

**Advance Policy Questions for the Honorable John M. McHugh**  
**Nominee for Secretary of the Army**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed Department of Defense (DOD) operations in a dramatic and positive way. I believe that the structure established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-service and joint relationships and promoted the effective execution of both military department and combatant command responsibilities. DOD, working with Congress, must continuously review the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics. I am currently unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, but if confirmed I would have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by today's security environment require amendments to the legislation with a view to continuing the objectives of defense reform.

**2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

This milestone legislation, now more than 20 years old, has ably served our Nation. I am currently unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, but if confirmed, I would have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by today's security environment require amendments to the legislation with a view to continuing the objectives of defense reform.

**Qualifications**

**3. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

In the role of Secretary, I would principally draw on my experiences as the representative of the Congressional District that is home to Fort Drum and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and as a 16-year member of the House Armed Services Committee. In that capacity, I held several leadership positions, first as the Chairman of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Panel, then as head of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, and later as the subcommittee's ranking member. At the beginning of the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, I assumed the Ranking Member position of the full committee. During the majority of my time in Congress, I have served as the cochair of the House Army Caucus and as a member of the West Point Board of Visitors. I have seen firsthand the dedication and sacrifice of America's service personnel and have interacted extensively with their civilian and military leadership. If confirmed, the leadership experience I have gained through my career as a public servant has prepared me well to serve as Secretary of the Army.

## **Duties**

**Section 3013 of title 10, United States Code, establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Army.**

### **4. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army?**

The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army and is responsible for, and has authority to, conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army as prescribed by law, by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense.

### **5. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?**

I expect that if I am confirmed, Secretary Gates would task me to implement the President's national security objectives throughout the Department of the Army. Further, as he has done with other military department Secretaries, Secretary Gates may prescribe for me additional duties that support him in carrying out his responsibilities to ensure that DOD successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions it has been entrusted with. At this time, I am not aware of any additional duties Secretary Gates may be considering assigning to the Secretary of the Army. However, if confirmed, I would carry out, to the best of my abilities, all duties assigned to me by law or the Secretary of Defense.

### **6. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Under Secretary of the Army?**

The Under Secretary serves as the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and advisor on issues of critical importance to the Army. If confirmed, I would review the Under Secretary's current assignment of duties and functions to determine the capacities in which he might most appropriately support my efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is effectively and efficiently administered in accordance with law and the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. Further, pursuant to Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, I would designate the Under Secretary as the Chief Management Officer of the

Department of the Army, with the primary management responsibility for business operations. In this capacity, if confirmed, I would assign the Under Secretary such duties and authorities as Chief Management Officer as are necessary to organize and administer the business operations of the Army effectively and efficiently in accordance with the policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense. In accordance with Section 908 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, I would act through the Under Secretary in his role as Chief Management Officer to continue the ongoing business transformation of the Army.

**7. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Army?**

Although I look forward with confidence to assuming the duties of the Secretary of the Army should the Senate confirm me, I recognize that every new Secretary has much to learn. I would work to further my understanding and knowledge of the Army, its people and organizations, the challenges it faces, its interaction with DOD, and the resources necessary to sustain and transform it. I would work with and through the talented and dedicated military and civilian personnel serving the Department to broaden my expertise and increase my knowledge, and I would seek advice and counsel from the many and diverse stakeholders dedicated to the success of the Army, including the Members and staff of Congress.

**Relationships**

**8. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with:**

**8.a. The Secretary of Defense.**

The Secretary of the Army reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and ensures that his priorities are implemented in the Department of the Army.

**8. b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.**

The Secretary of the Army works closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Secretary of Defense's priorities are implemented in the Department of the Army.

**8.c. The Under Secretaries of Defense.**

If confirmed, I, the Under Secretary of the Army, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army will coordinate and work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense to ensure that the Department of the Army's actions complement the priorities set forth by the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

**8.d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

The Secretary of the Army coordinates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that he has all the information and support necessary from the Department of the Army to perform the duties of principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

**8.e. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

The Secretary of the Army coordinates with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that he has all the information and support necessary from the Department of the Army to perform his duties.

**8.f. The Under Secretary of the Army.**

The Under Secretary of the Army is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The Under Secretary acts with the full authority of the Secretary in the management of the Department and performs any duties the Secretary of the Army gives him.

**8.g. The Chief of Staff of the Army.**

The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary according to Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

**8.h. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.**

The Assistant Secretaries perform specific oversight roles delegated to them by the Secretary of the Army.

**8.i. The General Counsel of the Army.**

The Army General Counsel is the senior civilian legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The General Counsel also serves as the Secretary of the Army's chief ethics official.

**8.j. The Inspector General of the Army.**

The Inspector General of the Army is charged with inquiring into and reporting on the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training, and readiness of the Army, as directed by the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff.

**8.k. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.**

The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving nonfederalized National Guard forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. The Chief,

National Guard Bureau also is the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States. Because the National Guard is a key element of the Reserve Component, the Secretary of the Army must work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to provide overall supervision of National Guard matters across all aspects of Army business as prescribed under Title 10.

## **Major Challenges and Priorities**

### **9. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Secretary of the Army?**

In my view, the Army faces major challenges in two key areas: the stress on the force and properly equipping the force. Soldiers and their families continue to experience tremendous strain as they defend our Nation at home and abroad. Many are experiencing multiple deployments with too little time in between to fully recover. This stress is taking its toll and is manifested in a variety of areas, including rates of suicide and divorce.

Additionally, the Army faces the challenge of resetting its equipment after many years of hard use under extreme conditions. As the Army shifts forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, the equipment will need to be repaired and refitted—all while continuing to fight in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army remains committed to equipping its forces for the current fight, it must continue to invest in modernization to ensure properly equipped forces for the future.

### **10. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the rest of the Army's leadership to reinforce effective programs that are already in place, make adjustments where appropriate, and, as needed, initiate programs that address new challenges. Taking care of soldiers and their families is fundamental to properly maintaining the force. Family support programs have improved tremendously over recent years, as have medical and behavioral health services that are now available to Soldiers and family members; however, there is always room for improvement. Ultimately, the challenge of long and frequent deployments boils down to an equation of supply and demand. The Army must always be able to provide enough forces to meet the needs of the commanders who are fighting the wars and at the same time increase the time Soldiers are able to spend at home between their deployments. The continued drawdown of forces from Iraq will help increase the supply of forces and lengthen dwell times at home.

If confirmed, I would demand innovative solutions to reset and modernize equipment to address current and future conflicts to ensure our defense dollars are well spent in this effort. To accomplish this, the Army's requirements, contracting, procurements, and processes must be

able to meet Soldier requirements within current and future resource constraints. I would place a great deal of emphasis on each of these areas.

**11. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Army?**

I am not aware of any serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Army.

**12. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?**

Should the Senate confirm me, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress to address any area of the Secretary of the Army's performance of functions that may require attention and pursue opportunities for improvement. As to a timetable, if confirmed I would strive to ensure that upon my departure from office, I would leave America's all-volunteer Army force better trained, equipped, and organized.

**13. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?**

If confirmed, my focus would be to keep America's Army the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led land force the world has ever seen. Since we are at war, my first priority would be ensuring that Soldiers and units are well organized, trained, equipped, and ready for success in the current conflicts.

A clear priority must be sustaining our Nation's quality, all-volunteer force by providing the support our Soldiers and families deserve, with a particular emphasis on health care programs, especially for wounded Soldiers.

Also, if confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Army continues to transform to meet the challenges of the 21st century. I would work to rebuild strategic depth and make sure the Army's organization, training, and modernization efforts can, on a continuous basis, provide land forces that are versatile enough to be successful across the full spectrum of operations.

**Acquisition Issues**

**Many experts have acknowledged that the Department of Defense may have gone too far in reducing its acquisition work force, resulting in undermining of its ability to provide needed oversight in the acquisition process.**

**14. Do you agree with this assessment?**

Yes.

**15. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address this problem?**

If confirmed, I would look to examine the size and age of the acquisition workforce and its impact on the oversight of acquisition programs today and in the future. The October 2007 “Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations,” often referred to as the Gansler Commission Report, recommended an increase in the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel and recommended additional training and tools for overall contracting activities. It is my understanding that the Army is in the process of implementing these recommendations.

Also, the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 have enabled the Army to implement initiatives and programs that will assist in recruiting, hiring, developing, training, recognizing, and retaining its acquisition workforce. This flexibility is critical in the contracting arena, as well as program management, systems engineering, cost estimating, and several other areas. I support the rightsizing of the overall workforce to the mission.

**Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability.**

**16. Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?**

The short answer is yes. Without examining each program in detail, it is difficult to judge whether funding instability or other reasons cause some programs to experience high cost or schedule delays. I recognize that large funding changes often are made for what appear to be valid reasons, such as changes in force structure requirements or mission focus, and participation in combat operations.

**17. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to address funding and requirements instability?**

To address funding and requirements stability, the Army must increase the fidelity of cost estimates, avoid the too rapid adoption of immature technology, improve the quality of systems engineering, control growth in requirements, and, when appropriate, use incremental builds.

**The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process.**

**18. Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?**

Although I fundamentally agree with the Comptroller General's assessment, I note that threats cannot be predicted with certainty and programs therefore must respond to a broad range of possible situations. Accordingly, the Army is challenged to develop and field the most technologically advanced capabilities to its warfighters to keep pace with this high level of operations.

**19. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?**

I understand that DOD published a major revision to the instruction on the operation of the Defense Acquisition System in December 2008. That instruction places increased emphasis on knowledge-based acquisition practices and delays the critical program initiation decision at Milestone B to provide for greater resolution on requirements, design, and costs. The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 reinforces the oversight and reporting process for major programs. It will take some time for the results of these actions to be seen in individual acquisition programs. If confirmed, I would insist on clarity and rigor in the oversight of major programs to ensure that the acquisition process supports the needs of the force and is a responsible steward of the resources available.

**By some estimates, the Department of Defense now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products.**

**20. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?**

If confirmed, I would direct an assessment of how the Army acquires services, including organization, policy, and processes, to make sure we have an effective management structure. I would also ensure that the management of service acquisition was properly led, staffed, and resourced.

