

Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES

## **UNITED STATES SENATE**

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE FINDINGS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON COURT REPORTING  
1029 VERMONT AVE, NW  
10TH FLOOR  
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1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE FINDINGS AND  
2 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
3 STRATEGY

4  
5 Tuesday, July 30, 2024

6  
7 U.S. Senate

8 Committee on Armed Services

9 Washington, D.C.  
10

11 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in  
12 Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Jack Reed,  
13 chairman of the committee, presiding.

14 Committee Members Present: Senators Reed [presiding],  
15 Shaheen, Gillibrand, Hirono, Kaine, King, Manchin, Wicker,  
16 Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tuberville, and Schmitt.  
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1           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 RHODE ISLAND

3           Chairman Reed: Good morning. The committee meets  
4 today to discuss the final report of the commission on the  
5 National Defense Strategy, or NDS. The NDS Commission was  
6 established in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense  
7 Authorization Act with the mandate of assessing the 2022  
8 NDS, and the department's efforts to successfully implement  
9 it.

10           During today's hearing, the committee will receive the  
11 commission's evaluation of the National Security challenges  
12 we face, whether the force planning construct in the 2022  
13 NDS remains valid, and the effectiveness of the Defense  
14 Department's implementation of the NDS. The Commissioner  
15 was shared by the Honorable Jane Harman, who served nine  
16 terms in Congress as the U.S. representative from  
17 California's 36 Congressional District and was Ranking  
18 Member of the Intelligence Committee for four years after  
19 911.

20           The Commission's Vice Chair Ambassador Eric Edelman is  
21 currently counselor at the Center for Strategy and  
22 Budgetary Assessments and served previously as  
23 undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 to 2009, and  
24 as U.S. Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, and really, I  
25 want to commend the commission for the extraordinary work

1 you've done. Very, very proud of your effort, and I know  
2 it was intense work over many, many months, so thank you  
3 very, very much.

4 I'm pleased of course to welcome the chair and vice  
5 chair but I also want to congratulate their fellow  
6 commissioners General Jack Keane, Thomas Mahnken, Mara  
7 Rudman, Mariah Sixkiller, Alissa Starzak, and Roger  
8 Zakheim. Together, you did a remarkable job. The 2022  
9 National Defense Strategy was written prior to Russia's  
10 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the evolution of the  
11 strategic partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and  
12 North Korea.

13 Nonetheless, the 2022 NDS provides an important  
14 framework for America's national security. The NDS ranks  
15 China as the most consequential strategic competitor,  
16 identifies Russia as an acute threat, and addresses the  
17 persistent challenges from authoritarian regimes and  
18 violent extremists. Indeed, I believe that we currently  
19 face the most dangerous complex security environment since  
20 World War II.

21 To address these challenges, the NDS proposes four  
22 broad missions for the Department of Defense, which include  
23 defending the U.S. homeland, deterring strategic attacks  
24 against the United States and its allies, and partners  
25 deteriorating aggression while being prepared to prevail in

1 a conflict and building a resilient joint force and defense  
2 ecosystem. The NDS also outlined several priorities of  
3 building joint capabilities, including the concept of  
4 integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that will  
5 build enduring advantages.

6 And these are well reasoned priorities. I understand  
7 that the NDS Commission agrees broadly with these  
8 objectives but has concluded that the Department of Defense  
9 is not adapting at the speed or scale necessary to achieve  
10 them or meet today's threats. The commission recommends a  
11 fundamental change in the way we approach our national  
12 defense including an overhaul of the defense department's  
13 relationships with the U.S. interagency and our allies.

14 A significant investment in the defense industrial  
15 base and a restructuring of departments acquisition and  
16 procurement process. I look forward to hearing the  
17 commission's specific recommendations on how to make  
18 targeted investments and reforms in these areas. Notably,  
19 the commission concludes that 2022 NDS does not provide an  
20 adequate force structure to handle simultaneous conflicts  
21 in multiple theaters.

22 The commission proposes a multiple theater force  
23 construct that would resize and restructure the joint force  
24 to match regional threats and integrate with regional  
25 allies. I would appreciate our witnesses further

1 explaining this construct in what challenges the  
2 departments may face in implementing it. At its core, the  
3 2022 NDS requires all elements of national power, including  
4 military, diplomatic, and economic to maintain a stable and  
5 open international system.

6 However, the commission concludes that America's civil  
7 society must also be reinvigorated as a source of national  
8 power. The American public must be educated on the threats  
9 we face and encouraged to engage in national service,  
10 whether through the military or civil service, and I  
11 support the Commission's urgent call to engage more in this  
12 area. Ultimately, the 2022 NDS recognizes that the U.S.  
13 must modernize and strengthen our military.

14 This will require smart investments in platforms and  
15 equipment, rapid development and integration of cutting-  
16 edge technologies, and steadfast support for our service  
17 members and national security workforce. I will welcome  
18 the Christians' insights on how the department is adapting  
19 to these complicated issues and the challenges of great  
20 power competition.

21 In light of the wide-ranging global security  
22 challenges presented by Chinese aggression in the Indo-  
23 Pacific region, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the  
24 persistent terrorist threat posed by extremist groups and  
25 rogue regimes, the committee would appreciate the

1 commission's assessment of the resources necessary to  
2 prevail in strategic competition, as well as its  
3 recommendations for strengthening U.S. global engagement  
4 and alliances.

5 Let me again thank the members and staff of the  
6 commission. We look forward to your testimony. Before  
7 recognizing Senator Wicker, we have a quorum and I would  
8 like to proceed with your permission. Since the quorum is  
9 not present, I ask the committee to consider a list of  
10 3,135 pending military nominations and two civilian  
11 nominations.

12 First, I ask the committee to consider a list of 3,135  
13 pending military nominations. All of these nominations  
14 have been for the committee, the required length of time.  
15 Is there a motion to favor to report this list of 3,135  
16 pending military nominations to this?

17 Senator Wicker: So moved.

18 Chairman Reed: Is there a second?

19 Senator Fischer: Second.

20 Chairman Reed: All in favor say aye.

21 [Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]

22 Chairman Reed: The motion carries. Finally, I ask  
23 the committee to consider the following civilian  
24 nominations; Ms. Tonya P. Wilkerson to be Under Secretary  
25 of Defense for Intelligence Security, and Dr. Michael L.

1 Sulmeyer to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber  
2 Policy. Is there a motion to favorably report these two  
3 nominations?

4 Senator Wicker: So moved.

5 Chairman Reed: Is there a second?

6 Senator Fischer: Second.

7 Chairman Reed: All in favor say aye.

8 [Voice vote. Chorus of ayes.]

9 Chairman Reed: The motion carries. Thank you very,  
10 very much. Senator Wicker, please.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 MISSISSIPPI

3 Senator Wicker: Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I  
4 want to congratulate you on a very fine opening statement  
5 which I fully subscribe to. We have two very distinguished  
6 witnesses today and this may possibly be the most important  
7 hearing we will have this year. But I have to say I very  
8 much appreciate the service of Representative Harman and  
9 Ambassador Edelman. Let's go back six years.

10 This committee began holding hearings on the first  
11 National Defense Strategy Commission report which reviewed  
12 the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The first NDS report  
13 was important, helped us make significant bipartisan  
14 progress toward improving our national defense. We lost  
15 Chairman Jim Inhofe just a few weeks ago. Many of us will  
16 remember that he in particular, admired that report.

17 He would often hold the report up and wave it around  
18 at hearings. His enthusiasm proved that the NDS served as  
19 a guiding light for him, and it prompted all of us to  
20 consider the report's recommendations. The global security  
21 environment has worsened much faster than we expected back  
22 in 2018. The first time that the first line of a new 2024  
23 NDS commission report summarizes the situation in which we  
24 find ourselves.

25 "The threats the United States faces are the most

1 serious and most challenging the nation has encountered  
2 since 1945 and include the potential for near term major  
3 war." A dramatic and forceful statement. It turns out  
4 that the commission believes that we are not at all where  
5 we need to be and I think members of the committee  
6 understand this. We understand clearly there's no time to  
7 waste.

8 The commission report notes that our military capacity  
9 and capabilities are insufficient to meet the current  
10 requirements at acceptable risk. The document details the  
11 way in which the 2022 National Defense Strategy and  
12 Assessment completed just two years ago did not adequately  
13 account for the threat of simultaneous and increasingly  
14 coordinated military action by our four primary  
15 adversaries. A group which I have come to call the axis of  
16 aggressors.

17 The report correctly notes that with the possible  
18 exception of the Department of Defense, the U.S. government  
19 is not acting with alacrity or making so-called whole of  
20 government strategies more than simply a buzzword. It  
21 amply describes our hollow brittle defense industrial base  
22 and painfully byzantine bureaucratic process. The report  
23 also finds that we cannot fix these problems without  
24 increasing defense spending.

25 Thankfully, this committee has added a \$25 billion top

1 line increase for the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Even that  
2 increase, a 3.8 percent nominal edition would fall short of  
3 the commission's recommendation fall well short. The  
4 report endorses a 3 to 5 percent real increase this year  
5 with inflation running above 2 percent.

6 I appreciate the commission's recommendation that  
7 national security spending must return to late Cold War  
8 levels. A goal which matches my plan to spend 5 percent  
9 eventually of GDP on defense. That level of investment  
10 would be temporary. It would be a down payment on the  
11 rebuilding of our national defense. Tools, for a  
12 generation, tools that have sharpened can reduce the risk  
13 that our adversaries will use military force against U.S.  
14 interests, peace through strength.

15 The 2018 and 2022 defense strategies both recommended  
16 a vague force sizing requirement. The mandate called for  
17 the U.S. military to have sufficient forces to defeat  
18 either China or Russia in a major conflict while  
19 simultaneously deterring other adversaries. That force  
20 sizing construct failed to provide a useful measuring stick  
21 by which to determine the ideal size and capability of the  
22 U.S. military.

23 I would appreciate the commissioners expanding upon  
24 their new force sizing construct, which proposes that we be  
25 able to lead coalitions that can defeat both China and

1 Russia, while continuing to maintain deterrence elsewhere.  
2 I would also like our witnesses to explain a claim they  
3 make in the report. The document contends that the  
4 American public does not appreciate the threat environment  
5 and therefore does not understand why strong defense is  
6 necessary to ensure a bright future for our country.

7 Very perceptive, this is a perspective that echoes  
8 concerns expressed by the recent Congressional Strategic  
9 Posture Commission. I'm of the opinion that this is  
10 largely the fault of the U.S. government, the executive and  
11 legislative branches alike, for failing to make the case to  
12 the American people. Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on.  
13 I would simply say that I appreciate the great a great deal  
14 of the commission report.

15 I'm grateful for the work of all eight bipartisan  
16 commissioners and their staff. Thank you for calling each  
17 and every name of the Commissioners and I hope their labor  
18 can help guide us as we write a new national defense  
19 strategy and the legislation that will follow to allow us  
20 to regain our military edge and avoid wars in the years to  
21 come. Again, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your  
22 opening statement and I subscribe to it and I yield back.  
23 Thank you, sir.

24 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.  
25 Now, let me recognize Chairwoman Harman.

1           STATEMENT OF JANE M. HARMAN, CHAIR, COMMISSION ON THE  
2 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

3           Ms. Harman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it's a  
4 pleasure to appear before you Ranking Member Wicker and so  
5 many other members of this committee whom I serve within  
6 the house and who are very good friends. I'm happy to be  
7 back. And as you know, Mr. Chairman, I almost wasn't back  
8 today because yesterday afternoon at Boston Children's  
9 Hospital, my youngest child, a daughter, had very  
10 experimental surgery, which has resulted we hope in her  
11 fetus becoming healthy.

12           And hopefully she will give birth in a few weeks and  
13 it's quite a miracle. And obviously, I was going to stay  
14 there if things had not gone well. But I mentioned this,  
15 not only because it's top of mind but also because it makes  
16 clear how amazing this country is and how important what we  
17 offer in terms of healthcare, and other services, and  
18 benefits to the American people is, and it's worth fighting  
19 for this country.

20           And that's what our report is about. We try to make  
21 the case about how it is worth fighting for our country.  
22 And some pundits have already said, well, it's a good  
23 report, but it'll gather dust on shelves. I sure hope not.  
24 Our commission on a bipartisan basis was unanimous in our  
25 recommendations and we are dedicated to making sure they

1 get implemented. And I just suggest to you and I listen to  
2 your opening statements.

