

Advance Policy Questions for James Anderson
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

Department of Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been successful in improving operational and warfighting effectiveness, and I do not see the need to modify that legislation.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not think modification is required.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (ASD/SPC) advises the Secretary of Defense on the formulation of national security and defense policy, the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives, and strategy and policy on matters relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, and security cooperation. The ASD/SPC also provides policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including National Defense Strategy implementation, the Nuclear Posture and Missile Defense reviews, and annual program and budget reviews.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above.

The Under Secretaries

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Under Secretaries of Defense in support of the Secretary's objectives. Specifically, the ASD/SPC provides the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Research and Engineering with policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic activities, most notably relating to nuclear weapons and missile defense.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with other Assistant Secretaries of Defense to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice on policy issues under consideration in the Department and provide policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance is implemented.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to provide support on matters that affect strategy, force planning and employment, nuclear weapons, and missile defense.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The ASD/SPC provides similar support to the Vice Chairman as described above.

The Service Secretaries

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning issues and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders.

The Service Chiefs

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of strategy, policy, and force planning issues.

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command

At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons and missile defense.

The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command

At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/SPC works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command in support of strategy development and execution and contingency planning.

The Combatant Commanders

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/SPC works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders, particularly in support of strategy development and execution, and steady-state and contingency planning.

The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The ASD/SPC works collaboratively with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to provide the USD(P) with advice and recommendations on security cooperation issues to ensure alignment with defense strategy.

The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration

The ASD/SPC works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on strategy and policy issues relating to nuclear weapons modernization and related issues.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned if you are confirmed?

My understanding is that the ASD/SPC is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on formulation and coordination of national security and defense strategy, the forces, campaign, and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy, U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense policy, and security cooperation plans and policies.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that qualify you for this position?

I have extensive policy, academic, and executive experience in my nearly three decades as a national security professional.

As a practitioner, I have worked issues during my prior service as a Schedule C appointee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2001-2009). From 2003-2009, I worked in a demanding and fast-paced regional office – International Security Affairs, Middle East (ISA/ME). In this

capacity, I first served as Country Director, Israel, and then Director for Middle East. In the former capacity, I coordinated a wide range of defense cooperation activities pertaining to key U.S. ally; in the latter, I gained a broader perspective of complex regional dynamics. I have authored (or co-authored) over one hundred monographs, articles, and Op-Eds on a wide range of strategy-related topics during my career. These topics include theater and national missile defense; the importance of security alliances, to include bilateral and multilateral alliances; security threats in the Middle East, Indo-Pacific, and European theaters; and national defense strategy and policy.

Since serving in OSD, I have lived overseas and taught at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies. In this capacity, I developed a deep appreciation for the importance of security cooperation. I taught military and civilian security officials from a wide range of European countries, and traveled extensively throughout the region to participate in a wide range of defense cooperation activities.

In my current capacity as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Marine Corps University, I am the chief academic officer for educational programs that reach over 60 thousand Marines annually. In this capacity, I help officers and enlisted personnel develop the critical and creative thinking skills necessary to prevail on future battlefields. My executive level responsibilities include ensuring accreditation for our three Master's degree granting institutions.

What background and experience do you have in the following areas?

Defense Strategy

My experience working in ISA/ME provided me an understanding of, and appreciation for, the importance of having a coherent, affordable, and sustainable defense strategy. I have taught defense strategy issues at civilian and military educational institution here at home and overseas. I have also written broadly about a wide range of defense strategy issues.

Force planning

I have familiarity with force planning concepts from my prior Pentagon experience and academic studies. I worked closely with my Joint Staff counterparts during my time in ISA/ME.

Force Development

I have familiarity with force development concepts from my prior Pentagon experience and academic studies. I worked closely with my Joint Staff counterparts during my time in ISA/ME.

Development and/or review of campaign and contingency plans, major force deployments, and military operational plans.

As Director in ISA/ME, I reviewed classified campaign plans, contingency plans and military operational plans. I understand and appreciate the importance of civilian oversight in these matters.

Joint capabilities requirements

I have familiarity with joint capabilities requirements from my prior Pentagon experience and academic studies. I worked closely with my Joint Staff counterparts when I worked in ISA/ME.

Joint concept development

I have familiarity with joint concept development from my prior Pentagon experience and academic studies. I have also worked with concept developers at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) on a variety of projects.