**21. Do you agree that the Army should develop processes and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis?**

I agree the Army should have the processes and systems in place to analyze spending and enhance the overall management of service contracts. I do not have sufficient insight at this time into the capabilities of the current information management systems. If confirmed, I would support modifying these systems as required to conduct these analyses.

**The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. The Department of Defense is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance.**

**22. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department of the Army?**

It is my understanding that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, DOD, and the Army have issued new or revised policies, procedures, and guidance to address the problems the Inspector General identified. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army's Procurement Management Review Team makes the assessment of compliance and effectiveness of policy and procedures an item of special interest.

### **Army Modernization**

**In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990's, Army modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided by DOD or Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause of program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited from broad DOD and Congressional support for its modernization and readiness programs even when problems with the technical progress and quality of management of those programs have been apparent—the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter is a recent example.**

**23. What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization record?**

The Army's modernization record clearly depicts the complexities of an Army in transition during wartime. I believe the Army must continue to adapt to a rapidly changing threat environment. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to equip and modernize the force.

**24. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?**

Stable, predictable total obligation authority allows the Army to balance its needs, chart a course, and stick to it. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to arrive at that stable funding level and, subsequently, a stable modernization program.

**25. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modernization investment strategy?**

Having watched this evolve over the past few years, I would offer that, by its very nature, the Army's modernization investment strategy is built on assessing the likelihood of evolving threats and planning future capabilities to mitigate those threats. It is an imprecise science, requires almost constant review and correction, and must balance investments in future development with improvements to today's equipment. If confirmed, I plan a thorough review of these investments.

**26. In your view does the Army's modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or irregular conflict?**

At this juncture it appears that the Army is making appropriate investments to counter unconventional and irregular threats. This includes investments in science and technology research and in an adaptable organizational structure in our labs, program offices, and headquarters staff that allow the Army to quickly address emerging threats on the battlefield. The key for me, if I am confirmed, is managing how the Army balances investments in current and future initiatives.

**27. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue in this regard?**

I do not have the detailed knowledge to make an accurate assessment at this time. If confirmed, I intend to fully review the Army's investment initiatives.

**28. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets?**

I believe one of the strengths of the Defense program is to specifically address affordability and the outyear projection of long-term funding requirements. Those processes have been strengthened by initiatives within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by Congress. If confirmed, I believe I would have the required visibility and management structure that would allow me to provide these judgments to Congress.

**29. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?**

While I do not have sufficient insight into what actions might be required, any trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully considered in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

### **Army Weapon System Programs**

#### **30. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, development, and acquisition programs?**

##### **30.a. Future Combat System (as restructured).**

It is my understanding that the acquisition program for the Future Combat System has been canceled because of issues related to technology maturity and affordability. In its place, the Army has been directed to make the transition to an Army modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs: (1) Spin Out Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT), (2) Follow-on BCT Modernization/Equipment for BCT Modernization, (3) Ground Tactical Network capability, and (4) a new platform for the Ground Combat Vehicle. I am not yet in a position to offer an informed assessment of these efforts

##### **30.b. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Stryker mobile gun variant.**

I am not yet in a position to offer an informed assessment of the Stryker program, but I understand that Stryker variants have been in production since 2004 and that the Army has successfully used the system in Iraq and is preparing to deploy it to Afghanistan.

##### **30.c. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV).**

Although I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of JLTV, I understand that it is a relatively new joint Service developmental program, which consists of a family of vehicles with companion trailers capable of performing multiple mission roles. Based on the lessons of Iraq, JLTV requires a design that supports inherent and supplemental protection, scalable to mission.

##### **30.d. Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH).**

It is my understanding that the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout that was unaffected by the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, but I understand that this latest effort is completing pretechnology development activities under the supervision of the Defense Acquisition Executive.

##### **30. e. M1 Abrams tank modernization.**

The Abrams Tank has been an integral part of the Army's force structure for decades. I understand that the tank has encountered performance decrements during Operation Iraqi Freedom that affect its operational performance and reliability, and that the Army has initiated a modernization strategy to maintain the tank's survivability, lethality, and maintainability through 2050. I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of this effort.

**30 f. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.**

The Bradley vehicle has been an integral part of the Army's force structure for decades. I understand that the program has encountered performance decrements during Operation Iraqi Freedom that affect the vehicle's operational performance and reliability, and that the Army has initiated modernization efforts to maintain the vehicle's survivability, lethality, and maintainability through 2050. I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of this effort.

**30. g. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).**

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of WIN-T, my general understanding is that WIN-T is the Army's critical modernization effort for managing electronic information in the tactical environment. I understand that the WIN-T capabilities are built on proven government and commercial technology using voice, video, and data. This program, as I understand it, is configured into separate increments, each providing increasing capabilities measured in terms of capacity, speed, network management, and maneuverability.

**30 h. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).**

Although I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of LMP, I understand that this program is designed to support, replace, and modernize aging, obsolete, and increasingly costly automation systems used at the national logistics level. LMP employs a commercially based Enterprise Resource Planning software solution and provides a comprehensive, modernized logistics and finance capability across major business areas. I understand that, when fully implemented, LMP is intended to enhance the Army's logistics capabilities to manage inventories, process millions of transactions, and integrate with many critical DOD software systems.

**30 i. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).**

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of JTRS, I understand that this program is part of the Army's and DOD's transformational and network modernization effort. I understand that the system will provide the fully mobile, flexible, dynamic radio networking capability needed to support a highly dispersed force over a noncontiguous area.

**Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles**

**31. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large MRAP vehicle fleet?**

The MRAP was procured in response to a joint urgent operational need statement from Multi-National Corps Iraq in June 2006. The initial intent was to replace all up-armored HMMWVs (UAH) in theater because those vehicles could not provide the required levels of protection, and previous modifications had reduced the vehicle's payload capacity to an unacceptable level. The urgent nature of this program resulted in the deferral of many steps associated with a traditional acquisition process in an effort to expedite fielding. If confirmed, I would work to determine the long-term strategy for the use and sustainment of the Army's fleet of MRAPs.

**Missile Defense**

**The Department of Defense intends to transition a number of ballistic missile defense programs from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to the Army, including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The Army and the MDA have negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding concerning such transition.**

**32. What is your understanding of the agreement between the Army and MDA on transition and transfer of missile defense systems from MDA to the Army?**

At present, I am not familiar with this agreement. If confirmed, I would become acquainted with its provisions and ensure that the Department meets its stated commitments.

**33. What is your view of the appropriate role of the Army in funding, managing, operating, or maintaining missile defense programs, including in the areas of research, development, test, and evaluation; procurement; operation and maintenance; and military construction?**

At present, I am not familiar with the Army's specific role with respect to these programs. If confirmed, I would evaluate this issue.

**34. If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to ensure that the Army's approach and the MDA's approach are coordinated and integrated, so that the resulting capabilities are joint and interoperable?**

The Army and the MDA are collaborating under a memorandum of agreement to coordinate the development of complementary current and future battle command and control products in their respective mission areas. Although I am not yet familiar with the details of this

agreement, if confirmed I would ensure that the Army's Acquisition Executive works closely with the MDA to maximize the jointness and interoperability between these systems.

**35. Do you agree with Secretary Gates' decision to increase the focus on effective theater missile defenses to defend our forward deployed forces and allies against existing regional missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran?**

Yes.

## Space

**The Army restructured its program executive office for air and missile defense to include Army space efforts, and issued an Army space policy.**

**36. Are you satisfied that current Department of Defense management structures adequately support Army objectives in space?**

I do not have detailed knowledge of DOD's management structures, but the Army depends heavily on space-based combat support. If confirmed, I would closely examine this issue.

**37. Are you satisfied with the current level of effort in the Army related to space programs? Do you believe these efforts have the right focus?**

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the Army.

**The Army currently defines its space career field as a subset of the information technology career field.**

**38. Do you believe the information technology career field structure is adequate to support Army space interests?**

If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more closely. I understand that some believe to fully realize the potential of space and to adequately support the Army's space interest, space operations should be recognized as a unique career field and included in a space requirements/acquisition and NASA support subset.

**39. Do you believe that the space career fields of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be integrated?**

It is my understanding that each Service has unique and broad requirements in how space assets are used and personnel are managed. Total integration might be unrealistic because of specific Service needs and existing models for the development of Service personnel. However, integration and cross-fertilization can be accomplished through joint training, assignments, and exercises.

**40. Does the Army plan to assign personnel to the new Operational Responsive Space Office?**

I do not have any knowledge of this matter.

**Modularity**

**Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. The new modular brigade combat team is supposed to have an increased capability to operate independently based upon increased and embedded combat support capabilities such as military intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat smaller in size, the new modular brigades are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 80 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design has slipped from 2011 to 2019.**

**41. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity transformation strategy?**

It is my understanding that the Army's modular transformation was designed to create a more expeditionary capable force that will address the full spectrum of missions emerging from a post-Cold War strategy. I have been advised that the Army continuously addresses changes to its unit designs by incorporating lessons learned and changes in technology that keep the formations relevant and effective. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing the strategy.

**42. In your view, what are the greatest challenges in realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?**

I have been advised that the Army faces two major challenges related to transformation: restoring balance to a force experiencing the cumulative effects of 8 years of war and setting conditions for the future to fulfill the Army's strategic role as an integral part of the joint force.

**43. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?**

The Army Campaign Plan and goals for modularity must be consistent with Department strategy for the current and future environment in an era of persistent conflict. While I have no recommendations for changes at this time, I would closely examine this issue if confirmed.

**44. What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom?**

Modular brigade level formations have provided a solid base of adaptation to meet a wide range of requirements for specific missions across the spectrum of conflict. Army Soldiers and leaders are performing superbly in both operations with these enhanced capabilities, and modular organizations augmented and trained for their assigned missions in each theater. I believe they are the right organization in terms of leadership and mission functionality to rotate through the Army's Force Generation Model and into operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere as required.