3 I think you're dedicated on a bipartisan basis to  
4 making that happen too. So, let's not waste a minute, in  
5 that vein, Eric Edelman, our vice chair, who co-chaired the  
6 last commission is sitting next to me and I will yield to  
7 him in just a moment. But let me make a few points. Our  
8 commissioners who are sitting on a bipartisan basis right  
9 over there have been introduced Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman,  
10 and Roger Zakheim.

11 But you did not introduce the vaunted staff sitting  
12 behind me on a bipartisan basis. Aably led by David  
13 Grannis, whom you may know was the Chief of Staff to the  
14 late Dianne Feinstein for many years here, and who was  
15 originally hired by me in my capacity as a member of the  
16 house. You've mentioned when the NDS was written, you've  
17 mentioned when we were created but I just underscore again  
18 that we think and you said it too, that the threats to U.S.  
19 national security and our interests are greater than any  
20 time since World War II.

21 And more complex than any threats during the Cold War.  
22 Significant and urgent action is needed. We recommend  
23 fundamental change in the way the Pentagon and other  
24 government agencies do business, the way they incorporate  
25 private sector technology, and a full embrace of our

1 partners and allies. Shorthand for this is we recommend  
2 using all elements of national power.

3 Our report includes actionable recommendations which  
4 we will highlight in just a moment, including one that is  
5 being implemented today, and that is telling the public how  
6 grave the threats are. Sadly, we think, and I'm sure you  
7 agree, that the public has no idea how great the threats  
8 are and is not mobilized to meet them.

9 Public support is critical to implement the changes we  
10 need to make leaders on both sides of the aisle and across  
11 government need to make the case to the public and get  
12 their support. Eric. Thank you.

13 [The prepared statement of Ms. Jane M. Harman  
14 follows:]

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1 STATEMENT OF ERIC S. EDELMAN, VICE CHAIR, COMMISSION  
2 ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

3 Ambassador Edelman: Chairman Reed, Ranking Member  
4 Wicker, and members of the committee. It's pleasure to be  
5 back before you again. I think this is the 11th time I've  
6 testified in front of this committee. And I do want to say  
7 one thing, which is we could not have come to a unanimous  
8 bipartisan conclusion of this report without the leadership  
9 of our Chair, Jane Harman, who worked indefatigably to get  
10 us there.

11 These are difficult issues that we wrestled with and  
12 which you wrestle with every day. But I really want to  
13 just commend Jane for the leadership she demonstrated in  
14 leading our commission. Several of our commissioners  
15 served on the 2018 Commission. And General Jack Keane,  
16 who's not able to be with us today, actually served with me  
17 on the 2010 Commission. The 2010 Commission said that we  
18 were facing a train wreck because threats were gathering  
19 but defense resources were declining.

20 In the 2014, National Defense Panel, we said that the  
21 Budget Control Act had been a strategic misstep that had  
22 hampered U.S. defenses and that we needed to go back to  
23 threat based defense budgeting as Secretary Gates had last  
24 done before the BCA and his Fiscal Year 2011 budget. And  
25 last time we raised the question of whether the United



1 States might find itself in a conflict that could lose if  
2 current trends continued.

3 Six years later when we came back to this task, the  
4 threats are more serious, and we found that we as a nation  
5 have failed to keep pace, as you said, Chairman Reed, and  
6 as Secretary Gates has said in an important article he  
7 wrote in Foreign Affairs, this is the most challenging  
8 global security environment since the Second World War.  
9 There is potential for near term war and a potential that  
10 we might lose such a conflict.

11 The partnership that's emerged among China, Russia,  
12 Iran, and North Korea is a major strategic shift that we  
13 have not completely accounted for in our defense planning.  
14 It makes each of those countries potentially stronger  
15 militarily, economically, and diplomatically, and  
16 potentially can weaken the tools we have at our disposal to  
17 deal with them. And it makes it more likely that a future  
18 conflict, for instance, in the Indo-Pacific, would expand  
19 across other theaters, and that we would find ourselves in  
20 a global war that is on the scale of the Second World War.

21 The 2022 NDS identified China as the pacing challenge.  
22 We found that China is in many ways, outpacing the U.S.,  
23 while we still have the strongest military in the world  
24 with the farthest global reach, when we get to a thousand  
25 miles of China's shore, we start to lose our military

1 dominance and could find ourselves on the losing end of a  
2 conflict. China's cyber capabilities, space assets,  
3 growing strategic forces, and fully modernized conventional  
4 forces are designed to keep us from engaging in the Taiwan  
5 Strait or the South or East China seas.

6 China has been testified to before Congress has  
7 infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent  
8 or deter U.S. action by contesting our logistics,  
9 disrupting American power and water, and otherwise removing  
10 the sanctuary of the homeland that we have long enjoyed.  
11 For its part, Russia has reconstituted its own defense  
12 industrial base after its invasion of Ukraine, much more  
13 rapidly than people anticipated.

14 Vladimir Putin seeks to reassert Russia as a great  
15 power and is happy to destabilize the world in order to do  
16 so. Our report describes the threats posed by Iran, North  
17 Korea, and terrorism as well. Clearly, Iran and North  
18 Korea both feel emboldened by the current environment and  
19 terrorism remains a potent threat fueled by the  
20 proliferation of technology. As the DNI has said, the  
21 current war in the Middle East is likely to have a general  
22 generational impact on terrorism.

23 We share the goal, I think, as a commission  
24 unanimously, of the NDS, that our purpose is to deter war.  
25 But doing so is going to require moving with a greater

1 sense of urgency and determination beyond what we've seen  
2 over the last couple of decades.

3 [The prepared statement of Ambassador Eric S. Edelman  
4 follows:]

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1 Ms. Harman: Mr. Chairman, we are at 10 minutes and  
2 happy to submit the rest of our testimony, if you prefer,  
3 and take questions. Or we can briefly summarize our  
4 findings. Which would be better?

5 Chairman Reed: I think the vice chair and I would  
6 like you to go ahead.

7 Ms. Harman: Thank you. Thank you very much. So,  
8 we're sharing this. First finding, DOD cannot and should  
9 not provide for the national defense by itself. The NDS  
10 calls for an integrated deterrence that is not reflected in  
11 practice today. A truly all elements of national power  
12 approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources  
13 across DOD, the rest of the executive branch, the private  
14 sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.

15 We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies and  
16 we commend the administration for expanding and  
17 strengthening NATO, and building up relationships and  
18 capabilities across Asia. We also point out ways for the  
19 United States to be better partners ourselves, including by  
20 maintaining a more stable presence globally. And in key  
21 organizations like NATO, we call for reducing barriers to  
22 intelligence, sharing joint production and military  
23 exports.

24 So, we can better support and prepare to fight with  
25 our closest allies. Second recommendation is fundamental

1 shifts in threats and technology require fundamental change  
2 in how DOD functions. This is particularly true of how DOD  
3 works with the tech sector, where most of our innovation  
4 happens. We say that DOD is operating at the speed of  
5 bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency.

6 DOD structure is optimized for research and  
7 development for exquisite irreplaceable platforms when the  
8 future is autonomy, AI, and large numbers of cheaper and  
9 attributable systems. I know this because I represented  
10 the Aerospace Center of Los Angeles in Congress for so many  
11 years, where exquisite irreplaceable satellite platforms  
12 were built.

13 And now we know that there is a plethora of commercial  
14 platforms that can do many of the same things and offer  
15 redundancy. DOD programs like Replicator and the Defense  
16 Innovation Unit, and the Office of Strategic Capital are  
17 great but they're essentially efforts to work around the  
18 larger Pentagon system. In addition, since the 2018  
19 report, the joint staff has worked to develop operational  
20 concepts to overcome deficits in numbers in geography.

21 Our commission finds that there is more work to be  
22 done to truly operate a joint force with technological and  
23 strategic advantage.

24 Ambassador Edelman: Mr. Wicker, you raised the issue  
25 of the fore sizing construct in your opening statement, and

1 we, as you noted, found that it is inadequate. I mean, it  
2 was written actually before the invasion of Ukraine and  
3 before the emergence of this tightening alliance between  
4 Russia and China. And we proposed that the force needs to  
5 be sized -- the joint force in conjunction with U.S. allies  
6 and partners to defend the homeland but simultaneously be  
7 able to deal with threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and  
8 the Middle East.

9       These are not all the same fight, so different  
10 elements of the force would be required in different parts  
11 of the globe but U.S. global responsibilities require a  
12 global military response as well as a diplomatic and  
13 economic one. President Putin, in some ways has done us a  
14 bit of a favor by having invaded Ukraine and exposed as a  
15 result, some of the limitations of U.S. defense industrial  
16 production.

17       And shown that it's grossly inadequate to provide the  
18 equipment, technology, and munitions that the U.S. military  
19 and our allies and partners need today, let alone given  
20 demands of a potential future conflict, which might be even  
21 more taxing. The DOD workforce and the all-volunteer force  
22 provide us with a kind of unmatched advantage, but  
23 recruiting failures have shrunk the force and have raised  
24 serious questions about the sustainability of the all-  
25 volunteer force in peace time.

1           Let alone if we had to mobilize for a major conflict  
2 or a protracted conflict. The civilian workforce at DOD  
3 and in the private sector also face critical shortfalls and  
4 we can discuss some of that later in the hearing.

5           Ms. Harman: A few more findings. We found that the  
6 joint force is at the breaking point of maintaining  
7 readiness today. Adding more burden without adding  
8 resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break. And  
9 secondly, we found that the United States must spend more  
10 but also spend better. This is a point we make  
11 consistently. It's not just more legacy programs, it's  
12 more spending that gets us to the ability to deter and win  
13 future wars.

14           Additionally, we think that Congress should revoke the  
15 2023 spending caps and provide real growth. I know Senator  
16 Wicker loves this one, for Fiscal Year 25, 2025, defense  
17 and non-defense, national security spending, that at a bare  
18 minimum, falls within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS  
19 Commission. That range was never achieved. Subsequent  
20 budgets will require spending, that puts defense in other  
21 components of national security.

22           Other components, jointly across government, and the  
23 tech sector, and partners, and allies, other components on  
24 a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the U.S.  
25 national efforts seen during the Cold War. But we agree

1 and let me underscore this because some of the commentary  
2 about our report has missed this. We agree on a unanimous  
3 basis that the national debt is its own national security  
4 challenge.

5 If we want to approach Cold War levels of spending, we  
6 need to increase resources, and reform entitlement  
7 spending, during the Cold War, top marginal income tax  
8 rates, were above 70 percent, and corporate tax rates  
9 averaged 50 percent. We don't call for those numbers, but  
10 we are calling for an increase in resources and point out  
11 that interest on the debt is higher than our total number  
12 of our total top line of defense spending.

13 So, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Wicker, and many good  
14 friends on this on this important committee, we thank you  
15 for your role in establishing our commission, and we're  
16 happy to share our report with you and we welcome the  
17 opportunity to answer questions. Thank you.

18 Chairman Reed: Well, thank you very much, Chairwoman  
19 Harman and Vice Chair Edelman, for your impressive and  
20 sobering testimony. Just to reiterate, you've said it  
21 several times that it's important to note is that our  
22 funding, it can't be exclusive to the Department of  
23 Defense. We have to look at the Department of Treasury,  
24 Department of State. You even indicate the Department of  
25 Education because of the shortfalls we're seeing in



1 recruitment.

2 Which can be traced back to very poor education and  
3 very poor public health, obesity. Just again  
4 Representative Harman, Ambassador, in your comments on  
5 that.

6 Ms. Harman: Yes.

7 Chairman Reed: Thank you.

8 Ms. Harman: Absolutely, all elements of national  
9 power, the U.S. needs to project power across our  
10 government, leverage the enormous talent and innovation of  
11 the tech sector, connect both of those to partners and  
12 allies. And then we have impressive deterrence. And in  
13 the kind of integrated deterrence that the NDS, the 2022  
14 NDS, calls for that was -- has never been achieved.

15 Chairman Reed: Thank you. When I was in the service  
16 a long, long time ago, the stock phrase was, shoot, move,  
17 and communicate. Now, I believe the phrase is communicate  
18 so that you can shoot and move. One of the key elements, I  
19 think, is we have tried but we're not there yet with a  
20 communication system that reaches every aspect of our  
21 military which is uninterruptible and which is dependable.  
22 And Ambassador, your thoughts on that issue?

