

Advance Questions for Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN
Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Defense Reforms [\(return to index\)](#)

On previous occasions, you have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing?

In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our Combatant Commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.

Duties [\(return to index\)](#)

Based on your experience as Chairman, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 152 through 155 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

Having been in office for a sufficient time to determine if changes are advisable, I do not recommend any changes to the law.

Relationships [\(return to index\)](#)

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense according to existing law assigns the functions of the heads of these offices. The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them. Under Title 10, the Chairman, JCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

Title 10, United States Code, and current Department of Defense (DoD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 140, the DoD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense. In general, the DoD General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services, establishing policy, and overseeing the DoD Standards of Conduct Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and advising on significant international law issues raised in major military operations, the DoD Law of War Program, and legality of weapons reviews. The office of the DoD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and communications with the combatant commanders by the DoD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts

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as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Combatant Commands.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to Title 10 responsibilities, and among other things, they serve two significant roles. Primarily, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can assure the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Secondly, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

The Combatant Commanders

The Combatant Commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the Combatant Commanders oversees their activities. He provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense.

The National Security Advisor

The National Security Advisor is a Special Assistant and direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the National Security Advisor to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the inter-agency and combatant commanders.

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The Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is a direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the inter-agency and combatant commanders.

The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security

The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security/Administrator for Nuclear Security Administration is charged with keeping nuclear weapons and naval nuclear reactors safe. The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security/Administrator for Nuclear Security Administration works with a network of labs, test sites and production sites owned by the government and run by contractors, such as Los Alamos National Laboratory. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Under Secretary to keep these facilities safe, transport weapons and materials safely, and ensure that weapons are ready and available to meet national security needs.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau

The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of the Department of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. If confirmed, the CNGB will continue to have full access to the upper echelons of the Joint Staff and me.

Major Challenges

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What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you have faced in your first term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

The most significant challenges I have faced in my first term as Chairman have been: 1) managing the transition in Iraq from a US-led to GoI-led effort, 2) resourcing the President's AF-PAK strategy—military and civilian components, and 3) addressing Health of the Force issues that threaten the vitality of the All Volunteer Force.

What new challenges do you expect to face if you are confirmed for a second term?

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As a global force with global responsibilities, the realities of today are cause for measured optimism and focused concern. While constrained and weakened, al Qaeda remains a national security threat. The epicenter of its senior leadership is in south Asia, making that region my number one priority. We have a new strategy for the effort there, and new leadership on both the military and civilian side. All existing troop requests for 2009 have been approved by the President and a new approach to counter-insurgency is already making a difference. In Pakistan, increased military and diplomatic dialogue, coupled with tangible military progress in the border regions, is encouraging. Pakistan deserves our sustained commitment.

Iranian and North Korean behavior provides ample reason for concern. Iran poses grave challenges because of its confrontational posture, nuclear ambitions, and longstanding support to terrorist organizations and activities. The tumultuous events coincident with the June 2009 Presidential elections in Iran have complicated U.S. and international community efforts at engagement. North Korea's belligerence, its quest for nuclear weapons, and its history of WMD and missile proliferation make it an equally difficult and dangerous challenge.

I remain concerned that the pace of current operations prevents our forces from training across the entire range of operations and erodes our readiness to counter future threats. We must continue to institutionalize proficiency in irregular warfare while restoring the balance and strategic depth necessary to assure national security. Additionally, the demands on our equipment are simply unsustainable. Continued operations that are not matched with appropriate resources will further degrade our warfighting systems, equipment, platforms and, most importantly, our people.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I intend to continue making the Afghanistan-Pakistan region the main effort. It is no longer a question of doing only that which we can, it is now, and urgently so, an imperative to demonstrate the resolve to do what we must in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without a commensurate shift in focus and resourcing both the military and civilian components, the conditions in Afghanistan will worsen.

In Iraq, managing the drawdown and transition to an Iraqi-led security effort is critical to an enduring peace in that country and the region. I believe that our success in Iraq is vital for regional stability.

Our Armed Forces continue to shoulder a heavy burden not only in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia, but worldwide. While our military remains the most capable in the world, the stress on our forces and the strain on our families have been tremendous. Over the coming two years, the number of deployed forces from our Active and Reserve Components and National Guard will remain high, exacerbating these concerns even further. We will not see improvements in the dwell time of our ground forces until 2011, at the earliest.

The quality, numbers, and fighting capability of the men and women serving in and supporting our military are vital, yet insufficient alone, to counter the challenges of this new century. Our national security requires the full involvement of not only the entire U.S. government but also that of our international community partners. We must continue to provide the sustained presence and persistent engagement required to effect enduring partnerships and cooperation necessary to secure our vital national interests. Through multilateral cooperation

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with our partners and allies, we will continue to take prudent measures to defend against any threat to the Nation.

Priorities

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Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as Chairman?

Upon becoming Chairman, I set three priorities for the U.S. military. These continue to guide us even as we assess and adjust our efforts. First, we will improve stability and defend our vital national interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia. Second, we will improve the health of our Armed Forces. Third, we will balance global strategic risks such that we can prevent future war by deterring conflict, while always being prepared to act decisively should deterrence fail. In so doing, we defend the Nation and reassure our allies and partners around the world.

Acquisition Reform and Acquisition Management

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What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2010?

I fully support the changes made in the Acquisition Reform Act and am working to implement the necessary changes to the requirements process. The results these changes seek are long overdue.

What role have you played in the implementation of the Act thus far and, if confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the implementation of the Act in the future?

As Chairman, I have been working—and, if confirmed will continue to strive—to implement the much-needed changes to the requirements process. I support and, if confirmed will continue to support full implementation of the Act.

What additional steps do you believe Congress or the Department of Defense should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?

The list of problems remains long. We still have a problem managing requirements creep. Cost estimates, although made in good faith, are often too low, leading to unexpected cost growth. High technology solutions are adopted before they are proven. The Joint

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Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is much too complex and needs to be revised.

The Congress has taken important steps in the 2009 Acquisition Reform Act to address most of these issues, but increased participation by the uniformed military throughout the acquisition lifecycle, stronger oversight of contractors, deeper understanding of the incentives in different contract types, and increased focus on improving our military acquisition corps are all needed.

Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?

We are reviewing a realignment of the roles that the Chairman and Vice Chairman play in requirements determination, to best manage requirements in the future, and to better balance the inputs of all stakeholders.

What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives?

The Nunn-McCurdy certification requirements force the Department to perform a fundamental net reassessment of a program, and decide to either restructure it appropriately or terminate it. This is a very important requirement. From a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) perspective, it is appropriate to ask the warfighter to revalidate a program's essentiality and requirements. In 2007, the JROC established a trip-wire process to bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays without sacrificing joint warfighting capabilities.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in the DOD acquisition process?

The results of our acquisition systems speak for themselves. A more credible and more empowered JROC can help control requirements growth and certify systems which fail Nunn-McCurdy requirements. We must better involve all with a stake in determining the necessary tradeoffs between cost, schedule and performance.

How should the role and priorities of the JROC change, if at all?

The JROC should place more priority on focusing on Combatant Commander needs, carefully managing the requirements of systems in development, and ensuring new systems have adequate requirements definition and trade space.

Greater emphasis must be placed on the need for balanced capabilities that match the strategic direction of the Department, meet the need dates of the Combatant Commanders, and provide solutions that remain fiscally responsive. Increasing the authority, responsibility and

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accountability of the uniformed military exercises over the requirements determination process is also vital in achieving the Joint Force we need.

Distribution of General and Flag Officers

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At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Congress included a provision in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 that designated up to 324 general and flag officer positions as joint duty assignments that are excluded from the limitation on the number of general and flag officers in each service, and specified the minimum number of officers required to serve in these positions for each service. The provision also reduced the number of general and flag officers authorized to serve on active duty in each service. Implementation of this provision was delayed until one year after the Secretary of Defense submits a report on the proposed implementation of the provision. The report was submitted in June 2009.

What is your view of the merits of this provision?

I am a strong proponent of this provision, which does not reduce the number of general and flag officers authorized to serve on active duty. Implementation of this provision will support the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols act by creating a statutory framework that allows the Secretary of Defense to reimburse the Services for participation in joint positions with G/FO authorizations. Importantly, the Joint Pool recognizes in-Service general and flag officer requirements to accomplish the mission to organize, train and equip, separate from joint general/flag officer requirements.

In your view, what impact will implementation of this provision have on joint officer assignments?

The Joint Pool will increase competition for these senior joint duty assignments. The legislation provides incentives for the Military Services to nominate their best officers, from both their active duty and reserve components, thereby promoting the competencies required for our Nation to continue to address the challenges that confront our forces. As proposed, the distribution of senior joint authorizations among the Military Services with a specified minimum distribution for each Service expands the number of positions open to nomination by all four Services.

In your opinion, should implementation of this provision be delayed until June, 2010, one year from the date the Secretary submitted the required report?

No. The Department is requesting enactment of conforming legislation in the Department's 2010 legislative package. This provides the Department the flexibility to meet rapidly emerging joint requirements.

Rebalancing Forces

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In connection with your first nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you answered questions on the progress toward achieving Secretary Gates' vision set forth in a memorandum of July 9, 2003 for a better balance in the capabilities of the active and reserve components.

During your first term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?

The Department has made significant progress towards rebalancing the total force through realignment of approximately 130,000 billets to date, with 225,000 by 2015, making more of the high demand capabilities previously residing solely in the Reserve Component (RC) available in our active force. For example, one initiative taken is changing the percentage of Civil Affairs capability residing the RC from 94% to 76% with a corresponding increase in the Active Component, while growing an additional 2,800 authorizations. By the end of FY13, this will have more than doubled our rotational capacity for these units. Force structure changes like these have reduced the frequency of mobilizing RC units and individuals, and continue to improve our operational and strategic flexibility.

Additionally, greater access and predictability of capabilities residing in the Guard and Reserve has been achieved through the use of improved rotational management tools such as the Army's Force Generation model (known as ARFORGeneral) which accounts for availability of forces based on dwell time, mobilization requirements, and reset periods to support existing and planned demand for forces. We are now giving our Reserve and Guard forces up to 24 months notification prior to deployment.

Finally, we have instituted policy changes, captured in DoD Directives, to facilitate more efficient planning, preparing, and executing of the mobilization and demobilization processes for the RC forces. These policy changes clearly outlined the time requirements for accessing the reserves, further improving predictability for the servicemembers, their families, and employers.

Rebalancing the force is an ongoing process. The Department will continue to preserve the RC's ability to operate across the range of missions as part of the Total Force.

What do you consider the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense set forth in his memorandum?

The biggest continuing obstacle to achieving the goals the Secretary of Defense set forth is that we must fight and win the wars of today while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow. I also see three additional challenges. First, the competing demands for Force on a global scale. Second, assuming greater risk in other theaters to achieve goals in the broader Middle East jeopardizes our capacity to meet global contingencies. Finally, the decline in Health of the Force and the critical importance of developing a restoration plan complemented by an investment strategy is significant given the time necessary to recover.

Additionally, we are challenged to determine the capabilities needed in the future and therefore, the appropriate balance between the Active and Reserve Components while maintaining sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and between, the Active and Reserve Components with the expressed

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purpose of improving readiness and deployability to support the full spectrum of mission. RC forces must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements.

During this protracted war, we continue to depend on the RC and they have performed in an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the RC you call out the will of the Nation, and they have answered that call.

Mental Health Issues

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The final report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health, issued in June 2007, found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a “critical failure” in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, “Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma; leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the service members they lead.” In light of increasing suicide rates in each of the Services and the increase in the number of service members diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, it is more important than ever to ensure that service members and their families have access to mental health care and that the stigma associated with seeking such care is eliminated. In your response to a previous advance policy question on this issue, you stated that you “intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we address” the stigma associated with seeking help for mental health issues in the military.

What actions have you taken over the past two years and what further actions are necessary, in your view, to alleviate this stigma?

As a nation, we have an enduring obligation to care for those who bear the scars of war, seen and unseen. This is why over the past two years I have made reducing the stigma of mental health care a personal priority. I realize that our service members and families will be reluctant to seek mental health care and treatment if they believe there will be a negative impact or if there are obstacles to securing that care. I also recognize that the stigma associated with seeking mental health treatment is common in our country and that there are inequities between mental health services and health care in general. Accordingly, I have promoted policies and practices along several lines of action to mitigate stigma and promote access to care.

I have actively supported and pushed initiatives by OSD, all military services, the Combatant Commands, and all other related agencies in activities to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help for mental health issues in the military. I have launched a Campaign Plan with specific initiatives to mitigate stress and promote access to mental health treatment, and have actively engaged the senior leaders of the Services and Combatant Commands to speak out as well. I have made reducing stigma a leadership issue for Commanders at all levels across the services. My staff is actively engaged in surveying and analyzing the distribution of mental health staff and ancillary practitioners across the Department in an effort to improve the availability and effectiveness of the treatment they provide. I have directly engaged both the leadership of the uniformed services and contract providers of healthcare to initiate policies and programs to improve access and mitigate stigma. I believe that by addressing mental health issues on several fronts and at multiple levels of DoD,

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the identification of mental health related counseling or treatment becomes more acceptable reducing the historical stigma.

I have had the advantage of being able to talk to our service members on the ground as well as families and health care workers in their neighborhoods. The town hall venue has given me the opportunity to hear the voices of individuals, individuals who identify areas where we need to strengthen our safety net. The other key component in providing this needed safety net is for all levels of leadership to be on board and support initiatives providing mental health services reducing the stigma at the unit level. I am acutely aware that many service members and their families feel that seeking mental health treatment will adversely affect their careers. Accordingly, I have supported all efforts to recognize that combat imposes stress on everyone and can impose enduring changes, in ways that are normal and fully acceptable. Providing support and access to care are vital to maintaining the strength and viability of the force and should be encouraged in an effort to sustain our combat capability.

If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate our mental health programs, training, and the needs of our service members and their families to identify areas for improvement across DoD in all services. Operational research methodologies should be used to identify improved resource allocation in the areas of mental health. Mental illness due to combat operations needs to be addressed and treated just like any other medical condition. I have made it a point that every leader in DoD must conform to this line of thought. If confirmed, I intend to continue my commitment to provide strong leadership to ensure that we completely remove the fear and stigma in seeking the proper care for our most precious resources.

What is your view of the need for revision of military policies on command notification when service members seek mental health care?

Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and as an institution, the DoD must continue to address this issue directly. While mental health questions need to be asked and investigated for security clearances, a balance needs to be established between mental health issues that have a high possibility to be detrimental to national security and mental health issues that the member experiences and is actively seeking help.

On July 2, 2009 a new Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) was issued that will soon be a new DoDI. This new instruction will positively affect command notification reducing the stigma associated with receiving mental health treatment.

DTM 09-006 was issued on July 2, 2009 - Revising Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing Mental Health Care to Military Personnel. This new DTM that will become a DODI within 180 days of issuance and applies to OSD, the Military Departments, CJCS, Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the DoD, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.

The recommendations were based on the conclusions from the DoD Task Force on Mental Health findings. This newly issued DTM not only provides more specific standards for health care providers regarding when to notify commanders of military member's use of mental health services but also provides a balance between patient confidentiality rights and the commander's right to know for operational and risk management decisions. Stigma associated with mental health treatment is reduced by paralleling notification standards to those for reporting any other health issue.

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In the future, we have to continue to monitor and determine what additional measures are needed to affect positively our service members and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to review current policies and ensure the policies do address the core issues surrounding mental health and not institutionalize stigma.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

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Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They assert that the Command failed to respond appropriately with basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges.

Based on your experience as Chairman, what additional actions, if any, should the Joint Staff take in monitoring progress within the military services and the combatant commands' areas of responsibility in order to ensure effective implementation of a "zero tolerance" policy relating to sexual assaults?

Sexual assaults remain at an unacceptable level. In FY 08, there were 251 reported cases in the operational theater. This is a significant increase from the 174 cases reported in FY 07. While we are improving access to care to victims when an incident occurs in theater, we still have a number of challenges in deployed areas based on dispersion of forces and proximity to support personnel.

The Service Chiefs and I recognize that the prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and enforced. They should also be held accountable in this area.

At the same time, we must ensure victims of these crimes are provided the best care possible as well as offering a variety of counseling options to help them deal with this traumatic event. If reconfirmed, I will continue to stress my expectations to the entire Armed Force.

The Joint Staff is revising joint doctrine to better define the roles and responsibilities for addressing sexual assault in the operational environment. This includes pre-deployment training and in theater operational reporting and case management.

Commanders at all levels across the joint force must remain committed to eliminating sexual assault within our forces through robust prevention and response policies; by providing thorough and effective training on awareness, intervention and response measures and procedures. We recognize that not all victims will come forward. Commanders must identify and eliminate barriers to reporting; and ensure care is available and accessible. Confidence in the system is paramount.

