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Before the

Subcommittee on Seapower

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON MARINE CORPS
GROUND MODERNIZATION IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

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7
8 U.S. Senate
9 Subcommittee on Seapower
10 Committee on Armed Services
11 Washington, D.C.

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13 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.
14 in Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger
15 F. Wicker, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

16 Committee Members Present: Senators Wicker
17 [presiding], Ayotte, Tillis, Sullivan, Blumenthal, Hirono,
18 and King.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, U.S.
2 SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

3 Senator Wicker: It is precisely 9:30, and this hearing
4 of the Senate Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee will come
5 to order.

6 Before we begin, I think Senator Hirono and I would
7 both like to express our concern for the seven marines and
8 four soldiers missing after a helicopter crash early this
9 morning in Florida. I understand that the search and rescue
10 mission continues, and we are anxious to receive any news we
11 can. Perhaps our witnesses might have some information
12 about that as they begin their testimony.

13 The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower
14 convenes this morning to examine Marine Corps ground
15 modernization programs. This is the Seapower Subcommittee's
16 first hearing for the 114th Congress.

17 I welcome my friend and colleague from Hawaii, Senator
18 Hirono, who serves as ranking member of this subcommittee.
19 I look forward to working with Senator Hirono to ensure that
20 our sailors and marines remain the best trained, best
21 equipped, and most professional maritime fighting force in
22 the world.

23 This morning we welcome Mr. Thomas P. Dee, Deputy
24 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Expeditionary Programs
25 and Logistics Management, and Lieutenant General Kenneth J.

1 Glueck, who serves as Deputy Commandant for combat
2 Development and Integration. General Glueck is also the
3 commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development
4 Command. Our subcommittee thanks you, and we thank the
5 nearly 185,000 marines who are operating in over 40
6 countries around the world for your service to our Nation.

7 Over the past several years, the Marine Corps has been
8 in a transition period moving from counterinsurgency and
9 stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Marine
10 Corps' more traditional role as a ready and capable rapid
11 response force. This transition has been and will continue
12 to be complicated by fiscal uncertainty, the prospect of
13 sequestration, reductions in end strength and force
14 structure, and challenges with combat vehicle modernization.

15 Today our efforts will update us on their efforts to
16 build a global crisis response force of amphibious, combat,
17 and tactical ground vehicles. This force should meet the
18 Nation's requirements for maneuver from the sea that is
19 technologically achievable and affordable. I would like our
20 witnesses to elaborate on the Marine Corps's strategy for
21 modernizing its vehicle fleet, including the amphibious
22 combat vehicle, ACV, and joint light tactical vehicle, JLTV.
23 I would be interested to learn how the Marine Corps plans to
24 meet its ground vehicle requirements within current and
25 projected budget constraints while still maintaining high

1 operational capability and readiness.

2 I understand the Marine Corps has restructured the
3 amphibious combat vehicle and will release a request for
4 proposals this year. I remain concerned that substituting
5 wheeled armor personnel carriers for amphibious track
6 vehicles could erode the Marine Corps' amphibious assault
7 capability, the capability that separates the Marine Corps
8 from the Army. So perhaps we will hear testimony about
9 that.

10 I look forward to hearing how the Marine Corps ACV
11 acquisition strategy will reduce fielding time and deliver
12 vehicles incrementally.

13 Now, with regard to the JLTV, I am encouraged by the
14 progress that the Marine Corps and the Army have made on
15 this multi-service program. The JLTV program office is
16 scheduled for milestone C and the low rate production
17 contract award in this fiscal year. The Marine Corps budget
18 request supports the achievement of initial operational
19 capability in fiscal year 2018. I trust that our witnesses
20 will reassure this subcommittee that the Marine Corps JLTV
21 design and requirements are stable. Such stability would
22 ensure that the Marine Corps will be able to afford to field
23 this important replacement for our HMMWV's as soon as
24 possible.

25 With regard to acquisition of the ACV and JLTV vehicle,

1 I understand that the Marine Corps relies on competition to
2 gauge early on what is technologically feasible and
3 affordable. But competition requires viable competitors,
4 which we do not always have. So maybe we will hear about
5 that. I would like our witnesses to provide their best
6 assessment of the state of the U.S. industrial base for
7 ground combat and tactical vehicles. Perhaps they will
8 suggest what can be done to sustain the viability of our
9 manufacturing base at the contractor and supply chain
10 levels.

11 Now, with regard to sequestration, the Marine Corps
12 faces significant budget challenges, as do all of our
13 services. Unless Congress acts, sequestration will return
14 in October of this year. And I feel like I am singing a
15 song from 2 and 3 years ago. As a member of both the Armed
16 Services Committee and the Budget Committee, I know that
17 tough decisions must be made across the Federal Government
18 -- tough decisions. However, I would remind everyone that
19 national defense is solely a Federal responsibility.
20 Defense spending is also a twofer, supporting both our
21 national security and our high tech manufacturing workforce.
22 Sequestration was designed to be so onerous that we would
23 never even proceed to it. And frankly, it is unthinkable
24 that having experienced it once, we would once again move to
25 it later on this calendar year.

1 The Marine Corps budget accounts for approximately 6
2 percent of DOD's total budget. I am concerned that
3 sequestration could disproportionately impact the Marine
4 Corps on everything from modernization to readiness. As
5 such, I hope our witnesses today will elaborate on the
6 impact that sequestration will have on our expeditionary
7 marines, their ability to execute our country's national
8 security strategy, and the vitality of our defense
9 industrial base.

10 Senator Hirono?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. MAZIE K. HIRONO, U.S. SENATOR FROM
2 HAWAII

3 Senator Hirono: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4 And thank you to the witnesses who are here. Thank you
5 for your service.

6 Mr. Chairman, I share your concerns regarding the
7 missing marines and soldiers after a helicopter accident in
8 Florida, and our thoughts are with the families and the
9 members.

10 Before I begin, of course, I want to acknowledge my
11 delight in being the ranking member on this committee with
12 you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly look forward to working
13 with you.

14 The Marine Corps continues its transition from
15 providing forces to support operations in Afghanistan and
16 Iraq back to its more traditional role of a force in
17 readiness, forward deployed at sea or stationed ashore, and
18 ready for crises responses. This transition has been
19 complicated unnecessarily and some might say even
20 dangerously by a fiscal uncertainty associated with the
21 Budget Control Act and the threat of sequestration, which
22 the chairman has already highlighted.

23 The broader context for this hearing, as you all know
24 will carry over to our shipbuilding and aviation hearings,
25 is much more challenging than just marine ground systems

1 modernization. We are justifiably concerned about the
2 synchronization, stability, technical achievability, and
3 affordability of several long-term complex and expensive
4 sea, air, as well as land system modernization programs that
5 are necessary to rebuild our amphibious capability. In this
6 regard, several amphibious ship and connector modernization
7 programs are essential to achieve the Navy's and Marine
8 Corps' requirements for a fully capable, globally postured,
9 and ready amphibious force.

10 As Commandant of the Marine Corps General Dunford
11 recently said, there is an amphibious ship and connector
12 capability gap that we must deal with if we are to
13 revitalize amphibious forces and meet global demand. Any
14 break or weakness in the chain of transfer or maneuvering of
15 land forces from ship to connector to shore undermines the
16 military power we expect to project with amphibious
17 operations.

18 While today's focus is primarily on ground
19 capabilities, we want an update from our witnesses on how
20 the marines' fiscal year 2016 request and future years
21 defense program, FYDP, is synchronize to rebuild modern
22 amphibious forces. We are interested in learning how the
23 Marine Corps will develop and deliver combat and tactical
24 vehicles that are technologically advanced and affordable.
25 We are particularly interested in learning more about

1 current and future requirements, capabilities, and technical
2 feasibility for armored amphibious assault and how Marine
3 plans for an end state force with as many as three different
4 vehicles is justified and affordable.

5 Unfortunately, we must recognize that the stability and
6 achievability of the Marine Corps' carefully considered
7 plans for ground system readiness and modernization is at
8 risk if sequestration level cuts are triggered for fiscal
9 year 2016 and beyond. We are interested to hear how
10 sequestration at any point compounds challenges to the
11 Marine Corps' size, force structure, readiness, and
12 modernization programs. If necessary, what tradeoffs will
13 the Marine Corps make?

14 For example, we know that the Marine Corps has gotten
15 smaller and may continue to reduce its end strength to meet
16 BCA caps. How will the Marine Corps analyze and distribute
17 reductions to end strength and force structure among its
18 U.S. and forward-stationed locations? How will the Marine
19 Corps ensure sufficient readiness in its non-deployed forces
20 to maintain strategic depth available for unforeseen
21 contingencies? Will the marines cancel or delay its new
22 systems development programs, delay the upgrade of current
23 capabilities, or both?

