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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

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U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Graham, Reed, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Well, good morning. I thank all the
4 witnesses for being here this morning.

5 The committee meets today to receive testimony on U.S.
6 policy in the Middle East. This hearing could not be more
7 timely, and I want to thank each of our expert witnesses for
8 appearing before us today on this critical and complex
9 topic: Dr. Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
10 Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Kenneth M.
11 Pollack, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy, Center for Middle
12 East Policy at the Brookings Institution; Colonel Derek J.
13 Harvey, U.S. Army, retired, Director of the Global
14 Initiative for Civil Society and Conflict at the University
15 of South Florida; Dr. Dafna H. Rand, Deputy Director of
16 Studies and Leon E. Panetta Fellow at the Center for a New
17 American Security.

18 Last month, the Director of National Intelligence,
19 James Clapper, testified before this committee, quote, "in
20 my 50-plus years in the intelligence business, I don't know
21 of a time that has been more beset by challenges and crises
22 around the world." Nowhere is that truer than in the Middle
23 East.

24 From Libya and Yemen, to Iraq and Syria, the old order
25 in the Middle East, both the regional balance among states

1 and the social order within states, is collapsing and no new
2 vision has emerged to take its place. This underlying
3 dynamic is made worse by the failure of U.S. strategy and
4 leadership to shape events in this vital part of the world
5 for the better. Instead, unfortunately, we have too often
6 confused our friends, encouraged our enemies, and created a
7 vacuum for hostile states such as Iran and Russia and
8 vicious non-state actors such as al Qaeda and ISIL.

9 The President stated our goal is, quote, "degrading and
10 ultimately destroying ISIL." However, I fear our effort in
11 Iraq may be exacerbating the conditions that gave rise to
12 ISIL in the first place by overly relying on brutal Iranian-
13 backed Shia militias and insufficiently empowering Sunni
14 Iraqis. The situation is far worse in Syria.

15 The administration has defined its policy in Syria more
16 by what it will not do rather than by what end state we aim
17 to achieve. The President repeatedly stresses that he will
18 not put boots on the ground and that we will not go after
19 Assad. But we still do not know whether we will defend the
20 Syrian opposition we are training against Assad's barrel
21 bombs. And the administration still believes somehow that
22 Assad will negotiate his own removal from power, even though
23 conditions on the ground do not support it. Our partners
24 are not assured of U.S. resolve by statements of what we
25 will not do. And hope in Syria or anywhere else is not a

1 strategy.

2 Likewise, nuclear negotiations with Iran are clearly
3 reaching the end game and we should recall how much we have
4 conceded. As Dr. Henry Kissinger testified in January
5 before this committee, an international effort supported by
6 six UN Security Council resolutions to deny Iran a nuclear
7 weapon capability has become an essentially bilateral
8 negotiation over the scope of that capability. As Dr.
9 Kissinger put it, "The impact of this approach will be to
10 move from preventing proliferation to managing it."

11 What has been obscured and possibly downplayed in our
12 focus on the nuclear negotiations is the reality that Iran
13 is not simply an arms control challenge. It is a
14 geopolitical challenge, as we have seen more clearly than
15 ever today.

16 In Iraq, the same Iranian-backed Shia militias that
17 killed hundreds of American soldiers and marines are
18 dictating the battle plans of the Iraqi Government and
19 exacerbating the sectarian tensions that first led to the
20 rise of ISIL.

21 In Syria, the Iranian-backed Assad regime, together
22 with Iranian proxies like Hezbollah, continue the slaughter
23 that has killed more than 200,000 Syrians and displaced 10
24 million more.

25 In Yemen, only 6 months after President Obama held it

1 up as a successful model of U.S. counterterrorism, the
2 takeover by Iranian-backed Houthis has pushed the country to
3 the brink of a failed state and a sectarian civil war,
4 strengthening the hand of both al Qaeda in the Arabian
5 Peninsula and Iran.

6 And yet, while Iran is increasing the scope and pace of
7 its malign activities in the region, there is a dangerous
8 delusion that somehow Iran can be a force for good in the
9 region, aligning with the United States in the fight against
10 ISIL. For example, Secretary Kerry recently said of the
11 Iranian military action in Iraq, quote, "the net effect is
12 positive." Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
13 General Dempsey, said, "As long as the Iraqi Government
14 remains committed to inclusivity of all of the various
15 groups inside the country, then I think Iranian influence
16 will be positive." I am not making that up.

17 General David Petraeus gave a realistic picture in a
18 recent interview, which is worth quoting in full. And I
19 will conclude. General David Petraeus said: "The current
20 Iranian regime is not our ally in the Middle East. It is
21 ultimately part of the problem, not the solution. The more
22 the Iranians are seen to be dominating the region, the more
23 it is going to inflame Sunni radicalism and fuel the rise of
24 groups like the Islamic State. While the U.S. and Iran may
25 have convergent interests in the defeat of Daesh, our

1 interests generally diverge. The Iranian response to the
2 open hand offered by the U.S. has not been encouraging.
3 Iranian power in the Middle East is thus a double problem.
4 It is foremost problematic because it is deeply hostile to
5 us and our friends. But it is also dangerous because the
6 more it is felt, the more it sets off reactions that are
7 also harmful to our interests -- Sunni radicalism and, if we
8 are not careful, the prospect of nuclear proliferation as
9 well."

10 This is a perilous moment in history for a region of
11 enormous importance to American national interests. It is
12 clear that we are engaged in a generational fight against
13 brutal enemies and that defeating these enemies will require
14 clear thinking, setting priorities, and a strategy funded by
15 adequate resources.

16 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on
17 these important questions.

18 Senator Reed?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
4 And good morning, and let me join Senator McCain in
5 welcoming our witnesses and let me thank the chairman for
6 arranging this hearing in the lead-up to Thursday's sessions
7 with our combatant commanders responsible for Africa and the
8 Middle East. The timing is absolutely superb. Both regions
9 are facing critical security challenges that will continue
10 to demand our time and consideration for the foreseeable
11 future and beyond, and hearing from experts outside of our
12 Government is an important input into our process.

13 Among the most significant issues in the Middle East
14 today is whether there will be any nuclear framework
15 agreement reached between the P5 Plus 1 in Iran. The end of
16 March is fast approaching and, deal of no deal, the outcome
17 of these negotiations will undoubtedly have an impact, not
18 only on the international community's relations with Iran,
19 but also reverberating across the region, indeed across the
20 world.

21 In Iraq and Syria, despite the setbacks that extremist
22 fighters have suffered, ISIS remains capable militarily and
23 continues to consolidate its power in the region, including
24 through the coercion of local populations. Coalition
25 airstrikes have enabled Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq

1 and Iraq security forces, operating with militia forces
2 north of Baghdad and most recently in Tikrit, to begin to
3 retain ground from ISIS. But significant concerns remain
4 about the growing influence of Shia-dominated militias, many
5 with close ties to the Qods Force, and if, when, and how
6 those forces will be integrated into the Iraqi security
7 forces or disbanded.

8 In addition, increasing reports of human right abuses
9 and brutal violence by Shia militias in Sunni communities
10 retaken from ISIS control, as has been recently reported in
11 Amerli, threaten to exacerbate the sectarian divide in Iraq
12 and undermine efforts by the Abadi government to govern more
13 inclusively.

14 Also of concern are when Iraqi security forces will be
15 ready to launch a counteroffensive to retake Mosul and how
16 Iran will wield their growing influence inside Iraq.

17 In Syria, coalition airstrikes have enabled Syrian
18 Kurdish fighters to regain control of Kobani and expand
19 outward, but ISIS remains a formidable force. General
20 Nagata will begin training the moderate Syrian opposition in
21 the coming month and, if successful, over time these forces
22 could further roll back ISIS gains and assist the coalition
23 to promote the conditions for a political settlement with
24 Assad. I am interested in the views of our witnesses on the
25 potential of the Syrian training initiative to achieve its

1 objectives and the challenges it will face confronting ISIS.
2 I am also interested in your assessment as to whether Iran
3 or Russia could help facilitate an Assad departure.

4 In North Africa, the deadly events in Tunisia last week
5 are a reminder that ISIS is bent on expanding its power and
6 influence and, despite setbacks, it continues to draw
7 fighters to its self-declared caliphate. While we must
8 continue to apply pressure on ISIS in Iraq and Syria, I
9 believe it will also be critical for the coalition to use
10 diplomatic and other tools of statecraft to more
11 strategically counter ISIS's narrative and undermine their
12 appeal globally. Over the past week, the world has watched
13 the Houthis gain additional territory in southern Yemen, and
14 all indications today are that the country of Yemen is
15 headed towards a protracted civil war. Given U.S.
16 counterterrorism interests in Yemen, these developments are
17 of deep concern and how the U.S. will adjust our posture to
18 ensure our CT operations can continue is an issue to monitor
19 closely.

20 Thank you again for appearing today, and I look forward
21 to hearing from you on these and many other important
22 issues.

23 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

24 We will begin with Dr. Takeyh. Doctor, thank you.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE
2 EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

3 Dr. Takeyh: Thank you, Senator McCain and Senator
4 Reed, for having me here today. It is always a pleasure to
5 appear with my friends.

6 I was asked to try to situate Iran's role in the region
7 as the region goes through vulnerable and violent
8 transitions.

9 I think it is fair to say -- and I am not exaggerating
10 -- to suggest that the Middle East is a region that
11 perennially divides against itself. In the past, monarchies
12 and radical republics, secular ideologues battled for
13 influence. Today, another more durable cold war is
14 descending on the Middle East, this time underpinned by
15 sectarian identities. Syria and Iraq are a heart of this
16 new conflict, pitting Iran and the Shia militants against
17 Saudi Arabia and the Sunni sects. The region cannot regain
18 its footing unless these civil wars somehow subside.

19 More than any country, Iran has always perceived itself
20 as the natural hegemon of the region. The leadership of the
21 Islamic Republic, the Arab Awakenings have shaken the
22 foundations of the Middle East making the region more
23 susceptible to their inroads. And they are telling -- the
24 Iranian leaders are telling -- America is a crestfallen,
25 imperialist state hastily retreating from the region.

1 Today, Tehran does see the United States as unable to impose
2 a solution on the recalcitrant regional problems. Whatever
3 compunction Tehran may have had about American power have
4 greatly diminished over the past years with the hesitations
5 in Syria and Iraq. Today too often our redlines are erased
6 as carelessly as they are drawn.

7 The fear gripping Arab capitals is that arms control
8 agreement with Iran will lead to a detente between the
9 United States and Iran. This concern has some justification
10 in fact and in history. During the heydays of arms
11 limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet
12 Union, nuclear accords were often followed by commerce and
13 diplomatic recognition. Washington has often been seduced
14 by the notion that a nuclear agreement can pave the way for
15 other areas of cooperation. At least for now, Iran's
16 leaders abjure such gestures of reconciliation, focusing on
17 exploiting opportunities that have suddenly appeared and
18 pressing their case in various contested areas.

19 The Islamic Republic's approach to Iran has undergone,
20 in my view, subtle and disturbing changes. The threat from
21 ISIL has led Iran to become more transparent and more
22 aggressive in its approach to Iraq. Iran has stepped into
23 the many vacuums of Iraq organizing its forces, directly
24 defending its key cities, and providing indispensable
25 assistance in a timely manner. Iranian officers, as was

1 mentioned, are embedded with Iraqi units and are leading the
2 campaign against ISIL strongholds. In the process, Iran has
3 been instrumental in stemming ISIL assaults and may account
4 for the shrinkage of its frontiers. However, these
5 successes have come at a terrible cost that could endanger
6 the stability of the region and independence of Iraq itself.

7 Iran's reliance on the Shia militias as opposed to the
8 Iraqi army has done much to disquiet the Sunni community,
9 further accentuating the sectarian cleavages that divide the
10 country. Given the rise of ISIL has much to do with the
11 Sunni community's grievances regarding its marginalization
12 in Iraq and elsewhere, such a brazen attempt to empower Shia
13 militias at the expense of Iraqi national institutions
14 further threatens the cohesion of that country. Although
15 the Iraqi Government led by Prime Minister Abadi is
16 concerned about the scope and scale of Iran's interventions,
17 it has limited options given the forces arrayed against it.
18 The Iranian claim that their intervention as opposed to the
19 passivity of the United States and Turkey has saved the day
20 does seem to resonate with some members of Shia and Kurdish
21 communities.

22 Syria has similarly emerged as a centerpiece of Iran's
23 regional strategy. Syria's divided ethnicities, a central
24 role in Iran's assault on the prevailing Arab order, mean
25 that Assad had many more cards up his sleeves. Washington

1 proclaimed a goal but failed to plan for the actual removal
2 of Assad. It is difficult to predict with any precision how
3 civil wars unfold and how they essentially come to an end.
4 By their very nature, civil wars are unpredictable
5 phenomena, susceptible to sudden shifts and changing
6 fortunes. However, it is not too premature to suggest that
7 the morale of Assad forces at this point is high while the
8 fragmented opposition is suffering not just from lack of
9 arms but also from the absence of international patronage.
10 The infusion of Russian arms, Iranian funds, Hezbollah
11 troops will ensure that Assad may be well maintained.

12 The Islamic Republic's calculations always differed in
13 Syria than those of the United States. They were confident
14 that Assad could turn back the tide of history if suitably
15 supported. To check Iran's power in the Levant, the United
16 States has to be a more active player in Syria, as was
17 mentioned, and maybe that is going to happen. The challenge
18 becomes more difficult every day given the scope and scale
19 of the casualties and fatalities.

20 The success of United States policy in the Middle East,
21 I will finally say, and toward Iran hinges to some extent on
22 the nature of the U.S.-Israeli alliance. Simply put, Iran
23 today dismisses the possibility of U.S. military retaliation
24 irrespective of its provocations. It is entirely possible
25 that Iranians are once more miscalculating and misjudging

1 America's predilections. Nonetheless, while the American
2 military option has somewhat receded in the Iranian
3 imagination, Israel still somewhat looms larger.
4 Fulminations aside, Iranian leaders have taken Israeli
5 threats more seriously and are at pains to assert their
6 retaliatory options. It is here that the shape and tone of
7 Israeli-American alliance matters most. Should the Iranian
8 regime see divisions in that alliance, they can assure
9 themselves that a beleaguered Israel cannot possibly strike
10 Iran while at odds with its superpower patron. Such
11 perceptions cheapen Israeli deterrence, diminish the potency
12 of Western remaining sticks, and make obtaining a suitable
13 arms control agreement even more difficult.

14 Thank you.

15 [The prepared statement of Dr. Takeyh follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

2 Dr. Pollack?

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH M. POLLACK, SENIOR FELLOW,
2 FOREIGN POLICY, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS
3 INSTITUTION

4 Dr. Pollack: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
5 Senator Reed, distinguished Senators. It is always a great
6 pleasure to address this committee, and I thank you for
7 having me back.

8 Mr. Chairman, I have prepared written testimony, and I
9 would ask that it be entered into the permanent record.

10 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

11 Dr. Pollack: Thank you.

12 With that in mind, I am going to emphasize just four
13 points from my written remarks that I think are worth
14 putting on the table as part of this conversation.