**45. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk?**

At present, I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to propose changes to the current modular design. I understand that the Army continues to review its force mix to ensure it meets combatant commanders' needs in the current and foreseeable operational environments.

**Active-Duty End Strength**

**The Army has increased its active duty end strength to meet current and future operational requirements. The Army had planned to increase its end strength to 547,400 by 2010, but has already achieved this goal in 2009.**

**46. In your view, what is the appropriate Army active duty end strength needed to meet the demand for deployed forces, increase nondeployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on Soldiers and their families?**

The Secretary of Defense's announcement to authorize a temporary end-strength increase should enable the Army to improve the readiness of its units throughout the Army Force Generation process. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Army Commands to determine the appropriate balance of end-strength and capabilities.

**47. If Army end strength is projected to be above 547,400 in fiscal years 2009 or 2010, how would you propose, if confirmed, to fund the additional end strength above levels budgeted for in FY 2010?**

Secretary Gates recently announced a temporary increase in the size of the Army by 22,000 Soldiers, and indicated that this money would be taken from current DOD funding levels for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) to identify appropriate funding sources, and I would seek assistance from the Secretary of Defense and Congress, as necessary, to ensure an appropriate level of funding.

**48. Do you believe that the Army's active duty end strength should rise by 30,000 in the 2010 to 2012 timeframe and beyond?**

The size of the Army is predicated on its ability to meet the strategic requirements of our Nation. That end strength should facilitate a rotation cycle that can meet operational requirements within the Department's force rotation goals and sustain the All-Volunteer Force. I understand that the Army plans to achieve a rotation ratio for the Active Component of 1:2 between the amount of time deployed to the amount of time not deployed during fiscal year 2011, and that its objective for the Active Component is to achieve a 1:3 rotation ratio.

### **Personnel and Entitlement Costs**

**In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.**

**49. If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?**

It is my understanding that the Military Departments have limited authority to control overall personnel costs and entitlement spending. If confirmed, I would ensure adequate oversight through processes, procedures, and audit reviews to provide early warning regarding the costs and effects of current and proposed military pays or benefits.

**50. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel costs?**

If confirmed, I would work closely within the Army and DOD to budget accurately, and then would monitor budget execution, end strength, and the use of incentives.

### **Lessons Learned**

**51. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its title 10, U.S. Code, responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the force?**

In terms of manning, I believe that 8 years of sustained combat operations have taken their toll on Soldiers. Increases in nondeployable rates require deploying units to continue to be overfilled at the expense of readiness for the rest of the Army. In terms of training, a major lesson is that versatile and agile units that are fundamentally competent can adapt to any threat from across the spectrum of conflict. Also, the rapid incorporation of operational lessons into the training of next-to-deploy forces at training centers, mobilization stations, and home stations ensures that units are ready. In terms of equipping, the Army must constantly strive for advance knowledge of emerging requirements and then promptly engage the acquisition and industrial communities to find solutions as early as possible.

**52. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority?**

I have been advised that the most urgent matter to address is the rising nondeployable population and its effect on manning. If confirmed, I would also continue to explore ways to anticipate emerging equipping requirements and satisfy them as quickly as possible.

**Private Security Contractors**

**The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recently reported that federal agencies including the Department of Defense have spent more than \$5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq since 2003. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007, employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and wounding many more.**

**53. Do you believe the Army should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?**

In principle, no. However U.S. Forces currently rely on contractors to “free” manpower for accomplishing missions focused on campaign objectives. Requiring uniformed forces to meet all requirements for security would divert a significant portion of a commander’s forces from planning and controlling combat operations. Contractor performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public

areas in an area of combat operations may constitute inherently governmental functions and must be avoided

**54. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?**

I tend to agree that some near-term damage may have occurred. If confirmed, I would work to improve oversight of private security contractors through implementation of a better automated tracking system for contractor personnel. In addition, I would oversee the Army's implementation of the interim final rule recently promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations. That rule establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract.

**55. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?**

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army complies with current mandates to reduce reliance on private security contractors to the greatest extent practicable and would explore initiatives to help ensure accountability.

**56. How do you believe the ongoing operations of private security contractors in Iraq are likely to be affected by the new Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq?**

The new Status of Forces Agreement no longer affords immunity to contractors supporting the United States in Iraq. This change would most likely affect the use of private security contractors who are U.S. nationals but not local nationals.

**57. Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?**

I have been advised that the Act was intended to address the jurisdictional gap in U.S. law regarding criminal sanctions, as applied to civilians employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States, members of the Armed Forces, and former members of the Armed Forces, including their dependents. I understand that legislation has been proposed in the past that would expand the Act to cover individuals employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States where the work under such contract is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by DOD) where the Armed Forces are conducting contingency operations. If confirmed, I would study this matter in coordination with The General Counsel of the Department of the Army and

The Judge Advocate General and assess whether this or any other change to the Act may be appropriate

**58. What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?**

I support the position that civilians serving with or accompanying our Armed Forces overseas who commit crimes should be held accountable as appropriate. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides commanders with the tools necessary to maintain good order, discipline, and the morale, welfare, and safety of all those under their jurisdiction during military operations. Because contractor misconduct may undermine good order and discipline, discredit the Army, or remain unaddressed absent the exercise of jurisdiction, Congress extended UCMJ jurisdiction to contractors. In turn, the Secretary of Defense published guidance on the prudent exercise of such jurisdiction. The guidance ensures that the Department of Justice and DOD each play an appropriate role in resolving whether, and under which system, jurisdiction might be better exercised in each potential case.

**OMB Circular A-76 defines “inherently governmental functions” to include “discretionary functions” that could “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons”**

**59. In your view, is the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently governmental function?**

I have been advised that DOD Instruction 3020.41 (Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces) prohibits the use of contract security services to guard U.S. or coalition military supply routes, military facilities, military personnel, or military property in contingency operations where major combat operations are ongoing or imminent, except as the geographic combatant commander specifically authorizes. When either of those two conditions have been met, the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations is not necessarily an inherently governmental function. I understand, however, that support services that require substantial discretion or prudent judgment are inherently governmental, and that the likelihood an individual will be required to resort to force, especially deadly force, and the degree to which an individual may be required to exercise force in public are important factors to consider in assessing whether a particular security mission is inherently governmental. Therefore, if I am confirmed, I intend to study this issue in greater depth to ensure that the Army’s assessment regarding this issue is fully considered in the ongoing review of DOD Instruction 3020.41.

**60. In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an inherently governmental function?**

I am familiar with OMB Circular A-76 and with Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which reflects the position of Congress regarding the interrogation of detainees by contractor personnel. I understand that, under existing DOD and Army policies, the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees is not considered an inherently governmental function as long as it is conducted under the supervision of government personnel.

**61. Do you believe that the Army fully considered these issues before deciding which functions should be assigned to private contractors in Iraq?**

I believe the Army is committed to adhering to law, regulation, and policy, but I am unaware of precisely what factors the Army considered in making the decisions referred to.

**62. Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of these issues now?**

I fully support the principles and policies set forth in President Obama's memorandum of March 4, 2009 which directs the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, among others, to develop and issue governmentwide guidance to assist executive branch agencies in reviewing the propriety of existing contracts and to formulate corrective action when appropriate. I believe any such review must include an appraisal of inherently governmental and other critical government functions and how they are performed.

**Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments**

**Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. In 2007, in order to support the surge of forces to Iraq, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases less than 12 months. Beginning in August 2008 Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active Component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve Component soldiers to not longer than 12 months.**

**63. What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty obligated service has been completed?**

The generation of young commissioned and noncommissioned officers now serving in the Army has known only conflict. These Soldiers well know the challenges the Army faces and continue to serve with distinction in a very fluid and demanding environment. The Army has advised me that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely affecting

enlisted retention, and have not resulted in the increased attrition of midgrade officers over the past several years.

I have been informed that Army officer shortages stem from force structure growth undertaken to support conversion to more self-sufficient, modular combat formations and to provide additional capabilities to meet the emerging threats in counterinsurgency warfare. I am encouraged that the measures the Army has taken to resolve shortages in midgrade officers, including increased accessions (over 5,000 by the end of FY 09); increasing Reserve Component calls to active duty; using inter-service transfers, higher promotion rates, below the zone promotions, and earlier promotion pin-on point to a path of resolving this challenge.

**64. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.**

In this period of high operational and personnel tempo, Army leaders must maintain constant awareness of the physical and mental condition of their Soldiers and families and constructively address concerns as soon as they come to light. It is my understanding that reenlistment rates are high, one indication that Soldier morale remains strong. I am also informed that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion, absence without leave, domestic violence, and courts-martial, have remained steady or declined in the past year. However, I am advised that other indicators of stress on the force, such as substance abuse and divorce, have increased. And, most notably, the significant increase in the number of Soldier suicides is of utmost concern. If confirmed, I would ensure that Soldiers and families are provided with multidisciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing the fitness and resilience of Soldiers and families.

**65. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?**

At this time, I do not have the information or particular insights to determine how long the Army can sustain the current level of commitment without incurring significant adverse consequences.

**The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has stated that the Army is “out of balance.”**

**66. What is your understanding of this statement and what do you think can or should be done to correct that imbalance?**

As I understand it, General Casey has publicly defined “balance” as the ability to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell (time at home station) ratio for Active Component Soldiers and a 1:4 mobilization-to-demobilization ratio for Reserve Component Soldiers. The two ways to improve balance are an increased deployable force structure or decreased demands. The Army

has grown to its new end strength of 547,000, and Secretary Gates will temporarily add 22,000 additional Soldiers. The increased end strength, along with a future reduction in demand for forces, is the key to regaining balance.

### **Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve**

**67. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's Reserve Components as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?**

The Army's Reserve Components have transformed and adapted to today's operational environment of enduring conflict along with the Active Force. The Army's Reserve Components bring a mix of skills and capabilities that have strengthened the force, and they are an essential and critical component of the current force generation system, which provides the right mix of trained and ready forces to the fight.

