

Advance Questions for Michèle Flournoy
Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort, and civilian oversight. We now have a generation of military leaders for whom operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment is the norm. Given these successes, I do not see the immediate need to change the provisions of this legislation.

I have co-authored a number of studies that have advocated using the Goldwater-Nichols Act as a point of departure for enhancing interagency unity of effort and the capabilities of America's non-military instruments of statecraft. If confirmed, I would hope to be in a position to help strengthen the U.S. government's ability to craft effective whole of government approaches to the national security challenges we face.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

See my previous answer.

Relationships

What is your understanding of the relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. The USD(P) provides policy support to the Secretary in interagency fora (such as National Security Council and Homeland Security

Council deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary for Policy provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Undersecretaries of Defense to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition, the Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the Under Secretary of Intelligence and other intelligence officials to ensure that policy formulation and execution are well informed and supported by intelligence.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy exercises authority, direction and control over the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Asian and Pacific Affairs (APSA), Global Security Affairs (GSA), Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SOLIC/IC) and Homeland Defense and Americas' Security (HD/AS). This team works together to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning and other areas in which the military departments are critical stakeholders.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. In practice, this means significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Security, and to ensure that their military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

The Commanders of the Regional Combatant Commanders

The USD(P) also works closely with the Regional Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Security, particularly in the areas of regional strategy and policy, contingency planning and policy oversight of operations.

Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Section 134 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls. Further, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.

Department of Defense Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

If confirmed, I will perform the duties set forth in Title 10 and the Department of Defense Directive. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. Specifically the USD(P) directly supports the Secretary of Defense in the interagency process, in dealings with foreign counterparts, in developing strategy and planning guidance for the rest of the PPBE process, in providing policy oversight of current operations, and in guiding the development and review of contingency plans. He or she

is the Secretary's principal policy adviser on the use of the U.S. military instrument and its adaptation for future missions.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in combating terrorism, in particular as differentiated from those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Integrated Capabilities functions under the authority, direction and control of the USD (P) in combating terrorism. In practice, ASD/SOLIC/IC is often asked to provide direct support to the Secretary on sensitive operational material.

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

I look forward to speaking with him further about how I could best support his efforts beyond those set forth in Section 134(b) of Title 10.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have had the privilege of spending more than twenty years working on a broad range of national security and defense issues, both in and out of government. From my time in university and graduate school wrestling with issues surrounding the Cold War and the Soviet nuclear arsenal, to my five and a half years spent in the Pentagon taking a lead role in formulating defense strategy in the immediate post-Cold War context for three different Secretaries of Defense, to my more recent roles in the think-tank community exploring U.S. policies to address the complex challenges of the post-9/11 era, I believe I have the policy background and management experience that would serve the country well if confirmed as the next Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is specifically directed to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

I believe that civilian leadership is critical in the formulation of strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and principles into the strategic ends that ultimately drive military planning.

More specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supports the development of the President's National Security Strategy, leads the development of the defense strategy, establishes realistic objectives and guidance to form the basis for contingency planning, and reviews DoD plans and programs to ensure they support strategic objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a critical partner in the development of guidance for contingency planning and provides independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition to the provision of written guidance, an important civilian role is to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the Combatant Commanders. The USD(P) is also responsible for facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

I believe that the United States is at a critical time in history – with multiple wars, enduring threats, and imminent challenges. From the need to redeploy forces in Iraq, strengthen commitments in Afghanistan, to the importance of combating terrorism and preparing for a future in which energy security and the rise of states like China and India will fundamentally alter the international environment, I believe that a strong civilian and military partnership on these issues is vital. If confirmed, I will examine this issue closely and seek to ensure that civilian leadership has the appropriate level of oversight on the full range of strategy, planning, and use of force issues.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

Given that we are at this critical point in history, I do feel that the strategy and planning capacity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be strengthened. From my time inside and outside of government, I have come to believe that the U.S. government needs to fortify its capacity for strategic thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deals with the challenges of today but is also well prepared for those of tomorrow.

If confirmed, I would strive to provide the best advice possible to the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling his responsibility to provide written policy guidance and to review contingency plans. I would also work closely with the Joint Staff to develop further opportunities to collaborate on planning guidance and reviews.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed, my office will likely play an important role within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy for a number of key issues, including among others: responsibly ending the war in Iraq; ensuring that the United States develops and employs a more effective strategy in Afghanistan and the surrounding region; working to prevent nuclear and WMD proliferation; combating terrorism; adapting the U.S. military for 21st century challenges; and strengthening America's alliances with key partners and allies. Beyond ensuring that the Secretary of Defense receives the best possible policy input on these vital questions, another major challenge will be to strengthen the organizational capacity to support these efforts.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would participate in a number of policy reviews, including the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which provides an opportunity to assess these challenges and develop policy, plans, and investments to address them.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed, I would give priority to the major challenges identified above and to strengthening the organizational capacity of OSD Policy to address them. I would also give priority to ensuring effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts through the Department and the interagency.

Iraq

The U.S.-Iraqi status of forces agreement (SOFA) requires that U.S. combat forces withdraw from cities and towns by June 2009 and that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq by the end of December 2011. Additionally, if Iraqi voters reject the SOFA in a referendum scheduled for July 2009, U.S. troops would be required to withdraw by July 2010.

What in your view are the greatest challenges facing the Department in meeting these deadlines and what actions, if any, would you recommend to maximize the chances of meeting these requirements?

The challenge in Iraq will be to continue the phased redeployment of U.S. forces while maintaining a secure environment to support elections, political reconciliation, and economic development. If confirmed, I would review DoD plans and work with colleagues across the Department to make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

What is your understanding and assessment of U.S. plans to support implementation of the SOFA requirements for repositioning and redeployment of U.S. forces, including contingency planning relating to the Iraqi referendum?

I have not had the opportunity to review detailed plans regarding the repositioning and redeployment of U.S. forces in Iraq. If confirmed, I would review such plans and make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

To date, U.S. taxpayers have paid approximately \$48 billion for stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq while the Iraqi Government has accrued a budget surplus of tens of billions of dollars. On April 8, 2008, Ambassador Crocker told the Committee “the era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure is over” and said the United States is no longer “involved in the physical reconstruction business.”

What do you believe is the appropriate role for the United States in reconstruction activities in Iraq going forward?

I support the President-elect’s views on bringing in Iraq’s neighbors to help with reconstruction efforts. I also believe American policy should continue to be supportive in working with and through our Iraqi partners and that the U.S. role in reconstruction should focus on capacity development and assisting our Iraqi partners in prioritizing, planning, and executing their reconstruction projects.

What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and operations for its security forces?

I believe that a critical part of our strategy depends on ensuring that the Iraqi government assumes control of the entire range of tasks necessary to organize, train, and equip its security forces. From DoD’s perspective, this includes helping our Iraqi partners to formulate a defense strategy and acquisition policy that is prudent and practical given finite resources.

What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to share the cost of combined operations with MNF-I forces and stability programs throughout Iraq?

I understand that the U.S. Government has not requested the Iraqis contribute to the costs of MNF-I operations. A key objective is for Iraq to develop and fully support its forces in order to assume responsibility for its own security and stability.

What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to share the increased operating and facilities costs associated with repositioning or withdrawal of U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi SOFA?

My understanding is that under the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, there is no Iraqi responsibility to pay costs associated with repositioning or withdrawal of U.S. forces. I believe the U.S. government should encourage Iraq to focus on the development and support of its security forces.

Afghanistan

What is your understanding and assessment of our strategic objectives in Afghanistan?