23 Ambassador Edelman: No, I very much agree with that,  
24 and that of course, what the joint all domain commanding  
25 control system is meant to address. But as you say, in

1 your as -- you suggested in your question, Chairman Reed,  
2 the department's not quite there yet. And we're of course,  
3 it's complicated by the fact that the system is being done  
4 by all three services and then has to be brought together  
5 and unified.

6 So, there's a lot of a lot of work to be done on that,  
7 and it's one of the areas where we think it -- insufficient  
8 progress has been made.

9 Chairman Reed: In terms of priority, I would think  
10 it'd be very, very high on the list, if not, number one, as  
11 I said, if you can't communicate, you can't do lots of  
12 things. Is that your feeling too?

13 Ambassador Edelman: Absolutely.

14 Ms. Harman: If I could just add one thing to that.  
15 We call for interoperability which has not been achieved  
16 across the Pentagon, let alone with other government  
17 agencies, let alone with partners and allies. And we make  
18 a point, that some of our classification systems work  
19 against each other in terms of sharing information. And  
20 the goal would be to have an effective communication system  
21 across all elements of national power.

22 Chairman Reed: Thank you. The other -- one of the  
23 many points and you've emphasized, and I think importantly  
24 so is, we have to engage the American people, not just in  
25 getting out the word about the threat but also getting them

1 involved. And that puts a big emphasis on public service,  
2 not just in the military domain but in civilian public  
3 service.

4 And can you just elaborate on lows, starting with  
5 Chairman Harman?

6 Ms. Harman: Well, the notion of public service isn't  
7 new as you know, Mr. Chairman, it's been around for years.  
8 It was around when I served in Congress and Congress did  
9 not act on any of the proposals that I saw. It is still a  
10 way to get all of the public, at the proper age, engaged  
11 in, in understanding the requirements of citizenship. A  
12 lot of our young people have no earthly idea.

13 Sadly, because they have no civic education what our  
14 government really is and what are the ways to serve. And  
15 surely one of the most honorable ways to serve is as a  
16 member of the military, you did it. And other members of  
17 this committee have done this. And I think that is the way  
18 to revive a kind of sense of coherence and patriotism that  
19 we are lacking right now.

20 Chairman Reed: And adding to this Ambassador Edelman,  
21 is the point you make in the report. The size of our  
22 millage force is too small and our ability to expand it  
23 rapidly is probably very weak. Was that a fair estimate of  
24 our situation?

25 Ambassador Edelman: I think that is a fair estimate,

1 Mr. Chairman. You know, we have not really as a society  
2 talked about the need for national mobilization but if the  
3 worst were to happen and some of the worst scenarios, we  
4 discuss in our report were to come to pass, and where we to  
5 face a global conflict, it would require mobilization on  
6 the scale of what we did as a nation during World War II.

7 And we haven't done that in a long time. We haven't  
8 thought about that in a long time. There are a lot of  
9 elements to it including stockpiling strategic materials  
10 but being able to rapidly bring people into the military,  
11 et cetera. And I just don't think we are prepared to do  
12 it. I think we have to have a national discussion about  
13 this and I think it goes hand in hand with the earlier  
14 discussion you had with my colleague about national  
15 -- about public service and serving the nation.

16 Chairman Reed: We had, in World War II, two years,  
17 essentially from September 1st, 1939 to December 7th, 1941  
18 to prepare. And I doubt it, we'll have two years to  
19 prepare in this environment. Thank you very much. Senator  
20 Wicker, please.

21 Senator Wicker: Well, thank you very much for your  
22 testimony. And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was  
23 a time when we could sort of count on a rivalry between  
24 Russia and China. We don't see much of that anymore. And  
25 of course I've spoken of this axis of aggressors. How are

1 they cooperating with each other now and in a real crisis?  
2 What do we need to look out for about increased  
3 cooperation?

4 Among the four countries that I've identified, that  
5 includes of course, Iran and North Korea, Representative  
6 Harman.

7 Ms. Harman: Well, I think Ambassador Edelman would  
8 want to add to this but I remember being a member of the  
9 Defense Policy Board when Jim Mattis was Secretary of  
10 Defense and his piece of advice to us was let's do  
11 everything, we can to keep Russia and China apart. Well,  
12 oops, that has not happened. And there is a -- you know,  
13 this close friendship and collaboration between them.

14 You asked how is it manifested? Well, we see it most  
15 at the moment in Ukraine, where Russia was the aggressor,  
16 violating international law, and invading Ukraine, and  
17 China is a huge help to Russia in evading our sanctions by  
18 buying Russian gas, and by its efforts to ship into China,  
19 material for the war. And then you add in, as you  
20 mentioned Iran and North Korea which are suppliers of  
21 drones and other lethal material to Russia.

22 And this unholy alliance, or whatever, I think you  
23 call it, alliance of aggression, is extremely dangerous.  
24 Let's remember that both North Korea has nuclear weapons,  
25 Iran is at breakout for nuclear weapons, and the other two

1 countries are nuclear countries. And where this goes is  
2 -- it seems to me terrifying. And that is again, why we  
3 need to leverage all elements of national power to make  
4 sure we deter these countries from acting against us.

5 Senator Wicker: Ambassador Edelman respond as you'd  
6 like, but also you might also want to take this question as  
7 you speak. Representative Harman mentions Ukraine, why is  
8 Ukraine important to this entire discussion? And if  
9 Ukraine manages to be successful and keep their own borders  
10 in their own country, what does -- what signal does this  
11 send to Xi Jinping?

12 Ambassador Edelman: Thank you, Senator Wicker. I  
13 really don't want to add very much to what Representative  
14 Harman just said other than to say in short, what we're  
15 watching is a war of premeditated, unprovoked aggression by  
16 Russia that is being financed by China and enabled by its  
17 transfer of dual use goods including precision tooling  
18 that's allowed Russia to get its defense industry up and  
19 running despite U.S. sanctions and export controls.

20 Drones provided to Russia, including a factory built  
21 in Russia by Iran, and of course, millions, literally  
22 millions of rounds of 152 ammunition for the Russian  
23 military coming from North Korea. Sure --

24 Senator Wicker: Some people ask, what's that to us?  
25 How does that affect the United States and our people?

1           Ambassador Edelman: Well, it affects the outcome, of  
2 course, of the fight in Ukraine, which gets to your second  
3 question. I mean, first, Ukraine offered to give up and I  
4 was involved in some of the diplomacy of this back in the  
5 nineties, the nuclear weapons that were left on its  
6 territory after the end of the Soviet Union. As a result  
7 of that, Ukraine gave them up.

8           But in exchange for assurances from the United States,  
9 Russia, Great Britain, and France, that its territorial  
10 integrity would be recognized along the borderlines that  
11 existed before the 2014 seizure of Crimea by Putin, which  
12 was a violation of those undertakings. If our assurances  
13 in the nonproliferation realm for, in this instance, are  
14 shown to be hollow, it will raise questions in the minds of  
15 all of our allies about the assurances we've given them.

16           Our extended deterrent assurances, whether it's for  
17 our allies in Europe, part of our multilateral NATO  
18 alliance, or our bilateral allies in East Asia, or our  
19 partners, parts of special relationships we've developed in  
20 Middle East with Israel, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the  
21 UAE, and Egypt, and others. So, the whole fabric, frankly,  
22 of the international order is at risk here depending on the  
23 outcome in Ukraine.

24           And to your point, if Putin is successful in Ukraine,  
25 the lesson that Xi Jinping is likely to draw is that he too

1 can be successful in Taiwan, or in the East China Sea, or  
2 the South China Sea.

3 Senator Wicker: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Wicker, Senator  
5 Shaheen, please.

6 Senator Shaheen: Thank you both for your work on this  
7 report and thank you to the other members of the  
8 commission, those of you who are here and those who are  
9 not. You talked about the communications, the need for  
10 interoperability, and for communications but I didn't hear  
11 you talk about -- and also you talked about an approach  
12 that coordinates all elements of national power, but you  
13 really didn't talk about the information environment.

14 So, can you -- one of the areas where we are not  
15 keeping up with our adversaries is in the information  
16 environment, it's with disinformation misinformation. So,  
17 can you talk about what the report suggests we should do  
18 with respect to information?

19 Ms. Harman: Well, it's a hugely important topic and  
20 you're right, we haven't got there yet but malign  
21 influence, foreign malign influence in our pending election  
22 is something that we're all worried about. And it is a  
23 security threat, let's go there. But certainly, across the  
24 world, foreign malign influence and dis and misinformation  
25 can alter how we understand what the threats are against



1 us.

2 This is a huge focus now of our intelligence community  
3 and I'm glad this committee is also paying attention to it.  
4 We touch on it but we really -- I'm just looking at  
5 Ambassador Edelman. We don't have a focus on that. We do  
6 talk about AI, cyber and the information environment but we  
7 don't specifically address mis and disinformation. And I  
8 wish we had paid more attention to that.

9 Senator Shaheen: I remember being in this room, I  
10 think after the KLM airline was shot down over Ukraine and  
11 General Breedlove, who was then USEUCOM commander, saying  
12 as long as it takes us two years to identify the Russians  
13 as being the people responsible for what happens, we are  
14 losing the fight. And I think that's a problem. Now, I  
15 appreciate everything you're saying about legacy systems  
16 but the reality is -- until we get that information domain  
17 into our discussions, we are not winning the fight.

18 Ms. Harman: I agree. And we have to attribute where  
19 attacks are coming from in real time. It's tricky, for  
20 example, in responding to cyber-attacks, to know whether if  
21 China does something to U.S., or Russia, or some criminal  
22 syndicate, we should respond immediately because tit for  
23 tat can lead to unwise outcomes for us. But nonetheless,  
24 we have to know who did what to us, and you are totally  
25 right.

1           Senator Shaheen: And we don't have a strategy, and we  
2 are not working the Global Engagement Center at the State  
3 Department, which has that as its goal, is not integrated  
4 with what we're doing at DOD. So, we --

5           Ms. Harman: We address that. We do say that the  
6 State Department, Defense Department have to align their  
7 regions of operation with each other, and then add in the  
8 Treasury Department with sanctions, add in all the other  
9 agencies of government, like USAID that have some play  
10 here, add in partners and allies. That's the way to  
11 project American Power.

12           And you're right, that a huge focus needs to be,  
13 absolutely needs to be on finding the source of dis and  
14 misinformation and making sure we correctly understand the  
15 threats against us.

16           Ambassador Edelman: Senator Shaheen, if I just might  
17 add to what Representative Harman said, part of our  
18 emphasis on all elements of National Power is precisely to  
19 get at the issue you raise, which is that we have, you  
20 know, disestablished, you know, number of years ago, the  
21 U.S. Information Agency, we don't really have a dedicated  
22 capability.

23           We, you know, have, in the Department of Defense, a  
24 capability for military information to support operations  
25 which is an important capability. But we, I think

1 sometimes in -- because there's a default to DOD, they end  
2 up engaged in information operations that are really beyond  
3 what they're capable of executing effectively. And I think  
4 that is a problem.

5 So, we need a better integrated effort across the  
6 entire panoply of national security institutions but also  
7 need some dedicated effort on information. Our adversaries  
8 think information is a hugely important to domain. They  
9 invest a lot in it and we just have not matched that  
10 investment.

11 Senator Shaheen: I certainly agree with that. I'm  
12 pleased to hear both of you say that. Hopefully, that will  
13 be more of a focus going forward and I appreciate the First  
14 Amendment concerns. However, we were able to deal with  
15 that during the Cold War. We ought to be able to deal with  
16 it today. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator  
18 Fischer, please.

19 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank  
20 you, Representative Harman and also Mr. Ambassador, all of  
21 the commissioners, and good staff for the work you've done  
22 here. Mr. Ambassador. Nuclear deterrence is the  
23 foundation. It is the bedrock on which our national  
24 security rests. And I understand that the commission did  
25 not seek to replicate that work that came out of the

1 Strategic Posture Commission.

2 But it does highlight the importance of deterrence,  
3 strategic deterrence in view of China's development,  
4 Russia's aggression on and on, as you considered the  
5 strategic elements of the national security policy for us.  
6 Can you explain to this committee the role that nuclear  
7 modernization plays in the NDS Commission's proposed  
8 Multiple Theater Force Construct

9 Ambassador Edelman: Nuclear deterrence, Senator  
10 Fischer, is at the, you know, is the fundament on which  
11 everything else is built in terms of our national security.  
12 It's operating every day. You know, it's not visible to,  
13 you know, American citizens but the fact of our nuclear  
14 deterrent force, all three legs of the triad being  
15 available is the most powerful deterrent that we have to  
16 conflict.