**68. In your view, what are the major challenges to transforming the Army Reserve and Army National Guard into a relevant and capable operational reserve?**

It appears that resources and institutional support are the major challenges. Resources are necessary to ensure a continuously ready Reserve Component force, such as increased training days and opportunities, recruiting and retention incentives, incentives for employers, earlier access to medical and dental readiness, increased installation and facility support, increased premobilization training support, and validation.

**69. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home, affect the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve force?**

I believe predictable cycles provide dwell time for the Soldiers to maintain their civilian careers and predictability for Soldiers, families, and employers for future deployments. This predictability also facilitates better training and requirements planning to prepare for future missions, thus enhancing unit viability.

**70. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure the most rapid, efficient, and effective transformation of the Army's Reserve Components into an operational reserve?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make specific proposals. However, it is clear the Army needs to ensure the rapid transformation of the National Guard and Reserve to an operational force in the same fashion as the active duty component. This could include a wide range of initiatives such as pay incentives for citizen Soldiers and families, generation of sufficient forces, progressive equipment strategies, and continuum of service that allows Soldiers to seamlessly transition duty statuses.

**In recent years, reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by mobilization timelines, equipment shortages, cross leveling, and reset policies.**

**71. What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?**

It is my understanding that Reserve force management policies and systems have been under continuous review throughout the transformation of the Reserve Component to an operational force and have been addressed when found to be inefficient or rigid.

**72. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland security defense or any other global or domestic support missions exclusively to the Reserve?**

DOD maintains a wide range of capabilities that may be called upon in times of catastrophic events that exceed the capabilities of the States and appropriate Federal agencies. However, no single Service or Reserve Component embodies the wide range of capabilities often required to support a catastrophic event. The Department must maintain a Total Force approach as part of an interagency team to ensure that it can provide the most effective and timely response with the ability to surge large follow-on forces in support of a global or domestic emergency. This Total Force approach requires all Active and Reserve Components for a truly complete response.

**Mobilization and Demobilization of National Guard and Reserves**

**In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.**

**73. What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?**

I have been informed that Reserve and National Guard Soldiers, their families, and their employers now receive more advanced notice. The mobilization process has been streamlined significantly. It appears the Army has made significant strides to reimburse those Soldiers who

need travel advances. The annual periodic health assessment replaced the five-year physical and, as a result, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers are screened more frequently and diagnosed earlier. The added screening and treatment of dental deficiencies is also a positive advancement for Reserve Component Soldiers in a premobilization status.

Challenges still exist. Two examples are greater improvements to the medical care for Reserve and National Guard Soldiers, and sourcing and notifying Soldiers of deployment even earlier where possible.

**74. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?**

Clearly, the transformation of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve from a strategic to an operational reserve has had the largest and most enduring impact, and it has fundamentally changed the contract between the Army and the Soldier in terms of what is expected from them and, frankly, who joins. The Army cannot execute its mission of prompt and sustained land combat absent a substantial contribution from the Reserve Component across the full spectrum of conflict. If confirmed, I would continue this necessary transformation.

**75. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?**

The current laws seem sufficiently adequate and flexible to provide Reserve and National Guard forces for the fight. We appear to possess the necessary statutory authorities to meet the needs of the force, but mobilizing citizen Soldiers is a solemn responsibility and should not be undertaken lightly. If confirmed, I would like to find efficiencies to make this process smoother and faster to give Soldiers the predictability they deserve.

**76. Do you agree that National Guard and Reserve personnel should be mobilized to serve in Afghanistan in lieu of civilians?**

The solution to Afghanistan is not solely military and therefore cannot be achieved by the U.S. military alone. The problems that the Afghani Government and its people face will require the expertise and all elements of national power. Using interagency and coalition responses is essential to success in Afghanistan. Mobilizing the U.S. Government for this task takes time, and it is possible that the military may be asked to shoulder the burden initially. The long-range solution is increased interagency capability in all elements and instruments of national power.

**Individual Ready Reserve**

**The Department of Defense established a policy in 2005 mandating the discharge of officers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) who are beyond their military service**

**obligations (MSO) unless the officer positively elects to remain in the IRR. Meanwhile, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war has been problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept.**

**77. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army force management planning?**

While the IRR is an important source of trained manpower to support Army missions across the spectrum of military requirements, I believe the mobilization of IRR Soldiers should be one of the last options. Not all IRR mobilizations have been involuntary; a number of IRR members have volunteered to serve on active duty. The IRR has been a valuable asset, primarily to fulfill requirements within Army National Guard and Army Reserve units.

**78. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Army's IRR recall policy?**

I do not have detailed knowledge of the Army's IRR recall policy but, as stated previously, any recall of IRR Soldiers should be one of the last options considered.

**79. What are your views about policies affecting continued service by officer and enlisted personnel in the reserve components who have fulfilled their MSO?**

Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to remain in the IRR are advised of the requirement to elect retention past their MSO; transfer to the retired reserve, if they are qualified for retired pay; or be discharged from the military.

**80. In your view, should members of the reserve components who are deployed when they reach the end of their military service obligation be treated differently?**

Current mobilization policy ensures that Soldiers have enough remaining MSO to serve their full mobilization if called on. Reserve Soldiers should not be treated any differently than Soldiers in other components.

**81. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make an assessment

**82. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Force?**

The IRR is extremely valuable to the force. The IRR provides individual replacements for deploying units and Soldiers to support short-term missions throughout the Army. The IRR maintains its connection with the Army and its availability to support Army missions. Thousands of IRR Soldiers have mobilized to theater in support of current operations. These Soldiers have served in all ranks and military occupational skills, including doctors, aviators, and linguists.

### **Medical and Dental Readiness of Army National Guard and Army Reserve Personnel**

**Medical and dental readiness of reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the Committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.**

#### **83. If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the reserves?**

If confirmed I would assess the effectiveness of reporting on the medical and dental readiness and evaluate the need for policy changes and increased oversight.

#### **84. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce a healthy and fit reserve component?**

I am advised that the Army has comprised a multidisciplinary task force to address and promote comprehensive Soldier fitness across all components. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the comprehensive Soldier fitness program, particularly as it applies to the Reserve Component, and working with leaders across the Army to implement it.

### **National Guard Organization, Equipment, and Readiness**

**Legislative proposals introduced in 2006 and 2007, recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March, 1, 2007, and the Department's response to these calls for change are all currently under consideration.**

#### **85. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O-10)?**

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 prescribed the appointment of the Chief, National Guard Bureau to serve in the grade of general. The position of the Chief is one of significant responsibility, requiring a level of operational experience, professional military education, and demonstrated expertise in both national and homeland defense matters. The Chief's service in the grade of general reflects the diversity and complexity of his duties. In

addition to exercising responsibility for the organization and operations of the National Guard, the Chief serves as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters involving non-federalized National Guard forces and other matters, and as the principal adviser to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on matters relating to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States.

**86. What is your understanding of the role and authority of the Director of the Army National Guard?**

The Director, Army National Guard assists the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the Bureau as they relate to the Department of the Army. Specifically, the Director of the Army National Guard guides the formulation, development, and implementation of programs and policies affecting the Army National Guard, a force of more

than 358,000 Soldiers dispersed across the 54 States and Territories, and the District of Columbia.

**87. In your view, should the Director be “dual hatted” as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make that determination. If confirmed, I would carefully consider any proposals to modify the title, functions, or authorities of the Director of the Army Guard.

**88. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?**

The Army National Guard is a critical element of our Nation’s total force. The Army National Guard has historically served as a “first responder” in State contingencies and national emergencies, while simultaneously meeting its operational commitments in support of overseas contingency operations. Since 2001, the National Guard Bureau has played an increased role in coordinating emergency relief and response efforts at the local, State, and national levels. It is a testament to the inherent flexibility of the current organization of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau that not one mission has been unexecuted in this environment of high-demand, dual-purpose requirements. I have every reason to expect this extraordinary performance to continue.

**89. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard?**

The recognition of the critical role of its Reserve Components, both Army Reserve and National Guard, is evident by the increased investment funding in both components. Budget requests continue to provide the National Guard and Reserve with equipment to both modernize and fill “holes.” Additionally, as part of a larger DOD program, efforts are underway in the Army to further increase the visibility and transparency of funding programmed for Army National Guard equipment.

**90. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget? In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?**

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army National Guard remains synchronized with the Army’s requirement development and resourcing process, and that the Guard’s needs are fully considered as part of the Army’s resourcing strategy.

In regards to the role of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would seek his advice on key National Guard programs and challenges.

### **Equipment Repair/Reset**

**Congress has provided the Army with approximately \$17 billion per year to cover the costs to repair and replace equipment worn out by combat operations and prepare forces for rotations in support of OIF/OEF.**

**91. In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces for OIF/OEF but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make that level of recommendation

**92. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?**

It is my understanding that all the Army's maintenance depots are currently operating at a level necessary to meet required workload, but capacity exists to assume an additional workload. The depots' current production levels are based on the rate of return of equipment from theater and the Army's need to equip units for training and deployment. It is my understanding that the depots can increase production if the rate of equipment return accelerates, and that the Army constantly evaluates depot production and adjusts it to meet current and anticipated demand.

**93. What additional steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make that level of recommendation.

**94. What impact do you believe the decision to send additional Army forces to Afghanistan is likely to have on equipment available for continued operations in Iraq and for non deployed unit training at home?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make that level of decision.

### **Army Science and Technology**

**95. What do you see as the role that Army science and technology programs would play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?**

The Army's science and technology investment strategy should be shaped to foster innovation and accelerate/mature technology to enable future force capabilities while exploiting opportunities to rapidly transition technology to the current force. The program should retain the flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through current operations. Insights into technology that can enable capabilities can also provide building blocks and interim technology goals to assist in increasing unit capabilities over time.

**96. What in your view have been the greatest contributions of Army science and technology programs to current operations?**

In my view, the most significant contribution the Army science and technology community has offered to current operations is its technical expertise coupled with a deep understanding of warfighter needs. This knowledge enables the community to respond to emerging theater needs and rapidly transform technology into warfighter capabilities. It is the capability of the Army's science and engineering workforce that has enabled the rapid development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable armor solutions that address the emerging threats for platforms such as the up-armored HMMWV and the MRAP. It is also my understanding that the Army's science and technology community has successfully transitioned other equipment, such as electronic countermeasures to provide jamming capabilities, base protection technologies to protect Soldiers while in forward operating bases, and a variety of sensors and situational awareness enablers that have been critical to Soldiers' efforts in theater.