European and Indo-Pacific regional and military affairs

I have experience in European and Indo-Pacific regional and military affairs from both a practical and academic perspective. I worked for three years at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, where I served as a professor and program director. I have traveled extensively throughout Europe and engaged in wide range of security cooperation activities with allies and partners. I also have written on NATO enlargement and Balkan security issues. Earlier in my career, I deployed to the Indo-Pacific region as an officer in the Marine Corps. I have since traveled to the Indo-Pacific region in my capacity of Dean of the Marine Corps War College. As well, I have written about the threats and challenges presented by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region.

Army capabilities and operational concepts.

I am very familiar with Army capabilities and operational concepts. In April 2017, I organized a major conference on Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) at Marine Corps University in Quantico.

Marine Corps capabilities and operational concepts.

I am very familiar with Marine Corps capabilities and operational concepts given my prior and current service, both in and out of uniform. I am well-versed in the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy, military capabilities, and operational concepts, to include Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).

Air Force capabilities and operational concepts

I am very familiar with Air Force capabilities, especially insofar as they pertain to nuclear deterrent capabilities and operational concepts. I have a general knowledge of other USAF capabilities and operational concepts, to include Agile Combat Employment (ACE).

Navy capabilities and operational concepts

I am very familiar with Navy Force capabilities, especially insofar as they pertain to nuclear deterrence (SSBMs) and missile defense capabilities (Aegis Combat System). I am well-versed in naval operational concepts, to include Distributed Lethality.

What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to fulfill the responsibilities of this position?

None.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?

Major challenges include crafting and implementing strategic guidance and reforms, supporting programmatic options, and ensuring planning processes allow DoD to apply resources as efficiently as possible in a more competitive and dangerous security environment. It is also a major challenge to ensure that our efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces meet policy and strategy requirements in a timely and cost-effective manner.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, it would be my priority to ensure our nuclear forces remain safe, secure, and effective and that they are planned, postured, operated, and modernized in accordance with policy guidance. I also would work with the Joint Staff to streamline and publish strategic guidance that promulgates clear priorities and risk tradeoffs and to infuse this guidance into processes and decision-making fora throughout DoD.

If confirmed, what do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of your responsibilities?

I am concerned about being able, if confirmed, to implement policies and strategies in a timely and cost-efficient manner.

If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) and the ASD/SPC staff to implement the National Defense Strategy by establishing specific action plans and timelines and to identify and resolve problems relating to the ASD/SPC portfolio.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?

If confirmed, my priorities for SPC would be to align the ASD component actions and processes behind the National Defense Strategy, fully implement initiatives identified in the Nuclear Posture Review and forthcoming Missile Defense Review, and successfully implement the fiscal year (FY) 2017 reforms of the Department's security cooperation enterprise.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of the relationship between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

My sense is that the relationship with the Committee and Congress is very good. If confirmed, I would work to continue this strong relationship and look for ways to enhance it.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive relationship between Congress and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?

If confirmed, building a productive relationship with the Congress would be a priority. This is particularly important given the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017 requirements for security cooperation reform and the several reporting requirements that fall in the ASD/SPC's area of responsibility.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Individuals in the custody or control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy who is required to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written

policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

Civilian control of the military remains a critical and statutory responsibility in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. I believe that it is critical for the Secretary of Defense, to provide end states, expectations for option development, and strategic assumptions and any other information that might be needed to effectively frame military planning. This ensures proper direction to military planners. However the civilian role does not stop with the issuance of guidance. To ensure military activities are aligned with political objectives, a continual interaction between the civilian and military leaders is required, starting with a robust plan review process. Given the increased fluidity of the modern threat environment, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy cannot afford to remain static or silent. I believe it is the role of the civilian leader to engage in iterative and open dialogue with military leadership to promote the development of achievable strategies and relevant plans.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

In my view, civilian leadership has the appropriate authorities to provide effective oversight of strategy formulation. This said, I believe the Department must relook aspects of the existing planning process to make contingency planning more responsive to the needs of senior decision makers, and more relevant given the demands of the modern threat environment.

What is your understanding and assessment of the capability and capacity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to provide comprehensive, objective, and realistic joint analysis in support of formulating and evaluating strategy and operational plans and related force planning?

In my view, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff could benefit from additional analytic capacity to support strategy and plan development. If confirmed, I would seek out innovative approaches and concepts to ensure Departmental decisions concerning force structure and force employment are objective, realistic, and sustainable.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy, contingency, and force planning?