What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?

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Currently reports are submitted through Service channels. The fielding of the new DOD sexual assault integrated database will improve communication protocols to better track victims services, case management and disposition, and identify trends and areas requiring additional emphasis. This will give Service leaders better access to the most current information and status of cases.

The new database will provide an important capability. Combatant Commanders will have visibility to support trend analysis and strategic planning for their area of responsibility and enable them to provide better oversight and program management in the operational environment.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Services have in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

There is a 24/7 response capability in garrison as well as deployed areas. Every military installation in the world now has a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC). Each SARC trains and oversees one or more Victim Advocates who help victims understand their reporting options and pathways to medical and mental health care.

If victim support resources are not readily available at the point of incident, victims are transported to a facility with appropriate victim advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of service) and investigative/legal support.

The services have primary responsibility to ensure sexual assault response personnel in deployed locations (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Victim Advocates, medical and mental health providers, criminal investigation, and legal personnel) are well trained to support victims, investigate, and respond to allegations of sexual assault. For example, the Navy uses a webinar forum to provide real-time online discussion and training for first responders in theater. Additionally, the Air Force has initiated a sexual assault response scenario-based evaluation to determine the effectiveness of first responders in the AOR.

The Joint Staff will remain a key partner with the Services and OSD in the campaign against sexual assault. My staff works closely with the Combatant Commands during the development of operational plans and personnel policy guidance to ensure the prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed. Additionally, Combatant Commanders are placing increased emphasis on prevention through education and training by leveraging all available forms of media to continue awareness and education while deployed.

What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent sexual assaults in combat zones?

The Services are implementing procedures and processes to meet the challenges of preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in deployed areas. We have over 200 Sexual Assault Coordinators (SARC) and Victim Advocates for all Services deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan at any one time.

The Services provide baseline training for all military personnel. As soon as an individual enters the military, we educate him or her about sexual assault, our policies, programs, and prevention.

Additionally, all service members and first responders receive sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention training prior to deployment. In addition, coordination among Service

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sexual assault response personnel has improved support to victims in the operational environment and provides additional resources to conduct additional training if needed.

We are providing our military members and leaders with more tools to empower them to take action. The Services have begun aggressive outreach programs, such as the Army's Intervene Act Motivate (IAM) Strong program to combat sexual assaults by engaging all Soldiers in preventing sexual assaults before they occur. The Navy and Marine Corps use the Mentors in Violence Prevention and Sex Signal presentations to train sailors and Marines on bystander intervention. The Air Force has also launched a training program focusing on bystander intervention.

Furthermore, we are communicating the message using a variety of methods. The 2009 DOD Sexual Assault Awareness Month theme, "Our Strength is for Defending: Readiness=Respect" connects prevention of sexual assault to mission readiness. Our military members know that sexual assault is a crime and is incompatible with military service.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

We continue to improve and will always strive to do better. The services are responsible for training sexual assault response personnel to ensure they are well trained to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. I support, for example, the Army's new Intervene Act Motivate (I.A.M.) Strong program. I.A.M Strong emphasizes that leaders must understand their responsibilities to ensure that victims of sexual assault receive sensitive care and support and are not re-victimized as a result of reporting the incident. It also provides tangible guidelines to help Army leaders remain alert-to, and respond proactively to, incidents of sexual assault. Improved training for investigators and trial counselors is one of the Secretary's priorities. This includes the investigative resources in deployed areas. As you may imagine, the combat environment and deployed operations are very dynamic. The investigative resources are often strained by other mission requirements. Remoteness of locations, availability of transportation, or the level of ongoing operations may complicate access to resources. I believe the DoD training network in place now prepares them and investigators to handle sexual assault cases in a caring, responsive, and professional manner. Our ability to respond and support victims is critical.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting to be effective?

Yes. I believe current policies and procedures have improved care to victims of sexual assault; however, restricted reporting limits a commander's ability to support the victim, investigate, and/or hold alleged offenders accountable.

Restricted reporting has been effective (original intent – to allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process). Although the use of restricted, or confidential, reporting doesn't allow a commander to investigate alleged assaults, it does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process.

Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires medical treatment, counseling but also provides for official investigation of his or her allegations within existing administrative reporting channels (such as their chain of command, law enforcement or through the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC)).

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As our military members' confidence in the reporting and investigative policies and procedures improve, I believe and certainly hope that more victims will choose unrestricted reporting; this will ultimately increase offender accountability.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the restricted reporting procedures have been put into effect?

Privacy for restricted and unrestricted reporting becomes a challenge in a deployed environment and remote locations where units are small communities and accountability of personnel is a critical task. In deployed areas confidential reporting becomes more difficult for the victim to reach out to the SARC or a victim advocate because of the need to keep track of all personnel movements within the theater and that support resources may not be co-located with the victim. The joint deployed environment could present additional difficulties in case management, delivering care, and tracking services due to the geographical dispersion of both victims and responders. Once the joint integrated sexual assault prevention and response data base becomes operational, our ability to communicate between the services will improve. The database is currently projected for fielding in 2010.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize that eliminating sexual assault from our military requires a personal commitment by all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Critical to this effort is the role of our leaders and system accountability. Leaders at all levels must foster a climate of confidence in their units, lead by example, and take action that:

- demonstrates zero tolerance for offensive sexual behaviors,*
- holds members accountable for their actions,*
- disciplines offenders and lets unit members know exactly where leaders stand on sexual assault, and*
- protects victim privacy through all phases of investigation and discipline.*

Without this leadership, our program cannot succeed and this crime will continue hurting the Americans who voluntarily risk their lives in defense of our country. I will stress together with our Service Chiefs that commanders and senior enlisted leaders must be held accountable for ensuring robust and effective sexual assault prevention and response programs in their commands.

Another cornerstone of our program that requires continued emphasis is education and training. By educating our military members when and how to act and intervene, we will turn bystanders into actors who can prevent sexual assault.

I will continue my open dialogue with the Secretary, Service Chiefs, and our men and women in uniform to ensure we have the best available resources and procedures in place to care for victims, improve prevention through training and education, and gain greater system accountability. The addition of the Service Vice Chiefs to the DoD Sexual Assault Advisory Council will make this senior forum more effective will aid in ensuring that policies and procedures are executable in the operational environment.

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Commission on National Guard and Reserves [\(return to index\)](#)

In a March 1, 2007 report to Congress, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended, among other things, that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs. The grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has since been increased to general (O-10), as recommended by this Commission. In your response to previous advance policy questions on this subject, you stated your opposition to making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do you still oppose making the Chief of National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Please provide your rationale.

Yes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services. The National Guard is a component of the Armed Services and is represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. A separate representation of a portion of the reserve components from a portion of the services would be inappropriate, and in my view divisive of a Total Force. As a four star General Officer, the CNGB is already participating in all appropriate JCS Tank sessions when domestic issues, which fall under the purview of our National Guard, are involved. This is similar to the methodology used to include the Commandant of the US Coast Guard when specific Coast Guard equities are involved. In addition, if I am confirmed, the CNGB will continue to have full access to the upper echelons of the Joint Staff and me.

In its final report, issued on January 31, 2008, the Commission concluded, among other things, “DOD must improve its capacities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities.” In response to a request for your assessment of the Commission’s final report, you stated, on April 21, 2008: “I have some concern with the Commission’s ideas enhancing the Defense Department’s role in the Homeland. While Reserve Component civil support requirements are important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat responsibilities.”

Is that still your view?

Yes. I continue to believe that the Department of Defense should not have statutory or policy directives that elevate civil support to the same level as combat responsibilities. The Department has taken—and continues to take—seriously its responsibility to provide support for civil authorities.

Using policy or statute to elevate the role of the Department of Defense’s role in response to major catastrophes would: erode the Department’s ability to perform its statutory responsibility; militarize domestic activities traditionally executed by civil authorities; and, undermine the role and credibility of other supported Federal departments in the fulfillment of their own unique statutory responsibilities.

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Tactical Control of Federal Military Forces by State Governors

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In its final report to Congress (January 31, 2008), the Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves recommended the Department of Defense “develop protocols that allow Governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster.”

In your view, should Governors have tactical control over federal military forces, including those in a title 10, United States Code, active status and operating in their States? What is your rationale for this view?

I do not believe Governors require the ability to exert tactical control over all military forces operating within their state when they are providing Military Support to Civil Authorities. Statutory authority currently exists whereby the President can appoint a Title 10/Title 32 Dual-Status Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander. The Dual-Status JTF Commander construct for command and control was successfully employed in 2004 for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions (DNC/RNC). It was also used for the G-8 Summit, in support of Customs and Border Patrol for Operation WINTER FREEZE, again for the 2008 DNC/RNC, and is currently being considered for the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit. In many instances, the Dual-Status JTF Commander is the best option to ensure unity of effort and provide both the President (and/or the Secretary of Defense*) and the Governor with the ability to employ all types of military forces in a synchronized effort.*

Federal forces are generally brought in to a state by FEMA under the Stafford Act, which means federal forces are in support of the federal effort, which is in support of the state priorities. Thus, it is appropriate for federal forces to take direction from FEMA to keep from diverging from the authorities’ relationships as they exist in accordance with the National Response Framework.

Governors currently have the authority to exert tactical control over National Guard forces in a State Active Duty or Title 32 status and have the ability to request the assistance of federal forces when the Governor believes such assistance is necessary, to include responses to terrorist acts and or public domestic emergencies. Available forces for such events would likely be placed under tactical control of the designated, JTF Commander, under operational control of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, or possibly under tactical control of a designated Title 10/Title 32 Dual-Status JTF Commander. The designated Commander working with the Governor and the state’s Adjutant General, would be able to provide the necessary support to restore order, save lives and secure property as the situation dictates.

** Note: On 23 July 2004, approval authority for 32 USC 325 was delegated from the President to the Secretary of Defense.*

Dwell Time [\(return to index\)](#)

For many military members, dwell time goals are not being met, and recent testimony suggests that dwell time will not improve appreciably over the next 12-18 months.

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In your view, what can be done to increase dwell time for both active and reserve component members, and when will these improvements be seen?

An increase in the size of the Armed Forces and/or a reduction in overall military requirements will naturally improve dwell. The current programmed growth in capabilities needed to support on-going operations, as well as the planned reduction in forces in OIF, will lead to improved dwell ratios in both the active and reserve components. As operational demand changes, we will continue to assess the impact to dwell time and make appropriate adjustments.

In your view, would additional Army end strength in 2010 or 2011 improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force, and if so, what numbers of active and reserve component members would be necessary?

The additional 22,000 Soldiers for the Army authorized by the Congress as a temporary end strength increase will not improve dwell time. However, it will relieve unit stress by reducing the rapid and repetitive churn associated with personnel assignments, training, deploying and resetting the force. We will continue to assess each Service's end strength in light of operational demand.

End Strength of Active Duty Forces [\(return to index\)](#)

In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?

The Services, Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their force structure recommendations. Both the Army and Marine Corps have planned end strengths of 547,000 in FY12 and 202,000 in FY11, respectively. This is consistent with the future demands expected to be placed on our ground forces. The Secretary of Defense reversed the Air Force's programmed reductions to be more in line with our future air demands. I believe the planned Air Force and Navy end strength levels of 330,000 and 328,000, respectively are appropriate. We continue to assess requirements of the active duty force as we draw down in OIF and increase our operational presence in OEF. Under the President's Declaration of National Emergency, the Secretary of Defense has authorized a temporary increase of 22,000 for the which will increase manning strength and improve readiness both for units deploying to combat and for units resetting following deployments. I will continue to work with the Services to determine the right size force as current and anticipated missions adjust.

Women in Combat [\(return to index\)](#)

The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

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Does the Department of Defense have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to assignment policy for women when needed?

The current law provides the Department sufficient flexibility to make changes to the assignment policy. Women in our armed forces continue to make tremendous contributions to our national defense. They are an integral part of the force and are proven performers in the operational environment and under fire. It is important to understand that DoD policies fully recognize that women are assigned to units and positions that are not immune from the threats present in a combat environment. In fact, women are assigned to units and positions that may necessitate combat actions – actions for which they are full trained and prepared to respond and to succeed.

Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?

As an advocate for improving the diversity of our force, I believe we should continue to broaden opportunities for women. One policy I would like to see changed is the one barring their service aboard submarines.

Wounded Warriors

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In Congressional testimony on the FY 2010 budget request, you stated that there is “no higher duty for this nation, or for those of us in leadership positions, than to care for those who sacrificed so much and who must now face lives forever changed by wounds both seen and unseen.” You have taken an active role in advocating for services and support to the wounded and their families, including those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and other mental health conditions.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of Defense and the services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured service members and their families?

We have made good improvement in the care and treatment of the seriously ill and wounded, but there are still aspects of our Wounded Warrior care that are woefully inadequate – including in mental health, Post-Traumatic Stress, Traumatic Brain Injury, and in transitioning seriously ill and injured service members .

What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

I count three. First, is our ability to innovate. I have seen remarkable improvements in our own care simply from an individual’s or a unit’s ability to adapt to new circumstances. Battlefield care and rehabilitative programs are obvious examples, but so, too, are improved practices at warrior transition units across the country, and more streamlined efforts to reduce to assign and compensate for disability ratings. We have begun to apply valuable lessons learned from across the services to improve both the efficiency and the effectiveness of our

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warrior transition programs, which now almost uniformly offer some sort of family outreach and support services.

Secondly, our programs, thanks to the Congress, are well-funded. We will continue to need this support.

And third, there is a real sense of urgency here and an understanding that this is an institutional imperative. I am heartened by the attention being given to issues of warrior care and stress reduction across the force. Leaders are increasingly taking these challenges on as personal mandates, and that is having a very positive effect.

What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

Let me highlight four areas that are in need of more improvement. First, we have not made as much progress as we should have in the area of mental health. I am deeply concerned by the rising suicide rate amongst active duty personnel. Evidence is mounting of increased mental and emotional stress among the families. There is still a stigma attached to the act of seeking mental health counseling, and that, too, is being felt by spouses who fear that by seeking such care, they will negatively impact the military career of their loved one.

Second, we are only just beginning to understand the complexities of post-traumatic stress, which may take many forms and include many symptoms not generally obvious to even the most skilled practitioner. Many experts estimate that as many as 25% of all deployed troops suffer from PTS or some type of traumatic brain injury (TBI). Anecdotally, we hear from many family members who say they also experience PTS-like symptoms. We simply must do a better job screening for and then treating PTS, and that should include some sort of mandatory face-to-face screening before a member departs for home.

Third, we have much more work to do on TBI. We need to better characterize the nature of TBI, particularly those defined as "mild", possibly by application of blast sensor technology. We need to create a better linkage of events to patient signs and symptoms. I repeatedly hear from soldiers and families about the benefits of alternative treatments, such as hyperbaric chambers and acupuncture, and yet it doesn't appear to me that the medical establishment has yet fully embraced these options. We need to do the quality medical studies to help sort out the value of these various alternative options. I also remain concerned about our ability to anticipate TBI damage by more accurately assessing one's vulnerability to long term effects after one or more TBI incidents. Some say the magic number is three events; others say there is no magic number. My sense is that there is enormous expertise out there -- such as the staff I met a few weeks ago at Boston VA medical center -- who possess and explore new knowledge about this very real injury. I would like to see us tap into that expertise much more completely than we do today.

Finally, we must improve the process of transitioning seriously ill and injured service members. The Disability Evaluation System (DES) frequently promotes disability instead of maximizing ability. The system currently pushes our departing troops into Veterans Administration programs immediately upon retirement and/or separation with little lash-up between the two departments beforehand and even less education for the member as he or she makes that transition. I am working closely with the VA to streamline and improve this process, but institutional practices long established and codified in law make that effort very difficult

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indeed. A pilot program underway to speed up the assignment of disability ratings and payments shows real promise but must be accelerated. Additionally, we have a Joint DoD/VA team critically examining the DES from stem to stern to determine the next steps in revolutionizing the DES system, to ultimately promote ability vice disability.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the services provided by the Department as well as your own efforts to continually improve care to the wounded?

Though improving, the Department's services are not yet where they need to be. To rectify this, I have made caring for Wounded Warriors and their families one of my top concerns and priorities. I established a permanent office on my staff to work with the Department of Defense, the service branches, and NGOs to leverage a broader network to address the myriad of issues related to the care of our wounded. Caring for those who have sacrificed so much is a sacred duty for this Nation, one which requires we redouble our efforts.

It is critical that senior uniformed military leaders have more insight and control into how medical resources are being applied.