**97. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?**

If confirmed, the metrics I would use to judge the value and investment level in Army science and technology programs would include the transitions of technology to the warfighter, adoption of technology into acquisition programs, and alignment of technology development to warfighter needs.

**Army Laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDEC)**

**98. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions?**

Army laboratories are the platforms for developing the advances in science and technology that are benefiting the warfighter, and as such must continue to play a major role in supporting current operations with the best capabilities available.

**99. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?**

If confirmed, I would encourage the laboratories to take advantage of the authorities they currently have in regard to infrastructure and to work with OSD in its current efforts to expand these authorities. Maintaining the current level of resources for all the laboratories and embracing best practices in regard to management would be a high priority.

### **Army Test and Evaluation (T&E) Efforts**

**The Army's test and evaluation budget has not been certified as adequate by the Director of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) for Fiscal Year 2010. This is after a conditional certification received in Fiscal Year 2009. TRMC identified a shortfall of over \$25 Million for investments in T&E range sustainment, operations, and modernization.**

#### **100. If confirmed, how will you address this shortfall?**

While I am not yet familiar with the specific concerns raised by the TRMC, I believe it is essential that the Department's test and evaluation infrastructure is adequately resourced.

#### **101. How would you ensure that the Army's test and evaluation infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new systems and technologies are tested to verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?**

If confirmed, I would become more familiar with the details of this requirement and ensure that future Army program and budget submissions provide an appropriate level of funding, consistent with competing demands on Departmental resources.

### **Army Information Technology Programs**

#### **102. What major improvements would you like to see made in the Army's development and deployment of major information technology systems?**

If confirmed, I would work to quickly leverage emerging technologies to meet security and operational capabilities. While this is an area I have not focused on in my work on the House Armed Services Committee, there are areas for improving the Army's development and deployment of major information technology systems. These include designing and adopting policies that reinforce management at the capability portfolio level, encouraging the identification and rapid development of new technologies, and improving the synchronization of acquisition management policies and processes. If confirmed, I would ensure that Army IT systems provide warfighters and business managers with leading edge capabilities that efficiently enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.

**103. What is your understanding of the Army's plan to adopt and deploy the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)? What are the major issues you feel need to be addressed in that process?**

I have not been informed of the specific status of the Army's implementation of DIMHRS. If confirmed, I would carefully review the implementation plan and associated milestones. If my review identifies any weakness, I would make appropriate recommendations, after cross-Service coordination, to the responsible officials.

**Housing Privatization**

**The Department of Defense has been engaged in the privatization of many of its support functions. Among the most significant privatization efforts is military family housing units and utility systems.**

**104. In your view, what challenges does the Army face in implementing housing privatization and, if confirmed, how would you propose addressing those challenges?**

It is my understanding that three key challenges face the Army in the continued implementation of housing privatization. First, the Army faces risk related to the capital market, both for projects that have obtained financing and those for upcoming projects. To address this risk, the Army must continue to monitor the capital markets and evaluate opportunities associated with fluctuating interest rates, credit terms, and risk parameters. Second, the Army faces risk of underperformance by a private sector partner. To mitigate this risk, the Army should continue to monitor the financial health of each partner and the operational metrics established in the Army's portfolio and asset management program. The third risk facing Army housing privatization is that faced by any real estate investor: namely, that expected occupancy, financial performance, or development targets will not be met. To mitigate and address this risk, the Army must continue to implement the best practices from private sector investment management to oversee existing housing privatization projects. Monitoring the key performance metrics associated with typical real estate transactions is critical to identifying and addressing potential issues.

**105. What adjustments, if any, would you anticipate as a result of the current lending environment?**

The terms and conditions of lending are growing more restrictive. Projects are now required to set aside more cash in reserve for debt payments, and rating agencies are downgrading the credit ratings on existing debt, which has affected the appeal of projects to investors. Many investors who have historically purchased military housing privatization debt

are saddled by financial challenges that have hindered their ability to invest. If confirmed, I would address these issues by ensuring that the Army continues to use experts to monitor how the financial markets could affect new and existing transactions. Additionally, I would direct that a team of senior Army leaders evaluate the current roster of proposed projects, both new and expansion, to determine what adjustments are necessary to ensure project feasibility.

**106. What actions would you propose, if any, to accommodate installations where there are housing shortfalls beyond the ability of the current privatization agreement?**

I understand that DOD and the Army's longstanding position is to rely first on housing in the local community. Where there are shortfalls locally, the Army has sought to educate community and business leaders on its housing requirements and to encourage development to meet those requirements. I have been informed that the Army has already held several industry forums in local communities for Fort Drum, Fort Riley, and Fort Bliss. Further, the Army has also used its domestic Army family housing lease authority as a bridging tactic until the local community is able to meet the Army's family housing requirements.

**107. What are your views regarding barracks privatization?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make that level of recommendation. If confirmed, barracks privatization is an issue I hope to be able to explore in depth.

**108. What is your opinion of the Army practice for the last ten years of using real estate consultants to assist with the development of housing privatization initiatives and the management of finances in awarded transactions?**

It is my understanding that the Army's practice of using real estate consultants to assist with the development of housing privatization programs has significantly contributed to the success the Army has experienced in its privatization efforts. If confirmed I would support the Army's effort to continue to use private sector expertise and consulting services as it interfaces with the capital markets and real estate developers.

**109. What changes, if any, do you think are needed with respect to the Army's practice of giving access to private sector experts in these decisions and processes?**

It is my understanding that the Army is considering new business processes regarding the use of consultant support. If confirmed, I would carefully study the Army's efforts to rebalance the tasks performed by its employees and private consultants and focus consultant use on providing financial, real estate, or research expertise, which is not inherent in the Army workforce.

**Investment in Infrastructure**

**Witnesses appearing before the Committee in recent years have testified that the military services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.**

**110. What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make an assessment. If confirmed, I would undertake to assess the sufficiency of the Army's current infrastructure investment strategy and implementation plan.

**111. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?**

If confirmed, I would support an investment strategy to ensure that the infrastructure backlog is addressed. I would also seek support from the Secretary of Defense and Congress for the President's budget request for Army installations and facilities.

**Implementation of Base Closures and Realignment**

**The 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process has resulted in the required closure or realignment of numerous major Army installations. The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property.**

**112. If confirmed, would you change any of the existing efforts to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?**

If confirmed, I would assess the current efforts and consider whether changes are warranted. I would also work diligently to uphold the commitment to support the communities of both closing and gaining installations.

**113. What, in your view, are the advantages or disadvantages, if any, on the use of no cost Economic Development Conveyances as a means of early property transfers under BRAC as opposed to holding out for full fair market value?**

I do not have sufficient information at this time to make an assessment.

**Expansion of Army Training Ranges**

**114. With the recent inability of the Army to be able gain support for the expansion of the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in Colorado, how would you propose addressing valid operational requirements to expand training and maneuver ranges across the United States as new weapon systems and additional end-strength drives the need for additional land for training?**

The most important way the Army can address valued operational requirements is to do so in partnership with the communities surrounding the installations. I believe that when all stakeholders and partners are adequately informed of Army issues and public concerns, reasonable solutions can be found.

### **Army Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse**

**115. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

Illegal drug use is not consistent with Army values or the Army mission. The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) is a commander's program used to assess the personnel readiness of his or her Soldiers. Army policy is that any disciplinary or administrative action taken should be based on the misconduct that led to the referral to ASAP, not on the fact that the Soldier is enrolled in the program. I agree with this policy because it gives the commander a tool to monitor the personnel readiness of his or her unit while providing sufficient flexibility when dealing with violations.

**116. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

Commanders are required to refer all potential alcohol abusers identified by self-referral, alcohol testing, DUI/DWI, investigation, apprehension, underage drinking, or other incident involving the use of alcohol to ASAP for screening and potential enrollment within 5 working days of the incident or investigation. Commanders are required to process Soldiers for separation who are involved in two serious incidents of alcohol-related misconduct in a 12-month period. This documentation is processed through the chains of command to the separation authority for final disposition. Additionally, any Soldier who is convicted of a DWI/DUI twice during their career must be administratively separated unless retained by the court martial convening authority. This authority may not be delegated. Soldiers diagnosed as alcohol dependent would be detoxified and given appropriate medical treatment. Those Soldiers

who warrant retention based on their potential for continued military service would be offered rehabilitation and retained. Soldiers who are separated would be referred to a Veterans Administration (VA) hospital or a civilian program by the ASAP counselor to continue (or initiate) their rehabilitation.

Soldiers who test positive for illicit drugs for the first time would undergo a process of evaluation for dependency, would be disciplined as appropriate, and may face possible separation as circumstances warrant. If a Soldier tests positive for illicit drugs, is subsequently retained by the separation authority, then tests positive again, the Soldier's chain of command would initiate administrative separation and forward the case to the court martial convening authority for decision on the disposition of the action. This authority may not be delegated.

This policy appears to provide a clear requirement for commanders to refer Soldiers and to appropriately review them for separation or retention within the parameters of Army regulations. Soldiers may also seek treatment through self referral. Soldiers who are retained must meet the standards for continued service to the Army.

**117. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?**

Although I have not had the opportunity to fully track these programs, it would appear that some installations do not have sufficient numbers of counseling resources to provide timely services to Soldiers. The Army is working to ensure that sufficient counselors are available and that this number takes into consideration the current state of continuous conflict.

**118. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?**

I do not have sufficient information to make an assessment.