Our strategic objective is a stable and secure Afghanistan in which Al Qaeda and the network of insurgent groups, including the Taliban, are incapable of seriously threatening the Afghan state and resurrecting a safe haven for terrorism. We are a long way from achieving this objective. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee on this enormous challenge, which requires urgent and sustained attention.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to our current strategy in Afghanistan?

Achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan will require a more integrated and comprehensive approach to security, economic development, and governance. All of the instruments of national power and persuasion must be harnessed in order to be successful. It is imperative that we improve coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors and that we achieve greater unity of effort among our coalition partners, international institutions, and the government of Afghanistan.

Do you believe that there is a need to develop a comprehensive civil-military plan for Afghanistan, akin to that used in Iraq?

Yes.

How do you assess the contributions of NATO allies to the effort in Afghanistan, and how do you believe that the United States can persuade these allies to increase their efforts as the United States does so?

Afghanistan would be less secure without the contributions and sacrifices of our NATO allies and other international ISAF partners. President-elect Obama and Secretary Gates have both called for greater contributions with fewer caveats from our NATO allies. By committing more of our own resources to the challenge, the United States will be better positioned to persuade our allies to do more.

General David McKiernan, USA, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, has identified a need for four additional combat brigades and support units in Afghanistan.

Do you support General McKiernan's request for additional forces? If so, would you support drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq faster in order to meet General McKiernan's request?

President-elect Obama and Secretary Gates have both consistently stated that they believe the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan required additional U.S. and international forces. If confirmed, I look forward to talking with them and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others to determine how DoD can best support that request. Balancing the demand for forces between Iraq and Afghanistan while ensuring that the military is ready for other contingencies will be one of the Department's key challenges and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with those in the Department responsible for this as well as with this committee.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's plans for the continued rotational flow of combat brigades and other units necessary to support operations in Iraq through 2009 and the availability of the additional combat brigades as requested by General McKiernan?

Though I have not been briefed in detail, I understand that the Department is preparing plans for the requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan as currently understood. If confirmed, I will consult with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior commanders to examine the plans in detail as the law requires my office to do.

How would the Department support combat brigade increases in Afghanistan without extending combat brigades or redeploying combat brigades without replacement in Iraq?

Managing the build-up of forces in Afghanistan must be balanced with the demands in Iraq and the necessity to restore full spectrum readiness. We have asked a great deal of our Servicemen and women, and I am acutely aware of the costs to them and to their families of extended and repeated deployments.

The goal for increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been revised from 68,000 to approximately 134,000 soldiers.

Would you support a "surge" of trainers from the United States and coalition partners into Afghanistan to accelerate the expansion of the ANA?

Building an effective, broadly representative, and respected ANA will require additional resources. If confirmed, I will work with the services, senior commanders, and our international partners to make sure that we have the right number of trainers, mentors, and advisors with sufficient resources to accomplish their mission.

What recommendations, if any, would you have for encouraging or enabling our coalition partners to provide more training team personnel to embed with ANA units?

Developing the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces to assume the front-line responsibility of security inside Afghanistan should be the greatest incentive for coalition partners to provide training team personnel. We must stress to our allies the long-term commitment of the United States to Afghanistan and the shared responsibility NATO has to develop Afghan forces so that they can eventually take the lead for security in Afghanistan.

One of the main threats to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan comes from cross-border attacks by the Taliban and extremist militants who find safe haven in Pakistan's border regions.

What steps in your view need to be taken to eliminate the threat posed by Taliban and extremist militants hiding out across the Afghan-Pakistan border?

Both President-elect Obama and Secretary Gates have cited the need to eliminate the terrorist sanctuary in the border regions of Pakistan, but there is no purely military solution. The U.S. must have an integrated strategy to promote development and prevent terrorism across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with my DoD and interagency colleagues to examine several potential components of such a strategy:

- Work with the Pakistani government to strengthen the capacity of the Pakistani military and police to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions;
- Encourage Pakistani political reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to better link the border regions to the central government with more democratic representation;
- Increase non-military economic assistance and support for education and health care; and
- Improve the partnership between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the coalition to secure the border, eliminate terrorist camps, and reduce cross-border insurgent movement.

The ANA has shown itself to be effective, well-motivated, and respected by the Afghan people.

Would you support giving the ANA the lead in stopping cross-border incursions, either by transferring the mission of patrolling the border to the ANA or by bringing the Afghan Border Patrol under the ANA?

Securing the border from cross-border incursions and illegal smuggling is an important component of a strategy for success in Afghanistan, but the specific command relationship between the ABP and ANA is an area that, if confirmed, I would need to examine in closer detail.

The cultivation of poppies and trafficking of opium has reached alarming proportions in Afghanistan. Some estimate that over 50 percent of Afghanistan's gross national product is associated with the illegal opium trade and that Afghanistan is at risk of failing as a nation state. Coalition strategies for countering the opium trade have not been effective to date.

In your view, what strategy would be most effective in reducing opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan?

Opium traffic distorts the Afghan economy, corrodes the judicial system, and increases the incentives for corruption and criminal violence. Countering the opium trade must include a multi-pronged coalition and Afghan strategy, including judicial reform, better law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and rural economic development.

What should the role of the U.S. military forces be in the counterdrug program in Afghanistan?

What is the appropriate role for coalition nations and the larger international community in effectively addressing the counterdrug challenge in Afghanistan and the surrounding region?

The international community must play a greater role in helping the Afghan government to strengthen Afghan institutions, including the judicial and law enforcement system, intelligence service, and Afghan National Security Forces, so that it can better take the lead in combating narcotics in Afghanistan.

What are the main challenges facing the U.S. and international community's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan?

The deterioration of the security situation is the most immediate challenge, but reconstruction and development in Afghanistan also face more fundamental challenges. As one of the poorest countries in the world that has suffered through more than a generation of war, Afghanistan's development challenges are daunting. Four out of five Afghans make their living from farming, yet widespread drought and a crumbling agricultural infrastructure have created an opening for illicit opium production to supplant the legal agricultural economy. While Afghanistan has made significant strides since 2001 in health care delivery, life expectancy is still below 45 years and more than half of Afghan children are growth-stunted from poor nutrition and disease. While progress has been made towards primary education in Afghanistan, fewer than half of adult males and only one in eight females can read, impeding the professionalization of the Afghan government and security forces and limiting economic growth.

What would be your priorities for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency and international partners to help create a truly comprehensive civil-military strategy to build the necessary foundation for a stable and secure Afghanistan.

What changes, if any, would you recommend for the strategy, organizational structure, or resourcing of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been critical to the development work undertaken in Afghanistan over the past six years. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing the committee's concerns and ideas on the use of PRTs.

Pakistan

What is your understanding and assessment of the efforts by the Pakistani Government to counter militant groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border and to fight terrorism in general?

The Pakistani Government will, of course, be central to defeating the terrorist and cross-border insurgent groups that threaten Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the international community. Although the Pakistani government has conducted a series of military operations against militants in the border region, the area remains a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated groups. If confirmed, I plan to focus significant time and energy to better understand the requirements to solve this particular challenge.

In your view, is the Pakistani Government doing enough to combat these threats? If not, what more should it be doing? What in your view should be the U.S. approach vis-à-vis Pakistan?

I have not had the opportunity to review Pakistan's most recent efforts in detail. If confirmed, I look forward to reporting back to the committee on my assessment of ways in which the U.S. and Pakistan can work better together to combat these shared threats.

India

The recent attacks in Mumbai raise questions about what more might be done to help India guard against and react to terrorist incidents and underscore the fragile nature of the relationship between India and neighboring Pakistan.

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India military-to-military contacts?