17 It's not sufficient, but it is the absolute basis.  
18 And we really, I think, agreed with the conclusion our  
19 colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission reached  
20 which is that we have to move forward with alacrity on all  
21 the elements of modernization of the nuclear triad. That's  
22 the GBSD Sentinel Program. That is the the B-21, that is  
23 the Ohio replacement class. All of those things have to be  
24 accomplished.

25 And there are problems in some -- one of the reasons

1 we highlighted education is that some of the problems that  
2 GBSD are running into has to do with lack of skilled, you  
3 know, workers to be able to pour the kind of special  
4 reinforced concrete that you need for the new silos for  
5 missiles, the new control systems for missiles. We lack  
6 welders in the submarine industrial bases Senator Wicker  
7 knows well.

8       So, there's a lot that has to be done across the board  
9 in order to move forward with nuclear modernization but it  
10 is absolutely fundamental to our ability to deter  
11 aggression against our allies and of course against the  
12 homeland.

13       Senator Fischer: Thank you and Representative, I  
14 really appreciated your comments on the workforce and the  
15 need we have for that, for a national strategy, and to be  
16 able to work with Senator King on a bill that we  
17 introduced, that we were able to get some of those  
18 important of factors into the NDAA so that we can address  
19 them and hopefully continue to grow what we need and meet  
20 those needs quickly.

21       Ambassador, based on the commission's work, what do  
22 you think are the biggest barriers that we are going to  
23 face as a country to achieving that Multiple Theater Force  
24 Construct? And Representative, I'd like to hear your  
25 opinion on that as well.

1           Ambassador Edelman: Well, in the first -- Senator  
2 Fisher, to your question, the force right now is too small  
3 and so we have to grow the force, and that's in the face of  
4 the recruiting challenges that we've highlighted in the  
5 report, that the Army in particular but also the Navy and  
6 the Air Force have faced --

7           Senator Fischer: Why -- and I'm going to interrupt  
8 you.

9           Ambassador Edelman: Please.

10          Senator Fischer: Why is it too small? Can you  
11 explain in this setting, the threats that we are facing  
12 when we look at the adversaries that we face and how that  
13 has changed over the last decade?

14          Ambassador Edelman: It's too small in part because  
15 the department was sizing itself for one conflict. But if  
16 you have to be present in three theaters as we are now,  
17 we've got conflicts in two theaters now. If we have a  
18 third conflict in a third theater, it's going to require,  
19 you know, more, a lot more forces. People talk, for  
20 instance, about the Indo-Pacific being largely a, you know,  
21 Navy and Air Force fight.

22          That's correct. But the logistics that support the  
23 Navy and the Air Force will largely be manned by the Army.  
24 And so, we have to have an army that is sufficiently large,  
25 that it can operate in all of these places, potentially

1 simultaneously, because honestly, it is very hard to  
2 imagine today, a conflict in the Indo-Pacific that doesn't  
3 become a global conflict very quickly.

4       Someone asked earlier in the hearing about cooperation  
5 between Russia and China. The last time I testified before  
6 this committee was two years ago about the so-called Three  
7 Body Problem, Russia, China being both nuclear peers of the  
8 United States. And, you know, one of the criticisms that  
9 was leveled at my colleague Frank Miller and me, was that,  
10 you know, well, there's no evidence that Russia and China  
11 are collaborating in the nuclear area.

12       Well, we just saw them flying strategic bombers  
13 together, you know, up near Alaska. So, you know, I don't  
14 know what more evidence you want that they're beginning to  
15 collaborate in that, in that strategic area.

16       Ms. Harman: If I could just add a few things. First  
17 of all, on the nuclear triad and the nuclear posture  
18 review, Senator Kyle, as a dear friend of ours, he did  
19 great service in the Senate, and writing that report, and  
20 we talked about whether we should in some ways overlap some  
21 of his recommendations but we decided they were so good  
22 they should stand alone. So, it's not that we don't care,  
23 it's just that we recognize good work.

24       And add to that though, that our nuclear agreements,  
25 that were so important over recent years, especially the

1 heroic work that president Reagan did, don't include China,  
2 and a number of them have lapsed. And that is a truly  
3 dangerous situation especially when rogue states like North  
4 Korea and Iran are part of the nuclear game now. And there  
5 could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or in Asia  
6 also.

7 So, just would point that out, in terms of workforce  
8 and why is it small? Well, one thing we have not done, and  
9 we mentioned this, is embrace the tech sector adequately.  
10 Future wars are not going to be fought the old way with  
11 vulnerable big platforms. They're going to be fought with  
12 more software, less hardware, more software. Not to  
13 diminish hardware, but we need both.

14 In fact, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was at the  
15 Aspen Security Forum last week. Some of us were there.  
16 Senator Sullivan was there and he said DOD is not a  
17 hardware department. Right. It's not, or if it is, it  
18 should not be a hardware department. So, not only do we  
19 need more people but we need different skills, and we need  
20 people who understand the tech base. And in fact, we have  
21 said that the business model of the Pentagon ought to move  
22 to embrace the business model of the tech sector.

23 Where failure sometimes is important so that you can  
24 improve things. And just one comment to a prior question.  
25 We -- some of us were in Ukraine looking at how they



1 produce goods, including drones, and tanks, and they have  
2 been much more innovative than we have. And there are  
3 lessons to learn there.

4 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator  
6 Hirono, please.

7 Senator Hirono: Thank you very much, Representative  
8 Harman and Ambassador Edelman, and to all of you who worked  
9 on this very important review leading to seven very  
10 substantive recommendations, each of which requires some  
11 fundamental changes. So, as I review your recommendations  
12 and I -- and noting that you started off, I believe by  
13 saying that we need to inform the public as to the nature  
14 of the dangers that we're facing with the great power  
15 competition.

16 And how we're going to do that. I'm not so sure, I am  
17 wondering whether your review included the fact that  
18 Russia, for example, is not only a gear power competition  
19 in the military sector but they are also engaged in our  
20 elections and misinformation when we have natural  
21 disasters. For example, I don't think very many people  
22 know that when Maui had its wildfire that we -- that there  
23 were indications that Russia had sent misinformation as to  
24 how, how the wildfire started.

25 And how to question what FEMA was doing. So, I'm

1 wondering whether you reviewed the -- all of the different  
2 ways that Russia is providing misinformation in a lot of  
3 platforms, not just in the military arena, and what can we  
4 do? That's one way to inform the public, I would say, to  
5 the dangers that we face.

6       Ambassador Edelman: I think the challenge we face,  
7 Senator Hirono, is that we're not -- Russia is very active  
8 in this space. You're correct. And it's an important part  
9 actually, of their military doctrine. And they see  
10 information operations as part of a suite of activities as  
11 opposed to being stove piped between information and other  
12 kinds of military operations.

13       And we still, I think, see it in sort of stove pipes  
14 but Russia's not the only challenge. I mean, Iran has been  
15 very active in this election cycle with a very different  
16 agenda than Russia's but still interfering in our election.  
17 China as well is very active. All of our adversaries are  
18 active in this domain and we need, I think, to take it  
19 very, very seriously. And I do think we need to inform the  
20 public, that's I think, a responsibility that the executive  
21 branch certainly has.

22       But I think, you know, you and your colleagues have a  
23 role to play as well.

24       Senator Hirono: I think that we are also stove piped  
25 in how we approach the dangers that are presented by China,

1 Russia, Iran, and the other actors in the cyber space.

2 Ambassador Edelman: Yes.

3 Senator Hirono: And so, one way that I think that the  
4 public will be apprised of the dangers is to inform them of  
5 the misinformation, et cetera, in the -- where they can  
6 relate, such as our elections. And I don't think we're  
7 doing such a great job with that. One of the other  
8 important recommendations you made, you talked about,  
9 Congressman Harman, is that we are not set up to take risks  
10 in our acquisitions and other forms.

11 And that the culture of not wanting to take risks.  
12 How do we even approach something like that? Because it's  
13 not just, we need to maybe spend more money on our military  
14 but how do we change the culture? So, it's not just about  
15 money, it's about attitudes. It's about risk taking. How  
16 do we approach that?

17 Ms. Harman: Well, let me respond to something you  
18 started with, which is the devastation in Lahar Maui,  
19 having been there just before the fire. It was a glorious  
20 place and you lost so much of your history, and it's tragic  
21 that that happened. On this topic, we had a lot of  
22 discussion about risk taking, which is a core value of the  
23 tech sector. How do you learn unless you take risk?

24 How does Space X learn? Unless it's prepared to lose  
25 a lot of its assets and then build better based on lessons?

1 Sadly, both the Pentagon and Congress are pretty risk  
2 averse. I'm not accusing anyone, any member of this  
3 committee personally however, the way Congress operates  
4 with respect to requirements of the Pentagon, and not only  
5 some of the budget issues here, we'll get into those, I'm  
6 sure.

7 You know, operating by CR and possible, you know,  
8 shutdowns is really an expensive way to proceed. I'm sure  
9 you are all aware of that and hopefully we are in a new era  
10 where we don't do that. But if you build to requirements  
11 and then the requirement fails and then you do oversight  
12 and punish the people who have failed, that creates a risk  
13 averse culture. I'm not saying reward people who have  
14 failed.

15 But understand that if we're going to iterate and  
16 build better models of, pick anything, drones, tanks  
17 anything that you might need in current and future wars, we  
18 have to be prepared to fail. And we have to understand  
19 that culture and this committee by doing multi-year  
20 procurements and other things, which we point out would be  
21 very helpful, and allowing the Pentagon to change some of  
22 its you know, some of the details of procurements as a  
23 routine matter, if that will improve the performance of  
24 whatever it's building, would be extremely helpful.

25 So, I'm glad you pointed that out. We tried to point

1 it out as well.

2 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

3 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator. Senator Rounds,  
4 please.

5 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let  
6 me begin by thanking both of you and the members of your  
7 commission for the work and the service to our country that  
8 this provides. Most recently, when Director Haines and  
9 General Cruz were before this committee, I think it was in  
10 May, they confirmed that the initial or the initiation of  
11 hostilities between the United States and either Russia or  
12 China would increase the likelihood that hostilities would  
13 be initiated by the other against the U.S. as well.

14 It would appear, based on the conversation so far that  
15 your commission would agree with that assessment. Is the  
16 department planning for this reality in which conflict with  
17 either Russia or China likely means a conflict with both  
18 today? Ambassador Edelman?

19 Ambassador Edelman: Well, the department's plans  
20 basically in the -- as embodied in the NDS of 2022, like  
21 its predecessor in 2018, essentially is geared towards  
22 defeating one adversary while holding the others, you know,  
23 harmless essentially by nuclear deterrence. What I don't  
24 think the department has actually begun to wrap its arms  
25 around is precisely the scenario you outline.

1           Where to give an example, if we got into some kind of  
2 conflict in the Indo-Pacific, whether it be over Taiwan, or  
3 South China Sea, or East China Sea, what might Russia do?  
4 You know, one thing that comes to mind is, take advantage  
5 of the separatist movement in Moldova to move on Moldova, a  
6 country that's trying to move closer to the European Union,  
7 and to the West which would then precipitate, you know,  
8 additional conflict in in Europe.

9           Or take advantage of the ethnic, Russian speaking  
10 minorities in the Baltic states, say Latvia, to initiate a  
11 conflict there. How would we manage that? When you raise  
12 that question with department leaders, they basically say,  
13 well, that, to go back to the Chairman's point earlier,  
14 well, that would be sort of like World War II or, you know,  
15 would require national mobilization, and that's correct.

16           But we haven't really taken the next steps to really  
17 focus on what that and what a protracted conflict would  
18 actually look like. We're optimized to fight very short  
19 wars.

20           Senator Rounds: Representative Harman, I appreciated  
21 your comments at the very beginning of this discussion in  
22 which you shared that yesterday your family was challenged  
23 and that your daughter was going through some very serious  
24 surgery, and this is something that every family can  
25 identify with. You also talked about the technologies

1 involved and your decision making was that you would stay  
2 there if anything, serious was still in, in the air.

