

Advance Questions for Marcel Lettre
Nominee for the Position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence

1. Duties

a. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I))?

My understanding is that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)) is responsible for assisting the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).

This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD Components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DoD Components funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

b. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and experience to effectively perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I have been honored to serve as Special Assistant under three Secretaries of Defense from 2011 to the present. In that capacity, I advised the Secretary of Defense on a range of matters pertaining to U.S. national security, including intelligence-related matters. With functional responsibilities as the civilian deputy chief of staff to Secretary Panetta, I supported the Secretary of Defense on defense strategy, budget development, acquisition oversight, national security policy initiatives, and crisis management. I also

led two Secretary of Defense transition teams. For my work in support of Secretary of Defense priorities, I am honored that Secretary Panetta awarded me the Defense Distinguished Public Service Award.

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, I had responsibilities on a team executing legislative programs on Departmental priorities including the defense budget and policy; Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; strategic nuclear arms control matters, including the ratification of the New START Treaty; acquisition and export control reforms; information operations, and Secretary Gates' efficiencies initiative. For my work on strategic nuclear arms control matters, Secretary Gates awarded me the Exceptional Public Service Award.

As Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor and then as Senior National Security Advisor to the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, I handled all "Gang of Eight" intelligence matters for the Leader, and shaped legislation and policy initiatives in areas including: Iraq and Afghanistan strategy; counterterrorism; enhancing foreign intelligence collection and sensitive intelligence operations; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in securing passage of defense and intelligence authorization bills, appropriations bills, and war supplementals.

As a Professional Staff Member on the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I supported the intelligence after-action reviews on the 9/11 terrorist attacks and on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and advised on the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which created the Director of National Intelligence.

Prior to these positions, I served in the private sector, the foreign policy research sector, and on a Congressional commission examining the organization and efficiency of the U.S. government regarding intelligence and programs to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Serving in both the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government has given me a multi-faceted appreciation for the role of intelligence. I have served as an intelligence consumer, ensuring the nation's senior decisionmakers are supported with intelligence products on important decisions. I have gained an appreciation of the statutory roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other senior leaders in ensuring effective intelligence capabilities. I have familiarity with a range of intelligence operations and capabilities. I have experience working intelligence resourcing issues through the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program, knowledge of key trajectories for our acquisition and investment programs, and some awareness of key counterintelligence and security priorities. I am personally committed to supporting the Secretary of Defense in focusing on the needs of the warfighter, particularly in intelligence support.

Finally, my experience has given me a deep appreciation for the important role of oversight, from within the executive branch as well as by the legislative and judiciary branches.

c. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the PDUSD(I)?

If confirmed, I believe the most significant action that I would need to take would be to assist Undersecretary Vickers in executing his priorities, consistent with the priorities of the Secretary of Defense, by enhancing my understanding of, and assessing the effectiveness of, plans and activities to implement and operationalize those priorities. I also believe that I need to more deeply understand the challenges posed by the new fiscal environment, the resource constraints that will be faced ahead, and the opportunities for further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, as we sustain and strengthen OUSD(I)'s budgetary oversight.

d. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I look forward to speaking with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense about how best I could support them. I anticipate that my duties and functions would include advising and assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense on intelligence planning, policy and resources. I believe they would expect me to assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in ensuring full intelligence support for ongoing operations; ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise; ensuring, without abrogating the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the Department; and ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. They may also assign me other duties as their priorities and my background and experience warrant.

2. Relationships

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

a. The Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), as the USD(I)'s principal assistant, if confirmed as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence I will serve as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, and security.

b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)), I will provide support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that which I would provide to the Secretary, as described above.

c. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will provide my full support to the USD(I) in carrying out his duties as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep him informed, seek his guidance and direction, and support him as he advises the Secretary of Defense on how to exercise his oversight authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related matters throughout the Department. At the outset, I will ascertain which responsibilities the USDI delegates to me, including a range of internal management functions within the Office of the Under Secretary, and focus on implementing his and the Secretary's priorities within the Office and across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

d. The other Under Secretaries of Defense

Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry out. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work closely with each of them and their Principal Deputies and senior teams. A close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), and their Principal Deputies, is particularly important, so I intend to fully support those relationships. In both of my former positions within the Department, both as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, I had positive relationships with a number of the Under Secretaries. If confirmed, I would continue to build on these relationships.

e. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration/Successor Organization

The Chief Information Officer (CIO), like its predecessor the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, has had oversight of enabling capabilities which are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CIO to ensure that this support remains robust.

f. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy

If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Rule of Law and Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and operations.

g. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD SOLIC&IC)

USD(I) and the ASD SO/LIC&IC work closely together on several important matters, and this close partnership has grown substantially during Dr. Vickers' tenure as USD(I). If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), I will contribute to ensuring that this close partnership continues.

h. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will support the USD(I) as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program. As appropriate, I will work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the current and future security environment, and that the intelligence organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the Department, and the Nation.

i. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD)

In my previous positions in DoD, I have worked closely with the General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will continue to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice on the legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.

j. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In my previous positions in DoD, I have worked closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior leaders on the Joint Staff, on a range of issues. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I would seek to continue this close relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands.

k. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will support the USD(I) in ensuring that the intelligence needs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including the Commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command, are met.

l. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will assist the USD(I) in his exercise of the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over NSA, NGA, NRO, and DIA. I will also help sustain the excellent relationship that the USD(I) has with the DNI by working with the Office of the DNI to ensure clear and consistent guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies.

n. The Director of National Intelligence

The USD(I) has an excellent relationship with the DNI. If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I intend to fully support the USD(I) and the DNI in their mutual goal of greater Intelligence Community integration. Because the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will support the USD(I) as he advises the DNI on Defense Intelligence capabilities.

o. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the already close relationship that the USD(I) has achieved with the Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and their senior team.

p. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the already close relationship between USD(I) and the NCTC.

q. The Director of the National Counterproliferation Center

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will work to sustain the relationship with the Director of the NCPC.

r. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will fully support the USD(I)'s relationship with the Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure integration and unity of effort in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

s. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will assist the USD(I) as he serves as the Secretary of Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters for senior officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

3. Major Challenges and Problems

a. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the PDUSD(I)?

If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), the major challenges that are likely to confront me are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly

changing intelligence environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, we must improve on protecting intelligence sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information. The next PDUSD(I) will have to help the USD(I) overcome these challenges while ensuring Defense Intelligence is postured with the IC to continue to provide world-class intelligence.

b. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If I am confirmed as the PDUSD(I), given the importance of intelligence to ongoing operations, I would do my best to assist the USD(I) in ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that it is properly protected. I would also reinforce and seek to effectively implement the USD(I)'s priorities across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

c. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the PDUSD(I)?

The primary near-term challenge to be faced in performing the functions of the USD(I) and, by extension, the PDUSD(I) is preparing for a period of defense budget uncertainty, which will also impact the Defense Intelligence enterprise and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.

A second serious challenge that continues to confront the USD(I) and, by extension, the PDUSD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, particularly as it relates to the insider threat, and the risks therefore posed to our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations.

d. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), I would support Dr. Vickers in managing budget uncertainty as guided by the Congress and the Secretary of Defense. I would support the USD(I) in ensuring we continue to provide the best possible intelligence support to current operations, look for opportunities to become more efficient while maintaining and increasing effectiveness, and continue to push to innovate and invest in key capabilities that maintain America's superior technological and operational edge.

In addition, I would support Dr. Vickers' commitment to implementing comprehensive technical, personnel, and administrative solutions to the challenge of unauthorized disclosures, particularly as it relates to the insider threat. I would work with OUSD(I), other DoD leaders and ODNI leadership as appropriate to ensure that the steps taken to

correct and mitigate recently exploited vulnerabilities effectively deter and prevent future unauthorized disclosures.

4. Priorities

a. How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time as the PDUSD(I)?

If confirmed, I would develop priorities for allocating my time consistent with Dr. Vickers' priorities. In general, I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, and internal management of OUSD(I) operations, and other duties as the Secretary and the USD(I) may assign. In what will continue to be a resource-constrained environment, I will assist the USD(I) in seeking to ensure that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the PDUSD(I)?

If confirmed, I would assist Dr. Vickers in continuing to execute what I understand are his overarching priorities, including: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the President's objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. As Dr. Vickers has done, I would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that: we have the right collection and analytical priorities; that we have a robust ISR architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future; that the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those of the CIA and National Clandestine Service; that the President's highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced; that analysis addresses the needs of policy makers and operational commanders; that intelligence is timely, accessible and protected; and, where appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to improve our intelligence capabilities.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Risk Assessment (CRA)

Section 153 of title 10, United States Code, requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually provide Congress with "an assessment of the risks associated with the most recent National Military Strategy (or update)."

a. What is your understanding and assessment of the CRA and the role, if any, of the OUSD(I) staff in supporting or participating in the preparation of this risk assessment?

The same legislation mandating the CRA also requires the Secretary of Defense to plan for mitigating risks the Chairman identifies as significant. My understanding is that while OUSD(I) does not directly participate in the CRA's development, as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, USD(I)'s role is to support the Secretary's risk mitigation plan by ensuring the Defense Intelligence Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring it has balanced investments towards delivering the right mix of intelligence capabilities to support the Combatant Commanders in accomplishing their missions and mitigating the risks identified in the CRA.

b. What is your understanding and assessment of how the CRA is used in DOD's strategic analysis process that informs the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, or any other department strategic decision making processes?