15 The first of them is, of course, the problems Middle
16 East were long in the making, and therefore they are
17 unlikely to be quick in solving. They reflect, as Senator
18 McCain mentioned in his opening remarks, the breakdown of
19 the post-war political order. They are a result of the slow
20 failure of the states of the Muslim Middle East over the
21 past 20 to 30 years, coupled with rather volatile swings in
22 U.S. policy over the last 15 years and most recently a
23 significant American disengagement from the region. We need
24 to recognize, as we consider how best to reshape our policy
25 toward the region, that it is going to take a similarly

1 long-term approach to deal with the many problems of the
2 region.

3 And here I think it important to note that one of the
4 greatest problems that the United States has had when
5 dealing with the problems of the Middle East over the past
6 40 to 50 years has been that we have consistently and
7 unfortunately prioritized short-term political expediency
8 over our long-term strategic interests. This is one -- not
9 the only, but an important element of the chaos and
10 turbulence that we now face in the region. And if we are
11 going to be serious about trying to guide the region to a
12 better place, one where our interests are less threatened
13 and better protected, we are going to have to start
14 prioritizing those long-term strategic interests over the
15 short-term political considerations.

16 Second, al Qaeda and ISIS and the growth in Iranian
17 influence across the region are significant threats to
18 American interests, but they are not the core problems of
19 the region. They are, in fact, symptoms of the deeper
20 problems of the region. As a result of the state failures
21 and American missteps in the region, we have seen security
22 vacuums in failed states open up in a number of key states.
23 The Iranians and al Qaeda have filled those vacuums. That
24 is what they do. They creep in wherever they are able.

25 The proper way to fight them, as we should have learned

1 from our long experience in this respect, is to fill the
2 security vacuums and deal with the failed states. You
3 cannot defeat terrorism simply by killing terrorists. It
4 does not work. We have to address the underlying grievances
5 that give rise to the terrorist problems to begin with, and
6 similarly, we need to remember that Iran is itself an alien
7 force in the Arab world, which the Arabs will reject if
8 given the opportunity to do so.

9 I think the best example that this is both the right
10 answer and the plausible solution to our problems is
11 provided by our experience in Iraq from 2007 to 2009. In
12 2006, Iraq was in a state of complete civil war. The state
13 had broken down. Al Qaeda dominated part of it and the
14 Iranians another part of it. But finally in 2007, after of
15 litany of mistakes, which the members of this committee
16 rightly and regularly criticized, the United States finally
17 adopted the right set of policies in Iraq. We secured the
18 populace. We forged a new power sharing agreement among the
19 warring factions. We brought the alienated Sunni community
20 back into Iraq's political system, and as a result, we ended
21 the civil war and stabilized the country.

22 And the result was that the Iraqis, with considerable
23 American assistance, but with them largely in the lead --
24 the Iraqis drove out al Qaeda in Iraq, which had already
25 declared itself the Islamic State of Iraq, the precursor of

1 today's ISIS. And not only did they drive out AQI, they
2 also drove out Iran. In Operation Charge of the Knights and
3 the subsequent military operations that followed, Prime
4 Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a brief moment of real
5 nationalism, and he and his people, united, drove out both
6 the terrorists and the Iranians. This is the right solution
7 to the problems of al Qaeda, of ISIS, and of expanding
8 Iranian influence in the region.

9 Third point. For this reason, the civil wars of the
10 region in Iraq, in Syria, in Libya and Yemen, with the
11 threat of civil wars breaking out elsewhere, in Jordan,
12 conceivably in Egypt or Bahrain, these have to be our first
13 focus. They have become the engines of instability in the
14 Middle East. I will say that I think that the policy
15 articulated by the President in September of 2014 and later
16 elaborated on by Chairman Dempsey before this committee
17 several days later is largely the right approach. I would
18 agree that that strategy must encompass the termination of
19 the Assad regime as well, but broadly speaking, the policy
20 articulated by the President and the Chairman are the right
21 approaches to dealing with the civil wars, at least in Iraq
22 and Syria, which are the two most important of the civil
23 wars we face.

24 The key question is whether these efforts will be
25 properly resourced and implemented by the entirety of the

1 U.S. Government. If they are, there is every reason to
2 believe that they can work. However, I fear that we are
3 making the same mistake that we made in 2001 when we
4 intervened in Afghanistan, in 2003 when we intervened in
5 Iraq, in 2011 when we intervened in Libya, and again in 2011
6 when we withdrew from Iraq. And that is, we made a major
7 military move unaccompanied by concomitant political,
8 diplomatic, and economic measures designed to translate
9 military operations into meaningful foreign policy
10 achievements.

11 We need to remember that the problem of ISIS is bigger
12 than just the problems of Iraq and Syria, but so too the
13 problems of Iraq and Syria are also bigger than just the
14 problem of ISIS. If all we do is defeat ISIS in Iraq and
15 degrade it in Syria, we will probably accomplish nothing.
16 It will be back. The civil wars there will rage on and new
17 terrorist groups just like them will be generated by those
18 conflicts.

19 Finally, I think it important to recognize and count in
20 our foreign for the fact that we have almost certainly not
21 seen the last of the Arab Spring. Unless there is
22 meaningful change, political, economic, and social, in the
23 Muslim Middle East, the unrest will be back. We do not know
24 when. We do not know how. We do not know in what form.
25 But it is highly likely that it will return and possibly in

1 more virulent form. This time around this wave of unrest
2 left us with four failed states that turned into civil wars
3 and a host of even more repressive governments and even more
4 vicious terrorist groups than we faced before. We cannot
5 know what a next wave will produce.

6 But I would simply say in closing that the smartest
7 answer that the United States could adopt to that question,
8 to that uncertainty is to not run that social science
9 experiment at all, but instead to press and to enable the
10 Arab states to engage in a process of reform that is the
11 only meaningful alternative to repression followed by
12 revolution.

13 Thank you, Senator.

14 [The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:]
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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

2 Colonel Harvey?

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1 STATEMENT OF COLONEL DEREK J. HARVEY, USA, RETIRED,
2 DIRECTOR, GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND CONFLICT,
3 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

4 Mr. Harvey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking minority,
5 and members of this committee. Thank you for inviting me to
6 testify.

7 I did not submit prepared remarks, but I am going to
8 make some extemporaneous points, and I hope that they are
9 relevant.

10 First, I agree with almost everything that has been
11 said, so I will just highlight a couple of points about the
12 broader regional trends that we need to take into
13 consideration. Besides the post-Arab Spring dynamics and
14 the failure of governance and institutions, there is a
15 fracturing of society. And one of the overarching themes
16 going here is this conflict within Islam and a conflict
17 within the Ummah. And it manifests itself in several ways.
18 You have the jihadist extremists Sunni-Salafist approach, a
19 takfiri, annihilationist agenda, which is against
20 establishment Islam and the established authorities. And
21 that is at one level. But there is also an intra-jihadist
22 fight going on, and then there is a Sunni versus Shia fight
23 going on at various levels too. And it is at the grassroots
24 level, but it is also at a geopolitical level. So you have
25 got four clear levels of intra-sectarian conflict going on,

1 and then you have an intra-Shia dynamic which is being
2 dominated right now by Qom over the Iraq-based Najaf-Karbala
3 view of a more quietest approach to Islam.

4 And so we have to take this into consideration because
5 it is at the heart of how many in the region are looking at
6 this through the sectarian divide and the approaches from
7 these sub-national elements and at the national level. You
8 hear it at the senior levels in the UAE, Qatar, and in
9 Kuwait. You also hear it across the region in the Levant.
10 So we have to take that into consideration.

11 Now, very quickly a couple of quick points.

12 One, the immediate threat is ISIS, but also an
13 immediate threat currently is the encroachment and
14 empowerment of Iran across the region, and it is the most
15 dangerous, long-term threat. ISIS is not the most dangerous
16 long-term threat, and we are misplacing our priorities and
17 we are forgetting about our strategic long-term interests in
18 securing an independent, sovereign, not-aligned Iraq. Iraq
19 is vital to the stability of the region, and we are at deep
20 risk of losing Baghdad today. In fact, we may have dug such
21 a deep hole that it is not recoverable for us. And I see a
22 similar pattern emerging to what we had with the Warsaw
23 Pact, Moscow, and their client states, East Berlin, Warsaw,
24 Prague, et cetera where Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut are
25 simply client states of Tehran.

1 The current fight against ISIS. I think we are still
2 underestimating the deep support that it has, not only in
3 parts of Iraq and Syria, but also the empathy that it has in
4 the Gulf. The operations against ISIS have had success on
5 the margins, along the Kurdish zone, Kirkuk, northern
6 Nineveh. It has been clearing in Diyala, the Hamrin
7 Mountains, and pushing up the Tigris River. Some localized
8 tactical successes in Anbar Province.

9 But even when you achieve clearing and holding in these
10 places, you are still going to have a residual, deep Sunni
11 Arab resistance effort unless there is fundamental change in
12 Baghdad. And I think we all understand that. We could be
13 back to the days of 2006 with an ongoing industrial strength
14 insurgency. And the way this fight has been moving forward
15 in a bulldozer-like approach where you demolish a city like
16 Jurf al Sakhar, southwest of Baghdad, what has happened in
17 Diyala and what appears to be happening in Tikrit -- this
18 does not bode well for Sunni and Shia relations at the
19 grassroots level.

20 Prime Minister Abadi is not sectarian in my judgment,
21 but he remains weak and isolated. The Iraqi security forces
22 are weak and marginalized in this current construct. Shia
23 militias are enhanced in their power and influence, and
24 their loyalty is to the Supreme Leader Khamenei and their
25 source of emulation Khamenei, not to Najaf, not to Karbala.

1 The one exception in this case is the Sadr movement, and
2 that is an area where there are some opportunities to reach
3 out for an Iraqi Shia nationalist agenda within these
4 militia elements. But we have a long and troubled history
5 with the Sadr trend, but I think that is one area of some
6 opportunity.

7 Tehran's sphere of influence, as I have said, is
8 expanding and they have the advantages of proximity, deep
9 knowledge of the players in the region, a vital strategic
10 interest in achieving their objectives, and a ruthless and
11 committed leadership that knows how to work in this
12 environment. And those are all things that the United
13 States fails to bring to the table and has not brought to
14 the table in recent years.

15 The Sunni Arab community is likely weaker and more
16 divided than ever in Iraq. Likewise, it is the same thing
17 in Syria. Major population displacement is unlikely to be
18 redressed with major Sunni communities moving back into
19 these places like Sakhar or even in Diyala or eventually
20 Tikrit because there seems to be an agenda underway of
21 diminishing, if not cleansing major Sunni communities from
22 around the Baghdad belts and the approaches into Baghdad in
23 a way to create buffer zones. And this is something that
24 has been done in the past, but they are just expanding the
25 geographic reach. And General Chisori and others from the

1 Qods Force has been orchestrating the same kind of effort
2 around Damascus and in other regions of Syria. It is a plan
3 that they have and we need to understand how they are
4 approaching this.

5 Long term, if there is going to be successful
6 reconciliation between these communities, there is going to
7 have to be an addressing of the disenfranchisement and
8 marginalization. That means some kind of local autonomy, a
9 national guard, better resource distribution, and rebuilding
10 and reinvestment in these Sunni Arab areas. Again, that is
11 unlikely to occur under the political dynamics in Baghdad.
12 And with the increasing influence of Iran and hard-line
13 Shia, it even makes it less likely.

14 Lastly, over the last year or more, our engagement in
15 Iraq has been insufficient to the task. We remain viewed as
16 a peripheral player, hesitant and weak. Without sufficient
17 military capabilities invested in this effort in ways that
18 are aligned to achieve our political, economic, and
19 diplomatic objectives, we are not going to be considered a
20 major player. I am not sure we can change our approach at
21 this point in time and develop a conceptual approach to our
22 engagement in Iraq and execute it effectively to counter the
23 gains made by Iran over the last 6 months for sure but how
24 they have been building their enterprise there over the last
25 several years.

1 We see a cementing of Shia militia relationships from
2 Beirut to Syria to Iraq, and these are not just on the
3 military side, but they are business, they are economic,
4 partnering going on between members of the Maliki family,
5 families in Beirut, the Assad family, and others. We could
6 go into great detail if one wanted to approach how this
7 cementing of relationships is being orchestrated by the Qods
8 Force and MOIS.

9 With that, I will just stop, and I am looking forward
10 to answering any of your questions.

11 [The prepared statement of Mr. Harvey follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

2 Dr. Rand?

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. DAFNA H. RAND, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
2 STUDIES AND LEON E. PANETTA FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW
3 AMERICAN SECURITY

4 Dr. Rand: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
5 Reed, members of the committee. Thanks for inviting me to
6 testify.

7 I ask that my longer written statement be submitted for
8 the record.

9 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

10 Dr. Rand: Great.

11 And shortly I just wanted to focus on the particular
12 strategic principles that I believe should guide and inform
13 and shape U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and
14 North Africa over the near term.

15 And I applaud your instinct to hold the hearing on the
16 greater question of U.S. Middle East foreign policy because
17 we are all so involved in the day-to-day crises.

18 I would offer six strategic principles that I believe
19 should inform our approach to the Middle East in the near
20 and longer terms.

21 First, the United States should not shy away from
22 publicly and privately articulating its interests and
23 objectives. These have endured, surprisingly, despite the
24 tumult in the region. They have not changed over time very
25 much, and they include protecting the U.S. homeland and its

1 personnel and interests abroad; countering radicalization,
2 terrorism, and proliferation; and securing the free flow of
3 natural resources, commerce, and other goods. The U.S.
4 seeks to protect its allies, including the State of Israel,
5 and advance a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
6 conflict. And all these goals support U.S. interests while
7 advancing regional and international security. The United
8 States also works with the governments and people of the
9 region to address public demands for education, employment,
10 governance, human rights, and just institutions.

11 The second principle is that the real and perceived
12 U.S. presence in the region matters. Without it, the
13 regional powers will try to manage and structure regional
14 order, often working at cross purposes with each other and
15 the United States. And the best example here is the U.S.
16 efforts to stand up the coalition to combat ISIS in the past
17 6 months. Here this multilateral coalition of over 60
18 nations, I believe, has inserted a degree of management,
19 regional architecture, and order to the post-Arab Spring
20 environment. It has generated some preliminary positive
21 outcomes. The practical results, of course, can be seen in
22 some of the beginning signs of military degradation of ISIS,
23 which is still preliminary but significant, as well as
24 regional allies' efforts and interests in countering ISIS's
25 financing, ideology, and recruitment efforts. These gains

1 are very modest, but the fact that the Arab allies are
2 working in sync with each other and with the United States
3 and other countries is a positive development. For example,
4 the Saudis have just invited the Iraqi prime minister to
5 visit Riyadh, which is an unprecedented sign of diplomatic
6 investment in the new Iraqi Government.

7 The third principle is that the United States must
8 seize all diplomatic openings and create them as a first
9 resort policy. In almost all cases, the alternative to
10 diplomacy involves risk, security dilemmas, and greater
11 instability. This is true with the current negotiations
12 between the P5 Plus 1 in Iran. It is also true when it
13 comes to the negotiated end to the Syrian civil war and for
14 the pursuit of the final status agreement of the Israeli-
15 Palestinian conflict. It is also true in Yemen and Libya I
16 will add.

17 The fourth important principle is when the U.S. chooses
18 to intervene militarily, judiciously, it must use force
19 carefully. U.S. military interventions in the region have
20 been most successful when they have involved local partners,
21 when the use of coercion is carefully targeted to achieve a
22 defined end state, and when the U.S. makes it clear that it
23 has no intention of deploying ground troops semi-permanently
24 in the region as the only day-after solution.

25 Fifth, the ideal end state for most of our efforts in

1 the region involve building partner self-sufficiency,
2 measured by the ability and the will of local leaders and
3 their security forces to combat mutual threats, joint
4 threats such as terrorism and proliferation. The training,
5 equipping, and assisting of local partners must be done with
6 an eye for shaping how these partners view their own
7 strategy and military doctrine, including the threat
8 perception that they hold. While building partnership
9 capacity will necessarily focus on the measurable military
10 capabilities, ensuring that all partner forces act
11 professionally and in a manner consonant with the ultimate
12 goal of inclusive governance are equally important
13 objectives. U.S. security assistance and training across
14 the region must be designed in a manner that reflects these
15 particular local challenges.

16 And finally, U.S. partners must subscribe to the view
17 that it is borne of abundant recent evidence that in this
18 particular region stability is borne of governance that is
19 inclusive, multi-sectarian, and based on compromise and
20 responsible leadership. And this is why Iran may share U.S.
21 concerns about ISIS in Iraq, but ultimately is not an
22 enduring partner in the strategic fight against the group in
23 the region.

24 Thanks very much. I look forward to your questions on
25 specific countries and cases where these principle apply.

1 [The prepared statement of Dr. Rand follows:]
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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, Dr. Rand. And I thank the
2 witnesses for their important contributions.

3 I know the witnesses are aware that General Petraeus
4 made a statement in the last few days where he basically
5 stated that he believed that Iran was a greater threat long-
6 term in the Middle East than ISIS is. Just maybe beginning
7 with you, Dr. Takeyh, maybe if you, all the witnesses,
8 respond to General Petraeus' statement.

9 Dr. Takeyh: Well, I think they are different threats.
10 One is also this kind of annihilistic terrorist group that,
11 as was mentioned, is borne out of Sunni community's
12 grievances. The other is a nation state that has command of
13 nation state resources, its economy. It has military and
14 all that. So in the long term, I think that is probably a
15 greater threat to the stability of the region. When you
16 have a nation state married to a revisionist ideology
17 enhancing its military capabilities, that will loom over the
18 region for some time to come.

19 Chairman McCain: Dr. Pollack?

20 Dr. Pollack: Senator, I agree with that statement. I
21 would strongly agree with Dr. Takeyh's characterization of
22 it. Al Qaeda, ISIS is a terrorist group. It represents an
23 extreme element of the Sunni community, one that they may
24 broadly sympathize with but they do not necessarily want to
25 represent them, let alone to rule over them. Its staying

1 power in the region is going to be limited and we have seen
2 it experience difficulties. That is not to suggest that it
3 is not a very serious threat that needs to be dealt with.
4 It does. But exactly as Dr. Takeyh has pointed out -- and I
5 think this was also the point that Colonel Harvey was making
6 earlier -- at the end of the day, Iran is a major power in
7 the region. It has the capacity to dominate the region and
8 has done so for centuries in the past. Ultimately that is a
9 greater threat to the United States because it demonstrates
10 a greater ability to control the region and to sustain that
11 control over time, if allowed to do so.

12 Chairman McCain: Colonel Harvey?

13 Mr. Harvey: Sir, there are no indications that Iran's
14 malign intent in the region vis-a-vis its neighbors has
15 shifted. Any beliefs that Iran's agenda in the region is
16 going to change based upon reformists taking power as a
17 result of the nuclear agreement down the road are probably
18 the same kinds of people that would think that a Libertarian
19 candidate in the United States could win a presidential
20 election in the next 10 years. It is not going to happen.
21 The few signs of political reformists advancing within the
22 government from academia, from economic arena, elsewhere are
23 minor. The hardliners are well entrenched, and the system
24 is aligned to keep them that way. We see Khamenei posters
25 popping up throughout Iraq. We see them posting on their

1 webs in these Shia militias that they are going to liberate
2 Shia in Kuwait, in Bahrain, and in the eastern provinces.
3 Intent plus capability equals threat. Our long-term threat,
4 the current threat is still Iran until we see real signs of
5 change.

6 Thank you.

7 Chairman McCain: Dr. Rand?

8 Dr. Rand: The sources of each threat is different. I
9 would just highlight something my colleagues have not
10 mentioned, which is that ISIS has reinterpreted and
11 distorted even al Qaeda's fatwas about killing civilians,
12 you know, giving a free reign to its folks to kill women and
13 civilians and minorities. There is something new and
14 different and terrifying about ISIS that cannot be
15 overestimated. That is that the source of the Iranian
16 threat is real and true and has been explained here. I see
17 their vision of a winner-take-all governance system as
18 deeply terrifying to our goals and our objectives in the
19 region.

20 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

21 Colonel Harvey, you were heavily involved in the surge
22 and other activities in Iraq. We now see pictures and
23 publicity coverage by the Iranians and others of Soleimani
24 in orchestrating and leading the attack on Tikrit. Is this
25 not the same guy that sent the copper-tipped IED's into Iraq

1 which killed hundreds of American soldiers and marines? And
2 should we not be more aware of the malign influence of
3 Soleimani through the last -- I believe he has been in power
4 for 21 years. And would the average Iraqi not believe that
5 it is the Iranians that are now coming to the rescue of the
6 Iraqis against ISIS and not the United States of America who
7 seems to be observing the activities around Tikrit?

8 And finally, does the difficulty that they are now
9 experiencing in retaking Tikrit not indicate the magnitude
10 of the challenge that they face in attempting to retake
11 Mosul?

12 Mr. Harvey: Sir, Soleimani and the Iranian Guard corps
13 commander Jafari and others have been deeply involved in
14 Iraq for the last 6 or 7 months. And for the Shia community
15 and even in the Kurdish region, they see that the Iranians
16 have become major players and they are contributing on the
17 ground. And the publicity and the information campaigns
18 have been really effective in my judgment, and Soleimani has
19 taken a front-line role in showcasing Iranian presence.

20 He is in fact the one that orchestrated the campaign
21 against the United States. Iran focused on creating
22 disorder and undermining our efforts there -- and they are
23 probably one of the key reasons that we had such difficulty
24 -- and undermined domestic U.S. will in that regard. But he
25 has also been deeply behind the efforts in Syria and of

1 course in Lebanon. Very brutal approaches in orchestrating
2 and conceiving of sectarian cleansing, barrel bombs, and
3 that type of thing attacking the types of targets and
4 focusing on not going after elements like al Qaeda, Jabhat
5 al-Nusra, and ISIS in order to create this picture of either
6 Assad or the extremists, very Machiavellian in their
7 approach.

8 At the end of the day, Khamenei's access and presence
9 and his underlings in the command centers in the 6th
10 infantry division, in the 8th infantry division with
11 commandos provides them reach and, I think, influence that
12 is going to be far-lasting. And we just do not have that
13 type of presence or capability on the ground. They know how
14 to play in this terrain. We have not.

15 Chairman McCain: Dr. Rand, maybe we could ask -- Dr.
16 Rand, do you --

17 Dr. Rand: It is an interesting question about whether
18 there are any lessons learned from the Tikrit offensive that
19 could be applied by the ISF towards the potential battle in
20 Mosul. This is, I think, what everyone is watching in the
21 media right now. A lot I think will hinge on how the people
22 of Tikrit feel liberated, quote/unquote, by these popular
23 mobilization forces. There were mixed reports in the media
24 about the response by the individual civilians and citizens
25 in Tikrit to the so-called liberators.

1 I think the ISF and, of course, the units that we are
2 training there have learned about this long-term versus
3 short-term tradeoff in terms of you might have a short term
4 free of ISIS, but there could be long-term human rights
5 abuses and other grievances that accrue when you are ruled
6 by groups like the popular mobilization units.

7 Dr. Pollack: Senator, if I could add to this. First
8 of all, I think this is a critical issue. I think that what
9 we are seeing now is very dangerous. I will just simply add
10 to Dr. Rand's point by noting that even if we see short-term
11 success -- and the Iranians are smart about this and the
12 Iraqi allies are smart about this -- they are trying hard to
13 win hearts and minds. But if there is not beyond that a
14 process of reconciliation between Iraqi Sunni and Shia, over
15 the long term this is going to break down and lead to
16 renewed violence.

17 In addition, I think the last part of your question
18 gets at a very important issue, which is that while Iran's
19 influence in Iraq is now deep and wide -- in fact, I would
20 say that it is greater in Iraq than at any time since the
21 rise of the Ottoman Empire. I do not think that that is an
22 exaggeration -- it is not permanent necessarily. And there
23 are Iraqi allies that we might help to push back on them.
24 And the best we have is Haider Abadi. From my conversation
25 with him and from other Iraqis, I am convinced that Prime

1 Minister Abadi does not like the Iranian presence, would
2 like to see it limited, would like to push back on it, but
3 he needs our help. He will be coming to the United States
4 in the middle of next month, and this provides a terrific, a
5 critical opportunity for the United States Government to
6 enable him and empower him to be able to push back on the
7 Iranians. But he needs resources. He needs the support of
8 the United States. He is going to need additional American
9 military and civilian assistance, not necessarily because he
10 has a specific need for anything, but because he needs to
11 demonstrate to his own people and to his rival political
12 leaders that he has the full support of the United States,
13 that the United States is providing resources just as Iran
14 does, and to give him the ability to push back on what the
15 Iranians are doing and demonstrate that there is a way to
16 work with the United States and people do not need to simply
17 work with the Iranians.

18 You are absolutely right, Senator. Going around
19 Baghdad with signs, as Derek Harvey was pointing out, all
20 proclaim Iraq's thanks to Iran for saving them from the ISIS
21 threat. And when you speak to Iraqi leaders, across the
22 board they all believe that it was Iran who saved them in
23 the summer of 2014, not the United States. We have got to
24 reverse that narrative.

25 Dr. Takeyh: I agree with Ken in suggesting that the

1 Iranian influence may be substantial but not enduring. The
2 Iranian model of operation in Iraq is, to some extent, drawn
3 from their experiences in Lebanon in the 1980's where they
4 sort of amalgamated the Shia political community into a
5 single political party and developed a lethal Hezbollah
6 proxy force. That is sort of their model in Iraq. Although
7 I think the Shia community in Iraq differs from that of
8 Lebanon. It has its own sources of emulation. It has its
9 own religious authority. It has its own religious
10 hierarchy, and I think it will be prone to resist the surge
11 of the Iranian influence in that country for all the reasons
12 that Ken suggested and particularly during the time of
13 Maliki, 2007-2009, where there was Iraqi leadership that put
14 Iraqi nationalism above sectarian identities.

15 What I fear is as Iranians are training these Shia
16 militias, they are training them today for domestic contests
17 in Iraq. Are they going to try to use them as they use
18 Hezbollah for transnational purposes, try to deploy them in
19 other places? At this point, I do not think they can
20 because there is so much work to be done in Iraq, but as the
21 ISIS threat diminishes, I think you may see them having
22 plans for those particular militias to operate in Syria and
23 operate beyond the boundaries of Iraq. And that is
24 something that we should be quite concerned about because it
25 is the birth of multiple Hezbollahhs.

1 Chairman McCain: I thank the witnesses.

2 Senator Reed: Dr. Takeyh, you made an allusion in your
3 discussion to our ops negotiations during the Cold War with
4 the Soviets, and you suggested that there were some
5 collateral benefits too. But my sense -- and I will ask you
6 -- is that those negotiations were most specifically focused
7 at reducing nuclear threats. In the context of Iran,
8 regardless of whether there are any collateral benefits, do
9 you believe it would be useful to reach an agreement with
10 the Iranians that can be verifiable that would at least
11 check their present nuclear ambitions?

12 Dr. Takeyh: I think, as was suggested I think by Dr.
13 Rand, the most viable solution to an Iranian nuclear
14 challenge is a negotiated one. But it has to be an
15 agreement that has the right technological attributes, not
16 just limited to verification procedures.

17 The dirty little secret about arms control, Senator
18 Reed, is that infractions of arms control agreements are
19 difficult to prosecute. So you can have a verification
20 regime, but it is very difficult to prosecute infractions
21 from the first arms control negotiated, the Test Ban Treaty
22 by Kennedy, through all the SALT and START agreements to all
23 the framework agreements. So we have to be concerned about
24 the components of this particular agreement. And I would
25 say there are some indications that this is technologically

1 permissive. It excludes some key issues from being
2 considered, and therefore, not any deal is superior to no
3 deal.

4 Senator Reed: No. I think that is a concept that we
5 all embrace. We have to look very carefully at the
6 agreement. But the issue is if we can get an agreement,
7 which is verifiable, which has all the technological issues,
8 that is important in and of itself even if it does not
9 immediately reflect a new Iran with new openings to the West
10 and less enthusiasm about their expansive hegemonic -- I am
11 mispronouncing it, but you get it -- is that fair?

12 Dr. Takeyh: I think historically we have looked at
13 arms control agreement as precursors to better
14 relationships. That is the Americans. Our adversaries have
15 not. The Soviets saw no particular contradiction about
16 signing SALT II and invading Afghanistan.

17 Senator Reed: But nevertheless, we entered these
18 agreements. And I think looking back, it materially
19 increased our security.

20 Dr. Takeyh: I think a good agreement can enhance our
21 security. A deficient agreement can substantially detract
22 from it.

23 Senator Reed: I understand.

24 Any other comments on this, Dr. Pollack?

25 Dr. Pollack: Absolutely, Senator. I think the point

1 that you are making is a very important one because as we
2 assess whatever agreement we may get with the Iranians --
3 and I also have my concerns about some of the rumors
4 swirling around about specifics of it. But nevertheless, we
5 have to assess it based on the real alternatives. If we do
6 not get an agreement with the Iranians, is it likely that we
7 will be able to force them back to the table and get a
8 better one at some later point? I remain very skeptical of
9 that. And I think under those circumstances, the most
10 likely alternatives will either be military action against
11 Iran, which I am on record and I will say again I think
12 would be a mistake, a mistake by us and a mistake by the
13 Israelis. I do not think it will solve the problem. I
14 think it will greatly exacerbate the problem.

15 The alternative is that the Iranian nuclear program is
16 unconstrained, and under those circumstances, I suspect that
17 at some point the Iranians will acquire a nuclear weapon.
18 And if that is the case, I think that we will look back and
19 say the opportunity that we missed was one that we should
20 not have missed.

21 Senator Reed: Quickly, any other comments, because I
22 do have one other line --

23 Mr. Harvey: I think that they are headed to a nuclear
24 weapon with the deal or without the deal. That is just my
25 judgment from everything I have been looking at with this

1 regime unless there is fundamental change in the regime. I
2 am concerned about their long-range missile program, their
3 long-range cruise missiles of about 3,000 miles, and their
4 continued efforts to weaponize warheads. There is only one
5 purpose for these types of long-range weapons and that is to
6 marry them with a nuclear warhead.

7 Senator Reed: Dr. Rand, any comments?

8 Dr. Rand: I already said on the record that I believe
9 negotiations are the best alternative here.

10 I would just add that resuming multilateral sanctions
11 is going to be very, very difficult in the future, and
12 evidence of the previous sanctions regime has shown the
13 importance of multilateral sanctions with bilateral U.S.
14 sanctions to really maximize the coercion.

