’s intelligence platform shortage?

As we develop our requirements we normally do not focus on specific platforms. We try to identify the operational and strategic needs and define shortfalls in capability and capacity. Then we seek needed capabilities and practical solutions rather than specific platforms and technologies.

Are you satisfied that this potential solution has been adequately considered?

Yes. I believe that MNF-I and U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the Department of Defense Task Force on ISR, are considering all possible solutions to ISR shortfalls.

Intelligence Support for Ground Forces

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the national intelligence agencies have developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility for regular ground forces in battling militias and IED networks are now more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps ground forces.

Do you believe that regular Army and Marine Corps ground forces can replicate the capabilities developed by Special Forces?

Special operations forces and conventional Army and Marine Corps units do have some overlapping capabilities. However, they also have unique characteristics based on their missions. For example, conventional forces are specifically designed to be able to hold terrain—a task for which special operations forces are ill-suited. Conversely, special operations forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct foreign internal defense, strategic reconnaissance, and specific counterterrorism missions typically beyond the capabilities of conventional units. Both conventional and special operations forces are needed as part of the comprehensive approach necessary to defeat

organizations such as the al Qaeda network. One of the positive developments we have seen in Iraq is an increasing sophistication in the ability of our conventional forces to work closely with special operations forces to synchronize efforts and achieve a greater effect. Conventional and Special Operation force capabilities continue to mature; which has created substantially more cooperation and synergy and improved capacity.

Are Multi-National Forces-Iraq commanders now attempting to accomplish this?

During my time as MNC-I Commander, one of our greatest successes was the synchronization and interaction of conventional and special operations forces. Conventional force commanders in Iraq continually adapted to accomplish their missions in diverse and complex local environments. Some of the tasks that they undertook, such as partnering with local Iraqi Security Forces, resembled missions historically associated with Special Forces. However, these efforts complement rather than duplicate the work done by special operations forces. Similarly, special operations force commanders recognize that their missions must complement the efforts of conventional force commanders who are responsible for maintaining security in the areas in which special operations forces conduct missions. Our gains in effectiveness have come not from merging the two different types of units, but from increasing the coordination and synchronization of their efforts.

Has DOD provided the resources to acquire the equipment and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps ground forces to adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and procedures?

A critical enabler for the success of Coalition operations in Iraq, particularly as we have drawn back down from surge force levels, has been a robust intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) posture. ISR assets have increased operational effectiveness and improved force protection capabilities. Platforms such as the armed Predator have also enabled precision targeting, which allows the elimination of threats, such as an enemy indirect fire team, while avoiding civilian casualties and damage to property. But this must be a continuous and dynamic process. The enemy will adapt and we must continue to adapt.

Military Transition Teams

Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend?

The current military transition teams, composed of 10-15 personnel, do not require any significant changes, as they have proven to be highly successful

during major operations across the battlefield. A team's composition is the result of battlefield assessments, commander's recommendations, and feedback from teams themselves. Recently, the Iraq Assistance Group, in conjunction with the Multi-National Division Commanders and division-level Transition Team chiefs, reviewed all transition team manning and requirements. This allowed Human Resources Command to modify the rank and specialty of selected positions within Transition Teams. This provided greater flexibility for the Army to assign team members who are qualified to coach, teach, and mentor Iraqi Security Forces.

The Iraqi Army will continue to increase in size over the next year and a half; however, this does not generate a need to increase the number of external Transition Teams. As Coalition Forces move toward operational overwatch, fewer forces will be involved in direct conflict, allowing more focus on the training and preparation of Iraqi forces. Coalition Forces will gradually shift to operational overwatch as threat levels decrease, more ISF units achieve ORA level one status, and Iraq moves towards sustainable security.

In the short term, MNC-I remains focused on security and stability operations, using a combination of internal and external Transition Teams, in conjunction with aggressive coalition partnering, to maintain current gains and continue to build towards Iraqi security autonomy. MNF-I and MNC-I continue to assess the optimal size and role of transition teams and the adjustments required to the Coalition Brigade and Division force structure for the future. Teams will likely remain 10-15 man elements. Coalition units will frequently augment teams based on operational need.

The size, structure, and operating procedures of Police Transition Teams (PTTs) are sufficient. PTTs have a core element of 11-16 individuals, though BCT commanders frequently augment the team based on their specific needs. The size of the PTTs allows partnering with Coalition units, which fosters continual improvement of the Iraqi Police Service.

The total number of personnel serving on PTTs is not sufficient. Because of manning levels, Coalition Forces currently have 252 Police Transition Teams in the 9 Provinces that have not yet transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control. This is only 83% of the 305 total PTTs required to provide coverage to all Police districts and stations within those provinces.

What is your view of the potential transition of this mission to contractors?

I support the DoD policy that prohibits contractors from serving in roles in which they are an integrated part of a combat force and from direct participation in offensive combat operations. In order to be effective in developing ISF capability, Transition Teams serve with Iraqi forces in day-to-day operations as advisors and trainers. This constant presence with ISF units provides a link to

Coalition enablers and allows the ISF to learn by observing our fine officers and noncommissioned officers in action on the battlefield everyday. Some contracted personnel play a properly limited but valuable role in Iraq by serving as advisors to Transition Team leaders on issues such as military doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, to include dissemination of “lessons learned” to incoming teams?