I understand that the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship is quite positive and getting stronger. If confirmed, these are areas that I hope we can work on together.

What do you believe the U.S. should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events?

As the world's largest democracy, India is a critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the U.S. share an interest in preventing terrorism. If confirmed, I will work with the State Department to carefully consider all requests for counterterrorism assistance from India.

In your view, what impact has this rise in tensions between Pakistan and India had on the stability of the South Asia region, generally, and on the prospects for security in Afghanistan?

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history, culture, language, and trade, and regional stability cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all three. It is in America's national interest to play a constructive role in helping defuse the recent rise in tensions and to help derive from the tragic attacks in Mumbai an opportunity for further cooperation between three of America's crucial allies.

Future of NATO

What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?

The United States has enormous stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO alliance, and both the President-elect and the Secretary of Defense have stressed their strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. Over the next five years, top-tier NATO-related challenges include, first and foremost, achieving durable progress on Afghanistan, while also developing a common approach toward managing relations with Russia, improving the prospects for unity-of-action between NATO and the EU, and finding common ground across the alliance on emerging threats and opportunities.

Do you envision further enlargement of NATO, beyond Albania and Croatia, within the next five years?

The President-elect has stated that NATO enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Precisely which countries and within what applicable timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions which the new administration will need to address in close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic and military reforms.

What more can the United States do to encourage NATO members to develop the capabilities and provide the resources necessary to carry out NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

While the President-elect and Secretary Gates have both stressed the need for the United States to invest more in its non-military instruments of national power, many of our NATO allies are underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Forging a shared strategic view of the emerging threat environment and updating NATO's strategic concept will be critical to encouraging NATO allies to develop the military capabilities needed now and in the future.

NATO-EU Relations

A challenge facing the United States and NATO in the months and years ahead is the European Union's (EU) implementation of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), that is, an EU capability to conduct military operations in response to international crises in cases where "NATO as a whole is not engaged." At the same time, NATO and EU are working alongside each other in addressing a number of common security challenges, including police training in Afghanistan and crisis management in Kosovo.

Are you concerned that the EU could assume a competing role, rather than a complementary role, to the NATO alliance?

Ideally, the NATO-EU relationship should be complementary. In the defense realm, NATO is going to be the preferred vehicle for negotiation whenever our European allies view the U.S. role as indispensable in responding to a shared security challenge. At the same time, the EU's great strength lies in its ability to project economic power and political influence in a way that helps to attenuate conflict. The Obama Administration will need to look carefully at the relationship to ensure that competition is kept to a minimum. Moreover, because both NATO and the EU draw largely from a single pool of national capabilities, cooperation will be extremely important.

What steps do you believe that the United States and NATO must take to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that strengthens the Alliance?

Over the past several years, ESDP-related activities have grown in number and diversity, to include the EU's recently launched anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Given these trends, high priority should be given to promoting good communications and a common operating picture between the U.S., its allies and partners, and EU-sponsored operations.

What is your view of the future of NATO-EU relations in areas relating to security, defense, and crisis management?

Both NATO and the EU have important roles to play in meeting future security, defense and crisis management challenges. As noted above, from an Alliance perspective, it will be important for DoD and U.S. interagency partners to take a clear-eyed view of the entire range of current EU-activities – from civilian policing, to military, border control

or other missions – to identify both areas of duplication and where closer coordination may be required.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian de-mining operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?

If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement. I believe the current and emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the militaries of our partners and allies around the world, and building productive relationships with many states in which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.

Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Yes. I believe military-to-military contacts contribute to U.S. national security in a variety of important ways. Such activities can build capacity among partner nations to participate in coalition operations to counter terrorism and other transnational threats, potentially relieving stress on U.S. forces. They can help harmonize nations' views of common security challenges. Military-to-military activities can also help sustain investments made by other U.S. assistance programs. Finally, when performed effectively, military-to-military activities should show by example how military forces can act effectively while respecting human rights and civilian control. If confirmed, I intend to help ensure that our engagement activities remain at the forefront of our planning and strategy development processes.

Stability Operations

Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DoD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

In stabilizing post-conflict environments, success depends upon the integrated efforts of both civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from planning

through execution. Ideally, civilian agencies should lead in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure and reviving economic activity. Military forces, in turn, are best suited to help provide a safe and secure environment and to assist in building accountable armed forces. The U.S. military has learned many hard lessons in this area over the past several years, and if confirmed I will work closely with Secretary Gates, military leaders and other U.S. government agencies to ensure we have the capabilities we need to execute these challenging missions.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

One of the most important lessons is that 21st century conflict will occur along the entire spectrum of conflict. That is, the military cannot be prepared only for combat. They must plan and train with their civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict. That said, the military should also be prepared to undertake critical non-military tasks when civilian agencies cannot operate effectively, either due to the security environment or due to lack of capacity. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire government. Finally, we need to obtain better situational awareness of the underlying drivers – political, cultural and economic – instability and conflict so as to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives and not trigger unintended consequences.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”).

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

One of the greatest threats to international security is the violence that is sparked when human security needs are not met by governments. This creates space for terrorists, insurgents, and other spoilers to operate and, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, to threaten the United States and its allies. The goal, therefore, is to close this space through efforts that strengthen bilateral relationships; increase U.S. access and influence; promote militaries that respect human rights, civilian control of the military and the rule of law; and build capacity for common security objectives. In addition to promoting regional and global security, enhanced partner capacity reduces the risk of future military interventions and reduces stress on U.S. armed forces.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

My understanding is that Section 1206 is intended to provide a quicker, more targeted ability to build partner capacity in critical regions than the more traditional routes of security assistance. Under law, it has two discrete purposes: to build a partner's national military or maritime security forces' capacity either to (1) conduct counterterrorism operations or (2) conduct or support stability operations where US forces are participating. I have not been involved in 1206 implementation, but I understand that the program has enthusiastic support from Embassies and COCOMs and reflects a close collaboration between State and DoD who work together in a "dual key" process to approve funding allocations. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary in fully assessing how well this authority is working and whether it meets congressional intent.

What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

The Departments of State and Defense need to work together very closely to avoid duplication of effort among these important activities. The Global Train and Equip authority fills two specific legal requirements (to build capacity for counterterrorism and for stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant). Foreign Military Financing serves a broader set of diplomatic and foreign policy objectives such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align.

Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DoD the ability to support U.S. or other Government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, I will support any interagency assessment of potential overlaps and work to ensure DoD programs are focused on supporting U.S. and other agency efforts to counter the flow of narcotics.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority ("Section 1207")? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?

Section 1207 was, as I understand it, designed to help the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to become operational. It facilitates security, stabilization, and reconstruction missions – bringing civilian expertise to bear alongside or in lieu of U.S. military forces. If confirmed, I will monitor this effort closely.

Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government's resources devoted to instruments of non-military "soft power" – civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates that there is a need to expand the Government's resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?

Absolutely. The President-elect and Secretary Gates have both made clear their strong desire to see more robust non-military instruments of national power. And Congress has the authority to expand significantly the Government's "soft-power" resources and U.S. civilian agency capacity. If confirmed, I will certainly make it my priority to assist in this effort.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

Generally, the Department's role should be to support, not lead, in the exercise of "soft power." But DoD plays a vital role in helping to promote – through the full gamut of planning effort, exchanges, exercises, operations, and bilateral defense relationships – the conditions that enable these instruments to be applied with maximum beneficial effect.

Which department should have the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy, the Department of State or the Department of Defense?