24 And finally, we would like our witnesses to address the
25 potential impact or risk on its modernization plans under

1 extraordinary budgetary pressures, pressures associated with
2 new or continuing support for ongoing operations around the
3 world.

4 Of course, our Nation could not be more proud of what
5 the Marine Corps does, what our marines and their families
6 have accomplished over the past 14 years of war.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Wicker: Thank you very much.

9 I note that our two witnesses have submitted a joint
10 statement, and without objection, it will be included in the
11 record in its entirety at this point.

12 [The prepared joint statement of General Glueck and Mr.
13 Dee follows:]

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1 Senator Wicker: And the bio of both of these gentlemen
2 is included in the front of that. Let us go ahead and put
3 that in the record too because it was submitted to us, and I
4 think it is important.

5 [The information referred to follows:]

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1 Senator Wicker: Which of you gentlemen would like to
2 proceed?

3 General Glueck: I can go first.

4 Senator Wicker: General Glueck, thank you very much.
5 And if you could, tell us what you know about this morning's
6 helicopter crash.

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1 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNETH J. GLUECK,
2 JR., USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND
3 INTEGRATION, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT
4 DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

5 General Glueck: Well, as far as I know right now, you
6 know, it is under investigation as time goes on. We know
7 that it occurred just outside of Eglin Air Force Base, and
8 it included both U.S. Army, I believe, special forces, as
9 well as our Marine special operations forces as well. They
10 do a lot of training down in that area in the panhandle of
11 Florida, and from indications I heard this morning that
12 there is potential that there could be a problem with
13 weather. So that is about what we have at this present
14 time, sir.

15 Senator Wicker: Thank you.

16 General Glueck: But thank you to both of you for your
17 condolences.

18 Senator Wicker: Well, we appreciate that update.

19 If you will, then proceed, as you will, to summarize
20 your testimony.

21 General Glueck: Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member
22 Hirono, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
23 you for this opportunity to testify before you today.

24 The Marine Corps' ability to serve as our Nation's
25 premier crisis response force is due, in large part, to this

1 subcommittee's continued strong support, and on behalf of
2 all our marines, I would like to say thank you very much.

3 A forward-deployed Marine Corps provides our Nation a
4 universal tool that can be immediately employed. This force
5 can serve as the leading edge of the larger joint force or
6 deploy and sustain itself in even the most austere of
7 environments. Our ability to rapidly respond to developing
8 crisis not only ensures that the combatant commanders have
9 the right force in the right place at the right time, but
10 provides national leaders with valuable decision space.

11 To execute this mission, the Marine Corps pursues
12 technologies that allow us to develop and sustain a ready,
13 balanced force that is flexible, survivable, lethal, and
14 highly expeditionary. Combatant commanders will task this
15 force to operate across a range of military operations in
16 smaller and distributed formations.

17 Our modernization programs are aimed at equipping these
18 forces with the necessary capabilities to achieve success no
19 matter what the mission or who the adversary. As the
20 Department of the Navy and your Marine Corps confront the
21 challenges of budget constraints of sequestration, we are
22 evaluating priorities and making hard choices that are
23 necessary to maintain the right balance in capacity,
24 capability, and industrial base sustainment. With the
25 smallest modernization budget in the Department of Defense,

1 the Marine Corps continually seeks to leverage the
2 investments of the other services, carefully allocating our
3 modernization resources to those investment areas which are
4 the most fiscally prudent and those which promise the most
5 operationally effective payoffs.

6 Innovative warfighting and can-do leadership are
7 hallmarks of our corps, but these cannot overcome the
8 vulnerabilities created by our rapidly aging fleet of
9 vehicles. Long-term shortfalls in modernization have a
10 detrimental impact on readiness, degrade our crisis response
11 capability, and will ultimately cost lives.

12 We are seeking to balance the increasing costs and
13 inefficiencies of maintaining legacy programs with required
14 investments in modernization. Our ground vehicle
15 modernization strategy is to sequentially modernize priority
16 capabilities, reduce aging equipment inventories whenever
17 possible, and judiciously sustain remaining equipment.

18 The future security environment requires a robust
19 capability to operate from the sea and maneuver ashore to
20 positions of advantage. The amphibious combat vehicle, or
21 ACV, is the Corps' highest ground modernization priority.
22 This program, when coupled with the improvements to our
23 existing fleet of amphibious assault vehicles, AAV's,
24 generates a complementary set of capabilities for both
25 littoral forceful entry and high-speed operational maneuver.

1 In parallel with these modernization efforts, a science
2 and technology portfolio is in development to continue our
3 exploration for high water speed technology. These efforts
4 will develop the knowledge necessary to reach an informed
5 decision by the mid-2020's on the feasibility,
6 affordability, and options for developing an extended range
7 high water speed ship-to-shore capability.

8 The second highest priority within our portfolio
9 remains the replacement of a portion of our legacy HMMWV
10 fleet. These trucks performed well in combat conditions,
11 but lacked the maneuverability and force protection required
12 to meet both current and future enemy threats. In
13 partnership with the Army, the Marine Corps has sequenced
14 the JLTV program to ensure affordability of the entire
15 ground tactical vehicle portfolio.

16 These Corps modernization efforts have been designed in
17 a manner to ensure their affordability. However, if the
18 budget is sequestered in fiscal year 2016 or beyond, it will
19 jeopardize both the timing and resources required to
20 undertake this strategy.

21 In addition to our critical investments in mobility,
22 the fiscal year 2016 budget includes a request for the next
23 generation radar which will replace five of our legacy
24 systems. The ground-air task-oriented radar is a multi-
25 role, ground-based expeditionary radar that provides greater

1 operational reach, volume, and precision to identify and
2 track both friendly and hostile forces and interfaces with
3 our Navy systems to project land and sea power beyond the
4 littorals.

5 A critical enabler for our future force remains our
6 advanced command and control systems. As we design our
7 force to operate more rapidly across greater distances, the
8 ability to communicate and utilize the most up-to-date
9 information becomes a critical capability gap. It is within
10 this portfolio that we will begin to see the creeping costs
11 of reduced budgets. While our highest priority programs are
12 either partially or fully funded, the ability to maintain
13 their currency in the future years is uncertain. This puts
14 at risk our ability to conduct near-term and future joint
15 and combined operations.

16 The Marine Corps continues to prioritize near-term
17 readiness above the other attributes of the force. However,
18 that readiness must be balanced in terms of accepting risk
19 by sustaining legacy systems and modernizing key programs to
20 ensure effectiveness on the future battlefield. The demand
21 for the expeditionary capabilities that marines provide to
22 the Nation will only increase. The marines tasked with
23 executing these missions will be asked to do so with the
24 equipment provided by our modernization programs today, but
25 we must be mindful that by sacrificing today's modernization

1 efforts, we will actually be degrading our future readiness.

2 Priorities reflected in the fiscal year 2016 budget are
3 the modernization efforts that we must have to remain the
4 most ready when the Nation is least ready. In partnership
5 with the Navy, the Marine Corps look forward to working with
6 you to address these issues.

7 Thank you for this opportunity to be here and I look
8 forward to your questions, sir.

9 Senator Wicker: Thank you.

10 Mr. Dee, do you have any additional testimony to add at
11 this point?

12 Mr. Dee: Yes, sir, if I may make a very brief opening
13 statement.

14 Senator Wicker: Please.

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1 STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. DEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
2 OF THE NAVY, EXPEDITIONARY PROGRAMS AND LOGISTICS
3 MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
4 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION

5 Mr. Dee: Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Hirono, and
6 distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
7 opportunity to testify before you today.

8 General Glueck has highlighted the importance of our
9 Marine Corps as America's expeditionary force in readiness
10 to the security of this Nation, and he commented on a few of
11 the priority modernization programs for which we are
12 requesting funding in fiscal year 2016.

13 Yesterday, the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified
14 before the full committee and outlined the risks associated
15 with the specter of sequestration should the Budget Control
16 Act of 2011 be implemented this year or in future years.

17 But regardless with what happens with sequestration
18 this year or next, the Marine Corps already has the most
19 austere investment budget of any service with only about 10
20 percent of their total obligation authority, or only about
21 \$2 billion, requested in fiscal year 2016 for the research
22 and development and procurement accounts. These funds need
23 to cover the range of Marine Corps ground force capabilities
24 from combat and tactical vehicles to artillery and missiles,
25 enterprise information technology, command and control

1 radars, unmanned aerial systems, personal protective
2 equipment, small arms, ammunition, generators, tents, and
3 everything in between. With the need to stretch so few
4 dollars over so many critical capabilities, the Marine Corps
5 is especially conscious of making every dollar count and of
6 the opportunity costs of making less than optimal decisions.

