

**Advance Questions for Dr. James Miller**  
**Nominee for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

I do not see the need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichol Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of several decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces – from strategic decision-making to operational command and control. An entire generation of military officers now has a much improved perspective on coordinated, multi-service, joint training and operations.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

See my previous answer.

**Relationships**

**What do you see as the relationship between the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?**

**The Secretary of Defense**

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as the USD(P)'s principal assistant, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)) serves as a staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

## **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy provides support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that provided to the Secretary, as described above.

## **The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

The PDUSD(P) is the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and exercising authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises on and supports the USD(P) with all responsibilities in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National Security Council and Homeland Security Council deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

## **The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the PDUSD(P) works closely with the other Undersecretaries of Defense and their Deputies, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility.

## **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the PDUSD(P) works closely with Assistant Secretaries of Defense across the Department to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. As the USD(P)'s principal assistant, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, the PDUSD(P) provides oversight of Assistant Secretaries on issues and at times as directed by the USD(P). The Policy team works together to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

## **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning and other areas in which the military departments are critical stakeholders.

### **The General Counsel of the Department of Defense**

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. This generally requires significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

### **The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and to help ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

### **The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands**

The PDUSD(P) also works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning and policy oversight of operations.

### **The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration**

The PDUSD(P) works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's oversight of strategy for nuclear weapons and forces, as well as USD(P)'s role on the Nuclear Weapons Council.

### **Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**Section 134a of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?**

My understanding is that, as the principal assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in advising the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy, and for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all USD(P) responsibilities outlined in Section 134(b) of Title 10. This includes, but not limited to, strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for you?**

If confirmed, I expect that my duties and functions would include advising and assisting the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy. I expect that this would include involvement in the planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) system, and in major departmental reviews such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. I look forward to speaking with the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy further about how I could best support their efforts.

**Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

I have been privileged to spend the last twenty-five years working on a wide range of defense and national security issues, both in and out of government. I had the honor to work for the late Les Aspin for four years as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, where I was responsible for both policy and procurement issues. I was privileged to serve for over three years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy, where my office led defense planning, oversight of war plans, and efforts to improve the military's ability to cope with weapons of mass destruction. During my time outside of government, I have had the opportunity to teach and conduct research on national security issues, to establish and lead a private sector group that provided consulting services to the Department of Defense, and to serve in a leadership position for a newly established national security think tank. In addition, I have served on a number of studies and panels including as an advisor to the Defense Science Board, and as an expert to the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. I believe that my substantive expertise and management experience would allow me to serve the country well if confirmed as Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy.

## **Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning**

**One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. DOD Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those important matters.**

**What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?**

Civilian oversight of the military is critical in a democracy, and is therefore paramount when considering the formulation of strategy and contingency plans. When I served in the Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy, I oversaw the development of strategic planning and contingency planning guidance, as well as the civilian review of contingency plans in support of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. Based on this experience, I believe strongly that the development of appropriate guidance and plans requires civilian and uniformed leaders to work in close partnership.

More specifically, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supports the development of the President's National Security Strategy, the development of the defense strategy, the establishment of realistic objectives and guidance to form the basis for contingency planning, and the review of DoD plans and programs to ensure they support strategic objectives. The Joint Staff is a critical partner in the development of guidance for contingency planning and provides independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition to the provision of written guidance, an important civilian role is to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the Combatant Commanders. The PDUSD(P) also supports the USD(P) in facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.

**In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency planning?**

I believe that the civilian leadership has the necessary authorities to provide effective oversight of strategy and contingency planning. At the same time, I believe that changes to the organizational structure of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy could help improve the support of senior leadership on these critical issues. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P) to examine this issue closely and to help ensure that civilian leadership has appropriate oversight of strategy, contingency planning, and other critical issues relating to the use of force.

**What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency planning?**

Ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a complex security environment globally, provide an incredibly diverse set of challenges and opportunities for today and the future. Because of this increased complexity, I believe that it is likely that strategy and planning require more senior level attention and more supporting personnel in DoD, and in particular in the Office of the Undersecretary for Policy, than has been the case in the past. In addition, I believe that recent experience has shown the importance of “whole of government” approaches to strategy, plans, and operations. Therefore establishing effective organizations and processes for working with interagency partners, while protecting Defense Department prerogatives, is an area where I believe it is useful to consider possible additional measures. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the USD(P) to examine these issues closely.

If confirmed, I would strive to provide the best support possible to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling their statutory responsibilities to provide written policy guidance and to review contingency plans. I would also work closely with the Joint Staff, and where appropriate interagency partners, to help develop further opportunities to collaborate on planning guidance and reviews.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

If confirmed, I expect to provide advice and counsel to the USD(P) and aid in the development of policy advice to the Secretary of Defense. I would expect that major challenges would include ensuring that the internal organization of the various policy oriented structures in OSD continue a relatively seamless transition as new leadership continues to assimilate. I also expect to play important roles in reviews including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and ensuring that adequate scrutiny and oversight are applied to the entire range of policy options that are reviewed in support of ongoing contingencies and possible future operations. Beyond ensuring that the Secretary of Defense receives the best possible policy input on these vital questions, another challenge will be to strengthen the organizational capacity of OSD Policy to support these and other efforts.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I expect to serve important advisory roles in a number of policy reviews, including the upcoming QDR and NPR, which provide an opportunity to assess these challenges and develop policy, plans, and investments to address them. More broadly, I expect to participate actively in a variety of DoD decision-making processes, including in

particular strategy development and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system. I also expect to support the USD(P) in efforts to responsibly end the war in Iraq; ensure that the United States develops and employs a more effective strategy in Afghanistan and the surrounding region; prevent nuclear and WMD proliferation; combat terrorism; adapt the U.S. military for 21st century challenges; and strengthen America's relationships with key partners and allies.

### **Priorities**

**If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

If confirmed, I would give priority to the major challenges identified by the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P), and to strengthening the organizational capacity of OSD Policy to address them. I would also pay close attention to help develop and maintain effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts in the Department and the interagency.

### **Iraq**

**The President has announced his plans for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and their transition to an overwatch mission, to be completed by the end of August 2010. The U.S.-Iraqi agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (the "security agreement") requires that U.S. combat forces withdraw from cities and towns by June 2009 and that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq by the end of December 2011. Additionally, if Iraqi voters reject the security agreement in a referendum scheduled for July 2009, U.S. troops would be required to withdraw by July 2010.**

**What in your view are the greatest challenges facing the Department in meeting these deadlines and what actions, if any, would you recommend to maximize the chances of meeting these requirements?**

A critical goal over the next months and years in Iraq will be to maintain a secure environment to support elections, political reconciliation, and economic development. As the U.S. military continues to transition from providing population security to conducting over-watch, and then re-deploys out of Iraq, continuing to build the capacity of the Iraqi military and police forces will be a continuing priority, as will ensuring the effectiveness of counter-terror operations. As the U.S. military repositions and draws down its forces in Iraq, there are likely to be important strategic choices about the positioning of U.S. forces in Iraq and the region, as well as questions relating to prioritization of logistical support for the movement of U.S. forces. If confirmed, I would aid in the review of DoD plans and work with colleagues across the Department to make any necessary recommendations to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense.

**What is your understanding and assessment of U.S. plans to support implementation of the President's drawdown plans and the security agreement requirements for repositioning and redeployment of U.S. forces, including contingency planning relating to the Iraqi referendum?**

Based on my current knowledge, my assessment is that the President's drawdown strategy reflects a careful consideration of events on the ground and respect for the bilateral agreements between the United States and Iraq. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the details of plans for repositioning and redeploying U.S. forces, as well as any contingency planning relating to the Iraqi referendum, and to supporting the USD(P) and Secretary of Defense in overseeing the implementation of strategy and plans.

**To date, U.S. taxpayers have paid approximately \$48 billion for stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq. On April 8, 2008, Ambassador Crocker told the Committee "the era of U.S.-funded major infrastructure is over" and said the United States is no longer "involved in the physical reconstruction business."**

**What do you believe is the appropriate role for the United States in reconstruction activities in Iraq going forward?**

I agree with and support the President's view that bringing in Iraq's neighbors to help with reconstruction efforts is an important priority. American policy should also continue to encourage and where necessary assist Iraqi institutions in building sufficient capacity for prioritizing, planning, and executing their own reconstruction projects.