15 Senator Reed: Let me just turn quickly because all of
16 you, both in the comments about Syria and Iraq, have
17 suggested this is really a political problem. The kinetics,
18 the military operations are critically important to buy
19 time, but we have to have -- and again, this seems deja vu,
20 deja vu. We have to resolve internal conflicts in Iraq
21 between Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. We have to resolve the
22 issue in Syria in terms of a minority Alawite government and
23 a huge majority Sunni population.

24 And it begs the question. You know, let us assume that
25 we are able to dispose of Assad, get him out, we are able to

1 defeat the ISIS threat. The costs, the investment that we
2 are going to have to make in both those countries I would
3 assume would be staggering. So the good news, if we win --
4 and I think this is a question we did not pursue vigorously
5 enough before we went into Iraq -- is what will be the costs
6 in terms of not just resources but commitment of personnel
7 on the ground, capacity building of governments. I mean, I
8 was, like Colonel Harvey, recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.
9 The capacity of ministries to operate is very limited.

10 So just quickly, we are talking about if we are
11 pursuing this sort of strategy -- it is not the quick win,
12 take out these militaries, stick somebody in the government.
13 We are talking about a multi-trillion dollar enterprise over
14 many years. Is that fair?

15 Dr. Takeyh: I think, as again Ken suggested, it will
16 take a long time to reconstitute these nation states. I
17 think Iraq, as bad as it is, is easier than Syria. And I
18 think success of Iraq will contribute to success in Syria.
19 Iraq does have ingredients of being able to reconstitute
20 itself as a unitary state in command of its territory. I
21 think Syria, for all practical purposes, will be very
22 difficult to reconstitute Syria as a nation state with the
23 sort of a central authority that has all the attributes of a
24 national authority that we can think of, protecting its
25 borders, ensuring law and order, commerce, and all that. So

1 Syria is a much substantial challenge than Iraq is. But I
2 think Iraq can contribute to success in Syria.

3 Senator Reed: And just before the others comment, let
4 me inject something else. This would not be a one-
5 dimensional approach by the Department of Defense in terms
6 of -- this is State Department, AID, the Department of
7 Agriculture, the Department of Justice building judicial
8 systems so that if sequestration went into effect, our
9 ability financially to carry out this grand strategy would
10 be basically mooted.

11 Dr. Takeyh: Substantial costs, yes.

12 Senator Reed: Dr. Pollack?

13 Dr. Pollack: Senator, I want to be careful here. As
14 you will remember, I famously went on record saying that I
15 could not imagine that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would
16 wind up costing us trillions of dollars. That is because I
17 also could not imagine that the Bush administration was
18 going to make the parade of mistakes that they made in Iraq,
19 which wound up costing us trillions of dollars.

20 That said, I am very skeptical of the idea that Iraq
21 and Syria will again cost us trillions of dollars. On this,
22 I do disagree with you. It is because I think the
23 experience of Iraq has illustrated that a great deal of what
24 we did in Iraq was probably unnecessary. First, again, so
25 much of what was about combat operations that were largely

1 about cleaning up the mess that we made starting in 2003.
2 If you think about how things might have gone differently if
3 we had done the right thing -- that is, what we did in 2007.
4 If we had done it in 2003, those costs would have been
5 dramatically reduced.

6 In addition, a lot of what we did on the civilian side
7 was not quite germane to the ultimate solution of the
8 problem. I want to be careful there. It did buy us Iraq's
9 goodwill after having made so many mistakes, but at the end
10 of the day, fixing sanitation in Ramadi was not critical to
11 stabilizing the country. What was critical to stabilizing
12 the country -- and incidentally, the historical record of
13 other civil wars makes this clear -- was, again, securing
14 the population, forging a new power sharing arrangement
15 among the warring factions and ensuring that there was some
16 entity that can create trust over the long term. That is
17 what we need to be going for in Syria. That is what we need
18 to be going for in Iraq. As Dr. Takeyh has pointed out, as
19 I have said as well, Iraq is going to be somewhat easier
20 than Syria because we have got some basis to do that in
21 Iraq. But nevertheless, this is mostly about the difficulty
22 of creating those processes, none of which ought to be that
23 expensive. The big expensive piece for us will be the
24 military piece, which is absolutely necessary in both Iraq
25 and Syria, and some degree of civilian assistance again, as

1 I said, mostly to empower the kinds of actors that we want
2 to help. But the lesson we should learn from Iraq is that a
3 lot of the money that we wound up spending on Iraqi civilian
4 programs really was not a key contributor to what actually
5 created stability there in 2007 to 2009.

6 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I think I would like to point out one
7 thing, and that is in the Gulf, in Jordan and Morocco where
8 we did not see the Arab Spring, we have fairly authoritarian
9 monarchial governments that are perceived for the most part
10 to be legitimate by their populations. I would be very
11 careful about what we are seeking in Syria as far as interim
12 steps towards some sort of political solution there.

13 What we need is capable, possibly authoritarian
14 transitional, technical approaches there, bottom-up
15 approaches to build the community of interests at the
16 provincial level. Top down is a problem, and we have to
17 make sure that we align it to the political-cultural dynamic
18 of Syria, and that is going to take some hard looking at the
19 demographics and what makes sense politically, tribally, et
20 cetera because there are a lot of bridges that we could take
21 advantage of once we got to the point where we are actually
22 talking about what would it look like.

23 I think we can diffuse costs regionally and
24 internationally because there is interest. Iraq is very
25 much a different story because they have got tremendous

1 wealth. Syria does not have that kind of wealth.

2 And I am doubtful when you look at intervention -- and
3 I teach a class on intervention -- I think we do have to be
4 humble about what it is that we can do. Our leadership is
5 absolutely critical in shaping it, but at the end of the
6 day, our ability to bring the interagency together in a
7 whole-of-government approach, to have everything prioritized
8 and to have the executive committing political capital to
9 achieve something and explain it to the American public, I
10 have doubts about our ability to do those things in order to
11 achieve something on the ground there.

12 Senator Reed: Dr. Rand, quickly please.

13 Dr. Rand: I would just add one quick additional point,
14 which is the role of allies in the reconstruction or the
15 future of Syria and Iraq. As I mentioned, this coalition
16 has preliminarily had some success in moving these countries
17 to work in sync. And as we know, before this coalition, for
18 many years in the Syrian conflict, a lot of the Gulf
19 countries were funding opposition forces out of their own
20 bank accounts. So it is far better to have a unified,
21 coherent strategy in Syria, and there are resources but they
22 just have to be moved through a coalition and through
23 leadership. And I believe the U.S. can leverage its
24 leadership role to gain allied support for both countries.

25 Senator Reed: Thank you very much.

1 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Dr. Takeyh and Dr. Pollack, you heard in Senator
3 McCain's opening statement the quote by David Petraeus. Do
4 you generally agree with General Petraeus in that statement?

5 Dr. Takeyh: Yes.

6 Dr. Pollack: Yes.

7 Mr. Harvey: Yes, Senator.

8 Chairman McCain: Do you generally agree, Dr. Rand?

9 Dr. Rand: As I said, I think there are different
10 sources of the threats.

11 Senator Inhofe: Not much has been said about the
12 negotiations that are taking place right now, and I will get
13 back to that in a minute after asking this initial question.
14 But when we had what I thought was really a great speech
15 that Netanyahu made when he was over here and was talking
16 about the negotiations, what are your feelings about his --
17 how close to target was he on the negotiations specifically
18 when he had made the joint speech to our House and the
19 Senate?

20 Dr. Takeyh: I think actually if you look at the
21 content of the speech, the prime minister moved from his
22 previous positions of total dismantlement of the Iranian
23 nuclear program in a pragmatic way. He is often accused of
24 being a maximalist and so on. He actually adjusted his own
25 previous prohibitions in order to come closer to what the 5

1 Plus 1 are negotiating. And he established some benchmarks,
2 namely the scope of the Iranian nuclear program should be
3 conditioned on its behavior in the region, terrorism, and so
4 on. I do not think that is what is happening in the
5 negotiations. They are maintaining them pretty much on the
6 nuclear issue. So in that sense, his attempt to link Iran's
7 nuclear ambitions to its regional ambitions is not something
8 that is being upheld by the 5 Plus 1 in their negotiations.
9 It may be sensible, but it is not happening.

10 Senator Inhofe: Dr. Pollack, I am just talking about
11 his statement to the joint session, not since the election
12 and some of the things that are perhaps a little bit
13 different. What do you think about his analysis at that
14 time?

15 Dr. Pollack: I think the prime minister exaggerated a
16 number of different points, and while again I think there is
17 truth in logic in them, we also need to be asking the
18 question what is practical. As Dr. Takeyh just pointed out,
19 I think that the idea of linking the nuclear deal to Iranian
20 behavior elsewhere is problematic. And here I would suggest
21 that I think that both critics on the left and right are
22 making too much of the deal.

23 I actually would suggest that we need to think about
24 the deal exactly the way the Iranians are. The Iranians are
25 portraying this deal as a simple transaction, limits on

1 their nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. And
2 I think they have made it very clear they are not interested
3 in anything beyond that. Certainly the Supreme Leader is
4 not. I am sure that Foreign Minister Zarif would love a
5 rapprochement, but I do not think that that is in the offing
6 because of the remarks of the Supreme Leader.

7 I think that we need to do the same. I think that we
8 need to recognize that there is utility, exactly as Senator
9 Reed's questions raised, in having a deal that will provide
10 some degree of limits on Iran's nuclear ambitions. I will
11 not disagree with Colonel Harvey that I think the Iranians
12 would like at some point to have a nuclear weapon, but I
13 think that they have made the decision that they do not need
14 an actual weapon at this point in time. And what I am
15 looking for is a deal that reinforces that inhibition for as
16 long as possible. If that is the case, I think that that
17 does remove a very important element of the problems in the
18 Middle East including those faced by Israel. But we should
19 not assume that our problems with Iran go away once the
20 nuclear deal is signed, and I think it a mistake for us to
21 be calibrating our responses elsewhere in the region under
22 the assumption that we are going to have a kinder, gentler
23 Iran after a nuclear deal.

24 Senator Inhofe: Yes. Before this hearing, I mentioned
25 to you I was going to ask the question about the prediction

1 that was made back in 2007 that by 2015 that Iran would have
2 a weapon and a delivery system. Here it is 2015. And now
3 you are saying you are not convinced that they ultimately
4 want the weapon. Is this what you are saying?

5 Dr. Pollack: No. What I am saying is I think they do
6 ultimately want the weapon. I think that they have decided
7 in the short-term not to get it immediately because we have
8 created very important disincentives for them to do so.

9 Senator Inhofe: Do you think our intelligence back in
10 2007 was accurate?

11 Dr. Pollack: I do not think that it was wrong. As an
12 old intel analyst, I have seen this movie any number of
13 times, Senator. I can remember predictions about when Iraq
14 would get a nuclear weapon, and they keep moving and they
15 keep moving. And we need to assume that the Iranians have
16 some kind of a program behind the scenes that has probably
17 been making progress.

18 Senator Inhofe: Well, the same with North Korea and
19 others. We are always making these predictions.

20 Dr. Takeyh, what do you think about what they said back
21 in 2007 and their intentions, and how close are they today?

22 Dr. Takeyh: The intentions of the Iranians to have --

23 Senator Inhofe: By 2015, they would have a weapon and
24 a delivery system.

25 Dr. Takeyh: I think to some extent, the fact that that

1 objective was not that -- the timeline was not met is a
2 testimony to success of export control, sabotage, and
3 sanctions, and what the international community has managed
4 to do in terms of imposing costs on the Iranian calculation.

5 The Islamic Republic deals more in nuclear weapons. To
6 2 weeks ago, their former negotiator, who is the current
7 representative of the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National
8 Security Council, Saeed Habibi, said in an interview in a
9 talk at the university that Americans have all these weapons
10 and they are objecting to the fact that we want to get
11 enough material for one bomb. That was 2 weeks ago. He is
12 not a former official. He is the current representative of
13 the Supreme Leader to the Supreme National Security Council
14 that makes all the decisions regarding nuclear strategy, as
15 well as domestic issues.

16 No, the question is not intentions. The question is
17 can the international community provide obstacles to their
18 intentions. And a deal can impose restraints, but it can
19 also serve as a pathway. There are problems in terms of a
20 sunset clause, upon expiration of which Iran can have an
21 industrial-sized nuclear program, similar to Japan and the
22 Netherlands. That is a dash to a bomb. There is a problem
23 about the kind of technologies that they will have as a
24 residual program. There are problems in terms of other
25 aspects of this deal. So a deal can be both a restraint

1 that delays the program, but also a pathway that makes the
2 march toward that weapon more legal, legitimate, and
3 therefore effective. So it is illegal and dangerous, legal
4 and longer.

5 Senator Inhofe: Well, I am running out of time here,
6 and I wanted to get to what is happening right now in Yemen
7 because it has been a strategy that the President has talked
8 about for a long time. We do airpower. Then we let the
9 other guys get on the ground. In fact, this is a direct
10 quote. He said, this strategy of taking out terrorists who
11 threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines,
12 is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen. Any
13 comments on Yemen?

14 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I think one of the issues we have had
15 is focusing almost exclusively on a counterterrorism
16 approach in, say, the horn of Africa and in Yemen and not
17 looking at some of the wider opportunities, more
18 opportunities we have to engage and build up security forces
19 and partnerships in a way to solidify governments and
20 address some of the other issues that we could have earlier.

21 I think right now the problem in Yemen for us is where
22 are they headed. It is a large population, about 30
23 million. It is radicalized. You have got the Islamic
24 State, al Qaeda, Houthis backed by Shia there. It is not
25 really a strategic threat to us from the Bab-el-Mandeb

1 straits, but from a Saudi perspective in the Gulf, it is
2 very, very concerning because of the radicalization and the
3 terrorism that can emanate from there.

4 Senator Inhofe: Yes. Mr. Chairman, I am going to get
5 some questions for the record, so I assume you are going to
6 leave that open because I think it is significant. We have
7 all this talent here. We need to extract as much as we can.
8 Thank you.

9 Chairman McCain: I would like to ask Dr. Rand if she
10 has additional response to Senator Inhofe's question.

11 Dr. Rand: I think it is an excellent question and it
12 is alarming what has happened in the past 2 months. The
13 long-term solution or the short-term solution really is a
14 combination of counterterrorism and political strategy that
15 involves governance and negotiations. And the national
16 dialogue was occurring between 2012 and 2014 in Yemen and
17 had international buy-in and had neighbor buy-in. The
18 challenge for the U.S. is really the risk assessment of
19 placing diplomats and other civilians on the ground to work
20 this process. The same reason why the U.S. security asking
21 for the embassy to withdraw -- other Western embassies have
22 withdrawn because of security conditions. So it is a
23 dilemma. The solution is a political, civilian assistance
24 mission, but the tactics to get there requires a risk and
25 that is the calculation the U.S. Government has to make.

1 Chairman McCain: Dr. Pollack?

2 Dr. Pollack: I just wanted to add. Thank you,
3 Senator.

4 First, Senator, when I heard the President make that
5 statement, I absolutely cringed. It is the worst way that
6 we can handle these situations. And as I said, to think
7 that you can simply fight terrorism by killing terrorists is
8 an absolute mistake, and I would hope that we would have
9 learned that after 14 or 40 years of trying exactly that
10 approach and failing so miserably.

11 In the case of Yemen, I think that there were other
12 alternatives available in the past, but now we need to
13 accept the fact Yemen is in civil war. It is not slipping
14 into civil war. It is not on the brink of civil war. This
15 is civil war. This what it looks like.

16 And to go back to my conversation with Senator Reed
17 just a minute ago, solving civil wars is not impossible, but
18 it is not easy. It is not simple. It is not fast, and it
19 can be very expensive. And while I think that the American
20 interests in Iraq and by extension Syria are significant
21 enough to merit that kind of an effort there, as President
22 Obama has signed us up for, I think rightly so, I am hard-
23 pressed to imagine that we are going to make a similar
24 effort in Yemen, which does not engage our interests the way
25 that Iraq and Syria do, especially when we are making

1 exactly that kind of an effort in Iraq and Syria.

2 So I think we are going to have to rethink Yemen
3 entirely, and to simply say that we need to come up with
4 better governance or we need to provide for negotiations,
5 this is not going to work. The history of civil wars makes
6 it very clear it is not going to work.

7 And I will simply say two things about Yemen. One, we
8 are going to have to contain the Yemeni civil war as best we
9 can, despite the fact that the historical evidence
10 demonstrates that it is exceptionally difficult to contain
11 the spillover of civil wars. And second, one of the most
12 important things that I would argue we need to do is to keep
13 our allies, the Saudis, out. The Saudis have an obsession
14 with Yemen and with the notion that Yemeni internal
15 instability will affect their own. It has not despite the
16 fact that Yemen has been unstable for 50 years. But the
17 Saudis cannot help themselves, and I think one of the
18 greatest dangers is a Saudi Arabia that is itself facing a
19 number of internal challenges will overstretch its resources
20 by getting deeply involved in a Yemeni quagmire.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Donnelly, the Saudis look at
22 the map and look at where Yemen is situated. I share their
23 concerns.

24 Senator Donnelly?

25 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 In regards to Iraq, we are trying to push ISIS back and
2 trying to enlist the help of the Sunni moderates. How do
3 the Sunni moderates help when it is primarily Iranian Shiite
4 militias? And so you are asking them to fight other Sunnis
5 and stand with Shiite militias that have attacked their own
6 families over the years.

7 Dr. Pollack: If I can begin, Senator, I think this is
8 the critical question facing Iraq and our efforts there. It
9 is why we need to recognize that the key obstacle to be
10 overcome is forging a new power sharing arrangement between
11 Sunni and Shia. And unfortunately, what I consistently hear
12 from senior U.S. Government officials is the sense that this
13 is somehow an academic exercise that can follow the
14 successful conclusion of the fighting. It cannot. It is a
15 necessary precondition.

16 If Sunnis do not know what a future Iraq is going to
17 look like, if they do not know what the Iraq they are
18 fighting for is going to -- how it is going to treat them,
19 if they do not know what role they are going to play, what
20 guarantees, what rights they are going to have in it, they
21 are not going to be willing to fight for that Iraq against
22 what they see as a Shia-dominated government that has in the
23 past oppressed them. We can make short-term gains. They
24 might be able to retake Tikrit. They may even be able to
25 take Mosul. The danger is that in doing so without that

1 umbrella power sharing arrangement that will make all Sunnis
2 comfortable that the future Iraq is one that they want to be
3 part of, they will go back to resistance. And at some
4 point, they will probably go back to ISIS or al Qaeda or
5 some other vicious Sunni group which they do not
6 particularly like, but they see as a critical ally in a
7 fight against a vicious Sunni government.

8 That is how ISIS came back in in 2013 because they saw
9 Nouri al-Maliki rip up the hard-won power sharing
10 arrangement that we forged in 2008-2009. If we do not have
11 that this time around, all of the military gains are likely
12 to prove ephemeral, and they are likely to feed a worse
13 civil war in Iraq in the future rather than ending the
14 current one.

15 Mr. Harvey: Sir, the Sunni leadership is fractured.
16 If you look for legitimate leaders, they are at the
17 provincial and sub-provincial level. In Baghdad, you have
18 real challenges with Sunni coherence and engagement and
19 representation and engagement despite the MOD being a Sunni,
20 for example.

21 Senator Donnelly: Well, it seems to me, to put it in
22 more basic terms for right here, it is like, okay, these are
23 my really bad cousins, and I do not like them at all. But
24 you are asking for me to join the people I really do not
25 like who live in the next town over to go and fight my own

1 cousins. My job is to clean up my cousins. It is not their
2 job to come in and clean them up.

3 So until we figure out the Sunni moderate piece, does
4 it not make it extraordinarily difficult to have success?
5 And here we are hoping to move out ISIS, and in return, we
6 are looking at Soleimani with Shiite militias. And you go,
7 how is that a better choice?

8 Mr. Harvey: Senator, for the last year we have known,
9 for the most part, who the moderate Sunni Arab provincial
10 and sub-tribal leaders are in these provinces.

11 Senator Donnelly: Right.

12 Mr. Harvey: We have not been able to deliver. We do
13 not have a presence. There is no honest broker on the
14 ground that can help build those bridges in an effective
15 way. There has been empty promise after empty promise from
16 the prime minister's office and others from MOD that they
17 are going to provide weapons and arms and munitions
18 effectively to the different tribes that have taken up the
19 fight against ISIS, and it has not been forthcoming in any
20 significant way.

21 Senator Donnelly: Let me ask you this. Abadi may be
22 trying, but is he not still surrounded by so many of
23 Maliki's people and those are the ones who are still pulling
24 the strings on decision after decision?

25 Dr. Pollack: I might put it slightly differently,

1 Senator. I do not think you are wrong about that, but I
2 just might phrase it differently, which is that he does not
3 have his own people. This is one of the biggest problems.
4 When you meet with Prime Minister Abadi and the people
5 around him, he has got one or two guys -- and I am not
6 exaggerating -- one or two guys who he relies on for almost
7 everything. And then those people have --

8 Senator Donnelly: Let me ask you this. What would you
9 recommend we do there at this point?

10 Dr. Pollack: First point. I think that Derek is
11 absolutely right about the fragmentation of the Sunni
12 community, but I do not think that that is something that
13 either Abadi or the Sunnis can overcome themselves. We are
14 going to have to do it. This is actually what we did in
15 2008 where then-Ambassador Crocker became the Sunni
16 surrogate in the conversations with the Shia. I think the
17 same thing needs to happen this time.

18 Second point --

19 Senator Donnelly: Do you think that the Iranian
20 nuclear discussions are hanging us up in Iraq?

21 Dr. Pollack: I think unfortunately they are, and I do
22 not think they should. That was my response --

23 Senator Donnelly: I am sorry.

24 Dr. Pollack: -- to Senator Inhofe's question before.
25 I think that we need to regard this as a transactional

1 thing, and we need to set that aside as --

2 Senator Donnelly: One is here. One is here. You do
3 each deal --

4 Dr. Pollack: Correct, because that is how the Iranians
5 treat it. And the Iraqis could not care less about what
6 deal we sign with the Iranians. They want to know what the
7 heck we are going to do in Iraq and why are we not doing
8 more to help them, to help the Iraqis who would like to push
9 Iran back and move in the direction we would like them to.

10 Point number two is we need to be in a position to
11 empower people like Prime Minister Abadi, both helping him
12 create the infrastructure to manage the Iraqi Government,
13 but also giving him the resources to take action and to
14 demonstrate to other Iraqis, who quite frankly are mostly on
15 the fence, that there is a reason for coming with him and
16 the American side and not simply --

17 Senator Donnelly: I am out of time. But I just want
18 to ask you real quick. How do you empower the Sunni
19 moderates at this point and give them the space to do
20 something?

21 Mr. Harvey: I think part of the solution is you have
22 to have enough U.S. force presence, credibility, and
23 leadership on the ground with a sense that the U.S. will be
24 committed to be there over the longer haul. It requires not
25 only a CT presence, but it requires some attack aviation,

1 logistics aviation, force protection so that we can actually
2 move around the battle space and do the engagement and help
3 build these political bridges and do the same things we did
4 between the Baghdad government and these leaders in these
5 provinces in the past. And you have to have a certain
6 amount of presence on the ground to do that. We do not have
7 that presence.

8 We also need to bring in people that have the
9 experience and the ongoing relationships with these people.
10 There are many that have those relationships, but they need
11 to be identified and selected and brought in to help with
12 this effort.

13 Senator Donnelly: Thank you very much.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Sessions?

16 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

17 Colonel Harvey, I think you just gave the only real
18 answer, solution in Iraq that we have heard. We have got a
19 lot of problems, but that is the solution I think.

20 Dr. Pollack, you said problems the long in making will
21 be long in solving. Just briefly, would you say with the
22 spasm of extremism and violence and sectarianism in the
23 Middle East that we have to have a long-term policy -- I
24 mean 30, 50, 60 years -- to try to be a positive force in
25 bringing some stability to that region? History tells us

1 those spates of violence tend to cool off, but often decades
2 in cooling off.

3 Dr. Pollack: Yes.

4 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

5 You said I believe also that the word is getting out
6 that Iran saved Iraq. I have a vivid memory of the
7 ambassador to the United States from Iraq being pounded by a
8 juvenile CNN reporter about why he was taking assistance
9 from Iran. He said we want assistance from the United
10 States. This is who we have stood with for a long time. We
11 want to be with them, but we face an existential threat, and
12 we will have to take the assistance wherever we get it.

13 And Senator McCain warned in 2011 -- I do not want to
14 be blamed again, but we made a lot of mistakes before 2011.
15 We made some after 2011. And I really, really, really
16 believe going to virtually zero presence in Iraq was a
17 colossal disaster. Go back and read Senator McCain's
18 warnings about what would happen if we did that, and it has
19 happened exactly like he said to the great tragedy.

20 Now, Colonel Harvey, General Stewart, the Defense
21 Intelligence officer who was there during the Awakening in
22 Fallujah and that area, acknowledged in this committee that
23 if we embedded with the Iraqi forces instead of allowing the
24 Iranians to be embedded with them, they fight better. They
25 have more confidence, that they feel like the operations are

1 better planned, that they have air support and smart
2 weaponry that can help them if they get in trouble. Do you
3 think even a small number of special forces embedded with
4 the Iraqi military forces, if we had done that, as they had
5 to, on Tikrit could have made a positive difference?

6 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I do think it could make a
7 substantial difference. One of my concerns right now,
8 though, is that we are training a lot of Shia militia that
9 are being integrated into some of the training programs
10 separate and apart from the training that is going on for
11 Pesh and the Sunnis out in Anbar at Al Asad. And I think
12 that is a concern for me.

13 The presence of the U.S. at headquarters at the
14 division and lower would be much appreciated. I know that
15 there is real frustration by Iraqi commanders that they have
16 Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq or you have got Badr Corps or you have got
17 Kata'ib Hezbollah, Shia militia members coordinating their
18 operations in their headquarters. And a U.S. counterbalance
19 to that would be very welcomed. It would improve their
20 efficiency, their capability, their confidence.

21 Senator Sessions: Well, General Petraeus said I think
22 at the same part of the remarks that Senator McCain quoted
23 -- said, quote, as for the United States' role, could all of
24 this have been averted if we had kept 10,000 troops here? I
25 honestly do not know. I certainly wish we could have tested

1 the proposition. Close quote. Do you agree with that?

2 Mr. Harvey: I think it would have been very helpful,
3 sir, but it requires political engagement and a commitment
4 to achieving the objectives that we have laid out --

5 Senator Sessions: But, Colonel Harvey --

6 Mr. Harvey: If you do not know where you are going,
7 any road will get you there, and I am afraid that we have
8 not known where we are going with Iraq.

9 Senator Sessions: I would certainly agree with that.
10 But in 2011 we had somehow with American influence
11 negotiated an understanding with the Shia and the Sunni and
12 the Kurds. The country, as the President acknowledged, was
13 on a sound path. When we left, it began to fall apart. We
14 can blame Maliki if we want to, which is ultimately the
15 problem, but maybe if we had kept our influence there and
16 they knew we were going to be there giving them confidence,
17 perhaps they would have stayed the course with the progress
18 that had been made by 2011.

19 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I think that it would have made a
20 difference. It depends upon how you act on the information.
21 We had significant early and often warning about the Islamic
22 State emerging threat going back to late 2012, 2013.
23 Clearly DIA Director General Flynn was highlighting that to
24 the different committees. Ambassador Brett McGurk was
25 highlighting the deterioration of the situation. Even

1 though you have warning, though, you have to have someone
2 who is going to act on it and not wish that Iraq would be in
3 the rear view mirror.

4 Senator Sessions: Well, it is certainly a complicated
5 situation, and it will remain that way for 30-plus years.
6 Hopefully not.

7 With regard to the -- my time is about out, but I will
8 just say, Dr. Takeyh, that I do not think any agreement is
9 good in itself, as you have indicated. If it leads us to
10 have a misunderstanding about what likely is going to occur
11 in the future, that would be bad. If Iran continues to
12 maintain its determination to go forward with a nuclear
13 weapon, if we reach an agreement, our ability to sanctions
14 and other actions could weaken and could also cause us to
15 lose credibility in the region.

16 Senator McCain had a group of observers of smart people
17 tell us that they think Iran has no intention whatsoever of
18 slowing down its action and that negotiations are simply a
19 way to get relief from the sanctions as they continue their
20 plot to go forward with a nuclear weapon.

21 Dr. Takeyh: Well, I absolutely agree with that,
22 Senator. And I think in response to Senator Reed's
23 question, I suggested a good agreement is a nice thing to
24 have, but a deficient agreement that has residual enrichment
25 capacity, a limited sunset clause, does not include the

1 ballistic missiles, does not discuss previous military
2 dimensions of the program, upon which a viable verification
3 regime can only be built on -- even a 1-year breakout period
4 I do not believe is sufficient. So I think if an agreement
5 does not cover all these issues and all these concerns in a
6 real viable way, then I am not quite sure if any agreement
7 is suitable.

8 Senator Sessions: Thank you.

9 Chairman McCain: Senator King?

10 Senator King: Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank you
11 particularly for this hearing but the series of hearings
12 that we have had. Abraham Lincoln once said if he was given
13 an hour to split a cord of wood, he would spend the first 15
14 minutes sharpening his axe. And that is what we are doing
15 here, is trying to think a bit instead of just doing. And I
16 commend you for that. In fact, this hearing has helped me
17 to think through.

18 Dr. Pollack, I do not know if there is a question
19 buried in here. I will it to you to find it.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Senator King: But it seems to me that what we are
22 seeing -- you mentioned the phrase, "I've seen this movie
23 before." And we have seen this movie, the whole movie
24 before. It was called Europe from 1500 to 1950. We have
25 got six historic trends that I can see: tribalism to

1 nationalism; autocracy to some kind of democracy; economic
2 democracy; number four, corrupt, incompetent government to
3 reasonably competent, non-corrupt government. And then that
4 is European history. And then we have got Sunni and Shia
5 divisions that go back 1,200 years. We have got a new
6 division in there. We have got radical Shia. We have
7 really got three strains now that are contending. And then
8 on top of everything else, we have got Persian-Arab, which
9 goes back to Darius the Great. So we are dealing with an
10 unbelievably complex series of historic trends that have, in
11 fact, played out with catastrophic wars, civil wars. And on
12 top of all that, we are watching this play out in a very
13 brief period of time with 21st century weapons.