7 So for that reason, we are committed to using every
8 option in the acquisition toolbox to control costs as we
9 deliver the finest equipment to our marines and balance the
10 imperative of current readiness with the requirement to
11 modernize and assure our future readiness. Competition,
12 contract incentives, affordability caps, should-cost goals
13 all help us to execute affordable modernization programs.
14 And of course, we need stable and realistic requirements,
15 and through early and extensive collaboration among our
16 combat developers, our programmers, our engineers, and our
17 acquisition professionals, we avoid pursuing the
18 unachievable or unaffordable requirements that will place
19 undue risk on our programs.

20 We also need stable budgets. Over the past few years,
21 the Navy and the Marine Corps team has been diligent in
22 making difficult trades to balance risk within our
23 modernization portfolios. Unpredictable budgets, continuing
24 resolutions, and other uncertainties inhibit our ability to
25 effectively plan and execute the programs that will ensure

1 that the Marine Corps will remain America's expeditionary
2 force in readiness well into the future.

3 Mr. Chairman, thank you for the support you and your
4 committee have provided and continue to provide to our
5 Marine Corps. I look forward to answering your questions.

6 Senator Wicker: Thank you.

7 This clock in front of me says 6 minutes. So I think
8 that is a good enough suggestion for us, so we will begin
9 with 6-minute rounds.

10 Let me start, General Glueck, with you. On the fiscal
11 year 2016 budget request, does that account for
12 sequestration returning?

13 General Glueck: Mr. Chairman, no, it does not.

14 Senator Wicker: Well, I think that points up a
15 challenge that we have at the subcommittee level and also as
16 an entire Congress. Sequestration right now is the law of
17 the land. I think we all understand that. Unless the law
18 changes, sequestration is back in October of this year. If
19 that should occur, what are your plans to manage risk and
20 program development in that eventuality, General?

21 General Glueck: Mr. Chairman, as stated yesterday by
22 the Commandant and also by the Secretary of the Navy, if we
23 do not deal with the sequestered budget, then we will have
24 to go ahead and do mission analysis of the Defense Security
25 Strategy. And based on that, then the Marine Corps would go

1 into do a deep dive analysis on exactly how we best can be
2 organized, trained, and equipped to be able to support the
3 mission that we have for the future.

4 Senator Wicker: I honestly hope that Congress is
5 taking this seriously enough, but I have seen it play out
6 before.

7 How well positioned are you to do this deep dive on a
8 fairly expedited basis? Because October 1st is going to be
9 here before we know it.

10 General Glueck: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I understand that.
11 We have been working on this program for quite a while
12 looking at different eventualities. But a lot of it will
13 come down to the strategy and how the joint force and OSD
14 and how we determine what the strategy for the future will
15 be and how the Marine Corps will best fit into that for us
16 to actually come to the real clarity that you are looking
17 for.

18 Senator Wicker: Mr. Dee, I was interested to hear you
19 say that even without sequestration, the Marine Corps budget
20 is the most austere of the services. Why is that? Is that
21 a decision that we made at the congressional level or is it
22 something that DOD decided we could live with? Help us
23 understand that.

24 Mr. Dee: So the Marine Corps, along with the Army, but
25 to a greater extent than the Army, is reliant on the

1 individual marine. So the bulk of the Marine Corps budget
2 is expended on manpower costs, manpower training operations,
3 et cetera. So once you pay those bills, the manpower costs
4 and the O&M costs, the operating forces costs add up to
5 about 90 percent of the Marine Corps budget, over 60 percent
6 for manpower alone. So that only leaves about 10 percent
7 for investment, and that is the primary reason why the
8 Marine Corps' budget is so low.

9 Senator Wicker: General, how is the transition going
10 from the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency and
11 stability model to the more traditional role as a ready and
12 capable rapid response force?

13 General Glueck: Thank you for that question, sir.

14 I think the transition is going extremely well. You
15 know, we never walked away from our amphibious roots. Even
16 during the time that we were conducting operations in Iraq
17 and Afghanistan, we still had our marine expeditionary units
18 that were forward-stationed and forward-deployed around the
19 world.

20 As we have come back out of Afghanistan and Iraq, at
21 this point what we needed was to take a look at a new
22 strategy. And based on that, we wrote a capstone concept
23 for the Marine Corps, which is entitled Expeditionary Force
24 21. That was signed last year in March, and that kind of
25 laid out the guideline for the next 10 years of how we

1 intend to operate across the range of military operations.

2 And to this point, that has been highly successful.

3 We were able to take that concept, Expeditionary Force
4 21, and the Commandant signed it in March of 2014. And just
5 here in Bold Alligator here just last September-October, the
6 forces down at II MEF and the naval forces that were
7 assigned as well actually took that and moved it into actual
8 execution. So I think that is a pretty strong message that
9 we have actually been able to go ahead and take a strategic
10 concept at a service level and be able to get it down to
11 both the operational and tactical level, and it is being
12 embraced very well.

13 Senator Wicker: Thank you. I think it is a matter of
14 where the emphasis is, and the capability has to be there
15 for both.

16 I have been saying this to everybody that would listen.
17 I think we have had great success in Afghanistan. I do not
18 think the American people perhaps understand how successful
19 our operation has been there. And I would just hope that we
20 as decision-makers and particularly the commander in chief
21 as a decision-maker would make sure that we not leave too
22 early based on a political agenda in Afghanistan and that
23 instead, we do the things necessary to solidify our gains
24 there and make sure that what has happened in a somewhat
25 different but somewhat analogous situation in Iraq do not

1 occur in Afghanistan.

2 My congratulations to our outstanding troops for
3 getting us where we are, and that is on the cusp of success
4 in Afghanistan. Thank you very much.

5 Senator Hirono?

6 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 The fiscal uncertainty that we have been operating
8 under for too many years has resulted in a chronic and
9 increasingly dangerous disconnect between strategy, military
10 requirements, budget estimates, appropriations, and the
11 efficient and effective execution of funds to support
12 current operations, build and sustain readiness, and prepare
13 for a dangerous future. In fact, General, you noted at the
14 beginning of your testimony that what is certain about the
15 future is its uncertainty.

16 I have several questions about this fiscal environment
17 and how the Marine Corps will manage its way through a
18 number of scenarios.

19 First, either one of you can respond, General or Mr.
20 Secretary. What have you learned in this environment of
21 uncertainty about estimating and executing your budget to
22 mitigate or build flexibility, a word that I note you used
23 several times in your testimony, General, into your programs
24 and achieve, as best you can, your most important
25 priorities?

1 General Glueck: Thank you for that question.

2 When you look at readiness for the future, the way the
3 Commandant defines it is in five pillars: the personnel
4 unit, modernization of equipment, the infrastructure, and of
5 course, our ability to support the combatant commanders,
6 which is warfighting. So as we move forward in that, it is
7 about maintaining that balance. And even in the 2016
8 budget, while there is a certain balance -- we put priority,
9 of course, in our near-term readiness of our forces that
10 would be forward-stationed and forward-deployed. So we took
11 reductions, of course, modernization and also in our
12 infrastructure.

13 What we really look forward to do in the 2016 budget
14 and beyond, we would like to be able to put stability in
15 there so that we can have particularly the fiscal stability
16 for procurement of the weapons systems that we need to
17 modernize for our force. You know, today when you look at
18 an amphibious assault vehicle, it is well over 40 years old.
19 You are looking at a HMMWV that is over 30 years old. I
20 mean, those vehicles are old, they are tired, they need to
21 be replaced. We will do what we can to go ahead and bring
22 some of those up to an acceptable standard. But to be the
23 Marine Corps that you want I think and our Nation needs for
24 the future, it is time that we need to do some
25 modernization. And the way we look at these vehicles is

1 that they are fully complementary with one another for the
2 missions that we see particularly coming from the sea.

3 Senator Hirono: So, General, you noted that we had to
4 -- your priorities were for near-term readiness as we were
5 in Afghanistan and Iraq, and you are saying that we delayed
6 the modernization priorities for too long and we really need
7 to move forward on that with your aging vehicles. I think
8 that your testimony noted that the modernization of all of
9 these vehicles will amount to hundreds and hundreds of
10 millions of dollars. So within that context, how do you
11 determine which vehicles are the most important to
12 modernize, which vehicles are you going to try to get longer
13 life from? You have already done those kinds of
14 assessments?