**What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to assume the cost of training, equipping, and operations for its security forces?**

An important component of our strategy centers on the Iraqi government successfully assuming control of the entire range of tasks necessary to organize, train, and equip its security forces. From DoD's perspective, this includes helping Iraqi institutions better formulate a defense strategy and acquisition policy that is sustainable and prudent in the absence of significant external assistance.

**What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to share the cost of combined operations with MNF-I forces and stability programs throughout Iraq?**

It is my understanding that the U.S. Government has not requested that Iraq contribute to the costs of MNF-I operations. It will be important for Iraq to organize, train, equip, and fully support its forces in order to assume responsibility for its own security. It is my view that the U.S. government should encourage Iraq to focus on the development and support of its security forces.

**What are your views on the responsibility of the Iraqi government to share the increased operating and facilities costs associated with repositioning or withdrawal of U.S. forces in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement?**

I understand that under the new U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement, there is no Iraqi responsibility to pay costs associated with repositioning or withdrawal of U.S. forces. In order to best advance our interests, I believe Iraq's internal resources are best applied in the development and support of its own security forces.

**Afghanistan**

**In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in Afghanistan?**

The Administration is considering this question as part of its ongoing Strategic Review of Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe that America's most enduring interest in the region is preventing Afghanistan from devolving to a safe-haven from which terrorists can attack the United States or our allies and partners. If confirmed, I expect to support the Department's efforts in this critical challenge, which requires urgent and sustained attention.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to our current strategy in Afghanistan?**

The Administration's Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review is on-going, and I am confident that it will identify any needed changes. My own view is that achieving our strategic objectives in Afghanistan requires a regional perspective; for example, Pakistan is key to the future of Afghanistan and vice-versa, and working with Pakistan, India and others in the region is likely to be essential to success in Afghanistan. More broadly, I believe that the United States should work with Afghanistan and our coalition partners to develop and pursue a more integrated and comprehensive approach to security, economic development, and governance. We must harness all of the instruments of national power and persuasion to be successful. It is imperative that we improve coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors, so that greater unity of effort is achieved among our coalition partners, international institutions, and the Government of Afghanistan.

**Do you believe there is a need to develop a comprehensive civil-military plan for Afghanistan, akin to that used in Iraq?**

Yes, and as noted above I believe that such a plan must consider Pakistan and other key players in the region.

**General David McKiernan, U.S.A., Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, and Commander U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, has identified a need for four additional combat brigades and support units in Afghanistan, equaling up to 30,000 additional troops. President Obama has approved the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan by late spring and summer of this year. General McKiernan has said that these additional forces will provide him what he needs for the coming months, but additional forces will still be needed to meet fully his initial request.**

**Do you support General McKiernan’s request for additional forces?**

I agree with President Obama and Secretary Gates, who have both consistently stated that they believe the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan required the deployment of additional U.S. and international forces. I have not been fully briefed on the details of current operations and threat assessments, or internal deliberations associated with the ongoing Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review. If confirmed, I look forward to assisting the USD(P) and others to assess the appropriate level of military forces required. I expect a critical component of these deliberations will concern the right balance between American, allied, and Afghan forces. Balancing the demand for additional forces while ensuring that the military is ready for other contingencies is one of the Department’s key challenges.

**If so, how should the Department support combat brigade increases in Afghanistan, in advance of the national elections?**

The President has approved the deployment of more than 17,000 additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan to meet urgent security needs, particularly in the volatile southern provinces, including the critical necessity to train additional Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). My understanding is that these forces will arrive in Afghanistan in advance of the presidential election in August. It is also my understanding that the Administration is looking to our Allies and partners to provide additional forces to ensure security during the elections as well as the success of the ANSF training mission. To my knowledge no decision has been made on the deployment of additional U.S. combat brigades beyond the 17,000 additional U.S. forces already planned.

**If confirmed, would you support drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq faster or redirecting to Afghanistan combat brigades already slated to replace brigades in Iraq in order to meet General McKiernan’s request?**

If confirmed, I would work closely with the USD(P), Joint Staff, and the Services to help ensure that the Department of Defense are carefully assesses and addresses risks in both theaters and prudently managing our military commitments, operational readiness, and stresses on the force.

**If confirmed, would you support the temporary extension of combat brigades already deployed to Afghanistan? Would you support the accelerated deployment of combat brigades slated to deploy later this year to Afghanistan?**

If confirmed, I expect to support the USD(P) and Secretary of Defense in providing guidance that ensures deployment lengths of the combat brigades in Afghanistan strike an appropriate balance between meeting our commanders' operational requirements and maintaining the health and readiness of our forces.

**The goal for increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been revised from 68,000 to approximately 134,000 soldiers.**

**In your view, should rapidly expanding the number of U.S. trainers to accelerate the expansion of the ANA be a top priority in Afghanistan?**

Building an effective, broadly representative, and respected ANA requires significant resources, and in my view must be a top priority. It is important that we look closely at the forces required for security in Afghanistan, and I understand that the on-going Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review is doing so. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) and Secretary of Defense in providing oversight and guidance that ensures that there are the right numbers of trainers, mentors, and advisors with sufficient resources to accomplish their mission.

**What recommendations, if any, do you have for encouraging or enabling our coalition partners to provide more training team personnel to embed with ANA units?**

In my view, helping the Afghan National Security Forces develop the ability to assume primary responsibility for security inside Afghanistan should be at the center of our long-term strategy. The United States and NATO have assumed a long-term commitment to develop Afghan forces that can eventually take the lead for security in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Department's efforts to encourage our coalition partners to deliver on their commitments to provide training team personnel.

**One of the main threats to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan comes from cross-border attacks by the Taliban and extremist militants who find safe haven in Pakistan's border regions.**

**What steps in your view need to be taken to eliminate or mitigate the threat to Afghanistan's security posed by Taliban and other extremist militants hiding out across the Afghan-Pakistan border?**

In my view, Afghanistan and Pakistan are in many respects a single theater of operations, and both President Obama and Secretary Gates have cited the need to eliminate the terrorist sanctuary in the border regions of Pakistan. This sanctuary poses a potential

threat not only to Afghanistan, but to the region and indeed to the United States. Clearly however, there is no purely military solution. The U.S. must define and resource an integrated strategy to promote development and prevent terrorism across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and I understand that this is a focus of the on-going strategy review. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with my DoD and interagency colleagues in accordance with the results of the strategy review.

**Would you agree that it is possible that developments within Afghanistan could lead to improvements in Afghanistan's security irrespective of developments in Pakistan's border areas?**

I agree that many of Afghanistan's challenges are internal. This is true of certain insurgent activities, the problem of warlords, poppy cultivation and narcotics production, and general criminality. However, I believe that we have learned from years of conflict that insurgent and terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan and illicit cross-border activity must also be addressed to establish sustainable security in Afghanistan.

**The ANA has shown itself to be effective, well-motivated, and respected by the Afghan people.**

**If confirmed, would you support giving the ANA the lead in stopping cross-border incursions, either by transferring the mission of patrolling the border to the ANA or by bringing the Afghan Border Patrol under the ANA?**

I agree that the ANA has generally and increasingly shown itself to be effective, well-motivated, and respected. And clearly securing the border areas from cross-border incursions and illegal smuggling is an important element of a successful long-term strategy. The issue of command relationships between the Afghan Border Patrol and ANA is an area that I have not examined in detail, and if confirmed, would need to examine more closely.

**The cultivation of poppies and trafficking of opium has reached alarming proportions in Afghanistan. Some estimate that over 50% of Afghanistan's gross national product is associated with the illegal opium trade and that Afghanistan is at risk of failing as a nation state. Coalition strategies for countering the opium trade have not been effective to date.**

**In your view, what strategy would be most effective in reducing opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan?**

Opium traffic continues to distort the Afghan economy, corrode the judicial system, and exacerbate corruption and criminal violence. In my view, countering the opium trade must include a nuanced and fully resourced coalition and Afghan strategy, including crop substitution and alternative livelihoods, interdiction and eradication, judicial reform,

better law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and rural economic development and public information.

What should the role of the U.S. military forces be in the counterdrug program in Afghanistan?

I understand that in the past year U.S. forces have been provided with new rules of engagement regarding counternarcotics activities, but I have not had the opportunity to review them in detail nor to assess their effectiveness. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the effectiveness of these policies and to discussing them further with the USD(P) and other officials.