**Tobacco and the Military**

**The Institute of Medicine recently released a study commissioned by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs which recommends, among other things, that the Department begin phasing in a tobacco-free military. These findings have evoked angry responses among some service members.**

**119. What is your understanding of the impact of tobacco use on the military and the effectiveness of current policies within DOD and the Army aimed at preventing tobacco use?**

Tobacco use in the military, as well as in civilian society, has widely known and long-term consequences. I am informed that significant short-term implications of tobacco use affect military readiness. It is my understanding that current Army policies discourage smoking and even prohibit it at certain times or in certain areas. Nevertheless, many smokers in the military report they started smoking only after joining the military. And the percentage of Soldier smokers is higher than the percentage of smokers across the U.S. population. Based on this information, it appears that current policies and educational efforts may not be as effective as hoped.

**120. If confirmed, what additional measures, if any, would you take to reduce the problem of tobacco use by soldiers and their family members?**

If confirmed, I would investigate additional means possible to discourage tobacco use by members of the Army.

**Abortion in Military Medical Facilities Overseas**

**121. What is your understanding of current requirements regarding performance of abortions at military treatment facilities?**

It is my understanding that no DOD funds may be used to administer any policy that provides for abortions at any DOD facility, except where the life of the mother may be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or where the pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or incest.

**122. What changes, if any, would you recommend with regard to these requirements?**

If confirmed, I would review the applicable law and policies with the Army's legal and medical experts to determine if any changes are necessary.

**National Security Personnel System (NSPS)**

**Section 1106 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 restored the collective bargaining rights of civilian employees included in the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) established by the Department of Defense pursuant to section 9902 of title 5, United States Code. Under section 1106, the Department retains the authority to establish a new performance management system (including pay for performance) and streamlined practices for hiring and promotion of civilian employees.**

**123. What is your view of the NSPS system, as currently constituted?**

I understand that the core purpose of NSPS was to support a streamlined and flexible civilian compensation, staffing, classification, and performance management system. Such a system is viewed as essential to the effective management of the sort of mission-oriented and results-driven civilian workforce that is vital to DOD's success. I recognize the many concerns with certain aspects of NSPS and understand that the NSPS Task Group's draft recommendation to the Defense Business Board was to initiate a reconstruction of the system. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DOD in the review of the recommendations detailed in the final report of the Defense Business Board

**124. If confirmed, how would you evaluate its success or failure to meet its goals?**

If confirmed, I would first review the findings and recommendations of the Defense Review Board and familiarize myself with reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Personnel Management and with other assessments that may be available. I would seek insights both into what works well in the extant system and into areas recommended for improvement, based on input for all stakeholders including recognized employee groups.

**125. Do you support the pay-for-performance approach adopted for civilian employees in the NSPS system?**

As a general principle, I support pay-for-performance and believe that employees' compensation should be based on their contribution to the mission. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Defense Review Board's comprehensive evaluation of NSPS and working with DOD to address the concerns identified.

**126. Do you believe that the Department needs streamlined authority for hiring and promotion of civilian employees to meet its human capital needs?**

I am advised that the Department is challenged to meet increased civilian labor requirements in critical occupations and to develop human capital strategies responsive to these challenges. It is my understanding that there are situations in which specialized hiring authorities are required to provide sufficient qualified applicants to meet mission needs. However, before making recommendations for additional authorities, I would want to ensure that managers fully understand the flexibility of the authorities currently available. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to prompt managers to creatively and actively use available authorities and to explore the need for, and uses of, direct and expedited hiring authorities to assist in achieving the Department's human capital objectives.

**127. In your view, is it viable in the long run for the Department of Defense to maintain two separate systems (NSPS and the General Schedule) for its civilian employees?**

It is my understanding that DOD operates a number of other personnel systems, such as the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System, a system for nonappropriated fund personnel, and laboratory demonstration projects. If confirmed, I would work with DOD, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) to assess the appropriate number and types of personnel systems required for effective and efficient personnel management in the Department of the Army.

**128. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the NSPS authorizing legislation?**

It is my understanding that the NSPS Task Group recently briefed its draft recommendations to the Defense Business Board and that the Task Group recommended reconstructing NSPS. Depending on the content of the final report, legislation may be appropriate to ensure that NSPS is on track to achieve its full potential.

**129. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the NSPS regulations?**

It is my understanding that the NSPS Task Group recently briefed its draft recommendations to the Defense Business Board and that the Task Group recommended reconstructing NSPS. Depending on the content of the final report, regulatory or policy changes may be appropriate to ensure that NSPS is on track to achieve its full potential.

**Management and Development of the Senior Executive Service (SES)**

**The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.**

**130. What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?**

The Army must carefully manage and develop its Senior Executive Service corps to meet the evolving work force challenges facing the Department. As I understand it, members of the Senior Executive Service are increasingly being looked to, when appropriate, as replacements for military flag officers in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields. To support this effort, I understand the Army's Senior Executive program focuses on the recruitment, assignment, and development of adaptive, multi-skilled senior civilian leaders, and that the current Senior Executive program includes periodic education and development opportunities and performance-based evaluations.

**Over the last ten years, the Army budget has almost doubled, but the number of senior executives in the Department of the Army has remained almost unchanged.**

**131. Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department into the future?**

If confirmed, I would carefully assess the Army's Senior Executive requirements and work to ensure that the Army has the number of Senior Executives with the diverse set of skills and experiences required to lead the Department into the future.

**Initial Recruit Training**

**The committee has received reports from non-commissioned officers in operational units that new recruits graduating from basic training and advanced training are not prepared as they reach their units. Moreover, the committee has received reports of some recruits suffering from mental health and other health issues upon first arriving to their units.**

**132. Do you believe that the Army's basic and advanced training programs fully prepare new soldiers for combat operations?**

As I understand the question, Army basic and advanced training programs are not intended to provide specific training for combat operations. Rather, it is my understanding that new Soldiers are trained to ensure they have the skills required by their military specialty and to function as an individual Soldier, and later receive additional training when assigned to a unit to prepare them for combat operations.

**133. In your view, has the Army sacrificed quality of personnel for quantity in achieving the past two years' growth in end strength?**

At present, I do not have the information required to answer your specific question. If confirmed, I will focus on maintaining the quality of the Army's all volunteer force.

**134. Has the Army lowered its basic and advanced training standards, including physical standards, to achieve this growth by graduating more recruits as compared to historical norms?**

I am informed that the standards of training, including physical training, have not been lowered and are in fact higher than before to prepare Soldiers for the conflicts they will face. The graduation rates for basic and advanced training are about the same as historical norms. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that our recruits continue to be adequately trained.

## **Stop Loss Authority**

### **135. What is your assessment of the Army's plan to implement the Secretary of Defense's recent direction to end the use of stop-loss?**

It appears the Army has a plan in place to implement the Secretary of Defense's guidance on the use of stop loss. The Army Reserve will begin mobilizing units without stop loss after 1 August 2009; the Army National Guard will begin mobilizing units without stop loss after 1 September 2009; and the Active Army will begin deploying units without stop loss after 1 January 2010. I do not have sufficient information at this time to make an assessment

### **136. In your view, is the termination of stop-loss in the Army achievable without adversely affecting unit manning, cohesion, and readiness?**

I do not have sufficient information to make an assessment at this time.

## **Operational and Personnel Tempo**

**Current Department of Defense policy is that active component personnel would have two years of dwell time for each year of deployment and that Reserve component members would have five years of dwell time for each year they are mobilized.**

### **137. What is your view of the achievability of this goal? What measures must be taken by the Army to be able to achieve it in five years or less?**

The Army's ability to achieve its steady-state deployment-to-dwell time ratios of 1:3 for the Active Component and 1:5 for the National Guard and Reserve would be a function of end strength and demand. The Army is currently working to achieve its surge deployment-to-dwell time ratios of 1:2 for the Active Component and 1:4 for the National Guard and Reserve.

### **138. In your view, how would shifting resources from Iraq to Afghanistan affect dwell-time ratios?**

Shifting resources from Iraq to Afghanistan would not affect dwell-time ratios unless it results in an increase or decrease in demand. The key factor in deployment-to-dwell time ratios is overall demand.

### **139. How would the end of the use of stop-loss affect dwell time ratios?**

It will create additional demand in manning units scheduled to deploy. While this may have a negative impact on individual Soldier dwell, the Army is offering incentive programs to encourage Soldiers to extend to complete deployments with their units. The Army is hopeful that these measures would mitigate the increased demand. The recent approval of a temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 Soldiers will also significantly assist in manning units without stop loss.

**140. What is your assessment of the Army's ability to support scheduled troop rotation planning in 2009 and beyond, particularly in combat support and combat service support missions, given this goal?**

The Army will continue to support scheduled troop rotation planning, including combat support and combat service support units, in 2009 and beyond. The recent approval of a temporary wartime allowance for an additional 22,000 Soldiers will assist the Army in its efforts to man units without stop loss and improve dwell. Achieving steady-state dwell time goals will depend on future reductions in demand.

**141. What measures are being taken to respond to operational requirements for low density, high demand units and personnel whose skills are found primarily in the Reserve components, e.g., civil affairs, medical personnel, and truck drivers?**

I do not have a detailed knowledge of all the measures being implemented. I believe the Army continues to seek solutions to sourcing low-density, high-demand requirements with a variety of initiatives, including the use of individual augmentees and rebalancing certain military occupational specialties between the Reserve and Active Components.

**142. In your view, what would be the effect on recruiting, retention, and readiness of the Army of the current rates of operations and personnel tempo through 2010?**

The Army has seen no negative effects on recruiting and retention because of operational and personnel tempo. Despite the challenges of a protracted conflict, the Army recently exceeded its enlisted recruiting missions for the first time since FY 02 and is optimistic it will meet its goals for FY 09 and FY 10. The Army monitors retention very closely given the high operational demand and multiple deployments Soldiers experience. Statistics show that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely affecting enlisted retention. On the officer side, the multiple deployments required of the Army to ensure success in overseas contingency operations missions have not resulted in increased losses of midgrade officers over the past several years. The Army's loss rates are well within historical norms at all officer grades and actually decreased slightly in company grade officers during 2008 and so far during 2009. The majority of the present generation of young officers and NCOs has entered the Army during a time of conflict. They have known the challenges we face and are continuing to serve with distinction in a very fluid and demanding environment.