My vision is that our returning warriors – wounded or well – successfully reintegrate upon return from war into the force and/or civil society. They should be able to find and hold rewarding jobs, access educational opportunities, and have the opportunity to find a home and raise their families. Those families must be well supported and able to assist that reintegration. This vision encompasses more than programs, it must also see communities supporting returning warriors and their families, and in turn being supported by the Department of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs—with all three working closely together. And, our families of the fallen must be comfortable in the knowledge that the U.S. military will not forget them or their sacrifice, that it will instead make concerted efforts to ensure they receive all benefits entitled and all support and counseling required to lead positive and productive lives.

What is your expectation for casualties resulting from operations in Afghanistan, both in terms of numbers and the adequacy of resources to support their care, transportation and recovery?

I believe we must all accept the fact that, as we better resource this fight and as we focus more on classic counter-insurgency operations (as opposed to simply counter-terror operations), we will see higher casualty rates among U.S. forces. Securing the population will remain a difficult and dangerous mission. General McChrystal has been provided everything he has requested in terms of medical care and support capabilities, but we will continue to monitor his needs very closely. If confirmed, this will remain a high priority for me.

Rising Costs of Medical Care

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In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.”

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In April, 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.”

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future Department of Defense plans?

The current trends and dramatic cost growth are not sustainable. Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our military service members.

If confirmed, I will continue to foster a health care benefit system that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our people – military members, retirees, and their families – who are my number one priority. Projected rising costs of medical care will require either an increase in the Department’s top-line or the acceptance of additional risk in warfighting capability.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will also continue to support close cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service, where much more needs to be done.

If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to the Secretary to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

If confirmed, I will continue to support the Secretary of Defense, as he leads the Department’s ongoing effort to promote efficiency in both our direct health care and purchased health care programs.

The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work and will seek the support of Congress. Maintaining the life long continuum of care is especially critical with the ongoing operations in the Middle East. I fully support our People, who are this Nation’s greatest asset. The state of their health and well-being defines the effectiveness of every dollar spent on acquisition, operations, and sustainment.

Homosexual Conduct Policy

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President Obama has made it clear that he intends to work with the military and with Congress to repeal the policy regarding homosexuality in the Armed Forces, commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” You have stated that you have begun discussions of this issue with other senior military leaders.

What is your view on repealing or changing this policy?

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Don't Ask, Don't Tell is commonly referred to as a Department of Defense policy but it is Public Law 103-160 910 (USC 654). Therefore, my view is quite simple: DoD policy must comply with the public law and only the Congress and the President can change the law. My responsibility is to guide the Armed Forces of the United States consistent with the law.

At the behest of Secretary Gates, Department of Defense legal counsel are currently examining whether the law allows a more flexible application of policy. I concur with the Secretary and fully support his efforts in that regard.

In determining whether and how to change the policy, we must act in accordance with law and in a thoughtful and deliberate way, taking into account the health and integrity of the force.

What is your understanding of the views of the service chiefs and combatant commanders on this policy?

I cannot speak for the Service Chiefs or Combatant Commanders, but I am confident that they share my desire for a measured, deliberate approach to any change required by law.

In your view, would changing this policy have an adverse impact on good order and discipline in the military?

Any change to the law would require sound policy revision and leadership. And, like any significant overhaul of military personnel policy, we must carefully consider its impact on military readiness. Whatever the decision, we will follow the law and remain focused on the supporting our troops in--and preparing for--combat.

If the policy is changed by Congress, how lengthy a phase-in period would you recommend?

The truth is that I just don't know, and I would need some time to study this before coming back to you with an answer.

National Military Strategy

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There continues to be much discussion about threats the United States will face in the coming decades, including radical Islam, the so-called "long war" against terrorism, and the growing potential for confrontations with a range of violent non-state actors. There are also pressures to take a broader view of the threat to U.S. national security from potential political, economic, and social instability caused by environmental catastrophes brought on by global warming or natural disasters. The 2004 National Military Strategy is due for another update and will be guided and informed by a range of strategic reviews including the 2008 National Defense Strategy, the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and the pending Quadrennial Defense and Nuclear Posture Reviews.

What is your assessment of the current 2004 National Military Strategy with respect to its treatment of threats, opportunities, strategies, and capabilities?

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My 2009 annual risk assessment report to the Congress provided a current assessment of the threats, opportunities, strategies, and required capabilities that will inform our revision of the 2004 National Military Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to issue an updated version of the National Military Strategy in 2010.

What major changes, if any, with respect to threats, opportunities, strategies, or capabilities do you anticipate will be made in the next update to the National Military Strategy?

To address the complex and dynamic strategic environment, we are working to update the National Military Strategy in parallel with the development of the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The evolving strategy will continue to emphasize the need to protect the homeland, prevail in current conflicts, promote cooperative security with partner nations, and prevent future conflicts by preparing for a wide range of contingencies. To execute this strategy, we need to sustain a balanced Joint Force with the capability and capacity to defeat hybrid combinations of conventional, irregular, and catastrophic threats across the full spectrum of conflict and in multiple locations. Toward that end, I am particularly concerned that we reset, reconstitute, and revitalize the Joint Force to defend the Nation, deter potential adversaries, and assure our allies.

Roles and Missions

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Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has considered and reconsidered its capabilities, requirements, technology acquisition strategies, organizational structure, and forces mix. Fundamental to change within the armed forces is agreement on the appropriate distribution of roles and missions among the military departments and several independent agencies. The last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have acknowledged major shifts in the strategic environment facing the nation, but recommended no changes to roles and missions and only minor adjustments to the form and size of the defense establishment. The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review also recommends no major adjustments to the Services, but acknowledges the need to improve capabilities and capacities to conduct irregular warfare, cyber security, intra-theater airlift, unmanned aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and interagency coordination.

Are you satisfied that our defense establishment is correctly structured, that roles and missions of the military departments are appropriately distributed, and that U.S. forces are properly armed, trained and equipped to meet the security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?

With your support, I believe the defense establishment can remain capable and ready to address the threats that our nation faces. There are areas such as irregular warfare, cyber security, intra-theater airlift, unmanned aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and inter-agency coordination that need continued focus. The recent work completed during the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review offered the Joint Chiefs an opportunity for comprehensive review of the distribution of roles and missions. As we increase capabilities in the focus areas, we will continue to evaluate the best defense structure to ensure

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we successfully arm, train and equip our forces to meet challenges both today and in the future. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have heavily immersed our forces, especially our ground forces, in irregular warfare. We lack the balance that is required for full spectrum training, equipping, and warfighting. As we reset the force, we need to regain that balance while planning for the future.

In your view, what changes, if any, are needed in the distribution of core missions, competencies, or functions between the Services or Special Operations Forces?

The current distribution of core missions, competencies, and functions meets the needs of the department and provides the necessary distribution among the Services and Special Operations Forces. During the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review, the Joint Chiefs and the Commander of Special Operations Command worked closely to review the distribution of core missions, competencies, and functions and concluded no significant change was warranted. Those efforts captured the current distributions and codified them in our extensive review and rewrite of DoD Directive 5100.1, which governs the functions of DoD and its components.

Strategic Depth [\(return to index\)](#)

At this moment, the vast majority of U.S. ground forces are fully committed to or exclusively preparing for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What is your assessment of the current readiness of our armed forces, and particularly our ground forces, for worldwide commitment to any contingency and any level of operations?

The Armed Forces are meeting all our current mission demands. The Department of Defense's persistently high operations tempo and OIF/OEF force requirements continue to stress our ability to reset, train, and maintain readiness for the full spectrum of operations. Although our ground forces are achieving "just in time" readiness, current commitments significantly impact our ability to respond to additional contingencies. We retain considerable air and maritime capability to deter aggression and continue to monitor our capacity to respond immediately to any emerging contingency.

What in your view is the level of strategic risk the nation faces given the lack of depth in our ground forces?

I believe the Armed Forces can execute the missions of the National Military Strategy, but at an elevated level of risk. We will prevail in the end, but it will take additional time and resources to deploy trained and ready ground forces for any new missions outside of our current requirements.

From a purely military perspective, continued deployments, accelerated equipment usage rates across the Services and high operational tempo all increase risk. None is likely to subside in the near term. I am confident that our Armed Forces remain capable of defeating all who threaten our Nation's security.

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What in your view are the three most important actions we should take immediately to mitigate and correct the lack of strategic depth?

To mitigate this risk we need to: (1) complete the growth of new units in the Army and Marine Corps, (2) increase the dwell time for units to train for different missions, and (3) reset and reconstitute a balanced Joint Force that can quickly adapt to a wide range of contingencies.

Transformation [\(return to index\)](#)

Please describe the progress that the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the armed forces.

While I am pleased with the progress made in transforming our Armed Forces for the threats we face and will face in the future, particularly in time of war, I also recognize more is left to do. We must continue to shift the balance of our capabilities to meet the irregular, disruptive, and potentially catastrophic security challenges of the 21st Century while maintaining our ability to defeat any traditional challenge that may confront us.

As stated in my January 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, the military should shift its focus to adopt the following common operating precepts:

- *Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and between the joint force and US government, international and other partners.*
- *Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and space.*
- *Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring results.*
- *Combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather than merely additive effects.*
- *Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating advantage.*
- *Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed effectively.*
- *Operate indirectly through partners to the extent that each situation permits.*
- *Ensure operational freedom of action.*
- *Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.*
- *Inform domestic audiences and influence the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.*

In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, US Joint Forces Command is responsible to me for leading and coordinating Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) activities. My Joint Staff supports USJFCOM in their transformation efforts by working in partnership with combatant commands and services to facilitate and advocate their concept development and experimentation efforts.

The Joint Staff has increased the focus on rapid transition, to ensure the results of these concepts and experiments are fielded more rapidly to the warfighter.

In addition, Joint Staff has continued to champion the Joint Staff developed Joint Capability Areas (JCA) framework and lexicon as an integral part of the capabilities based

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planning process. Through our efforts, JCAs have become the common language to discuss and describe capabilities and increase transparency across related DoD activities and processes.

If confirmed, what would be your goals regarding transformation in the future?

- *We must recruit and retain the high quality of our Joint force and rapidly reset that force to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.*
- *Our future military concepts all reflect the need for addressing future security challenges as a unified, inter-agency team. One of my primary goals would therefore be for DoD to partner with other US agencies to routinely achieve national security objectives with whole of government approaches, now and in the future.*
- *We must continue to build relationships with multi-national partners and potential partners, laying the foundation for future joint operations and shaping the environment for those operations.*

Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?

I believe the Joint Staff should continue to pursue new operational and organizational initiatives that enable our forces to be more effective. We should also aggressively address and solve issues that fall in or across the seams between the combatant commands, while reducing those seams, and work with the Services to ensure our best ideas, and technologies are made rapidly available to our warfighters, now and in the future.

"Institutionalizing" Support for Irregular Warfare [\(return to index\)](#)

A major objective of the Department's fiscal year 2010 budget request is to “rebalance” the Department's investments across the spectrum of conflict by increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations. Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department to "institutionalize and finance" the support necessary for the irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last few years and will be needed in the future.

What, in your view, does it mean to "institutionalize" support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Defense Department?

I believe General Mattis', Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 11 March 2009 memo to Secretary Gates on "institutionalizing Irregular Warfare [IW] as a core competency of the Armed Forces while maintaining a balance with other required capabilities" and his seven anchor points provides a useful framework:

- 1) *Establish National Center for Small Unit Excellence to ensure IW superiority.*
- 2) *Direct an outside review (e.g., Red Team) of the Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) for appropriate inclusion of hybrid, complex threats.*
- 3) *Direct DIA to produce an annual, unclassified, update on the IW/hybrid threat.*
- 4) *Offer to run an IW/hybrid wargame for State and the interagency.*
- 5) *Use our Professional Military Education (PME) program as a strategic asset.*
- 6) *Direct process to reduce USJFCOM-identified high demand, low density forces through changes in organizational and personnel policies.*

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7) *Direct a fully resourced effort to immediately develop first class simulators for IW training.*

My staff has worked with OSD, Department of State, Combatant Commands, and Services to plan a way ahead for each of these activities, many of which are near completion.

As well, results of this year's Global Force Management Process informed the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review, making recommendations to resolve capacity shortfalls, including those shortfalls in irregular warfare. These recommendations for institutionalizing IW enhancements were captured in the FY 2011-2015 Guidance for the Development of the Force Update.

What are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to overcome those obstacles?

I believe there are two obstacles: resourcing and changing mindsets. Regarding resourcing, for example, we look forward to working with the Congress to fulfill Resource Management Decision 802's intent to establish the National Program for Small Unit Excellence¹ so that the Joint Irregular Warfare Center, led by US Joint Forces Command, is adequately funded to support the mission of the NPSUE.

While we have progressed, I believe we have more work to do in changing mindsets. We have made great strides within the Services to share capabilities, and we need to continue in that direction to ensure that all new capabilities we develop/program for are truly joint. Irregular Warfare capabilities must be joint and Services must work with each other to identify training and simulation tools that can provide cross-functionality. My staff as well as OSD continue to reach out to the interagency to support our common missions. We collaborate closely with the Departments of State and Homeland Security and are expanding our efforts with other agencies. The goal is to leverage and compliment each other's capabilities and work together to build joint irregular warfare capabilities that are value added to all.

While program changes may be necessary for such rebalancing, they are unlikely to prove sufficient. The greater challenge may prove to be changing military culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies.

In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might be required, to complement programmatic changes, in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare?

In my view, our progress in executing some of the Irregular Warfare anchor points illustrates the sort of changes needed. The most important considerations that could complement programmatic decisions in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare are:

- *An outside review (e.g., Red Team) of USD-Policy developed Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) to ensure the family of scenarios is appropriately balanced to address the future threat environment, specifically, hybrid, complex threats.*

¹ National Center for Small Unit Excellence was renamed National Program for Small Unit Excellence after receipt of Gen Mattis' 11 March Anchor Points Memo.

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- *A DIA-led annual, unclassified, update on the IW/hybrid threat through direct collaboration with Joint Forces Command, J2; the Joint Irregular Warfare Center; the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the National Ground Intelligence Center.*
- *An IA/hybrid wargame for the interagency, specifically, Department of State, to generate valuable insights and inspire a comprehensive perspective essential to meeting the complex security challenges we face.*
- *Use our Professional Military Education Program as a strategic asset to improve synchronization across all military departments in education and training with our foreign partners.*

Iraq

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Diplomatic and military leaders in Iraq have cautioned that security gains over the last year remain fragile and are still subject to reversal.

What is your assessment of the stability of security gains and reduced violence?

Security incidents throughout Iraq continue to show a decreasing trend of violence in 2009 and remain at the lowest levels in five years. However, underlying sources of instability have yet to be resolved. Upticks in high profile attacks targeting civilians during July and August have not affected the overall trend of violence seen this year, but have caused an increase in civilian casualties. We are carefully monitoring the full effects of the U.S. withdrawal from cities, villages, and other locales and assessing the impact on the overall stability and sustainability of security gains in Iraq.

What, in your view, are the greatest threats to these gains and what are the prospects of these threats materializing?

There are a number of underlying sources of instability that the Iraqi government must overcome. Immediate challenges include Arab-Kurd tensions, Shi'a-Sunni rivalries, violent extremists groups, and malign Iranian influence.

Arab / Kurd Tensions - Arab-Kurd tensions remain the most dangerous threat to Iraq. Confrontations between the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga-- as well as aggressive political rhetoric on both sides--continue to raise tensions. Without a concerted effort to resolve issues by both the Government of Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government and continued U.S. engagement, this situation has the potential to directly impact our security gains.

Shi'a – Sunni Rivalries –continued integration of Sunni, primarily Sons of Iraq, into the Iraqi government is key to mitigating Sunni sense of disenfranchisement. Failure by the Government of Iraq to continue progress on reconciliation issues could result in a return to Sunni-Shi'a violence.

Countering Violent Extremist Groups – The ability of violent extremist groups, most notably AQI, to conduct attacks has been severely degraded but not completely destroyed. The continued maturation of the Iraq Security Forces is essential to countering violent extremist groups in Iraq.

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Malign Iranian Influence – Iran poses a significant challenge to Iraq’s long-term stability and political independence. The Government of Iraq, through reciprocal visits with Iran, has sent tough messages warning Iran against interference in Iraqi politics, while still encouraging improved bilateral relations, economic cooperation, and cultural/religious exchanges.

What do you believe are the most important remaining steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

The most important near-term step the U.S. must take is assisting Iraq in conducting legitimate, free, and fair elections and seating the new government following the elections. Additionally, the U.S. must assist the Iraqi Security Forces with filling equipment and training gaps to ensure they are capable of meeting internal threats by the end of 2011. Finally, the U.S. must transition from a DoD to DoS led

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What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?

Dialogue and engagement between political actors will be essential for them to reach a political solution on critical unresolved issues. We can play an important role in this. Increasingly, our leverage stems from our ability to play a mediation and coordination role on key, unresolved issues. A lasting political solution is also dependent on all groups actively participating in the electoral and political process. All indicators suggest that this will continue to be the case. To further encourage this, using the Strategic Framework Agreement, whereby we offer assistance to Iraq in the areas of education, agricultural capacity, local governance programs, and assisting Iraq with strengthening the rule of law, we can reinforce to political leaders in Iraq that political solutions to their problems are more enduring than military ones.

Secretary Gates has indicated that if security conditions continue to improve we may be able to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Do you agree with his assessment of the security situation and the possible acceleration of the troop withdrawal?

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Yes. A stable security environment is the primary factor in any decision to accelerate the drawdown in Iraq. Our responsible drawdown plan includes options to accelerate the redeployment of certain units should the security environment allow it. Generals Odierno and Petraeus will continue to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and I based on the security situation.

What is your assessment of Iraqi elections as indicators of increasing or decreasing stability and security in Iraq? Are there other indicators that are better barometers of improving or deteriorating stability conditions?

I believe the elections in Iraq are excellent indicators for determining stability conditions in Iraq. Recent provincial elections in Iraq were a testament to the determination of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people to express their will through the electoral process – choosing ballots over bullets. Most notably, Sunni Arabs actively re-engaged the electoral process, helping to redress their earlier under-representation on provincial councils. General Odierno rightly assesses that the national elections timeframe will be a period of heightened risk and vulnerability, when AQI and other extremist groups may attempt to exploit ethno-sectarian rivalries.

As for other indicators of improving or deteriorating conditions, Arab-Kurd tensions will need to be closely monitored, particularly along the disputed territories. The overall level of violence and number of large-scale attacks are important because it both reflects AQI and Iraqi Security Force capabilities, and affects the Iraqi public's confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces.

An important aspect of the improved security conditions in Iraq is the improved capability of the Iraqi Security Forces. However, press reports, following a recent series of high profile attacks in Mosul and Baghdad, suggest that the Iraqi Security Forces are not ready to assume full responsibility for the security of their country.

What is your assessment of the overall capability and reliability of the Iraqi Security Forces?

Based on current conditions, the Iraqi Security Forces are ready to handle responsibilities for security in the cities and urban areas. We are in the assessment phase in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Diyala to determine sustainability of the withdrawal in those localities.

Operational readiness continues to improve for both Ministry of Defense forces and the Ministry of Interior. With U.S. assistance in the development and fielding of key enablers, I believe the Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of handling internal security, to include counter-insurgency operations, by the time U.S. forces depart in 2011.

In your view, what are the enduring challenges or threats to the establishment of reliably professional and capable Iraqi Security Forces?

One of the most significant challenges facing the Iraqi Security Forces is budget shortfalls. Both the Ministry of Defense and Interior face extreme budgetary shortfalls, which

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have affected the growth of both personnel and equipment. Another significant challenge is maintaining an Iraqi Security Force that is non-sectarian in both actions and perception. Currently public confidence remains moderately high in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to secure Iraq and the majority of the public views the Iraqi Security Forces as a non-sectarian entity.

What support should the U.S. be prepared to provide to the Iraqi Security Forces beyond the end of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement in December 2011?

Operational readiness continues to improve for both the Ministry of Defense forces as well as the Ministry of Interior. With US assistance in the development and fielding of key enablers, I believe the Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of handling internal security, to include counter-insurgency operations, by December 2011 while setting the conditions for the Iraqis to continue the development and growth of their security forces.

We are working very closely with the State Department to draft a framework for US support to the Iraqi Security Forces in 2012 and beyond. This framework may include technical assistance and Foreign Military Sales through an Office of Security Cooperation. Ultimately, our level of support will depend on agreements reached between our government and the government of Iraq.

What is your assessment of security conditions in those provinces and cities where Iraqi Security Forces have already assumed responsibility for maintaining security?

Iraqi Security Forces have assumed responsibility for maintaining security in all of the provinces and cities as of June 30, 2009. For the most part, they have handled themselves professionally and in a non-sectarian manner and overall security incidents in Iraq have shown a decreasing trend. However, I am concerned about recent high profile attacks that have resulted in greater civilian casualties, particularly in Baghdad and Mosul. There is the potential that if these types of attacks continue, the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006 and 2007 could return. Iraq's leaders continue to denounce these attacks and vow not to let them trigger renewed sectarian violence. That is encouraging.

Our military forces continue to work closely with the Iraqi security forces to help them stop future attacks by encouraging them to take aggressive and proactive security measures. We are also helping them reassess their force protection measures to reduce vulnerability to these types of attacks. In addition, our forces in Iraq continue to conduct joint counter-terrorism operations, share actionable intelligence, and provide the necessary enablers to help the Iraqi Security Forces safeguard their citizens.

What is your assessment of the infiltration or the risk of infiltration of Iraqi Security Forces by sectarian militias, al Qa'ida-in-Iraq, and Iranian agents?

Though difficult to assess, there is currently no reporting suggesting widespread infiltration by sectarian militias, AQI, or Iranian agents into Iraqi Security Forces. Both the Government of Iraq and U.S. forces recognize the inherent risk that such actors could infiltrate the Iraqi Security Forces and will continue to monitor the issue.

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The Government of Iraq has assumed responsibility for the approximately 85,000 Sons of Iraq (SoI) throughout Iraq. There are enduring problems, however, with the Government of Iraq's ability to pay SoI salaries as promised, continue to integrate a portion of them into the security forces, and assist in transitioning the remaining SoI into civil or private employment.

What is your assessment of Iraqi progress in implementing the integration of the SoI into the Iraqi Security Forces or placing them in civil or private jobs?

Despite some obstacles, SoI integration is moving forward, albeit slower than originally planned. In October 2008, the government of Iraq began to pay and exercise responsibility for the Sons of Iraq. This was an important first step since it demonstrated to the Iraqi Sunni community that the government of Iraq recognized the security contributions of the Sons of Iraq. There now remain 86,000 Iraqis in the Sons of Iraq program. There have been problems in the past with late payroll disbursements but we have worked closely with the Iraqi leadership to overcome those issues. Another friction point is the perception by the Sunni population that the Iraqi Security Forces were targeting some of the Sons of Iraq leadership based on sectarian agendas. We worked closely with the Government of Iraq and the Sons of Iraq leadership on this issue and these types of incidents have declined significantly.

The government of Iraq's goal is to ensure that all of the Sons of Iraq receive long-term government employment. The plan is for 20% of the Sons of Iraq to transition into the Iraqi Security Forces and 80% of the Sons of Iraq to transition to non-security government jobs. The Government of Iraq continues to move forward towards meeting those goals, albeit slowly. To date, they have transitioned approximately 13,000 Sons of Iraq into security related jobs but only 6,000 into non-security jobs. The rate of integration of Sons of Iraq is not on pace to meet the Government of Iraq's stated goal of transitioning all Sons of Iraq by the end of 2009 and could undermine Sunni confidence in the Government of Iraq.

We continue to work with the government of Iraq to expand Sons of Iraq government employment opportunities while ensuring the Sons of Iraq are paid in a timely and accurate manner. We stress that this is critical to preventing the disenfranchisement of the Sunni community and will strengthen national unity.

How likely are more confrontations between Iraqi Security Forces and SoI groups? What should U.S. forces do to reduce this risk?

In the past, Iraqi Security Forces targeting of Sons of Iraq leaders previously threatened to undermine Sunni confidence in the Government of Iraq and U.S. efforts overall. Although there were some instances of targeting Sons of Iraq leaders, this has been largely abated in recent months. Engagement by key U.S. leadership has been essential in ensuring Government of Iraq continues its reconciliation commitments to the Sons of Iraq. Continued engagements by U.S. forces will remain the key to reducing the risk of future Iraqi Security Forces/Sons of Iraq confrontations.

What is your assessment of Muqtada al-Sadr's intentions and capabilities through the rest of this year, especially with respect to the district and parliamentary elections and the completion of the U.S. combat mission by August 2010?

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I believe we will need to continue to watch how Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers respond to the electoral results. For now, there are signs that the Sadrists are actively engaged in the political process and intend to participate in the parliamentary elections. The 30 June withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraqi cities removed some of the energy associated with Sadr's militant faction. Assuming a peaceful transition of the national government occurs, and the Sadrists remain engaged in the political process, Sadr and his political movement will not benefit from inciting violence.

How would you characterize the level of success achieved against al Qaeda-in-Iraq?

I would characterize the level of success achieved against al Qaeda-in-Iraq (AQI) as positive; however, AQI has not been defeated and remains dangerous. Iraqi Security Forces and US targeting continues to pressure AQI's ability to direct and carry out attacks. Security operations in Basrah, Baghdad, Ninewa, Maysan, and Diyala have produced encouraging results that further degraded the capabilities of AQI. Iraqi forces have extended control over more areas of Iraq and on Government of Iraq operations have severely degraded AQI activities, finances, and supply networks, leading to the capture of several high-value individuals. Extensive COIN operations in Mosul and Diyala have continued to pressure AQI networks and clear areas that had been AQI strongholds. Although Iraq has achieved progress, AQI retains a limited capability to conduct high profile attacks targeting civilians and Iraqi Security Forces, primarily in mixed urban areas such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk as well as Diyala province in an attempt to discredit the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces and incite sectarian violence – as evidenced by the recent high profile attacks in Ninewa and Baghdad. In the upcoming months, AQI may attempt to take advantage of changes in the political and security environment to reassert its presence in some areas of Iraq. AQI remains the primary instigator for ethno-sectarian violence, and it will seek to capitalize on Sunni-Shia and Arab-Kurd tensions.

Drawdown in Iraq and Troop Levels/Rotations in Afghanistan

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What is the relationship between the pace of our force drawdown in Iraq and the pace of our force increase in Afghanistan? In other words, will an accelerated drawdown of forces in Iraq improve the readiness and availability of additional forces needed in Afghanistan?

As forces drawdown in Iraq, those forces will become available to support other global requirements, including operations in Afghanistan. I will continue to work with the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders to determine the proper force size and composition necessary to support the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to ensure that current and anticipated missions are supported.

How does the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities this summer impact the availability of forces for deployment to Afghanistan?

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The withdrawal of forces from Iraqi cities this summer does not directly affect the ability of forces to deploy to Afghanistan. The pace for the withdrawal of forces from the cities is linked to the security agreement with Iraq and the overall progress by the Government of Iraq to provide for its own security requirements. If Iraqi security continues to improve, as verified by General Odierno and Ambassador Hill, then our force drawdown should proceed as planned. We will continue to monitor and assess the requirements in both Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure that the force size and composition are matched to mission requirements.

What considerations will be factored into decisions regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq will be transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces?

Operational readiness of US forces and the ability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to achieve the essential, sustainable capabilities to maintain security after the departure of US forces in December 2011 will be the drivers. We continue to define the requirement so the exact types and numbers of equipment are still being determined; however, our goal is to ensure the ISF has a foundational ground defense capability to maintain internal security and stability with a credible, initial deterrence against external conventional threats. Additionally, they need to maintain maritime security and sovereignty of Iraqi airspace.

How should the readiness requirements of the Services for non-excess defense articles currently in Iraq be addressed as part of this transfer determination process?

We have a process to weigh the impacts to Service readiness and make decisions accordingly. The Joint Staff, Military Services, National Guard Bureau, Central Command (CENTCOM), Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) are all actively involved in the process.

We are carefully considering readiness of US forces, including the Reserve Component. Some of the equipment required by the ISF is excess to US Forces; however, US Forces have a need for non-excess equipment to fulfill worldwide requirements. It is a matter of weighing risks and making informed decisions. Therefore, all those organizations involved in the process will weigh the risks and make collective recommendations, accordingly.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy

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The strategy announced by the President in March sets out as its goal “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”

In your view, can this strategic goal be achieved through a purely military solution? If not, what other instruments of power are needed to achieve this goal?

No. There is not a purely military solution to achieving the President’s strategic goal. All elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—must be

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brought to bear. This requires better civil-military coordination and a significant change in the management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance. Our approach to defeating al Qaeda must be one that builds trust with Afghans and Pakistanis while applying all instruments of power. We require these diverse instruments to deny sanctuary to al Qaeda and the Taliban now, and to generate a stable and secure Afghanistan capable of denying al Qaeda return after the withdrawal of our combat forces, and while we sustain partnership and commitment to political and economic development in that nation.

What steps do you believe are required to prevent al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan in the future?

We are working with the Afghan government to build its capacity to secure its people from Taliban intimidation, to provide an environment for required economic growth, and to set the conditions for an education system that will enhance the lives of people well into the future. A critical component of this effort is to increase the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to secure its own people. We also support Afghan counter-terrorism measures that target specific al Qaeda members and support networks. As the Afghan government strengthens its ties to its people it will help set conditions that prevent the return of al Qaeda extremists.

Is defeating the Afghan Taliban and militant extremists, other than al Qaeda, who are attacking Afghanistan from safe havens in Pakistan a necessary component of the President's strategy?

Yes. Defeating the Afghan Taliban and militant extremists operating out of Pakistan, whether directly linked to al Qaeda or not, is an essential component of the President's regional strategy. As the President stated, the objective of the strategy is to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and their extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan," and "prevent their return to either country in the future..." we must separate al Qaeda operatives from their key allies. While a complex web of groups, the Afghan Taliban are interwoven with al Qaeda in many ways. Thus, we must work with Pakistan and our other partners to disrupt and defeat the Afghan Taliban, to advance a stable and secure Afghanistan and to inhibit the spread of al Qaeda influence in Afghanistan and across the region.

Is defeating the Pakistan Taliban a necessary component of the President's strategy?

Yes. Defeating the Pakistan Taliban is an important component of the President's regional strategy. Defeating the Pakistan Taliban will prevent al Qaeda from collaborating with other extremist allies in the region and is necessary to ensure a stable, democratic Government of Pakistan (GoP). Defeating the Pakistan Taliban is a responsibility of the GoP, which faces serious threats from insurgent activities. Our role in defeating the Pakistan Taliban includes supporting the GoP through diplomatic and military means.

In your view, what are the greatest challenges in implementing the Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan?

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The most significant challenges we face in implementing the Administration's strategy arise from our requirement to bridge the common ground between our national interests and those of the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both sovereign nations face threats from entrenched insurgencies as well as significant domestic challenges. As a responsible partner and ally, we need to work carefully to support the two governments in maintaining the stability of their governments, defeating extremists, and supporting the needs of their populations. By supporting the two nations with all elements of our national power, we can enable them as they seek to prevent extremists from threatening regional stability.

Afghanistan

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Secretary Gates has said that in the long run the conflict in Afghanistan has to be “Afghanistan’s war for its own people.”

Do you agree with that assessment?

Yes. Unlike conventional battles for dominance of air, sea, land, or space, counterinsurgency is, at its core, a battle for the people. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is attempting to undermine, and in some cases replace, the Government and its services. ISAF efforts in the near, mid and long term must focus on creating capability and capacity within Afghan structures in order to re-gain the confidence of the Afghan people. As Afghan institutions do so, they will win the confidence of the people, the Taliban will fall out of favor, and the Afghan Government will grow to provide the necessary services expected of a democratically elected national government. The Taliban offer no popular governance agenda, and are feared and mistrusted by more than 80% of Afghans. Thus, an empowered Afghan government is essential to undercut the fundamental approach of the Afghan Taliban

Do you believe that our long-term strategy is properly oriented toward enabling the Afghan people to assume responsibility for their own security?

The orientation of our strategy is sound; however, the execution of the strategy is under review. The ISAF Commander, General McChrystal, has just completed his initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. I and other senior leaders are taking a hard look at his assessment to define the way ahead to better focus our efforts and improve our effectiveness in enabling the Afghan people to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

From your perspective, what are the key lessons learned from our experience in Iraq that should be applied in Afghanistan?

Every conflict is different. In Afghanistan, General McChrystal is implementing a strategy that reflects the reality of the current fight as it relates to the actual situation on the ground and the goals of the President's strategy. I believe one of the greatest lessons learned from Iraq that are applicable to all conflicts is the multi-faceted approach to problem solving and issue-resolution. Bringing together our very best talent from across the military, other US

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Government Agencies and Departments as well as the leaders of industry provides for a whole-of-government approach applicable to the unique circumstances of the conflict.

You have expressed a sense of urgency about conditions in Afghanistan, saying that “we've got to start to turn this thing around within the next 12 to 18 months.”

In your view, what goals and objectives must U.S. forces in Afghanistan achieve within the next 12 to 28 months?

If we fail to gain the initiative and reverse the insurgent’s momentum, we will face an emboldened enemy and worsening security situation. Gains in this must be our focus over the coming 12-18 months. But, we must also account for the importance of longer-term activities that will provide the path to success.

We must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces. We must leverage a whole-of- government approach, assisting in the development of effectiveness governance in Afghanistan. We must also secure the population and separate them from the insurgents to allow for social development and reconstruction.

You have also been quoted as saying the situation in Afghanistan is “serious and deteriorating” and expressing concern over recent opinion polls indicating that for the first time a majority of Americans do not think the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting.

What has caused you to describe conditions in Afghanistan as “serious and deteriorating”?

We have been fighting this war for eight years, and although considerable effort and sacrifice has resulted in some progress, many tangible indicators and perceptions here at home, within the International community, and among the Afghan people have resulted in less confidence in our ability to accomplish the mission. The perception that our resolve is uncertain creates reluctance amongst the Afghans to align against the insurgency. The security situation has worsened, which makes the Afghan people feel less safe and have less confidence in Coalition forces. And the insurgency itself is more sophisticated and more resilient than at any time since 2001.

What would you say to those who question whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting?

The U.S. military conducts the missions it is given. The question of “worth” is one for the American people to answer through debate, and ultimately by their elected representatives in the Congress and by the President.

Personally, however, I believe that allowing Afghanistan to again be used as a safe haven for those who seek to do us harm would not serve the national interest.

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force/ Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, is in the process of conducting an assessment of the campaign plan in Afghanistan, including a review of U.S. and Afghan troop levels.

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Do you believe that the current end strength targets of 134,000 for the Afghan National Army and 96,800 for the Afghan National Police are sufficient, or should those end strength targets be increased?

I do not believe the current authorized ANSF force levels (134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP) are sufficient to provide security for the Afghan population. One of the stated goals of the President's strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan is to develop an increasingly self-reliant ANSF that can take the lead role in the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency fight with reduced U.S. assistance. Current ANSF force levels are not sufficient to accomplish this goal.

The Secretary of Defense has directed a detailed analysis, led by CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, be conducted to inform recommendations on options for future end-strength and capabilities for both the ANA and the ANP. If confirmed, I will use this analysis as well as inputs from the Service Chiefs, our Allies and partners to make recommendations on the future size and required capabilities of the ANSF.

What in your view are the factors that should be considered in evaluating any request for additional U.S. forces for Afghanistan?

A proper analysis of General McChrystal's initial assessment will be critical to evaluating U.S. Force levels in Afghanistan. Understanding the effective application of current resources in Afghanistan is a key factor. Any request for additional resources must focus on what is required to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan, where there are shortfalls, and then the specific requests to meet the requirement. We must understand how the additional forces fit into the overall strategy. Finally, careful consideration and assessments must be made about available force levels and the impact additional forces will have on the health of the force.

What in your view are the major challenges for accelerating the growth of the Afghanistan National Security Forces, and how would you recommend addressing these challenges, if confirmed?

The greatest international community challenge to accelerating the growth of the ANSF is the requirement for mentors for these forces. The greatest Afghan challenge is the development of leadership for the expanded force.

The President's decision in March to deploy the 4/82 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to provide additional mentors for the Afghan National Security Forces will allow us to meet our ANA embedded training team requirements for the 134K Army and will significantly increase the number of ANP police mentor teams. US COIN BCTs are also assuming responsibility for police mentors in districts within their battlespace. We must continue to encourage our NATO partners to provide these district mentors in order to build synergy for security within the battlespace and increase the number of districts with police mentor coverage. I also recommend encouraging NATO to use the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which just recently stood up on 10 September 2009, as an opportunity to enhance training and mentoring of the ANP.

Expanding the leadership capacity of the ANSF requires training and experience and both the ANA and ANP have leadership development programs in place. However, we must also recognize that leader development requires time and we must balance the pressing need for

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additional growth and progress in leadership with this reality in order to build forces that are self-sustaining over the long-term.

As the size of the Afghan National Army increases, should more of these forces be deployed to the border region to prevent cross-border attacks by extremist militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan?

I will defer comments on the placement of additional Afghan National Army forces to the senior commanders in theater as well as the leadership within the Afghan Ministry of Defense. However, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) have primary responsibility for border security. The Afghan National Army provides direct support and support in depth to the ABP. Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) are currently being established at the Regional and Provincial levels to improve information sharing and synchronization of efforts.

Preventing all incursions is difficult due to the length and porous nature of the border. However, practical cooperation between Afghan, Pakistani, and international forces improves border security. Effective military operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas are key to disrupt and eventually deny safe havens to al Qaeda and the Taliban from which to launch these incursions.

ISAF and USFOR-A must continue to enhance the practical cooperation between ANSF, Pakistani military and international forces and increase the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency operations. Border and Joint Coordination Centers, regular tripartite engagements at all levels, and counterinsurgency training of Afghan and Pakistani forces are key to these efforts.

NATO has agreed to the establishment of a three-star command within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command structure to oversee the day-to-day execution of the conflict.

What further changes, if any, to the U.S. and ISAF command structures in Afghanistan do you support to achieve greater unity of command?

Achieving unity of command is critical to the success of any strategy. The Intermediate Joint Headquarters is a critical step in aligning the many current operational activities under a single command. Ongoing reviews of the various training organizations, special operations forces and other units will further streamline our command structures, and assist the U.S. and its allies achieve unity of effort while supporting the Government of Afghanistan.

We also need to review how we conduct and synchronize our efforts across Afghanistan. In the past, we have often operated as if there were five separate campaigns occurring in each of the Regional Commands. While conditions on the ground may vary widely across the country, we must insure that our counterinsurgency campaign is unified throughout Afghanistan. The new Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, or CAAT, initiative, currently under development in Afghanistan, will assist ISAF in achieving unity of effort across the Regional Commands. CAATs will be employed in all five Regional Commands, and will assist commanders at all levels in achieving ISAF campaign objectives. They will also assist in rapidly disseminating counterinsurgency best practices across the theater. I expect the CAAT teams will

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be tremendous assets as we move to unify our counterinsurgency efforts, and will enable commanders to apply a combined, multi-disciplined approach to the problem sets they face.

What is your assessment of the contributions by our NATO allies to the mission in Afghanistan? What more should our NATO allies be doing to support that mission, particularly the training of the Afghan National Security Forces?

Both our NATO and non-NATO partners have served valiantly alongside our forces, and more importantly, the growing Afghanistan national Security Forces. The fruits of their collective labors bore out during last months national and provincial elections, as Afghan National Army and National Police, having been trained and mentored by international ISAF forces, secured their country's first-even self-run democratic election.

As we adjust our strategy, we continue to seek our allies' perspectives and incorporate them into our approach going forward. Some allies have restrictive caveats that make our operations on the ground and in the air challenging and impact ISAF's unity of effort. The new intermediate joint command headquarters will go a long way in improving unity of effort, but there is still work required to encourage our partners to remove or reduce their caveats.

Additionally, we would encourage our allies and coalition partners to contribute in ways consistent with their traditional strengths, including trainers for Afghan National Army and Police units. The new NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan command will leverage our allies' strengths in these areas. Certainly, we would welcome both equipment and financial donations from our partners who are unable to provide troops. As we collectively focus on building Afghan governance, all contributions will be welcome and put to good use.

Fielding the right kind of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in Afghanistan is more challenging than in Iraq, due in large part to the very different geography of the country.

In your view are there adequate ISR assets available to support requirements in Afghanistan? Is there a need for more?

With the help of the Congress, we have made progress ensuring our troops in Afghanistan have every advantage possible through significant investments in ISR. Since the Secretary of Defense stood up the ISR Task Force in 2008, we have resourced initiatives that collectively increase full motion video capabilities by more than 200 percent and signals intelligence capabilities by approximately 300 percent. As we shift our focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, we will work closely with General McChrystal and his staff to ensure our ISR capabilities adequately respond to the unique challenges associated with terrain, distance, and the relative lack of communications infrastructure. While increased ISR collection and sensors remain important, we must also ensure that the necessary processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities are in place to move information rapidly to tactical users.

What in your view are the best performing ISR assets?

We have learned through experience in Iraq and Afghanistan that in addition to ISR assets, cross-cueing, and fusion of information from a variety of sensors is also critical to

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success. One example of this has been the use of signals intelligence as a means to employ more effectively full motion video. Commanders on the ground ask for additional full motion video more than any other ISR asset.

Recent press articles have raised concerns about the ability to provide assured beyond line of site and satellite communications as needed to troops deployed in Afghanistan outside of the large main bases.

In your view, is there a problem with sustainable communications and if so, what options do you see as available to address the situation?

Yes. It is clearly a challenge to provide robust and sustainable communications in Afghanistan due to the rugged terrain, varied missions our troops must execute, and lack of existing infrastructure within the country. We are increasing our overall satellite capacity in the theater by taking advantage of a variety of assets (for example, the recent launch of the Wideband Global Communications-2 (WGS-2) capability. We are also working to improve our troops' communication capabilities and equipment at the small- unit level to support such critical functions as Command and Control (C2), MEDEVAC requests, and -"call for fire" support. Where it makes sense, we are leveraging emerging commercial capabilities in country, such as cellular telephone networks. Communications is a critical enabler for our forces, and we are making a concerted effort to ensure delivery of the very best capabilities we can wherever needed.

News reports indicate that Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO airstrikes continues to grow. In July, General McChrystal issued a new directive limiting the use of airstrikes and assaults against homes in order to reduce the incidents of civilian casualties. General McChrystal called for avoiding "the trap of winning tactical victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people."

Do you support restraints on the use of airpower and home entries to reduce civilian casualties even if this increases the risks to U.S. forces?

Any time an innocent person is killed our mission becomes more difficult and our men and women in Afghanistan understand this. In addition to the tragic loss of life, all of the leadership is aware of the negative repercussions that result from civilian casualties. As such, General McChrystal has published a new tactical directive that provides guidance to subordinate commanders, and the force, on controlled use of munitions and tactical techniques to better safeguard the population and reduce civilian casualties. I recognize, as does General McChrystal, that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails some risks to our troops – we must work to mitigate that risk wherever possible, but excessive use of force resulting in an alienated populace will produce far greater risk to the accomplishment of our mission. I have every confidence in the ability of our forces to operate effectively and to succeed in this challenging environment under the current guidelines.

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Pakistan [\(return to index\)](#)

Administration officials have said that “no improvement” is possible in Afghanistan without progress in Pakistan or, similarly, that you can’t succeed in Afghanistan without “solving” Pakistan.

Do you agree that no improvement is possible in Afghanistan without solving Pakistan’s control of its border region?

The Government of Pakistan (GoP) has been conducting continuous operations within the border regions of the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas since August 2008. Pakistan’s ability to conduct sustained operations against terrorists and other extremist groups who seek safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is vitally important to our regional strategy. The GoP’s long-term commitment to reconstruction, economic development, and building the capacity of their security forces contributes greatly to our efforts in concert with ISAF to stabilize Afghanistan.

How would you describe the linkage between progress in Afghanistan and developments in Pakistan?

Afghanistan and Pakistan stability are inextricably linked as extremist threats transcend regional boundaries. The strategy we have for Afghanistan and Pakistan is regionally focused in recognition of the fact that what happens in one country affects the other. Clearly, addressing extremist safe havens and cross border activities is essential to success in Afghanistan. Our strategy develops Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities and simultaneously pursues long-term approaches to promote stable, democratic governance and sound economic policies to provide opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

What are the strategic risks in tying Afghanistan’s future too closely to developments in Pakistan?

The ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine our efforts in Afghanistan is known, which is why our new approach to the strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is regionally focused. U.S. and international support to the Government of Pakistan in their efforts against extremism is an imperative. While we continue to enhance our bilateral relationship with each country based on its own merits, we cannot ignore the ties between the two countries by de-linking Afghanistan’s future from developments in Pakistan. Without effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face an enduring threat to its long-term stability.

What is your assessment of how the Pakistan Army leadership perceives the threat to Pakistan from militant extremists located along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?

Pakistan’s leaders recognize that extremist groups pose a growing threat to Pakistan’s national security and long-term stability. Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders have publicly expressed their commitment to countering this threat. They understand that insurgencies cannot

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be defeated in months but rather in decades. Pakistan's military must sustain its action against extremist groups within its borders and provide humanitarian assistance to mitigate the threat. Ongoing operations in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are a promising start. U.S. leaders engage regularly with the Government of Pakistan to convey both our concern about these threats and our political support and we are augmenting their efforts through military and economic assistance and cooperation.

Through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, the United States is providing significant assistance to train and equip the Pakistan Frontier Corps and build the capacity of the Pakistan Army to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Would you agree that in order for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan to be effective, Pakistan's leadership must make it clear to the Pakistani people that confronting the threat posed by al Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant extremists is essential for the sake of Pakistan's own security interests?

Indications from Pakistan senior leadership and outside observers are that Pakistan's military operations along the border currently have the support of the Pakistani population as the Pakistani people are becoming increasingly aware of the threat posed by extremist organizations. It is important for the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistan military to have the support of the population for these operations, without which we could not effectively provide U.S. military assistance. We also understand that the population needs a whole-of-government approach to the problems Pakistan faces or support for the Government and military operations could erode. Our broad assistance efforts support this approach by improving Pakistan's military/security capabilities and assisting the Government of Pakistan to make improvements in education, agriculture, job creation, long-term economic development, as well as governance in order to improve the lives of the Pakistani people.

What steps would you recommend taking to ensure that U.S. military assistance provided to Pakistan is used to enhance Pakistan's efforts to confront the threat posed by militant extremists on its territory and deny safe haven to groups conducting cross-border incursions into Afghanistan?

We have two primary funding authorities for providing assistance to Pakistan that support the Pakistan security forces efforts against extremist groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border. These are the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) and Foreign Military Finance (FMF). PCF/PCCF provides the Combatant Commander a flexible, responsive funding source to meet near-term COIN requirements of Pakistan security forces along the border. FMF supports aspects of our Af-Pak strategy and COIN requirements and helps build the capabilities of Pakistan's conventional forces in order to provide key enablers and supporting activities for the fight. FMF also reinforces the longer-term US-Pakistan mil-to-mil relationship and the broader goal of building a long-term effective partnership with Pakistan. I believe we have the mechanisms and authorities in place to help fund the equipment/assistance the Pakistanis need to ensure we are meeting the goals for which these funding mechanisms were intended.

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What additional steps, if any, would you recommend to ensure transparency and accountability for reimbursements paid to Pakistan from Coalition Support Funds for support provided to the United States relating to Operation Enduring Freedom?

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) provide reimbursement to Pakistan for expenses incurred while conducting operations in support of US efforts against extremist/terrorist organizations and are a key element toward meeting our objectives in the Afghan-Pakistan strategy. We continue to work with the Pakistan military to improve CSF processes, and ensure appropriate accountability and transparency for CSF. We recently sent a team to Pakistan to review, with the Pakistan military, the CSF documentation and other requirements in order to improve accountability and timeliness of payments.

In your view, what should be done to press the Pakistan Government to confront the Afghan Taliban shura operating out of the city of Quetta in Baluchistan?

The U.S. should continue to support the Government of Pakistan to expand their capabilities and help them confront and defeat militant extremism wherever it may be in Pakistan. The Quetta Shura bears the ideological standard for the Taliban—we must continue to work with Pakistan to approach the Taliban as a regional threat to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban groups throughout the region derive their operational guidance from commanders at the local and tribal level. Ongoing operations in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas target the threat's current center of gravity at the local commander and tribal level. They are a promising start, and strengthen the GoP's legitimacy in the eyes of the Pakistani people. U.S. leaders must continue to engage Pakistan and encourage the government to continue to take sustained action against militant extremists throughout Pakistan.

What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in confronting the threat of militant extremists in the border region?

The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to improve from just a few years ago and the leadership of both countries continues to engage in discussion with a goal of enhancing the relationship including greater cooperation. Pakistan's leaders are increasingly convinced of the demonstrated benefits of cross-border cooperation. This cooperation also occurs at the lower levels through border coordination and other activities in order to meet the challenge of dealing with extremist threats in the border region. There is more that can be done and the U.S. continually works to facilitate and improve the cooperation between these two countries and with coalition forces on the Afghanistan side of the border.

To what extent can actions by India, particularly with respect to troop levels along the India-Pakistan border, help or hinder U.S. efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

India and Pakistan share a common regional threat of violent extremism. Our strategy is regionally focused and acknowledges that what happens in one country affects the other. Al-Qaeda and associated extremist organizations are targeting India, as well as Pakistan, Afghanistan, our allies in the Middle East, Europe, Australia, and the U.S. homeland. We

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continue to encourage increased contact across the Line of Control, senior-level bilateral engagement and trade. Our strategy seeks opportunities to build India-Pakistan confidence. While there are no immediate options or quick-fixes, continued demonstration of U.S. long-term commitment to regional security will reduce tensions between Pakistan and India and enhance the will and capacity of Pakistanis to move decisively against extremists.