**What is the appropriate role for coalition nations and the larger international community in effectively addressing the counterdrug challenge in Afghanistan and the surrounding region?**

I believe it is critical for the international community to play a greater role across the full range of initiatives and operations designed to help the Government of Afghanistan strengthen Afghan institutions, ranging from the judicial and law enforcement system, to its intelligence service, and the Afghan National Security Forces, so that it can better take the lead in combating narcotics in Afghanistan.

**What are the main challenges facing the U.S. and international community's reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan?**

In my view, high levels of violence in Afghanistan constitute the most immediate and pressing challenge to reconstruction and development efforts, which must feature prominently in any successful long-term strategy. The Afghan people have suffered through more than a generation of war, and the country's development challenges are immense. The majority of Afghans make their living from farming, yet extensive drought and failing agricultural infrastructure create openings for opium production to supplant the legal agricultural economy. While Afghanistan has seen improvements in health care in recent years, life expectancy remains below 45 years while more than half of Afghan children suffer from poor nutrition and disease. While progress has been made towards primary education in Afghanistan, fewer than half of adult males and only one in eight females can read, impeding the professionalization of the Afghan government and security forces and limiting economic growth.

**If confirmed, what would your priorities be for addressing those challenges?**

If confirmed, I look forward to aiding the USD(P) in working with interagency partners to help implement an improved strategy that can effectively engage our coalition partners and the international community to advance reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend for the strategy, organizational structure, or resourcing of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?**

I believe that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been critical to the development work undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing the committee's concerns and ideas on the use of PRTs.

**Pakistan**

**What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Pakistani security relations? What steps, if any, would you recommend to improve these relations?**

Pakistan is a critical ally in the long-term struggle against extremism and terrorism. A confluence of overlapping security concerns - including presence of al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban-affiliated extremists, United States and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, and an unstable economic environment - make Pakistan a key national security interest for the United States. Pakistan and the United States share mutual interests in these areas and it is essential that we continue to build and cultivate a long-term relationship built on respect and trust regarding security and other overlapping interests. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about all aspects of ongoing U.S.-Pakistan relations and helping the USD(P) shape effective policies for engagement by the U.S. military, the State Department, and other agencies.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the efforts by the Pakistani Government to counter militant groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border and to fight terrorism in general?**

Any enduring solution to the challenge of defeating the terrorist and cross-border insurgent groups that threaten Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the international community requires Pakistan's strong support. While the Pakistani government has conducted several military operations against militants in border areas, the region remains a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated groups. If confirmed, I expect to assist the USD(P) in overseeing and reviewing the development of options to improve Pakistani counterterrorism and counter-insurgency capacities.

**In your view, is the Pakistani Government doing enough to combat these threats? If not, what more should it be doing?**

While I have not been briefed in detail on any assessments of Pakistan's willingness and ability to combat these threats, I believe that any long-term success in countering them requires extensive and sustained attention by various elements of Pakistan's government. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing ways in which the U.S. and Pakistan can work better together to combat these shared threats.

## **India**

**The attacks in Mumbai raise questions about what more might be done to help India guard against and respond to terrorist incidents and underscore the fragile nature of the relationship between India and neighboring Pakistan.**

**What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India military-to-military contacts?**

It is my understanding that the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship is generally quite positive and is improving.

**What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events?**

India is the world's largest democracy, and a strong and healthy U.S.-Indian partnership is an important American interest. The recent attacks in Mumbai have only underscored our shared interest in preventing and responding to terrorism. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in considering any additional measures, and in working with the State Department to carefully consider any requests for counterterrorism assistance from India.

**In your view, what impact has this rise in tensions between Pakistan and India had on the stability of the South Asia region, generally, and on the prospects for security in Afghanistan?**

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history, culture, language, and trade, and progress in Afghanistan and broader regional stability cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all three. It is in America's national interest to play a constructive role in helping defuse any tensions and to help derive from the tragic attacks in Mumbai an opportunity for further cooperation between three of America's important allies.

## **Future of NATO**

**What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?**

Without question, the job of adapting our transatlantic alliance relationships to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges is going to be arduous. The President and the Secretary of Defense have stressed our country's stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO alliance. To rebuild NATO solidarity, we need, first and foremost, a broadly agreed way-ahead for achieving durable progress on Afghanistan, especially where ISAF operations have been impeded by national caveats or the dearth of civilian expertise for critical missions. Closer to home, the alliance faces a more assertive Russia, continued instability in part of the Balkans and among former Soviet republics, and new concerns over cyber security and global climate change. My hope is that upcoming NATO summit in Strasbourg will give a strong boost to the drafting of a new Strategic Concept – one that helps to illuminate emerging threats and opportunities, as well as the capabilities required for

effective joint action and ways for improving unity-of-action between NATO and the European Union.

**Do you envision further enlargement of NATO, beyond Albania and Croatia, within the next five years?**

As the President and his national security team have stressed, NATO enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Precisely which countries and within what applicable timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions which the administration will need to address in close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic and military reforms.

**What more can the United States do to encourage NATO members to develop the capabilities and provide the resources necessary to carry out NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere?**

President Obama and Secretary Gates have both stressed the need for the United States and NATO to invest more in its non-military instruments of national power. Many of our NATO allies have unique civilian capabilities that can enhance the overall effort in Afghanistan. The questions that both we and they now face are how best to mobilize these resources and target them to maximum positive effect. Also, as previously noted, forging a shared strategic view of the emerging threat environment and updating NATO's strategic concept from both a military and civilian governance perspective will be critical to success in Afghanistan.

**NATO-EU Relations**

**A potential challenge facing the United States and NATO in the months and years ahead is the European Union's (EU) implementation of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), that is, an EU capability to conduct military operations in response to international crises in cases where "NATO as a whole is not engaged." At the same time, NATO and EU are working alongside each other in addressing a number of common security challenges, including police training in Afghanistan and crisis management in Kosovo.**

**Are you concerned that the EU could assume a competing role, rather than a complementary role, to the NATO alliance?**

As Undersecretary Flournoy indicated during her confirmation process, the NATO-EU relationship should ideally be complementary. For defense matters and crisis management, NATO is the preferred vehicle for cooperation between our European allies and the U.S. in responding to a shared security challenge. At the same time, the EU's great strength lies in its ability to project economic power and political influence in a way that helps to attenuate conflict. While the current economic crisis has greatly stressed the

EU's solidarity and its outreach to the East, its "soft power" role will clearly be critical over the long-term. Moreover, because both NATO and the EU draw largely from a single pool of national capabilities, cooperation is extremely important.

**What steps do you believe that the United States and NATO should take to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that strengthens the Alliance?**

Given the growth and diversity of ESDP-related activities in recent years, to include the EU's current anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, we must explore every possible angle of NATO-EU collaboration at the operational level. I believe that priority should be given to promoting good communications and a common operating picture between NATO, its allies and EU partners.

**What is your view of the future of NATO-EU relations in areas relating to security, defense, and crisis management?**

As suggested above, both NATO and the EU have important roles to play in meeting future security, defense and crisis management challenges. From an Alliance perspective, it is important for all U.S. interagency partners to take a clear-eyed view of the entire range of current EU-activities – from civilian policing, to military, border control or other missions – to identify both areas of duplication and where closer NATO-EU coordination is required.

**Engagement Policy**

**One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and similar activities were used to achieve this goal.**

**If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?**

Yes. If confirmed, subject to guidance provided by USD(P) and the Secretary, I will support a policy of continued U.S. military-to-military engagement, and as appropriate, given opportunities and resource constraints, expanding this engagement. The emerging security environment requires that we engage with our partners and allies around the world, and work to build productive relationships with many states for which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.

**Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?**

Yes. I believe military-to-military contacts contribute to U.S. national security in a variety of important ways. Such activities can help to strengthen the capacity of partner nations to counter terrorism and other transnational threats, both within and beyond their borders, thereby potentially relieving stress on U.S. forces. They can help harmonize nations' views of common security challenges. Military-to-military activities can also help safeguard investments made by other U.S. assistance programs. Finally, and very importantly, when performed effectively, military-to-military activities should show by example how military forces can act effectively while respecting human rights and civilian control.

**Stability Operations**

**The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.**

**In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other federal agencies in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?**

Success in stability operations in a post-conflict environment requires integrating the efforts of civilian and military organizations in all aspects, from planning through execution. It is important for civilian agencies to lead in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable and legitimate institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure and reviving economic activity. Military forces are best suited to helping provide a safe and secure environment and to assist in building accountable armed forces. Over the last several years, the U.S. military has learned many hard lessons, and if confirmed I will work closely with the USD(P), military leaders and other U.S. government agencies to ensure that the Department properly institutionalizes adaptation to better prepare for future challenges.