I believe the existing processes and authorities support civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency and force planning. As previously stated, constant dialogue among all national security stakeholders is key to ensure alignment among policy objectives, military activities, and whole-of-government efforts. If confirmed, I would maintain strong networks with our interagency partners to ensure a synchronized governmental effort. Simultaneously, it will be my priority to ensure continual, open discussions between the civilian and military leadership, which are essential to the civilian oversight process within the Department.

A number of geographic combatant commands' contingency and operation plans are undergoing Department of Defense review.

If confirmed, how would you determine whether the alterations to a contingency or operation plan are warranted due to geo-strategic change, risk assessments, potential adversary and our own capability enhancements, and fiscal realities?

The plans review process involves many stakeholders and several analytic steps to ensure plans are current, in terms of the geo-political dynamics and DoD capabilities, and are viable, resource-informed, risk appropriate, and aligned with political objectives. If confirmed, I would seek to accelerate the process to determine whether any change to planning is warranted and, then, ultimately approved by the Secretary.

National Defense Strategy

What is your understanding and evaluation of the Department of Defense's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for the development and implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS)?

My understanding is that the development of the National Defense Strategy was informed through a variety of analytic products from across the Department and external organizations, including intelligence products, strategic and operational wargaming, campaign and mission-level analyses, and red teaming. As the Department moves into implementation, I believe it is necessary to have an assessment and analytic process that rigorously assesses risks and tradeoffs. Such a process should consider uncertainties inherent in the evolving security environment.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve the Department's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decision making?

In an era of long-term strategic competition, the Department should have an analytic process that emphasizes jointness, overcomes seams, and incentivizes exploration of alternatives and risk.

What is your understanding of the role of the Defense Planning Guidance and Guidance for the Employment of the Force in the implementation of the NDS?

The Defense Planning Guidance is the Secretary's primary tool for translating the NDS into his force planning and resourcing priorities. The document provides critical Secretary of Defense guidance to the Military Departments, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Missile Defense Agency for the development of their draft budgets.

The Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) provides classified, near-term strategic policy guidance. The GEF implements the NDS, and plays an important role in defining how the Department balances near-term activities with rebuilding readiness and creating the space to

achieve NDS objectives over the longer-term. . The GEF is the primary source document for the CJCS to develop the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which tasks the Combatant Commanders to develop campaign, contingency, and posture plans.

The NDS emphasizes long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. In your assessment, what are the capabilities the Joint Force needs to prevail in competition with China and Russia?

To achieve the NDS aim of a more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready force, the Department needs to prioritize investment in several key areas. These are: nuclear force modernization; resiliency for forward forces, command and control, and logistics; assured space and cyber operations; missile defense, advanced fires, and strike options; munitions; and readiness recovery for major warfights. Over the longer term, DoD must increase investment in advanced technology development (e.g., autonomous systems, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence) to ensure the Joint Force remains capable of defeating adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict.

The NDS references “expanding the competitive space.” Though with different approaches, both China and Russia have been successful competing with the United States below the threshold of armed conflict.

What does “expanding the competitive space” mean for competition with China and Russia?

More than any other nation, the United States can expand the competitive space, seizing the initiative to challenge our competitors where we possess advantages and they lack strength. The approach set out in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy expands the competitive space by applying all dimensions of strategy and national power, not just military force, across the full spectrum of conflict. If confirmed, I will work to assist the Department in integrating better with other U.S. departments and agencies. This will enable us to be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable and capable of countering coercion and subversion short of armed conflict more effectively. I am committed to working to foster this competitive mindset, if confirmed.

What are the capabilities the Joint Force needs to compete below the threshold of armed conflict?

The Department of Defense should support U.S. interagency approaches and work by, with, and through our allies and partners to secure U.S. interests and counteract adversary coercion or competition below armed conflict.

The NDS’s Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment concepts emphasize sustaining capabilities for major combat, while “providing options for proactive and scalable employment of the Joint Force.”

In your assessment, how will this differ from current models of employment of force?

The Department must have a force employment concept and operational model that is adaptable to account for the uncertainty that exists in the changing global strategic environment. Many of our existing force employment models and operational concepts date to the immediate post-Cold War era, when our military advantage was unchallenged and the primary threats were rogue regimes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we implement the Global Operating Model and Dynamic Force Employment concepts outlined in the NDS.

How will force employment models be implemented while the Services are simultaneously rebuilding readiness? Do you have any concerns in this regard?