3 And I appreciated that. And believe me, this entire  
4 committee would've supported you in that decision. You  
5 also indicated the need or what this country represented  
6 with regard to the technology that we have and that we  
7 sometimes don't take advantage of. We have that  
8 opportunity with this report to talk about those  
9 technologies today. There are five different domains in  
10 which our country will be attacked in the future.

11 Airland and sea, most people would understand, but  
12 space and cyberspace are the new domains, which will  
13 precede any attack on the first three. With regard to  
14 cyber, today in the United States, we just recently came  
15 through a time period in which an accident occurring by one  
16 company literally crippled a significant part of our  
17 airline industry. Is it fair to say that both Russia and  
18 China have capabilities to do more than simply cripple  
19 airline capabilities?

20 And what exactly would that look like for the American  
21 people? Should we have a contest with either one of those  
22 two adversaries?

23 Ms. Harman: Well, thank you, Senator Rounds, for your  
24 personal comments. I really appreciate that and I hope  
25 everyone on this committee is as fortunate as I was with

1 the news that I got late last night which enabled me to get  
2 on the 6:00 AM plane. On cyber, it's a huge threat and I  
3 don't think we minimize it in any way.

4 One of the things we might anticipate, for example, is  
5 if China decides to annex Taiwan or whatever euphemism they  
6 might use, they might engage in a major cyber-attack here  
7 first, for which we are under prepared, cyber-attack of our  
8 infrastructure. When I was in Congress, I represented the  
9 Port of Los Angeles, which with the Port of Long Beach is  
10 the largest container port complex in the country.

11 50 percent of our container traffic enters and exits  
12 through those ports. There are cranes on the port,  
13 surprised to move the cargo, and those cranes have Chinese  
14 technology. So, guess what? We should --

15 Senator Rounds: All of which are subject to the  
16 possibilities of cyber-attacks?

17 Ms. Harman: Absolutely. We should anticipate that  
18 our ports could go down.

19 Senator Rounds: Throughout our entire society we find  
20 that to be the case, don't we?

21 Ms. Harman: I'm agreeing with you and this is  
22 devastating. Does the American public understand this?  
23 No, this is our point about public awareness. This is  
24 something that's happening right now. If anyone's watching  
25 this important hearing, they're learning things that they



1 might not know otherwise. It's an opportunity for  
2 leadership to try to educate the public and thank to your  
3 committee for doing it about the grave threats we face.

4 So, cyber is a huge threat. You also mentioned space,  
5 again, something I know something about since I used to  
6 call my district the aerospace center of the universe,  
7 where most of our intelligence satellites were made. We  
8 are more dependent on space as a country and more  
9 vulnerable in space because of that dependency than any  
10 other country. And shoring up space, which is one of the  
11 threats we address, is absolutely crucial.

12 And it's not just military space but commercial space.  
13 A lot of how you talked about communication, a lot of how  
14 we communicate is through commercial space and think how  
15 inconvenience the public would be if all of a sudden, their  
16 little devices, which were all dependent on didn't work.

17 Senator Rounds: Thank you. I'm out of time and  
18 overtime. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman Reed: Well said, Senator.

20 Senator Rounds: Thank you.

21 Chairman Reed: Senator Kaine, please.

22 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to  
23 our witnesses. It's good to be back before you, Ambassador  
24 Edelman, 11 times testifying here. And Jane probably about  
25 the equivalent. We should give you guys some steak knives

1 or something. I mean, very helpful report. A couple of  
2 thoughts before I have some questions.

3 Ambassador Edelman, you mentioned your testimony  
4 earlier when you talked about potential for nuclear  
5 collaboration between China and Russia. You were kind of  
6 criticized for that and I remember that, and frankly, the  
7 Pentagon during the entire time I've been here, beginning  
8 in 2013, when we asked questions about the possibility of  
9 cooperation between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

10 They've kind of poo-pooed the idea as if historical  
11 entities, or border disputes, or the past would block them  
12 from being able to work in a collaborative way. And I've  
13 always found that dismissive attitude naive. And I think  
14 that the results of today are showing the degree to which  
15 these nations, seeing the U.S.' strong alliances, realizing  
16 they don't have them, they're drawn closer and closer  
17 together.

18 There may be barriers to the level of cooperation but  
19 we shouldn't assume those barriers are going to inhibit  
20 significant collaboration. And I think that's one of the  
21 aspects of your testimony or joint testimony in the report  
22 that's very powerful. I did chuckle at one of the  
23 punchlines, which is that we need to do a lot more defense  
24 spending and bring the deficit down too.

25 But we hear that punchline at a lot of hearings in a

1 lot of different committees. But that's why, you know,  
2 that's why we get elected to do what we do, and there are  
3 tough choices to be made. Here's a question that I have.  
4 If you asked American public, and I do think educating the  
5 public about the challenges is important.

6 You said, what's the most important national security  
7 threat today? I bet the top one would be fentanyl. I  
8 think before just the American public would cite Ukraine or  
9 would cite the possibility of a war against Taiwan, I bet  
10 they would say fentanyl. The National Defense Strategy in  
11 2022 had one paragraph about the Western hemisphere. You  
12 have a section dealing with Africa and Latin America.

13 That is a much longer paragraph. I like that. And  
14 yet it's about Africa and Latin America and it talks about  
15 the fact that China and Russia are making Africa and Latin  
16 America real centers of activity. And as the Chairman of  
17 the Americas Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, when I  
18 travel in the Americas again and again and again from  
19 governments left, right center or unpredictable.

20 What I hear, is we'd rather work with you than with  
21 China, for example, but you're not present. Yeah, we  
22 appreciate you lecturing us not to accept a free 5G system  
23 from China but what do you have on the table? We  
24 appreciate you telling us not to allow Russia to help with  
25 port investments but what do you have on the table? And I

1 think the fact that we spend so little intellectual energy  
2 focusing on our own hemisphere, and I just match that up  
3 against, I think American public would say fentanyl is like  
4 the biggest challenge, national security challenge that  
5 they see every day.

6 Now, this committee's done some good work. We have  
7 done significant investments in fentanyl interdiction  
8 technology. I had a chance to see some of it that is being  
9 piloted in Brownsville about two weeks ago. That I think  
10 will really help us. And Senator Ernst and I, in last  
11 year's NDAA, did a provision that calls for greater mill to  
12 mill cooperation between the United States and Mexican  
13 militaries on the fentanyl issue.

14 But why don't we just spend more energy on the  
15 Americas? What blocks us from more focus in the  
16 hemisphere? And I just worry, we can't see it, our own  
17 backyard to -- especially Chinese investments and count on  
18 our ability to lecture about the danger of Chinese  
19 investments to carry the day.

20 Ms. Harman: I agree. And I think we all agree. We  
21 did meet the head of SOUTHCOM. We met the head of AFRICOM,  
22 both of whom told us that we're under investing in Latin  
23 America and in Africa, and --

24 Senator Kaine: Just in Africa, a stat of the 35  
25 youngest countries in the world, 32 are in Africa.

1 Ms. Harman: Well, and I --

2 Senator Kaine: So, in terms of a youth bulge in a  
3 growing population, I mean, this is where the future is.

4 Ms. Harman: I think the population in Africa is going  
5 to double by 2050 and it will be the most populous  
6 continent. I think in, in the world. I'm not positive  
7 that it will exceed China and India but I think it will.  
8 And we're under investing. And in South America, for  
9 example, we heard that there are five countries with no  
10 ambassadors, no confirmed ambassadors, and our military  
11 footprint in Africa is decreasing.

12 I think we all agree on this commission that  
13 investment has to improve. And again, our whole idea about  
14 all elements of national power has to include partners and  
15 allies in those regions. Not an afterthought, not to say,  
16 oh, yeah, about Africa, and South America, and on fentanyl.  
17 I believe that President Biden and President Xi, when they  
18 met in San Francisco, came up with some deal on China  
19 policing the precursors of fentanyl.

20 Which come into our country, mostly, I think through  
21 Mexico. That deal hasn't been fully implemented but it's a  
22 start. And it's absolutely important, given how  
23 devastating fentanyl is to young people in this country who  
24 take drugs unsuspecting, that they have -- they're laced  
25 with fentanyl. It's absolutely crucial as a national

1 security threat to us. We do more.

2 Senator Kaine: Thank you. My time is up. Thanks,  
3 Mr. Chair.

4 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator  
5 Tuberville, please.

6 Senator Tuberville: Thank you very much. Following  
7 up on that, is our southern border a national threat? I've  
8 only seen it in your report one time.

9 Ambassador Edelman: Yes, absolutely. The border  
10 security is a threat. We do call in the report for  
11 additional funding across the agencies of national  
12 security, including DHS, which has the fundamental  
13 responsibility for the border.

14 Senator Tuberville: 80,000 Chinese coming across the  
15 border in the last nine months. Is that a threat? That's  
16 a pretty good threat, isn't it?

17 Ambassador Edelman: Its a potential threat, sir.  
18 Yes.

19 Senator Tuberville: Yeah, huge. I don't understand  
20 why we're not talking about it more, fentanyl, I saw a  
21 report the other day where you can order fentanyl from  
22 China and make it at your own house. You can order -- be  
23 delivered and make millions of appeals without any  
24 repercussion. I mean, we've lost our minds. We're losing  
25 our kids. You're talking about education. I spent 35

1 years in education and your report mentions changing our  
2 military standards.

3 Is that correct? To take more young men and women in  
4 the military?

5 Ambassador Edelman: Part of what you hear from the  
6 services when you talk about the recruitment challenges  
7 they face Senator Tuberville is that some of the standards  
8 are no longer really relevant. And some of it's an  
9 artifact of --

10 Senator Tuberville: Such as?

11 Ambassador Edelman: Childhood asthma for instance.  
12 You know, is that something that --

13 Senator Tuberville: Flat feet --

14 Ambassador Edelman: You know, that's --

15 Senator Tuberville: A lot of people got out of  
16 Vietnam because of flat feet, right?

17 Ambassador Edelman: Yeah. So, the question is do you  
18 continue to, you know, use those standards which are  
19 screening out people who might otherwise be willing and you  
20 know, ready to serve, or do you change it? Some of it's a  
21 function of the changing tracking that we have in medical  
22 records that allow things that wouldn't have come up 10 or  
23 15 years ago to block somebody from service.

24 And that's, I think what we were talking about.

25 Senator Tuberville: Well, you, what's hurting us too

1 is a lot of our government schools, I call them government  
2 schools because I went in thousands and while I was  
3 coaching, recruiting, and the problem we have is hate.  
4 That's being taught in a lot of our government schools  
5 towards our country. Why would any young man or woman want  
6 to fight for a country that they don't believe in, that  
7 they're being taught to hate.

8 It's absolutely amazing to me the direction this  
9 country's going. So, is there any agreement there even  
10 Representative Harman? I mean --

11 Ms. Harman: Yeah, there is agreement there. Yeah. I  
12 think hate on both sides is totally destructive. I think  
13 the absence of civics education and the absence of  
14 institutions that help people understand what patriotism  
15 means, that's, we had a conversation about national  
16 service, which might be a way to get all of our youth back  
17 together. I mean, this country, sadly, is in a point where  
18 many people say our biggest enemy is us fighting each  
19 other.

20 I was just going to talk about standards. One of the  
21 problems is the kind of deployments the military does every  
22 two years. Moving somewhere where in many cases the spouse  
23 works and having to change his or her job every two years  
24 is very burdensome. It's also hard on kids. And so that  
25 could change. And we, we talk about incorporating more of



1 the tech base and the tech skills into the work that our  
2 military does.

3 I mean, after all, future fights, we were just talking  
4 about this, are in more domains. They're in cyber and  
5 space, not just in air land and sea. And so, if we don't  
6 have the skill sets to fight those wars, we're going to  
7 lose.

8 Senator Tuberville: Yeah, because we don't have a  
9 middle class. We're ruining our middle class. Where  
10 technical schools, all these kids, we tell, hey, you got to  
11 go to a four-year school to get a job. We all knew that.  
12 And when we grew up, that's what we're told. But now  
13 that's not true. A lot of these kids go to school and  
14 their wages paid and unfortunately, they get social -- some  
15 kind of social justice degree and they can't get a job at  
16 Walmart.

17 We have got to start training our kids again. We're  
18 losing the ball here. I mean, this is where, that's, to  
19 me, that's a national security threat, where we don't teach  
20 kids how to use their hands and do those things. Let's go  
21 to Ukraine real quick. We got to get out of this, right?  
22 I mean, this has got to be solved. Do we let Ukraine into  
23 NATO? Your thoughts?