15 General Glueck: Yes, we have. We have done exhaustive
16 assessments on this and worked this very, very closely.

17 You know, we believe that the number one priority, as
18 the Commandant has stated, is the amphibious combat vehicle,
19 which is number one. We have about 1,062 AAV's that we have
20 been operating for the past 40 years. Some of those
21 amphibious assault vehicles we will do a survivability
22 upgrade on, which will be about 392 of those vehicles. And
23 that will enable us to maintain a forceful entry capability
24 for all seven of our marine expeditionary units, as well as
25 our two marine expeditionary brigades, which we are required

1 by law to be able to maintain the forceful entry capability
2 of two brigades simultaneously. So that 392 will address
3 that.

4 So the overall requirement that we have for our marines
5 is to have armored lift for 10 battalions of infantry. With
6 our AAV's, the 392 that get the survivability upgrade, they
7 will be able to carry four infantry battalions. With the
8 ACV 1.1 and the 1.2, they will account for an additional six
9 infantry battalions. So that is where you are going to get
10 your 10 battalions' worth of lift to be able to take us into
11 the future.

12 And so we looked at these vehicles as being
13 complementary in nature. It is not that they only have to
14 be complementary amongst themselves, but they have to be
15 complementary to our overall objective of operational
16 maneuver from the sea. And if you look at the amphibious
17 ships, you look at the connectors that are required to
18 support the sea basing, it is all complementary in nature
19 and it is all about having a family of vehicles that are
20 tied and linked together to be able to give us that
21 operational capability reach that we want.

22 Senator Hirono: So I realize that that is your current
23 plan right now, which does not take into account
24 sequestration. So if we do not deal with sequestration in
25 the way we should, which is to eliminate it, would you just

1 then decrease the number of battalions? Would you just
2 impose numbers? Would it be a numbers decision for you?

3 General Glueck: It will be actually a capability
4 decision. You know, as our Commandant has stated, we are
5 only going to be as big as we can be good. That is a strong
6 statement. And it is not just about numbers. It is about
7 quality and capability of the force. So if we are
8 sequestered, it will come down to priorities. Like I said,
9 the number one priority would be the amphibious combat
10 vehicle. At some point, what you will find is that programs
11 get stretched out. You have to take cuts in other programs,
12 and we are willing to do that if necessary to be able to
13 meet the objectives that will come from the strategy.

14 Senator Wicker: You can take another round.

15 Senator Hirono: Am I done? Oh, my goodness. How time
16 flies. I will go into a second round. Thank you, Mr.
17 Chairman.

18 Senator Wicker: Senator Sullivan, does this uniform
19 look familiar to you?

20 Senator Sullivan: Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is a sharp
21 looking uniform if I do say so myself.

22 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thanks for
23 your testimony.

24 General Glueck, I appreciate in particular the emphasis
25 in your testimony, particularly during the challenging times

1 we are all seeing with regard to the budget, on the
2 frugality or what I like to refer to in testimony yesterday
3 with the Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy as the
4 bang for the buck that the Marine Corps provides. I think
5 it is good for the American people to know that. It does
6 not get out there a lot. I know marines take a lot of pride
7 in that frugality, and you know, the number that the
8 Commandant mentioned yesterday, 6 percent of the DOD budget,
9 21 percent of the infantry battalions -- and it is not just
10 the quantity. It is the quality. Those infantry battalions
11 are some of the best in the world, and I think that is a
12 statement that is irrefutable in my view.

13 So what I would like to focus on a little bit initially
14 is the rebalance to Asia and the discussion particularly
15 with regard to the ground forces. And I think you know,
16 General, this committee for years has been looking at some
17 of the rebalancing that the Marine Corps has been doing from
18 Okinawa to Guam. And as part of our oversight
19 responsibilities, some of the members of this committee will
20 be heading out to the region relatively soon to get a more
21 detailed look at some of those issues.

22 So I was just wondering from the perspective of how you
23 would have us think through those issues, do you think that
24 that redeployment is going well? And what are the big
25 issues that you would want us to be focusing on?

1 General Glueck: Sir, thank you very much for that
2 question.

3 Prior to this assignment, I was the commanding general
4 of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa. So I am
5 fairly conversant on that.

6 Our marines in Okinawa -- you know, the mantra that we
7 had for them was they need to be prepared to fight the
8 night, and that would be in Korea. That is probably our
9 most dangerous scenario.

10 As we look at the rebalance, for us, when I got there,
11 we did not even have our UDP. Our unit deployment plan had
12 been in support of Afghanistan and Iraq over the years. So
13 we lacked our infantry battalions. And thanks to the
14 foresight of the Commandant, as soon as we were pulling out,
15 we reconstituted those forces and put those battalions back
16 into Okinawa. So that was a major step forward, and that
17 was even before the shift in the strategy.

18 So as you stand today, the intent is to maintain 22,500
19 marines west of the International Date Line. So it comes
20 down to where are those marines going to be positioned.

21 Senator Sullivan: Can I ask about that? Because, you
22 know, the Commandant talked about that a little bit
23 yesterday. You have the Date Line, but you also have -- I
24 was looking at a map yesterday. The marines in Darwin are
25 actually further from Korea than troops in Anchorage,

1 Alaska. And I am not advocating yet for a Marine Corps base
2 in Alaska, but that could be coming. But I mean, there is
3 this kind of Date Line issue, but there is also proximity.
4 And Darwin is pretty darned far from Northeast Asia.

5 General Glueck: That is true. But also, as you know,
6 Asia is a very big AOR. And if you look at what we had down
7 in the southern region, we really had nothing at that time.
8 You know, we started off with Darwin. We actually put a
9 rifle company down there. It was the very first element
10 that we stuck down there. And I think they were probably
11 the most publicized rifle company in the Marine Corps
12 history when they went down there. It actually disappointed
13 the Australians on well behaved they were.

14 So we have taken that and actually the intent is to
15 take that up to about a level of about 2,500, and that is
16 going to be based on the infrastructure that actually is
17 down there working with our host to be able to support that.
18 This last detachment that went down there or element that
19 was there was in the neighborhood of about 1,200. So we are
20 going to continue to increase that size to be able to take
21 some of that pressure off of Okinawa.

22 But you also know that down in Darwin you can only
23 train for about 7 months out of the year because of the
24 monsoon season that comes in there. So we are a little bit
25 limited on that. But as a commander of III MEF no matter

1 where I was going to put forces, whether it was going to be
2 in Darwin or I am going to put them in Guam, to me it came
3 down to operational capability and what you can do with that
4 capability. You know, it is the marines. It is the
5 infrastructure that supports those marines. It is the
6 equipment. It is the training, the ability to be able to
7 sustain yourself and proficiency, and then it is the
8 strategic lift to be able to move those marines someplace to
9 do something.

10 So the area I think that we need to focus on here,
11 particularly when you look at Darwin in particular, is what
12 is the strategic lift that we are going to go ahead and tie
13 to them to be able to use them as force in readiness,
14 whether it is crisis response or whatever the case may be.
15 The same thing with Guam. It is those five factors. So if
16 you want to have an operational capability, you have got to
17 have all of those five factors.

18 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

19 Let me switch to another issue that has been coming up
20 in a lot of the testimony, and that is the challenges in the
21 Arctic. You know, the Russians are making a very bold, in
22 many ways, very definitive move into the Arctic with
23 building several new airfields. General Dempsey mentioned
24 in his testimony with Secretary Carter recently the Russians
25 are looking at increasing brigades, up to six brigades, four

1 of which will be based in the Arctic. And in terms of new
2 icebreakers, they have a fleet of 40, 6 new ones, 5
3 additionally planned. I think we are number five in the
4 country in terms of icebreakers. So, you know, we put out
5 pieces of paper on the Arctic while the Russians are
6 literally moving very aggressively in the Arctic.

7 I will just throw this out for both of you gentlemen.
8 You know, I was a little disappointed to see Expeditionary
9 Force 21 had, I do not think, a single sentence on the
10 Arctic. And the Marine Corps, as you know, General, has a
11 proud history of being the kind of northern flank protector
12 in terms of Norway and other places in previous OP plans.

13 What are the thoughts on the Arctic, and are there any
14 thoughts with regard to the Navy's budget to have an
15 icebreaker? It is going to be a critical area. The
16 Russians are eyeing it and moving into it, and yet we seem
17 to be, at least from the Army's perspective, looking at
18 removing combat brigades from Alaska, which I think would
19 send a really, really bad signal to Vladimir Putin and
20 others. So if you wish to comment just on your thoughts on
21 the Arctic, both of you gentlemen.

22 Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I went a little long.

23 General Glueck: If I could on Expeditionary Force 21,
24 when we wrote the document, we knew that it was going to
25 require updates, and our plan is to do updates annually here

1 and we have got one that is due to the Commandant here
2 within the next few months. So that is one of the updates I
3 am sure that we will put some retention on.