**143. In your judgment, what would be the impact on the current rates of operations and personnel tempo of assigning principal responsibility for support to civil authorities for consequence management of natural, domestic disasters to reserve component forces? What would be the impact of assigning these responsibilities to active component forces?**

I believe assigning principal responsibility for these missions to the Reserve forces would likely lessen the demand on active duty forces, potentially yielding some improvements in operational and personnel tempo for the active duty. The reverse would likely be true if responsibility were assigned to active duty forces.

### **Medical personnel recruiting and retention**

**The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components. Increasing medical support requirements, caused by the growth of the Army and the modular force, surge requirements in theater, and other factors would compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse and behavioral health personnel.**

**144. What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?**

As the Nation deals with a shortage of medical professionals, the recruiting and retention of skilled and dedicated care providers continues to be a significant challenge for the Army. Issues of operational tempo, pay compatibility, and adequacy of support staff present ongoing hurdles to overcome. Even during these challenging times, I am heartened that Army medicine continues to attract and produce world-class physicians, nurses, and medics.

**145. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2010 and beyond?**

If confirmed, I would review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis and incorporate all new requirements in ongoing planning and recruiting efforts. I am advised that the Army already reviews medical support requirements as part of its ongoing internal processes and, if confirmed, I would continue this practice.

**146. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?**

If confirmed, I would work closely with The Surgeon General to evaluate the Army's requirements, support ongoing programs, and develop initiatives to enhance the Army's ability

to recruit and retain care providers and support personnel with the requisite critical skills. Should legislative or policy changes be required, I will work with the leadership of the Department of Defense and Congress to bring them to fruition.

### **Ground Combat Exclusion Policy**

**In May 2005, you cosponsored an amendment to the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 that would have required the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress if he proposed any changes to the ground combat exclusion policy or if he proposed to open or close any career designator to the assignment of women. In speaking of this amendment, you stated: “Many Americans feel that women in combat or combat support positions is not a bridge that we want to cross at this point.”**

#### **147. What objective did you have in mind when you cosponsored this amendment?**

The language as first included in the Military Personnel Subcommittee mark was inserted at the direct request of the full Committee Chairman. Subsequent to that adoption, it became clear that the Army had not provided the committee with a full and complete picture of the extent to which women were being used in forward support companies, and it was not clear that the Army was in compliance with DOD’s existing regulations. Accordingly, I worked with the Chairman and other senior members of the Committee to develop a secondary amendment that, in essence, sought to codify existing DOD regulations and require notification to Congress of any proposed changes to units and assignments for female members. My intent was to provide for better oversight by requiring the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress of changes to the ground combat exclusion policy or proposals to open or close any career designator to the assignment of women. I also introduced a second amendment to require the Secretary of Defense to review military service policies with regard to the assignment of women, with a specific focus on the collocation policy.

#### **148. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?**

Female Soldiers make irreplaceable contributions to the Army’s success and are an integral part of the all-volunteer force. All Soldiers—male and female—are trained to fight in combat. As I understand the current law and policy, once properly assigned, female Soldiers are subject to the same utilization policies as their male counterparts and, as required by their unit’s mission, may find themselves in combat. Female Soldiers remain with their assigned units, perform their assigned duties, and operate as a team with male Soldiers as they have been trained to do.

#### **149. What is your view of the current policy regarding women in combat with respect to female soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom?**

In my view, the current policy seems to be operating adequately. If it is determined a need exists to consider a change to that policy, I would provide the Secretary of Defense with the most accurate information and cogent advice possible regarding the changes sought and would ensure that the Army complies with all the notification requirements in Title 10.

**150. What is your assessment of the Army's compliance with the requirements of the current ground combat exclusion policy?**

It is my understanding that the Army is in compliance with the requirements of law and DOD policy relating to women in combat. Women have and will continue to be an integral part of the Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties and positions open to them.

**151. In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing nature of warfare?**

If confirmed and if, after careful study and deliberation, it is determined it is necessary to seek a change to the policy, I would provide the Secretary of Defense with the most accurate information and cogent advice possible regarding the changes sought and would ensure that the Army complies with all the notification requirements in Title 10.

**Religious Guidelines**

**152. What is your understanding of current policies and programs of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army regarding religious practices in the military?**

At this time I do not have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the current policies and programs, but it is my belief that whatever policies are in place must be consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded to all Americans.

**153. Do these policies accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?**

At this time I do not have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the current policies and programs, but it is my belief that whatever policies are in place must be consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded to all Americans.

**154. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?**

At this time I do not have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the current policies, but it is my understanding that Army policies require chaplains to support all unit personnel, regardless of their beliefs.

**155. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?**

At this time I do not have a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the current policies and programs, but it is my belief that whatever policies are in place must be consistent with the First Amendment protections afforded to all Americans.

### **Family Support**

**The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.**

**156. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?**

I recognize that Soldiers and their families have made, and continue to make, significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. I fully support the Army Family Covenant, a commitment to provide Soldiers and their families—Active, Guard, and Reserve—a quality of life commensurate with their level of service. If confirmed, I would continue efforts to improve family readiness through the Family Covenant. As the former Chair and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, I endeavored to ensure that military families received the support and resources they required. If confirmed, I commit to continuing my advocacy on behalf of Army families.

**157. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, lengthy deployments, and the planned growth of the Army?**

Repeated deployments and frequent moves because of base realignment and closure and other Army transformational efforts combine to create stress and anxiety for Army families. The Army offers a number of family service programs—child and youth services, relocation and recreational programs, and a myriad of counseling services—all designed to foster strong,

resilient families capable of successfully navigating the challenges of military service and coping with the demands of a military lifestyle. One of the “pillars” of the Army Family Covenant is to standardize and fund these programs and services throughout the Army, providing families with predictable and consistent services no matter where they may be stationed. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for the robust family service programs that I believe to be so important to creating a supportive environment in which Army families can thrive.

**158. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as active-duty families who do not reside near a military installation?**

Supporting the families of geographically dispersed Soldiers poses special challenges but would be a high priority for me if I am confirmed. I understand that the Army already has undertaken several initiatives focused specifically on service to Reserve Component families as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation. In 2008 the National Guard Bureau created the Soldier Family Services and Support Division to provide family program resources, guidance, and training to all States and territories. In addition, the Army has implemented the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program; added more than 1,000 family readiness support assistant positions to provide administrative and logistical support to Family Readiness Groups; established “Army OneSource” to provide Soldiers and their families with online access to standardized services, programs, and support; supported 249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers; and expanded community-based outreach to geographically dispersed children and youth of deployed Active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers through Operation: Military Kids.

**Mental Health Advisory Teams**

**The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in the Iraqi theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF. The most recent report, MHAT V, stated that deployment length and number of deployments were related to higher rates of mental health problems.**

**159. Based on the findings of MHAT V that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthy deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?**

I have been advised that the Mental Health Advisory Teams have shown that far-forward mental health prevention and care are effective in assisting Soldiers and reducing unnecessary evacuations from theater. If confirmed, I would review the Army’s current force structure, and recruitment and retention programs for behavioral health providers across all force components,

military and civilian, to make sure sufficient behavioral health providers are in theater and at home.

**160. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?**

I have been informed that multiple valuable findings have emerged from the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, which have been studying and reporting on mental health issues in combat zones since 2003. Among the findings are that the level of combat a Soldier is and has been involved in continues to be the main determinant of a Soldier's mental health status, good noncommissioned officer leadership is a key to sustaining a Soldier's mental health and well-being, and the stigma that continues to be associated with those who seek mental health care.

Mental Health Advisory Team findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing combat and operational stress control units to create more flexible and capable organizations. Information from the teams has also been used to better predict the quantity of behavioral health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, information from the teams has been used to create a training program known as "Battlemind," which changes the way the Army prepares Soldiers, leaders, and families for high-stress deployments. The importance of leadership in the mitigation of mental health difficulties is a vital lesson that must be applied to future deployments.

## **Suicides**

**The Committee continues to be concerned about the continuing increase in soldier suicides.**

**161. In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of suicides?**

I have been advised that the data suggests no single reason exists for the increase in the number of suicides in the Army. Several individual and organizational factors working in concert appear to lead an individual to make the tragic decision to end his or her life. The Army's operational tempo appears to play a role, but precisely what that role may be is unclear. For example, my understanding is that approximately one-third of all suicides across all Army components since 2003 were Soldiers who had never deployed.

**162. What is your assessment of the Army's response to this increase in suicide rates?**

I have been advised that the Army has taken important proactive steps to address this problem, including implementation of suicide prevention and intervention training for its

personnel; issuing the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention; and entering into an agreement with the National Institute of Mental Health to conduct a 5-year longitudinal study with the goal of identifying both the causes of suicides and viable intervention methods. I pledge to you that, if confirmed, one of my top priorities would be to ensure that the Army's response to this critical problem is aggressive, effective, and appropriate.

**The Army recently signed an agreement with the National Institute of Mental Health to perform a 5-year study on suicides in the Army.**

**163. If confirmed, what actions would you propose that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention program?**

I appreciate and share the Committee's sense of urgency in addressing issues of suicide prevention and intervention. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the suicide prevention program receives the leadership, resourcing priority, and support necessary to effectively address this difficult and challenging problem.

### **Support for Wounded Soldiers**

**Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded soldiers.**

**164. In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001?**

As I understand it, the Army was not prepared for the increase in wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers that resulted from overseas contingency operations such as OEF and OIF. One area that needed improvement was the management of outpatient Soldiers during their recovery period. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to continue to promote a high standard of care for wounded warriors.

**165. What is your assessment of the Army's response?**

The Army is in the process of transforming its care for wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers and their families. As a cosponsor of the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act of 2007 in the House of Representatives, it was one of my highest priorities during my time on the House Armed Services Committee. If confirmed, I would assess the effectiveness of the Army's response and continue to work with Congress to ensure that America's warriors receive the highest possible care and support.