For the past 15 years, near-term force employment has outstripped readiness generation. This imbalance has resulted in multiple readiness challenges across the Department. The NDS is capable of addressing both near- and long-term security challenges with consistent, multiyear investment. If confirmed, I will assist the Department with implementation of its force employment models to rebuild operational readiness in the near-term while also developing a future force designed to confront evolving great power threats.

Joint Requirements

What is your understanding of the Department of Defense's current process for establishing a prioritized list of Joint Force requirements derived from the NDS?

My understanding is that the Department is making the tough choices to implement the NDS, both regarding near-term demands on how the force is employed, and longer-term demands on how the force is redesigned, postured, and made ready for future missions. This requires trade-offs and ruthless prioritization, including between those near- and longer-term demands, and among the capability, capacity, and readiness requirements of the Joint Force. Across the force management, posture, budget, requirements, and other processes, senior Department leadership must vet their decisions through the lens of the NDS-directed priorities.

What is your understanding of the Department's current process for assessing both U.S. and adversary capabilities?

The Office of the Secretary of Defense works closely with the Military Departments and Services, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Intelligence Community to conduct wargames and analyses that assess both U.S. and adversary capabilities.

In your opinion, is this process adequately identifying potential solutions (through procurement and concept development), assigning responsibility for implementing those solutions to the appropriate organization, and aligning the defense program to strategic priorities?

My understanding is that yes, the Department, led by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, is systematically implementing the NDS and holding the Services and DoD components accountable.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make to improve the Department’s processes for establishing Joint Force requirements?

Department leadership must continue to stress the need to innovate, develop, and field capabilities at what Secretary Mattis has called the “speed of relevance.” A key component of this process is exploring innovation not just at the technical but also at the operational level. It is important to be able to assess alternatives based on measurable results in a timely and cost-effective manner.

Joint Concept Development

What is your understanding of the Department of Defense’s current organizational structure, capability, and capacity concerning joint concept development?

The National Defense Strategy rightly identifies evolving innovative concepts as a key vector to building a more lethal force and organizing for innovation as a necessary Department reform. If confirmed, I will seek to improve Department joint concept development.

In your opinion, can the Department successfully produce short- and mid-term joint concept development that drives change in the Joint Force in response to identified shortfalls?

Yes. Addressing our shortfalls is not solely defined by new or additional hardware. It also requires change in the ways we organize and employ forces by rigorously identifying the problems and fostering a culture of operational experimentation where calculated risk-taking is encouraged and rewarded.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make to improve the Department’s joint concept development?

Recommendations for improving joint concept development would include accelerating field experimentation with emerging or off-the-shelf technologies and fostering deeper inter-military service concept development around the tactical and operational problems we need to address.

Joint Force Capabilities

The RAND Corporation released a report in late 2017 that stated, “U.S. forces could, under plausible assumptions, lose the next war they are called upon to fight.” Do you agree with this assessment when it comes to a potential conflict with China

or Russia? If so, what are the most significant strategic and operational factors that have led you to support such an assessment?

The National Defense Strategy argues that for decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and operations conducted at increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion). These trends, if unaddressed, will erode our competitive military advantage and challenge our ability to deter aggression.

In your assessment, what are the key areas each military service must improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to the Joint Force to prevail in long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia?

The Army should focus on redesigning the force for a future warfight by, for example, investing in more survivable forces, air and missile defenses, and long-range fires. The Air Force should rebalance towards high-end warfare (e.g., air dominance and counter Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), while consistent with the President's policy direction, reducing expensive contributions to ongoing counter-Violent Extremism Organization (VEO) campaigns. The Marine Corps should sustain its role as an expeditionary force-in-readiness, while also investing in capabilities to contribute to a high-end warfight. The Navy must focus on advanced capabilities to deter great power war; this means recapitalizing the Ballistic Missile Submarine force, as well as investing in advanced munitions and platforms.

In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force present the most significant challenge to addressing threats posed by China and Russia?

My other responses touch on critical capability gaps and needed investments. In terms of challenges, I would say that some of the greatest challenges to implementing the National Defense Strategy vision are broader in nature. Primarily, the Department will need continued and sufficient resourcing, along with fiscal predictability, to sustain the progress we are now making. Additionally, the Department must reform many aspects of how it does business in order to maximize resources and U.S. military effectiveness.