**What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with respect to achieving success in post-conflict stability operations?**

I believe that the Department has learned many important lessons, including the following. Improved interagency planning of operations is critical, and must start early. Because the situation on the ground will change, strategies and plans must be adapted over time. The Department of Defense must retain significant capabilities for stability operations, and other agencies and departments must build increased capacity to support these operations. Building partner capacity is an essential task which requires significant leadership attention and resources. Engaging allies and other coalition partners to contribute, while often challenging, is essential. It is critical that the Department of

Defense and other departments/agencies better institutionalize wartime lessons, and fully resource those capabilities and organizational innovations that have proved critical to success in stability operations.

### **Building Partner Capacity**

**In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”).**

#### **What are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?**

I agree with Secretary Gates and others who have stated that the future security environment is likely to present more threats stemming from the consequences of state weakness than from displays of state strength. As the international system continues to become more complex and increasingly globalized, tensions arising from water and food scarcity, economic displacement, demographic shifts, and competition over resources are likely to present opportunities for terrorist and insurgent groups to undermine state, regional and international stability. It is therefore critical that U.S. foreign policy support efforts that strengthen bilateral relationships; increase U.S. access and influence; promote militaries that respect human rights, civilian control of the military and the rule of law; and build capacity for common security objectives. In addition to promoting regional and global security, enhanced partner capacity reduces the risk of future military interventions and reduces stress on U.S. armed forces.

#### **What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?**

It is my understanding that Section 1206 was created to provide increased ability to build partner capacity than the more traditional routes of security assistance. Under law, it has two purposes: to build the capacity of a country’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations, and to help support stability operations where US forces are participating. While I have not been involved in implementation of Section 1206, I understand that the program enjoys strong support from Embassies and combatant commands (COCOMs). If confirmed, I will assist the USD(P) and the Secretary in fully assessing how well this authority is working and whether it meets congressional intent.

**What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?**

It is important that both the Defense and State Departments work together to avoid duplication of effort among these important activities. The Global Train and Equip authority fills two specific legal requirements: to build capacity for counterterrorism and for stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. Foreign Military Financing serves a broader set of diplomatic and foreign policy objectives, to include improving bilateral relations, encouraging behaviors that advance U.S. interests, increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests overlap.

Counternarcotics authorities are designed to allow DoD to support U.S. or other government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, I would support the Department and any interagency assessment of potential overlaps and work to ensure DoD counternarcotics programs are focused on supporting U.S. and other agency efforts to counter the flow of narcotics.

**What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?**

I understand that Section 1207 was designed to help the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to build the capacity to become more operational. It was designed to bring civilian expertise to security, stabilization, and reconstruction missions, and complement existing U.S. military capabilities. While I have not been involved in implementation of Section 1207, I believe that the program has been useful in supporting a more integrated approach to security, stabilization, and reconstruction challenges.

**Secretary of Defense Gates has called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power”, *i.e.*, civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.**

**Do you agree that there is a need to expand the Government’s resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?**

Yes. I agree strongly with President Obama and Secretary Gates that the United States should strengthen non-military instruments of statecraft.

**In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis the civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?**

Generally, the Department of Defense's role should be to support, not lead, in the exercise of "soft power." However, the Department plays an important role in helping to promote – through planning, exchanges, exercises, operations, and bilateral defense relationships – the conditions that enable these instruments to be applied successfully.

**Which agency should have the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy, the Department of State or the Department of Defense?**

The State Department should have the lead in setting U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance priorities broadly, including security assistance. DoD has critical roles to play, however, in informing, developing, and implementing such programs in an effective and timely manner. In my view, strong interagency processes and relationships are vital to ensure successful security assistance policies.

**Russia**

**What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian security relationship?**

Russia's recent aggressive external behavior is a source of deep concern. Of greatest concern is a growing pattern of Russian pressure, and, in some cases, aggressive action against sovereign states on its borders, most visibly including Georgia. Nevertheless, I believe that there is an opportunity to pursue a more constructive relationship with Russia on a range of issues including strategic arms control, non-proliferation, and counterterrorism.

**What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?**

As President Obama noted, it is in no one's interest to see U.S.-Russian relations return to a Cold War posture. U.S. and Russian interests clearly overlap in such key areas as strategic arms control, non-proliferation (including North Korea and Iran), counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and counternarcotics. Ultimately, I believe we should work to create the conditions that make clear that stable, democratic neighbors on Russia's borders are in Russia's own interest.

**In your view, what policy steps should DOD take to improve security relations with Russia? For instance would you support increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?**

I believe that military-to-military and other exchanges with Russia are generally beneficial. If confirmed, in consultation the State Department as well as with Congress I would assess areas where greater cooperation might be possible.

**Are there common security issues that you believe would best be addressed jointly by the United States and Russia, or which cannot be adequately addressed without Russia's cooperation?**

U.S. – Russia cooperation is essential in many areas of importance to the United States, including strategic arms control and non-proliferation including policies toward North Korea and Iran. Such cooperation is highly desirable on many additional issues, including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counter-piracy, and Afghanistan. To cite one example, Russia is already cooperating with NATO in Afghanistan by recently allowing the transit of non-lethal equipment through its territory for ISAF.

**Would you support any joint development or other cooperative programs with Russia?**

If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in exploring the potential for the Joint Data Exchange Center and additional cooperative programs with Russia.

**Iran**

**Do you believe it would be in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in a direct dialogue to promote regional stability and security?**

I support President Obama's view that after careful preparation, the United States should be willing to pursue direct diplomacy with Iran. Furthermore, I fully support the President's view that we should not take any options off the table and that engagement has an important role to play in our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and end their support for destabilizing activities and terrorism in the region.

**Do you believe it would be in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in a direct dialogue regarding the narcotics problems in Afghanistan?**

I understand that this issue is being examined as part of broader interagency policy reviews on Iran and Afghanistan. My own view is that it is in the U.S. interest to engage Iran on Afghanistan security issues including narcotics, and to do so largely through multilateral exchanges.

**What more do you believe the United States and the international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program? Specifically, what actions do you believe that DOD ought to undertake to support diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon?**

The United States has not yet brought to bear all the elements of statecraft to deal effectively with this issue. The use of tough, direct, and principled diplomacy, working with our other international partners and allies, can increase the chances of making useful inroads. Helping to bring about auspicious conditions in the region is critical to generating leverage and therefore to success. Therefore I believe that DoD should continue developing the ongoing multilateral cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other allies in the region, in support of the State Department's diplomatic initiatives.

### **Syria**

**Do you believe it would be in the United States' interest to engage Syria in a direct dialogue regarding regional security and stability?**

I understand that the Administration is engaged in a review of its Syria policy. The Department of State should take the lead on any diplomatic initiatives with Syria. I agree with the President's view that Syria is best engaged in the context of an aggressive regional diplomatic approach.

### **Saudi Arabia**

**What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-Saudi security relations and defense cooperation activities? What changes, if any, would you recommend in this relationship?**

Saudi Arabia is one of our most important relationships in the Middle East. The United States continues to invest major efforts into our security assistance programs with the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) and Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). If confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts in coordination with State Department colleagues to encourage the Saudis to develop better ways and means to deter Iranian aggression, protect the Kingdom's critical infrastructure, enhance maritime security, enhance ballistic missile defense, counter piracy, and conduct counterterrorism operations. I will also look for opportunities to increase Saudi support for multilateral security activities among GCC countries, to include regional air and missile defense and maritime security efforts.

## China

**China is viewed by some in the United States as a potential threat and by others as a potentially constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community.**

**To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops, and the extent to which it becomes a cooperative partner or a competitor of the United States?**

As Secretary Gates noted in a recent speech, “China is a competitor but not necessarily an adversary, and there is no reason for China to become an adversary.” Without question, China’s sustained rise over the past decade is due to its progressive integration into the global economy. While the ultimate destination of the Chinese people is for them to decide, I believe that the United States and other countries, both in East Asia and beyond, can exert a positive influence upon the direction of China’s development. Indeed, no country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China’s development and international integration than the United States. That alone provides no assurance of China’s willingness to play the role of constructive partner, but it does give both sides a clear appreciation of the stakes involved in maintaining a reasonable working relationship on a wide range of issues, including first and foremost in dealing with the current economic crisis.

**What do you believe are China’s political-military objectives regarding Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region, and globally?**

I agree with the view that the overriding objectives of China’s leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China’s economic development, maintain the country’s domestic political stability, defend China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China’s status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward *de jure* independence is a key part of Beijing’s strategy. Within each dimension there are both challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

**What do you see as China’s objectives for its military modernization program and steady increases in defense spending?**

The pace and scale of China’s military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding both capabilities and intentions, are a source of concern for the United States as well as for its allies and the region more broadly. I believe that the U.S. should continue and expand engagement efforts to fully comprehend the future direction of China’s programs in order to reduce the potential for miscalculations and build mutual trust. At the same time, we must strive for a prudent level of defense preparedness so as to ensure we are able to protect United States national interests and fulfill our Alliance responsibilities.

**What is your view of the U.S. policy of selling military equipment to Taiwan, despite China's objections?**

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for nearly 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner.

**In its 2008 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that China is asserting various excessive claims of sovereignty, including maritime, air and space, and also concluded that these claims have negative implications for the United States. Further, the Commission concluded that more must be done to ensure that China's rapid expansion of nuclear power does not result in the decline in safety or an increase in proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or expertise.**

**How should the United States respond to excessive claims of sovereignty by China?**

The United States has a longstanding policy on Freedom of Navigation, and as recent events relating to the USNS IMPECCABLE have demonstrated, does not acquiesce to excessive maritime, air, or space claims that restrict navigation and over-flight rights under customary international law (as reflected for example in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea). In addition to asserting U.S. rights, I believe the United States should work with other countries that have a stake in this issue to engage China.

**What do you believe should be the role of DOD, if any, in helping to ensure that China's nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?**

The Obama Administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DoD should work in the interagency process to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China including its nuclear power industry are expressed to the Chinese government in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to proliferation.

**Do you believe any changes in the quality or quantity of military-to-military relations with China should be made? If so, what changes and why?**

If confirmed, I would look closely at exchanges with China's armed forces at all levels and across a range of issues, including the recently opened dialogue on nuclear policy and strategy, which I understand is a priority for Secretary Gates. My general sense is

that more can be done to improve the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quality and the quantity of exchanges between the armed forces of our countries. In general, I believe we should look to engage in a wide range of areas where we can work with China on priorities that improve transparency, reduce risks of miscalculation, and advance stability, both regionally and globally.

**On March 8, 2009, five Chinese ships aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close proximity to USNS IMPECCABLE, a U.S. ocean surveillance vessel operated by the Military Sealift Command conducting routine operations in the South China Sea.**

**How do you think the U.S. Government should respond to provocative actions of this kind and what actions should the U.S. should take to try to prevent similar incidents in the future?**

As noted above, the United States has a longstanding policy on freedom of navigation, consistent with customary international law and as reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. I believe the United States should clearly assert and exercise our rights, work with other states with similar interests and perspectives as appropriate, and ensuring effective communication to reduce the risks of accident or miscalculation. I was very pleased by Secretary Gates' statement on March 18 that "... based on the diplomatic exchanges that have taken place, since the aggressive acts against the Impeccable ...there won't be a repetition of this [incident]."

## **Japan**

**Secretary of State Clinton recently signed a U.S. agreement with Japan on realignment of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam.**

**What is your understanding of the key provisions of this agreement and the risks surrounding the likelihood of the move proceeding on the timeline previously established given financial considerations in Japan and the U.S.?**

My understanding of the Guam International Agreement ("Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam") is that it was concluded as a means to formalize the accountability and transparency associated with Japan's eventual transfer of \$2.8 billion for Guam development. The agreement also reiterates Japan's commitment to build the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) on Camp Schwab and surrounding waters in northern Okinawa, and to provide additional financing for development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. Both the FRF project in Okinawa and the Guam project are complex challenges, with ambitious target completion dates of 2014.

The realignment of US force posture in East Asia and the Pacific – and in particular the relocation of U.S. forces and their dependents to Guam – is a major focus for the U.S.-

Japan alliance at present. I believe that while the timelines are challenging, both sides are committed to timely execution as well as ensuring a quality program.

## **North Korea**

**What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?**

North Korea's conventional military, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and proliferation activities continue to pose a significant threat to regional peace and security. Also, recent North Korean provocations, including its apparent intent to launch a long-range missile (even if characterized as a satellite launch), are unhelpful to regional stability and relations. Working with our allies and other key parties in the region on diplomatic solutions is an essential element in addressing the totality of security problems on the Korean peninsula, the most vital of which is the denuclearization of North Korea. Likewise, it is essential to maintain the capabilities to deter North Korea's military threat and proliferation activities. Our strong alliances with South Korea and Japan remain instrumental in this regard. These alliances help maintain the peace and stability that has allowed the wider East Asia region to prosper over the past several decades.

**What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States, its forward-deployed forces, and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?**

I believe that North Korea missile and WMD programs pose a serious threat to the United States, our forces, and our allies. This threat has been evidenced recently in North Korea's announced intention to launch what it refers to as an "experimental communications satellite" in April (long-range ballistic missiles and satellite launch vehicles derive from nearly identical technology). Strong alliances, regional partnerships and forward military presence remain key means to deal with these threats. U.S. national capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense, are also an essential element in deterring the threat and defending our interests.

**In your view, what should be done to maintain or strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?**

The most critical ingredient for effective deterrence on the peninsula is found in the strength of the alliances between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and between the United States and Japan. If confirmed, I would work with DoD and interagency colleagues to continue strengthening these alliances.

**In view of recent speculation regarding the possible poor health of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, what do you believe the United States should be doing now, if anything, to prepare for the possibility of a change in leadership in North Korea?**

The manifestations of sudden change in North Korea could take different forms, including a sudden health crisis or change in leadership in Pyongyang. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States and our allies are capable of addressing sudden onset crises. Fundamentally, our focus should be ensuring we are ready to maintain stability in the region, support defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous technologies from North Korea.

**If confirmed, would you undertake a review of the status of the efforts to obtain from North Korea remains of U.S. service members who have been missing since the Korean War ?**

Yes.

**Under what circumstances do you think that such efforts should resume?**

I believe these efforts should resume once appropriate conditions exist that both enable us to carry out the important mission and ensure the safety of our personnel.

### **Republic of Korea**

**The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.**

**What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?**

I believe that the U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and continues to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In the face of changes in the regional security environment, the U.S. and the ROK have made great strides in transforming their collective deterrent and defense posture. In particular, the ROK has made major strides in developing its defense capabilities, commensurate with its economic development. Consequently, the Alliance remains relevant and capable both for deterring aggression on the peninsula and for addressing regional and global security issues.

**If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?**

If confirmed, I would support the realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and the return of facilities that our forces no longer require. The United States is also working

toward new command and control relationships with Korea and we need to ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate to the situations we face. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that we work effectively with the Republic of Korea as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with its economic clout and influence.

**What is your view regarding the planned timing of the transfer of wartime operational command to the ROK?**

As Secretary Gates said publicly following his meeting with the Korean Minister of Defense last October, the ROK military forces and U.S. forces are on track to complete the alliance agreement to transition wartime operational control in 2012. This effort will enable the ROK military to take the lead role in the defense of Korea. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Secretary, this Committee, and others to ensure that the important transition in command relationships is carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula.

**What do you view as the optimal timeline, and major milestones, for consolidating U.S. forces south of Seoul at Camp Humphreys?**

I understand that Camp Humphreys represents an essential part of our joint effort with our ROK allies to reduce the overall U.S. military footprint and consolidate U.S. forces in modern and enduring facilities away from the congested center of Seoul. This realignment of U.S. forces is mutually beneficial, and therefore it is our desire to implement these plans as efficiently as possible. If confirmed, I look forward to working with United States Forces Korea, U.S. Pacific Command and others in DoD to review the timeline involved.

**U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)**

**The creation of Africa Command has raised questions about the role of the Department of Defense in U.S. development efforts in Africa.**

**What do you see as the role of AFRICOM in U.S. African policy and in development and humanitarian engagement?**

The Department of State and USAID lead U.S. foreign policy and development engagements abroad, to include Africa. USAFRICOM is intended to promote a coordinated engagement approach to Africa. Ideally, USAFRICOM's supporting role should promote national security objectives by working with African states, regional organizations, and the African Union to enhance regional stability and security. Specifically, USAFRICOM should help pursue closer U.S. military-to-military relations with African states. If confirmed, I would support DoD's efforts to maintain strong

interagency relationships and work with Congress to ensure that USAFRICOM assists in advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

**AFRICOM's leadership has promoted the concept of "active security," with an increased emphasis on theater security cooperation, as a guiding principle of the command.**

**Are DOD's current security assistance authorities (e.g., Section 1206 train and equip authority) and funding levels adequate to fulfill AFRICOM's mission? If yes, please explain. If not, why not?**

I have not been briefed in detail on AFRICOM's current and projected requirements to fulfill its mission. If confirmed and if asked to study the matter, I will provide my views to USD(P) Flournoy and if requested the members of this committee.