My understanding is that the CRA, a congressionally-mandated report from the Chairman, is used to inform departmental strategic decision-making processes by providing the Chairman's assessment of the nature and magnitude of strategic and military risk in executing the missions called for in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review and National Military Strategy. By considering the range of operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional factors, the CRA provides a holistic assessment of the ability of U.S. armed forces to meet strategic requirements in the near-term. The Chairman submits the CRA through the Secretary of Defense, who then forwards it to Congress along with his congressionally-mandated annual Risk Mitigation Plan, and additional comments as necessary. The Chairman may also include in the report his recommendations for mitigating risk, such as changes in strategy, development of new operational concepts or capabilities, increases in capacity, or adjustments in force posture or employment.

c. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose in how OUSD(I) supports the CRA or how it is used to support other strategy decision processes?

At this time, I do not recommend any specific changes in how OUSD(I) supports the CRA process. However, the CRA may prove useful during the Joint Staff's annual Capability Gap Assessment by underpinning Joint Requirements Oversight Council decisions related to mitigating Combatant Commands' most critical capability gaps. The CRA would be helpful in prioritizing capability gaps and informing Joint Requirements Oversight Council recommendations on where to apply resources or other risk-reduction activities to mitigate the most critical DoD capability gaps. As an advisory member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the DoD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, the USD(I)'s role is to ensure all parts of the intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture are integrated and optimized to meet warfighter needs.

6. Combating Terrorism

a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad?

The President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates is supported by the Department's counterterrorism strategy which focuses first on operational and regional defeat and then strategic and global defeat. Operational defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates requires conducting operations to render these organizations incapable of planning and conducting attacks, denying them sanctuary and severing relationships to groups providing support to al Qaeda. Strategic defeat could then be achieved by preventing al Qaeda's resurgence.

Achieving both operational and strategic defeat of al Qaeda requires a sustained global counterterrorism campaign with mutually reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. Building the capacity of our partners, preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, and countering radicalization is necessary, in addition to conducting operations to directly disrupt and dismantle terrorist groups.

Within areas of hostilities, the Department has a lead role in conducting these activities, along with our international partners. Outside such areas where named operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the Department plays a complementary role to other instruments of national power. Recognizing that al Qaeda and its affiliates remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is the Department -- in conjunction with the whole of U.S. Government and our international partners -- has the correct counterterrorism strategy in place, and it is increasingly more effective.

b. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?

If confirmed, I will ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged in the Department's counterterrorism strategy and supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda. The goal is to ensure we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve the President's counterterrorism objectives, by working closely with Military Departments and Services, the Combat Support Agencies, Combatant Commanders, the wider Intelligence Community, and our international partners.

c. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?

Close collaboration among U.S. departments and agencies and with our international partners is essential to our counterterrorism success. One example of this was the

establishment of the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs), which have ensured full interagency contributions to the fight. The Department has developed a close operational partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts. I believe these types of actions posture the Department to effectively combat terrorism.

d. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal agencies?

If confirmed, I would seek to build on and extend these interagency and partner collaborations. These previous efforts have resulted in significant improvements in coordination of operations and interagency concurrence; I would work hard to move the Department and its partners toward further integration of intelligence operations and counterterrorism efforts.

e. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?

Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. My understanding is that USSOCOM liaises with members of the Intelligence Community in the Washington, D.C. area, at the Headquarters in Tampa, Florida and on the battlefield. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the demonstrable gains achieved in intelligence coordination with the interagency and international partners over the last 12 years are not only sustained, but continue to improve in order to achieve the U.S. Government's counterterrorism goals.

7. Combating Proliferation of WMD

a. What is your assessment and understanding of the Department's strategy for countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and how that strategy fits into the broader national strategy to counter WMD proliferation?

Because of my previous experience on the OSD staff, I know that the Department's strategy pursues robust counterproliferation policies and capabilities to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats. The DoD strategy supports the National Strategy to Combat WMD and related national strategic guidance through military force planning and doctrine to organize, train, exercise, and equip U.S. Armed Forces to combat WMD, in addition to preparing appropriate plans to address the defense-related aspects of combating WMD.

b. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to countering the proliferation of WMD?

If confirmed, I will work with the USD(I) to provide guidance and oversight to Defense Intelligence organizations and ensure that the Defense Intelligence organizations respond to the direction and priorities of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and DoD Components with respect to WMD threats. Furthermore, I will support USD(I) efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of Defense Intelligence capabilities in identifying and assessing WMD threats.

c. How can the Department best structure itself to support the mission of countering the proliferation of WMD?

If confirmed, I would continue to make this question a focus, just as I understand it has been for the USD(I). Based on my previous experience on the OSD staff, it is my sense that, consistent with national strategy, the Department has efforts in place to support the mission of countering WMD proliferation in a number of key ways, including interdiction and elimination operations, active and passive defense, consequence management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation.

These missions rely on timely and actionable intelligence in a number of areas, including: the state of nations' WMD programs; terrorists' interest in those efforts; existing proliferation networks; national proliferation activities; and the security status of WMD facilities, including possible threats and vulnerabilities.

d. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD with those of other federal agencies?