4 I was just out at the Mount Warfare Center here about
5 just a couple weeks ago. And that is where we do a lot of
6 our cold weather training up there. And one of our
7 companies was actually coming out of the field from being up
8 there for about 10 days and looking at the equipment. And I
9 had an opportunity to talk to the commander up there as well
10 and about the equipment that they have. And quite frankly,
11 we need to do better. He is the actual advocate for cold
12 weather training, and so I tasked him to make sure that he
13 looks at what we need to be able to update ourselves to be
14 able to have a good capability, a solid capability in cold
15 weather operations and the training what was going to be
16 required from the doctrine.

17 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

18 Senator Wicker: Senator King?

19 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

20 First, I would like to associate myself with your
21 comments both today and yesterday about Afghanistan. It
22 would be absolutely tragic if we squandered the success that
23 we have achieved and that the Afghan people have achieved by
24 prematurely pulling out according to some date on a
25 calendar. To me it is equivalent of fumbling on the 5-yard

1 line. With a modest additional investment and particularly
2 of authority to the troops that are there, I think we can
3 secure a really significantly brighter future for the people
4 of Afghanistan. So I agree.

5 Also, in terms of the Arctic, we have one heavy
6 icebreaker, Coast Guard. We have one that is old that is
7 essentially out of service, and one medium icebreaker. And
8 that is the highway of the Arctic, if you think about it.
9 And I agree with the Senator from Alaska. This is a major
10 area where the Russians are moving very aggressively, and I
11 think we need to take account of that, but also we just need
12 to take account of the importance that this region is going
13 to have both in terms of energy, commerce, trade, transit.
14 They may not get all the way to Mississippi, but it is
15 important to the entire country. So I agree with that.

16 Mr. Dee, how much do the complex and arcane rules of
17 procurement drive up the cost of a given piece of equipment?
18 Procurement is an issue that the whole committee is
19 concerned about particularly in these tight budget times.
20 And my sense is that it is so complicated and arcane and so
21 many rules that have to be followed that it ends up -- that
22 is how we end up with devices that cost twice as much as
23 they should.

24 Mr. Dee: Sir, there are a lot of rules, and there is a
25 lot of oversight. Just as background, I am aware that the

1 Secretary yesterday showed our DAU chart for the acquisition
2 for how that works.

3 Senator King: Yes. It would have made Rube Goldberg
4 ashamed.

5 Mr. Dee: Yes, sir.

6 And those rules reflect both statute, regulation, and
7 policy. So some of it begins here with statute. Some of it
8 gets translated into regulation, and some of it becomes
9 policy within the Department. All of those rules at
10 whatever level we are putting them in are there to reduce
11 risk in some way. There were instances in the past where we
12 had overrun programs and waste. So everything that is in
13 there was largely the result of lessons learned, that
14 somebody is trying to make the system better by reducing
15 risk and providing more oversight to make sure that the
16 Department does well.

17 Senator King: The road to hell is often paved with
18 good intentions.

19 Mr. Dee: Yes, sir. So that is part two.

20 So all of these rules are in there to reduce risk, but
21 there is also operational risk that we have to be able to
22 balance. The rules that are in place are to reduce the risk
23 to the U.S. taxpayer on wasting dollars. There is risk to
24 the Marine Corps, to the operational forces of not getting
25 capable equipment out there, timely equipment. We

1 demonstrated during OEF and OIF that we can deliver
2 equipment quickly. We can deliver it capably, but there is
3 a cost that comes with that and there is a little increased
4 risk on the cost side of it in order to reduce the risk on
5 the operational side and on the schedule side. So there is
6 a way to do that.

7 Again, back to the Secretary's chart that he showed
8 yesterday, there are three parts to that, three layers of
9 that. There is a requirements side. There is an
10 acquisition side, and there is a programming and budget side
11 to it. The best way and what we have begun doing within the
12 Marine Corps -- the best way to reduce that risk and to get
13 things done is to have early collaboration between those
14 three communities so that we are not pursuing very difficult
15 and unachievable requirements so that the requirements
16 community is aware of what is actually within the art of the
17 possible, and that is collaboration with our engineers with
18 the acquisition community, collaboration with the budgeteers
19 and the programmers to ensure that what we are building will
20 be good enough to meet the requirements but we are not
21 stretching so far that we are introducing tremendous risk in
22 terms of performance or schedule or cost.

23 So the acquisition community would very much like to
24 see reduced oversight and rules at whatever level, statute,
25 regulation, policy. But we also know we can mitigate the

1 risk that is involved in that process somewhat by better
2 collaboration early on in the process.

3 Senator King: Well, I am not suggesting that we should
4 diminish oversight, but I just think it might be a timely
5 exercise to go back and look at this structure that has been
6 built up and accreted over the years and see if there is a
7 way to simplify, make it a little more straightforward
8 because the taxpayers are paying the cost. And again, as
9 you say, it is a matter of weighing risk against cost.

10 Mr. Dee: If I may, sir, on that. Within the last
11 iteration of our 5000, the DOD policy on acquisition,
12 Secretary Kendall included a enclosure in there to talk
13 specifically about how to do things more quickly, rapid
14 acquisition. And the trigger for that is some sort of
15 urgent need, and if there is an urgent need, then the gates
16 are opened to allow you to take a little more risk in terms
17 of all of the policy that is in place in order to be able to
18 deliver a capable system quicker to the force.

19 Senator King: I have the greatest respect for
20 Secretary Kendall. I think he is one of the most able
21 people we have.

22 According to the budget documents, most of your
23 equipment maintenance, General, has come out of OCO funding,
24 and OCO funding is almost certainly going to go down. Does
25 that negatively affect your ability to maintain your

1 equipment?

2 General Glueck: It will have an impact, yes, sir.
3 Currently our request for OCO for 2016 is at \$1.3 billion.
4 But we are also in the process of also resetting our
5 equipment that we are bringing back from Afghanistan, and
6 that has been a good news story. I would have to say that
7 our marine logisticians have done yeoman's work there in
8 being able to get all of our equipment accounted for and get
9 it back.

10 I would like to talk just for a second on that. About
11 60 percent of it has been reset today. Another 40 percent
12 is in work. And we expect to have all that equipment reset
13 by 2016.

14 So we think within the budget is \$365 million to go
15 ahead for a reset, but we will also be looking at OCO funds
16 to make up any differences.

17 Senator King: Thank you.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Senator Wicker: General Glueck, Darwin is farther away
20 from our most likely hotspot in Alaska and it is not
21 operational half the time. Was Darwin a good decision?

22 General Glueck: I think that Darwin was a good
23 decision at the time because we wanted to increase our
24 presence down in that particular region of the Pacific, and
25 I think that is going to meet our objectives in the future.

1 I think there are ways that we can probably mitigate the
2 distance. Out in III MEF, sir, we do about 75 exercises,
3 activities, operations in any given year, for example. One
4 of the largest exercises we do is in Cobra Gold in Thailand,
5 for example. And that is in that general vicinity as well.
6 If you look at the number of forces that we send down there
7 for that particular exercise, which is the largest joint
8 combined exercise in the world today, there is mitigation in
9 risk that you accept just sending them down there as well.
10 I think as long as we have the strategic lift tied to those
11 marines, then we will be able to go ahead and move them to
12 the right place at the right time.

13 Senator Wicker: How soon can you get those troops to
14 Korea?

15 General Glueck: Well, it would be a function of
16 strategic lift to be able to get it down there. So it would
17 be a prioritization within the theater commander to say that
18 I want C-17 lift to go down to Darwin to pick our marines
19 and move them up to Korea. But they would not be the first
20 responders, sir. They would be the marines that are coming
21 out of Okinawa and the 31st MEU would be your first
22 response.

23 Senator Wicker: But how soon?

24 General Glueck: How soon? I would have to take that
25 for the record and actually put a little bit of thought to

1 it. But I would say that you are not talking weeks. If
2 strategic lift is identified, you are talking in a matter of
3 about 48 hours.

4 [The information referred to follows:]

5 [SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Wicker: And what is the plan for monsoon
2 season?

3 General Glueck: Well, for monsoon season, we do not
4 send the marines down there.

5 Senator Wicker: All right.

6 General Glueck: They look for other training
7 opportunities within the Pacific region.

8 Senator Wicker: Mr. Dee, I mentioned concerns about
9 substituting wheeled armored personnel carriers for
10 amphibious track vehicles. Could you respond to that, and
11 could you respond to this statement? The Marine Corps has
12 evolved over the last 3 years from a cancelled EEV to a
13 similar concept for high water speed ACV. Studies conducted
14 during that time by the Marine Corps and armored vehicle
15 makers have led to the conclusion that while high water
16 speed is technologically feasible, it remains unaffordable.
17 So instead, we are going to pursue the 1.1 version of ACV.
18 Would you respond to that and enlighten the subcommittee?