The State Department should retain the overall lead in setting our foreign policy and foreign assistance priorities broadly, including security assistance. Still, DoD has critical roles to play in informing, developing, and implementing agreed programs in an effective and timely manner. Strong and close working relationships between DoD, the State Department, and other U.S. agencies are critical.

Russia

What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian security relationship?

Russia's more aggressive external behavior – combined with its retreat from democracy and openness at home – is a source of deep concern. Of greatest concern, clearly, is a growing pattern of Russian pressures on, and, in some cases, aggressive action against the sovereign states located on its immediate borders, most notably Georgia. Russia's standing in the international community has declined as a result of its threatening behavior, and the U.S.-Russia security relationship has become much more difficult to manage as a result. That said, as Secretary Gates has noted, Russia's military capacity remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor, and a combination of adverse economic and demographic trends are not likely to change that picture dramatically in the foreseeable future.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

As the President-elect has stressed, it is in no one's interest to see our relations return to a Cold War posture. Our interests clearly overlap in areas such as non-proliferation, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and counternarcotics. Ultimately, I believe we should work to create the conditions that make clear that stable, democratic neighbors on Russia's borders are in Russia's own interest. We need to look at ways of enhancing cooperation in areas such as preventing WMD terrorism, where coordinated action is critical.

In your view what policy steps should DoD take to improve relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia?

Yes, when it is in our interest to do so, and in close coordination with the State Department. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to assess areas where greater military-to-military and other exchanges with Russia might be beneficial. It is certainly important for U.S. security interests that we work to keep our lines of communication open.

Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia?

I am not prepared at this stage to offer any specific recommendations on this issue. If confirmed, I will study the issue closely and consult with interested members of this committee.

Iran

Do you believe it would be in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in a direct dialogue to promote regional stability and security?

I support the President-elect's view that the United States should be willing to engage with all nations, friend or foe, and with careful preparation, to pursue direct diplomacy. Furthermore, I fully support the President-elect's view that we should not take any options off the table, but that we should employ tough diplomacy, backed by real incentives and pressures, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and end their support of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah.

Do you believe it would be in the United States' interest to engage Iran in a direct dialogue regarding the narcotics problem in Afghanistan?

This issue should be examined as part of a broader interagency policy review on Iran.

What more do you believe the United States and the international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program? Specifically, what actions do you believe that DoD should undertake to support diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon?

The United States has not yet brought to bear all the elements of statecraft to deal with this issue. The use of tough, direct, and principled diplomacy, working with our other international partners and allies, can increase the chances of making useful inroads. Setting the conditions in the region is critical. DoD should therefore continue developing the ongoing multilateral cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other allies in the region, in support of the State Department's diplomatic initiatives.

Syria

Do you believe it would be in the United States' interest to engage Syria in a direct dialogue regarding regional security and stability?

The Department of State should take the lead on any diplomatic initiatives with Syria. I agree with the President-elect's view that Syria is best engaged in the context of an aggressive regional diplomatic approach on the question of Iraq. Syria has a great and growing interest in ensuring that the large population of Iraqi refugees within its borders eventually returns home. I would hope that this topic would be examined when the new administration comes into office.

Saudi Arabia

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations and defense cooperation activities? What changes, if any, would you recommend in this relationship?

Saudi Arabia is an important ally of the United States. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a close defense relationship and extensive security assistance programs. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing ongoing cooperation activities and identifying ways to sustain this important relationship.

What is the future of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, including training programs such as the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization program? What other types of military or security cooperation do you envision advocating?

I have not been briefed on the details of current or prospective security cooperation programs with the Kingdom. If confirmed, I will consider and evaluate the full range of possible initiatives to support this relationship.

China

China is viewed by some in the United States as a potential threat and by others as a potential constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community.

To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops, and the extent to which it becomes a cooperative partner or a competitor of the United States?

China's sustained rise over the past decade is due in no small measure to its progressive integration into the global economy. For this reason, I believe that the United States and other countries can have positive influence on the direction of China's development. Indeed, no country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China's development and international integration than the United States. However, U.S. policy and actions, or those of any country or group of countries, cannot alone determine China's future. Ultimately, it is the Chinese who will determine China's future.

Furthermore, as Secretary Gates noted in a recent speech, "China is a competitor but not necessarily an adversary, and there is no reason for China to become an adversary." If confirmed, I would seek to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in the international community and to encourage Beijing to view this role as the best choice for their own strategic interests, as well as ours.

What do you see as the impact of the current global economic crisis on stability and security in China specifically, and in the region generally?

It is too early to gauge the full impact of the global economic crisis upon China and stability in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. But those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive to the security-economic interconnections and be prepared to work together with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.

What do you believe are China's political-military objectives regarding Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region, and globally?

Broadly, the overriding objectives of China's leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China's economic development, maintain the country's domestic political stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China's status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

What is your view of the U.S. policy of selling military equipment to Taiwan, despite China's objections?

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for nearly 30

years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I would work closely with Congress and our interagency partners to ensure the continued effective implementation of this longstanding policy.

How do you believe the United States should respond to China's military modernization program?

The pace and scale of Chinese modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding both capabilities and intentions, are a source of concern for the United States as well as for its allies and the region more broadly. An appropriate U.S. response would include efforts to fully comprehend the future direction of China's programs, active engagement to reduce the potential for miscalculations and to manage unwanted competition, and, finally, defense preparedness to ensure we retain our edge in areas that are critical to achieving specific operational objectives. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that DoD places a high priority on this issue and would consult closely with Committee members on appropriate U.S. responses.

In its 2008 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that China is asserting various excessive claims of sovereignty relating to maritime, air and space, and also concluded that these claims have negative implications for the United States. Further, the Commission concluded that more must be done to ensure that China's rapid expansion of nuclear power does not result in the decline in safety or an increase in proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or expertise.

How should the United States respond to excessive claims of sovereignty by China?

I appreciate that China's claims of sovereignty are controversial and detract from regional stability. The United States has a longstanding policy on Freedom of Navigation and does not acquiesce to excessive maritime claims that restrict navigation and over-flight rights under customary international law, as reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Department of State, and as appropriate with other countries that have a stake in this issue, on developing a common understanding of and collaborative approaches to these issues.

What is the role of DoD in helping to ensure that China does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or weapons technology in the region?

DoD should continue to support interagency efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, including with respect to China.

Our current military-to-military relations with the Chinese have been described by defense officials as "modest."

Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

More can be done to improve the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quality and the quantity of exchanges between the armed forces of our countries. If confirmed, I would look closely at exchanges with the Chinese armed forces at all levels and across a range of issues, including the recently opened dialogue on nuclear policy and strategy, which I understand is a priority for Secretary Gates. If confirmed, I look to engage in a wide range of areas where we can encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

Is legislation needed to effect these changes?

I do not know. If confirmed, I would carefully monitor developments in the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship and consult with Congress on these issues.

North Korea

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea's conventional military, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and proliferation activities pose a significant threat to regional peace and security. Working with our allies and other key parties in the region on diplomatic solutions is an essential element in addressing the totality of the security problem on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, it is essential to maintain the capabilities to deter North Korea's military threat and proliferation activities. Our strong alliances with South Korea and Japan remain instrumental in this regard. These alliances help maintain the peace and stability that has allowed the wider East Asia region and U.S. interests there to prosper over the past several decades. If confirmed, I would work with my military and interagency colleagues to strengthen these alliance relationships and U.S. efforts to address the problems posed by North Korea. The United States must continue to provide strong leadership to ensure the full implementation of the recent agreement in North Korea. North Korea must dismantle its nuclear weapons program and confirm the full extent of its past plutonium production and uranium enrichment activities.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities? In your view, how should DoD forces be sized, trained, and equipped to deal with this threat?