**166. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?**

I am informed that the Army established the Army Wounded Warrior Program in 2004 to provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from service. The Army Wounded Warrior Program assists and advocates for the most severely wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers, veterans, and their families by providing personalized support through more than 120 local Army wounded warrior advocates who connect Soldiers and veterans with resources and assist in their transition to life post-injury. Should I be confirmed, I would strongly support this program and work to improve the partnership with the VA to ensure the care of all wounded Soldiers separating from service.

**167. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?**

If confirmed, I would continuously assess the efficiency and appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would implement strategies and seek additional resources as appropriate to make sure the Army meets the needs of wounded Soldiers.

**Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.**

**168. What is your assessment of the need to streamline and improve the Army's disability evaluation system?**

I understand that beginning on November 26, 2007, the Army initiated testing of a revamped physical disability program at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, streamlining the process used to determine Soldiers' fitness for service or eligibility for military and veterans' benefits. Key features of this pilot program include a single medical examination and a single sourced disability rating.

If confirmed I would closely examine the disability evaluation process to reveal any areas that need to be improved. I would also work toward this end with stakeholders in the Army, as well as with experts in DOD and VA.

**169. Is it your view that the Army currently is correctly assigning disability ratings to soldiers who are found not to be fit for duty?**

I do not have sufficient information to make a judgment at this time

**170. If confirmed, how would you address any need for change?**

If confirmed, I would listen to the information presented by the experts in this area. I would work with the stakeholders in the Army and with appropriate personnel in both DOD and VA to determine what elements of the current system should be changed and how to best accomplish those changes.

### **Army Medical Action Plan and Wounded Warriors**

**The Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) has attempted to address the various needs of wounded warriors and their families.**

**171. What is your view of the adequacy of the AMAP, and if confirmed, would you make any changes to the program?**

The AMAP, now referred to as the Army's Warrior Care and Transition Program, has accomplished much over the past 2 years. If confirmed, I would support continued refinement of the program to ensure that it is not only efficient and effective, but is flexible enough to meet the demands of changing circumstances.

**Staffing of Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) has been a major issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.**

**172. What are the impediments to fully staffing these units?**

I do not have sufficient information to make a judgment at this time

**173. If confirmed, would you pursue changes to improve assignment of military personnel and hiring of civilian personnel to improve staffing of WTUs?**

If confirmed, I would ensure that systems are put in place to assign appropriate staffing in WTUs. WTUs must be able to expand or contract as the population of wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers changes.

### **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response**

**Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.**

**174. What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?**

It is my understanding the Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition of the special circumstances that apply to deployments. In addition, I understand that the Army has implemented a comprehensive Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SHARP), which includes medical, advocacy, chaplaincy, investigative, and legal services. Under this program, the Army requires every unit, brigade-size and higher, to appoint and train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and requires every battalion to appoint and train two unit victim advocates. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army continues to take appropriate steps to aid victims of sexual assault, both in garrison and deployed locations.

**175. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as home stations?**

In my opinion, the Army has taken several important steps in its campaign to prevent sexual assaults both at home stations and deployed locations. For instance, I have been informed that the "I. A.M. Strong" Prevention Campaign is being implemented across the Army. "I. A.M. Strong" features Soldiers as influential role models providing peer-to-peer messages to encourage other Soldiers to take action to promote a positive command climate in which sexual assault is not acceptable. Command leadership and program representatives from divisions in deployed locations and home stations have participated in prevention summits held in September 2008 and April 2009. If confirmed, I would monitor these and other related programs closely.

**176. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?**

It appears that the Army is committed to ensuring that it has trained personnel and resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. I have been advised that the Army continues to emphasize victim services and response capabilities. I have also been advised that the Army is in the process of hiring and placing additional special investigators and prosecutors at Army installations with the highest occurrences of sexual assault and adding examiners to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory. If confirmed, I would assess whether additional steps should be taken to support victims and hold offenders accountable.

**177. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?**

This effort needs to be robust and ongoing. Clearly, significant challenges remain unresolved. If confirmed, it would be a high priority.

**178. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?**

At this time I am not aware of any problems with the current restricted reporting procedures. If confirmed, I would closely monitor the Army's sexual assault response procedures to determine whether improvements are needed in the area of confidential reporting. While the program is vital, those who might use it must hold it in trust.

**179. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?**

Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in the Army's ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.

I have been advised that as part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DOD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and DOD policy. Finally, senior Army leaders require their Inspectors General periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

**180. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?**

If confirmed, I would work with Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 to ensure that SHARP operates effectively and receives the appropriate level of support.

**Morale, Welfare, and Recreation**

**Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active duty and reserve personnel, retirees, and their eligible family members.**

**181. What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?**

I know from my experiences in representing the Fort Drum military community that Army morale, welfare, and recreation programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of military families. The continued vitality of these programs depends on consistent appropriated and nonappropriated funding. Yet I appreciate the difficulties associated with ensuring adequate funding for morale, welfare, and recreation activities in a challenging fiscal environment. In my view, the Army must constantly evaluate and improve support programs to meet the changing needs of Soldiers and families. If confirmed, I would endeavor to ensure support for morale, welfare, and recreation programs that best meet the needs of Soldiers and families and contribute positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness.

### **Officer Shortages**

**A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. The CRS also found that shortages would persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves. In that time, in addition to aggressive recruiting efforts, the Army has increased officer accessions through Officer Candidate School (OCS) from the pool of most qualified enlisted members.**

**182. What is your understanding of the reasons for the current shortfall, and what is your assessment of the steps the Army is taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?**

I have been informed that Army officer shortages stem from force structure growth undertaken to support conversion to more self-sufficient, modular combat formations and to provide additional capabilities to meet the emerging threats in counterinsurgency warfare. I am encouraged that the measures the Army has taken to resolve shortages in midgrade officers, including increased accessions (over 5,000 by the end of FY 09); increasing Reserve Component calls to active duty; using inter-service transfers, higher promotion rates, below the zone promotions, and earlier promotion pin-on point to a path of resolving this challenge.

**183. In your view, what are the long term consequences and challenges, if any, for both the officer and non-commissioned officer corps of increasing the relative size of the officer corps through OCS accessions?**

Officer Candidate School graduates offer the Army a tremendous benefit; the Officer Candidate School cohort has the highest officer retention rates of any commissioning program. I am informed that the noncommissioned officer corps can support demands to sustain Officer Candidate School accessions at current and projected levels without adverse long-term consequences. In addition, the school has consistently produced minority officer candidates at the highest rate of any of the commissioning sources. It also offers an avenue for civilians with

college degrees, in many cases in academic disciplines greatly needed in the Army, to enlist in order to seek a commission.

**184. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next ten years?**

If confirmed, I would support the Army's strategy of retaining the capable and experienced company grade and junior field grade officers. In addition, I would support the continued development of nonmonetary incentives, including advanced education, quality of life, assignment to the region of choice, and other options that would best assist leaders in positively influencing an officer's decision to continue to serve.

**185. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to continuously monitor and ensure the quality of mid-career field grade and senior non-commissioned officers?**

If confirmed, I will continuously monitor and ensure the quality of the Army's midcareer field grade and senior noncommissioned officers. I would also work to ensure that midgrade and noncommissioned officers receive the necessary training and mentoring to realize the full benefit of their Army experience.

### **Detainee Treatment Standards**

**186. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

I fully support the policy set forth in Deputy Secretary of Defense England's July 7, 2006, memorandum.

**187. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

I do. The Army Field Manual and the directive clarify the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among military intelligence, military police, and health care providers in detainee operations and establish unequivocally that humane treatment is the standard of care for all detainees. These documents and the standards they promulgate have been instrumental in restoring the confidence of the American people in the Army as an institution and should act as important resources to guide Soldiers in future contingency operations.

**188. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Compliance with the humane treatment standards specified in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is fully consistent with effective U.S. military operations and with Army values.

**189. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?**

It is my understanding that as the DOD Executive Agent for the administration of detainee operations policy, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for gathering “lessons learned” from detention operations and incorporating those lessons in Army policy and doctrine. U.S. Forces worldwide are held to standards that are rooted in sound training and enforced by leadership. If confirmed, I will work to reinforce the Army’s robust detention operations training program, which ensures that all U.S. Forces involved in detainee and interrogation operations are aware of their obligations under U.S. and international law and implementing DOD policies.

**In the past two years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.**

**190. What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?**

As I understand it, the primary lessons learned include, first and foremost, that the Army must clearly communicate its commitment to ensuring that all Soldiers adhere to the law of war and live up to the Army values, regardless of the circumstances. Second, Soldiers who are determined to have violated the laws of war or to have failed to uphold Army values must be held accountable, as appropriate.

Another major lesson learned is that the Army may need to expand its detention operations force structure, particularly military police and military intelligence. If confirmed, I will act to ensure that the Army continues to assess and refine the force structure needed to successfully support the combatant commanders’ detention operations missions.

Although Army policies have always prohibited inhumane treatment, Army detention operations policy and doctrine required revisions to incorporate operational realities. Policy and doctrine across the full spectrum of detention operations have been revised and published. I am told that key revisions include the designation of a single commander for detention operations;

clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for detainee care, custody, and interrogations; and the promulgation of very specific guidance for identifying and reporting detainee abuse. It is my understanding that these new policies also mandate that U.S. Forces receive additional law of war and cultural awareness training, and that the Army has enhanced detention operations training for Soldiers, units, and civilians, not only in the predeployment context, but also as an annual requirement and by incorporating these courses into institutional training systems.

**191. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?**

It is my understanding that since 2004, the lessons learned have been spiraled into DOD policy, doctrine, and training. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and the HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence continue to incorporate lessons learned from current operations into the curriculum development for human intelligence-specific training and also into curricula for the professional development of leaders of all ranks. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth includes lessons learned for detention and interrogation operations in scenarios composed for the Battle Command Training Program and in the intermediate level education curriculum, both of which provide realistic and challenging training to prepare leaders to succeed in future operations. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that the Army constantly reviews its procedures and updates its doctrine through the analysis of lessons learned and best practices derived from afteraction reviews conducted by returning units, and that lessons learned collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned are used in the development and revision of Army policy, doctrine, and training.

**Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**192. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes

**193. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Army?**

Yes

**194. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes

**195. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes