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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS

Thursday, December 10, 2015

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6 U.S. Senate
7 Committee on Armed Services
8 Washington, D.C.
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10 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
11 Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John
12 McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

13 Committee Members Present: Senators McCain
14 [presiding], Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst,
15 Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen,
16 Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, and King.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Well, good morning.

4 The committee meets today to continue our series of
5 hearings on defense reform. We have reviewed the effects of
6 the Goldwater-Nichols reforms on our defense acquisition,
7 management, and personnel system, and our past few hearings
8 have considered what most view as the essence of Goldwater-
9 Nichols, the roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of
10 Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
11 service secretaries, and service chiefs, and the combatant
12 commanders.

13 This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater-
14 Nichols has impacted the effectiveness of U.S. military
15 operations and what reforms may be necessary.

16 We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of
17 witnesses who will offer insights from their many years of
18 experience and distinguished service. General Norton
19 Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and
20 President and CEO of Business Executives for National
21 Security; Admiral James Stavridis, former Commander, U.S.
22 European Command and U.S. Southern Command, and currently
23 the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
24 Tufts University and frequent appearance on various liberal
25 media outlets; Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Director of the

1 Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National
2 Defense University.

3 More than anything else, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was
4 a result of escalating concern in the Congress and in the
5 country about the effectiveness of U.S. military operations.
6 The Vietnam War, the failure of the hostage rescue mission
7 in Iran, and the flawed invasion of Grenada all pointed to
8 deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise that needed
9 to be addressed for the sake of both our warfighters and our
10 national security.

11 In particular, Goldwater-Nichols focused on ensuring
12 the unity of command and improving the ability of our forces
13 to operate jointly. As we have explored in previous
14 hearings, many questions remain about the balance our
15 military is striking between core military competitiveness,
16 competencies, and joint experience. But as it relates to
17 combat effectiveness, there is no doubt, as one former
18 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, no other
19 nation can match our ability to combine forces on the
20 battlefield and fight jointly.

21 The subject of today's hearing relates directly to the
22 many steps Goldwater-Nichols took to improve the unity of
23 command. The law made unified commanders explicitly
24 responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense
25 for the performance of missions and preparedness of their

1 commands. It also removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from
2 the operational chain of command and prevented the services
3 from moving forces in and out of regional commands without
4 approval. Geographic combatant commanders were given the
5 ability to issue authoritative direction on all aspects of
6 operations, joint training and logistics, internal chains of
7 command, and personnel within their assigned areas of
8 responsibility. These steps were effective in establishing
9 clear lines of command authority and responsibilities that
10 translated to a more effective fighting force than we had in
11 the 1980s.

12 However, 30 years later, we have to take a hard look at
13 this command structure in light of current threats and how
14 our model of warfighting has evolved. The United States
15 confronts the most diverse and complex array of crises since
16 the end of World War II, from rising competitors like China,
17 revanchist powers like Russia, the growing asymmetric
18 capabilities of nations ranging from Iran to North Korea,
19 the persistence of radical Islamic extremism, and the
20 emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and
21 cyberspace. These threats cut across our regional
22 operational structures embodied by geographic combatant
23 commands.

24 So we must ask whether the current combatant command
25 structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic

1 environment of the 21st century. Should we consider
2 alternative structures that are organized less around
3 geography and transregional and functional missions.

4 At the same time, as numerous witnesses have observed,
5 while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the
6 warfighting arm of the military, the Department of Defense,
7 that function has largely migrated to joint task forces,
8 especially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging
9 contingencies. This suggests that people have identified a
10 shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures
11 to work around the system as we see quite often. This
12 should inform our efforts to reevaluate and re-imagine the
13 combatant commands.

14 At the same time, combatant commands have come to play
15 very important peacetime diplomatic functions. Do these
16 developments argue for changes in the structure of combatant
17 commands? At a minimum, it would call into question the
18 top-heavy and bloated staff structures that we see in the
19 combatant commands. Time and again during these hearings,
20 we have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and
21 military staffs have persisted even as resources available
22 for warfighting functions are increasingly strained.

23 As former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele
24 Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant command
25 staffs have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three

1 divisions' worth of staff in just the combatant commands
2 alone. We have to ask if this is truly necessary and
3 whether it is improving our warfighting capabilities.

4 At the same time, we have to examine whether there are
5 duplicative functions in the Joint Staff, combatant
6 commands, and subordinate commands that can be streamlined.
7 That includes the question of whether we really need all of
8 the current combatant commands. For example, do we really
9 need a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM? Do we really need a
10 separate AFRICOM headquartered in Germany when the vast
11 majority of its forces reside within EUROM?

12 As we have to revisit the role of the Chairman and the
13 members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater-Nichols
14 strengthened the Joint Staff and operational commanders at
15 the expense of the services. Has that gone too far or not
16 far enough? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates raised
17 this issue when he testified before this committee because
18 of his frustration with the military services' lack of
19 responsiveness to current operational requirements.

20 Many of our witnesses have discussed whether the
21 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sufficient
22 statutory authority to perform the strategic integration
23 that the Department of Defense all too often seems to do
24 poorly, integrating priorities, efforts, and resources
25 across regions, across domains of military activity, and

1 across time, balancing short-term and long-term
2 requirements. The question has been raised whether the
3 Chairman should be placed in the chain of command with the
4 service chiefs and combatant commanders reporting to him.
5 We have heard testimony in favor and against. I look
6 forward to exploring this further today.

7 These are critical questions about our defense
8 organization that have direct bearing on the effectiveness
9 of U.S. military operations and, as a consequence, on the
10 wellbeing of our warfighters. We owe it to them to look at
11 this seriously, ask the tough questions, challenge old
12 assumptions, and embrace new solutions if and when it is
13 needed.

14 I thank our witnesses again and look forward to their
15 testimony.

16 Senator Reed?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
4 Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses. I have had the
5 privilege really of working with General Schwartz as Chief
6 of Staff of the Air Force, Admiral Stavridis as EUCOM
7 Commander, and Dr. Lamb, your service in the Defense
8 Department, now as an analyst and academic. I deeply
9 appreciate it. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for joining
10 us today.

11 As the chairman has said, we have undertaken a very
12 rigorous, under his direction, review of Goldwater-Nichols.
13 And we heard just a few days ago from former Under Secretary
14 of Defense Michele Flournoy about one of the issues, and
15 that was in her words, "over the years, the QDR has become a
16 routinized, bottom-up staff exercise that includes hundreds
17 of participants and consumes many thousands of man-hours
18 rather than a top-down leadership exercise that sets clear
19 priorities, makes hard choices and allocates risk."

20 So one of the things I would hope that the witnesses
21 would talk about with this whole planning process, the
22 formal process, the informal process, and how we can improve
23 that -- that is just one of the items. There is a long and
24 I think important list of topics that we could discuss: the
25 role and authorities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint

1 Chiefs of Staff, including whether the Chairman should be
2 placed in the chain of for military operations; improving
3 the employment and synchronization of military capabilities
4 through possible structural reforms to our combatant
5 commands, defense agencies, and field activities; and the
6 potential benefits of adopting organizational changes,
7 including consolidation of staff elements and creation of
8 cross-functional teams, to achieve efficiencies and provide
9 senior civilian and military leaders with more impactful and
10 timely recommendations.

11 And finally, in previous hearings, several of our
12 witnesses have rightly observed that enhancing the
13 effectiveness of our military operations and better
14 capitalizing upon the gains achieved through those
15 improvements may require significant changes to our
16 interagency national security structure and processes as
17 well. And this point was made by Jim Locher, who was the
18 godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater-Nichols. In his
19 words, "No matter how well you transform the Department of
20 Defense, it is still going to be troubled by an interagency
21 system that is quite broken and the problems that confront
22 this Nation and national security require an interagency
23 response. The days of the Department of Defense being able
24 to execute a national security mission by itself are long
25 gone, and we do not have the ability to integrate the

1 expertise and capacity of all of the government agencies
2 that are necessary." I think it is important to keep that
3 in mind.

4 And chairman -- again, let me commend him for beginning
5 this process with this committee and the Department of
6 Defense, and I hope it is a catalyst under his leadership
7 for serious review by other committees and other agencies
8 about how together we can improve the security of the United
9 States.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

12 Welcome, General Schwartz.

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF,
2 RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CEO, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL
3 SECURITY, AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE

4 General Schwartz: Thanks, Chairman McCain and Ranking
5 Member Reed for your and the committee's commitment to
6 improving DOD's internal governance and defense organization
7 shaped by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. It is an
8 unexpected privilege to return to this hearing room and to
9 offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in
10 the Department of Defense, and it is a special pleasure to
11 sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, Jim
12 Stavridis.

13 While there are many issues that warrant attention,
14 command arrangements, resource allocation, acquisition
15 processes, overhead reduction, joint credentialing of
16 military personnel, and the potential for consolidation,
17 among others, I wish to focus this morning on the three that
18 I am persuaded hold the greatest promise for particularly
19 positive outcomes. They are the role and authority of the
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, right-sizing the
21 combatant commands, and establishing standing joint task
22 forces for execution of COCOM operational missions. I am
23 certainly prepared to address the other matters you
24 mentioned at your discretion.

25 In my experience as a former member of the Joint Chiefs

1 of Staff and the Joint Staff, a functional combatant
2 commander, and a chief of service, I have come to the
3 conclusion that the Chairman's informal role in supervising
4 the combatant commanders and the JCS is insufficient for the
5 demands of our times. While it is true that delegated
6 authority from the Secretary of Defense is an alternative,
7 there should be no doubt in the armed forces about the
8 directive authority of the Chairman, subject to the close
9 and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the Secretary of
10 Defense.