19 Mr. Dee: Yes, sir. Let me take the second part first.

20 So EFV was cancelled back in 2011 for affordability and
21 some concerns about reliability that then translated into
22 affordability issues. Following the cancellation, ACV was
23 initiated. We did an analysis of alternative to see what
24 potential solutions we may have for the replacement of the
25 AAV. A very in-depth study was initiated. It was conducted

1 by the executive director of MARCORSYSCOM, along with
2 scientists, engineers, operators, budgeteers, again the
3 collaboration I talked about earlier that took place over
4 the course of a year. We looked at all of the trades would
5 be required in order to produce a high water speed vehicle.
6 We have demonstrated it is technologically feasible. We
7 have prototypes from the EFV that are available to ride and
8 get up on plane and go very fast. But the trades that were
9 required to get there, not just in terms of cost, but
10 largely in terms of the protection levels that you can
11 get --

12 Senator Wicker: Where can we see one of those?

13 Mr. Dee: They are out in San Diego, Camp Pendleton,
14 sir. We have prototypes.

15 Senator Wicker: Great.

16 General Glueck: If I could. We also have one out --
17 or a couple out at the Nevada facility, out in Nevada.

18 Mr. Dee: So we do that extensive study and we looked
19 at the trades, and high water speed is achievable. High
20 water speed would require us to accept lesser levels of
21 protection, and with the lessons learned from Afghanistan
22 and Iraq with improvised explosive devices, that was not a
23 trade that the Marine Corps was willing to make right now.
24 It also requires lesser levels of lethality in terms of the
25 amount of weight. It all comes down to weight and how much

1 reserve buoyancy can you get out of a vehicle. So how much
2 more armor can you put on it? How many more weapons can you
3 carry? How big of a weapon can you carry, et cetera? So
4 with all of that and the imperative to replace the AAV, the
5 decision was made in order to focus on the, as General
6 Glueck had mentioned earlier, the ground mobility
7 capabilities of the vehicle, and we will forego for now the
8 high water speed capability in order to begin having a
9 suitable replacement for the AAV, with a decision down the
10 road, technology investments to continue in looking at how
11 to mitigate some of those trades that we had to make, a
12 decision down the road, a decade down the road probably on
13 revisiting the high water speed vehicle.

14 On the capabilities of the wheeled vehicle versus the
15 track vehicle. So a lot has changed in time since the AAV
16 was designed and built. The capabilities from heavy
17 industry on wheeled vehicles has improved tremendously with
18 things like independent suspension and variable inflatable
19 tires, et cetera, and all kinds of computer controls. We
20 have tested. We had the Nevada Automotive Test Center build
21 a demonstrator vehicle that we actually tested in actual
22 conditions for an 8-wheeled vehicle to serve initially as an
23 MPC prototype and now is an ACV prototype. Performance was
24 very good, and for a medium-weight vehicle, it was the
25 equivalent basically to what we would be able to get out of

1 a track vehicle. It may not be as maneuverable or as mobile
2 in off-road conditions in certain cases as is the M-1 tank,
3 but it is as certainly as maneuverable as we are going to
4 get in that class of vehicle.

5 Senator Wicker: So it does not erode our capability.

6 General Glueck: No, sir. It actually improves our
7 capability, sir, from an operational perspective. You know,
8 we found, if I could -- what we found that high water speed
9 was technologically feasible, we could get a track vehicle
10 and get it up on plane and it could go 25 knots. But all
11 the development that we were putting into it -- we were
12 trading away operational capability ashore. So we were
13 designing a vehicle that was optimized to operate on the
14 water but not optimized for 90 percent of its mission that
15 was going to be ashore. And I am convinced that the
16 decision that we have made to move forward on the ACV
17 wheeled vehicle is the right answer for us to be able to
18 provide the greatest capability in terms of maneuver, fire
19 power, as well as survivability to our marines ashore.

20 Senator Wicker: I did not know there was enough water
21 in Nevada to test something like --

22 General Glueck: They do most of the ground testing
23 there, and then actually the water testing is done around
24 the coastlines. But I have seen some of the water testing
25 by a couple of the major manufacturers, and so far they have

1 been very good. They have actually focused not on just the
2 1.1 version. They have really focused their builds on the
3 1.2 version because they want the entire contract. And that
4 would be able to give us the capability to have the same or
5 better swim capability than the AAV currently has.

6 Senator Wicker: I would like to see that.

7 Senator Blumenthal?

8 Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

9 I want to shift a little bit in terms of modernization
10 to one of the key challenges in my view, although it may not
11 involve hardware in the most direct sense, and that is the
12 downsizing of our force and how we develop and retain the
13 key skills that are necessary to operate the new machinery
14 that we are discussing here. How do we keep the best and
15 the brightest at a time when the Marine Corps is going to go
16 from -- I am bad on numbers, but I think it is 202,000 down
17 to 182,000, more or less, and go from, obviously, a wartime
18 mission to one that intermittently involves conflict but not
19 the same kind of ongoing constant challenges, which may have
20 an impact on the interests of our marines to stay in the
21 Corps. So that is, I realize, a broad question, but I would
22 welcome any thoughts you have about it.

23 Mr. Dee: Let me talk about the civilian workforce, and
24 I will defer the marines to General Glueck.

25 So we do have critical skills especially in our

1 maintenance world in our depots for civilians. The Marine
2 Corps maintains two depots, one in Barstow, California, one
3 in Albany, Georgia. And we need to maintain a certain level
4 of work to ensure that we have the core capabilities
5 necessary, the skills in order to maintain and reset the
6 equipment that we talked about earlier. So the current
7 program has sufficient work going into those two depots in
8 order to do that through the FYDP. Of course, we will
9 become challenged, as in everything else, should those
10 numbers diminish tremendously and we cannot maintain the
11 maintenance. So we are concerned about the technical
12 skills, the craftsmanship of our civilian workforce,
13 especially in terms of maintenance, and we are working to
14 maintain the core levels of work at those two depots.

15 General Glueck: Thank you for that question, sir.

16 You are correct. We are coming down from 202,000. And
17 the announcements that we have done is that an optimized
18 Marine Corps to be able to meet crisis response and
19 contingency response challenges that we face today and to be
20 able to maintain a one-to-three dwell for our marines -- so
21 every 7 months you are gone, you have 3 months back before
22 you go again -- is at 186.8. Currently for fiscal year
23 2016, we are looking at a force that is going to be at
24 184,000. In fiscal year 2017, we will be continued down to
25 182,000.

1 So what that means to the force is that we are going to
2 be on -- many of our low-density, high-demand capabilities
3 we have out there, the marines that are part of that -- they
4 will be on one-to-two or less dwell. So some of our B-22
5 squadrons, some of our deploying infantry battalions, and
6 those that are deployed the heaviest will be at a one-to-two
7 dwell.

8 The Commandant's focus is going to be on maintaining
9 quality over capacity. So, you know, he is looking to make
10 sure that we can maintain the right leader-to-lead ratios as
11 we downsize to make sure that we do not give up -- if we
12 give up capacity, but we make up for it in quality. And so,
13 like I said, he is willing to focus on the Marine Corps is
14 only going to be as big as we can be good.

15 Senator Blumenthal: And let me drill down a little bit
16 if I may. As a personnel management function, how does the
17 Marine Corps plan to accomplish that goal?

18 General Glueck: Well, there is an effort ongoing right
19 now to make sure that we get the right leadership and at the
20 right levels. For example, one of the critical areas that
21 the Commandant is most concerned with, both in the infantry
22 battalions and our flying squadrons, is where are the
23 sergeants. Where are those mature men and women that we
24 need to lead the infantry squads as well as to be the
25 critical quality inspectors that we have within the

1 squadrons and the mechanics? There are a lot of
2 requirements out there, and what we are finding right now is
3 that probably the majority are not where they need to be for
4 one reason or another. And so he has got an effort on track
5 right now, and he is personally involved to make sure that
6 we can identify how do we improve this capability in the
7 leadership and get them in the right place.

8 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you. Thank you very much.
9 Thank you both for your service.

10 Senator Wicker: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

11 Senator Hirono?

12 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

13 I know we had quite a bit of discussion regarding ACV
14 1.1. From what I got from the discussion is that what I
15 have been told was more of an interim system, the ACV 1.1,
16 because it will not be in the strict sense a fighting
17 vehicle. It will have limited swimming capability. It may
18 not carry a full infantry squad because the previous
19 vehicles would carry 14 marines, and the ACV 1.1 will carry
20 10 and on an equal lift basis weigh more and take up more
21 space on transport ships.

22 So I did have a question about how the Marine Corps is
23 approaching the tension between capability and affordability
24 between the tracked ACV and the wheeled what I have been
25 informed is a less capable ACV 1.1. Would you like to just

1 go over that again for us briefly?