**The Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) mission appears to have shifted from counter terrorism to civil and humanitarian affairs since its inception in 2002.**

**What do you see as CJTF-HOA's primary mission?**

I understand that the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa is designed to support the State Department's and DoD's security strategy in Africa to counter violent extremism, in part through building partner capacity and promoting regional stability.

**Do you believe it should continue as an enduring presence? If yes, what recommendations, if any, might you make regarding manpower, resources, and activities?**

If confirmed, I would support the USD(P)'s interaction with the Joint Staff and with USAFRICOM to assess this issue, and would aid in efforts to ensure that U.S. security interests in the region are supported by an appropriate, properly balanced and resourced posture to promote long-term stability in the region.

### **Darfur**

**More than four years after then-Secretary of State Colin Powell's declaration that genocide was taking place in Darfur, the death toll has continued to climb, the camps for displaced persons have grown more crowded, and humanitarian access to help people in need has diminished in many areas. The member nations of the United Nations have pledged to send 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, but have sent less than half that number and has not provided them with the helicopters, vehicles, and other tools to fulfill their mission.**

**What do you believe is the appropriate role of the United States and, in particular, the Department of Defense, in assisting with the deployment and mobility of this peacekeeping mission, given that its creation was largely a U.S. initiative and today is largely funded by a variety of U.S. assistance programs?**

I support President Obama's statements concerning the need to pressure the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum to halt the genocide in Darfur. It is my understanding that both the Defense and State Department have supported the deployment of African contingents to the UN Darfur mission by providing a variety of enablers, to include equipment, logistical expertise, deployment assistance, and airlift.

### **United Nations Peacekeeping**

**The DOD has provided logistics, communications, and headquarters staff to a variety of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions over the past several years.**

**In your view, what support, if any, should the DOD provide to U.N. peacekeeping missions?**

The United Nations operates peacekeeping forces in a wide variety of venues – from Central and West Africa to the Middle East and the Caribbean – and the United States has important security and humanitarian stakes in the success of these missions. To ensure the best use of DoD's logistics, communications, headquarters staffing and other forms of enabling assistance, the issue of U.S. support for UN field missions is certainly worthy of careful study in close consultation with our State Department colleagues, and subsequently with other UN member states.

**The United States along with its partners in the G-8 sponsored an initiative to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. This program, known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), is run by the Department of State. DOD has provided varying degrees of support since the program's inception.**

**In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DOD in this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?**

DoD has long played an important role in the training and equipping of international peacekeeping units. In this regard, I believe that DoD collaboration with State is important to successfully identifying and vetting viable partners, analyzing indigenous capacities, developing sustainable train-the-trainer programs, and promoting self-sufficiency in this critical area so that more nations can more effectively contribute to the increasing demand for skilled peacekeepers around the world.

**If confirmed, would you support or oppose an extension of the GPOI program and its mandate beyond its scheduled end date in 2010? Please explain.**

In general, the United States has a strong interest in helping to expand the pool of available peacekeepers worldwide, including those with whom we may need to operate jointly. President Obama has stated his support for continued funding for GPOI. If confirmed, I would do my part to work closely with State Department colleagues as well as members of Congress to ensure GPOI supports the President's objectives in this area.

### **Somalia**

**In your view, what should the U.S. policy towards Somalia be and what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in support of that policy?**

Somalia's political turmoil and violence poses not only the specter of continued humanitarian suffering but also a security danger in that it provides a safe haven to violent extremists and, more recently, to pirates who prey upon international shipping routes through the Gulf of Aden. Instability in Somalia is a threat to the region and potentially to the United States and our allies. If confirmed, I will support DoD's efforts to work with the interagency to develop a coordinated U.S. national security policy toward Africa that addresses the U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the Department of Defense can and should best support this policy.

### **Combating Terrorism**

**What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad?**

The Department's strategy for combating terrorism has three pillars: protecting the homeland, disrupting and attacking terrorist networks, and countering ideological support for terrorism. The strategy includes indirect approaches aimed at building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces as well as direct approaches to defeat terrorist networks. Consistent with existing law, the Department's role within the United States is limited to providing support to civil authorities.

It is my view that the United States needs a more comprehensive and cohesive strategy for combating terrorism. An integrated interagency approach is needed that combines all tools of statecraft, and fully engages allies and international organizations. If confirmed, and as directed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SOLIC & IC) and other colleagues within the Department and across the interagency to undertake a review and assessment of our strategy to ensure it meets the goals of the President and the Secretary of Defense.

**How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?**

While I have not been briefed in enough detail to provide a complete answer, if confirmed and as directed I would welcome the opportunity to work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SOLIC & IC) to assist the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in evaluating the Department's counterterrorism posture to help ensure that that it is appropriately organized to protect and defend against all forms of terrorism.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Defense intelligence community to ensure optimal support to combating terrorism and other homeland security efforts?**

Timely and accurate intelligence is a vital part of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. If confirmed, I will help the USD(P) continue the close relationship Policy has with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Intelligence Community to ensure intelligence and operations are mutually supportive.

**Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal agencies?**

I expect that there is room for improvement in this area of vital national interest, but because of the sensitive nature of some activities, I do not at present have a comprehensive view. If confirmed I look forward to developing such a view, and supporting the refinement and implementation of a comprehensive interagency approach to the challenge of combating extremism and terrorism.

**The Department and intelligence community have determined that some terrorist organizations are beginning to rely more heavily on producing and trafficking narcotics to fund their operations.**

**Do you believe the Department of Defense should have the lead for the U.S. Government's efforts to combat the nexus between narcotics and terrorism?**

The link between narcotics and terrorism is a serious and growing issue. This requires a comprehensive interagency approach, in which DoD plays an important part. The Department possesses important tools and provides extensive capabilities designed to counter networks that support both terrorist and international criminal organizations. If confirmed, I expect to support the USD(P) and work with ASD(SOLIC & IC) to help review DoD's role in this area and coordinate with other elements of the U.S. Government to determine the best way forward.

## **War on Drugs**

**The DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the United States.**

**What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the United States to significantly reduce the amount of drugs illegally entering into our nation?**

Drug trafficking is a significant and growing threat that affects not only the United States but many of our key partnership including Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and parts of West Africa. Traffickers often employ advanced technology and corrupt governments to facilitate the drug trade. Although the U.S. government has made progress in coordinating interagency efforts, there is more to be done to counter this threat. If confirmed, I will assist the Department's effort to work with its interagency partners in assessing its efforts to date and develop an improved way forward.

**In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in U.S. counterdrug efforts?**

The Department's global focus, organization, capabilities, and its ability to act as an honest broker provide a useful complement to law enforcement agencies and make it an effective partner in global counterdrug efforts. DoD brings effective tools and global capabilities to interagency efforts to counter both terrorist and international criminal networks that often utilize the drug trade.

The international community has detected a new narcotics trafficking route from Colombia to Europe via West Africa. In your view, what should be the role of the United States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the United States?

The spread and trafficking of narcotics is a global issue and, like other complex global issue, cannot be effectively addressed individual states pursuing different and separate strategies. The United States should work with its allies and international organizations to counter the drug trade through coordinated and strategic civil-military efforts.

## **Nuclear Posture Review**

**If confirmed, what role will you play in the Nuclear Posture Review?**

If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in overseeing the Nuclear Posture Review. I would expect to engage other senior officials in DoD, as well officials in the Departments of Energy and State in this review, and to consult fully with members of this committee.

## **DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program**

**Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia -- namely, the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the Department of Energy?**

I am aware that President Obama has expressed his concern about the need to break bureaucratic logjams that have slowed the progress of CTR and other threat reduction programs in the recent past. If confirmed, I will support USD(P) in giving this matter the urgent attention it deserves.

**The CTR program was recently expanded to geographic areas outside the former Soviet Union.**

**What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR should address outside the former Soviet Union?**

Expanding the geographic reach of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union strikes me as an important step toward reducing WMD threats and building global partnerships. I am also aware that recent bipartisan reports, including the report from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, have stressed the importance of reducing nuclear threats wherever possible and highlight bioterrorism as a key proliferation concern demanding greater attention. If confirmed, I will look forward to working closely with Congress, other U.S. government agencies, and global partners to strengthen our efforts to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism.