11 Strategic guidance for force employment, force
12 allocation tradeoffs between combatant commands and
13 establishing strategic priorities for the armed forces
14 should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation or the
15 exquisite application of personal persuasion, but rather the
16 product of strategic leadership. This capacity is
17 constrained by the Chairman's inability to exercise
18 executive authority on behalf of the Secretary of Defense,
19 and the remedy I suggest is to place the Chairman in the
20 line of supervision between the Secretary and his or her
21 combatant commanders.

22 The nine combatant commands are complex entities, none
23 of which are alike, some with regional responsibilities and
24 some with functional roles. The commands strive to serve
25 both peacetime, crisis response, and warfighting

1 obligations. The composition of the combatant command
2 staffs clearly reflect the inherent tension in this
3 excessively broad mission array: peacetime administration,
4 deterrence, training, and partner engagement versus
5 maintaining the capacity to conduct complex contingency
6 operations in peace and war.

7 The proliferation of resource directorates, J-8's;
8 joint intelligence centers, J-2's; security assistance
9 program offices, typically J-4's; partner engagement
10 entities, typically J-9's; and operations and training
11 staff, J-3's, is the result of this expansive assigned
12 mission set. And over time, the warfighting role of the
13 combatant commands has evolved to the almost exclusive use,
14 some would suggest excessive use, of joint task forces up to
15 and including four-star-led joint task forces to execute
16 assigned missions. The simple question in my mind is, can
17 the combatant command, no matter how well tailored, perform
18 each and every associated task with equal competence? I do
19 not think so and the attempt to infuse greater interagency
20 heft into the combatant commands has, in my experience,
21 detracted from the core operational focus in either
22 peacetime or in conflict.

23 How have we squared the tension between combatant
24 commands' peacetime and wartime roles? I would argue by
25 again extensive use of joint task force organizations to

1 execute operational missions. It is my conviction that the
2 efficacy of the task force employment model is beyond
3 dispute. The National Counterterrorism Joint Task Force
4 demonstrates conclusively in my mind the enduring value of
5 standing, mature, well-trained, and equipped joint task
6 forces. It may well be that high performance parallels
7 exist for national joint task forces in the surface,
8 maritime, and air domains as well. What we should continue,
9 however -- or what, I should say, we should discontinue is
10 the proliferation of joint task forces in each combatant
11 command with the attendant service components and
12 headquarters staffs. Task Force 510 in the Pacific Command
13 might qualify, however, as an exception to the rule.

14 In short, Mr. Chairman, we need to have within the
15 armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive
16 authority. We need to aggressively tailor combatant command
17 headquarters composition to its core mission or missions and
18 refrain from creating subordinate joint task forces out of
19 service headquarters. And finally, we need to drive toward
20 employment of long-term, highly proficient national joint
21 task forces for combatant command employment.

22 Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
23 members of the committee for your attention this morning. I
24 trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble
25 cause of Goldwater-Nichols reform. Thank you, sir.

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[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]

1 Chairman McCain: Admiral Stavridis?

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1 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, RETIRED,
2 DEAN OF THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS
3 UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER COMMANDER OF U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
4 AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

5 Admiral Stavridis: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
6 Reed, other distinguished members, a pleasure to be back
7 with you and to be here with General Schwartz, who was not
8 only a service chief but a combatant commander, as well as
9 being Director of the Joint Staff. There is no one who can
10 talk more coherently to these issues than him. And as well,
11 my good friend, Dr. Chris Lamb, who I think an best address
12 the questions of planning and strategy that Senator Reed
13 raised a moment ago.

14 I spent 37 years in uniform. I spent probably a decade
15 of that in the Pentagon. I wish I had been at sea during
16 those years, but in that time, I managed to serve on the
17 staff of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
18 Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chairman of the
19 Joint Chiefs of Staff. So I have sort of seen inside the
20 building. And as Senator McCain mentioned, I was twice a
21 combatant commander, once in Europe and once in Southern
22 Command, Latin America and the Caribbean.

23 So I am going to simply walk into four or five ideas
24 that I think might be interesting for this committee to
25 discuss and debate. None of these are fully firmed ideas,

1 but I think they relate to the objective of what the
2 committee I think very correctly seeks to do as we sit here
3 kind of 3 decades after Goldwater-Nichols. And they all
4 relate in one way or another to how the Department is
5 organized.

6 So I am going to start with one that I think is
7 controversial but ought to be considered, and that is do we
8 need a cyber force for the United States. I would invite
9 you to think about where we were 100 years ago. We had an
10 Army, a Navy, and a Marine Corps. Did we have an Air Force?
11 Of course, not. We barely flew airplanes 100 years ago. I
12 would argue today it feels like that moment a few years
13 after the beach at Kitty Hawk, and my thought is clearly we
14 need a Cyber Command, and I think we are moving in that
15 direction. But I think it is time to think about whether we
16 want to accelerate that process because our vulnerabilities
17 in the cyber domain, in my view, are extraordinary, and we
18 are ill-prepared for them. And therefore, some part of our
19 response will have to be done by the Department of Defense,
20 and the sooner we have not only a Cyber Command, but in my
21 view a cyber force, small, capable, I think we would be well
22 served. I think we should have that discussion.

23 Secondly, to the question of the interagency and the
24 power of how to bring those parts of the government
25 together, I think an interesting organizational change to

1 consider would be at each of the regional combatant commands
2 to have a deputy who is a U.S. ambassador or perhaps some
3 other senior diplomat. I think you would need to continue
4 to have a military deputy in order to conduct military
5 operations, but a great deal of what combatant commands do
6 is diplomatic in nature. And I think having a senior
7 representative from the interagency present would be
8 salutary. This has been tried at SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and
9 AFRICOM at one time or another, and I think it would be an
10 effective and interesting idea to consider as you look at
11 the combatant commands.

12 Thirdly -- and the chairman mentioned this -- in my
13 view geographically we have too many combatant commands. We
14 have six today. I think we should seriously consider
15 merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM and merging EUCOM and AFRICOM.
16 I think there are obvious efficiencies in doing so. I think
17 there are operational additional benefits that derive. And
18 I think finally it is a way to begin reducing what has
19 correctly been identified as the bloat in the operational
20 combatant command staffs.

21 Fourth, I would associate myself with General Schwartz
22 and a number of others who have testified with the idea that
23 we should consider an independent general staff and
24 strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
25 of Staff. Frankly, in practice, as a combatant commander I

1 would very typically call the Chairman, check signals with
2 the Chairman. I would not undertake a radical departure
3 without talking to the Chairman. I think putting the
4 Chairman in the chain of command, as General Schwartz has
5 outlined and a number of other witnesses have mentioned, is
6 efficient, sensible, and frankly codifies what is in effect
7 today in many ways.

8 In addition, I think that Chairman would be well served
9 with what some have termed a general staff. This is the
10 idea of taking mid-grade military officers of extraordinary
11 promise and pulling them from their services and more or
12 less permanently assigning them to this general staff. This
13 model has been used in other points by other nations in
14 history. I think it is a powerful way to create
15 efficiencies and avoid duplication because by doing so, you
16 can reduce a great deal of what happens in the combatant
17 commands today. So in addition to strengthening the
18 position of the Chairman, I think it would be worth
19 considering whether a general staff model would make sense.

20 Fifth and finally, I think that we talk a great deal,
21 appropriately, about joint operations. It is important to
22 remember that joint education is extraordinarily important
23 in both ultimately the conduct of operations, the creation
24 of strategy, the intellectual content of our services. So I
25 would advocate considering whether we should integrate our

1 joint educational institutions, probably by taking the
2 National Defense University, putting it back to three-star
3 rank, and giving that officer directive authority over the
4 Nation's war colleges. This would also create a reservoir
5 of intellectual capability, which I think could match up
6 well with the idea of a general staff.

7 All five of those ideas are controversial, but I think
8 they should be part of the conversation that this committee
9 is unpackaging, which is one that is deeply important for
10 the Nation's security. Thank you.

11 [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, Admiral.

2 Dr. Lamb?

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
2 OF THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
3 DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

4 Dr. Lamb: Senator McCain, Senator Reed, and members of
5 the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my
6 views on improving the effectiveness of military operations
7 this morning. Your invitation to testify is a great honor
8 and especially so considering the distinguished service of
9 your other witnesses today, General Schwartz and Admiral
10 Stavridis. It is the high point of my career to be sitting
11 with them today and in front of you, and I am really, truly
12 humbled by the opportunity.

13 I also want to acknowledge the presence of my wife who,
14 in light of the unconventional things I am about to say,
15 decided I needed moral support, and I agree with her.

16 Chairman McCain: We will hold her in no way
17 responsible.

18 [Laughter.]

19 Dr. Lamb: She will appreciate that I know.

20 In my written statement, I argued for three sets of
21 organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of U.S.
22 military operations.

23 First, to correct a persistent lack of preparedness for
24 irregular threats, I argue that we should give USSOCOM the
25 lead for small unit irregular conflict and the Marine Corps

1 the lead for larger irregular conflicts.

2 Second, to make the best possible investments in
3 military capabilities and maintain our advantages in major
4 combat operations, I believe we should encourage the use of
5 horizontal teams in the Department of Defense and support
6 their work with collaborative management or joint scenarios,
7 operating concepts, data, methods of analysis, risk metrics,
8 and institutional knowledge. And I completely agree with
9 General Schwartz that we need to reinvigorate our approach
10 to joint headquarters so that we have standing task forces
11 ready to experiment with and test new joint concepts.