In your assessment, which programs are the highest priorities for mitigating current and emerging warfighting capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the Joint Force?

In terms of joint, Department-wide investments, I believe the Department needs to prioritize investment in nuclear modernization, forward force and posture resiliency, advanced fires and

strike options, munitions, command and control, missile defense, and the restoration of warfighting readiness.

Responsibility for nuclear and missile defense policy is currently aligned with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities. Responsibility for cyber and space is currently aligned with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security.

In your view, is this the most effective way to divide responsibility for these key joint warfighting areas?

Yes. There are trade-offs no matter how we organize the strategic capabilities and functional portfolios within the Office of the USD(P). Our close relationship and proximity to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security enables close coordination on strategic capabilities.

In your opinion, should a single Assistant Secretary of Defense have responsibility for all strategic capabilities, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, cyber, space, and electronic warfare?

No. The current alignment of portfolios allows the ASD/SPC office to integrate strategy, plans, deterrence, and burden sharing most effectively.

Global Force Posture

What changes in the strategic and operational environment do you identify in the NDS that have consequences for how U.S. forces are postured around the world, particularly in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East?

U.S. global defense posture is the most tangible expression of our interests abroad. To allies, partners, and adversaries alike, our posture demonstrates our ability to respond rapidly to developments that affect our national security. Our posture deters aggression, safeguards regional stability, enables timely response to contingencies, and facilitates close cooperation with our allies and partners.

I understand that the Department is evaluating posture requirements as part of its efforts to implement the NDS. Evaluation of our posture requires the consideration of operational requirements, political-military dynamics, host nation support, effects on the force, and costs. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each region, operational demands, and costs. If confirmed, I would work to continue seeking innovative ways to posture U.S. forces in ways that leverage our advantages and provide options to the Secretary and the President for contingency response.

In your assessment, will changes to U.S. global force posture be required to implement the Dynamic Force Employment and Global Operating Model concepts in the NDS?

I understand that the Department is evaluating posture requirements as part of its efforts to implement the NDS, including the Dynamic Force Employment and Global Operating Model concepts. U.S. posture is designed to be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable, all while enhancing the lethality and availability of U.S. forces. If confirmed, I would work to continue seeking innovative ways to posture U.S. forces in ways that leverage our advantages and provide credible options to the Secretary and the President for contingency response.

What is your understanding and assessment of the relative cost and benefits of the permanent versus rotational forces forward stationed overseas, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific?

Forward-stationed forces play an important role in assuring allies and partners and deterring potential adversaries, especially in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters that the NDS identifies as priorities for the Department. The proper balance among forward-stationed, rotationally deployed, and surge forces will vary from region to region and is constantly changing based on a dynamic security environment. If confirmed, I will work through my role as co-chair of the Global Posture Executive Council to ensure the Department pursues a methodical and analytic approach to determining the appropriate overseas force structure. Our force posture in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command's areas of responsibility (AOR) is prepared to respond to contingencies across both AORs. Although geography plays a role, we plan with the understanding that we can leverage our logistical capabilities to meet threats with speed and agility wherever they may arise in the region.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department of Defense's methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?

I understand that the Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces. We look at a number of cost factors to evaluate the most efficient and effective stationing of U.S. forces, from host nation cost-sharing to rotational costs to base infrastructure costs to military construction costs. We combine this analysis with an accounting of the conditions in each region, the operational demands on U.S. forces, and the benefits of burden sharing with allies and partners who host our forces. If confirmed, I would work to ensure cost analysis remains a key decision criterion when evaluating where to station U.S. forces to ensure the most effective force posture.

If confirmed, what actions would you take, or what changes would you recommend, if any, to the Department's methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure our cost methodology and assumptions leverage the most advantageous bilateral arrangements possible, and that planned expenditures on overseas basing are thoroughly reviewed to ensure investments are executable and efficient. If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize high-impact, limited-footprint methods and seek to build capacity among our allies and partners to provide for their security.

Nuclear Posture Review, Nuclear Policy, and Arms Control

Do you support the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and its recommendations?

Yes. Nuclear weapons have played and will continue to play a critical role in deterring nuclear attack and in preventing large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed States for the foreseeable future. I support the 2018 NPR's recommendations regarding the need for a flexible, adaptable, and resilient set of nuclear capabilities in order to tailor the U.S. approach to deterring diverse potential adversaries in different circumstances. The 2018 NPR confirms the findings of previous NPRs that the nuclear triad—supported by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dual-capable aircraft and a robust nuclear command, control, and communications system—is the most cost-effective and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence.