North Korea missile and WMD programs pose a serious threat to the United States, the rest of Asia, and the world. Strong alliances, regional partnerships and forward military presence remain key means to deal with these threats. U.S. national capabilities are also an essential element in deterring the threat and defending our interests. Additionally, in the event of a DPRK collapse, the U.S. would need the capabilities to work closely with

the ROK to rapidly and safely secure nuclear weapons and materials. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military commanders and members of this Committee to ensure that the U.S. military has the capabilities needed to deal with the range of threats North Korea poses and that our contingency planning is adaptive and responsive.

In your view, what should be done to maintain or strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

Maintaining a strong alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea remains central to effective deterrence on the Peninsula. Our alliance with Japan is likewise a critical factor in security and stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region, including on the Peninsula. If confirmed, I would work hard to continue strengthening these alliances.

With recent speculation regarding the possible poor health of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, what do you believe the United States should be doing now to prepare for the possibility of a change in leadership in North Korea?

The unexpected, with its attendant opportunities and challenges, can take different forms, including a sudden health crisis or change in leadership in North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with this committee about the range of potential challenges we face and ensuring that we are capable of addressing these contingencies. I believe our focus should be ensuring we are ready to maintain stability in the region, defend the Republic of Korea, and prevent the proliferation of WMD or other dangerous technologies from the DPRK.

If confirmed, would you undertake a review of the status of the efforts to obtain from North Korea remains of U.S. Serviceman missing from the Korean War and specifically address under what circumstances such efforts could resume?

Yes.

Republic of Korea

Since the end of World War II, the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?

Over a half-century old, the alliance remains strong and reflects the common values and aspirations of the Korean and American people. The alliance continues to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. As the regional security environment has evolved over time, the U.S. and the ROK have made great strides in

transforming their collective deterrent and defense posture. In particular, the ROK has made major strides in developing its defense capabilities, commensurate with its economic development. Consequently, the Alliance remains relevant and capable both for deterring aggression on the peninsula and for addressing regional and global security issues. If confirmed, I would work to continue the positive development of this key U.S. security relationship and would hope to work with the Committee to that end.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

If confirmed, I would work with Congress, the Joint Staff, and others to complete the realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and return facilities our forces no longer require. I would also work to ensure that our command and control relationships with Korea and our contingency plans remain appropriate to the situations we face. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance.

What is your view regarding the planned timing of the transfer of wartime operational command to the ROK?

As Secretary Gates said following his meeting with the Korean Minister of Defense last October, the ROK military forces and U.S. forces are on track to complete the alliance agreement to transition wartime operational control in 2012. This effort will enable the ROK military to take the lead role in the defense of Korea. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, this Committee, and others to ensure that the important transition in command relationships is carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)

On October 1, 2008, U.S. Africa Command was authorized Unified Command status. The creation of AFRICOM has raised questions about the role of the Department of Defense in U.S. development efforts.

What do you see as the role of AFRICOM in U.S. African policy and in economic development and humanitarian engagement?

The Department of State and USAID lead U.S. foreign policy and development engagements abroad, to include Africa. President-elect Obama has argued that AFRICOM should promote a more united and coordinated engagement plan for Africa. Ideally, AFRICOM's supporting role should be to promote national security objectives by working with African states, regional organizations, and the African Union to enhance stability and security in the region. In particular, AFRICOM should work to forge closer U.S. military-to-military relations with states on the African continent. If confirmed, my intent would be to work closely with State, USAID, other agencies and the Congress to ensure that AFRICOM's roles and missions support US foreign policy and national security objectives and are transparent.

AFRICOM's leadership has promoted the concept of "active security," with an increased emphasis on theater security cooperation, as a guiding principle of the command.

Are DoD's current security assistance authorities and funding levels adequate to fulfill AFRICOM's mission? If yes, please explain. If not, why not?

I am not in a position to render a definitive judgment on this important question. I will, if confirmed, study the matter and, if changes are needed, provide views to Secretary Gates and the members of this committee.

The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) mission appears to have shifted from counter terrorism to civil and humanitarian affairs since its inception in 2002.

What do you see as CJTF-HOA's primary mission?

It is my understanding that the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is designed to support the State Department's and DoD's security strategy in Africa to counter terrorism, in part through building partner capacity and promoting regional stability.

Do you believe it should continue as an enduring presence? If yes, what recommendations might you make regarding manpower, resources, and activities?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM to assess the question of CJTF-HOA's duration and to ensure that U.S. security interests in the region are supported by an appropriate, right-sized and properly resourced posture to promote long-term stability in the region.

Darfur

More than four years after then-Secretary of State Powell's declaration that genocide was taking place in Darfur, the death toll has climbed still higher, the camps for displaced persons have grown more crowded, and humanitarian access to help people in need has diminished in many areas. The United Nations has pledged to send 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, but has sent less than half that number and has not provided them with the helicopters, vehicles, and other tools to fulfill their mission.

What do you believe is the appropriate role of the United States and, in particular, the Department of Defense, in assisting with the deployment and mobility of this peacekeeping mission, given that its creation was largely a U.S. initiative and today is largely funded by a variety of U.S. assistance programs?

I agree with the President-elect's statements about the need to bring pressure to bear on Sudanese authorities in Khartoum to halt the genocide in Darfur. The UN has two major peacekeeping missions in Sudan that seek to create a secure environment conducive to a political settlement of the cultural, ethnic and religious differences that divide Sudan's periphery from the center. I understand that the Departments of State and Defense have supported the deployment of African contingents to the UN Darfur mission by providing personnel, training, equipment, logistical expertise, deployment assistance, and, when required, airlift. If confirmed, I will look closely at what additional support DoD could reasonably provide in this area if so directed by the President-elect.

United Nations Peacekeeping

The DoD has provided logistics, communications, and headquarters staff to a variety of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions over the past several years.

In your view, what support, if any, should the DoD provide to U.N. peacekeeping missions?

From Haiti to Liberia, Lebanon and other venues, the United States has important stakes in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to logistics, communications and headquarters staff-related assistance, the issue of DoD help for UN field missions should be studied closely and in close consultation with other UN member states.

The United States sponsored along with its partners in the G-8 an initiative to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. This program, known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), is run by the Department of State. DoD has provided varying degrees of support since the program's inception.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DoD in this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?

DoD plays an important role in bringing its expertise to bear in the training and equipping of peacekeeping units. DoD collaboration with State is important to successfully identifying and vetting viable partners, analyzing indigenous capacities, developing sustainable train-the-trainer programs, and promoting self-sufficiency in this critical area so that more nations can more effectively contribute to the increasing demand for skilled peacekeepers around the world.

As the GPOI program approaches its scheduled end date (i.e. 2010), would you support or oppose an extension of the program and its mandate? Please explain.

President-elect Obama has stated his support for continued funding for GPOI. In general, I believe the United States has a strong interest in effective training that expands the pool of available peacekeepers worldwide, including those with whom we may need to operate

jointly. If confirmed, my intent would be to work closely with State Department colleagues as well as members of Congress to ensure GPOI supports the President-elect's objectives in this area.

Somalia

In your view, what should be the U.S. policy towards Somalia and what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in support of that policy?

Somalia's political turmoil and violence pose the continued specter of humanitarian suffering as well as offering a sanctuary to violent extremists and, more recently, a haven for pirates. Instability in Somalia is a threat to the region and potentially to the United States and our allies. If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to develop a coordinated U.S. national security policy toward Africa that addresses the U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the Department of Defense can and should best support this policy.

Combating Terrorism

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad?