Prior to serving as advisors to Iraqi Security Forces, Army and Marine Corps teams undergo extensive training regarding cultural awareness, advisor skills, ground maneuver tactics, individual and crew served weapons, foreign weapons, fire support, logistics, intelligence, and communications. Externally sourced Army teams attend training at Fort Riley, KS and then Camp Beuhring, Kuwait, while Marine teams train at 29 Palms, CA. Internally sourced Army teams conduct training at home station with their Brigade Combat Team and participate in training exercises to include Combat Training Center rotations and Mission Readiness Exercises. All teams, regardless of sourcing, attend training at the Phoenix Academy in Taji, Iraq, before conducting a ten day transition with outgoing teams.

The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG, a directorate of Multi-National Corps - Iraq), Fort Riley, and 29 Palms conduct quarterly training conferences to review all training programs. Also, if major changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures occur, that information is immediately transmitted to Fort Riley for input into training plans for deploying teams. Sixty days into their deployment, teams conduct an initial review that is designed to provide direct feedback on the training they received and allow immediate adjustments to training at Fort Riley. IAG compiles and posts on its website lessons learned and best practices from over 200 teams in the field to allow easy access. These lessons learned are discussed during quarterly conferences to ensure the data is incorporated into future training and is easily accessible for all teams.

The mission to train Transition Teams (TTs) is currently supported by over 25 major external agencies, including the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Defense Language Institute, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. Additionally, the IAG runs two very effective programs, the alumni program and the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) program. The alumni program sends current TT members back to Fort Riley during their mid-tour leave to discuss lessons learned and link up with incoming team members. The PDSS program brings every team leader undergoing training at Ft. Riley to Iraq to co-locate and operate with the team they will replace for a 7 – 10 day period. They gain valuable insight into their area of operations and bring lessons learned back to their team’s training program at Ft. Riley.

If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?

I will support aggressive assessment and adjustment to Transition Team training and lessons learned proliferation. It is critical to continue to adjust and improve the critical component of our strategy.

Detainee Treatment Standards

Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 must be the standard for U.S. and Coalition Forces to adhere to in regards to the handling of detainees at all levels. How we treat detainees reflects upon us as a nation.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. The FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability while at all times ensuring humane treatment. Having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity.

Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes. I agree that the way we treat detainees may affect how our captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are treated. We adhere to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as a baseline for treatment, regardless of whether our enemies afford us that treatment.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, mandates compliance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Treating detainees in compliance with the Geneva Conventions is an integral part of counterinsurgency operations.

Iraqi State-Owned Enterprises

What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?

Prior to 1991, Iraq was the most industrialized of the Arab States, with a significant base of industrial operations across a wide range of sectors and a highly skilled civilian workforce. From 1991-2003, industry in Iraq was strictly focused on internal production to meet domestic demand as United Nations sanctions prevented export of goods or international economic engagement. Many of these factories shut down immediately after liberation. Coalition efforts to help Iraq revitalize its State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are led by the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (TF BSO). TF BSO has assisted Iraqi leaders in restoring operations and/or materially increasing production at 56 factories across Iraq. Funded projects, which were specifically targeted to restart or increase production, range from procurement of raw materials and spare parts to replacement of damaged or obsolete production equipment. Initiatives to revitalize SOEs have directly resulted in the re-employment of over 100,000 idled or underemployed workers.

In coordination with Iraqi leaders, TF BSO continues its efforts to restart production at Iraqi factories, with specific focus on agriculture and food processing operations and factories in Southern Iraq that had been inaccessible prior to recent military operations. To ensure sustainable results, TF BSO is assisting with the application of standard business investment management practices to the process of allocating new funds to idled or low-production-rate factories. Coalition personnel also instruct factory managers in business plan preparation, marketing strategies, and capital investment plans.

The Iraqi government announced in January the first private investment awards to international consortiums—for three cement factories. Two of these deals, which average over \$100 million each, were finalized in April, and another is still in negotiation. Under the private joint venture arrangement, investors will manage the facility and increase current production levels six-fold, thus creating employment for 5,000 Iraqi workers. These deals represent a modern, profitable business model for investors and for Iraq. In combination with other initiatives focused on private sector development, banking, budget execution, and facilitation of foreign direct investment, these are small but positive steps toward market economy development in Iraq.

The jobs created by the revitalization of SOEs are an important support to Coalition and Iraqi efforts to reduce underemployment; this has a direct impact on security in that it decreases the pool of economically-driven potential recruits for insurgent and extremist elements in Iraq. Revitalization efforts are also an

important first step toward future privatization of Iraqi industries. I would seek to encourage further development of these initiatives if confirmed.

Iraqi Refugees

The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas within Iraq.

What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home?