12 And then, finally, to better integrate military
13 operations with other instruments of national power, I
14 believe we need legislation that allows the President to
15 empower leaders to run interagency teams.

16 None of these recommendations are unique to me, and
17 they have all been made before by various groups and
18 individuals. But I hope now is an opportune time for the
19 Senate and the leadership in the Department of Defense to
20 reconsider their merits.

21 In the brief time remaining, I would like to address
22 some likely questions about these recommendations,
23 particularly with respect to horizontal or sometimes
24 referred to as cross-functional teams because I know that
25 members of the committee have expressed some interest in

1 that. And so I want to raise a number of questions that are
2 likely to come up in this area.

3 First of all, it is often asked whether all national
4 security problems are not inherently complex and therefore
5 require cross-functional teams. My response to that would
6 be no. Clausewitz famously argued the most important
7 judgment a statesman and commander have to make is
8 determining, quote, the kind of war in which they are
9 embarking, neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it
10 into something that is alien to its nature.

11 I think the same thing holds true for national security
12 problems more generally. We need to determine the kind of
13 problem being addressed. Not all military tasks are
14 intrinsically joint. Not all national security missions are
15 intrinsically interagency. If we say otherwise, we greatly
16 increase the risks of failing to bring the right type of
17 expertise to bear on the problem at hand.

18 Another question that frequently arises is whether all
19 groups with representatives from functional organizations
20 are, in effect, cross-functional teams. No. There is a
21 huge difference between a committee and a team in the
22 executive branch. The members of the committee, to use some
23 shorthand, typically give priority to protecting their
24 parent organization's equities, and the members of a cross-
25 functional team give priority to the team mission.

1 So why do some groups work like teams and some groups
2 work like committees? For example, why do all executive
3 branch cross-functional groups not work as well as, say, an
4 Army battalion headquarters, which also has to integrate
5 functional expertise from the artillery, the infantry,
6 armor, et cetera? Well, I think the answer is that the
7 difference is the degree of autonomy exercised by the
8 functional organizations and the degree of oversight
9 exercised by their common authority. In a battalion
10 headquarters, all the participants share a cross-cutting
11 culture, have the obligation to follow legal orders, and
12 receive direct and ongoing supervision from the battalion
13 commander. Most interagency groups consist of members from
14 organizations with quite different cultures, different legal
15 authorities and obligations, and no supervision from the
16 only person in the system with the authority to direct their
17 behavior, the President.

18 Another question often raised is whether we do not
19 already have in effect good interagency teams with empowered
20 leaders, for example, the State Department's country teams.
21 Ambassadors, after all, have been given chief of mission
22 authority by the President.

23 Well, first of all, there are notable exceptions to
24 that authority to the ambassador, particularly with respect
25 to military and covert operations. But in any case, the

1 ambassador's authority is not sufficient. Many ambassadors
2 are perceived as representing State's interests rather than
3 national interests. Hence, the country team members often
4 feel justified in working around the ambassador, and the
5 direct supervision of the President is so far removed that
6 many of the people on the country teams feel that they can
7 do that and actually be rewarded by their parent
8 organizations for doing so.

9 I will stop there, but I want to close by anticipating
10 one final reaction to the proposals for horizontal teams.
11 Some will invariably complain that this is all rather
12 complicated and that at the end of the day, we are better
13 off just finding and appointing good leaders. This is an
14 understandable but dangerous simplification.

15 First, as Jim Locher likes to say, there is no need to
16 choose between good leaders and good organizations. We need
17 both. Horizontal teams cannot be employed to good effect
18 without supportive and attentive senior leaders, but neither
19 can senior leaders of functional organizations solve complex
20 problems without organizations that are engineered to
21 support cross-cutting teams.

22 Second, in the current environment, titular leaders
23 simply lack the time to supervise every or even the most
24 important cross-cutting problems. Neither is it sufficient
25 to simply insist that their subordinates, quote, get along.

1 The heads of functional organizations have an obligation to
2 represent their organization's perspectives and expertise.
3 This obligation, reinforced by bureaucratic norms and human
4 nature, ensures that group members with diverse expertise
5 will clash. Conflicting views are healthy, but they must be
6 productively resolved in a way that gives priority to
7 mission success and not less noble factors.

8 Finally, I would dare to say that the intense focus on
9 leadership, particularly in this town, has always struck me
10 as rather un-American. Our Founding Fathers realized the
11 American people needed more than good leadership. They paid
12 great attention to organizing the government so that it
13 would work well or work well enough, even if it is not
14 always led by saints and savants. We should do the same
15 with respect to the Department of Defense and the national
16 security system. Right now, I do not believe the men and
17 women who go in harm's way for our collective security are
18 backed up by the best possible policy, strategy, planning,
19 and decision-making system. That can and should change, and
20 I am glad the committee is looking into this matter.

21 Thank you again for this opportunity to share some
22 results of our research at National Defense University. I
23 look forward to answering any questions you might have.

24 [The prepared statement of Dr. Lamb follows:]

25

1 Chairman McCain: Thank you very much, Doctor.

2 Let us start out with a fairly easy one. Is there a
3 reason why we should have a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM? And is
4 there a reason for us to have an AFRICOM that is based in
5 Germany right next to your old command, Admiral Stavridis?
6 And let me add onto that question. Is there not now a need,
7 as much as we are trying to reduce and streamline -- is
8 there not now a need for a Cyber Command, given the nature
9 of that threat? I will begin with you, General.

10 General Schwartz: Sir, the original thinking on
11 NORTHCOM was concern about having assigned forces to a
12 senior officer with responsibility for the U.S., the
13 domestic circumstances. That notion foreclosed at the time
14 the possibility of having a joint command for both North and
15 South America. It is time now with the passage of time to
16 consolidate both of those organizations, as Admiral
17 Stavridis suggested.

18 The rationale for AFRICOM was somewhat different. As
19 you will recall, there was actually an effort to place
20 AFRICOM on the African continent.

21 Chairman McCain: That did not turn out too well.

22 General Schwartz: It did not. But you can appreciate
23 how that thought process sort of preempted other
24 considerations at the time. But again, with the passage of
25 time, that is an act of consolidation that certainly makes

1 sense to me.

2 And with respect to CYBERCOM, yes. Once they have
3 assigned forces, it is time to establish CYBERCOM as an
4 independent COCOM.

5 Chairman McCain: Admiral?

6 Admiral Stavridis: Sir, I think we absolutely should
7 merge NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, not only for the efficiencies,
8 but I think there are cultural connections that are
9 important to get Canada and Mexico, two of the largest
10 economies in the Americas, into the flow with our work and
11 our world to the south. Predictably, there will be some
12 objections based on NORAD. I think that can be easily
13 handled with a subunified command in some way.

14 AFRICOM was a good experiment, but I think it is time
15 to admit merging it back together. The forces, as you said,
16 are all in Europe. And I think those connections between
17 Europe and Africa actually would be very positive and in
18 some sense well received in the African world.

19 And then Cyber Command I have already addressed. I
20 think it is absolutely time to do it. The real question we
21 should be considering, do we want to go one step further to
22 a cyber force?

23 Chairman McCain: That is really important. Thank you.

24 Doctor?

25 Dr. Lamb: I would not have strong feelings on the span

1 of control we assign to the combatant commands, but I would
2 make the following observation. I think that decision is
3 probably best linked to other recommendations that have been
4 made here today, including whether we increase and beef up
5 our ability to field joint task forces, standing joint task
6 forces, whether we have a general staff, or we have the
7 Chairman in the chain of command. I think that would impact
8 a lot the effective span of control the combatant commanders
9 could exercise.

10 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

11 And this whole issue of the joint task forces I think
12 is one of the most important aspects of it, obviously, since
13 there is now a gap between the organizations in being and
14 the appointment in every crisis of a joint task force,
15 whether it comes from that command or from others. It is
16 obvious that is where the operations are.

17 Finally, in a more philosophical plane here, one of the
18 much criticized but yet pretty successful staff structure
19 has been the German general staff, names like Schlieffen and
20 Ludendorff and others, as well as Keitel and others. And
21 every time we start talking about centralizing authority in
22 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that issue is
23 raised. The German general staff system is not something
24 that we want to emulate, and yet, there are others who say
25 that it was not because of the staff system that they lost,

1 it was for other reasons.

2 So give me more of a fundamental view. Do you want to
3 centralize this much power in the hands of one individual or
4 authority in the hands of this one individual? General?

5 General Schwartz: Mr. Chairman, I would not create a
6 general staff. I actually believe that there is risk of
7 having the brilliant few become self-serving. However, it
8 is not necessary that a Chairman in the chain of command
9 connect to a general staff. By retaining a similar
10 arrangement as we have now, where the Joint Staff is a
11 creature of the Joint Chiefs, you minimize concern about a
12 rogue individual.

13 Admiral Stavridis: I would at least have a robust
14 discussion about the pros and cons of a general staff, in
15 addition to placing the Chairman atop it operationally.

16 In terms of the concerns raised about the German
17 general staff, you know, that rattles old ghosts in our
18 memories, but at the end of the day, it was political
19 leadership and economic collapse in Germany that led to the
20 rise of fascism. The German general staff was perhaps a
21 tool of that.

22 I think here in the United States, the culture in the
23 military is so strongly one of subservience to civilian
24 leadership that I would not believe that to be a significant
25 concern when weighed against the efficiencies that could be

1 derived from such a structure.