14 Am I accurately reflecting all these trends that are
15 occurring all at once?

16 Dr. Pollack: Senator, I find myself in complete
17 agreement with you, and it goes back to my answer to --

18 Senator King: That is why I addressed my question --
19 [Laughter.]

20 Dr. Pollack: And I think you have also got a very good
21 model there because we do need to remember. We sometimes
22 forget this. We look at Europe now. It is wonderful. We
23 all like to go on vacation --

24 Senator King: We had a world war 60 years ago.

25 Dr. Pollack: Exactly. And as you point out, for 500

1 years Europe was the worst continent on the planet by far.
2 Every horrific thing that mankind has ever experienced, it
3 experienced in Europe and to the worst extent possible.

4 Senator King: And we had a little matter of a civil
5 war here.

6 Dr. Pollack: A little matter of that.

7 But inherent in that comment, it also gets to the
8 importance of a solution and thinking long-term about it
9 because when we finally did in 1945 decide, you know, what,
10 we cannot allow Europe to continue to create these problems
11 for the world and for us and we actually got serious about
12 it and moved Europe toward a process of reform, securing the
13 area, and pushing the governments toward democratization, it
14 took 40 years but it succeeded.

15 We did the same thing in East Asia. We started to do
16 the same thing beginning in the 1980's in Latin America.
17 And East Asia and Latin America are both moving very
18 smartly. And you and I can both remember times when we had
19 horrible, vicious wars, ethnic cleansing, et cetera in both
20 East Asia and in Latin America. Again, it took the United
21 States saying we are going to get serious. We are going to
22 make a long-term investment. We are going to move these
23 countries toward reform.

24 That is what is lacking in the Middle East. We have
25 never been willing to do so. We keep just trying to slap a

1 band-aid on the problem and hope it goes away. It does not.
2 It gets worse and worse.

3 Senator King: And military is part of it, but the
4 underlying dynamic is better lives for people.

5 Dr. Pollack: Exactly. It is political. It is
6 economic. It is social.

7 Senator King: A question that sort of comes out of
8 this -- Mr. Harvey, you have had a lot of experience in
9 Iraq. Can Iraq be one country? The term "inclusiveness"
10 comes trippingly to the tongue. But are you ever going to
11 have Sunnis and Shias, given the historic division, able to
12 live in the same country without the kind of slights,
13 oppression, discrimination that keep raising their head and,
14 in fact, are raising their head right now in the attempt to
15 retake Tikrit?

16 Mr. Harvey: Sir, it is very difficult when you have
17 the extremes dominating the debate and shaping the security
18 environment the way they are. But at its core, I think
19 there are a lot of reasons to be optimistic about the
20 continued possibility of a unified Iraq. There are very
21 good reasons for the Kurdish regional government to stay
22 aligned with Baghdad. First and foremost is they are
23 significantly better off on a per capita basis getting part
24 of that Iraqi oil wealth. And what they would have on their
25 own is dwarfed by what they could get on a per capita basis

1 out of Baghdad.

2 Similarly with the Sunni Arabs who do not have that
3 type of wealth -- a potential in Anbar, but it is still a
4 problem for them. But at a human level, there has always
5 been a great deal of interconnectedness. Shia and Sunni
6 tribes' intermarriage and those types of things. It has
7 been the breakdown of civil order, the fracturing of the
8 normalcy there, and the economic dislocation, and the fear
9 that penetrates every part of that society about what their
10 future looks like, which causes people to align on a
11 sectarian basis right now.

12 First and foremost, security. Give them hope with
13 political agreements. It takes leadership. I do not think
14 they can get there on their own. It takes U.S. engagement,
15 in partnership with others in the region, but that is easier
16 said than done.

17 Senator King: Abadi is the key right now. Abadi is
18 the key.

19 Mr. Harvey: I think he is essentially a good man but,
20 as I said in my opening comment, fairly isolated and weak at
21 this point in time.

22 Dr. Takeyh: Can I just say one thing? Every time Iraq
23 goes through one of its tribulations, there are arguments
24 made on this partition. A partition of Iraq in three states
25 does not enhance the stability of the Middle East. It does

1 not enhance the stability of that subregion of the Middle
2 East because it makes all --

3 Senator King: I was not making a --

4 Dr. Takeyh: No, no, no. I understand that.

5 Senator King: I was just trying to make a pragmatic --

6 Dr. Takeyh: There is a resilience to the Iraqi
7 national identity that has survived all these sectarian
8 conflicts. I think for a lot of reasons the Iraqis would
9 want to maintain in a unitary state that has some degree of
10 autonomy for the promises and the regional parliaments and
11 so forth. But I do think that there is a history of Iraq as
12 a unitary state with --

13 Senator King: Only since 1918 or 1921 or 1922.

14 Dr. Takeyh: But there is an Iraqi national identity.
15 And as Ken suggested, it did emerge in 2007-2009 to
16 supersede some of the sectarian concerns.

17 Senator King: A quick question, Dr. Takeyh, a follow-
18 up on Iran. You recently had a very interesting article
19 with Michael Hayden about the technology of a violation and
20 this idea of a 1-year breakout. Once you got to all the
21 steps of reporting and verifying and everything else, it
22 comes down to a couple of months. Could you articulate
23 that? I think that is a very important point.

24 Dr. Takeyh: I want to, first of all, suggest that any
25 arms control agreement -- and the history of arms control

1 agreements suggest it -- is difficult to redress violations
2 of that agreement. Now, that was true about SALT II. That
3 is true about ABM. We were in a process of trying to
4 adjudicate --

5 Senator King: The INF --

6 Dr. Takeyh: The INF agreement. That is right.

7 There have been -- the notion of a 1-year breakout time
8 suggests that 1 year is a sufficient time for the
9 international community to come to terms on coercive
10 measures to compel Iranians to stop is a tough case to make
11 because all the agencies of the U.S. Government have to
12 agree. The IAEA has to begin a conversation with --

13 Senator King: The Germans, the Chinese, the Indians.

14 Dr. Takeyh: Well, first is the Americans agreeing
15 among themselves that there is a violation. And there is
16 going to be investment in this particular agreement. Then
17 the IAEA will begin a conversation with the Iranians about
18 those infractions, and they may have some satisfactory
19 resolution or as Parchin military base has indicated, they
20 may not.

21 Then it comes to the Security Council for contemplation
22 of coercive measures to be implemented, and they usually
23 begin with economic sanctions if there is an agreement among
24 the 5 Plus 1. And they may not be because of the Russians
25 and Chinese, not to mention Germany and others. And then

1 you can apply that.

2 Now, can an American President avoid all that and use
3 force? Technically yes. Has it happened historically? No.
4 And in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, all American
5 intelligence agencies are going to be more hesitant about
6 WMD violations. The international community is going to be
7 more skeptical, and any American President is likely to be
8 more cautious.

9 Senator King: So one of the things we should look at
10 in this agreement is the bureaucracy of enforcement.

11 Dr. Takeyh: I think inherently it is difficult to
12 enforce violations of an agreement particularly if they are
13 incremental. Let me give you three examples of violations.

14 Senator King: I am afraid I am out of time. But that
15 does not mean you do not try to get an agreement, but maybe
16 this is an aspect of it we should focus upon.

17 Dr. Takeyh: That is right.

18 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator Graham?

20 Senator Graham: Let us make this relevant to the
21 American people. From our own national security interest, a
22 Sunni-Shia conflict of great depth and breadth is not good
23 for us. Do we all agree with that?

24 If you could, Dr. Rand, in 30 seconds, tell me why.

25 Dr. Rand: Sure. A great regional divide that is

1 sectarian in nature will play out in the worst possible way.
2 We are seeing it in Syria and Iraq. You see it in Lebanon,
3 elsewhere. So it will lead to conflict. It will lead to
4 de-democratization. It will lead to weakening of states and
5 leadership and the inability of central states to address
6 the economic and political demands of their people.

7 Senator Graham: Well, it lead to higher gas prices?

8 Dr. Rand: Potentially. It depends which way the
9 conflicts go.

10 Senator Graham: Will it make it harder to do business
11 throughout the world?

12 Dr. Rand: Potentially.

13 Senator Graham: When it comes to Syria, do any of you
14 believe we have a plan in place that will destroy ISIL in
15 Syria in the next 3 years?

16 Mr. Harvey: There is no plan in place that would
17 achieve that in the next 3 years, sir, in my view.

18 Senator Graham: Does everyone agree with that?

19 Dr. Pollack: I might take slight exception. I think
20 that the plan laid out by Chairman Dempsey before this
21 committee theoretically could do so in about 2 to 5 years.
22 But it has to be properly resourced, and it has to be
23 properly implemented. And there I do not see --

24 Senator Graham: On a scale of 1 to 10, what is the
25 likelihood of this plan working in the next 3 years?

1 Dr. Pollack: Again, Senator, that depends on how well
2 the United States pursues it. Given what we are doing now,
3 I would give it about a 2.

4 Senator Graham: All right. What happens the day
5 after? Well, do you all agree that no Arab army, if we
6 could ever form one, is going to go into Syria and just
7 fight ISIL and leave Assad in charge?

8 Dr. Pollack: I would completely with that, Senator.

9 Senator Graham: Does everybody agree with that?

10 Dr. Pollack: I think it is a complete mistake to think
11 that we can build a Syrian opposition army that will only
12 fight Daesh. They will not.

13 Senator Graham: Does everybody agree with that?

14 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I also think that we need the Turkish
15 Government on side for that.

16 Senator Graham: Right, and they are not going to get
17 involved if you leave Assad in power.

18 Mr. Harvey: Absolutely correct.

19 Senator Graham: Because you are giving Syria to the
20 Iranians if you leave Assad in power. Right?

21 Mr. Harvey: For the long haul, yes, sir.

22 Senator Graham: Now, from an American point of view,
23 if Syria is not resolved in the next 3 to 5 years, do you
24 worry about our allies in Lebanon and Jordan?

25 Dr. Pollack: Yes.

1 Senator Graham: Could they be one of the victims of a
2 protracted civil war in Syria?

3 Dr. Pollack: Absolutely. They are already suffering
4 from the spillover of that civil war.

5 Dr. Takeyh: And I think it leads to radicalization of
6 the Sunni community. Syria is a great incubator for
7 radicalizing the Sunni community because of the level of
8 slaughter there, which destabilizes all the other places,
9 particularly the neighboring countries.

10 Senator Graham: Do you agree that the terrorist
11 organizations that are operating in Syria and Iraq, Yemen --
12 if they are not dealt with more effectively, we could get
13 hit here at home? The likelihood of an attack is going up
14 on the homeland.

15 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I think there intent and there is
16 capability to strike not only the Western European targets
17 but U.S. targets in the homeland that will increase over
18 time, undoubtedly.

19 Senator Graham: So the more foreign fighters that flow
20 into Syria and Iraq to help ISIL and other organizations
21 makes it more difficult for us to prevent the next attack
22 because some of them have passports that could work their
23 way back here. Right?

24 Mr. Harvey: Affirmative.

25 Senator Graham: Now, let us talk a little bit about

1 Iran. Without a nuclear weapon, do you agree with me that
2 Iran is wreaking havoc in the region?

3 Mr. Harvey: Correct.

4 Dr. Pollack: Yes.

5 Senator Graham: Everybody agrees with that.

6 Dr. Pollack: I would agree, Senator, but I would also
7 say that I think we are allowing them to wreak havoc in the
8 region.

9 Senator Graham: I could not agree with you more.

10 Chairman McCain: Could I say Dr. Rand may want to --

11 Dr. Rand: Yes. I want to try to clarify that. I
12 would not call it "wreaking havoc." I would say increasing
13 its interventionism and its expansionism.

14 Senator Graham: Okay.

15 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I think they are creating disorder in
16 order to enhance their ability to intervene and offer
17 themselves as a solution.

18 Senator Graham: Would you agree with me that if they
19 had more money, probably they would not build hospitals and
20 schools with it if the current regime had more money?

21 Mr. Harvey: Sir, even under the constrained times they
22 have had, they have probably provided over \$4 billion to
23 subsidize the Syrian Government in the last 18 months.

24 Senator Graham: So the idea that if sanctions were
25 lifted and you infused their economy with more money, do you

1 agree with me it would be more likely than not some of that
2 money, if not most of it, would go to destabilizing the
3 region?

4 Dr. Takeyh: I do not know how they apportion their
5 budget, but I suspect --

6 Senator Graham: Well, if past behavior is any
7 indication of future action, the answer would be yes.

8 Dr. Takeyh: I agree with that, yes.

9 Dr. Rand: I mean, we do not really know because there
10 is a great demand by the people of Iran.

11 Senator Graham: Well, we know what they are doing now.

12 Dr. Rand: Right, but the sanctions relief might be
13 funneled to respond to the demands of the people.

14 Senator Graham: But I do not know how much influence
15 the Iranian people have over their own budget.

16 But here is what I am saying. The likelihood of more
17 money in the hands of this regime to me creates more
18 possibility for destabilization unless they change their
19 behavior.

20 Finally, is there a moderate hard-line divide in Iran
21 in your view that is meaningful?

22 Mr. Harvey: Sir, I said in my opening comments that
23 there really is not a divide that is meaningful to the
24 outcomes that we are interested in here today. The
25 hardliners have a lock on the levers of power there, Qods

1 Force and the hardliners in the Council of Guardians and
2 elsewhere. A moderate voice is, I think, not really hopeful
3 of emerging in that country.

4 Senator Graham: Do you all generally agree with that?

5 Dr. Pollack: I see a wide division of views within
6 Iran. But I do agree with Colonel Harvey that at the end of
7 the day, I think that the Supreme Leader is the one who
8 calls the shots, and he has tended to move Iran in the
9 direction mostly consistent with the hard-line viewpoint.

10 Dr. Takeyh: I would just say there is diversity of
11 views, but on core security issues, I think there is more
12 consensus than disagreement.

13 Dr. Rand: I would just add if you look at the speeches
14 of Rouhani and Zarif, you see greater pragmatism than some
15 of their other colleagues in the government.

16 Senator Graham: Yes. And their speeches and their
17 action in the assembly of experts apparently is now in the
18 hand of a pretty tough dude.

19 Last question. I am over my time. Do you all agree
20 that a bad deal with Iran would manifest itself with the
21 Arab breakout in terms of their nuclear desires, that the
22 worst possible outcome with a deal with the Iranians is to
23 create a nuclear arms race in the Mideast where the Arabs
24 felt like they needed to have a nuclear weapon of their own?

25 Dr. Takeyh: I think we will see proliferation of

1 nuclear technologies in the region, not necessarily nuclear
2 weapons, but perhaps other countries trying to experiment
3 with an enrichment capacity or plutonium plants. I think we
4 will see some sort of a proliferation of that as Sunni Arabs
5 try to match Iran's nuclear capabilities.

6 Senator Graham: Thank you very much.

7 Chairman McCain: Senator Cotton?

8 Senator Cotton: The Middle East is a place of many
9 dangerous and complex questions, and the answer in whole or
10 in part to virtually every one of those questions is Iran.

11 Why, after all, are we negotiating with the Islamic
12 Revolution over their nuclear weapons program, but for the
13 President's quest to harpoon the great white whale of a
14 nuclear agreement with Iran?