24 Ambassador Edelman: NATO has already made the  
25 decision back in 2008, that Ukraine at some point will be

1 in NATO. And that's a decision that was taken under the  
2 George W. Bush administration in which I served. I think  
3 the alliance, the just completed summit of the Alliance has  
4 made clear that while there's an ongoing conflict in in  
5 Ukraine, it's probably not appropriate to have Ukraine be a  
6 member.

7 But the Alliance has undertaken a series of actions  
8 and the U.S. bilaterally with Ukraine has undertaken a  
9 series of actions to build a bridge towards Ukraine's  
10 potential future membership.

11 Senator Tuberville: Well, that being said, should we  
12 allow, with the new government in Mexico, Mexico join  
13 BRICS? Should we allow that? Because it's coming, it's  
14 coming.

15 Ambassador Edelman: I don't. Senator, I don't know  
16 that we have any ability to, you know, the BRIC is an  
17 organization which the United States not, you know, a party  
18 to. So, I don't know --

19 Senator Tuberville: I'm just asking your opinion  
20 because we're doing the National Defense Strategy and we're  
21 going to be looking down the barrel of a gun on this  
22 because they're going to be on our border. You just said  
23 that, you know, NATO was going to accept Ukraine. Should  
24 Mexico go into BRICS if offered that position with the new  
25 president they have?

1           Ambassador Edelman:  If, well, the BRICS was actually  
2 kind of an invention of Goldman Sachs.  It's not really a  
3 serious military organization of any sort --

4           Senator Tuberville:  As we speak, it is coming though  
5 with India joining, with Iran joining, Saudi Arabia  
6 joining, it could be a threat.  Thank you, Mr. President.

7           Chairman Reed:  Thank you very much, Senator  
8 Tuberville.  Senator King, please.

9           Senator King:  Thank you.  The first country to adapt  
10 new technologies generally wins wars, Genghis Khan, and the  
11 stir up, the long bow at the Battle of Agincourt, the tank  
12 in World War I, radar in World War II, we are  
13 systematically missing technologies.  It's one of the great  
14 failures of the last 10 or 15 years in our defense  
15 structure, directed energy, hyper sonics, AI, cyber  
16 information warfare.

17           We are woefully behind on every one of those hyper  
18 sonics.  I'm sorry, directed energy.  We are shooting down  
19 \$20,000 Houthi missiles with \$4.3 million missiles of our  
20 own.  That's ridiculous.  And the budget for directed  
21 energy in the Defense Department has fallen by half in the  
22 last three years.  Representative Harman, is it systematic  
23 legacy thinking?  What's the problem?  Why did we miss  
24 these obvious technologies?

25           Ms. Harman:  Well, you heard us say that the Pentagon

1 is moving at the speed of bureaucracy. I think it is  
2 legacy systems. Old think, I think Congress is somewhat  
3 legacy --

4 Senator King: I think it's legacy thinking.

5 Ms. Harman: Legacy thinking, fine. But I think that  
6 Congress is somewhat complicit in the way the budget  
7 process doesn't work. And this insistence on requirements  
8 and oversight rather than on what is the problem set we are  
9 solving for, which is how the tech sector thinks.

10 I've been making a comment about DIU, the defense  
11 innovation unit that was set up by the late secretary, Ash  
12 Carter, that maybe we should outsource the Pentagon to DIU,  
13 which is ably headed by someone named Doug Beck, who had 11  
14 years' experience in the private sector because they know  
15 how to think about this. And I couldn't agree with you  
16 more. The budget of DIU is \$1 billion out of 850 billion.

17 Doug Beck says he can leverage that --

18 Senator King: Yes, these technologies that win  
19 wars --

20 Ms. Harman: Right?

21 Senator King: New technologies --

22 Ms. Harman: I'm in violent agreement with you. He  
23 says he can leverage that into 50 billion of commercial  
24 investment but that's still a pittance compared to the kind  
25 of change we need to undergo. Not just at the Pentagon but

1 at the Pentagon lashed up with other government agencies  
2 with the tech sector and with partners and allies. That is  
3 our point about all elements of national power, which will  
4 win the next war.

5 Senator King: Let's talk about cyber for a minute. I  
6 think it's kind of pathetic that today, just today, this  
7 morning, at the beginning of this meeting, we approve the  
8 very first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber. Cyber  
9 has been a serious threat in this country for 15 or 20  
10 years. And just today we are finally getting there.

11 To me, that's emblematic. Let me talk about another  
12 point about cyber. Several of our members, and you all  
13 have talked about the cornerstone of our defense strategy  
14 is deterrence. In cyber, we have no deterrent strategy.  
15 We're trying to patch our way out of this. People have  
16 attacked our country, they've attacked our elections,  
17 they've attacked our infrastructure. There have been no  
18 consequences, no results.

19 No one fears us in the cyber realm. Do you agree with  
20 me that we need to develop a cyber deterrent strategy? It  
21 doesn't necessarily have to be cyber for cyber but there  
22 has to be a price to be paid for attacking this country in  
23 the realm of cyber, Mr. Ambassador?

24 Ambassador Edelman: Senator King, I think one of the  
25 challenges with deterrence and the cyber realm is that

1 first attribution is frequently, you know, a problem. But  
2 secondly, the actions you take are not necessarily visible.  
3 And therefore, it lacks the kind of, you know, visible  
4 signs that we have. In other realms --

5 Senator King: It needs to be visible to the adversary  
6 --

7 Ambassador Edelman: To the adversary.

8 Senator King: Or deterrence.

9 Ambassador Edelman: Yeah. Well, the problem is it  
10 needs to be visible to the adversary. But you know, the  
11 question is, is it visible to your allies who you're also  
12 trying to protect with your deterrent? I did want to, if  
13 you permit me on the directed energy point because I think  
14 it's a very powerful point that you make. I think directed  
15 energy has suffered a bit from over promising in the past  
16 and it's been the next big thing and a lot of people have  
17 felt that it's not been delivered.

18 But clearly what you identified is correct, which is  
19 we can't be on the wrong end of the cost imposition curve  
20 where adversaries can use very cheap but tradeables that  
21 we're shooting down with million-dollar missiles, that's  
22 just not sustainable. But there is progress being made on  
23 directed energy, including by our allies, the UK has system  
24 Dragon Fire that looks like it's got some promise.

25 The Israelis have, you know, got iron beam. So,

1 there's activity going on. And I think you're right that  
2 we need to invest more time and effort in it.

3 Ms. Harman: If I could just add one thing on cyber, I  
4 think you serve on the intelligence committee as well.  
5 There are things we're doing that we can't talk about that  
6 are deterring cyber against us. And we are in other  
7 networks and I --

8 Senator King: I'm sorry, but if we can't talk about  
9 it, it's not a deterrent.

10 Ms. Harman: But it --

11 Senator King: You got to be able to talk about it --

12 Ms. Harman: No, but maybe --

13 Senator King: It's Dr. Strange love.

14 Ms. Harman: But not all --

15 Senator King: You can't keep the doomsday machines  
16 secret.

17 Ms. Harman: Not all the time, our adversaries do  
18 understand some of the things we're doing for deterrence.  
19 Attribution is still an evolving art and we can't always  
20 identify who's doing what to us. But I think we're  
21 stronger in the cyber realm than may appear publicly.

22 Senator King: I think we have capabilities. My time  
23 is up. I commend you for mentioning terrorism. I worry  
24 that we've turned our focus so much to great power  
25 competition. One demented individual almost upset our

1 entire presidential process a few weeks ago. I think  
2 terrorism is still a very, very significant threat and I'm  
3 afraid we are not attending to it sufficiently. Thank you,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator King. Senator  
6 Cotton, please.

7 Senator Cotton: Representative Harman, Ambassador  
8 Edelman, and the rest of the commission, thank you for your  
9 good work once again. Ambassador Edelman, you spoke with  
10 Senator Fischer about the Multiple Theater Force Construct,  
11 basically the kind of threats we're planning for. And  
12 there's a time when this nation planned to fight two major  
13 wars at time.

14 And I think now we're down to a force that can fight  
15 one conflict, and protect our homeland, and hopefully scare  
16 bad guys everywhere else around the world, and not starting  
17 a war, is that right?

18 Ambassador Edelman: That is correct. That's what the  
19 2022 NDS describes.

20 Senator Cotton: Is our, so that's the, what our  
21 National Defense Strategy says. Is the current force even  
22 capable of doing that, in your opinion? Putting aside what  
23 it should be capable of doing?

24 Ambassador Edelman: Yeah.

25 Senator Cotton: Which I'll come to momentarily. Can



1 it even do that?

2 Ambassador Edelman: I think they're very serious  
3 questions about whether the force in being could actually  
4 execute the strategy.

5 Senator Cotton: Okay, there's been some talk about  
6 this access of Russia, and China, and North Korea, and  
7 Iran. You might add in a few other ancillary bad actors  
8 like Cuba for instance. Do these countries have to get  
9 together in a secret diplomatic meeting and agree to carve  
10 up different parts of the world or to act in concert  
11 Russia, you strike Ukraine, China, I'm going to hit Taiwan,  
12 and then Iran's going to go for the jugular in Israel.

13 Do they have to get together like the Molotov Ribbon  
14 Trop Summit and have a pact to act in concert together?

15 Ambassador Edelman: They could do that, but they  
16 don't necessarily have to do that. I mean, the problem we  
17 face is twofold. We face one problem that you've just  
18 described, which is concerted, you know, collaboration in  
19 aggression but there's also the potential of opportunistic  
20 aggression if something happens in one theater, and one of  
21 the other actors decides to take advantage of it to do  
22 something in another theater.

23 Senator Cotton: Representative Harman, I see you  
24 nodding your head. Would you like to add your perspective?

25 Ms. Harman: I totally agree with that and we see that

1 all the time. And I'm not sure if you were in the room but  
2 one of the things that Ambassador Edelman said is that  
3 China is watching intently whether Russia can get away with  
4 its illegal invasion of Ukraine. And if it can, that would  
5 empower China without a conversation with Russia to move  
6 against Taiwan.

7 Senator Cotton: And that this idea, well found in  
8 history, that these adversary nations don't have to sit  
9 down at a secret summit, that they can just see that for  
10 instance, the United States and its allies are being taxed  
11 in Europe and therefore now is the time to become more  
12 aggressive in the Middle East, if you're Iran, or maybe  
13 China goes for the jugular in Taiwan.

14 It gets back to the point about this force construct  
15 as well. What they also see is what the United States just  
16 says it's capable of doing and the fact that it may not  
17 even be capable of doing that. Is that right?

18 Ambassador Edelman: I agree.

19 Ms. Harman: And the word pivot probably should be  
20 retired. I don't think we can leave anywhere. I think we  
21 have to have an understanding of the threats against us not  
22 just against regions everywhere. And the whole idea of  
23 this Multiple Force Construct is flexibility and having an  
24 adequate deterrent so we don't engage in more wars.

25 Senator Cotton: Another related point, there's been

1 some questions about the information environment,  
2 misinformation, disinformation, cyber threats as well.  
3 Those are important, don't get me wrong but are wars going  
4 to be won in the information environment and cyber without  
5 things that go boom in the real world? Ambassador Edelman?

6 Ambassador Edelman: You have to have both. I mean,  
7 one, I don't think you were in the room, Senator Cotton. I  
8 said that the -- our adversaries, particularly the Russians  
9 who have written a lot about this doctrinally see  
10 information as part of a suite of activities including all  
11 of their kinetic activities. Whereas we see it in sort of  
12 silos.

13 But they see it totally differently. And you have to  
14 be able to, you know, bring all of those elements together  
15 and more.

16 Senator Cotton: And we've learned a lot and we've  
17 technologically seen advances on the battlefield in Ukraine  
18 on both sides. But isn't the case that the most important  
19 technological advances or the advances that enhance the  
20 power of the things that go boom on the battlefield, the  
21 munitions, the aircraft, the drones, the interceptors and  
22 so forth, not things are just done from keyboards sitting  
23 back in Washington.

24 Ambassador Edelman: I want to be careful because I  
25 think part of the answer is that the, you know, some of

1 what we've done for instance in arming the Ukrainians with  
2 different off the shelf commercial drones has been undone  
3 by Russian electronic warfare which is done from a  
4 keyboard. So, and electronic warfare is sometimes, you  
5 know, attributed to "information," you know, "warfare" as  
6 well.