2 Dr. Lamb: I would just second what Admiral Stavridis
3 said about there not being a threat to civilian control of
4 the military from a general staff. But I do think it is
5 worthwhile for the committee to ask or take up an issue that
6 Michele Flournoy raised earlier in the week about the
7 tyranny of consensus. Even compared to OSD, the Joint Staff
8 is well known for its extensive coordination to ensure
9 consensus on positions that are forwarded to the Chairman.
10 And I think it would be very interesting to hear from former
11 Chairmen or the current Chairman what they think of their
12 staff's performance in that regard and for the committee to
13 get to the heart of why consensus tends to rule in the way
14 the Joint Staff operates and runs. I think it has not
15 served us particularly well or the Chairman particularly
16 well to date.

17 Chairman McCain: Well, I just would finally make a
18 comment, and that is that being a student of World War II,
19 they did not have any of all this stuff. There were just
20 some very brilliant guys named Marshall and Leahy and King
21 and others that won the most seminal war probably of modern
22 times. So I do not know how we look at that aspect of it,
23 but it certainly was the major factor in winning World War
24 II.

25 Senator Reed?

1 Senator Reed: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 And thank you, gentlemen, for your very, very
3 thoughtful testimony.

4 Two issues are emerging, among many. One is putting
5 the Chairman in the chain of command, and two, creating a
6 general staff. And there are pros and cons, as Admiral
7 Stavridis pointed out. And since you gentlemen are some of
8 the most intellectually honest people I know, it helps us --
9 we get the pros a lot. What is the con? What do you worry
10 about, General Schwartz? If we had a Chairman in the chain
11 of command -- if we did it, we would have to create sort of
12 a buffer against those downsides. So both you and Admiral
13 Stavridis, please, and Dr. Lamb.

14 General Schwartz: The traditional thinking of having
15 the Chairman in the chain of command is potentials for
16 abuse, for excessive exercise of one's authority, and
17 undermining, as Chris Lamb mentioned, the fundamental
18 principle of civilian authority. That is the downside.

19 But I believe that -- and given my experience -- the
20 Chairman and the Secretary operate so closely in today's
21 environment that there is a level of supervision which
22 mitigates that possibility. But that is a legitimate
23 consideration.

24 Senator Reed: Let me follow up with a question. Even
25 in your concept of putting the Chairman in the chain, he

1 would be still subordinate to the Secretary of the Defense.

2 General Schwartz: Of course, exactly. Correct.

3 Senator Reed: The practical effect would be injecting
4 him between the service chiefs and service secretaries?

5 What is the practical effect?

6 General Schwartz: The practical effect is that there
7 is an authoritative referee in uniform. At the moment, that
8 authoritative referee is either the Deputy Secretary or the
9 Secretary. And it seems to me that having someone in
10 uniform with executive authority, properly supervised
11 contributes to effective activity.

12 Senator Reed: Admiral Stavridis, your points on both
13 these issues, the general staff, standalone general staff,
14 and the Chairman in the chain.

15 Admiral Stavridis: Sir, let me take the Chairman
16 position first. We have identified and already correctly
17 identified one of the cons. I will give you another one.
18 It is having put that much power and authority into one
19 person, what if you get an extremely mediocre Chairman,
20 someone who is not smart, not effective? We have a very
21 good up and out system. We are probably going to get a very
22 good Chairman. But that level of power and authority -- you
23 need to worry not only about abuse of power but lack of
24 capability in it as well.

25 In terms of the general staff, I think a con would be

1 that a general staff, because the officers would have been
2 plucked out of their services at the 04/05 level in their
3 late 30's, they would not have the robust level of
4 operational experience that we see on the Joint Staff today.
5 That would be a con. Again, my intuition is that in both
6 cases the pros would outweigh the cons, but that would be
7 part of the conversation, looking at both sides.

8 Senator Reed: Dr. Lamb, your comments.

9 Dr. Lamb: First, with respect to the Chairman in the
10 chain of command, I think I would agree with General
11 Schwartz that in the past the relationship between the
12 Chairman and the Secretary has been extremely tight. And so
13 I am not sure what the value added in inserting someone
14 formally into the chain of command is. There are issues
15 there. Some Chairman and Secretary teams have worked very
16 closely, and the Secretary's interests and decisions have
17 been passed through the Chairman. And in other cases, you
18 can think of Secretaries who have dealt directly with the
19 combatant commanders at length. So I think I would be kind
20 of agnostic on that, but I am generally inclined to believe
21 there is not a lot of value added to that.

22 The more important decisions that I think the Chairman
23 needs to work on are future force development. This is
24 where we really have to work hard to preserve the
25 qualitative advantages that we currently enjoy and which I

1 think most people agree are diminishing. And there, to get
2 to the issue of the general staff, I think he needs really
3 dedicated, deep expertise on his staff, and currently we
4 tend not to have that. We bring people directly in from
5 operational commands who have never worked those broad
6 issues before. We throw them at a problem for a couple
7 years, then rotate them out. My view would be that more
8 stability like a general staff would bring to the Chairman
9 would probably be a good thing on the whole.

10 Senator Reed: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank
11 you for your service and for your testimony.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst?

13 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

14 Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. It is nice
15 to have you here. Some interesting comments.

16 Admiral and Dr. Lamb, if you would please. In 2009, in
17 relation to the DOD, former DOD Secretary Bob Gates said
18 this is a Department that principally plans for war. It is
19 not organized to wage war, and that is what I am trying to
20 fix. Again, that was from Bob Gates.

21 And from both of you, please, do you believe that it
22 can be fixed within the Department? And if so, if you could
23 share your thoughts on that. Yes, please. General, go
24 ahead.

25 General Schwartz: I agree that the model for

1 employment -- once again, I would try to reemphasize my
2 earlier point, that we have migrated perhaps more by chance
3 than by design, but the joint task forces are the way we
4 operate today. And it seems to me that professionalizing
5 those entities in the same way that we have grown the
6 special operations national joint task force is the model
7 for the future in the other operating domains.

8 Senator Ernst: Thank you.

9 Admiral Stavridis: I agree with General Schwartz as a
10 general position. I think we should make the point that the
11 Department of Defense today operates very effectively in a
12 number of venues, but we could be better and more efficient
13 if we had a model like General Schwartz is suggesting in my
14 view.

15 Dr. Lamb: I really appreciate the question. I am
16 personally fascinated by Secretary Gates and his tenure as
17 Secretary of Defense. I think he is a remarkable man, and
18 he has been very candid in his memoirs about the experience
19 he had leading the Department of Defense at a time of war.
20 And I have looked at what he had to say very carefully, and
21 I think it is interesting.

22 And what really seemed to frustrate him was that even
23 though we had troops on the battlefield in contact with the
24 enemy, the service chiefs were called to their statutory
25 obligation to raise, train, and equip the force of the

1 future, and he could not get enough capability in the field
2 for the problem we were currently trying to master. And
3 this was a source of great frustration to the Secretary, and
4 I think it underlies the comment that you just quoted him
5 on.

6 But for me, the problem there was in part our lack of
7 preparedness for irregular warfare. The services, whether
8 we are talking about preparing for future irregular
9 conflicts or we are engaged in them currently, have always
10 given priority to what they consider their core
11 responsibility of fighting and winning the Nation's large-
12 scale force-on-force conflicts. We have never been very
13 good at being prepared for irregular war, and I think that
14 is true over the last 60 years.

15 So I think we do need some changes there. But for me,
16 the solution there is to put someone definitively in charge
17 of being prepared for irregular conflict. That is something
18 we have not done. We always turn to all the services and
19 say you are all equally responsible for being prepared for
20 irregular conflict, and they invariably consider a lesser
21 included case. So we do not go to those conflicts thinking
22 about them, planning for them, prepared for them with the
23 niche capabilities, et cetera. I think that is what
24 frustrated the Secretary, and I think it can and should be
25 fixed.

1 Senator Ernst: Yes, and there were a lot of very
2 provocative comments that the Secretary has made, and that
3 is good because now we are spending the time talking about
4 some of those reforms and thoughts that he had in regards to
5 irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare. We really did not
6 start talking -- at least I was not so much aware of it
7 until about 15 years ago or so when we really started taking
8 a look at our force.

9 But how can we empower those combatant commanders to
10 take that prudent risk and make those decisions on their
11 own? Do we empower them to do that, or how can we empower
12 them to do that? Any thoughts? Or does it need to be a
13 top-down approach? Why can it not be a more bottom-up
14 approach in taking some of those risks? General?

15 General Schwartz: I think thoughtful combatant
16 commanders like Jim Stavridis did exactly that. However, it
17 is important to assign missions and to distinguished what
18 the priorities are. That is a function of the Pentagon in
19 this town. And we have not been terribly good at that.

20 Senator Ernst: We have not. Thank you, General.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Manchin?

22 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 And thank all of you for your service.

24 And I am going to direct these to General Schwartz and
25 Admiral Stavridis.

1 I am so appreciative of you all coming and so candid
2 with us and tell us exactly what you have seen and what your
3 experience. The hard thing I am having a hard time with,
4 why either you cannot make these changes when you are in
5 that command, when you are on the front line, when you are
6 in charge. Is the system bogged down to where we are
7 throwing so much stuff at you from here to the
8 intermediators that is coming to us? But also, how do we
9 keep the separation of the civilian oversight, as we do,
10 which is unbelievable, and I am glad we do. And that is the
11 concern we might have, the balance.