2 General Glueck: I could. Let me talk about the
3 capability of tracks versus wheeled technology. Out at the
4 Nevada test facility -- and I would invite any of the
5 members that would like to come out to go out there -- we
6 have every combat vehicle that we have in the inventory, to
7 include the expeditionary fighting vehicle and then the
8 prototypes. In fact, the Commandant was just recently out
9 there a little bit over a month ago and had an opportunity
10 to experience the ride and go through some pretty rough
11 terrain and see the mobility and then the capabilities of
12 the ACV in particular.

13 I have been out there about four times now. And we
14 have had five different vendors that have brought their
15 vehicles out there that we have had an opportunity to
16 actually experience the ride, maneuverability, and see the
17 capability that they have.

18 And from all the analysis that we have done, we are not
19 giving away any capability whatsoever by going from track to
20 wheeled technology. Actually we are gaining capability. We
21 are gaining survivability. So with an AAV, for example, you
22 are going to have a survivability that is going to be less
23 than 1.0. You know, these ACV's, for example, with the
24 technology, the V-hull and double V-hulls that they have
25 underneath, their ability to go ahead and raise and lower

1 the height of the vehicle, you are going to get
2 survivability in excess of 2.0. So it is double the
3 survivability. These vehicles will capability -- because
4 of the independent drives that they have on them, will be
5 able to go out and hit an IED and actually blow off, say,
6 two wheels on one side of the vehicle and continue to drive
7 and drive out of the threat area. So I think our marines
8 are going to be very well served with the amphibious combat
9 vehicle.

10 Now, to get to the decision, if I could, of how we went
11 to 1.1, what we did was, you know, we had a program out
12 there several years ago. It was the marine personnel
13 carrier program that we were working with, and we had to
14 cancel that due to affordability as well because it was
15 competing against the EFV. And the decision was made to go
16 ahead and stand that program down. It was not cancelled but
17 we stood it down.

18 And so what we have focused on for 1.1 was how fast can
19 we get a good vehicle out there that is going to be good
20 enough that is non-developmental and be able to meet our
21 basic requirements. And that is what we looked at for 1.1
22 so that enabled us to go ahead and streamline the
23 acquisition process. So we did not have to start with a
24 blank sheet of paper. We were able to start at where we
25 were due to a lot of support from Mr. Kendall and others.

1 We were able to save several years there as we moved
2 forward.

3 So the initial buy, which will be about 204 vehicles,
4 are just focused on being personnel transporters. And right
5 now the threshold for that was for 10 because that is what
6 the MPC was. But what we are finding is that the industry
7 is really focused not on the threshold for 1.1. They are
8 focused on the objective of 1.1 and the objective of 1.2
9 because they want the full contract. So a lot of them --
10 instead of focusing on just putting 10 seats for the 1.1,
11 most of them are focused on 12 to 13 seats, for example.
12 The swim quality -- instead of focusing on the lower
13 threshold requirement of, say, a level of 2 feet significant
14 wave height, they are actually focusing on building the
15 vehicle to be at 3. So we are actually going to be getting
16 a more capable vehicle from the beginning. The 1.2 -- the
17 next follow-on was to go ahead and address some of those
18 improvements we wanted to have but also focus on mission-
19 specific capabilities such as command and control,
20 logistics, recovery vehicles, and perhaps even fire power.

21 Senator Hirono: So, General, it would be inaccurate to
22 think of the ACV 1.1 as a less capable than the tracked ACV
23 from everything you just told us.

24 General Glueck: That is my assessment, yes, ma'am.

25 Senator Hirono: General, I assume you are familiar

1 with the advanced amphibious assault vehicles that China
2 appears to have developed. One version is a tank with a 105
3 millimeter gun. The other is an infantry fighting vehicle
4 with a 30 millimeter cannon. Both are reported to be high
5 water speed vehicles like the terminated EFV. China is also
6 building its first set of large amphibious ships that
7 compare to the U.S. classes like the LPD-17. What is your
8 assessment of the Chinese amphibious assault vehicles and
9 how do you rate their performance in the water, their fire
10 power, mobility, and protection levels? Mr. Secretary, if
11 you would like to answer.

12 Mr. Dee: Yes, ma'am. I mentioned earlier the
13 exhaustive study that we had done last year over the course
14 of a year with all the trades on all of the different
15 capabilities we were looking for in terms of protection,
16 water speed, personnel carrying capacity, lethality, et
17 cetera. As part of that study, we looked at all of the
18 vehicles that are being manufactured in the world today, to
19 include those Chinese vehicles that you mentioned. And the
20 advertised capabilities -- our assessment -- exceed their
21 actual capabilities in a lot of cases, including the water
22 speed claims that they have had. So we took a look at
23 those, worked with the intelligence community to be able to
24 gain an assessment of where these different vehicles stand.
25 And we think we accepted the right path, and we do not think

1 there is a magic formula for building in high water speed,
2 very well protected and very lethal amphibious combat
3 vehicle.

4 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

5 Senator Wicker: General Glueck, before I turn to
6 Senator Sullivan for a second round, since Senator Hirono
7 has brought this up again, the wheeled armored personnel
8 carriers will have to be lifted ashore. And the amphibious
9 track vehicles could swim to shore. How much of a concern
10 is that?

11 General Glueck: The 1.1 version of the ACV was
12 designed to be able to swim from shore to shore. Okay? But
13 we are finding that it actually could much better than that.

14 Senator Wicker: So that is not a concern.

15 General Glueck: Well, if I could, sir.

16 Senator Wicker: Okay.

17 General Glueck: What we are finding is that in fact
18 the vehicle is going to be able to go from ship to shore or
19 from another connector to shore. What we have found is that
20 with the current A2AD threat, for example, when we were
21 looking at high water speed for the expeditionary fighting
22 vehicle, we envisioned that a fleet would be -- probably the
23 sea base would probably be 25 miles off the coast, and they
24 would be able to probably adjust the sea base to bring it in
25 to be able to launch so that 25 knots for a vehicle meant

1 that the marines were not going to be in there longer than
2 about 1 hour.

3 What we are finding today is that with the threat,
4 depending on where you go, that sea base may be actually
5 pushed out further. So what we find is that even a self-
6 deploying vehicle is probably not going to be able to launch
7 from 65 nautical miles. It is going to have to have the
8 assist of some high speed connector.

9 It is really, like I said, a family of vehicles in how
10 we bring these together. Even the current AAV, if I cannot
11 get any closer, I am going to go ahead and put those maybe
12 on a joint high-speed vessel, for example. So the joint
13 high-speed vessel could pick up, say, 25 AAV's or ACV's
14 because we can do at-sea arrival in assembly now with some
15 of these more capable ships, and then be able to go ahead
16 and maneuver that force with high speed and range to be the
17 place that we want to go ahead and apply that pressure. So
18 what we see is that in the future, connectors are going to
19 be highly critical for both self-deployers as well as those
20 that maybe are not self-deployers, such as like the joint
21 light tactical vehicle.

22 Senator Wicker: Thank you for clearing that up. And
23 Senator Sullivan, I apologize for making you wait. You are
24 recognized for a second round.

25 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Secretary Dee, I wanted to follow up on the Arctic
2 question that I had asked previously and, again, kind of the
3 broader perspective from the Navy's standpoint in terms of
4 not only in military and seeing what the Russians are doing,
5 which again is very clearly some concrete, significant moves
6 into the Arctic with a whole host of infrastructure
7 building, new bases, new brigades, new icebreakers. I mean,
8 it is a move. And we are doing nothing essentially. We
9 have a 13-page Arctic strategy that nobody seems to be
10 paying attention to in my view.

11 And then there is the whole issue that is critical to
12 the Navy's overall function in terms of keeping sea lanes
13 open and commerce. You know, we obviously have done an
14 incredible job over the decades doing that, but we have a
15 new sea lane and lane of commerce that is opening up in the
16 Arctic, as you are well aware.

17 Yesterday -- I mentioned this, the question about
18 icebreakers for the Navy. And by the way, all the SecDef,
19 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- they are all saying, hey, we
20 recognize this is a pretty significant development, and we
21 need to pay attention to it. And yet, when I asked about
22 icebreakers and looking at that, the CNO essentially said,
23 hey, that is not our department. That is Homeland Security.
24 That is Coast Guard. I have the utmost respect for him and
25 the rest of the people serving in the Navy and the Marine

1 Corps, but I thought that was kind of a bureaucratic answer.
2 I mean, these are leaders of the country.

3 You do not have to answer it here, but I would like the
4 Navy collectively to get back to us and just answer the
5 simple question. Is it in the national interest of the
6 United States, given the developments in the Arctic, to have
7 an additional heavy icebreaker? I am not interested in
8 whose budget it is or, sorry, that is not my -- the issue of
9 national security is everybody's issue. And so I would just
10 like an answer that is not bureaucratic that answers the
11 question, and if you can get back to us on that, maybe check
12 with the CNO on that issue. I think that is important.

