

**Written Statement by Dr. Doug Stone to
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the
Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate**

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee thank you for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on the U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremism.

I begin my remarks on with the assertion that our Nation faces the constant threat of terrorist actions from violent Islamists.

In an effort to recruit and grow their ideological insurgency within the Muslim global community and in an effort focused on “altering” the mainstream ideology of the Ummah towards a specific and fundamental orientation, this effort must recruit.

Indeed to be successful in this effort, they must recruit significant numbers.

Thus, the asymmetrical use of terrorism, a common precursor tactic in most insurgencies, is to establish fear and intimidation in order to change policy, and attract recruits to their cause. Terrorism, as a prolonged tactic, without resulting in significant recruiting rarely achieves the ideological objective of the force employing the tactic. The reason is that to be effective terrorism must kill civilians in a marquee event, and over time, without winning over that population, the insurgent cause is lost. Force of such kind can win, fear and intimidation can prevail, but terrorists, by killing those they want to convert, run a risk of alienating that same population. Tribal in nature, and often in strategic and tactical employment, the terrorists we encounter today understand this risk to recruiting if they kill or offend the “wrong” members of the community. Therefore, killing American’s in general, is an aligning function and helps recruiting.

It is vital that this sub-committee, our government, and our citizens not alter the desired end state but focus all energies on a broad range of existent and new talents and techniques to neutralize this threat. I believe there are three precepts to begin with:

1. Identify terrorism as a war fighting tactic.
2. Identify the true enemy as “violent Islamists”.
3. Identify the true aim of the ideological cause as a “conversion” of the Ummah, the body of global Islamic believers.

By so doing, I hope to answer your question by saying that our National efforts, to counter this threat must be focused on, in part, reducing the likelihood of the violent Islamists ability to recruit in globally significant numbers.

I will state my own definition of the desired end state in this ideological fight; “This ideological war ends when the non-violent Muslims feel empowered and then cause the violent Islamists within their faith, to be marginalized”.

To this end, while our military forces (active and reserve, CONUS and OCONUS based) must provide for the common defense, we must recognize that other agencies are needed, as are non-traditional -- perhaps non-existent --- skill sets; new measures of success; different alliances; and new approaches that enable precise human intelligence gathering and sound policing techniques in order to thwart the efforts of those committed to violent Islamic ideologies and practices.

To defend ourselves we need a clear, coordinated, and national campaign across multiple disciplines---education for our own leadership and citizenry; the constant development of new techniques in new populations across many nations. Some of those techniques will be comfortable, some hostile, and in ways that tomorrow will seem common sense, but today feel odd maybe even threatening. We need to speak the languages, read the texts, argue the arguments in context, and engage in directed efforts to both de-mystify the threat and to disarm it. We need to establish metrics of success, new definitions of “winning”, new definitions of “fighting”, and active and engaged problem solving from not just the halls of our Federal government but from our entire citizenry, rallying them to understand what the threat is, and how they can provide for our common defense.

To gain clear and actionable intelligence that proactively defends our citizens, while protecting our rule of law and liberties. We must know the enemy, and know and thwart his intentions. Simply put, we must align with those Muslims, who in each community can provide clear warning of such intentions.

This means that we must engage in person and across cyber-space -- in community groups, with religious leadership, educators, prison officials, and families both within our borders and outside of them where the threat of recruiting might generate. We must “out recruit” and offer alternate ideologies, and different dialogues now offered by violent Islamists. More importantly, we must be mindful not to employ tactics that will enhance the enemy's ability to recruit -- as the example of Abu Gharib so clearly illustrates.

Concurrently, we must demonstrate that whether detainee or citizen we have respect for the rights of an individual and preserve their dignity; yet we must accept the necessity of killing and capturing those who pose a direct war-fighting threat to our citizens and national interests. For the mission to succeed these two pillars must stand side by side yet remain separate and equal.

The U.S. Government agency with the greatest funding can usually direct the approach. DOD rightly has a large budget, but to counter this challenge, we need to increase resources, both capital and human, in many areas of our government, other than DOD in an effort to discover the right balance of engagements necessary to counter this threat.

To recruit, when not practicing the techniques of fear and intimidation, violent Islamists have effectively employed radicalization to the cause. Altering the belief structure of an individual such that they willingly discard all other forms of belief, oaths, family ties and societal norms and choose to willingly participate in advancing the cause of the violent Islamist ideological effort, and to act as a recruiting example, by conducting violent acts of terrorism---including and quite commonly suicide bombings.

The process of violent Islamic radicalization is reasonably well known, and I over simplify by saying that it has three steps:

1. The West, led by the United States, is engaged in a war against Islam.
2. Muslims are obligated to defend their religion and there are theological justifications for doing so.
3. Violence is the necessary means to defend the religion.

What is less well studied in our Nation, is how to address this radicalization process. Critical to our defense, is learning who this enemy is, how to counter this process wherever it may attempt to recruit, and to attack this non-kinetic objective with the same competency that we use kinetics. Along with the Muslim community, we need to create a global counter initiative, which results in slowing this radicalization and resultant recruiting effort. This is an asymmetrical form of war-fighting that requires education, alliance with Muslim religious leadership, interviews, interrogation, detention, the direct countering of ideological claims, the engagement of families, and efforts in economic development as well as teaching the skills of security and defense.

By definition asymmetrical war-fighting must engage the sectors of our government charged with foreign policy, justice, protection of our borders, education, humanitarian and relief efforts, outreach to at risk populations to understand what programs or tactics are necessary to turn an at risk population into an ally.

Using kinetics DOD can create room for this type of asymmetrical war-fighting to be carried out. One cannot exist without the other. This will require a cultural shift within the military leadership, our armed forces, and our governmental and non-governmental partners. DOD and our military forces recognize at all levels that kinetics is not always the best or only answer. Non-military agencies and organizations will need to understand that the threat posed by radical Islamist is real and immediate and that kinetics will provide the safe harbor to begin the “social”

work that must be done. If we are to succeed our citizenry will need to understand and support this critical shift to 21st century war-fighting.

Key to this success will be that we find and support those in the Muslim faith, in leadership and non-leadership, tribal and non-tribal, secular and non-secular roles to counter the narrative of violent Islamists, and to co-develop the full range of techniques and skill sets needed to counter radicalization and recruiting.

As we sit in the halls that make our laws, across from the other two branches of our Government that enforce and judge those laws, I want to remind you that for the violent Islamists, that concept--of a rule of law different than God's Law—Sharia, is violently inconsistent with their own belief. There is no need but for Sharia, judged by the Ulema, and its basis is the Holy Quran.

To fail to internalize this reality is to fail to understand the motivations of most of these warriors for God. It is also why, at the extreme, this is the battlefield of the mind, and as much an ideological battle for the definition of a global citizen as it is about which rule of law should be the rule of the land. Violent Islamists believe in only one interpretation of that concept. And while they are not trying to change our Constitution or its foundation, so clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence -- the concepts therein must, in their minds, be subservient to Sharia.

This makes the challenge of this ideological war unique, one that mandates new learning by our own leadership and citizenship about a new enemy, by the need for the creation of new alliances, by new and clear clarification of goals, by clear knowledge between defensive actions and offensive actions, and in examining the physical and ideological borders of our own Nation as we provide for our citizen's common defense, in this, yet another challenge to our revolutionary concepts that all men are created equal, under a rule of law, with the freedom to believe as their own judgment best guides.

Again, let me thank you Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee for the honor of appearing before you today. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.