12 But you know, when you have -- the 2010 report by
13 McKinsey and Company found that less than 25 percent, or
14 one-quarter, of active duty troops were in combat roles,
15 with the majority instead performing overhead activities.
16 And if you look at it from the standpoint of all the pay
17 increases, we are giving the same pay increases to 75
18 percent of the people who do not see any action. I think we
19 need to know from you now in your role, not being
20 constrained in your remarks, how do we get to where you are
21 able to make the decision when you are in charge and in
22 power. They are saying they cannot be made. The military
23 cannot change. Under the Goldwater Act that we had way back
24 when, that only we can force it from here. But yet, we have
25 thrown so many regulations and so many oversights, that it

1 makes it impossible to govern. Where is the intermediate?
2 Who makes that decision? Is there a commission that should
3 be in place?

4 And for those who are concerned about giving total
5 power to the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, still having the
6 civilians in the control in an advisory capacity -- I do not
7 know how to circumnavigate this.

8 And the final question you all two can answer. I know
9 that we are talking about NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. I would
10 ask the same question about National Guard and Reserves. I
11 as a Governor, former Governor. I was over my Guard. And I
12 would have gladly shared with the President, and if the only
13 reason we have the Reserves doing what they are doing and
14 the Guard doing what they are doing is because of separation
15 of oversight, it does not make any sense to me. We could
16 save a tremendous amount and use our Guard and Reserves in a
17 much more, I think, effective role and much more cost-
18 effective. But I do not see that happening either.

19 So whoever wants to chime in, please do.

20 General Schwartz: Thank you.

21 I actually believe that giving the Chairman, hopefully
22 a very capable individual, directive authority, executive
23 authority would change the dynamic in what you are saying.

24 Senator Manchin: And right now, you are saying that
25 that person does not have that.

1 General Schwartz: At the moment, he does not have
2 that. He can encourage. He can persuade, but he cannot
3 compel. And that is not a business-like approach to the
4 problem.

5 Secondly, with regard to the Guard and Reserve, it is
6 at least in part a function of the statutory authority, as
7 you are aware being a former Governor and others here on the
8 dais. The Reserve is a Title 10 entity which is responsive
9 to the service leadership, and the Guard, of course, is
10 Title 32 and a little more complex arrangement. And I think
11 it is safe to say that at least the Army and the Air Force
12 have a preference for maintaining both of those entities
13 because access to the Reserve is cleaner and more
14 expeditious in most cases than it is in some cases with the
15 Guard.

16 Senator Manchin: Admiral?

17 Admiral Stavridis: A couple of thoughts, sir. You do
18 touch on, I think, an important aspect of all this, which is
19 reforming pay, benefits. I think those authorities derive
20 from all of you here on Capitol Hill based on proposals that
21 can come, and I think you are spot-on to look at why do we
22 pay an O3 essentially exactly the same amount of money.

23 Senator Manchin: Right.

24 Admiral Stavridis: It really is in my view ripe for a
25 new look. You could drive it from here, but I think in the

1 building, they have the authority to build that into
2 proposals and move it forward. And I hope you spur them to
3 do it.

4 In terms of authorities to really make changes, I think
5 providing the SecDef more authority to go into government
6 and move civilians that have been there, simple authorities
7 over the GS system I think would be helpful in creating
8 efficiencies.

9 In terms of the Guard and Reserve, to the degree the
10 committee wants to really lick your finger, reach up, and
11 touch the third rail, you could look at an alternative model
12 in the maritime world. We have an Air Guard and a land
13 Guard, if you will, but we have a Coast Guard. The Coast
14 Guard resides, as you all well know, in the Department of
15 Homeland Security. It is a very different model. If you
16 want to look at efficiencies and structures, that might be
17 an interesting model to look at as to whether it pertains in
18 the air and on the land, as it seems to work quite
19 effectively in my view at sea.

20 So these are huge questions. In terms of do you need a
21 commission, I would say what this committee is doing right
22 now is the basis of driving these thoughts forward, and I
23 hope you continue at this.

24 Senator Manchin: Thank you, sir.

25 Chairman McCain: Senator Fischer?

1 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Gentlemen, recently a friend and I have been having
3 discussions on a 1984 speech by Caspar Weinberger, which of
4 course became known as the Weinberger Doctrine. And the
5 third rule that he laid out would be that military forces
6 should only be committed after the military and political
7 objectives have been clearly defined.

8 There has been criticism lately because of recent
9 campaigns that we have seen in Afghanistan and Syria,
10 criticisms that perhaps we have not seen that end result,
11 that end state really clearly defined. I think in future
12 conflicts, especially when we look at the cyber area, it is
13 going to be difficult. It is going to be a challenge there
14 to be able to define what is ahead.

15 I guess I would like to hear from all of you, if you
16 believe these evolving trends are going to change, how we
17 look at laying out those objectives in the future, and are
18 we going to be able to look at a comprehensive strategy and
19 comprehensive plan for the future? Or are we going to have
20 to look at it more incrementally as we move forward, and
21 what are the risks that would be involved with that? If I
22 could start with you, General.

23 General Schwartz: As I see it, ma'am, the role of
24 civilian leadership is to decide the why and the where, and
25 the role of the uniforms is to offer advice on the how.

1 Both are essential ingredients of success. And the desire
2 for clarity in the why and the where is important to those
3 who serve in uniform, without a doubt.

4 I think the clear thing here is that there is a need
5 for understanding that these are complex circumstances, but
6 it is important for there to be support for the mission.

7 And if I may offer an unsolicited piece of advice, the
8 absence of an authorization for use of military force in the
9 current setting is less than ideal.

10 Admiral Stavridis: I agree with General Schwartz.
11 Clearly, ideally the ideal structure, Senator, would be
12 crisp, clear direction from the political level, a coherent
13 strategy that has been explained to the American people and
14 has a reasonable level of support in our democracy. Then
15 the military conducts the detailed planning, which really is
16 the precision piece of this going forward. How to make that
17 link more effective -- I think a lot of what we are
18 discussing today would be helpful in that regard. And the
19 degree to which that our military can be given that kind of
20 strategic clarity will be the degree to which we are
21 successful in our engagements overseas.

22 Senator Fischer: So would you both say that that is a
23 rule that we as Members of the Senate should continue to
24 require to limit risk even into a future where the nature of
25 warfare may change?

1 Admiral Stavridis: Yes.

2 Senator Fischer: And, Dr. Lamb, if you had comments,
3 please.

4 Dr. Lamb: Yes. One of the jobs I had in the Pentagon
5 was helping prepare the contingency planning guidance and
6 the defense planning guidance and overseeing the Nation's
7 war plans for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
8 And one of my observations was that the operational plans
9 were crystal clear compared to the strategic guidance that
10 we often are able to promulgate. And I know that some of
11 your previous witnesses have talked about strategy from the
12 point of view of the need for more gray matter, greater
13 strategists, better strategists, et cetera.

14 My view is a little bit different. I think there are
15 political and bureaucratic forces at work that tend to
16 militate against strategy. You ask why do we not have a
17 clear end state. Why do we not have a clear center of
18 gravity? Why do we not marshal our resources against that
19 center of gravity, et cetera? I think the answer is
20 twofold.

21 First of all, in formulating a strategy with that kind
22 of clarity, right now there are great political and even
23 bureaucratic disincentives for that kind of clarity. So if
24 you say there are three ways to attack this problem and we
25 are going to choose door B, so to speak, someone will always

1 criticize you for not having taken option A or option C. So
2 the safer thing to do is to say we are going to do all those
3 things. So in the war on terrorism, we are going to
4 emphasize strategic communications and we are going to go
5 after the terrorists themselves and we are going to dissuade
6 state sponsors, and on and on and on. So if you look at all
7 of our public strategy documents, they are just long laundry
8 lists of objectives, and you do not have that clarity.

9 And then when it comes to implementing the strategy,
10 you similarly have bureaucratic forces at play. I am firmly
11 convinced, after a year of study, that a lot of popular
12 opinion about what went wrong in Iraq is in fact wrong.
13 Because of the point we just made about formulating
14 strategy, if you have real strategy, it really exists not on
15 paper but in the minds of the key decision-makers because
16 they cannot promulgate the strategy for the reasons I just
17 mentioned. So it is in their minds. So if you are going to
18 get a clear, cohesive implementation of the strategy,
19 everybody has to be working together and have a mind-meld,
20 if you will.

21 That did not happen in Iraq, and we could go into
22 detail on why that did not happen. But the point is we had
23 people in one part of our national security system working
24 very hard to go in one direction and people on the ground in
25 Baghdad supported by other people trying to go in a

1 different direction. And the results were not good.

2 So when it comes to strategy, I think we have political
3 and bureaucratic problems. And it is one reason I favor
4 these cross-functional teams. I think they can put the
5 strategy together and have a better chance of implementing
6 it in a cohesive and a unified way.

7 Senator Fischer: Thank you.

8 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine?

9 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

10 And I appreciate Senator Fischer bringing up the
11 Weinberger Doctrine and, General Schwartz, your comment
12 about the authorization. I think there are many reasons why
13 an authorization is really important. One is just the legal
14 requirements of Article I and Article II. The second is the
15 sign of resolve that you show to adversaries, allies, and
16 especially your troops. But the third is sort of the one
17 that the Weinberger Doctrine gets at, which is it helps you
18 clash out at the beginning what is the mission and goal. So
19 traditionally the President would present an authorization,
20 but then Congress usually does not just accept it verbatim.
21 President Bush presented an authorization right after the
22 attack on 9/11. Congress rejected the originally presented
23 version and batted it around and came up with something
24 different.