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) [\(return to index\)](#)

The Department of Defense has taken inconsistent positions on the disposition of ad hoc, but critical, entities created to respond to the urgent needs of combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense has recently stated in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, that the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) task force should be phased out, while at the same time, the Department has decided to institutionalize JIEDDO. Some have expressed concern about the possible hasty demise of the ISR task force, while others have expressed concern about the premature decision to make JIEDDO permanent. While the JIEDDO reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays an active role in reviewing and validating urgent operational needs emerging from Iraq and Afghanistan.

What are your views of JIEDDO and its role within the Department and within the Department's process for responding to urgent operational needs?

The Joint IED Defeat Organization is effective in its mission to lead, advocate, and coordinate the Department's C-IED efforts in support of Combatant Commanders. They are a highly valued capability that continues to demonstrate the agility to respond quickly to urgent operational needs by providing essential material and nonmaterial solutions to counter known, newly deployed and emerging IED threats.

What are your views of the criteria the Department is using to determine which institutions should become permanent and which should not, and to demonstrate how these criteria are being consistently applied across organizations?

Organizations are often created in response to shortfalls identified by Combatant Commanders. There are several venues, including Senior Warfighter Forums (SWarFs) and Deputies Advisory Working Groups (DAWGs), to review and make recommendations to the Department leadership as to whether an organization should become permanent. In the case of JIEDDO, the C-IED SWarF and the DAWG concluded that the nature of the IED threat and continued Combatant Commanders' need for rapid solutions necessitated an enduring organization with the agility to rapidly respond to changing urgent operational needs. In addition to its rapid acquisition capability, JIEDDO's operations and information fusion support, and their ability to support time-sensitive joint C-IED training requirements, are well suited to meet these urgent operational needs.

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Counternarcotics [\(return to index\)](#)

Recently, senior U.S. government officials have indicated that the U.S. will begin to increase alternative crop development, public information, and interdiction programs, rather than continuing or expanding ongoing eradication efforts. This has been viewed as a u-turn of the U.S. counter narcotics strategy in Afghanistan and has been greeted with skepticism from some senior Afghan officials.

What is your view of this ongoing change in strategy?

I understand the interagency's intent to rebalance its counter narcotics strategy and focus resources on those programs that will contribute directly to breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus and help connect the people of Afghanistan to their government. I believe we need a multi-pronged approach that targets laboratories, traffickers, and movement of drugs, and facilitators at the same time we work to provide alternative income opportunities for farmers.

What is your assessment of the eradication policy the U.S. has pursued in recent years?

The efforts of the US Government to support and fund the Afghan Government's eradication efforts have shown little success. The funding and energy for eradication programs should be redistributed to other counter narcotics activities that have proven far more successful such as interdiction, public information, and alternative development.

Do you believe that this shift in policy is adequately resourced?

If the resources dedicated to the eradication programs of the US counter narcotics strategy were redistributed to interdiction, rule of law, public information, and alternative development, this would be a step in the right direction. However, General McChrystal has just completed an initial assessment for the Secretary of Defense, and we need to review the assessment to determine if the shift in counter-narcotics policy is adequately resourced. Additionally, SRAP, NSC, and the interagency are in the process of reviewing our CN Strategy for Afghanistan.

What role do you believe the Department of Defense will play in each component of the new strategy?

DoD's counter-narcotics mission is to support the Combatant Commander and law enforcement, through information sharing, training and equipping, infrastructure, and emergency assistance. DoD's main focus is on interdiction efforts to decrease narcotics trafficking and processing in Afghanistan while building Afghan capacity to disrupt and dismantle significant drug trafficking organizations. A nexus exists between narcotics and the insurgency as well as corruption and criminality. Recent decisions by the NATO Defense Ministers and the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Afghan Government, provided the guidance and authorities for both ISAF forces and the US Military to target the trafficking and

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production of narcotics where the nexus exists. Additionally, the recent change to DOD's international counter narcotics policy enabled more robust support and integration of capabilities with civilian law enforcement agencies operating in Afghanistan.

Counterdrug Operations [\(return to index\)](#)

The Department of Defense expends more than \$1 billion per year in the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking. For much of the last two decades, the fight against illegal narcotics has taken place within the Western Hemisphere, but in recent years, counternarcotics operations have expanded to Afghanistan, West Africa, and Asia. U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan have identified success against narcotics traffickers as fundamental to the success of their mission to root out the Taliban and al Qaeda. Despite this expanding focus to other parts of the globe and the focus of U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, the Department often views counternarcotics operations as the job of federal law enforcement agencies.

Please discuss your views of the DOD's counternarcotics mission and the apparent tension that exists within the Department about the proper role of the military.

Illegal narcotics and their proceeds fuel terrorism, regional instability, and organized crime. They are a serious, evolving, and global threat – which no country can defeat alone. All agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities must work together to ensure our collective tactics, techniques, and procedures provide the agility required to counter such an asymmetric, adaptable threat. Although federal law enforcement agencies are responsible for the majority of counternarcotics missions, the Department of Defense is a critical supporting member of the team. Combating drug trafficking and related threats requires a whole of U.S. Government approach along the continuum of drug production, interdiction, investigations, intelligence and information sharing, eradication, capability and capacity building, demand reduction, and alternative livelihood development and partnerships. These are important counternarcotics elements whether combating drugs in the U.S., the Western Hemisphere, or the poppy fields of Afghanistan.

Within the U.S., the DoD is the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States (10 USC 124). We carry out this mission in support of the counterdrug activities of Federal, State, local and international partner law enforcement agencies through our Geographic Combatant Commands, their subordinate commands and task forces, and as a full partner in interagency counterdrug intelligence and operations coordination and "fusion" centers located throughout the country. These include the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, CA, and Office of National Drug Control Strategy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA). In addition, the DoD supports 54 State and territorial counterdrug task forces through the National Guard Counterdrug Governors' State Plans (32 USC 112). These 2,600 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen leverage DoD resources and unique capabilities to act as catalysts to better coordinate State and local law enforcement efforts with those of the federal government in attacking both the supply and demand for illicit drugs in our homeland.

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Lastly, within the Department there is a healthy, constructive, and continuous dialogue about the proper role of the military in counternarcotics activities. As you well know with two major combat operations on going and a steady state requirement for the defense of the homeland, resources are always a limiting factor. It is this competition of resources that forces all of us to scrutinize each mission to ensure our military members support interagency activities that not only add measurable value to our whole of government counterdrug efforts, but enhance, rather than detract from the readiness of our military and civilian members.

Strategic Communications ([return to index](#))

Over the past few years, the Department of Defense has funded a growing number of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have a separate budget outlining its strategic communication activities, the GAO reports that DOD “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities, including recent initiatives funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and geographic combatant commands. Many of these ongoing programs are in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

What are your views on DOD’s strategic communications role and its integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Quite honestly, I am not a fan of the term strategic communications. I believe that we are best served by a communications policy that aligns deeds and words, and that builds on America’s historic reputation for being credible and reliable – saying what we mean and doing what we say. As you know, the Department of State is the designated lead for U.S. Government communication efforts at the national level, developing and coordinating “whole-of-government” foreign policy objectives and supporting programs for the communications efforts through the National Security Council. Our military activities are integrated with and support these objectives and programs. All of our service members have an important role to play – aligning our actions and communications activities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels in a manner that minimizes “say-do” gaps, and represents our national interests and values in a culturally appropriate manner.

What is your view of the apparently expanded role of the U.S. military in supporting U.S. strategic communications programs led by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan?

As noted above, I believe that the military performs a vital role in national communication programs, and one that remains consistent with our authorities and responsibilities. We provide worldwide forward-deployed military communications resources

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and unique capabilities in support to State and USAID efforts. Over the past decade, military activities supporting these “whole of government” programs have expanded in concert with growing regional challenges and our global engagement posture. However, they are but one component of extensive collaboration with our interagency partners to promote national policy objectives. We often find that DOD has capability and capacity that, when coupled with State and AID programs, provides a powerful lever to advance U.S. Government interests and objectives. I appreciate the Congress’s continuing support for further development of these important capabilities.

Iran ([return to index](#))

What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East region?

Iran continues to be one of the most destabilizing regional actors with regard to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader Middle East region, and therefore must be taken into account as we execute and develop future policy. Our policy and strategy regarding Iran requires close coordination of all elements of national and international power. The President has articulated an initial policy of reaching out to Iran, which I fully support. I also support current diplomatic and economic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include UN actions (both sanctions and financial measures), regional initiatives, and international pressure. I fully support the Department of State’s Gulf Security Dialogue initiative to strengthen and reassure our regional partners. This includes military aspects such as capacity building, border security, missile defense, and proliferation security initiatives.

In your view, does Iran pose a near term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its nuclear program?

While these programs will not threaten the U.S. homeland in the near term, Iran’s posturing can threaten U.S. interests in the region. These include Iranian use of proxies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, on the African continent, and even in the tri-border region of South America.

If you believe either of these programs pose a near term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?

I will continue to support current initiatives with regard to Iran, to include engagement, UN actions, regional initiatives (to include reassuring our regional partners), financial measures, and international pressure. We encourage Iran to fulfill its responsibility with regard to international agreements to the Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a signatory, and the additional protocol.

Other than nuclear or missile programs, what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?

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A primary concern is Iranian malicious activity throughout the region through the use of proxies in an effort to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing weapons, technology, training, and finance. This can be seen through Iranian support to HAMAS and Hizballah, as well as interference within Afghanistan and Iraq. I am concerned Iran's continued malign activities will impact stability and potentially the regional economy. It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies, by continuing to build partner capacity, as well as land and maritime security to counter Iranian malign influence in the region. I will continue to work in close coordination with all applicable USG departments to ensure our policies toward Iran take a regional approach.

What concerns, if any, does the election related unrest in Iran raise from a military perspective?

I am concerned that the growing influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over Iranian politics will result in the militarization of Iranian foreign policy. Nonetheless, at the moment I do not project any significant changes to Iran's overall foreign policy objectives. I have observed no positive effects on the Iranian military as a result of recent election unrest.

China

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China has an increasingly significant role in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the United States must determine how best to respond to China's emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military relations?

Relations between the U.S. and Chinese militaries are consistent with years past. The moratorium in exchanges unilaterally imposed by the PRC last year has been lifted, permitting the continuation of military-to-military exchanges. The increasing number of exchanges notwithstanding, I am concerned about China's continued lack of transparency with regard to PLA modernization, capability, and strategic intent. I am hopeful that we can keep the substance and the tone of our military relationship with China on a positive trajectory.

How would you characterize the quality of U.S.-China military-to-military engagements to date and what should be the U.S. goal for such engagements in the future?

U.S.-China military-to-military relations, as constituted, provide opportunities for exchange and dialogue on a representational level, but are not yet sufficient to provide enhanced understanding of China's intentions or capabilities. Moreover, the relationship is fragile, and vulnerable to perceived slights. Our goal is to establish continuous communication channels that are open not only when relations are good, but in periods of turbulence as well. We have recently had several engagements including Defense Consultative Talks, the Chief of Staff of the Army's visit, and Special Military Maritime Consultative Agreement dialogues. These indicate a

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gradual willingness on the part of China to engage in a more substantial relationship, and I welcome this.

U.S. Relations with Russia [\(return to index\)](#)

U.S. relations with Russia, although strained over a variety of issues, have improved recently in some areas. At the Moscow Summit in July, you signed a new strategic framework for U.S.-Russian military-to-military engagement with your Russian counterpart.

What do you believe are the potential benefits and opportunities to improve U.S.-Russian relations either through military-to-military programs or other cooperative actions that you would recommend?

We have witnessed positive developments in our interaction with Russia since the Presidents agreed at the Moscow Summit to pursue a more constructive relationship based on mutual security interests. While we will undoubtedly continue to experience challenges in our bilateral relationship, we are committed to a course change with Russia, which will require strategic focus, effort, and discipline. The Strategic Framework General Makharov and I signed at the Summit puts our nations' militaries on a more pragmatic and reciprocal path to cooperation in areas where we share common interest, such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, crisis response, peacekeeping and anti-piracy. In those areas, I believe we can make the most progress towards achieving operational capability for combined missions and in formulating common strategic approaches to the challenges that face both nations. Additionally, militaries of the size and capabilities possessed by our nations should remain engaged in constructive communications and dialogue, not only to foster understanding and address unforeseen consequences, but also to promote positive cooperation and enhance regional and global peace and stability. Enhanced communications will aid in mitigating our strategic differences and will serve to cultivate a positive change in Russia's policy approach

Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia [\(return to index\)](#)

In an interview with a Russian newspaper before the July Moscow summit meeting, President Obama said the following: "We have not yet decided how we will configure missile defense in Europe. But my sincere hope is that Russia will be a partner in that project. If we combine our assets on missile defense, the United States, Russia, and our allies will be much safer than if we go it alone. I see great potential here, and I hope to have a robust discussion with President Medvedev about these possibilities for cooperation on missile defense when I am in Moscow next week."

Do you agree with the President that missile defense cooperation with Russia would serve our mutual security interests and could enhance our security against potential missile threats from nations like Iran?

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Yes. We remain interested in exploring cooperative opportunities that would complement our missile defense architecture. As an example, we believe the Russian Garbarla Radar in Azerbaijan and the Armavir radar in southern Russia could be additive to our missile defense architecture and provide helpful information for early ballistic missile warning detection. It would go a long way towards reassuring the Russians that our missile defense efforts in Europe are not directed towards their nation. While we are realistic about Russian willingness to join us in this endeavor, cooperation could be an important element in a broader strategic partnership between the United States and Russia aimed at addressing the key security challenges facing both our nations.

Ballistic Missile Defense [\(return to index\)](#)

With the Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, Secretary Gates has refocused the Department’s missile defense program on effective theater missile defenses to protect our forward deployed forces, allies, and friends against existing short- and medium-range missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran. The budget request would provide \$900 million in increased funding for more of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Standard Missiles-3 interceptors, and more Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates’ decision to increase the focus on effective theater missile defenses to defend our forces against existing regional (short and medium-range) missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran?

Yes. Our forces are increasingly threatened by shorter-range ballistic missiles and the proliferation of dangerous technologies among rogue regimes and non-state actors. In addition, states like Iran and North Korea continue to develop longer-range ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United States and our allies and friends.

The Administration is considering a number of options for possible missile defense in Europe against a potential future Iranian missile threat, including the previously proposed deployment of missile defense capabilities in Poland and the Czech Republic.

From a technical standpoint, do you believe there are a number of possible options for a missile defense in Europe, and do you believe a land-based Standard Missile-3 interceptor could provide a useful capability against future Iranian missile threats, both to Europe and potentially to the United States?

Yes. I believe there are a number of technical alternatives for missile defense architectures in Europe. Land- and sea-based SM-3 interceptors, along with the necessary sensors and warning from both ground and space, could be key components of an alternative technical architecture.

The Fiscal Year 2010 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency includes an initiative to develop the capability to intercept ballistic missiles early in their flight, sometimes referred to as the “ascent phase.” This initiative would use the Standard Missile-

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3 interceptor along with existing and near-term sensors. If this capability is developed successfully, it could permit the United States to intercept long-range missiles from nations like North Korea well before the Ground-base Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would have to be used to defend the Nation.

What is your view of the potential value of an early intercept or ascent-phase intercept capability?

An early or ascent-phase intercept capability would improve defense of theater areas and the homeland, and we are considering options for that potential capability. This defense capability would allow more intercept opportunities and potentially conserve interceptors by allowing more shoot-look-shoot vice salvo engagements. As a hedge against evolving future threats, destroying a threat missile early in flight reduces the effectiveness of the missile's countermeasures.

Security Force Assistance [\(return to index\)](#)

Secretary Gates has repeatedly called for strengthening the civilian capacity and capabilities of the U.S. government, and has also stressed the importance of fostering the capabilities of international allies and partners. What is less clear, however, is whether the Defense Department's military and stability support capabilities, in terms of resources and requirements, ought to shrink, as the capabilities of U.S. government civilian agencies and international partners grow.

To what extent, if any, should assumptions about future growth in or availability of U.S. government civilian capacity and capabilities shape calculations of Defense Department requirements, force structure, and investment decisions?

I would suggest that this is about growing overall U.S. Government capacity rather than simply shifting existing capacity. DoD requires substantial and enduring capabilities to conduct stability operations to succeed in contingencies where a non-permissive environment either disallows or severely constrains the deployment of civilian professionals.

That said, the U.S. Government also requires a robust civilian expeditionary capability for contingencies where the security environment is permissive – and not just for post-conflict stabilization, but also to conduct stability operations on a preventive basis -- to help partners solve problems before they become crisis that may require military interventions.