The NPR describes what might be called a “deterrence gap,” where Russian leaders appear to believe that threatening or even limited actual use of nuclear weapons would serve to de-escalate a regional conflict on terms favorable to them. The NPR also describes comprehensive modernization of the Russian nuclear arsenal, both strategic weapons accountable under the New START Treaty and tactical weapons outside any treaty.

Do you agree with this assessment of Russian nuclear doctrine and forces?

Yes, I agree with this assessment of Russian nuclear doctrine and forces. The magnitude of the imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, when combined with Russian nuclear modernization, doctrine, and practice, is concerning. Russian investment in these weapons and its behavior during exercises provide indicators that Russia believes it can leverage these weapons to coerce the United States and our allies and partners.

The supplemental capabilities called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review address Russia's doctrine of using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict on terms favorable to it. The supplemental capabilities demonstrate the United States' commitment to extended deterrence and send a message that we are prepared and have a range of means to respond to the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Regarding Russia's comprehensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal, Russia is modernizing “legacy” Soviet nuclear systems and developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers. These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based missiles, and land-based missiles. Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental-range systems--a hypersonic glide vehicle and a nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.

Russia is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty, and Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities. This modernization includes the production, possession, and flight testing of a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

How do you believe U.S. allies, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, will respond to the changes recommended by the NPR?

My understanding is that both NATO and Asian allies were broadly supportive of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), in particular its strong commitment to U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. I also understand that allies were extremely appreciative of the extensive and meaningful consultations that the United States conducted with them during the 2018 NPR deliberations.

How do you believe China and Russia will respond to the changes recommended by the NPR?

I believe China and Russia are pursuing nuclear strategies and developing nuclear forces based on determinations of their own national security requirements, made long before the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was issued. As the 2018 NPR notes, Russia already has been pursuing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and I would expect Russia to continue modernization of its strategic and non-strategic systems that began before the 2018 NPR release. China continues to modernize and add new military capabilities to its nuclear forces by enhancing silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems.

The 2018 NPR makes only modest adjustments to the previous Administration's nuclear policy and posture, and these were made to strengthen deterrence, not to threaten China or Russia.

If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect to have relative to the Nuclear Weapons Council?

The Nuclear Weapons Council is the primary interface for coordinating nuclear weapons enterprise issues between the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. Its top priority is to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons infrastructure, which has suffered the effects of aging and years of underfunding.

If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in his role as a voting member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and will work closely with the staffs and principals of those components that comprise the NWC counterparts on the Nuclear Weapons Council to implement stockpile-related 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommendations and other elements of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force structure and planning?

If confirmed, my responsibilities would include developing and coordinating DoD policy and guidance on U.S. nuclear deterrence, nuclear employment strategy, nuclear force structure, force structure requirements, posture, and plans; the effective control of nuclear forces and operation of the force in peacetime, crisis, and war; arms control negotiations, implementation, and verification related to nuclear weapon systems; and non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities, including force structure requirements, posture, and deployment plans.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing implementation of the New START Treaty? What role do you expect to play in the Administration's decision on whether or not to extend the New START Treaty?

If confirmed, my responsibilities would include arms control negotiations, implementation, and verification related to nuclear weapon systems. This would include responsibility for advising the Secretary on a Department of Defense position on whether to extend the New START Treaty, and responsibility for representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense position in interagency discussions related to the Treaty.

Responsibility for arms control policy is currently distributed between numerous offices throughout the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy depending on the treaty, so that one office has primary responsibility for New START, another for the Open Skies Treaty, another for the Chemical Weapons Convention, and so on.

In your opinion, should we consider each of these treaties as separate policy issues, especially in the context of possible violations by other states party to one or more treaties?

A treaty's value, in terms of its contribution to national security, should be judged in the first instance on its own merits. However, the treaty partner's behavior and compliance with other treaties are factors in determining that value.

Missile Defense

If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities contained in the Missile Defense Review once it is completed?

If confirmed, I would be the lead Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for missile defense, so I would have a direct role in implementing policies, strategies, and priorities as they pertain to both homeland defense and regional defense.

Do you support the “fly before buy” approach to ensure that operationally realistic flight testing is conducted before missile defense programs are procured and deployed?

Yes. Realistic testing before acquisition is essential to fielding systems the United States can count on.