15 Why is Bashar al-Assad still in power years after the
16 President said he must go but for any reason because Iran
17 views Syria as a legitimate sphere of interest and the
18 President has largely conceded that sphere?

19 Why is the Secretary of State wrong-footing himself
20 repeatedly on our policy with Syria? Because the President
21 is now effectively allowing Assad to stay in power.

22 Why are the Qods Force increasingly the dominant force
23 inside of Iraq, and why is Qasem Suleimani, the commander of
24 the Qods Force, a man with the blood of hundreds of American
25 troops on his hand, showing up like a celebrity on Facebook

1 and other social media throughout Iraq? Because Iran views
2 Iraq as a sphere of its interests and the West appears ready
3 to grant that to Iran.

4 Why did Yemen fall to Shiite militants that chant
5 "death to America" and "death to Israel"? Again, because
6 they are aligned with Iran.

7 Why is our campaign against the Islamic State going so
8 slowly and haltingly? Because we are more concerned about
9 upsetting Iran's interest in the region.

10 And why is Hezbollah still so strong in Lebanon?
11 Because they remain Iran's terrorist cat's paw.

12 In the face of all these negotiations with Iran and its
13 drive for regional hegemony, the President has said
14 repeatedly that he will not allow Iran to get a nuclear
15 weapon and threat of force remains on the table. However,
16 Dr. Takeyh, you say on page 6 of your testimony, "Iran today
17 pointedly dismisses the possibility of U.S. military
18 retaliation irrespective of its provocations." Would you
19 care to elaborate on that?

20 Dr. Takeyh: I do not believe at this particular point
21 that they take the threat of American military retribution
22 seriously. They could be miscalculating. I mean, the
23 history of international relations is a history of
24 miscalculations. But I do not believe they see themselves
25 as vulnerable to a military strike. And that is often the

1 case when you have a diplomatic process. I mean, diplomatic
2 process is something that nobody wants to disrupt by
3 actually undertaking military action against one of the
4 participants.

5 Senator Cotton: Do you believe that the President's
6 refusal to enforce his own red line against Bashar al-
7 Assad's regime in September of 2013 did anything to make
8 Iran believe that he would not actually use the threat of
9 force in any credible fashion?

10 Dr. Takeyh: As I think I mentioned in my opening
11 remarks, the fact that we erase our red lines as carelessly
12 as we drew them had an effect on the credibility of American
13 deterrence.

14 Senator Cotton: Now I would like to draw your
15 attention to something you say shortly down the page on page
16 6. "While America's military option has receded in the
17 Iranian imagination, Israel still looms large. Fulminations
18 aside, Iranian leaders take Israeli threats seriously and
19 are at pains to assert their retaliatory options. It is
20 here that the shape and tone of the U.S.-Israeli alliance
21 matters most. Should the clerical regime sense divisions in
22 that alliance, they can assure themselves that a beleaguered
23 Israel cannot possibly strike Iran while at odds with its
24 superpower patron." Can you elaborate further?

25 Dr. Takeyh: Yes. Sure. I think that the divisions

1 and the problems and tensions in U.S.-Israeli relations have
2 not well affected Israeli deterrence posture as well because
3 the view is that the two powers, Israel and the United
4 States, are in such disagreement. Again, that might be a
5 miscalculation. Israeli officials and the Israeli
6 Government has in the past used military force at the times
7 when the United States did not approve of it. But at this
8 point, I think the perception is that Israel is somewhat
9 restrained in terms of its military posture because --

10 Senator Cotton: Could that be because anonymous White
11 House officials have been quoted in Western media reports
12 saying that they have effectively delayed Israel's
13 opportunity to strike Iran before they get a nuclear weapon?

14 Dr. Takeyh: I think such disclosures are not helpful.
15 But I do think that I am not entirely sure that Israel is
16 bent on a military action against the Iranian nuclear
17 facilities anyway. So we may be restraining a power that
18 wants to be self-restrained.

19 Senator Cotton: Diplomacy is always more effective
20 when backed by the credible threat of force, though.
21 Correct?

22 Dr. Takeyh: That is right, yes.

23 Senator Cotton: Even if perhaps not the American
24 credible threat of force.

25 Dr. Takeyh: Sure.

1 Senator Cotton: So as you say, divisions in that
2 alliance could undermine even that threat in the perception
3 of Iran's leaders. And last week in the aftermath of
4 Benjamin Netanyahu's decisive victory in Iran, the President
5 and many of his senior advisors made several statements that
6 they would have to reconsider our relationship with Israel,
7 that they might allow the United Nations or other
8 international institutions to take adverse action against
9 Israel in an unfair and discriminatory pattern as is their
10 history.

11 As you may also be aware, Ayatollah Khamenei gave his
12 annual Nowruz message on Saturday, just 3 days ago, in which
13 he whipped the crowd into frenzied chants of "death to
14 America." And his response was, "yes, certainly, death to
15 America." And yesterday, the President's spokesman said
16 that it just for domestic political consumption.

17 Do you believe the reaction to Benjamin Netanyahu's
18 statements in a democratic election versus the reaction to
19 Ayatollah Khamenei's statement discredits Benjamin Netanyahu
20 as a critic of the President's negotiations, undermines our
21 relationship with Israel, and helps change our relationship
22 with Iran?

23 Dr. Takeyh: Well, to separate the two issues, I do
24 think that it is in the interest of both the United States
25 and Israel to get beyond the point of disagreements that

1 they have and try to rehabilitate the alliance. That is
2 good for Israel. That is good for the United States. That
3 is good for diplomacy toward Iran.

4 As far as Ali Khamenei trying to satiate a domestic
5 audience by chanting "death to America," I do not know who
6 that is. Most of the Iranians do not share his animosity
7 toward America. So when he says those things, he actually
8 is expressing his own opinion, an opinion of many hard-line
9 groups that share his proscriptive ideology.

10 Senator Cotton: I suggest that when people chant
11 "death to America," we should take them seriously and
12 reconsider whether we want to make nuclear concessions to
13 such people and their regime.

14 My time has expired. Thank you.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine?

16 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
17 the witnesses. A number of topics.

18 First, on the Foreign Relations Committee, now we are
19 engaged in a discussion about finally authorizing the
20 current war against ISIL. And I believe strongly Congress
21 does need to do this. There are couple of sort of disputed
22 points that we are kind of working through, and that is the
23 wisdom of U.S. ground troops in such an engagement, what our
24 posture should be in a war against ISIL vis-a-vis the Bashar
25 al-Assad regime in Syria. Those are two fairly critical

1 areas where even in a body that overwhelmingly supports
2 military action against ISIL, both the House and Senate --
3 both parties do -- there are some details that are
4 important. I think we can get to a compromise, but there
5 are details that are important.

6 I would love your thoughts sort of on either of those
7 points: you know, ground troops and how they should be used
8 and also what should sort of the mission definition be in
9 Syria in any authorization that we do.

10 Dr. Pollack: I am glad to start, Senator, and I will
11 start by saying that I think that an AUMF is very important.
12 I have always believed that having congressional support for
13 major American foreign policy endeavors is absolutely
14 critical in sustaining support over the long term.

15 Second point. I think that initial ground troops will
16 be necessary in Iraq, and they may prove necessary to some
17 extent in Syria. Here I am thinking about the JTAC's, the
18 air liaison officers.

19 But I also go back to a point that Colonel Harvey
20 raised earlier on. I think that one of the critical
21 elements missing from the Iraq advisory program is the
22 accompany mission. I think that we do need American
23 advisors down to brigade and battalion level accompanying
24 Iraqis in the field both for the reason that Colonel Harvey
25 mentioned, which is that it makes these forces more

1 efficient, but also because it gives us a much greater
2 ability to control the behavior of those forces. I think
3 back, Senators Reed and McCain, to 2006 when I can remember
4 being in Iraq and having Iraqis say to me we get frightened
5 when Iraqi troops come into our village and there are no
6 Americans with them because we do not know who they are
7 going to kill. If there are Americans with them, they tend
8 to behave themselves. And so I think that accompany mission
9 is absolutely critical to the political future of Iraq in
10 ensuring that these forces do not run amuck as they have in
11 a number of instances.

12 And last point. With regard to Bashar al-Assad's
13 regime, I believe that a solution in Syria is impossible as
14 long as Bashar al-Assad remains in charge of the Syrian
15 regime. I think that the Alawi community will have to be
16 brought in, will have to be represented in a future power
17 sharing arrangement, but I think that Bashar himself and a
18 number of key allies around him must go. And as we were
19 talking about earlier, I think that it is foolish to believe
20 that we can build a Syrian opposition army solely to
21 prosecute a war against ISIS. It must be used to deal with
22 the Assad regime and, in fact, the entire panoply of bad
23 actors in Syria because it has to be about ending the Syrian
24 civil war, not just killing ISIS.

25 Senator Kaine: Other thoughts?

1 Dr. Rand: Sure. I would add that the importance of
2 the AUMF is a signaling device in addition to the
3 authorization here. It is showing the credibility of what
4 is already going on and what is happening and the intent and
5 the support of the American people. So I think it is
6 absolutely important to authorize this force.

7 On the ground combat operations, there is a sunset
8 clause in the draft language, and I think that is a very
9 important part of this because part of the strategy against
10 ISIS inherently involves a checking in or reporting
11 requirement and seeing how things are going. This is a very
12 fluid situation. So I would urge Members of Congress to
13 look at reporting requirements and the sunset clause as also
14 a way to see how the operation is going and what new types
15 of offensive ground combat operations are needed over time.

16 And then finally, on Syria, I am not sure if this draft
17 language of AUMF is the right place to authorize use of
18 force against Syria. But, of course, the debate needs to
19 be, as Dr. Pollack has outlined, what is the plan for the
20 reinsertion of these forces. How are they going to get in?
21 Where are they going to go in? What are the priority areas?
22 How are they going to work with the changing coalitions of
23 Syrian oppositionists that every week are changing partners?
24 And the other question is, what is the role of the Kurds in
25 this part of Syria, particularly in the northeast?

1 Senator Kaine: Let me ask a second question. U.S.
2 policy since President Truman -- and I consider myself a
3 Truman Democrat or I would like to be one day thought to be
4 a Truman Democrat. That is a high standard to meet. U.S.
5 policy with respect to Israel has been to strongly support
6 Israel as our ally, but also to support the notion of a
7 Palestinian state. That was the original UN mandate and it
8 was reaffirmed in the Oslo Accords, and that is official
9 U.S. policy.

10 I think it is safe to say that at least now sort of the
11 official policy of the Israeli Government may be different.
12 Both President Rivlin and now Prime Minister Netanyahu have
13 indicated that there will not be a second state. I do not
14 really see a one-state solution working, but maybe I have
15 not figured out how it can.

16 But given that the stated position of both the prime
17 minister and the president of Israel at this point are
18 contrary to what has been U.S. policy supporting two states,
19 what, if anything, should the United States do now that
20 there is that gulf in policy between our two nations?
21 Should the U.S. change our policy, or should we keep the
22 policy we have? And what should we do to try to make that a
23 reality?

24 Mr. Harvey: Well, sir, I would say that the overall
25 atmospherics in the relationship between the United States

1 and Israel has clearly undermined the Israeli confidence
2 about moving forward in a number of areas, and this is one
3 that you have highlighted. It is hard to make difficult
4 decisions that go at your core political support at home,
5 that go to the real threat to your country. They had a 50-
6 day war last year with Gaza, after giving up in agreement
7 after agreement after agreement things to the Gazans and
8 Hamas. And when they look at the West Bank and you look at
9 the one-state solution, first and foremost, you have to have
10 confidence in your long-term security and what those
11 arrangements might be. And right now, there is tremendous
12 doubt in Tel Aviv about the strength of our relationship and
13 whatever the sidebar decisions would be that are going to
14 affect this overall agreement of a two-state solution. So I
15 think, first and foremost, you have to right the ship
16 politically, diplomatically between the two countries in
17 order to create the environment that you might be able to
18 move forward on.

19 Senator Kaine: I am just curious. Are you suggesting
20 that the disclaiming of the idea of two states is the United
21 States' fault?

22 Mr. Harvey: No. What I am saying is that the impact
23 -- if you are in Tel Aviv and you are thinking about where
24 you are headed with this two-state solution, you cannot
25 discount the friction and the undermining from their view of

1 their relationship with Washington, D.C. It has to impact
2 these other decisions.

3 Senator Kaine: I have no other questions, Mr. Chair.
4 But if any other witnesses would care to comment on that --
5 I am over my time, but --

6 Dr. Takeyh: I will just briefly say that in the 1990's
7 there was a notion that a resolution of the Israeli-
8 Palestinian conflict would transform the region. I do not
9 believe that is true. But I also think the absence of that
10 resolution does contribute to the instability of the region.
11 And I think the prime minister's advocacy on Iran and other
12 issues would have much more force and legitimacy if he had a
13 more forthcoming approach toward the Palestinian problem.

14 Dr. Pollack: Senator, I will add to that while I would
15 not want to characterize Prime Minister Netanyahu's
16 position, because I do not feel like I understand it at the
17 moment, I will simply say that I continue to believe that
18 the best policy for the United States is to pursue the two-
19 state solution. I believe that that is just. I believe it
20 is equitable. As you pointed out, it was the original
21 intent of the United Nations, and quite frankly, I do not
22 see -- no one has ever shown me a workable alternative, a
23 one-state solution, a three-state solution, that both
24 preserves the Jewish character and Israeli democracy. And
25 that being the case, I see no reason for the United States

1 to deviate from that policy and every reason for the United
2 States to continue to advocate it as best we possibly can.

3 Senator Kaine: Dr. Rand?

4 Dr. Rand: I would just completely agree that the two-
5 state solution has been the policy of the United States for
6 decades and the policy of the international community and
7 offers the U.S. and Israelis in my opinion the best option
8 for living in peace and stability and security of the State
9 of Israel.

10 I would also add that I think it is dangerous to over-
11 dramatize the current political tensions between Tel Aviv,
12 Jerusalem and Washington in the sense that the broad
13 national security apparatuses between the two countries --
14 the relationships are very strong and very thick, as this
15 committee knows, in terms of defense appropriations having
16 reached last year I think an unprecedented \$3 billion in
17 FMF, the Iron Dome, other missile defense programs. So
18 there is a thickness to the relationship that is actually
19 improving and increasing at the non-political level. And
20 that portends a very important trend in U.S.-Israeli
21 relations that supersedes the personalities of individual
22 leaders.

23 Senator Kaine: Great. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I went
24 over, but I appreciate you letting the witnesses take that
25 question.

1 Senator Reed: Senator McCain has been very gracious to
2 allow me to ask questions at the conclusion. Senator Hirono
3 has just arrived, and so I will yield to Senator Hirono.
4 Then when she is finished, I will ask questions.

5 Senator Hirono: Thank you very much.

6 This is a question for all of the witnesses to respond
7 as you desire, a broader framing. The instability of
8 multiple nations throughout the world, particularly in the
9 Middle East and North Africa, has become a growing threat to
10 U.S. interests by providing ungoverned space for extremism
11 to operate. How do we balance the ever-increasing economic
12 gap between developing nations and their vulnerability to
13 power vacuums with radical ethnic and/or religious
14 philosophies that appeal to rising young adult populations?
15 Does anyone care to respond?