On several occasions, my predecessors and I -- and the Secretary of Defense -- have testified before the Congress regarding the national strategic importance of this civilian expeditionary force. Moreover, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have been working in earnest with the State Department and the Congress on development of this civilian expeditionary capability since 2004. Unfortunately, progress has been very slow. It took almost five years to get authorization to establish a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) under the aegis of the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Congress appropriated \$75M for the CRC, which has since resulted in the recruiting of 67 of 250 CRC-Active component personnel (the full-time first responders) and 530 of 2000 CRC-

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Standby component personnel (those assigned other full-time duties but who train and volunteer to deploy when available). S/CRS hopes to have all 250 CRC-A and 1000 CRC-S in place by the end of FY 2010. We are pleased with this recent progress, but frankly, the small size of the CRC suggests DoD must continue to prepare for situations where its capabilities may be overwhelmed or where the threat situation prohibits their deployment.

To what extent, if any, should assumptions about future growth in, or the availability of, the military capabilities of our international partners and allies shape calculations of Defense Department requirements, force structure, and investment decisions?

We do account for allied and partner capabilities as we consider investment decisions, although we do so on the margins. However, we do not see any large increase in partner capacity forthcoming. There are exceptions; however. For example, as we consider worldwide distribution of missile defense assets, we continually assess (and encourage) the contributions of partner nations. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) resulted in an intensive 8-year effort to build the capacity of our coalition partners to work with us. At the height of our efforts in Iraq, we had 34 countries and 25,000 coalition troops deployed. Right now in Afghanistan, we have 41 countries and 37,000 deployed troops fighting along side us. I consider this a substantial accomplishment. These coalition forces have reduced requirements for the deployment of US forces and reduced the risk to US forces that are deployed. However, there is much more we can do and we need your help in a three areas.

First, we need authorization to use Section 1206 Global Train & Equip authority to train and equip coalition partners. DoD appreciates the recent clarification provided by the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate (HASC and SASC), respectively in their reports on the FY2010 NDAA bills, which endorse the use of 1206 to train and equip partners for participation in coalition operations in Afghanistan. We look forward to clarification being included in the FY10 NDAA bill that emerges from conference.

We currently have an appropriation that allows us to loan equipment, called the Defense Coalition Readiness Program, but our partners cannot keep it. This greatly complicates the problem of fielding coalition partners who have no way to maintain their readiness once a deployment is complete. Foreign partners such as Georgia, Jordan, Columbia, and many others are willing to conduct multiple deployments over a period of years, so it makes little sense to let their capabilities atrophy between each deployment and start over from scratch each time.

Second, the ceiling of \$350M on 1206 authority needs to increase. Every Geographic Commander has cited 1206 as the most important program they have to address rapidly threats and opportunities in their theater. Annual global demand is about \$800M per year and, once proposals vetted, we have about \$500M in quality strategic programs operating under a \$350M cap. If we expand the use of 1206 to train and equip coalition partners, the demand will only grow.

Third, for three years now, we have requested that the Congress grant us authority to establish a standing inventory of equipment that we know almost every coalition partner will need to deploy to the war fight. This year, we requested an appropriation of \$22M in addition to the authority. The lack of this authority creates very long lead times in the provision of equipment to foreign partners because they are often standing in line behind our own force

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requirements. In some cases, the lack of this authority has delayed deployment of coalition partners by 8-10 months, which simply increases risks to US forces.

A major operational effort in both Afghanistan and Iraq will be building their military and police forces' capability such that these forces can eventually take on the responsibility for securing their populations and fighting insurgents.

What organizational and operational realignments in military structure and resources, if any, are necessary to create, train, equip, and deploy U.S. personnel or units to meet these increased requirements for security force assistance?

Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is currently designated as the proponent for Security Forces Assistance (SFA) within DoD. In this role, they lead development of joint SFA doctrine; lead the development of joint SFA training and education for individuals and units; lead the identification of required joint SFA capabilities across all warfighting domains; lead the development of joint SFA mission essential ask lists; collaborate with Joint staff and USJFCOM, in coordination the Services and Geographic Combatant Commanders, to develop global joint sourcing solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces for validated SFA requirements; serve as a source of SFA expertise to Joint Task Forces or Combatant Command Headquarters; coordinate through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to consult with other USG agencies on future SFA-related initiatives, strategies, concepts and plans; and assist USD (P&R) in identifying critical SFA skills, training, and experience.

Additionally, as you may know, several years ago we established the Joint Center for International Security Assistance to capture and analyzes security force assistance lessons from contemporary operations in order to advise combatant commands and Military Departments on appropriate doctrine, practices, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions efficiently. That activity currently reports to me, but that alignment is under review. Finally, I should mention that all SFA-related activities in the Department are under review in the current Quadrennial Defense Review, which is assessing gaps in SFA capabilities, alignment of responsibilities and authorities, and SFA process.

With respect to your questions on police, DoD requires some capability to train and equip police forces to succeed in contingencies where a non-permissive environment either disallows or severely constrains the deployment of civilian professionals. But my strong preference is that the US Government develops a civilian expeditionary capability that includes a robust police training component. Until this exists, DoD will have to fill the gap, as we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Building Partner Capacity [\(return to index\)](#)

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”). There is growing debate over whether these temporary authorities should reside in the Department of Defense or the Department of State, if they are continued beyond their current authorizations.

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What should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Building the capacity of foreign partners to counter terrorism and promote regional stability around the world is an investment in a preventive strategy that is fundamental to our national strategy. There are several reasons why this is true. First, we can save American lives and reduce stress on U.S. forces by helping partners solve problems before they become crises that require major U.S. military interventions. Second, the U.S. does not have sufficient military forces to deny terrorists sanctuary everywhere in the world. So we must rely on partners: helping to build their capacity and creating networks of partners working together to counter terrorism. Third, if properly trained and equipped, foreign forces can often be more effective than U.S. forces because they know the language, politics, culture, and human terrain. Fourth, the enemy uses as a recruiting tool the large U.S. military footprints abroad. Capable foreign forces can alleviate requirements for large U.S. military footprints. Finally, the U.S. is at peace with many countries where terrorists enjoy sanctuary or where instability threatens our security interests. So we must work with and through them to help reduce terrorist space, capability, and influence and to help promote stability.

These concepts are now firmly embedded in our defense guidance documents and the Services and Combatant Commands have earnest efforts underway to implement that guidance. In DoD's Guidance for Employment of the Force, preservation of peace and security is as important as combat operations. DoD's Guidance for Development of the Force now puts a premium on development of US capabilities to assist foreign partners. Our global counter-terrorism plan, which has both kinetic and indirect lines of operation, now prioritizes the indirect lines (working with and through partners) as the decisive and priority lines. Two sweeping DoD Directives require the Services and Combatant Commands to develop capabilities to conduct stability operations and irregular warfare that are on par with combat capabilities. Finally, we have created the DoD Building Partnerships (BP) portfolio, one of nine portfolios that together are inclusive of all of the activities of the Department. Our BP Portfolio gives us a horizontal look across BP programs and activities within DoD so we can make better investment decisions in this important area.

What is your assessment of these temporary capacity-building authorities, in particular Section 1206 and Section 1207?

As stated above, each Geographic Commander has cited 1206 as the most important program he has to address rapidly threats and opportunities in their theater. State Department Ambassadors also speak very highly of this program. We consider it our gold standard security assistance program. It is critical to reducing military risk on a preventative basis. I will continue to advocate for a permanent authority.

1206's flexibility allows it to meet urgent and emerging threats or opportunities. Funds are not earmarked, but allocated against priorities using a merit-based process. It requires joint DoD-DoS formulation and approval of programs. This has brought about significantly improved interagency cooperation and effectiveness in meeting goals in the areas of building partnership capacity.

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In addressing train-and-equip authorities, the recent mark-up by the HASC recognized the significant and “fundamental distinction of purpose between [FMF] requirements generated on behalf of the partner nation (consistent with U.S. policy), and [Section 1206] requirements generated through a Department of Defense-led assessment of United States’ national security needs....” This recognition by the HASC is a significant and positive shift in philosophy.

1206 needs to be kept closely tied to DoD’s mission. It should not be used to (1) backfill DoS FMF shortfalls; (2) fund activities with long production times that will not meet priority military needs; (3) fund programs appropriately funded by other means (e.g., counternarcotics funds); or (4) serve as a tool of near-term convenience (e.g., a political quid pro quo).

There are some perpetual misconceptions about 1206 and DoD’s appropriate role in security assistance that I would like to clear up. Foremost, the program is often portrayed as a DoD run on a State Department mission. However, DoD has executed train and equip missions on behalf of the Secretary of State for decades. 1206 introduces only two innovations. It allows DoD to pay for security assistance programs, and it allows DoD to vote on which programs are implemented. In other words, complaints about 1206 are driven by concerns over budgetary jurisdictions that have nothing to do with national security or the prerogatives of the Department of State. SECSTATE exercises oversight of the program and DoD simply “pays” and also “votes.”

In my view, this shared jurisdictional model is a very good one. DoD requires shared jurisdiction with State over the provision of security assistance in cases where we bear the preponderance of risk, including risk to the lives of our service members. In my mind, there are four clear cases: 1) Combat operations where security assistance is a strategic imperative (i.e. Iraq Security Forces Fund, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund), 2) Security assistance to partners that directly affect the outcome of combat operations (Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund), 3) Security assistance to partners who will deploy with us for combat operations or other multi-national operations, and 4) Security assistance to respond to urgent threats or opportunities, to help partners solve problems before they become crises requiring major military interventions (e.g. 1206).

Our requirement for Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance authority is similar. DoD should be able to effect cash transfer to State for the execution of civilian assistance programs that buy down military risk. Stability in Haiti, for instance, has remained a concern. We know from historical experience that instability led to mass migration, triggering deployment of U.S. Forces to restore stability. We therefore supported a set of 1207 civilian programs that ultimately resulted in stabilization of Cite Sole, which for decades has been the major source of political instability in the capital. Those 1207 programs created an environment that was permissive enough to pave the way for millions of dollars of follow-up aid that reinforced the initial effort. Georgia is another good example. After Russia’s invasion of Georgia last year, Section 1207 was the most flexible and responsive program the US Government had to provide food and livelihood support to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and to rebuild police capacity. This was the first aid received by the Government of Georgia. It was critical to restoring stability, which was very much in our national security interest. Not every 1207 program is going to succeed or turn a country around, but we need the ability to look for opportunities like this to buy down security risks.

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What role should the combatant commander play in determining the security assistance requirements within the commander's area of responsibility?

The Secretary of Defense tasks Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop plans to achieve desired theater end states that support enhancement of US security and that of our allies. One of the most important tools they employ in the development of those plans is security assistance. But their plans are developed in coordination with country teams that include military security cooperation officers, and Combatant Command plans must also support Embassy mission strategic plans. The 1206 program exemplifies this model. Joint formulation of program proposals is highly encouraged and has become the norm, and Embassy and Combatant Command concurrence is required for any proposal to be considered. It is also important to note the critical role of the foreign partner, who must also agree to the program in support of a shared security interest.

What should be the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as DOD counternarcotics assistance and State Department foreign assistance and foreign military financing?

We are diligent in our de-confliction of 1206 with counter narcotics (CN) funds and have disapproved 1206 proposals that were clearly aimed at subsidizing CN efforts. That said, the Congress has disapproved some 1206 proposals in SOUTHCOM that we considered valid. In particular, we would like to use 1206 in SOUTHCOM to train and equip professional special operations forces to build additional defensive layers along our southern water border. Some Congressional staff have expressed the view that a terrorist threat must be extant in SOUTHCOM in order to use global train and equip. That is a pre-9/11 view of the world. Any terrorist organization can buy its way into the illicit networks and routes to our South. We would like the flexibility to train and equip foreign special operations forces that may not otherwise be a priority for counternarcotics funding.

With respect to foreign military financing (FMF), we consider this to be a long term strategic tool that is of importance to DoD and the US, but this program does operate under a number of significant constraints. The Administration has initiated a review of security assistance authorities, which will address some of these current constraints, and the Congress will likely see the results of that review in the form of change proposals in the next legislative cycle. I would prefer to defer on any other particulars pending the outcome of that review.

In the last few years, some of the security assistance provided has gone to countries that may have troubling records on human rights issues or civilian control of the military in the past. How do authorities like 1206 seek to ensure the near term, national security critical benefits of the assistance we provide do not produce long-term negative consequences?

Train-and-equip programs like Section 1206 help our partners gain security capabilities that can stabilize ungoverned areas, consequently depriving terrorist organizations of potential safe havens. This authority also assists our partners in securing their national borders, restoring legitimate authority, and establishing the rule of law—all elements that strengthen democracy and governance.

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As you know, the Department's current train-and-equip programs are implemented according to statutory requirements that no equipment, supplies, or training that are prohibited may be provided by any provision of law, nor may a capacity-building program be provided for any foreign country that is otherwise prohibited from receiving such type of assistance under any other provision of law. Both the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the Legal Adviser at the Department of State certify that each project complies with all legal requirements before they are approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State. In particular, we rely heavily on our colleagues at the Department of State for the vetting of recipient units in accordance with the Leahy amendments.

In addition to abiding by the statutory requirements, before implementing any train-and-equip program, we carefully assess, in close consultation with the Department of State, the potential political and military implications a program may have on partner nations. Program development and collaboration in the field between the Chief of Mission and the Combatant Commander is the first step in a rigorous inter-departmental process to target our security assistance toward appropriate military units within a country. This process continues in Washington through close coordination by the regional and functional offices at the Departments of Defense and State and culminates in approval by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Special efforts must be made to avoid human rights violations that can result from myopic security assistance efforts. As you are aware, under Section 1206, we are not authorized to provide equipment, supplies, or training to a foreign military unit unless it has been vetted for information regarding human rights violations by the Department of State. Both Departments consider the protection of human rights as a paramount concern, and we devote a considerable amount of time, analysis, and effort in critically vetting every proposed train-and-equip program to ensure the units receiving assistance do not have a history of human rights abuses. In addition to their role in vetting recipient units in accordance with the Leahy amendments, we also rely on our colleagues at the State Department to assess human rights and foreign policy implications broadly as part of the requirement for the Secretary of State's concurrence in all Section 1206 programs

Military train-and-equip programs must uphold the cornerstones of democracy—human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Please be assured that we share your concerns about promoting human rights, building enduring stability, and creating an environment for good governance to prevail.

In a speech to the Nixon Center in January, you argued for a whole-of-government approach and said that the military should be more willing to say when the Armed Forces are not “the best choice to take the lead.” You also said you would support transferring Department of Defense resources to other U.S. government departments when needed.

What factors do you believe should be considered in determining those situations in which the armed forces should step back from taking the lead in favor of other civilian agencies?

In a permissive environment, I believe the State Department should have the lead in the conducting of stability operations; with DoD in a supporting role, if required. This is playing out in our planning for the responsible drawdown in Iraq.

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Do you continue to see a need to be able to transfer DOD resources to other U.S. government departments?

Yes. We routinely run into situations where other Departments have the authority to conduct an activity that is critical to DoD, but they lack the funding to provide the support we need. I believe we should consider an authority whereby DoD could to exercise cash transfers to other Departments in certain circumstances – to reduce risk to the lives of our service members or other government employees, for instance, or to pay for an activity that will significantly reduce the cost of DoD operations. I would cite as an example our desire to provide air traffic control equipment to a particular Central Asian country, which would enable it to handle more of our logistics flights into Afghanistan. Because this nation’s air traffic control is provided by a contractor, DoD is challenged to find the authority to fund a capability that could save the U.S. Government millions of dollars in transportation costs.

Combatant Command Structure [\(return to index\)](#)

In recent years, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command have adopted command structures that embed civilian personnel from other government agencies, such as the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others.

What is your view of this type of command structure and do you believe it should be adopted by the other geographic combatant commands?

There is a clear need to continue our efforts to improve DOD/Inter-agency (IA) coordination. We continually asses and analyze our IA cooperation and coordination efforts, and will press forward with best practices and solutions. Nevertheless, there is no "one size fits all" Combatant Commander structural model for improving inter-agency coordination. I believe it is particularly appropriate for combatant commands that are not actively engaged in or potentially confronted by major combat operations, to investigate the feasibility of new structures and processes that support this goal.

USSOUTHCOM, for example, has adopted a strategy-focused staff organization with a goal of seamless interface with IA counterparts. USAFRICOM, on the other hand, has eliminated the traditional J-code structure, combining complimentary functions and significant structural modifications to accommodate the IA. Importantly, we have seen improvement in IA participation and coordination in both commands.

I would point out, however, that our other combatant commands are actively pursuing, and achieving, a high degree of inter-agency integration and cooperation.

All of these efforts strongly suggest we are on a positive trajectory toward our goal of achieving a comprehensive, integrated government- wide approach.

