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Senate Armed Services Committee  
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Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. For many years now, the members of this committee have worked to keep our forces ahead of threats our nation faces. I thank you for that commitment.

As you are well aware, The Department is engaged heavily in the Quadrennial Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews. I would like to speak briefly, about three overriding points that guide my thinking as these reviews relate to missile defense.

First, our objective in some form will be to seek to prevent future conflict, and failing that, to prevail in any conflict we enter. The global nature of the threats we face, and the rapid pace of technological change, impose significant challenges on any deterrent strategy. No longer will a monolithic, mutual-assured destruction approach deter our aggressors. With the proliferation of ballistic missile delivery and weapon system technologies, the promise of closing general purpose forces in days or weeks, or in the extreme, countering with strategic nuclear weapons will be inappropriate or insufficient to prevent or terminate conflict on our terms. Our deterrent strategy will need to handle the rapid advances in technologies across a broad range of threats and conditions.

At the essence of tomorrow's strategy is the credibility to adapt our strategy and capabilities that are more in line with Moore's Law than the threat-based, platform-centric solutions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Second, given the challenges of rapid technology change and global proliferation, we will need to integrate our offensive and defensive capabilities rather than continuing on

an either-or strategy. Tailoring our capabilities for both known and unexpected challenges will be essential vice relying on a one-sized deterrent fits all approach.

Today, our offensive strategic deterrent is challenged to remain credible and relevant as more and more, nations and potentially non-nation states, aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. There is compelling need to develop defensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missile defense, integrated with our offensive capabilities, to provide a strategy tailored to the threats we actually face versus threats we want to face.

Third, deterrent strategies have at least two enduring qualities: to impose cost and to deny benefit. As we move to the future, our legacy threat-centric platforms are unlikely to accomplish either. Competitive edge is more likely found in our ability to string ad hoc sensor, Command and Control and weapons together in order to create credible counters to emerging threats before they manifest themselves. In the case of ballistic missiles, the constant proliferation of these lethal, fast-acting weapon systems must be neutralized and turned back against the adversary in a cost imposing strategy. And we must deny others the benefit of their use.

So whether we are challenged with the latest upgrade to an existing missile, the emergence of a new missile, or an asymmetric challenge we did not anticipate, we cannot wait years to field a counter. We must be able to find competitive advantage inside much more stressing timelines, similar to the destruction of an errant satellite last year. The rapid adaptation of existing sensors, Command and Control and weapons is far more responsive than developing a threat-based system to counter the threat.

I look forward to continuing our work together on these important issues.