As I understand it, the Department's strategy for combating terrorism has three primary elements: protecting the homeland, disrupting and attacking terrorist networks, and countering ideological support for terrorism. The strategy includes indirect approaches aimed at building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces as well as direct approaches to defeat terrorist networks. Consistent with existing law, the Department's role within the United States is limited to providing support to civil authorities.

I believe the United States needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism – an integrated whole-of-government effort that brings all elements of national power to bear effectively against this threat and fully engages allies and international organizations. If confirmed, I will work with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and my interagency colleagues to undertake a review and assessment of our strategy to ensure it meets the goals of the President-elect and the Secretary of Defense.

How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?

I am not in a position to recommend changes in structure for this specific problem-set at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to evaluating the Department's structure vis-à-vis a whole-of-government strategy as discussed above and will do my utmost to ensure that we are organized properly to combat all forms of terrorism.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Defense intelligence community to ensure optimal support to combating terrorism and other homeland security efforts?

Timely and accurate intelligence is a vital part of U.S. efforts against terrorism. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationship Policy has with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Intelligence Community to ensure intelligence and operations are mutually supportive.

Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal agencies?

Yes. If confirmed I look forward to collaborating with members of the National Security Council, National Counterterrorism Center and others in a whole-of-government approach to combating terrorism.

The Department and intelligence community have determined that some terrorist organizations are beginning to rely more heavily on producing and trafficking narcotics to fund their operations.

Do you believe the Department of Defense should have the lead for the U.S. Government's efforts to combat the nexus between narcotics and terrorism? If not, who should have the lead?

The nexus between narcotics and terrorism is a serious challenge. This requires an integrated interagency approach, of which DoD is an integral part. DoD brings important tools and global capabilities to interagency efforts to counter networks that support both terrorist and international criminal organizations. If confirmed, I will review the DoD role in combating this nexus and coordinate with the other elements of the U.S. Government to determine the best way ahead.

War on Drugs

The DoD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the United States.

What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the United States to significantly reduce the amount of drugs illegally entering into our nation?

Drug trafficking – and the increasing link to terrorism in many places – is a formidable threat that challenges our nation as well as our friends such as Mexico and Afghanistan. Drug traffickers can acquire the latest technology and corrupt governments around the world facilitate the trade. Although we have made significant progress in coordinating efforts across multiple agencies to counter this threat, there is more to be done. If

confirmed, I will work with my interagency colleagues to assess the U.S. government's efforts to date and craft a strategic way forward.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in U.S. counterdrug efforts?

The Department's global focus, organization, capabilities, and its ability to act as an honest broker complement law enforcement goals and make it an effective actor in counterdrug efforts. DoD brings important tools and global capabilities to interagency efforts to counter both terrorist and international criminal networks.

The international community has detected a new narcotics trafficking route from Columbia to Europe via West Africa.

In your view, what should be the role of the United States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States?

Clearly the transnational flow of narcotics is a global issue and cannot be addressed separately by individual nations around the world. The United States should work with allies and international organizations to counter the trans-national flow of narcotics through coordinated and strategic civil-military efforts.

Colombia

Success in suppressing violence in Colombia has been credited to U.S. assistance to support Plan Colombia and to the growth of the Colombian economy, which spread wealth to a larger portion of the population. Over the past two years, there has been a debate about the most effective balance of U.S. assistance to continue to build on this success. Much of the U.S. assistance to Colombia over the past five years would be characterized as hard-side security assistance (such as weapons, aircraft, and necessary training), but some argue hard-side assistance should now be decreased significantly and a more robust development plan should be implemented.

In your view, what is the most appropriate strategy for U.S. engagement (including "soft" support) vis-à-vis Colombia?

In principle, where a threat has been diminished, external support should be able to transition from a heavily military posture to a greater focus on promoting enduring stability through soft-power engagement. Congress has already begun a phased reduction of assistance reflecting their assessment that Colombian security forces are capable of pressing rebels and paramilitary groups to demobilize. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency colleagues – and the Colombians – to assess the progress of Plan Colombia and support a comprehensive civilian-military strategy for enduring stability.

Space Posture Review

If confirmed, what role will you play in the Space Posture Review?

The Space Posture Review is a joint review to be conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence intended to clarify the national security space policy and strategy of the United States. In this regard, if I am confirmed, I will play a leading role in working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and others to conduct the review and respond to the Congressional tasking.

Nuclear Posture Review

If confirmed, what role will you play in the Nuclear Posture Review?

If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would oversee the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). I consider this basket of issues one of the most important long-term challenges we face – how to support the President-elect’s ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide while ensuring that America retains a robust nuclear deterrent that is sufficient to the threats we face. I would expect to engage other senior officials in DoD, as well officials in the Departments of Energy and State, in this review and to consult fully with members of this committee.

Nuclear Weapons Council

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. What are the significant issues that the NWC should/will take up in the coming years?

In my view, the most important immediate issue before the NWC is ensuring a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure and reliable. In the near term, this includes sustaining a viable nuclear stockpile and a weapons complex capable of supporting the stockpile, both of which are appropriately sized for the 21st Century.

Do you believe that the NWC should have a role in addressing lapses in attention to nuclear matters, which have resulted in a number of serious problems, particularly in the Air Force?

The Nuclear Weapons Council has oversight for a variety of matters, including nuclear safety, security and control issues. I believe we must demand the highest standards of stewardship for nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I will give these important responsibilities the attention they deserve through my participation on the NWC as well as other related fora.

If confirmed would you commit to active personal participation in NWC matters?

Yes.

DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., DoD, the State Department and the Department of Energy?

The President-elect has expressed his concern about the need to break bureaucratic logjams that have slowed the progress of CTR and other threat reduction programs, and if confirmed, I will give this matter the urgent attention it deserves.

The CTR program was recently expanded to geographic areas outside the former Soviet Union.

What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR should address outside the former Soviet Union? Please explain.

The Congressional initiative to expand the geographic reach of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union strikes me as an important step toward reducing WMD threats and building global partnerships. I am aware that recent bipartisan reports, including the report from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, have stressed the importance of reducing nuclear threats wherever possible and highlight bioterrorism as a key proliferation concern demanding greater attention. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, other U.S. government agencies, and global partners to strengthen our efforts to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism.

CTR has completed or will soon complete the bulk of the scheduled work with Russia.

What in your view is the next step in the U.S.-Russia CTR program?

I anticipate that our CTR programs in Russia will remain a high priority for the new Administration. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program represents an important and very successful relationship between our two countries which has endured even as difficulties have grown in other aspects of our relations. If confirmed, I will explore expanding this relationship and the capabilities built through CTR for mutually beneficial purposes to reduce the risks of WMD proliferation and terrorism outside of Russia.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

Like the President-elect and the current Secretary of Defense, I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States should be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's oceans; by becoming a party to the Convention we send a clear signal to all nations that we are committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally under the Convention, we provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. More than 150 nations are parties to the Convention. By becoming a party, the United States will be better positioned to work with foreign air forces, navies, and coast guards to cooperatively address the full spectrum of 21st Century security challenges.

In your view, is customary international law alone sufficient to safeguard U.S. navigational and overflight rights and freedoms worldwide?

I am not a legal expert, but from what I have learned from those who are, customary international law alone is not sufficient to safeguard U.S. navigational and overflight rights and freedoms. U.S. assertions of rights under customary international law carry less weight with other States than do binding treaty obligations. By its very nature, customary international law is less certain than treaties, as it is subject to the influence of changing State practice. If the United States remains outside the Convention, it will not be best positioned to interpret, apply, and protect the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention.

Bilateral Defense Trade Cooperation Agreements

Defense trade cooperation agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Australia are currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

What are your views on the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia defense trade cooperation agreements?