In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, what role do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities? Should the role of allied partners be expanded?

The Administration has clearly provided direction to place a sharper focus on opportunities for increased missile defense contributions on the part of allies and partners to share more widely the responsibility for our common defense against missile attacks. If confirmed, I will encourage our allies and partners to acquire missile defense capabilities that can be integrated with U.S. and other allied and partner systems.

How do you view the role of missile defense within the NDS?

Missile Defenses support the NDS by expanding decision space, supporting our nuclear deterrent, and assuring allies and partners of our security commitments. Additionally, missile defenses provide opportunities to cooperate with allies and partners and build those relationships to strengthen our positions and influence around the world.

Do you believe missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

Our missile defense policy is to stay ahead of the rogue State ballistic missile threat to the nation. We rely primarily on nuclear deterrence to address the larger and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental missile capabilities. However, we will defend against any missile projected to impact the homeland. Regional missile defenses are not limited to rogue State threats, though, and I believe we should employ our regional missile defense systems against any adversary.

Do you believe the Department of Defense should explore boost phase defense as a necessary capability to counter the North Korean threat?

The optimal time to defeat a missile threat that has been launched is in the boost phase when it is over the adversary’s territory, has not deployed its warhead or countermeasures, and is the most vulnerable. If confirmed, I will be a proponent of developing and fielding boost-phase missile defense systems.

Stability Operations

In your view, what are the key lessons learned from the stability operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan?

The most critical lesson from stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is that stabilization is inherently a political endeavor to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and security forces can peacefully manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. The second key lesson is that civilian-military integration and unity of effort are essential to successful stabilization efforts.

I understand the Department is responding to the changes to its authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 by revamping its organizational approach to security cooperation and ensuring our efforts to build partner capacity in key theaters are conducted consistent with best practices. The Department is making strides to ensure our commanders in the field and our on-the-ground advisors have the experience, training, and support they need to perform their assigned missions.

What do you believe is the proper role for the Department of Defense in the planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies?

DoD's core responsibilities during stabilization efforts are enhancing security, maintaining basic public order, and enabling response to the immediate needs of the population. In fragile and conflict-affected areas, civilian personnel often lack direct access to oversee and implement stabilization activities. DoD has access, but limited expertise and authorities, to conduct transitional, small-scale stabilization activities in concert with interagency partners. DoD plays an important role in planning for and conducting stability operations, but must do it with robust, interagency collaboration, maintaining the Department of State as the lead Federal agency for stabilization and USAID as the lead implementing agency on the ground.

Defense Security Cooperation

What is the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in the conduct of security sector assistance?

DoD helps achieve our political-military objectives in priority theaters by implementing Title 22 programs and leading Title 10 efforts to conduct security cooperation initiatives that enable the Geographic Combatant Commanders to set the theater, deter conflict, or prevail in conflict alongside our partners and allies, if necessary.

What should be the Department of Defense's relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these activities?

DoD activities are always conducted in accord with broader U.S. foreign policy, which requires thorough coordination and collaboration with the State Department. This collaboration is achieved through the interagency process and by robust engagement between the two

departments at all levels.

What should be the strategic objectives of the Defense Department's efforts to build the capabilities of a partner nation's security forces?

DoD's security sector assistance objectives should be centered on enabling allies and partners to address shared security challenges, enhancing the interoperability of allies and partners with the U.S. joint force, and ensuring DoD access in key areas to respond to contingencies.

In your view, is the Defense Department appropriately organized and resourced to effectively conduct such activities? If not, what changes would you recommend?

The Department is moving in the right direction, with more work to be done. Over the last 15-20 years, the Department's and Congress's views on building partner capacity have evolved. After the Cold War, we sold equipment when asked and conducted exercises with select partners to ensure interoperability against often ambiguous threats. Against the backdrop of the National Security and Defense strategies, we now conduct security cooperation activities against specific strategic challenges, including great power competitors who are likewise using security cooperation as a tool to forge partnerships and limit U.S. influence. Our strategic approach and our authorities have grown in recent years along with the evolving security environment, but we still have room to improve to ensure that our efforts are targeted, coherent, and aid in the achievement of our strategic objectives. This shortfall has been addressed most recently by Congress through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which mandated security cooperation workforce development, assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation projects and activities, and a comprehensive, strategy-driven budget for security cooperation.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

I do.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities?

I do.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

I do.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

I do.

Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

I do.

If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

I do.