25 The war against ISIL is one that we started on August

1 8th, 2014 -- the President to protect Yazidis on Mount
2 Sinjar and to protect the American consulate in Irbil. But
3 within a couple of weeks, it was, okay, now we have to go on
4 offense, but we did not have the discussion. We did not
5 have the administration's presentation of the rationale and
6 then the withering cross examination that that deserves. I
7 fault the President for not sending an authorization to
8 Congress for, I mean, essentially 6 months after the
9 beginning of the war, and now it has been 10 months since
10 the President sent an authorization. We still really have
11 not had the discussion that you ought to have at the front
12 end if you are going to ask people to risk their lives. So
13 I think the Weinberger Doctrine is a good way to look at it.

14 A couple questions just to clarify. You have all
15 offered some interesting ideas. So, Admiral Stavridis, the
16 cyber force. Just walk through, if you are looking 15 years
17 ahead, how does that look. There is a force. There is a
18 command. Is there a cyber academy? Most of us have just
19 done our service academy nominations. Is there a cyber
20 academy? Talk to us about what that would look like.

21 Admiral Stavridis: I can. I think it is small. It is
22 probably numbered in thousands of members, so quite small,
23 less than 10,000 probably.

24 I think what you have today is each of the service
25 academies is building inside itself a small cyber academy,

1 and this is kind of the inefficiency of it that I think we
2 need to overcome.

3 So, yes, I think there would be an educational
4 pipeline. I think there would be a career path. I think
5 you would have to get away from some of the, if you will,
6 traditional go to boot camp, shave your head, crawl your way
7 up a hierarchical organization. I am not sure that is going
8 to attract the kind of people we need in a cyber force. So
9 it probably has somewhat different paid benefits back to
10 Senator Manchin's question a moment ago about are we paying
11 the right people the right amount. So this may be a highly
12 paid cadre. I think probably the closest analog to what we
13 have, quite obviously, is special forces, and that is
14 roughly what it would look like.

15 I do believe it is time we get after this because I
16 think our vulnerabilities are significant in this area.

17 Senator Kaine: A second question to another idea you
18 had. I thought it was intriguing, the idea of an
19 ambassadorial level sort of civilian deputy within the
20 COCOMs. And I gather there is sort of an unstated
21 assumption that is kind of about the nature of the American
22 military mission now that so much of it is diplomacy, you
23 know, the nations that want us to send the special purpose
24 MAGTFs throughout Africa to train their militaries. I mean,
25 so much of it is kind of on the border between diplomacy and

1 military or working out with the Japanese the Okinawan
2 situation. That is diplomatic as much as it is military.
3 Is that sort of your thinking behind the recommendation?

4 Admiral Stavridis: It is. The structure, as it was in
5 effect when I was at Southern Command and while I was at
6 U.S. European Command, I had a military deputy, and I think
7 you need to continue to have a military deputy for the
8 conduct --

9 Senator Kaine: Operations.

10 Admiral Stavridis: -- of operations.

11 But we also had, instead of a POLAD, a political
12 advisor from the State Department -- we had a senior
13 ambassador who was our civilian deputy, and he or she was
14 capable of doing that kind of engagement, diplomatic work,
15 working with host nations, helped resolve innumerable
16 individual challenges in, if you will, the smart power side
17 of the equation. It is low cost, and it also is a strong
18 signal to the interagency about how we want to work together
19 to address problems that I think is salutary.

20 Senator Kaine: It sounds like a Fletcher School dean
21 idea.

22 And then, Dr. Lamb, one last question for you. The
23 idea that you advocate in your opening testimony about
24 having some primary responsibility for irregular war, if it
25 is small or if it is large, rather than everybody feeling

1 like the irregular wars are sort of a lesser responsibility,
2 which means we are not really preparing for regular wars.
3 Talk a little bit about that. Elaborate on that if you
4 would.

5 Dr. Lamb: Yes. I mean, I think that we have a
6 parallel with regard to special operations forces in
7 general. All the services, before we combined them under
8 SOCOM, had special operations forces. They knew what they
9 wanted to use them for, et cetera. But they were not a
10 priority for the services. So Congress in its wisdom -- and
11 I think rightly so -- created USSOCOM, and we now have
12 world-class special operations forces particularly for the
13 high value target mission. So the direct action, go there,
14 go to a site, get what you need done, and come back. We
15 have unparalleled capabilities. And those have only
16 improved over the last 10 or 15 years.

17 But when it comes to working by, with, or through host
18 nation forces, we are not quite as sharp. And there is a
19 number of complex reasons for that which have been discussed
20 by many individuals. But I think the committee needs to
21 take that issue up with SOCOM. SOCOM leadership has
22 repeatedly told Congress that they think the indirect
23 mission is in fact more important and they intend to improve
24 their indirect capabilities. But whether or not that is
25 happening I think is a matter of great import.

1 With regard to the Marine Corps, not every problem,
2 unfortunately, not every low end of the conflict spectrum
3 problem could be handled with a small special operations
4 team. So the question is who in the Department of Defense,
5 amongst all our forces, is really responsible for being
6 prepared for that mission. Time and time again, we go on
7 these missions, whether it is Panama, Somalia, Bosnia. We
8 go on these missions not really prepared for them, kind of
9 learning on the job, seeing what the situation demands, not
10 having the equipment, as Secretary Gates found, not only not
11 having the equipment, but not being able to generate it
12 quickly in response even to urgent requests from forces in
13 the field.

14 I think we can do better than that. The Marine Corps,
15 from my point of view, would work well in that regard for a
16 number of reasons. It has a history of greater involvement
17 in these. It is already kind of a joint force with
18 amphibious, air, land capabilities that are well integrated.
19 So there is a lot of advantages there.

20 I think we have come to a point where we cannot afford
21 all the duplication we have without some clarification of
22 roles in the Department. So this is something that made
23 sense to me.

24 Senator Kaine: I thank all of you.

25 And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Ayotte?

2 Senator Ayotte: Thank you, Chairman.

3 I want to thank all of you for being here today.

4 Admiral Stavridis, I wanted to ask you about your prior
5 position as Commander of SOUTHCOM. And we had testimony
6 this spring from General John Kelly, the Commander of
7 SOUTHCOM, about how the networks are working over our
8 southern border, the sophisticated smuggling networks that I
9 can assure you now, unfortunately, are being used to
10 devastate my State with how heroin is coming into my State,
11 but also the issue that he raised as well was that he
12 believed that adherents to ISIS have called for infiltration
13 of our southern border.

14 So I wanted to ask you about your thoughts on that in
15 terms of the use of those networks not only on things like
16 drugs, but also as we look at this terrorism challenge. Is
17 this something we should be worried about?

18 Admiral Stavridis: It absolutely is something we
19 should be worried about, Senator. And I have called this
20 before convergence, and it is the convergence of these drug
21 routes, which are extremely efficient, with the possibility
22 of using them to move terrorists or, at the really dark end
23 of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction, along with the
24 narcotics. So when those drug routes and those higher-level
25 threats converge -- convergence -- I think we are at great

1 risk.

2 What we should do about it is exactly what we are
3 talking about here is think holistically about how you
4 create a network to combat a network. This is a very
5 sophisticated, private-public, if you will, collaboration
6 with international abilities ranging from moving submarines
7 with 10 tons of cocaine to aircraft, et cetera, et cetera.
8 So you need to bring the interagency to bear. You need to
9 bring special operations to bear. And I think this also
10 argues for merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM because it creates
11 one sphere through which these routes are coming at us. So
12 there is a quick basket of ideas.

13 Senator Ayotte: I appreciate it. I do not know if
14 anyone else wants to comment on that. Thank you.

15 I also wanted to, not to pick on you today, Admiral,
16 but given your prior position as certainly the Commander of
17 NATO, what we have seen recently with Iran -- on October
18 10th, Iran conducted a ballistic missile test, a medium-
19 range missile, and then also recently we have learned that
20 they have tested a missile on November 21st. And as I look
21 at these, first of all, a clear violation of U.N.
22 resolutions. Also from what we understand, the reports
23 suggest that the missile tested last month has a range of
24 approximately 1,200 miles. So that would give Iran a
25 capability, of course, of hitting eastern Europe and places

1 that we are concerned about in the NATO context.

2 So I have been asking why are we not responding to
3 this, and what do you think our response should be? Should
4 there be some response? It strikes me as a very important
5 issue because it is already, in light of the JCPOA -- they
6 are violating existing U.N. resolutions. And it seems to me
7 if there is not some response from us, that they are going
8 to continue. Not only this does not bode well for the
9 JCPOA, but also to continue to develop ICBM capability, as
10 you know, that could go even further to hit the United
11 States.

12 Admiral Stavridis: As I have said often, Senator, we
13 ought to be concerned about Iran's nuclear program, but it
14 is a much bigger problem than that. Iran views itself as an
15 imperial power dating back 2 and a half millennia. They
16 currently are in control of five capitals in this region.
17 The JCPOA I think is going to shower resources upon them.
18 And so they are a highly dangerous opponent and will be
19 going forward.

20 So what should we do?

21 First, we should hold Iran to the commitments they have
22 made in the JCPOA, and if that means that agreement is
23 broken and we, therefore, return to a sanctions regime, we
24 need to face that.

25 Secondly, we need to use all of our clandestine, our

1 intelligence capability to truly understand what is going on
2 in Iran.

3 Thirdly, we need to stand with our Sunni allies in the
4 region and, of course, with Israel, who are going to be the
5 bulwark against this kind of expansion.

6 Fourthly, in Europe, as you well know, Senator -- I
7 took you around there -- we looked at the missile defense
8 system. We should continue to move in that direction. That
9 is kind of a beginning, but I think Iran will continue to be
10 a geopolitical threat to the United States.