We must continue robust efforts to counter proliferation of WMD using all available national and international authorities and apply all elements of national power - diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Collaboration and integration among all relevant departments and agencies are key factors for the Administration's strategy to combat WMD. Senior level attention can help ensure federal agencies - as well as other key partners such as at the state and local level and internationally - remain synchronized and focused on the top priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the opportunities for USD(I) to contribute to this important priority.

e. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by Department of Defense entities and forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by other elements of the intelligence community?

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I look forward to working with IC partners in global layered defenses to prevent, detect and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists. We must continue to develop tools and capabilities with IC partners to detect and disrupt the movement of WMD including precursor materials. Because we can never be certain of our ability to prevent or protect against all potential WMD terrorist attacks, collaboration among IC partners to manage and mitigate the consequences of such attacks continues to

be necessary, as is improving our capabilities to attribute their source. Thus, continued work is necessary to harness, in an effective multinational way, all relevant collective resources to establish more coordinated and effective capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to the global threat of WMD terrorism.

8. RPA - Title 10 vs. Title 50 Operations

According to published reports, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the CIA conduct counterterrorism strikes using armed Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). For example, RPA strikes by both U.S. SOF and the CIA have reportedly been conducted in Yemen. Other published reports indicate the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism dictates a shift in all lethal RPA operations to the Department of Defense.

- a. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages from a legal and operational perspective of moving all lethal RPA operations to the Department of Defense?**
- b. What is your understanding of the milestones that would need to be achieved for such a shift to occur? How long do you believe it will take to achieve these milestones?**
- c. Do you expect responsibility for certain geographic areas will transition more rapidly than others? If so, which ones?**
- d. Do you expect aircraft and/or personnel will be transferred from the CIA to the operational and tactical control of DOD in the near term as part of this transition?**
- e. If confirmed, how would you ensure that lessons learned, including tactics, techniques, and procedures, for the use of armed RPA are captured and transferred to the Department of Defense?**

In response to a series of questions about counterterrorism operations on *Meet the Press*, former-Secretary Panetta indicated that “a lot more of this [counterterrorism operations] can be put under Title 10” and that “the advantage to it is that it becomes much more transparent in terms of what we’re doing.”

- f. Do you share former-Secretary Panetta’s observation that there has been a limited amount of transparency with respect to Title 50 U.S. counterterrorism operations?**
- g. Do you believe additional transparency would better enable the U.S. to push back against claims of civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes?**

With reference to this question set, I am not able to comment in this medium on such activities other than to say that I support the President's policy on the operation of such aircraft, as articulated in his May 23, 2013 speech at the National Defense University and in related Presidential Policy Guidance. I understand the U.S. military has extensive experience in the use of remotely piloted aircraft to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as direct action during armed conflict. The appropriate role of the Department of Defense in operating remotely piloted aircraft, weighing the advantages and disadvantages, is essentially a policy decision for the President to make. If confirmed, my focus will be to provide the best counsel possible on the intelligence and operational value for such operations and help ensure compliance with applicable policy in conducting such operations. I also look forward to supporting the USD(I) and other senior Administration officials in a constructive ongoing dialogue with the committee on this and related issues.

9. **Counterterrorism Cooperation**

Non-DOD elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) and the military offer unique strengths with regard to intelligence collection against terrorism targets, spanning across the various forms of intelligence (e.g. human and signals intelligence).

a. What is your understanding of the extent to which the military and non-DOD IC elements collaborate on counterterrorism objectives?

My understanding is there is extensive collaboration on counterterrorism objectives with the non-DoD IC elements. This is done in several ways: participation in Joint Interagency Task Forces, sharing information on intelligence sources and methods, and exchanging officers at all levels of operations. I believe the Department and non-DOD IC elements should continue to look for opportunities to leverage each other's strengths and improve collaboration.

b. If confirmed, how would you seek to strengthen this collaboration?

If confirmed, I will seek, in concert with counterparts at the DNI, to enable better, faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data, while remaining cognizant of the problem we face with respect to risks of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. There has been significant progress in this area that can stand as an example for future efforts. For instance, my understanding is the move to a common, integrated network in Afghanistan – the Afghan Mission Network -- and one common database – the Combined Information Data Network Exchange -- supports intelligence, military operations, command and control and logistics across all U.S. entities and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable national, tactical and commercially available data from across the DoD and IC is available and discoverable.

c. What are the major obstacles to achieving greater collaboration?

Two of the long-standing challenges to integrating the intelligence capabilities of DoD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies have been IT system compatibility and effective guidance on sharing classified information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress on the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for protecting information from unauthorized disclosure. If confirmed, I will seek to achieve similar progress against the challenge of IT system compatibility.

10. Cyber and Information Operations

Information operations, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic warfare, operational security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception. Each of these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, they are interwoven.

a. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command organizationally separated cyber operations from the other elements making up “information operations.” How does this separation complicate integration across these elements, and what is your understanding of the Department’s efforts to mitigate its impact?

If confirmed, I look forward to studying this question further. My current understanding is that Information Operations as currently defined refers to the integration of various information activities to achieve effects across the information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command does not change the relationship of cyberspace operations to the other capabilities necessary for DoD to conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct information operations in the cyber domain.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (sec. 941) that would require the Secretary of Defense to designate a Senate-confirmed official within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to provide oversight and resource management of U.S. Cyber Command’s offensive cyber mission.

b. What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to information operations, and particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(I)?

My current understanding is that the information operations policies as outlined in Directive 3600.01 adequately define the roles and responsibilities of both the USD(P) and

the USD(I). If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I will endeavor to support the USD(I) in fulfilling these responsibilities and support the efforts of the USD(P) in the execution of all assigned responsibilities under this Directive. Additionally, I will view it as a priority to play an appropriate role in the oversight of offensive computer network operations, now termed offensive cyber effects operations.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (sec. 901) that would transfer supervision from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) to the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) of the National Security Agency (NSA). This action is recommended because the cybersecurity mission of the NSA IAD falls under the CIO and not the USDI.

c. What are your views on the most appropriate oversight of the information assurance and information systems security program by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

My understanding is that currently the DoD CIO is responsible for providing policy guidance to the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), regarding network operations and cybersecurity matters in consultation and coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I believe that this relationship is effective and allows for proper oversight of these functions.

11. Information Sharing

There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within the intelligence community. Countervailing the objective of sharing more broadly is the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S. persons.

Despite these barriers, we have also seen recent examples of leaking massive amounts of data by DOD employees and contractors who have been given access to data shared across organizations. Leaking such information has the potential to do serious damage to our national security.

a. What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of U.S. persons' information?

During my tenure on the OSD staff, I have seen the Department make progress towards increasing access to counterterrorism data for those who demonstrate a need for it, while also recognizing both our responsibility to protect sensitive sources and methods and to

respect U.S. civil liberties and privacy laws. Mechanisms continue to be developed to better recognize U.S. person information and minimize the chances of human error. These mechanisms include the development of better policies, improved processes, smart systems, and active oversight by both the Intelligence Community and components of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Collectively, these mechanisms can help maximize access while minimizing risk.

b. How should we achieve the proper balance between sharing of information more broadly and protecting sensitive sources and methods?

I believe that a careful balance should exist between the need to share intelligence information and protecting sources and methods. I agree with an observation Dr. Vickers has made that the need to share cannot trump the need to know, nor can the fear of protecting sources and methods override the necessity to provide necessary information when it is needed most. Finding the proper balance between sharing information and protecting sources and methods is not a static target; it is, in fact, constantly moving, depending upon specific situations, risks, and urgency. The key to success is recognizing the threshold and circumstances for sharing certain information and making sure others recognize it as well.

c. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue if confirmed to be PDUSD(I)?

If confirmed as the PDUSD(I), I will seek to foster continued policy refinements and refinements in training and capability development to help change behaviors and culture within the DoD enterprise. I will ensure that “need to share” remains in healthy tension with “need to protect”. I will continue to drive the DNI’s and USD(I)’s “Write for Release” policy by ensuring its tenets are taught at our schoolhouses, incorporated into our systems, and practiced at our analytic centers. I will work closely with our DoD and non-DoD partners to identify best practices and develop new incentives to reward prudent and effective information sharing.

12. Homeland Defense

a. In your view, what progress has been made in integrating the intelligence capabilities of the DOD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies?

From my experience on the OSD staff, I believe DoD considers itself a valuable partner and enabler to the greater homeland defense effort. DoD works with its partners in the Intelligence Community to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared appropriately with domestic law enforcement and security agencies. Recent initiatives include DoD funded inter-agency collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), and maritime domain awareness. DoD also provides domestic agencies with valuable instruction in the detection of

improvised explosive devices, conducting terrorism analysis, and mapping cultural terrain. Lastly, DoD fosters interagency integration via the embedding of DoD personnel in other agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and FBI joint terrorism task forces

In addition, DOD has moved forward in formally integrating DoD intelligence capabilities with those of our Federal, State, and local partners. For example, in October, 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the USD(I) as the DoD Senior Agency Official to implement Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities (SLTPS). Pursuant to this responsibility, DoD is negotiating a memorandum of understanding with DHS to allow State, Local, and Tribal Fusion Centers to access the SIPRNET to support the Fusion Centers' mission of ensuring the safety of the US homeland.

b. What challenges lie ahead for achieving better integration?

I believe that successful integration demands that we promulgate effective guidance for sharing classified information and sustain attention at both leadership and operational levels. The recent publication of Executive Order 13587 "Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information" helps enable the sharing of classified information. In addition, the DNI has promulgated guidance that further mandates effective information sharing practices. As architectures and systems connect the Intelligence Community to new partners in national security, ensuring guidance remains current, applicable and fully-coordinated across the U.S. government will be of continuing importance.

c. Does the DOD's existing process for setting requirements adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for the homeland defense mission?

My understanding is that DoD's current intelligence requirements process includes the Homeland Defense mission. DoD intelligence requirements continue to compete for finite resources, so ensuring that Homeland Defense priorities are incorporated in Defense intelligence priorities is a challenging, yet worthwhile endeavor. DoD is exploring ways to reconcile these diverse intelligence requirements and is actively working to improve the process.

13. Defense Clandestine Service

DOD announced an initiative last year to establish a Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) that would be patterned after the National Clandestine Service.

a. Do you support the expansion of the Defense Clandestine Service? If so, why?

The implementation of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) is an important initiative to improve the operational effectiveness of defense human intelligence operations and I fully support this initiative. My understanding is the DCS initiative is not an expansion, but a realignment of existing resources, a repositioning and rebalancing of capabilities to improve the Department's collection against our highest priorities. The implementation of the DCS will also incorporate other benefits to the Department by enhancing our strategic partnerships with other Intelligence Community agencies, and by improving the career management and utilization of our clandestine military and civilian collector cadre. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(I) in a continued dialogue with the oversight committees about achieving our shared goals of enhancing U.S. human intelligence collection in the defense context.

In imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and overhead reconnaissance, the intelligence community operates through a single consolidated agency to meet the needs of national policymakers and the Department of Defense. In human intelligence, however, there are two separate organizations funded by the national Intelligence Program budget, one run by the CIA and one managed by DIA.

b. What is the justification for two organizations in this mission area in a time of severe budget austerity?

The Department of Defense maintains organic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities because it operates under different authorities than the CIA and also responds to different customers, priorities, requirements, and targets. Under Title 50, U.S.C., the DoD must satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the Department, including the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders. The Secretary of Defense established DCS on 20 April 2012 to provide enhanced collection against high priority national and defense requirements. It is my current understanding that the DCS will operate within existing resources and will complement rather than duplicate the collection activities of the CIA.

c. Would you be supportive of a pilot program to assess the feasibility, advisability, and cost effectiveness of establishing a military division within the National Clandestine Service (NCS) that is responsive to the needs of the Defense Department yet resides within and utilizes the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency?

If confirmed, one of my key responsibilities in my new position will be to monitor the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of many different DoD intelligence programs, to include the DCS, and to make program adjustments as necessary. It is my current sense, however, that it is premature at this time to consider a pilot program establishing a military division within the CIA. The Department has provided Congress with a 5 year DCS implementation plan that proposes increased operational integration with CIA. I believe at this time that the Department should first be given the opportunity to assess the performance of DCS and efforts towards enhanced integration with IC partners before trying a pilot program. I believe the Department's assessments of DCS performance

should be shared with Congress, and if confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(I) in a continued dialogue with the oversight committees about achieving our shared goals of enhancing U.S. human intelligence collection in the defense context.

14. USD(I) Role in Intelligence Personnel, Acquisition, and Policy

DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I) includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they apply to the intelligence mission.

a. In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?

In support of the USD(I), I look forward to assessing this in more detail, if confirmed, as the current fiscal environment does require a careful look to ensure inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication are eliminated across headquarters elements. As I have observed from my current and previous capacities on the OSD staff, I have not viewed the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative, but instead complementary. The USD(I) focuses on the unique authorities and requirements of the Intelligence Community workforce, managing the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) under Title 10 that is designed to respond to the unique requirements of the Defense Intelligence workforce. For the goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to be realized, the Defense Intelligence personnel system must work in tandem with those of other IC members (the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc.)

My understanding also is that OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. Specifically, intelligence analysts with acquisition experience provide acquisition decision makers the clearest picture of intelligence capabilities, the cost to address shortfalls, and the risk if the intelligence needs cannot be met. In this climate of ever-changing threats, rapid technological advancement, and reduced resources this cross-functional analysis ensures discovery of cross-enterprise efficiencies. Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.

15. Impact of Sequestration

a. What is your assessment of the impact that sequestration would have on intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commands and the Leadership of the Department if it is sustained in fiscal year 2014?

In a period of unprecedented fiscal uncertainty, the Department, including its intelligence components, has had a significant challenge over Fiscal Year 2013 to operate as good stewards in meeting near term operational requirements. The technical mechanism of sequestration-- reducing discretionary spending proportionally across all programs, projects, and activities without regard to their relative impacts on national security-- creates systemic waste and inefficiency, significantly impeding the ability to support the intelligence requirements of the Combatant Commands and the Department's leadership. I would urge Congress to pass the President's budget as soon as possible to preserve our critical intelligence capabilities.

b. What is your assessment of the impact of sequestration on intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commands and the Leadership of the Department if it is sustained for the full duration outlined in the Budget Control Act?