16 Dr. Rand: Sure. This is an excellent question because
17 this gets at the root drivers of some of the trends that we
18 have been discussing that a lot of the U.S. foreign policy
19 responses have to be predicated on what is actually going
20 on.

21 Here I would just raise two points in response to this
22 question. One is that the rise in economic opportunity by
23 some and the rise in education in the 1990's and 2000's
24 actually created higher expectations among many of the youth
25 in the region. So you had higher graduation rates across

1 the Middle East and North Africa, including in many of the
2 countries that saw a revolution in 2011, without the
3 commensurate supply of jobs that were at the level for
4 university graduates. And this is a serious problem and
5 endures across the region. So there is a job retraining
6 educational element to the economic dilemma.

7 But the second point is that there are natural
8 resources and economic sources of revenue in many of these
9 states. So the key question is how to reform some of the
10 state economic decision-making so that the budgets are
11 growing and so that the state can use its resources and use
12 its revenue, whether it is from oil or foreign aid or other
13 assistance, to create the kind of market economies that will
14 provide jobs and provide opportunity.

15 Dr. Pollack: Senator, if I could just add to Dr.
16 Rand's very cogent comments. I would like to pull out one
17 of her points which I think is absolutely critical, and that
18 is the role of education. And I would commend to you, if
19 you have not already seen it, the Arab Human Development
20 reports, in particular the volumes issued in 2002 and 2003.
21 These are landmark reports by Arab scholars and Arab experts
22 looking at their own part of the world, commissioned by the
23 United Nations.

24 And the critical point that they came to was that, as
25 Dr. Rand has pointed out, there has been a massive growth in

1 the quantity of education provided to Arabs, but no
2 corresponding improvement in the quality of the education
3 they receive. They continue to be taught by rote
4 memorization with the disparagement of critical thinking in
5 ways that do not equip Arabs to become productive members of
6 an information economy. And as a result, you have gotten
7 more and more people with high school and college degrees
8 who believe that they are entitled to become middle and
9 upper class citizens of their communities and of the world,
10 but they simply do not have the skills to function as such.
11 This is the most critical gap in the Arab world today. And
12 again, it is a problem that is not going to be solved in the
13 next 2 years or the next 10 years, but if we do want to help
14 the Arab world move out of its current state of affairs, it
15 is one that we need to help them address.

16 Senator Hirono: Well, following up then, are we doing
17 something to address these kinds of institutional changes
18 that need to occur with regard to the quality of their
19 education?

20 Dr. Rand: This is an excellent question, and this is
21 an area where the U.S. State Department and USAID is
22 actively involved and has been for decades. Again, the
23 going is tough.

24 So in some parts of the region, there are still states
25 functioning and there are a lot of reforms going on and the

1 U.S. Government is working in places like Morocco and
2 Tunisia. Even in Libya before this current round of
3 fighting, there was a new authorization and appropriation
4 for telelearning programs, education programs. So there is
5 creative work that the U.S. Government is doing to try to
6 address these gaps.

7 The challenge is that there is an increasing number of
8 states in the region where there is great instability and
9 conflict. So we have four or five states where there is
10 either failure or a civil conflict right now. And those
11 states are providing a real challenge.

12 And the other challenge is combating the appeal of
13 foreign fighters and radicalization as part of this because
14 the ISIS recruiters can work much faster than the
15 international programs to support education and long-term
16 job growth programs.

17 Senator Hirono: Can you point to a nation in the
18 Middle East that is a model for the kind of changes that
19 would really address the underlying problems or challenges
20 in the Middle East that lead to instability?

21 Dr. Rand: There is no one model that comes to mind.
22 There are isolated programs that either the governments or
23 the international community have introduced in Morocco, in
24 Tunisia, in Jordan in particular that come to mind as
25 useful. Again, it is very hard to measure the effect of an

1 intervention on the outcome because a lot of this is a lot
2 of different factors. International assistance can help and
3 can work, and the U.S. should continue to do this even
4 though it is hard, even though there are obvious demands on
5 the budget.

6 Mr. Harvey: I think when we talk about the region, we
7 have to recognize that the problems are different for the
8 Gulf where addressing educational quality is an issue, the
9 critical thinking, but it is different in North Africa and
10 different in Syria. If you cannot establish security and
11 address the building of the institutional capacity so the
12 state not only controls the means of policing and the means
13 of violence in the state but can deliver some services and
14 is exactly the go-to place and is relevant to people's
15 lives, then you are going to have some real problems.

16 But the international community on a broader scale,
17 whether it is USAID or others, large-scale projects tend not
18 to work. A lot of the projects we have tend to be well-
19 intentioned but not aligned with the social, cultural,
20 business approaches there. We do not have good conditions-
21 based metrics or conditions-based programs that require some
22 accounting in a way that would be more transparent. And so
23 it enables corruption in ways that become very
24 dysfunctional.

25 Or you engage in a place like Afghanistan with

1 significant programs that, in effect, draw the
2 entrepreneurial and the educated that are needed for other
3 programs -- they draw them to these larger USAID projects in
4 a dysfunctional way. We need to keep the nurses and the
5 doctors in the medical field not working in a USAID project
6 because they speak English and make more money because we
7 brought in a different pay scale that attracts these people.
8 There are so many different things that seem to be going
9 wrong when we try to do good things.

10 Dr. Pollack: Senator, if I could just quickly. I
11 would actually point to Saudi Arabia.

12 Senator Hirono: With the indulgence of the chair.

13 Dr. Pollack: Thank you, Senator.

14 I would actually point to Saudi Arabia for three
15 different reasons, and I know it seems ironic because we
16 typically think of Saudi Arabia as an utterly repressive,
17 medieval regime. But under King Abdullah, there was a very
18 determined effort to try to reform the Saudi educational
19 system. King Abdullah tried to press for co-education. He
20 tried to press for a change in curriculum. He tried to
21 press for Western instructors and Western methods of
22 achievement.

23 Now, a few things in order. First, it was largely a
24 Saudi-driven process. It was the king and his advisors who
25 recognized the importance of the need to do it and that

1 pretty much did it on their own. We need to be looking
2 elsewhere in the region for other Arabs who are willing to
3 take this on themselves and then ask the question of how can
4 we help you, which is about the best that we are going to do
5 because they are going to have to drive this train
6 themselves.

7 Second, it is worth noting that the king had modest
8 success. He did create King Abdullah University of Science
9 and Technology, which is kind of, sort of a model for what
10 could happen. And he did make some progress toward
11 curriculum reform, co-education, a variety of other things.
12 But it only moved so far. And we have to recognize that
13 these kinds of big changes are going to move haltingly.

14 And the third point to make is the reason that they
15 only went so far is because the king was resisted by a whole
16 variety of different factors within his society, the clergy,
17 the bureaucracy, others with vested interest in the current
18 society. And again, we need to recognize that these were
19 all obstacles that need to be overcome.

20 But, again, I think that Saudi Arabia in some ways is a
21 wonderful case study to look at over the last 10 years of
22 how to move things forward but also the difficulties in
23 doing so, difficulties that we should be thinking creatively
24 of how we might help them overcome.

25 Senator Hirono: Do you think Qatar would also qualify

1 for that kind of change?

2 Dr. Pollack: Qatar is difficult for reasons that I
3 think that Colonel Harvey alluded to, which is that Qatar is
4 unlike pretty much anything other than conceivably the UAE
5 and Kuwait. It is not a great model for the larger states
6 of the region. It is a tiny, little population. It is
7 obscenely wealthy. They are able to do things in ways that
8 no one else in the region can. And so we can look at them
9 and again say, well, maybe there is something here that
10 Arabs might look to as something they might some day
11 emulate, but I think that the reality is that it is not a
12 close enough approximation of the circumstances of the rest
13 of the region to serve as a practical model.

14 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

16 Senator Reed: Thank you, Senator Hirono.

17 And I want to thank the chairman for convening this
18 hearing. It is extraordinarily thoughtful, insightful, and
19 timely. And thank you all for your testimony.

20 Just a couple of questions, and I asked the chairman if
21 I could pose these. I was in the chamber and I listened to
22 Prime Minister Netanyahu. It was a very eloquent and very
23 powerful discussion. But one of the points I seem to recall
24 is he said if we reject this agreement, we will get a better
25 agreement. Do you believe that would be the case, Dr.

1 Takeyh, that after all this effort and the political capital
2 that all sides have laid down, that we will simply get a
3 better agreement?

4 Dr. Takeyh: I think it is an impossible proposition to
5 verify. It can only be validated in practice. And the
6 prime minister's position was that if this agreement proves
7 unsatisfactory, you can go back and increase the level of
8 pressure on Iran through the international community and so
9 on and possibly come back with a more superior agreement.

10 There have been times in history of arms control where
11 that has taken place where you have gone back and revisited
12 some of the issues and so on. The Iranian regime does have
13 vulnerabilities less so today than it did in November of
14 2013. I think it is fair to say -- and I think history will
15 validate this -- that we could have gotten a better
16 agreement than the joint plan of action in November 2013. I
17 think that is largely true. At that time, the country was
18 essentially suffering 7 percent negative economic growth.
19 Today it is about 1-2 percent growth. At that time the
20 Rouhani regime needed some sort of a validation of his
21 strategy of his electoral claims, and at that time, Iran was
22 much more vulnerable. And history has shown that Iranian
23 presidents tend to be stronger in the first year than every
24 other year. That is not unique to their presidency. You
25 see it in other chief executives.

1 Today there is more resilience in the system, more
2 economic resilience, a greater degree of consensus, less
3 measure of factionalism. It will be harder to do that
4 today. I do not believe it is impossible. We have to
5 consider the fact that these are negotiations between the
6 international community and a superpower and a second-rate
7 power with substantial vulnerability in terms of economic
8 deficiencies, in terms of popular dissent, disaffection, and
9 in terms of elite fragmentation. I cannot rule it out, but
10 I can tell you it is going to be harder.

11 Senator Reed: Dr. Pollack?

12 Dr. Pollack: Senator, I find myself very much in
13 agreement with Dr. Takeyh's statement, my good friend. My
14 body language might be a bit different than his, though. I
15 think that everything that he has just said is absolutely
16 accurate. We do not know. We will not know until we test
17 the proposition.

18 I also agree that we might have done better, and I wish
19 we had done some things differently in terms of the tactics
20 of how we got here, but given where we are, I think it
21 unlikely that we will get a better agreement. And I think
22 that a lot of this has to do with how the world now sees
23 these negotiations, and I am quite concerned that if the
24 United States walks away from this current agreement, as
25 imperfect as it may be, that the rest of the world will

1 blame us for doing so, not the Iranians, and that will make
2 it very difficult to get a better deal.

3 Dr. Takeyh: I just want to say one thing very briefly.
4 We do not have an agreement at this point. We have a
5 negotiating process. Therefore, some of the deficiencies
6 that have been highlighted, duration of sunset clause,
7 absence of PMD -- I think Secretary Kerry can strengthen his
8 case internationally and here by going back and revisiting
9 some of those issues.

10 Senator Reed: No. I do not think there is a question
11 there.

12 But I want Colonel Harvey and dr. Rand to comment also.

13 But just, Dr. Pollack, to follow up, your sort of sense
14 is that given all the events, we are at a critical moment,
15 and that if there is not an agreement, there is a question
16 of will the sanctions regime stay in place. Do you think
17 that is likely?

18 Dr. Pollack: I am very concerned that it will begin to
19 erode and erode quickly if we do not get an agreement soon.

20 Senator Reed: Even with the sanctions regime in place
21 and we do not have an agreement, do you believe that the
22 Iranians will accelerate their efforts to develop a nuclear
23 device or at least a virtual nuclear device rather than just
24 simply sort of status quo?

25 Dr. Pollack: That is a hard one to answer, Senator,

1 because again I think it will be based on their calculation
2 of how much they need it. And as I said, I do not think
3 that they feel like they need a weapon right now, but I
4 think it would also be calculated on their expectation of
5 what is the best way to erode the sanctions regime. And
6 again, I suspect that their feeling will be the best way to
7 handle the breakdown of negotiations is to actually say,
8 look, we do not want a nuclear weapon. We keep saying we do
9 not want one. We are going to forswear acquiring one at
10 least for now to make clear that the Americans are the
11 problem, not us.

12 Senator Reed: And then again, I think we always have
13 to think worst case, which is with or without an agreement,
14 with or without the durability of sanctions, if we detect a
15 movement away from compliance and they are developing a
16 nuclear capacity or technology or a breakout that is not a
17 year but weeks, then we are forced with the issue of
18 military action. One of the arguments that is made is that
19 without an agreement -- and it seems to track what you said
20 about sort of the world kind of consensus -- our ability to
21 engage the world community at least supporting us, maybe
22 even after the fact would be diminished. Is that fair?

23 Dr. Pollack: I would agree with that. I think that we
24 would be in a strong position to engage in military action
25 which, again, I do not believe is the right course of

1 action, but nevertheless, we would be in a stronger position
2 with an agreement. And what is more, especially if we were
3 seen as the party that walked away from the current
4 negotiations, it would be very difficult for us to then come
5 back to the world and say we would like international
6 support to take military action against Iran for continuing
7 to pursue their nuclear program.

8 Senator Reed: Let me ask Colonel Harvey. I do not
9 know if I promoted you or demoted. I almost called you
10 "doctor."

11 [Laughter.]

12 Senator Reed: And then Dr. Rand, and then I will
13 conclude.

14 Mr. Harvey: We are not very good at maintaining a
15 siege mentality against other countries, and I think that is
16 part of the problem. I agree with everything I have heard
17 heretofore on this issue.

18 I wish that we would have not decoupled the missiles
19 and delivery means from this track of negotiations. I think
20 we need more transparency and more work on that. I think it
21 would have been much better if we could have kept that
22 connected.

23 I am very concerned that we are not going to have the
24 intelligence awareness and insights as to where they are at.
25 And my belief, after studying this regime now for over 2

1 decades -- and I used to be a missile and nuclear analyst at
2 DIA on these issues -- is that this is viewed in the
3 leadership that matters in Tehran as just a transitional
4 point, an obstacle to get over to continue to move in the
5 direction because the character and nature of the regime is
6 not fundamentally shifting, and we have not put any other
7 conditions about behavior or missiles or other things to
8 influence how that regime responds to this agreement.

9 Senator Reed: Thank you, Colonel.

10 Dr. Rand, the last word, please.

11 Dr. Rand: I mean, I want to repeat what some of my
12 colleagues have said but just emphatically say that I think
13 the logic behind waiting for a better deal has a lot of
14 holes in it. And the first one is this question of what is
15 the course of pressure that you then mobilize in the moment
16 after this current negotiation breakdown. Where are the
17 multilateral sanctions and the international will? So I do
18 not see how you pinch Iran to get them to the table in 1, 2,
19 3, 4, or 5 years. I have never seen that explained.

20 But second, I think it is again just a question of what
21 happens internal to Iran and domestic politics, which we do
22 not want to rely on in terms of whether they go to
23 accelerate nuclear weaponization in the aftermath of a
24 failed deal. This is just a big unknown that will depend on
25 a lot of things outside U.S. and international control. And

1 I do not want to take that risk.

2 Senator Reed: Well, thank you all very much.

3 I am going to, I think at this point, on behalf of
4 Chairman McCain, thank you for extraordinarily effective and
5 insightful testimony and recess the hearing. Adjourn it
6 actually. Thank you.

7 [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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