Special Operations Command [\(return to index\)](#)

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The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) recently submitted a number of proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense designed to improve the coordination between USSOCOM and the Services related to personnel management issues, including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. Included in these proposals was a modification of section 167 of title 10, United States Code, that would change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

Do you support a change to title 10, United States Code, to give the Commander of USSOCOM greater influence on personnel management decisions and policies related to special operations forces?

I support the coordination between USSOCOM and the Services related to personnel issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed this close coordination and included language in DoD Directive 5100.01 that meets the intent of USSOCOM Commander’s proposals. In discussion with the USSOCOM Commander and the Services, I believe that a modification to section 167 of title 10, United States Code is not needed at this time.

Earlier this year, the Commander of USSOCOM testified that “We are and will be dependent upon our Service partners for key force enablers. The non-availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment.”

Do you agree that there is a shortage of enablers for missions carried out by special operations forces? If so, how should these shortages be addressed?

Yes. Over the past few years, we have significantly grown our SOF combat capabilities, but did not proportionally grow enablers for those SOF elements. Since SOF elements are not sized or resourced to maintain a large support structure, the bulk of SOF enabler support must be provided by the Services or Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC).

To address these shortfalls, USSOCOM has begun several initiatives focused on internal reprioritization, growing their own force structure, and force management. Although USSOCOM currently estimates their current enabler shortage through 2015 to be approximately 30-35%, their proposed QDR 2010 initiatives would reduce those shortages by 10%. USSOCOM is currently considering a variety of other initiatives, including GCC and Service provided support, to address the remaining shortfalls, and once complete, will forward those for my review.

Army Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program [\(return to index\)](#)

The Department's fiscal year 2010 budget request includes cancellation of the family of armored manned ground vehicles in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. In announcing his decisions to restructure FCS and cancel the manned ground vehicle, and then again later in a speech at the Army War College, Secretary Gates emphasized his

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commitment to help the Army get a new ground combat vehicle in 5 to 7 years and promised to protect the Army's future year's funds that had been aligned with the FCS program for this purpose.

What, in your view, is the appropriate schedule for developing a new ground combat vehicle system?

I support Secretary Gates' commitment to help the Army field a new ground combat vehicle (GCV) in five to seven years. In the FY 2010 FCS budget decision, an important factor was the need to focus that investment on delivering useful military capability sooner than later. I think the timeline proposed by the Army is reasonable. It will help allow inclusion of the lessons from the current fight over time, to see what changes are needed, and incrementally make these changes.

What is the operational urgency, if any, in fielding a new ground combat vehicle (GCV) in a 5-7 year timeframe?

We have learned much over the last eight years of war. The Department must strike a balance between what equipment is needed for today's fight with what equipment is desired for the future. Persistent conflict and the complex nature of the threat are re-defining the timelines for modernization. The enemy is more rapidly adapting its tactics to exploit weaknesses in our current combat vehicles, even as enhancements are made to counter those changing threats. Some of our combat vehicles have increased vulnerabilities due to space, weight, and power limitations that cannot be resolved by further upgrades alone as with the Bradley Fight Vehicle (BFV) and the M113 Family of Vehicles (FoVs). Despite our enhancements, survivability and vehicle protection requirements clearly demonstrate the need for a faster and more flexible ground combat vehicle acquisition approach to field capabilities quickly and efficiently, when and where needed. The Joint Staff is supporting the Army as they fundamentally relook their requirements for a new GCV, as well as the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization strategy. The Army is also working closely with the Marine Corps in this refocused effort, and is scheduled to outline its requirements way ahead to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council this fall.

Are you confident that DOD will protect the Army's original FCS funds to start and sustain a new ground vehicle modernization program?

Yes. The Department is committed to start a new GCV modernization program that strikes the right balance to address the span of threats current and in the future that we will likely face. There will be challenges ahead to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our force with investments that pay dividends today, tomorrow, and well into the future.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that DOD provides the funds as promised?

If confirmed, I will remain fully committed to providing the best possible military advice to our Nation's leaders and to ensure the necessary resources are provided to strike the right

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balance to prevail in our current conflicts while also maintaining, equipping, and preparing the force for the challenges of tomorrow. I believe that the new GCV modernization program is part of the Army effort to strike this balance.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

[\(return to index\)](#)

Recently, the Office of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) launched the TACSAT 3 small satellite with a payload, know as Artemis, that can be used by commanders in the field. ORS is also in the process of developing an additional small satellite, ORSSAT 1, specifically designed to be taskable by the commanders in the field.

In your view, how will these small satellites provide additional needed ISR capability not currently available in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

Small, low cost satellites can provide the joint warfighter with highly responsive capabilities to meet unanticipated or otherwise unmet needs.

TACSAT-3 was designed to assess the military utility of hyper-spectral imaging and test real-time data downlink to a theater. Once the demonstration is complete, residual capability/capacity may be available to the warfighter to support theater needs.

ORS-1 is intended to exercise our ability to quickly provide capability to the warfighter. Once built and launched, it is anticipated it will meet specific CENTCOM needs.

Lessons learned from these activities might not only assist filling current joint warfighter needs, but also improve our nation's ability to provide options to meet future joint warfighter needs.

Reductions in Nuclear Weapons

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The President has made a commitment with Russian President Medvedev to bilaterally reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.

Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads, both reserve and operationally deployed are feasible?

I believe the United States, with similar reductions by Russia, can reduce the total number of nuclear warheads, and still maintain an effective deterrent. The New START Treaty negotiations do not address nuclear weapons in reserve status, only operationally deployed weapons. The proposed range of 500-1100 strategic delivery vehicles (which includes heavy bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs) and a limit of 1500-1675 warheads will be sufficient to maintain U.S. strategic deterrence. The currently on-going Nuclear Posture Review is looking at these potential reductions in both its international dimensions and from a stockpile and infrastructure perspective and is fully informing our START Follow-On negotiating team. This review will help us ultimately decide on the supportable limits.

Do you believe reductions in the total number of START accountable delivery systems could also be reduced in a bilateral context?

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Yes. In the Joint Understanding issued by both President Obama and Russian President Medvedev, it stated that each nation would determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. This is as in past agreements, where the U.S. has opted to maintain a larger force structure of delivery vehicles with a smaller number of warheads associated with each. The Russian Federation has done the opposite and has maintained fewer strategic delivery vehicles with a larger number of warheads associated with each. Therefore, while the number of START accounted delivery systems can be reduced, these sovereign choices may require a negotiated range of delivery vehicles.

If your answer to the two questions above is yes, how should capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?

The Nuclear Posture Review, which has been underway for several months, is examining that exact issue. Specific reductions in warhead types or delivery systems have to be studied carefully to assess the impact on military requirements while being cognizant of the challenges associated with maintaining a rapidly aging stockpile. The review is taking into consideration practical reductions in the role and number of nuclear weapons in order to strengthen our nuclear deterrent and enhance the security environment. The review is looking at over 100 separate program items and is taking into consideration maintenance of the nuclear triad and its associated warheads. The final recommendations will be a product of national security strategy guidance, stability and stockpile management. In addition, we will evaluate our capabilities and requirements with a continued focus on major power stability and an increased emphasis on extended deterrence and assurance of our allies and friends.

Nuclear Force Structure [\(return to index\)](#)

With the recent changes in operations and management in the Air Force designed to address the problems from the last decade that culminated in the mistaken transport of nuclear weapons on a B-52 bomber, there appear to be significant improvements in the nuclear enterprise. One of the underlying causes of the many problems was a lack of attention and support for the nuclear enterprise from senior military and civilian leadership.

How will you ensure that the senior leadership is provided?

The mission of safeguarding our vital nuclear capabilities and maintaining our nuclear deterrence mission requires leadership at the highest levels. Even though the Air Force has made good strides in addressing some of the problems from the last decade, there is more to be done.

Work is already underway to place a greater emphasis on the nuclear deterrent mission within the Joint Staff and the Services. I have directed standup of an organization on the Joint Staff headed by a senior executive service civilian to focus on the nuclear mission, and am devoting additional staff resources to enhance development of nuclear strategy, plans, policies, exercises, and analysis. I am also directing the Joint Staff to assess resourcing and timelines for

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developing curricula to educate joint officers in deterrence theory and nuclear doctrine in order to provide for future leadership.

I am providing pertinent program inputs to enhance the requirements development process via the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who serves as my representative to the Nuclear Weapons Council. The Vice Chairman is also deeply involved in addressing many of the issues and concerns associated with strengthening the nuclear enterprise within the department. This is an important leadership role that I take very seriously and will continue to emphasize as we work to bolster confidence in our nuclear deterrence capabilities.

I also strongly support the services' efforts to correct the mistakes of the recent past and prevent their reoccurrence, as well as strengthen senior leadership involvement within the greater U.S. nuclear enterprise. I fully endorse the changes made by the Air Force to date, including forming a strategic deterrence and nuclear integration directorate within the Air Staff and their recent standup of a new major "Air Force Global Strike Command," which will be responsible for the organize, train, and equip functions for nuclear operations within their service component.

Some concern has been expressed that future reductions in nuclear weapons and delivery systems will once again undermine the ability to manage the nuclear enterprise effectively.

How will you ensure that the necessary reductions in the nuclear arsenal do not undermine the need to maintain the arsenal and ensure that it is secure and accounted for?

The security and reliability of our nation's nuclear stockpile is of paramount importance. We must be vigilant against the tendency to believe that a reduction coincides with a de-emphasis. The Air Force has taken significant steps over the last two years to improve its organizational alignment and command focus. The Services, U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff are also working closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy to ensure that the nuclear enterprise remains effective in supporting the stockpile even as we continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

We need top down focus on the recapitalization of an aging Department of Defense and Department of Energy infrastructure. I view this as a critical requirement, and plan to work closely with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Service Chiefs, and Congressional leadership to place greater emphasis on the need to invest for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility

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Do you support closing the detention facility at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?

Yes, I have said so publicly since 2005. I support the President's decision to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay. On 22 January 2009, President Obama signed

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Executive Order 13492 ordering the closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay within one year. We are making every effort to meet that deadline.

The Joint Staff and DoD are working with departments and agencies across the U.S. Government to conduct a comprehensive review of our detention policy and to develop a plan for closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.

Future of NATO ([return to index](#))

In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next five years?

NATO should concentrate its strategic efforts first on Afghanistan. This will require continuing emphasis on sustaining and increasing the international community's support and resourcing of our efforts on the ground in Afghanistan. Strategic outreach, engagement, and cooperation with the international community, to include the European Union and the United Nations, and other appropriate organizations remain critical to this approach.

I believe that other strategic priorities for NATO include: the move to deterrent presence in Kosovo; consolidating gains and further capacity-building in Iraqi security forces through the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I); and counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa. This latter mission is closely linked to NATO support to the African Union, which can address some of the root causes of piracy.

In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next five years?

The question of NATO enlargement is largely a political one that must be addressed by President and the Congress for the United States, and by the governments of the other 27 NATO nations.

Are you satisfied with the progress of NATO member nations, particularly new member nations, in transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations? Where do you see room for improvement?

Yes. While Allied progress in these three areas varies from nation to nation, each nation is continuing, within its own means and capabilities, to make progress. Much of this progress is driven by the increasing demands of the many on-going NATO-led operations, particularly, the operation in Afghanistan. The participation of the Alliance and of each of its individual member States over the past six years in ISAF is producing forces that are increasingly more deployable and sustainable. It has also resulted in the development of enhanced Alliance capabilities, and has significantly improved the interoperability between not only U.S. and other Allied forces, but also between the 28 NATO nations and the 14 other partner nations participating in this operation.

Despite the Alliance's accomplishments, I believe that NATO must continue to develop its capability for response to evolving threats and challenges in new ways. Cyber warfare and counter-piracy are areas in which the Alliance can further its ability to work in a comprehensive

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manner with other international organizations like the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and non-governmental organizations. Working in concert with these entities clearly enhances the Alliance's ability to address emerging threats as well as existing challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is also work to do on the defense investment front. Only five European nations consistently meet the NATO goal of investing at least 2% of GDP in defense. Many NATO countries need to invest more.

What steps if any could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

NATO should continue to use the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the primary mechanism for Russian and Allied consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, and as the forum for dialogue with Russia with a view towards resolving problems and building practical co-operation. In fact, the NRC Foreign Ministers met in Greece on 27 June where, among other things they identified common security interests, such as the stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, crisis management, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-piracy.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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In connection with your first nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you answered questions on your support for U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Do you stand by your answers provided at that time expressing support for U.S. accession to the convention?

I continue to stand by my answers. I am on record in Senate and House hearings on the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention in 2003 and 2004 fully supporting United States accession to it. In all there have been eight full committee Congressional hearings since 2003. All views have been fully aired. The time has come to stop going over the same ground. I urge the Senate to provide its advice and consent as soon as possible. Since President Reagan's direction in March 1983, U.S. armed forces have been implementing and relying on the Convention around the world.

By remaining outside the Convention, we give up the firmer foundation of treaty law for navigational rights vital to our global mobility. There are significant national security impacts from failing to join the Convention.

- *The US must accede to the Convention to remain the leader in the development of the law of the sea and to protect our national security.*
- *With over 150 countries that have ratified the Convention (including all our major allies except Israel and Turkey), the failure to join maintains the United States in non-party status with Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela.*
- *Global security depends upon a partnership of maritime nations sharing common goals and values. One of the most important of those values is respect for the rule of*

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law. By failing to join the Convention, some countries doubt our commitment to act in accordance with international law.

- *The United States is outside the process that influences law of the sea developments such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority (where we would have blocking authority on deep seabed claims), and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (which will rule on claims by Arctic nations, such as Russia).*
- *We do not have access to the sole process for gaining international recognition with legal certainty of our sovereign resource rights beyond 200 nautical miles, especially in the Arctic where Russia has already made efforts to stake its claims. The US is the only Arctic nation not a party to the Convention.*

Military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense have consistently articulated their support for accession to the convention and have stressed the benefits for our national security.

What is being done within DOD and the military departments to help secure U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention?

We have continued to express our clear support for the Convention to the new Administration, as we did with the past Administration. We were pleased to see that the Convention is listed as one of the Obama Administration's Treaty priorities. We have strongly advocated for the Convention in the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, in which the Joint Staff participates. Finally, and most important, our military continues to rely on the provisions of the Convention—for example: in the conduct of counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa, to transit through the Strait of Hormuz, or to conduct military activities in the Pacific—demonstrating by our actions that the Convention helps us protect our national security.

United Nations Peacekeeping

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In recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.” She also pointed out that the U.S. currently has 93 personnel assigned to UN operations, fewer than 65 other member states including the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council.

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel to both observer and staff positions in support of UN peacekeeping operations?

Current US military operations proscribe any substantial commitments of US forces to UN Peacekeeping missions and I do not see that changing for the foreseeable future. However,

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as our commitments change we will weigh opportunities for a more active role in support of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

I consider UN peacekeeping operations to be extremely important and cost effective in comparison to unilateral operations. The US contributes slightly more than one-quarter of the UN peacekeeping budget, and when requested, we coordinate support to UN operations such as airlift, intelligence, and the deployment of highly skilled military staff officers/observers to assist the UN in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations. The UN currently has about 95,000 uniformed peacekeepers deployed worldwide and this number is growing. These peacekeepers help promote stability and help reduce the risks that major US military interventions may be required to restore stability in a country or region. Therefore, the success of these operations is very much in our national interest.

By law, I maintain a small division in support of the UN Military Staff Committee. These officers directly support Ambassador Rice and we are in the process of boosting that staff from three to ten. This division is working closely with UN Force Generation Services to increase the number of US staff officers and observers assigned to UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, these officers are working to ensure UN peacekeeping mandates have realistic objectives and attainable goals.

Finally, my staff, in coordination with the State Department and Combatant commands, also assists with development and execution of plans to grow peacekeepers around the world through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative. As of June 2009, over 81,000 military personnel from 75 countries have been trained.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to UN operations?

In some circumstances, US participation and leadership can act as a catalyst that encourages other nations to participate. We recognize that some countries might be more inclined to contribute military forces if the U.S. commits forces to UN peacekeeping efforts, especially specialized capabilities and skills that are in short supply. In addition, US participation can certainly improve the prospects for mission success because we do have the most capable military forces in the world. That said, however, U.S. military forces are not necessarily what the UN needs the most from the U.S. There are political and regional sensitivities that need to be taken into consideration when deploying Western troops to developing nations. So it is often more efficacious for the U.S. to contribute enabling capabilities, either unilaterally or together with partners, and in some circumstances, skilled military staff that have high mission leverage but a small footprint.

Congressional Oversight [\(return to index\)](#)

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important to this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

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Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to the appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes

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