I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail. I understand that several Senators raised a number of concerns and questions about the Treaties during the

last Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Senate on any issues related to ratification.

In your view, are these agreements in the national security interest of the United States?

I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail. If confirmed, I will review them and be available to consult with Congress.

What do you consider to be the main advantages and disadvantages of these defense trade cooperation arrangements?

See above.

Arms Control

What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?

Arms control has been an important element of U.S. national security policy since the Cold War, and it remains important today. Engaging other nations in a process that builds confidence, increases transparency, reduces arsenals, and enhances cooperation has been, and remains, important to our interests. Arms control negotiations can also further progress towards the long term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

What are your views on the next bilateral steps to address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?

High level engagement will be critical in addressing the wide variety of issues between the United States and the Russian Federation, including nuclear weapons issues. One key issue that both nations will need to address early in the new administration is the impending expiration of START.

What elements of START, if any, do you believe should be retained in any future agreement?

The most important element to retain in any future agreement is the extension of essential monitoring and verification provisions contained in the current START Treaty.

In the absence of a START extension or successor treaty, what steps would you take to extend, expand, and to verify the Moscow Treaty?

If confirmed, I would initiate a prompt and detailed review to determine the best path forward with respect to START, the Moscow Treaty, and any successor agreements.

What is your view of the role of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security, and how should it be strengthened or improved?

The NPT is an important tool for constraining further nuclear proliferation. We should work to strengthen the Treaty by encouraging States to adhere to the NPT and to agree to IAEA safeguards inspections. I support the President-elect's view that we need to work with our allies, partners, and other nations to achieve a successful outcome in the 2010 NPT review conference. One way to strengthen the NPT regime would be to ensure that any violation automatically triggers sanctions. Others should be examined as well. I would also like to see the United States abide by our promises to reduce our nuclear stockpiles over time and to further increase the safety and security of our arsenal.

Do you support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

Yes, I support the President-elect's view that passing the CTBT is in America's national security interest.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that missile defense programs are prioritized in a manner that ensures that further development and deployment is pragmatic, cost-effective and appropriate to the threats of tomorrow. I understand that the U.S. currently has operationally deployed a range of sea-based and ground-based ballistic missile defense systems to protect our forward-based forces, allies and other friendly nations against short and medium-range missile threats and to defend the U.S. homeland against longer-range threats.

Do you agree that U.S. missile defense efforts should be prioritized on providing effective defenses against existing ballistic missile threats, especially the many hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that are currently within range of our forward-based forces, allies, and other friendly nations?

I am aware of the threats posed by short and medium-range ballistic missiles. If confirmed, I will review our BMD programs and consult with Congress to ensure we have an appropriate mix of short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missile defense capabilities that are responsive to existing and emerging threats to our homeland, deployed forces, allies and other friendly nations.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to

assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to making decisions to deploy such systems?

Yes. While missile defense testing is not a Policy responsibility, I agree that missile defense testing should be operationally realistic and should involve the Operational Test and Evaluation office as well as our warfighters.

If the United States and Russia could agree on a cooperative approach on missile defense issues, do you believe it would be in the security interest of the United States to pursue such an effort?

Yes, although the final contours of such an approach would require close consultations between the Administration and Congress. I believe that working with Russia in areas where we have common security concerns is in the interests of both of our countries. Efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense to address the risk of ballistic missile and WMD proliferation go back to the 1990s during the Clinton Administration. I understand that in recent years, the U.S. has continued to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia. If confirmed, I will review the recent efforts; consult with colleagues and the State Department, and help recommend an appropriate course of action.

Chemical Weapons Elimination and the Chemical Weapons Conventions

Do you agree that the United States should make every effort to meet its treaty obligations, including its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?

Yes. As a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the US is obligated to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by April 29, 2012. The United States also has a Congressional mandate to destroy its stockpile by April 29, 2012, but not later than December 31, 2017.

Do you agree that the Department should plan and budget for the most expeditious elimination of United States chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with safety and security requirements, in order to complete the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as close to the CWC deadline as possible?

Yes, but there are competing priorities to balance. Although I have not yet examined this issue in detail, I understand that in 2006, the United States informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it would not meet this deadline, but would accelerate the destruction effort as much as practical. To date, the Department is on track to destroy 90 percent of the US stockpile by the CWC deadline.

If confirmed, will you focus your personal attention on this matter?

If confirmed, I will look for alternative ways to accelerate the destruction of the remaining 10 percent of the stockpile.

Space Management and Organization

What role, if any, do you believe the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of a national security space policy?

I understand that the recent Congressionally-directed Review and Assessment of the Organization and Management of Space in the Department of Defense has recommended the development of a National Space Strategy. If this initiative is adopted and I am confirmed, I will consult with Secretary Gates on the proper role that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the development and coordination of any such policy or strategy.

National Guard and Reserve Role in Homeland Defense

There is current debate about the role the National Guard and Reserve should play in defending the homeland.

What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserve should have in defending the homeland?

Homeland defense is a Total Force responsibility. However, experience has shown the nation needs to focus on better using the extensive competencies and capabilities of the National Guard and the Reserves in support of their priority missions. If confirmed, I will update my understanding of the roles, missions and capabilities of the National Guard and the Reserves and will work to ensure that they have the equipment, training, and personnel to accomplish their missions, both at home and abroad, during this time of war.

What role do you believe the active-duty forces should have in defending the homeland?

As part of the Total Force, active-duty forces also have important roles to play in supporting civilian authorities in homeland defense, particularly in large-scale crises when local and state responders may lack response capabilities adequate to the task. If confirmed, I will look into the roles and missions performed by each element of the Total Force to ensure that we take best advantage of their competencies to fulfill this critical obligation to protect the American people.

Homeland Defense

The Department of Homeland Security is now responsible for homeland security, but DoD retains responsibility for homeland defense.

What do you believe are the principal roles and missions of DoD for homeland defense, and how do they relate to the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security?

DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have complementary and mutually supporting roles, missions, and responsibilities. DoD is responsible for defending the United States from attack upon its territory at home and securing its interests abroad. DoD executes military missions to deter, defend against, and defeat those who threaten the United States. DHS is responsible for leading the nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters; to secure the nation's borders, ports, and airports; and to ensure that the Federal Government works with states, localities, and the private sector as a true partner in prevention, mitigation, and response. As necessary, and consistent with the law, DoD provides support to DHS in the execution of its missions.

Reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current organization of the OUSD(P)?

If confirmed, I would anticipate the need to shift some portfolios to better align the organization with President-elect Obama's and Secretary Gates' policy objectives. For example, we may want consider elevating and realigning strategic portfolios such as nuclear weapons, countering WMD, space, missile defense, and cyber. We may also want to consider how best to enhance the policy role in the PPBE process, for example by elevating the strategy, planning, and force development functions. Finally, there may be an opportunity to enhance policy coordination on the issue of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which currently spans multiple ASDs. If confirmed, I would consult with the committee in detail on these ideas.

Do you anticipate that any proposed changes would require changes to existing law?

No. At this point, none of these potential portfolio adjustments should require changes to existing law.

Private Security Contractors

Do you believe the Department of Defense and other federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

I understand the concerns of Congress on this issue and believe that a comprehensive review of the role of military contractors on the battlefield is needed in order to set the terms for how they might be utilized in the future. I also agree with President-elect Obama's views on the need to improve oversight and transparency in how private security contractors are utilized and to establish clear standards regarding accountability, command and control, Rules of Engagement, and personnel policies. If confirmed, I will work with civilian and military officials of the Department and others who have primary responsibility for policy development and employment of private security contractors.