There is a strong case to be made that the threat environment we are facing in the face of fiscally-driven force structure reductions will require greater investments in intelligence. Others advocate a proportionate reduction to intelligence with force structure. It is premature to predict how the Department will resolve these strategic decisions, but we are on a path to provide an answer with the 2015 budget submission and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

From an intelligence specific perspective, however, although technology is critical to our nation's intelligence capabilities, ultimately it is the quality of the intelligence workforce that determines the quality of intelligence support. I am deeply concerned with the impact of long-term fiscal uncertainty on the training, compensation, morale, and retention of the intelligence workforce.

16. Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence Analysis should be independent and free of political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.

a. If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within the DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure?

If confirmed, I would work with IC leaders to reinforce analytical tradecraft standards as established in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (Analytical Standards), and reaffirm the importance of objective and independent analysis at all levels. There is and should be no tolerance for pressure of any kind on analysts to reach certain conclusions.

b. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a

substantive intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration positions?

If Congress requires testimony on a substantive intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts with an administration position.

17. Control of Intelligence Agencies within the DOD

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained language asserting that nothing in the Act should be construed so as to impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the Secretary of Defense has delegated “direction, control, and authority” – the highest form of authority in the executive branch -- over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the USD(I).

a. What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of Defense?

In my view, IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence. The Secretary of Defense retains the responsibility for execution of DoD intelligence activities, and has primary responsibility for leadership and management. The FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act significantly increased the authorities of the DNI regarding leadership and management functions in the IC. DoD and the ODNI staffs have together devoted considerable time and attention to implementing these authorities in a manner that gives full effect to the Act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and preserving the Secretary of Defense’s ability to execute his statutory responsibilities with respect to DoD’s intelligence components.

b. What are your views on the extent of the grant of “direction, control, and authority” to the USD(I) over DOD national intelligence organizations?

Statutory provisions in both Title 10 and Title 50, U.S.C. assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of Defense over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department, consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this balance of authorities is appropriate. This is also clearly stated in the current USD(I) charter.

c. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities, processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for

and conduct military operations will be developed and acquired through the National Intelligence Program?

Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities, processes and structures in place between DoD and the DNI have produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military operations.

18. Analytic Capabilities and Capacity

The DOD Inspector General (IG) recently issued an assessment of DOD long-term intelligence analysis. The assessment concluded that the Department has significant problems in three areas. One is broadly termed “non-traditional support” to the combatant commands in such areas as shaping the environment and deterring potential adversaries, partner engagements, long-term analysis for campaign planning, and evaluation of cyber threats. A second is scientific and technical intelligence support to the acquisition process. A third problem area is lack of in-depth expertise in the analytic workforce.

a. Do you agree with the IG’s assessment? If so, how do you believe the Department can address these problems despite declines in budgets and personnel levels, while sustaining support for counterterrorism and other transnational requirements, and the pivot to the Pacific?

I am not familiar with this assessment, but if confirmed, I will review it and discuss the IG’s observations with Dr. Vickers to ascertain the best way to address the issues raised. In general, I know that the impact of budget and personnel reductions will be factored into the design of these efforts, but I am committed to ensuring that the capabilities of the analytic workforce are systematically and systemically improved. If confirmed I will continue to look for ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency in these areas.

Similarly, the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community recently concluded that the Intelligence Community makes only a “limited effort” to discern and exploit the strategic research and development intentions and capabilities of our adversaries.

b. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency recently established a new Defense Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology Intelligence. Why was this position established; what is the mission of this office; and how does it relate to the findings of the IG and the National R&D Commission?

My understanding is the Defense Intelligence Officer for Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DIO S&TI) was established in December 2012 in response to a DIA Director Advisory Board recommendation as well as the DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence Framework—both of which informed the National Commission for the

Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. The DIO S&TI is the Defense Counterpart to the National Intelligence Mission Manager for Scientific and Technical Intelligence.

The DIO S&TI is charged with developing the first Defense Intelligence Enterprise Scientific and Technical Intelligence Strategic Intelligence Plan (SIP). The SIP is an advisory document to posture and align, over the next seven years, DIA, the Combatant Command (CCMD) J2s, and the Military Service Intelligence Centers to discern and exploit the strategic research and development intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. It is designed to reduce the risk of strategic technical surprise and assist program and resource managers with mission prioritization across the General Defense Intelligence Program, DIA Military Intelligence Program, and the Department of Defense Foreign Counterintelligence Program. In addition to the SIP, the DIO S&TI directly supports and partners with USD(AT&L) and ASD(A) to improve scientific and technical intelligence support to the acquisition process.