**The CTR program has completed or will soon complete the bulk of the scheduled work with Russia.**

**What in your view is the next step in the U.S.-Russia CTR program?**

I believe that CTR programs in Russia should remain a high priority. Clearly, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program represents an important and very successful relationship between our two countries which has endured even as difficulties have grown in other aspects of our relations. If confirmed, I will support USD(P) in expanding this relationship and the capabilities built through CTR for mutually beneficial purposes to reduce the risks of WMD proliferation and terrorism outside of Russia.

## **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.**

### **What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?**

I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is in America's enduring interest to be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's oceans. Were we to become a party to the Convention it would send a clear signal to the world that we are committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally under the Convention, we would provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure our friends and allies, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

### **From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the legal advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?**

Were the United States to join the convention, it would provide a seat at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. More than 150 nations are parties to the Convention. By becoming a party, the United States will be better positioned to work with foreign air forces, navies, and coast guards to cooperatively address the full spectrum of 21st century security challenges. More so than at any time in our past, it is in our national interest to lead, and be seen to lead, by helping frame a judicious and prudent approach to better ensure stability at sea.

### **Bilateral Defense Trade Cooperation Agreements**

**Defense trade cooperation agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Australia are currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.**

### **What are your views on the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia defense trade cooperation agreements?**

While I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail, I support the general objectives of the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties. I also believe that robust interoperability with these two key allies along with the enhanced protection of our defense articles pursuant to the Treaties will further America's national security interests. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) and the State Department in working with the Senate to resolve any issues related to ratification.

**In your view, are these agreements in the national security interest of the United States?**

I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail, but I believe that the intent of the Treaties to increase defense trade and interoperability with these two key allies is sound and in the interest of our national security. If confirmed, and if asked, I will review the Treaties in detail and support the USD(P) and the Department of State in working with the Senate to address any issues.

**Arms Control**

**What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?**

Arms control has been an important element of U.S. national security policy since the Cold War and it remains important today. This is especially so if such negotiations can help to stave off unwanted competition among states and strengthen our efforts to curb proliferation. Engaging other nations in a process that builds confidence, increases transparency, reduces arsenals, and enhances cooperation has been, and remains, important to our interests. Arms control negotiations can also further progress towards the President's long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

**What are your views on the next bilateral steps to address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?**

High level engagement between Washington and Moscow will be critical in addressing the wide variety of issues, including (but not limited to) nuclear weapons issues. One key issue that both nations will need to address in the coming months is the expiration of START in December 2009.

**What elements of START, if any, do you believe should be retained in any future agreement?**

I believe that the most important element to retain in any future agreement is the extension of essential monitoring and verification provisions contained in the current START Treaty. In addition, I believe that the United States should pursue further reductions in strategic warheads, and should encourage Russia to structure its strategic forces in ways that promote predictability, security, and strategic stability.

**In the absence of a START extension or successor treaty, what steps would you take to extend, expand, and to verify the Moscow Treaty?**

If confirmed, I would support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in determining the best path forward with respect to START, the Moscow Treaty, and any successor agreements.

**What is your view of the role of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security, and how should it be strengthened or improved?**

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important tool for constraining further nuclear proliferation. A first priority in preserving and strengthening the treaty regime is working with our international partners to roll back North Korea's nuclear weapons program and stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. We should also work to strengthen the Treaty by encouraging States to adhere to the NPT and to agree to IAEA safeguards inspections. I support President Obama's view that we need to work with our allies, partners, and other nations to achieve a successful outcome in the 2010 NPT review conference. One way to strengthen the NPT regime would be to ensure that any violation automatically triggers sanctions. Others should be examined as well. I believe that success in these efforts will be more likely if United States sets an example by pursuing negotiated reductions with Russia.

**Do you support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?**

Yes, I share the President's assessment that ratifying and ultimately acceding to the CTBT is in America's national security interest, and believe that with careful planning and continued investment that the United States can ensure the safety, reliability, surety, security and sustainability of our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT.

**Ballistic Missile Defense**

**Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?**

Yes. I understand that the U.S. currently has operationally deployed a range of sea-based and ground-based ballistic missile defense systems to protect our forward-based forces, allies and other friendly nations against short and medium-range missile threats and to defend the U.S. homeland against longer-range threats. If confirmed, I would do my part to ensure that further U.S. development and deployment of missile defenses is done in a pragmatic, cost-effective fashion, and is appropriate to the threats of today and the potential threats of tomorrow.

**Do you agree that U.S. missile defense efforts should be prioritized on providing effective defenses against existing ballistic missile threats, especially the many hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that are currently within range of our forward-based forces, allies, and other friendly nations?**

I agree that the threats posed by short and medium-range ballistic missiles are growing and deserve priority attention. At the same time, I believe that it is important to defend the U.S. homeland against potential longer-range threats that may emanate for example from North Korea and/or Iran. If confirmed, I will support efforts to review our BMD

programs and consult with Congress to ensure we have an appropriate mix of short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missile defense capabilities that are responsive to existing and emerging threats to our homeland, deployed forces, allies and other friendly nations.

**Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to making decisions to deploy such systems?**

Yes. While missile defense testing is not a Policy responsibility, I strongly concur with the view that missile defense testing should be operationally realistic and should involve the Operational Test and Evaluation office as well as our warfighters.

**If the United States and Russia could agree on a cooperative approach on missile defense issues, do you believe it would be in the security interest of the United States to pursue such an effort?**

I believe that it is possible that a cooperative approach on missile defense could be in U.S. interests; the answer would depend on the details of such an approach. More broadly, I believe that working with Russia in areas where we have common security concerns can be in the interests of both of our countries. Efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense to address the risk of ballistic missile and WMD proliferation go back to the 1990s. I understand that in recent years, the U.S. has continued to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia. If confirmed, I will review the recent efforts, consult with colleagues in DoD and the State Department, and help recommend an appropriate course of action for possible consideration by the Administration and Congress.

### **Chemical Weapons Elimination and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**

**Do you agree that the Department should plan and budget for the most expeditious elimination of the United States chemical weapons stockpile, consistent with safety and security requirements, in order to complete the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile as close to the CWC deadline as possible?**

Yes. I am aware, however, there are competing priorities to balance. Although I have not yet examined this issue in detail, I understand that in 2006, the United States informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it would not meet this deadline, but would accelerate the destruction effort as much as practical. To date, I understand that the Department is on track to destroy 90 percent of the US stockpile by the CWC deadline.

## **Space Management and Organization**

**What role, if any, do you believe the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the formulation of national security space policy?**

Outer space is becoming a more contested arena for the United States; we cannot take a complacent attitude about the motivations and capabilities of other space-faring actors. As the Administration conducts its policy review, I believe that, as directed, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense should support the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in defining U.S. interests, objectives, and options, and in representing Department of Defense perspectives to the interagency. I understand that the recent Congressionally-directed Review and Assessment of the Organization and Management of Space in the Department of Defense has recommended the development of a National Space Strategy. If this initiative is adopted and I am confirmed, I will consult with Secretary Gates and Undersecretary Flournoy on the desired role of the PDUSD(P) in the development and coordination of any such strategy.

## **National Guard and Reserve Role in Homeland Defense**

**There is current debate about the role the National Guard and Reserve should play in defending the Homeland and in providing support to civilian authorities with responsibility for Homeland Security.**

**What role do you believe the National Guard and Reserve should have in defending the Homeland as compared to supporting Homeland Security?**

The National Guard and the Reserves -- the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve -- do indeed have complementary roles to play in defending the Homeland and in supporting Homeland Security. Their allocation for Homeland Security as opposed to Homeland Defense roles is something that deserves careful review. The National Guard and Reserves have extensive competencies and capabilities vital to defending the United States from attack by executing military missions to deter, defend against, and defeat those who threaten the United States and to assisting civil authorities in securing the United States from the threat and effects of natural disasters, terrorism, and other man-made disasters.