In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?

I do believe that several high-profile incidents in Iraq involving private security contractors have harmed U.S. policy objectives in Iraq. In December 2007 DoD and the Department of State agreed on consistent procedures for use of private security contractors in Iraq; moreover, both Departments have been transitioning to greater use of local nationals wherever practical. If confirmed, I expect to work on this issue and will keep Congress informed.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

The use of security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully coordinated among all agencies that employ them. There must be unified procedures and strong oversight for all such contractors, regardless of which U.S. agency hires them. Commanders on the ground should have the authority to restrict or redirect their operations as appropriate. I believe there must be assured legal accountability for the actions of all security contractors, not just those employed by the Defense Department.

How do you believe the ongoing operations of private security contractors in Iraq are likely to be affected by the new Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq?

It is my understanding that since January 1st, U.S. government private security contractors no longer have immunity from host nation law. Furthermore, they must comply with host nation registration and licensing requirements. For all contractors, the SOFA has meant substantially more liaison and coordination with Iraqi authorities at all levels.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

Yes.

Contractor Performance of Information Operations

In October 2008, the Department of Defense announced a plan to award contracts in excess of \$300 million to U.S. contractors to conduct “information operations” through the Iraqi media. The purposes of this contract include building up Iraqi public support for the government of Iraq and the security forces of Iraq, and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq.

What is your view of the appropriate roles of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in media campaigns to build up Iraqi public support for the government and security forces of Iraq and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq?

I have not had an opportunity to become familiar with the details of these programs, but believe they deserve careful scrutiny. If confirmed, I would expect to look into these matters and discuss them with members of the committee.

What is your view on the effectiveness of information operations conducted by the United States through the Iraqi media?

See previous answer.

Do you believe that it is appropriate for the United States to pay for media campaigns to build up support for the government and the security forces of Iraq at a time when the Iraqi government has a surplus of tens of billions of dollars?

See previous answer.

Do you see a risk that a DoD media campaign designed to build up support for the government and security forces of Iraq could result in the inappropriate dissemination of propaganda inside the United States through the internet and other media that cross international boundaries?

See previous answer.

A spokesman for the Iraqi government has been quoted as saying that any future DoD information operations in the Iraqi media should be a joint effort with the Iraqi government. According to a November 7, 2008 article in the Washington Post, the spokesman stated: “We don’t have a hand in all the propaganda that is being done now. It could be done much better when Iraqis have a word and Iraqis can advise.”

See previous answer.

Do you believe that DoD information operations through the Iraqi media should be conducted jointly with the Iraqis?

See previous answer.

Under what circumstances do you believe that it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to conduct information operations in a sovereign country without the participation and approval of the host country?

See previous answer.

Detainee Treatment Policy

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

I believe the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is clearly in America's best strategic interest and consistent with our values. During the long history of the Cold War, when America's way of life was challenged by a powerful competing ideology, we were ultimately successful, in part, because we held true to the best ideals and principles that sustained America as a shining beacon to millions under totalitarian rule. Power in the 21st century will stem as much from the strength and appeal of our ideas and moral principles as from our military might. If we are to defeat violent extremism, we must hold true to those ideas that make this country great, and continue to inspire the growth of freedom and tolerance around the world.

Do you believe that the phrase "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?

I have not received enough information to have an informed opinion on this question. If confirmed, I expect to work with the DoD General Counsel on this issue.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes I will.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DoD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?

Yes. If confirmed, I expect to work with the DoD General Counsel on this issue.

Do you believe that the United States has the legal authority to continue holding alleged members and supporters of al Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy combatants?

Yes I do as a general matter, but I am not in a position to comment on specific cases.

Do you believe that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened by the Department of Defense to provide Guantanamo detainees an opportunity to contest designation as enemy combatants provide detainees with appropriate legal standards and processes?

I have not been briefed on this specific issue. If confirmed, I expect to work with the DoD General Counsel on this issue.

Do you believe that the federal courts have the procedures and capabilities needed to fairly and appropriately review the detention of enemy combatants, pursuant to *habeas corpus* petitions?

It is my understanding that U.S. Supreme Court recognized that some adjustment to normal habeas proceedings may be necessary in these cases and that the exact procedures to apply in these cases are still being considered by the courts.

What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in reviewing the status of Guantanamo detainees and determining whether the United States should continue to hold such detainees?

If confirmed as USD(P), I would provide policy advice to the Secretary of Defense regarding the closure of Guantanamo Bay and the disposition of the remaining detainee population.

Do you support closing the detention facility for enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO)?

Yes. As both President-elect Obama and Secretary Gates have stated, the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay has become a liability for the United States.

In order to mitigate the risk associated with the release of GTMO detainees, do you believe the Department of Defense should establish some form of rehabilitation training for enemy combatants held at GTMO?

I understand that the efforts in Iraq to rehabilitate and reconcile detainees have been fairly successful. If confirmed as USD(P), I expect to learn more about whether such a program could be tailored appropriately and successfully implemented for the population at Guantanamo Bay.

What other ways could the United States use to encourage or entice our allies or other nations to accept detainees from GTMO? Would monetary support or sharing of technology for monitoring detainees be helpful inducements?

If confirmed as USD(P), I would work closely with the Office of Detainee Affairs and the State Department to seek new ways to encourage our allies and friends to assist us in transferring those detainees from GTMO who can be safely returned to their home countries or resettled in a third country when that is not possible. In some cases, financial incentives may be appropriate, and increased capacity-building may be mutually beneficial for this purpose and for broader collaborative efforts to combat terrorism.

The Military Commissions Act of 2006 authorized the trial of “alien unlawful enemy combatants” by military commission and established the procedures for such trials.

In your view, does the Military Commissions Act provide appropriate legal standards and processes for the trial of alien unlawful enemy combatants?

If confirmed, I expect to review any recommendation from the DoD General Counsel and the Department of Justice about whether the MCA strikes the right balance in protecting U.S. national security interests while providing appropriate legal standards and processes for a fair and adequate hearing.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it would be appropriate to use coerced testimony in the criminal trial of a detainee?

If confirmed, I would expect to review this matter with the DoD General Counsel and the Department of Justice.

What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in determining whether Guantanamo detainees should be tried for war crimes, and if so, in what forum?

If confirmed, it is my understanding that I would play no role in determining which specific detainees should be tried for war crimes. However, should there be a review of our options for war crimes trials, I would expect to play a role in advising the Secretary of Defense on policy matters.

What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in reviewing the Military Commissions Act and developing Administration recommendations for any changes that may be needed to that Act?

If confirmed, I would expect to play a role in advising the Secretary of Defense on policy options.

In the past two years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.

What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?

I visited Iraq in February and October of 2008 and was impressed by the “COIN Inside the Wire” approach taken by U.S. forces there. Particularly as we begin to transition detention operations and facilities to full Iraqi control, it is vital that we do our best to ensure that the quality of our facilities and our approach to detainee operations is maintained, as this line of operation is a critical component of successful counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. If confirmed as USD(P), I would be interested in seeing whether these counterinsurgency based programs can be tailored and applied more broadly to our detention operations elsewhere.

What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into DoD doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?

I believe that a lot of these lessons are being captured today, and are reflected in new doctrine and directives, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* in particular. I firmly believe that these lessons should continue to be gleaned as we continue operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To a degree perhaps unappreciated in the past, the way we treat detainees inside operational theaters is an important component of our overall strategy. If confirmed as the USD(P), I would work to ensure that these efforts continue in DoD schoolhouses, manuals, publications, and training, and that these lessons are applied as robustly as possible in all of our detention operations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.