11 Senator Ayotte: Thank you all.

12 Senator Reed [presiding]: Thank you, Senator.

13 On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Shaheen.

14 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

15 Thank you all very much both for your service and for
16 being here today.

17 Dr. Lamb, you talk about flattening the structure of
18 the military to set up special teams that have a commitment
19 to mission as opposed to what often interagency groups bring
20 to task. It seems to me that I really like that idea. I
21 think that one of the things -- if we look at the private
22 sector, one of the things they figured out is that the top-
23 down approach, a hierarchical approach, is not as good for
24 decision-making for what they are trying to accomplish as a
25 team approach.

1 But what are the challenges -- and I guess maybe I
2 ought to ask both General Schwartz and Admiral Stavridis
3 what you think the challenges are of trying to move from
4 what has been such a traditional hierarchical structure to
5 one that allows that team approach to really address the
6 challenges that we are facing? And, General Schwartz, do
7 you want to start?

8 General Schwartz: Sure. You know, I do not know,
9 ma'am, if the committee has had Stan McChrystal before you,
10 but here is an example, maybe the best recent example, of
11 how the team approach produces extraordinary results with
12 his organization. And he has written two books and what
13 have you. But the bottom line is that Chris Lamb's model
14 does work. There is evidence of that. And there is a new
15 generation of military leadership that gets it I think, and
16 we should support that, encourage it, and through your
17 oversight, mandate it.

18 Senator Shaheen: Admiral Stavridis?

19 Admiral Stavridis: A core question going forward. And
20 what mitigates against it, what makes it difficult, Senator
21 -- and you know this -- is the built-in structure of the
22 military. This is an organization where a million people
23 get up in the morning and put on the same outfit. I mean,
24 this is why we call it "uniforms." And you have got to
25 start cracking that mentality. We will -- I think General

1 Schwartz is spot-on -- because there is a generational
2 shift.

3 The question here is this is not an on and off switch
4 between a highly chaotic, Silicon Valley-like entity or a
5 Prussian-style military. It is a rheostat. We need to dial
6 that rheostat more toward team approaches, interagency,
7 international cooperation, strategic communication, all of
8 those smart power things without losing our ability to
9 deliver lethal combat power. I think we can do that. We
10 need to think of it as a rheostat that is turning in the
11 direction you identified.

12 Senator Shaheen: And, Dr. Lamb, you talked about the
13 Coast Guard having a different model. One of the things I
14 remember after the BP oil spill, when they were talking
15 about the response to rescuing people -- no. I am sorry.
16 Not the oil spill. Hurricane Katrina -- was that the Coast
17 Guard was very effective in responding I think both there
18 and on the BP oil spill because they were able to make
19 decisions on the spot without having to check with anybody.

20 So what is different about the Coast Guard model, and
21 how do you transfer what is effective about that? Or should
22 we be looking at transferring what is effective about that
23 to address some of the other challenges of building that
24 teamwork capacity?

25 Dr. Lamb: Well, when I was involved in the project,

1 national security reform, we spent some time looking at the
2 Coast Guard model. And the Coast Guard I think would say --
3 and Admiral Stavridis could speak to this, I think, more
4 directly. But I think they would say their leadership model
5 and their training and education model is different than
6 some of the other services. Because of their very nature,
7 they are used to thinking about problems in a cross-
8 functional way. They both serve the Department of Defense
9 in war and law enforcement in peacetime. And so they have
10 some natural advantages in that respect.

11 Senator Shaheen: So can you explain? When you say
12 their leadership model is different, their training is
13 different, what is different that gives them that different
14 ability to focus? Admiral Stavridis?

15 Admiral Stavridis: They begin their lives at the Coast
16 Guard Academy with an appreciation of the fact that they are
17 but one entity within the Department of Homeland Security,
18 which has 19 different entities within it. They know they
19 straddle that border between Title 10 combat operations, in
20 which they participated heroically many, many times, as well
21 as law enforcement, as well as rescue at sea, as well as
22 environmental. So their mission, their ethos, their
23 mentality is simply one of cooperation, working together.
24 It is hard to find a better integrated organization than the
25 Coast Guard. I think we could learn a lot from that.

1 General Schwartz: And they have much greater
2 experience with State and local leadership than typically do
3 the active duty forces.

4 Senator Shaheen: Thank you all very much.

5 Senator Reed: Thank you.

6 On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Sullivan, please.

7 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and your
9 years of service, decades of service to our country.

10 I wanted to focus a little bit, Admiral, on your
11 recommendation perhaps with regard to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
12 merging with a bit of a focus on the Arctic. General
13 Schwartz, I know that you have spent a lot of time in Alaska
14 and so have a sense of that. We have had a lot of
15 discussions here. Senator King and I and the chairman and a
16 lot of others are interested very much in what is going on
17 in the Arctic. Actually in this NDAA, there is a
18 requirement for the Secretary of Defense to put together an
19 Arctic operations plan for the first time, which we think is
20 progress.

21 But just given your background -- actually any of the
22 panelists. You know, one of the many challenges that we
23 have up there is that when you look at the Arctic, it is the
24 classic scenes of different combatant commands where its
25 forces are OPCOM to PACOM. Its advocate is NORTHCOM, and

1 its threat is primarily in EUCOM.

2 So you, I am sure, all noticed the very massive Russian
3 buildup. Actually just yesterday there was another article
4 about a new missile defense system that they are putting in
5 the Arctic, four new combat brigades, 11 new airfields, on
6 and on and on, huge exercises. And we are looking at
7 actually getting rid of the only airborne BCT in the entire
8 Asia-Pacific and in the Arctic. And as you know, General
9 Schwartz, that takes a lot of training to have your forces
10 up there well trained to be able to operate in 30 below
11 zero.

12 So I would just really appreciate your views on the
13 Arctic, but also how that NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM merger idea
14 would either enhance or merger idea would either enhance or
15 diminish -- we do not think it should be much more
16 diminished. We think there should be more attention on the
17 Arctic given all that is going on up there right now. Any
18 panelist, I would welcome your thoughts on it.

19 General Schwartz: I think it is important that the
20 Arctic be assigned as a mission to one of the combatant
21 commands. That has yet to happen. It should transpire.
22 That is point one.

23 Point two is a more pedestrian concern, but we only
24 have one operating icebreaker, Senator Sullivan. This is
25 unthinkable for the United States of America. And clearly,

1 that Coast Guard platform -- we need more of that, and we
2 need the other kinds of wherewithal that allow us to assert
3 our sovereignty in the Arctic.

4 Senator Sullivan: We have one and the Russians have 40
5 I believe.

6 General Schwartz: Understood, sir.

7 Admiral Stavridis: You are absolutely correct. Russia
8 has 38 plus 2 icebreakers. The Chinese, who are not an
9 Arctic power, to say the least, have 16 icebreakers, et
10 cetera. The Danes, a nation of 5 million, have eight
11 icebreakers. So this is actually beyond a pedestrian point.
12 It is a very good one.

13 I agree with assigning it to U.S. Northern Command in
14 its entirety. I think that it would not be diminished by
15 the merger between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When you look at
16 the level of activity to the south and what NORTHCOM is
17 doing, I think that could easily be folded into a unified
18 command responsibility, and I think it would be valuable
19 because it would further solidify our integration with
20 Canada, with whom we ought to be partnering in a very
21 significant way, as you know better than anybody, in the
22 north.

23 Lastly, we should be working with NATO to ensure that
24 NATO perceives this is a NATO frontier. This is a NATO
25 border. Canada and the United States are NATO nations. We

1 need to think of that border as importantly as we do as the
2 borders of the Alliance in eastern Europe and to the south
3 on the Mediterranean.

4 Senator Sullivan: General Schwartz, could you talk to
5 just the strategic location of those forces up there?
6 Because, you know, Admiral, when you talk about having it
7 completely with regard to unified under NORTHCOM, do you
8 think that the operational forces should also be under
9 NORTHCOM, given that they are very oriented towards the
10 Asia-Pacific? And as General Schwartz -- and I know you
11 know, sir, the strategic location of Alaska is such that
12 those forces, those air forces, those Army forces, can
13 really be anywhere in the northern hemisphere within 7-8
14 hours whether it is Korea or the Baltics. Would you mind
15 just talking on that for a bit, sir?

16 General Schwartz: Quickly, if the constraint of
17 assigned forces to the domestic four-star can be overcome,
18 that makes sense. To assign those assets in Alaska that
19 have the opportunity both to reinforce America's claims in
20 the Arctic, as well as be deployable for other missions that
21 might be assigned is certainly the right approach.

22 Admiral Stavridis: I would only add we talk a lot
23 about the unified command plan, which kind of divides the
24 world among the combatant commanders. The other important
25 document, Senator, is called the "Forces For" document,

1 which actually apportions and assigns those forces. It is
2 renegotiated typically every 2 years. I think as General
3 Schwartz indicates, that would be a very important new way
4 to think about force assignment.

5 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Chairman McCain [presiding]: Senator King?

8 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 A couple of quick points. Amen on the icebreakers. It
10 is preposterous that we do not have more significant
11 icebreaker capacity, particularly given what is happening in
12 the Arctic in terms of the opening up of the ice.

13 Secondly, would all of you agree that it would be
14 advantageous to the U.S. to accede to the Law of the Sea
15 Treaty?