7 So, I, think it's --

8 Senator Cotton: Keyboard's closer to the battlefield  
9 with big dishes that shoot

10 Ambassador Edelman: Correct.

11 Senator Cotton: Shoot invisible things up in the sky,  
12 right?

13 Ambassador Edelman: Exactly.

14 Senator Cotton: Not just people sitting at a keyboard  
15 writing a hashtag out.

16 Ambassador Edelman: Correct. Correct.

17 Senator Cotton: Okay, thank you both, my time's  
18 expired.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you very much, Senator Cotton.  
20 Senator Manchin, please.

21 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank  
22 both of you all for very informative discussions this  
23 morning. I appreciate all the hard work you've done. When  
24 I first came to the Senate in 2010, I came leaving the  
25 Governor's office of West Virginia and wasn't really that

1 much in tune on the national threats that we had. I was  
2 worried about the threats we had in West Virginia.

3 So, when I came here, I tried to bone up when I was on  
4 this committee, my first committee, and I'll never forget  
5 and it had to be early February or late January of 2011.  
6 We had all the joint chiefs of staff and all the questions  
7 were being asked, and identifying the problems we had  
8 around the world, and the threats we had. And the question  
9 was asked to Admiral Mullins, Mike Mullins at that time,  
10 what's the greatest threat to the United States faces?

11 I thought I'm going to hear about, you know, learning  
12 about China more, and about Russia, and always being  
13 Russia, and the threat that they have. And then all of a  
14 sudden, without hesitating, he said, the debt of our nation  
15 is the greatest threat that we face as Americans. So, I  
16 would ask you all, since we just hit \$35 trillion of debt  
17 yesterday, what do you all believe is the greatest threat  
18 we face, Jane?

19 Ms. Harman: Well, let me agree with you that our  
20 hemorrhaging debt is a huge threat. And one of the things  
21 we -- one's

22 Senator Manchin: Who was even talking about on either  
23 of national --

24 Ms. Harman: We do --

25 Senator Manchin: Democrat, Republicans, nobody --

1 Ms. Harman: Senator, we do, in this report, we  
2 identify the national debt as a national security threat.  
3 And we say that we need to spend smarter and spend more on  
4 defense and pay for it. We, on a unanimous basis are not  
5 recommending printing more money. We are recommending  
6 finding a way to raise the revenues and reform  
7 entitlements. I know that's a sacred cow, sadly, these  
8 days.

9 But reform entitlements and we point out that the  
10 interest on the debt is larger than our defense budget.

11 Senator Manchin: So, you both agree to that,  
12 Ambassador?

13 Ambassador Edelman: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Manchin: Okay. Second, I would say that on  
15 your report, you talked about the current force structure  
16 that we have and I think you had identified that the  
17 Marines are only ones meeting that we agree with, that what  
18 you failed to do is basically identify why we have not or  
19 why you all did not take up women being in selective  
20 service or joining selective service because women make up  
21 74 percent healthcare and education industry, 52 percent of  
22 financial activities.

23 They're a tremendously strong force. And there's a  
24 lot of women I don't want to go up against. I can tell you  
25 that, in so many ways. But why do you believe, I guess my

1 question is simple. Does the commission support women  
2 registering for selective service?

3 Ms. Harman: Well, I'll speak for myself. I do. I  
4 think that women are a majority of our population, a  
5 majority of the talent pool, many of the most talented  
6 women serve on this committee. So, yes, they should be  
7 -- we should be, and --

8 Senator Manchin: Make it clear that we, it does  
9 not -- we talked about this, does not require women to  
10 participate in military draft.

11 Ms. Harman: I understand.

12 Senator Manchin: Which will also require --

13 Ms. Harman: It's registering.

14 Senator Manchin: Yeah, registering, that's all.

15 Ms. Harman: Yes. And my answer to that is yes. Okay.

16 Senator Manchin: How come you all didn't address it?

17 Ambassador Edelman: You know, I don't have a good  
18 answer for you, Senator Manchin. It's not something we  
19 took up. We looked at other elements of the recruiting  
20 challenges that the services face.

21 Senator Manchin: Got you. Well, I hope you all would  
22 revisit that, if you will. So, my last, I have two more  
23 questions. My next question would be Russia. What have we  
24 learned about Russia during the Ukraine war? Do you think  
25 it's basically shown Russia's vulnerability or they've

1 learned basically where the vulnerabilities were  
2 strengthening? What's your concerns?

3 Ambassador Edelman: I think we've learned a lot of  
4 things. I mean, at first, I think we've learned that  
5 corruption is a feature, not a bug of the system that  
6 Vladimir Putin has created since he became president of  
7 Russia. You know, at the turn of the century, I think  
8 we've learned that Russian military doctrine is not  
9 necessarily going to predict how they actually will fight  
10 when a conflict comes up.

11 I think we've learned that that we've relearned a  
12 lesson that has been true of Russian military history for  
13 hundreds of years which is they're willing to sacrifice the  
14 lives of their service folks to gain an objective without  
15 regard, you know, to the human costs.

16 Senator Manchin: If I can, my final question, if I  
17 could real quickly, I commend your report on tension to  
18 defense industrial base especially munitions and supply  
19 chain. However, there was no mention of Solid Rocket  
20 Motors. We have a problem. And the problem is this. We  
21 continue to keep pouring money into Aerojet Rocketdyne that  
22 can continually fall short of producing the quality of  
23 rockets in the environment we need. But the government is  
24 into that, supporting it.

25 And yet the federal government, we own the ABL lab at



1 Rocket City in West Virginia, and they have been producing  
2 unbelievable. And no one's saying a word about it. No  
3 one's basically pushing, why are you shoving money into a  
4 private entity when board changes? Who's buying stock  
5 ownership when you already own one? Have you all looked at  
6 that or would you and basically bring it to a higher level?

7 Ms. Harman: Sure. Absolutely. And you'll be missed  
8 here. You have been very articulate at identifying things  
9 not just that West Virginia does but you know the energy  
10 needs of this country and why it matters, that we export  
11 more energy.

12 Senator Manchin: If you would look into it and  
13 compare ABL, at Rocket City, in West Virginia, okay, versus  
14 Aerojet Rocketdyne, and look at the ownership, the  
15 production, the quality of what we're producing there.  
16 Because without that as we've said before, we can't  
17 compete. We just can't. So, if you would do that, I would  
18 appreciate it.

19 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Manchin. Senator  
20 Ernst, please.

21 Senator Ernst: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank  
22 you both so much for being here for your leadership and to  
23 the entire commission for their great work and support  
24 staff as well. We really do appreciate it. Of course,  
25 we've had the opportunity to hear about this urgent

1 assessment of our national security landscape and it has  
2 changed quite dramatically since the last NDS. So, thank  
3 you for your time and attention.

4 The recommendation should be a roadmap to address our  
5 security challenges and restore American leadership on the  
6 world stage. I feel that's very important. It's  
7 desperately needed right now. And I know we have talked  
8 about force structure, and Ambassador, we'll start with  
9 you. Only recently has the force planning shifted to a  
10 single conflict structure despite facing the most  
11 significant strategic competition our country has ever  
12 faced.

13 So, the, the report, I want to draw attention to the  
14 quote, and I, again, I know we've talked about it, but the  
15 report includes a quote from a defense strategist who warns  
16 " a force that can only wage one conflict is effectively a  
17 zero-conflict force since employing it would require the  
18 President to preclude any other meaningful global  
19 engagement."

20 And in light of this, again, if you can talk a little  
21 bit about the Multi Theater Force Construct, Ambassador,  
22 but then I also want to then lead into what Senator King  
23 alluded to with terrorism. Where does that leave our  
24 counter-terrorism forces?

25 Ambassador Edelman: Senator Ernst, I think the

1 problem we have is that, to go to your point, if we have a  
2 force that's optimized to fight one war when a crisis  
3 erupts and the President asks the Secretary of Defense and  
4 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for military options to  
5 deal with it, the answer they're likely to get is, you  
6 know, Mr. or Madam President, we can fight this fight but  
7 you will be at very high risk in all these other places.

8 And against that backdrop, you know, what kind of  
9 decisions would, you know, come out of that. It's why I  
10 think it's described as a zero-war force. Our view was  
11 that you have to be able to deter and potentially defeat  
12 adversaries in all three of the main theaters that we have  
13 been engaged in since the end of the Second World War.

14 And which we repeatedly engaged in. I mean, there's  
15 been no shortage of efforts to try and extricate the United  
16 States from the Middle East. The last NDS in 2018 said we  
17 should be willing to run risk in the Middle East. I think  
18 on October 7th, we got a sense, and then again on April  
19 13th of what running additional risk means in the Middle  
20 East.

21 So, it's our view that we have to be able to, you  
22 know, manage to do all of those things. In that regard, I  
23 think we're consistent with our colleagues on the Strategic  
24 Posture Commission who argued something quite similar. But  
25 we also have to be able to deal with the ongoing threat as

1 Senator King said of terrorism. And to be able to continue  
2 to focus on the things that Special Operations Command has  
3 been focused on for a number of years.

4 Making sure that we don't have terrorists plotting to,  
5 you know, create mass casualties either in the homeland or,  
6 you know, with our allies.

7 Ms. Harman: Yes. If I could just add to that, I was  
8 in Congress on 911. Many were, I was a member before that  
9 of a commission on, I think, the Commission on Terrorism,  
10 which predicted a major attack on U.S. soil. No one was  
11 listening. And then came 911 and we surged everything to  
12 the GWAT, the Global War on Terror. Surging everything is  
13 not a good strategy.

14 We missed when we did that, the rise of China. We  
15 missed the rise of Russian grievance. We missed the kind  
16 of world we now live in. We have to do all these things at  
17 the same time, walk, and chew gum at the same time. And  
18 this report tries, by promoting this all elements of,  
19 national power strategy to talk about how we could do that.

20 And we don't think we, the commission on a unanimous  
21 basis, that accepting risk in certain parts of the world  
22 basically meaning not projecting U.S. leadership is a  
23 successful strategy. We have to be strong everywhere which  
24 doesn't mean we have to have boots on the ground everywhere  
25 but we have to have an all elements of national power

1 strategy everywhere.

2 Senator Ernst: Yeah. I am in absolute agreement,  
3 Representative Harman and mentioning SOCOM, Special  
4 Operations Command. I do think it's incredibly important  
5 and I'm in full agreement that we need to be able to face  
6 multiple fronts. I think all of us on this committee would  
7 agree with that but we also have to have those that are  
8 nimble, agile, those that can respond quickly to  
9 situations.

10 Those forces are found in SOCOM. We need to be able  
11 to leverage different tools of power in other regions to  
12 create stability. So, whether it's kinetic action through  
13 the military or just working with friends and allies, we  
14 need to create greater stability all around the world. And  
15 I think we can achieve that but we have to be willing to  
16 invest.

17 Ms. Harman: And diplomacy is one of our tools. So,  
18 it's soft power matters but hard power does too. And we're  
19 not talking about selecting parts of the world for one and  
20 other parts for the other. We're talking about a  
21 combination that's greater than the sum of the parts.

22 Senator Ernst: Absolutely. Again, I want to thank  
23 you both for your service and our entire commission and  
24 support staff. Thank you very much.

25 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator

1 Gillibrand, please.

2           Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Congresswoman Harman.  
3 Thank you, Ambassador Edelman. So, grateful for your  
4 testimony and thank you for the great work of this report.  
5 One of the things that you concluded was that the DOD  
6 should invest more in cyber capabilities and capacity over  
7 the last two NDAA cycles. We included a cyber academy to  
8 create an ROTC-type program. There's about 600 schools  
9 eligible right now across the country who are already  
10 participating in this program.

11           It's built on NNSA, a smaller, much smaller program.  
12 Can you talk a little bit about how this cyber academy and  
13 its thousand slots a year could help meet DODs future  
14 needs?

15           Ambassador Edelman: I don't doubt that it will help,  
16 you know, fill the gap because we need more cyber warriors.  
17 I do think that Cyber Command has actually done a pretty  
18 good job at Cyber Command and NSA under General Nakasone's  
19 leadership and now his successor at building the force.  
20 Which you know, when we looked at this from the commission  
21 point of view six years ago, there were questions about how  
22 well we were doing.

23           I think we've actually made a lot of progress in the  
24 ensuing years. But obviously the more we can generate  
25 young cyber warriors who are, you know, willing to come to

1 work for the government because that's been an issue in the  
2 past, that is going to be a boon.