The DIO S&TI has met with members of the National R&D Commission and is sponsoring a meeting with Commission members and the DIA Director and Deputy Director in October 2013. In discussions with members of the Commission, they indicated their support to the DIO S&TI's efforts regarding the SIP. Specifically, both the Commission members and the PDDNI have indicated that the SIP will serve as the roadmap to address foreign strategic research and development and support the identification of areas for U.S. exploitation.

19. Science and Technology

a. What technical challenges does the intelligence community face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately by DOD science and technology (S&T) efforts?

If confirmed, I would continue to address challenges in making the best use of existing and planned sensors in a rapidly changing environment, and then exploiting data coming from those sensors to answer the hard intelligence questions. The Department must continue its significant efforts to protect our critical space systems and data networks from our adversaries.

In my view, however, there are several emerging S&T shortfalls on the horizon that the Department will need to address. The impact of next-generation communications, cryptography, sensors, and computing requires an understanding of adversarial investments and capability developments, as well as whether the Department has the appropriate investment strategy to maintain US capability advantage. The Department needs to better understand the impacts and accelerating rate of change of developing open-source and social media on both offensive and defensive intelligence capabilities and threats. DoD must reinvigorate S&T investments in counterintelligence capabilities to detect and counter the insider threat; identify, track, and counter the cyber activities of

Foreign Intelligence Entities; and protect US intelligence personnel from active discovery and targeting.

b. How should the S&T portfolio contribute to rationalizing intelligence capability as we draw down forces after Iraq and Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would ensure an appropriate focus on the development of sources, tools and techniques for new and diverse operating environments. Understanding the complexity of intelligence support to small units in distributed operations while working through international partners is important to shaping the environment for campaign planning. Information sharing with nontraditional partners, law enforcement and coalitions provide additional challenges. Finally, there are lessons learned for the IC across the board from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations that will need to be reflected in future partnerships.

The S&T portfolio must support the development of novel collection and analysis capabilities tailored to the future operating environment. We must rationalize intelligence sharing policies with nontraditional partners, law enforcement and coalitions, and ensure we deliver intelligence systems that meet those operational requirements. We must also improve our capacity to ingest and process intelligence information provided by such partners for use in our Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

c. What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of operation, technical viability, and affordability of airships as long-duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?

The Department recognizes persistence as a key development capability for future intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance fleet and continues to advocate for research in the area of stratospheric airships. Theoretically, the potential exists to accomplish multi-year, wide area surveillance, long stand-off distance, airship missions at relatively low operating cost. However, technological and financial hurdles remain before the Department commits to fielding a high altitude airship.

d. What specific S&T-related efforts should DOD be pursuing to understand the human, social, cultural terrain of adversaries?

In my time on the OSD staff, I have witnessed the intelligence community make significant progress in developing new concepts and methodologies that include social and cultural insight into the operating environment. I believe these concepts and methodologies have proven critical to understanding our national security challenges, and if confirmed, I would support pursuing the necessary science and technology developments to transition these efforts from a labor intensive process today to a more automated process in the future. Advanced automated processing would allow for the automatic ingestion and processing of diverse sources of audio, text, and imagery in order to extract meaning and context from all sources, enabling more rapid and accurate analysis of the human, social, and cultural terrain, enhancing our intelligence capabilities

20. Role of the DOD Inspector General in Supervising the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Inspectors General

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259) established the Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) as statutory IGs. The Committee has learned that the IG of the NRO has taken the position that the DOD IG has no authority over the NRO IG as a result of this legislation, even for the purpose of establishing DOD-wide IG policy and directives.

a. What are your views on the relationship between the DOD IG and the IGs of the Defense Intelligence Agencies?

My understanding is that the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to establish the IGs at the Defense Intelligence agencies as statutory IGs and gives them the authority to function independently with respect to the agency they serve. However, the Intelligence Authorization Act did not change the statutory authorities and responsibilities of the DoD IG for the entire department, to include the four Defense Intelligence agencies. Section 8 of the IG Act provides the DoD IG with specific duties and responsibilities relating to its oversight role in DoD. As Defense Agencies, the programs and operations of all four of the Defense Intelligence agencies, to include NRO, fall within those statutory responsibilities. Clearly, all agencies directly concerned and the Department as a whole will benefit from day-to-day cooperation and collaboration between the DoD IG and Defense Intelligence agency IGs, and I will certainly encourage a strong relationship among those organizations.

21. Security Clearance Reform

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (S. 1197) includes a provision (sec. 931) that would require the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to reform the personnel security clearance investigation, adjudication, and transfer processes to improve security and reduce costs.

a. What are your views on the need for improved security, process reform, greater cost transparency, and cost reductions in this area?

Based on my previous experience on the OSD staff, I know that the USD(I) and the Secretary of Defense have been and remain committed to examining every opportunity to improve security, process reform, greater cost transparency, and cost reductions. If confirmed, I will work in support of the USD(I) with the DNI, who is the Security Executive Agent responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and

adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position.

22. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

a. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

b. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

Yes.

c. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

d. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.