Although refugee and displacement issues remain a serious concern, there are indicators that the situation has begun to improve. According to U.S. Agency for International Development reporting, the rate of displacement of Iraqi citizens has been slowing for at least the last four months. In addition, some Iraqis (primarily those from ethnically and religiously homogenous areas) are returning to their homes. These returns are motivated by a variety of factors, including: deteriorating conditions in places of displacement, increased restrictions in neighboring countries, tribal reconciliation, and reports of improved security in places of origin. It is encouraging that the Iraqi government has begun to take a more proactive approach to the problem of Iraqi refugees through the drafting of a national policy on internally displaced persons and a Basic Law for the Ministry of Displacement and Migration.

Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue?

While protecting the population and assisting Iraqi security forces should be the military's primary roles, the military can also play a limited role in addressing other concerns associated with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee return.

What the Military Can Do

- Execute humanitarian assistance when asked to do so by the Iraqi government
- Liaise with USAID for humanitarian assistance coordination
- Track IDPs in the AOR in so far as they affect security operations.
- Utilize PRTs/ePRTs as requested to identify and relay IDP-related issues

What the Military Cannot Do

- Assist IA and ISF with forcibly removing squatters and IDPs
- Provide security for IDP camps or movements of IDPs
- Move or clear IDPs from government or private property

What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others?

In addition to the capabilities and limitations discussed above, the US military can continue to assist with key leader engagement on this issue and to help develop the governmental capacity that will be necessary to handle refugee and IDP returns.

Special Inspector General

The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGR?

The reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) provide valuable insights to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the activities of the SIGIR as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Commander and, if confirmed, I will support them as the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

Mental Health Assessments in Theater

The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made 5 separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT V, found that stress and mental health problems increased with each subsequent month of deployment, and that "soldiers on their third or fourth deployment were at significantly higher risk" for mental health problems. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other mental health problems.

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

The MHAT process has provided an objective assessment on what is transpiring with service members' psychological health and valuable recommendations for future action on this issue. MHAT V produced 43 separate recommendations. Some, such as the recommendation to cross-train Army medics in behavioral health concepts, are already being implemented at the DA level; others, such as

the recommendation to authorize assignment of a mental health professional to every Combat Aviation Brigade, are under review at the DA level. If I am confirmed, I would seek to implement recommendations which are independently actionable at the MNF-I level.

If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?

I would strongly encourage and fully support future MHAT assessments if confirmed. This would include (but not be limited to) providing full access to information and staff input and feedback as appropriate.

Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

My views are shaped by the recommendations of mental health professionals and by tools such as MHAT assessments. We must continue to learn and study to ensure the welfare of our soldiers.

Generally speaking, prevention begins with supporting service members and their families before service members deploy; this includes tough training at home station that builds camaraderie in units and gives soldiers the confidence that they can accomplish their tasks. Predictability of deployments and time at home in between deployments for troopers to 'reset' with their families are also important.

Many important preventive steps are already being taken in theater. Medics in theater are already being trained on behavioral health topics so they can assist in identifying soldiers who need help, and Suicide Risk Management Teams have been created to ensure servicemen and women having difficulties get the help they need. Perhaps most critically, commanders are pushing the message that seeking help is a sign of strength, not weakness, and that it is essential to look out for battle buddies' mental health.

Do you believe that mental health resources in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed service members?

My understanding is that MNF-I is currently reassessing the adequacy of mental health resources in theater to ensure soldiers' needs are met. One possibility being considered is requesting 30 additional behavioral health personnel in theater, including mental health professionals and behavioral health technicians.

Sexual Assault

If confirmed as Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

What lessons did you learn while implementing sexual assault training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while serving as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq that can help improve any of these policies or their implementation in theater?

The prevention of sexual assault is a critical command issue. It is important to have a program that incorporates an awareness campaign that reaches every service member and that provides integrated response services, including medical care/counseling, victim advocacy, chaplain, law enforcement (investigation, detainment, etc.), legal (prosecution, legal assistance, and victim/witness liaison), reporting (assault reporting and data collection), and program assessment. I know that such a program must receive a commander's emphasis to be effective, and I would continue to seek to give it that emphasis if confirmed as the commander of MNF-I.

What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are available in the operational environment of Iraq?

Some of the most important challenges in Iraq include combat stress, battlefield dispersion, and a mixed, joint service and civilian population. With regard to the last of these challenges, civilians constitute approximately 50% of the force on the ground in Iraq and are critical contributors to mission success. The availability of response services for DoD civilian and contractor personnel should be similar to the services available to service members. There are jurisdictional, legal, contractual, and resource challenges associated with extending program response provisions to DoD civilian or contractor personnel which should be addressed.

With regard to sexual harassment and mental health, it is important to continually reinforce the responsibility of all individuals in theater to remain cognizant of the welfare of their fellow service members and co-workers and to encourage those exhibiting signs of difficulty to receive help.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault prevention and response resources currently available in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility?

Sexual assault is a serious crime that adversely impacts the physical and psychological readiness of our combat fighting force in Iraq. In my experience as the MNC-I Commander, I found the sexual assault and response program and resourcing to be robust. However, if confirmed as the MNF-I Commander, I would continue to assess our efforts in this area to ensure we continue meeting

the needs of our deployed service members and civilians. It is important for a commander to constantly monitor organizational climate and to foster the development of a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.