16 Admiral Stavridis: Because I am an Admiral, I get to
17 go first.

18 Senator King: Yes, sir.

19 Admiral Stavridis: Yes.

20 Senator King: Thank you.

21 General, do you agree?

22 General Schwartz: And airmen agree with that.

23 Senator King: Thank you.

24 Dr. Lamb?

25 Dr. Lamb: Agnostic, sir.

1 Senator King: Agnostic on the treaty? All right. Two
2 to one. We will take those odds.

3 Chairman McCain: Could I ask why agnostic?

4 Dr. Lamb: I really have not studied it at length, but
5 I am concerned about our willingness to protect freedom of
6 navigation around the world and the way other nations are
7 interpreting their littoral areas and their control over
8 them. I am not quite sure of the impact of the Law of the
9 Sea Treaty on those kinds of issues.

10 Senator King: My concern is that other nations are
11 going through that process, making claims, and we are
12 standing on the sidelines. Your gestures will not show up
13 in the record. Could you --

14 Admiral Stavridis: I agree with your assessment. We
15 are much better inside that treaty than outside it in terms
16 of protecting our rights. We could have a long hearing on
17 the Law of the Sea, and I am sure such has been done. But
18 call me back up on that one anytime.

19 Senator King: Thank you.

20 I want to associate myself with the comments of Senator
21 Ayotte on this Iran ballistic missile test. It is hard to
22 interpret exactly what they are doing. There is some
23 thinking that maybe this is the struggle of the hardliners
24 and they are trying to torpedo the agreement. On the other
25 hand, it seems to me it would be very dangerous for us to

1 establish the precedent of blinking at violations. I am a
2 great believer that implementation is as important as
3 vision. I voted for the JCPOA but it was based upon an
4 understanding and expectation that it would be scrupulously
5 enforced. And I think this could be interpreted as an early
6 test of our resolve. And, General, I take it you agree.

7 General Schwartz: I certainly do. And if it is a
8 violation of U.N. resolutions, we should call that out
9 without hesitation.

10 Senator King: Thank you.

11 Admiral Stavridis: I agree with General Schwartz. I
12 agree with your comment as well.

13 I have been hopeful of this agreement, but I am
14 increasingly skeptical that it will be the right step for
15 U.S. national security. This certainly gives weight to the
16 negative side of that equation.

17 Senator King: Thank you.

18 Dr. Lamb, in your prepared remarks, you talked about
19 how we need to be thinking about unconventional warfare and
20 suggested several areas, one that I want to emphasize. You
21 talk about persuasive communication. In my view, there are
22 two fronts to the war with ISIS. One is military. The
23 other is ideas. And we are badly losing the war of ideas.
24 And it strikes me that that is a huge gap in our national
25 strategy. I know we are doing some things, but my sense is

1 it does not have the priority that it should. Would you
2 agree with that?

3 Dr. Lamb: Yes, I absolutely would. I think there are
4 two issues here, one substantive and one organizational.
5 Organizationally we are not well organized to treat the
6 issues of communications. We get public affairs, public
7 diplomacy, and then what used to be called psychological
8 operations.

9 Senator King: And USIA was abolished 15 years ago.

10 Dr. Lamb: Yes, yes. We do not have a dedicated
11 organization to deal with this anymore, and we are confused
12 about the difference between these different -- Americans
13 are very sensitive about government control or use of
14 information. And we are losing this game. I would actually
15 concur.

16 On the substantive front, we are having some real
17 political problems with deciding the best way to deal with
18 the issue, as General Dempsey once said, with the fact that
19 some terrorists happen to also be Muslim and Islamic. And
20 we want to emphasize that the Islamic religion is peaceful
21 and tolerant and so on and so forth, but we do have this
22 strain within that religion that sees the world differently.
23 And our ability to deal with that in a forthright way has
24 really been handicapped.

25 And actually I am surprised by the number of senior

1 leaders who have said in their memoirs from their tours of
2 duty during the past 15 years that this is an Achilles heel
3 for us and that we still have not effectively identified the
4 enemy we are up against and how best to deal with that, how
5 to turn that issue back into something that the Islamic
6 world debates itself about what it is going to do about this
7 virulent strain within it.

8 So I think substantively and organizationally we are
9 really on our heels in this regard. I could not agree more.

10 Senator King: And ultimately that is where this battle
11 will be won or lost in my view because there are now -- pick
12 a number -- 100,000, 200,000 jihadists. There are 1.6
13 billion Muslims. That is the battlefield. And it can only
14 be won within the Muslim community, but we have to lead it,
15 it seems to me, or we at least need to work with the
16 worldwide non-jihadist Muslim community.

17 General?

18 General Schwartz: Senator, I just would close by
19 saying we need to give voice to those who have escaped ISIL-
20 occupied areas.

21 Senator King: It seems to me a natural.

22 General Schwartz: Yes.

23 Admiral Stavridis: Just one last thought, if I could.
24 It is a battlefield, but it is also a marketplace. And we
25 have to compete. We have to recognize that. That is a very

1 important aspect of how we communicate. We are pretty good
2 at dominating markets. We should bring some of those skills
3 to bear.

4 Senator King: It is ironic in the extreme that we are
5 the people that invented Facebook and Twitter and all of
6 those things, and we are losing on that front.

7 Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. I have a lot of
8 other questions about the organization, but we will get to
9 those later. Thank you.

10 Chairman McCain: If you would like to ask an
11 additional question --

12 Senator King: One additional question on -- and maybe
13 this is for the record. We are talking about combining
14 several of the combatant commands, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM,
15 AFRICOM and Europe. Are there any savings to be had? And
16 if so, we would like to quantify them because in fiscal year
17 2017 we are going to face about a \$15 billion shortfall from
18 where we would like to be. And that is real money, and we
19 are going to have to find some places where it can be saved
20 in staff, personnel, noncombatant kind of areas. So perhaps
21 you have an immediate response or for the record.

22 General Schwartz: In the business world, we call those
23 synergies. And I cannot offer a number, but certainly there
24 are those in the Department who could answer that question
25 for you and I would recommend you press for that.

1 Admiral Stavridis: Yes. There are savings. And I
2 would recommend not only pressing the Department but getting
3 somebody on the outside to take a good look at that.

4 Senator King: Thank you very much. I appreciate your
5 testimony.

6 Chairman McCain: I appreciate the comments about the
7 hearts and minds, but first you have got to kill them. And
8 as long as the perception is out there that they are
9 winning, then they will also win in other areas as well. I
10 believe that one of the reasons why these young men are most
11 attracted is that they think they are joining a winning
12 cause, and events such as at San Bernardino and Paris are
13 one of the greatest recruitment tools they have. And until
14 we beat them on the battlefield, I think that our messaging
15 efforts will be severely hindered, but I also agree that it
16 is just going to be a long fight on using the most advanced
17 technologies.

18 And I would also point out that we still have a big
19 problem with the ability now of ISIS to be contacted and
20 direct a young man or young woman to a secure site. That is
21 just not right. That is not right. And I see heads
22 nodding. As Senator King mentioned, that is not recorded.

23 Senator King: I agree with the chairman on both
24 fronts. Thank you.

25 Chairman McCain: Admiral?

1 Admiral Stavridis: I agree completely. And I think
2 that this also gets into the cyber piece of this. There are
3 ways that we can track, control, eradicate in the cyber
4 world.

5 I also particularly agree the leading edge of this has
6 to be hard power. In the long game, it is a mix of hard
7 power, smart power. But at the moment, dealing with the
8 forces that are arrayed against us from the Islamic State,
9 we have to go hard now.

10 Chairman McCain: Doctor, did you have any comment?

11 Dr. Lamb: For myself, I think this is just a good
12 example of what I was referring to on the indirect approach
13 in special operations, the military information support
14 forces in SOCOM. If you look at how they are raised,
15 trained, and equipped, it is not to the same levels of
16 proficiency that the other aspects of SOCOM are. So I think
17 there is room for improvement there.

18 Chairman McCain: Well, I thank you.

19 And the Doctor is a graduate of the institution in
20 which you are presently employed when it had the correct
21 name. I want to thank you for your continued good work.

22 And I thank the Admiral and General for your many years
23 of service.

24 This will probably be the conclusion of a series of
25 hearings that we are having as we try to address this whole

1 issue of reform, ability to get into the challenge, to meet
2 the challenges of the 21st century. I believe that
3 Goldwater-Nichols could never have come from within the
4 Pentagon. I think everybody agrees with that. And we
5 intend, on a bipartisan basis, to work with the Pentagon and
6 Secretary Carter as closely as we possibly can, but I think
7 it is pretty well known that we have to lead. And it is not
8 to the exclusion of the Pentagon, but it certainly is a
9 responsibility that I think that we have. And I am proud of
10 the modest measures that we have taken in this year, but I
11 think next year is really where we can really make a
12 significant impact. And the series of hearings that we are
13 now concluding with I think gives us an excellent basis for
14 the kinds of reforms that need to be made.

15 It just is disappointing to our constituents when I go
16 back to Arizona and somebody asks me about a \$2 billion cost
17 overrun of one weapon system. It is hard to defend, hard to
18 justify. And then when we see the combat capabilities going
19 down in organizations and yet the staffs and support going
20 up and we are still unable to conduct an audit successfully
21 of the Department of Defense and no one can tell this
22 committee how many contract personnel are employed, there is
23 a pretty large task ahead of us. But if we pursue the
24 principles that you have recommended to us today, some of
25 those other aspects of this challenge will follow.

1 So you have been very helpful.

2 And, Admiral, I asked the panel yesterday if you all
3 would prepare notes of condolences to be delivered to
4 Senator Reed on Saturday afternoon, it would be much
5 appreciated.

6 [Laughter.]

7 Admiral Stavridis: Con gusto.

8 Senator Reed: Go Army.

9 [Laughter.]

10 Admiral Stavridis: Go Navy.

11 Chairman McCain: We are adjourned.

12 [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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