13 Mr. Dee: Yes, sir. We will coordinate with OPNAV
14 staff and get back to you.

15 [The information referred to follows:]

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1 Senator Sullivan: Great.

2 General Glueck, I wanted to follow up on the issue of
3 training. You mentioned you were at Bridgeport recently,
4 and I think that that is an amazing place for training for
5 all U.S. military, whether it is the Marine Corps or others.
6 You know, certainly one of the hallmarks of the Marine Corps
7 -- and Bridgeport is an example of that -- is tough, severe
8 training. You know, there is a lot of discussion I think on
9 these committees on the best way to take care of our troops.
10 I think the Marine Corps has really focused on the best way
11 to take care of our troops is train them as hard as they can
12 so when they have to go fight wars for the country, they
13 come home alive. That is the best way to take care of our
14 troops.

15 You know, the mantra that is the Army and when you talk
16 about Korea, no more "Task Force Smiths," I think that is
17 always important to keep that in mind because as a country,
18 we have not done a great job historically of downsizing. We
19 have forgotten the importance of training.

20 I just wanted to ask you, given your previous positions
21 and your current role, do you see the focus even in severe
22 budget times on hard training closed with "destroy the
23 enemy" that is the hallmark of the Marine Corps -- is that
24 something that we are still able to do with these budgets?
25 And also, do you get interference in some ways from

1 civilians who maybe have a different focus? Maybe they are
2 focusing on other areas because I think sometimes that tough
3 training is lost on some people on how important that is.

4 And then from a different angle, I will just mention
5 something in my own personal experience as a reservist who
6 relinquished command recently of a unit in the Reserves.
7 There does seem to be an increasing amount of mandates that
8 come down to units, particularly on the Reserve side. You
9 need to do a class on this. You need to do a class on that.
10 Do you think we are kind of overwhelming our units with
11 mandates from higher headquarters and forgetting that there
12 is only so much time to actually focus on the infantry
13 skills that are the hallmark of the Marine Corps that are so
14 important, not only the Marine Corps but to the defense of
15 our Nation?

16 General Glueck: Well, Senator, thank you very much for
17 that question. And training continues to be one of our
18 hallmarks.

19 You know, I had an opportunity. Yesterday I had
20 breakfast with Golf Company at TBS. They graduate here in
21 about 10 days. And we made the point to them just how
22 important training is, and they have just come out. They
23 call themselves like the frozen company because they have
24 just been through 6 months of some pretty severe conditions.

25 But it really is about training, realistic training,

1 and we put a very high priority on that to make sure that
2 all our units get the training that they need. So we are
3 not going to back away from that.

4 As far as any kind of interference, the only
5 interference you have sometimes, you know, depending on
6 where you are training. We have training challenges even in
7 Okinawa. We have training challenges wherever we go in the
8 world. But we can work around them. We are able to do that
9 and still be able to accomplish not only our individual
10 marine's training requirements, the unit training
11 requirements, but also our joint and coalition training
12 requirements as well.

13 So I feel good at where we are. We are going to
14 continue to put resources towards that, particularly in the
15 areas of live and virtual training.

16 Senator Sullivan: How about mandates on the --

17 General Glueck: We call it "rocks in the rucksack."
18 We keep giving them more rocks and putting them in the
19 rucksack.

20 Senator Sullivan: The rucksack is getting heavier.

21 General Glueck: It is getting heavier and heavier. In
22 fact, I just put out an all marine notification here just
23 within the last couple weeks giving the commanders the
24 ability to go ahead and reduce some of those requirements.
25 The Commandant has now said that as commanders -- you know,

1 we hand-select you to be a lieutenant colonel, colonel
2 command, you know, general officer commanders -- that you
3 will have the ability to go ahead and prioritize what some
4 of these that you have to comply with, as long as they are
5 Marine Corps standards or Marine Corps rules, and others
6 that we can go ahead and put a lower requirement.

7 Senator Sullivan: Great. I am really glad to hear
8 that is happening.

9 Thank you.

10 Senator Wicker: Senator Blumenthal?

11 Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

12 I know that this question will sound heretical and
13 maybe even disrespectful. So please forgive me.

14 Senator Wicker: But you have our attention.

15 [Laughter.]

16 Senator Blumenthal: If I am explaining to a
17 Connecticut constituency or constituent who is wondering
18 about why we are doing amphibious assault vehicles, the 1.1
19 and 1.2, why we are thinking about that type of vehicle --
20 we have all seen in the movies and so forth the use of these
21 vehicles in the past. Where right now could you envision --
22 if I want to give an example of where these vehicles might
23 be useful, might be essential, can you give me some
24 scenarios, even if you cannot refer to a country by name,
25 how I would explain to my constituent the need for this

1 vehicle as a priority? And you have identified it as a
2 priority for the Marine Corps today.

3 General Glueck: Well, thanks for that question.

4 You know, when you look at our forward-stationed,
5 forward-deployed marines today, those are the ones that the
6 combatant commanders are going to turn to when you say, hey,
7 I got a crisis, and you are going to address that crisis
8 with today's force and you are going to do it today. So it
9 is what you have out there to be able to operate. So those
10 forces are going to be operating across the entire range of
11 military operations. So these vehicles apply whether you
12 are doing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief when the
13 port is closed or has been destroyed that you have to come
14 ashore. You know, we have seen that even in our own country
15 down in New Orleans where we had some of our amphibious
16 tractors that actually were saving lives for people that
17 were stranded. So I mean, they have applicability across
18 the entire range of military operations.

19 The example that you use of, let us say, an Iwo Jima,
20 Tarawa that is burnt into our brain housing groups about
21 amphibious assault -- that is not the way we want to conduct
22 business. Okay? If you look at it from a renewable warfare
23 philosophy perspective and also our ship-to-objective
24 maneuver concept that is out there, it is about finding the
25 gaps in the seams within the enemy's defenses out there, and

1 that is where you want to attack.

2 So, for example, when I gave the example of the joint
3 high-speed vessel, we still do not have a ramp to be able to
4 launch from, but we got S&T efforts looking at that. But
5 instead of the enemy thinking that you are going to be
6 coming at the center of a beach, or whatever the objective
7 is, we are going to go ahead and maneuver around. When we
8 find those gaps in the seams where they are weak, because
9 they cannot be strong everywhere, if you refer back to Sun
10 Tzu and whatnot, we will find those and there will be niches
11 within that armor that we are going to be able to exploit.

12 Senator Blumenthal: Would it be against an enemy that
13 is technologically disadvantaged because in the world of
14 drones and other kind of air threats to amphibious combat
15 vehicles that are essentially exposed for some period of
16 time, I would assume that a more modern equipped enemy would
17 have some capability to endanger those forces?

18 General Glueck: Yes, sir. It comes down to setting
19 the conditions. And if you are going to do an amphibious
20 assault operation in a major amphibious campaign, we are not
21 going to be working for the Marine Corps. We are going to
22 be working for our joint force commander. And so we are
23 going to be looking at all the capabilities he has
24 throughout his joint force that will be able to help us to
25 set the conditions that are going to be required because

1 there will be certain conditions that are going to be
2 required.

3 We just did a war game, our service war game, down in
4 Norfolk 2 weeks ago and looked at in a couple scenarios what
5 would be required to be able to set conditions for us to
6 actually move an amphibious force in close enough to shore
7 to be able to launch. And we have the capabilities within
8 the joint force and within the naval force to be able to set
9 those conditions. But it is over a certain place at a
10 certain time, not across an entire theater, but to be able
11 to accomplish the military objectives that we will have.

12 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you very much.

13 Senator Wicker: Thank you, members of the
14 subcommittee. And thank you to our distinguished witnesses.

15 Senator Hirono and I have consulted and agreed to
16 submit the remainder of our questions for the record. Other
17 members will be given that opportunity.

18 And so if there is nothing further --

19 Senator Hirono: Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one
20 comment. I know that the marines represent just about 6
21 percent of the DOD budget, and so you really do have to
22 leverage the investments of other services. And I commend
23 you for those efforts and collaborating and making sure that
24 you get the resources you need in collaboration with our
25 other services so that you can meet your mission. I want to

1 thank both of you for that.

2 Senator Wicker: Thank you, Senator Hirono.

3 I think it has been a very good discussion. I am very
4 impressed with our two witnesses.

5 If there is nothing further, this hearing will be
6 adjourned. Thank you.

7 [Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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