3 Ms. Harman: I would just add that and I'm not sure  
4 you were here, when we talked about it, that the two new  
5 defense domains are space and cyber, and we now have space  
6 force, and we have cyber command. And slowly, we are  
7 building the skill sets that we need for our defense  
8 capability, not just in the Pentagon to be robust and  
9 effective. And so, a major cyber-attack on U.S. soil could  
10 pre sage China's annexation of Taiwan.

11 That's something we mentioned before, that could  
12 happen. Are the -- is the American public aware of this  
13 and ready? Absolutely not. Is there Chinese technology  
14 all over America, including in our ports? Absolutely. And  
15 so building more capable people who have the training and  
16 having a more focused government on the threats is -- are  
17 both essential things to do.

18 Senator Gillibrand: So, one of the concerns I have is  
19 that the current recruiting technique for Cybercom,  
20 Cyberforce, is that they're recruiting from the existing  
21 services. So, Navy has to give X number every year, army,  
22 marines, et cetera, air force, and not all the services can  
23 meet the goals. Not all the services have the senior cyber  
24 personnel that a cyber command actually needs and wants.

25 And when they do leave to cyber command, then there's

1 no cyber expert left in the service because they just gave  
2 those personnel to cyber command. So, one question I have  
3 for space as well, shouldn't we consider having a west  
4 point for cyber or west point for space, or having one new  
5 service academy to educate and train the military personnel  
6 for cyber command and space command?

7 And the reason I say this is because the cyber academy  
8 that we have created is just civilian jobs because 50  
9 percent of all cyber jobs are civilian. So, let's at least  
10 recruit from the entire country in an ROTC type program for  
11 non-military personnel. And so, that arguably can be a  
12 thousand kids a year graduating with that capability. So,  
13 let me push the next question. A thousand of civilian  
14 personnel is great, not going to meet all our needs.

15 Do you think we should think about or at least do a  
16 study on the importance of perhaps having a service academy  
17 to directly train military personnel and commanders in  
18 cyber and space?

19 Ambassador Edelman: It's not something we examined,  
20 Senator Gillibrand, but I certainly think it's something  
21 worth some study, to see whether that would generate the  
22 kind of flow through that you would want to staff those  
23 skill sets, as my colleague just said.

24 Ms. Harman: And we also talk about integrating the  
25 tech base with the DOD base and make a recommendation that



1 the business model of the tech base may be much more  
2 successful than the business model. You know, government  
3 at the pace of bureaucracy of the Pentagon and the tech  
4 base produces a lot of highly trained cyber folks through  
5 our national university system and private universities.

6 So, I think the study is still a good idea but I also  
7 think there are resources we're not leveraging that we  
8 could.

9 Senator Gillibrand: So, even a more serious question,  
10 you conclude, that given that much of the critical  
11 infrastructure that the United States relies on for the  
12 projection -- power projection overseas falls outside of  
13 the DODs remit, the department needs to further its  
14 integration with and increase the capability of the other  
15 parts of the U.S. government, including ds DHS and CSA.

16 Intelligence community, FBI and state and local  
17 governments. This finding, I find to be the most troubling  
18 because it's entirely outside the DODs mission. It's  
19 outside their authority, it's outside the job they want,  
20 the job they're willing to do but in actuality we don't  
21 therefore have domestic cyber defense. FBI is the best  
22 cyber response organization to the globe.

23 CISA can literally only offer best practices. And  
24 their best practices are the best practices and they're  
25 doing great outreach and all the things but there's no one

1 to stop. And this goes to Senator Angus King's questions.  
2 There's no one to stop a significant cyber-attack, let's  
3 just say, on military bases.

4 Taking out all of our capabilities domestically to  
5 have an electric grid, a water supply, food supply  
6 emergency services, stock exchanges, there's no one to stop  
7 that as if we'd want that in a war scenario and we stop a  
8 bombing that's going to happen on our subway system but we  
9 don't stop a cyber-attack that's about to, on our subway  
10 system.

11 We'll do response, we do offensive. So, with the zero  
12 seconds I have left, could you please talk a little bit  
13 about what we should be doing from a cyber defense for the  
14 homeland? This year's NDAA has a requirement for a plan,  
15 for how to protect at least our military bases but I think  
16 we should be protecting all of critical infrastructure.

17 Ambassador Edelman: Look, I agree. And, you know, I  
18 think the department is just beginning to wrap its arms  
19 around this problem that, as I'm not sure if you were in  
20 the room, Senator Gerald Brandt, when we said earlier, the  
21 homeland, if there's a conflict, is not going to be a  
22 sanctuary anymore. And the first attacks will likely be in  
23 the cyber domain and they will be incredibly disabling for  
24 our society but also for the department.

25 But getting all the agencies of government that would

1 have a role in all this, because it goes beyond just DOD,  
2 it goes beyond just DHS, I mean, it goes to the Department  
3 of Transportation, it goes to commerce. I mean, there's  
4 just, it's an unbelievably complex issue. And we're only,  
5 I think now, kind of wrapping our minds around it, and it  
6 needs a lot more work and attention from the department.

7 Ms. Harman: I think that Senator King mentioned that  
8 this committee just confirmed an Assistant Secretary of  
9 Defense for Cyber today. It's way too late. It's way too  
10 slow. You're absolutely right that all of this stuff has  
11 to be accelerated. I do think some of our capabilities  
12 that we can't talk about publicly are more extensive than  
13 people may believe but the public is essentially clueless  
14 about the massive cyber-attacks that could be launched any  
15 day by our adversaries.

16 Not just nation states but rogue actors as well.

17 Chairman Reed: Thank, thank you. Senator Gillibrand.  
18 Senator Schmitt, please.

19 Senator Schmitt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank  
20 you for your work, both of you. I want to ask a few  
21 questions about sort of this our pivot to China which I  
22 think, you know, in this place, in this town, there's hard  
23 to find bipartisan agreement on much. I think most people  
24 agree that China is our, however you want to call it, chief  
25 adversary, pacing threat, pacing challenge, however you

1 want to wordsmith it.

2 I think that's real. And I think there's recognition,  
3 I think in your work and others that we have a capacity  
4 problem in effectively doing that. So, I'd wanted to ask,  
5 maybe Dr. Edelman, as relates to this sort of like  
6 priorities, how would you, if we, I guess for either one of  
7 you, what would you say? I mean, I think I have an idea of  
8 what the number is.

9 The amount of money that we spend in Europe, how much  
10 of our defense budget, what -- give me a ballpark of a  
11 dollar amount.

12 Ambassador Edelman: Senator Schmitt, it's a little  
13 hard to disaggregate it because, you know, you've got  
14 command and control that, you know, covers a variety of  
15 sins. But if you're getting at the question of, you know,  
16 do we need to spend less on defense of Europe and more in  
17 the Indo-Pacific, I think we've got to be able to do both.  
18 We've got --

19 Senator Schmitt: Well, but, I'm -- here is this  
20 point. We're not doing both.

21 Ambassador Edelman: Right.

22 Senator Schmitt: And my argument isn't the withdrawal  
23 necessarily. My argument is, you know, some estimates  
24 would be 150 billion to 300 billion a year. Let's just,  
25 let's just use that as a number and people could debate

1 what that actually is. I think for me and I want to get  
2 your thoughts on this, if Canada and Europe went from -- so  
3 they're a combined total of 2 percent right now, if they  
4 went to 3.4 percent of spending on defense per -- you know,  
5 as it relates to their GDP.

6 Like we do, that's another \$300 billion. And I'm  
7 just, how have you guys grappled with this? Because to me,  
8 \$300 billion allows us to, you know, continue to be, you  
9 know, an important ally for a European allies, but also  
10 allows us to do the things that we need to do for the  
11 homeland in China. So how do you guys view that?

12 Ambassador Edelman: I think, look, our allies need to  
13 spend more on defense. That's clear. At the latest NATO  
14 summit, there's clearly a lot of talk of allies moving  
15 beyond 2 percent of GDP, which now I think about two thirds  
16 of them are hitting to beyond 2 percent to 2.5 percent. I  
17 think, you know, honestly, a cynic went on of them doing  
18 that is also seeing us make the investment.

19 Which is why in increasing our top line, which is one  
20 of the reasons we came to the conclusions we did about, you  
21 know, the U.S. top line, obviously we need our allies to be  
22 producing more. Our defense industrial base is in very bad  
23 shape as we've discussed in our report. The European  
24 defense industrial base is, you know, in even worse shape.  
25 So, we need you know, their industrial base, we need our

1 industrial base.

2 We need our allies in the Indo-Pacific Australia,  
3 Japan, The Republic of Korea, Taiwan, all need to be  
4 stepping up because to match what Russia, China, North  
5 Korea, and Iran are doing is going to beyond our ability to  
6 do it ourselves. We're going to have to do it, you know,  
7 with allies. So, there's going to have to be broad  
8 investment across the, you know, across all of the regions,  
9 by the way, Middle East as well.

10 We've got you know, partners in the Middle East who  
11 could also be doing more in that regard.

12 Ms. Harman: I would just add that I think Europe is  
13 waking up to this and I think there's a robust conversation  
14 in Europe about doing more and even possibly setting up. I  
15 don't think this idea will ever take, you know, become a  
16 reality, some kind of a European force. But the point is  
17 spending more, leading, more, fighting Europe's fight in  
18 Europe. And I would add that we embrace in this all  
19 elements of national power strategy.

20 That's the core of our report, doing more with  
21 partners and allies. Think about the Indo-Pacific. The  
22 Secretary of Defense is there now, I think with Secretary  
23 Blinken, talking about how to turn the -- enhance the  
24 command that we have in Japan into a more robust command.  
25 It shouldn't just be --

1           Senator Schmitt: I have limited time. I want to get  
2 to one more question. So, I appreciate -- I think that's  
3 true. I think that \$300 billion would go a long way in  
4 allowing us to sort of, as we talk about priorities, and  
5 just to run through a couple, you know, \$320 million for  
6 the Gaza Pier would've gone a long way and almost fully  
7 funded. You know, the Guam Missile Defense Project that  
8 we're not spending money on.

9           So, there, you could go over, you could go through  
10 this list about things of us being spread too thin and  
11 missing what our real priorities are. And I don't have  
12 time to go through them all, but they're significant. I  
13 guess the final question of the time that I have is, this  
14 question of the industrial base. I mean there's -- to me,  
15 there's no question Europe needs to step up and that's the  
16 part of a lot of conversations we have here.

17           But as it relates to our industrial base, I supported  
18 the plus up. I think we should be spending more. What is  
19 the, if there's a couple of things that could be done to  
20 actually produce the things that we need, we're not, we  
21 don't have enough of what we need. What are a couple of  
22 those top line suggestions that you would have that when  
23 people ask me back home when I talk about this challenge.  
24 What are the things that can be done differently?

25           Ambassador Edelman: Well, I mean, members of this

1 committee have done, you know, their job for sure in  
2 providing, for instance, authority for multi-year  
3 procurement, which is, I think one of the most important  
4 things because industry responds to, you know, the notion  
5 that they're going to have a, you know, long timeline to  
6 produce this not just a spike and then go down. It would  
7 be helpful if the appropriators would on their side, make  
8 sure their dollars appropriated against that, to do that  
9 for the department.

10 That I know is one of the problems that's held up the  
11 department until recently.

12 Ms. Harman: I just add that we're not only talking  
13 about the defense in industrial base, we're talking about  
14 the industrial base and embracing fully the tech sector,  
15 which has much more to contribute to the defense of our  
16 country than it is able to contribute.

17 Senator Schmitt: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman Reed: Thank you, Senator Schmitt. I want to  
19 thank Representative Harman, Ambassador Edelman, excellent  
20 testimony based on a superb report. And I also want to  
21 shout out to General Keane, and Tom Mahnken, Mara Rudman,  
22 Mariah Sixkiller, Alissa Starzak, and Roger Zakheim, the  
23 great group.

24 But I have to give a special kudos to David Grannis,  
25 Ralph Cohen, Amy Hopkins, Travis Sharp, Dustin Walker, and



1 Becca Wasser, because we all know you get the credit, they  
2 did the work. So, thank you very much. But this has been  
3 an extraordinarily useful hearing and it's got us both  
4 informed and I think energized to move forward. And with  
5 that, I thank you all and I will adjourn the hearing.

6 [Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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