## **Homeland Defense**

**What is your understanding of the difference, or delineation, between the missions of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security?**

It appears that DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordination is still a work in progress. The two departments do indeed have complementary and mutually supporting roles, missions, and responsibilities. DoD is responsible for the military defense of the United States from attack upon its territory at home and securing its interests abroad; its military missions aim to deter, defend against, and defeat those who threaten the United States. For its part, DHS is responsible for leading the nation's efforts

to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters; to secure the nation's borders, ports, and airports; and to ensure that the Federal Government works with states, localities, and the private sector as a true partner in prevention, mitigation, and response. As necessary, and consistent with the law, DoD provides support to DHS in the execution of its missions.

**What do you believe are the principal roles and missions of the Department of Defense for homeland defense, and how do they relate to the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security?**

See preceding answer.

### **Reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**What is your understanding of changes that have been approved, if any, to the organization of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

In response to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee during her confirmation process, now-USD(P) Flournoy stated that she anticipated the need to shift some portfolios to better align the Policy organization with President Obama's and Secretary Gates' policy objectives. My understanding is that Undersecretary Flournoy has advised the Secretary of Defense of potential changes intended to elevate the functions of strategy development and force management to better provide policy guidance for the Secretary, to enhance the oversight and policy role regarding strategic issues (e.g., combating weapons of mass destruction, nuclear deterrence, missile defense, space, and cyberspace issues), and to improve integration of efforts across OSD Policy. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense has approved Under Secretary Flournoy's plan to realign these and other selected functions within the organization.

**What would be your role in implementing any proposed changes to the organization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) as directed in implementing changes that support alignment of the Policy organization to the President's and Secretary of Defense's policy objectives, and would provide my assessment of the effectiveness of these changes over time to the USD(P), the Secretary of Defense, and if requested to the Armed Services Committees.

### **Private Security Contractors**

**Do you believe the Department of Defense and other federal agencies should rely on contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?**

In my view, wherever possible it would be preferable for military and where appropriate other government security personnel (U.S., coalition, and/or host nation) to perform such security functions. I understand and appreciate the concerns of Congress on this issue and believe that a comprehensive review of the role of military contractors on the battlefield, and the current and potential future capacities of DoD and other agencies, is needed in order to set the terms for possible future use. I also believe that improved oversight and transparency is needed in how private security contractors are utilized and to establish clear standards regarding accountability, command and control, Rules of Engagement, and personnel policies. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in working with civilian and military officials of the Department and others who have responsibility for policy development and employment of private security contractors.

**In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?**

I think it is clear that several high-profile incidents in Iraq involving private security contractors harmed U.S. policy objectives. I understand that in December 2007 DoD and the Department of State agreed on consistent procedures for use of private security contractors in Iraq; moreover, both Departments have been transitioning to greater use of local nationals wherever practical. If confirmed, I expect to work on this issue with the USD(P) and others.

**What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?**

The use of security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully coordinated among all agencies that employ them. There must be unified procedures and strong oversight for all such contractors, regardless of which U.S. agency hires them. Commanders on the ground should have the authority to restrict or redirect their operations as appropriate. There must be assured legal accountability for the actions of all security contractors, not just those employed by the Defense Department.

**How do you believe the ongoing operations of private security contractors in Iraq are likely to be affected by the new Security Agreement between the United States and Iraq?**

I understand that since January 1, 2009, U.S. government private security contractors no longer have immunity from Iraqi law. Furthermore, they must comply with Iraqi registration and licensing requirements. For all contractors, the security agreement has meant substantially more liaison and coordination with Iraqi authorities at all levels.

**Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors used by all federal agencies overseas?**

Yes.

### **Information Operations**

**What in your view is the role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in managing Department of Defense public diplomacy and information operations activities? If confirmed, what do you envision would be the role of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in these efforts?**

It is my understanding that the Department of State is the lead agency for public diplomacy and strategic communication, and that the Department of Defense works closely with the Department of State to ensure that DoD information activities support U.S. public diplomacy priorities and strategic communication efforts. Within DoD, OSD Policy plays an important role in the strategic communication planning process, necessitating close collaboration across the Department. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would work to ensure that DoD works effectively with the State Department and others agencies and departments as appropriate, while continuing to improve the military's ability to support U.S. efforts in the changing information environment.

**In October 2008, the Department of Defense announced a plan to award contracts in excess of \$300 million to U.S. contractors to conduct "information operations" through the Iraqi media. The purposes of this contract include building up support for the government of Iraq and the security forces of Iraq, and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq.**

**What is your view of the appropriate roles of the Department of Defense and the Department of State in media campaigns to build up support for the government and security forces of Iraq and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq?**

I have not had an opportunity to become familiar with the details of these programs, but believe they deserve careful scrutiny. If confirmed, I would expect to look into these matters and look forward to sharing any conclusions with the committee.

**What is your view on the effectiveness of information operations conducted by the United States through the Iraqi media?**

See previous answer.

**Do you see a risk that a DOD media campaign designed to build up support for the government and security forces of Iraq could result in the inappropriate dissemination of propaganda inside the United States through the internet and other media that cross international boundaries?**

See previous answer.

**A spokesman for the Iraqi government has been quoted as saying that any future DOD information operations in the Iraqi media should be a joint effort with the Iraqi government. According to an article in the *Washington Post*, the spokesman stated: “We don’t have a hand in all the propaganda that is being done now. It could be done much better when Iraqis have a word and Iraqis can advise.”**

**Do you believe that DOD information operations through the Iraqi media should be conducted jointly with the Iraqis?**

See previous answer.

**Under what circumstances do you believe that it is appropriate for the Department of Defense to conduct information operations in a sovereign country without the knowledge and support of the host country?**

See previous answer.

### **Detainee Treatment Policy**

**Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the**

**United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.**

**In your view, is this prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?**

Yes, I believe that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is in America's best strategic interest and consistent with our values. For decades during the Cold War with the Soviet Union and during long wars in a variety of theatres in the last century, America's image as a just and honorable global leader was retained in large part because of how we treated our adversaries and not simply our friends. Holding true to the values that lay at America's foundation is critical to ensuring that America's men and women in uniform enjoy the moral high ground when we ask them to go into harm's way. Perhaps more so in this century than during the last, American influence will stem from the power of our example and not simply the example of our power. If we are to defeat violent extremism, we must hold true to the ideals that made this country great, and continue to inspire the growth of freedom and tolerance around the world.

**Do you believe that the phrase "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" has been adequately and appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?**

I understand that there are potential ambiguities in the application of these principles to specific cases, but have not received enough information to form a proper opinion on this question. If confirmed, I would expect to work with the DoD General Counsel on this issue.

**If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes.

**Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

Yes.

**Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.**

**In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S. detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?**

Yes. However, I am not a lawyer, and if confirmed would consult with the DoD General Counsel regarding this issue.

**The President has announced his intention to close the detention facility for enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.**

**What role, if any, would you expect to play, if confirmed, in reviewing the status of Guantanamo detainees and determining whether the United States should continue to hold such detainees?**

If confirmed as PDUSD(P) and if asked, I would provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense regarding the closure of Guantanamo Bay and the disposition of the remaining detainee population.

**The Military Commissions Act of 2006 authorized the trial of “unlawful enemy combatants” by military commission and established the procedures for such trials.**

**What role, if any, would you expect to play, if confirmed, in determining whether Guantanamo detainees should be tried for war crimes, and if so, in what forum?**

If confirmed, I understand that I would play no role in determining which specific detainees should be tried for war crimes. Should there be a review of options for war crimes trials, I would expect to play a role in advising the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on policy matters.

**What role, if any, would you expect to play, if confirmed, in reviewing the Military Commissions Act and developing Administration recommendations for any changes that may be needed to that Act?**

If confirmed, I would expect to play a role in advising the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on policy options.

**In the past two years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.**

**What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?**

I believe the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq reflect the insight that during counterinsurgency and stability operations, the strategic center of gravity is the health and welfare of the population, and not necessarily the strength or disposition of insurgent groups. Protecting the population – including those incarcerated by U.S. or host nation forces – and being seen to treat the people with respect and honor, is perhaps the most effective force multiplier that can be generated during these complex operations. If confirmed as PDUSD(P), I would be interested in working to ensure these counterinsurgency based programs can be tailored and applied more broadly to our detention operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

**What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into DoD doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?**

Like many of the hard won lessons gleaned from our ongoing experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think civilian leaders have a vital role to play in ensuring that valuable innovations concerning detention and interrogation operations should be institutionalized in order to prevent a recurrence of future mistakes and oversights. If confirmed as PDUSD(P), I would work to ensure that these efforts continue in DoD schoolhouses, manuals, publications, and training, and that these lessons are applied in all of our detention operations.

**Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.