

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Ms. Alexandra Baker
Nominee for Appointment to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Duties

Pursuant to section 137a of title 10, U.S. Code, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) serve as the first assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and assists the Under Secretary in the performance of the duties set forth in section 134 of the code.

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the DUSD(P)?

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) is the primary assistant to and senior-most official under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The DUSD(P) will assist the USD(P) to perform all duties in Section 134 and 137a of Title 10, U.S.C. As a Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed official, the DUSD(P) is empowered to act on behalf of USD(P) on delegated topics, and when the USD(P) is unavailable or recused.

2. What is your understanding of the role of the DUSD(P) as “first assistant” to the USD(P)?

Per the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended (5 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349d), the “first assistant” is the first successor to USD(P) in case the USD(P) dies, resigns, or is unavailable to perform his/her duties. In such a case, DUSD(P) shall act for the USD(P) until a successor is either appointed or the absence or unavailability ends, subject to the time limitations and other provisions of the Act.

3. If confirmed, what specific additional duties might you expect the USD(P) to prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I will foremost help USD(P) carry out the responsibilities, fulfill functions, manage relationships, and exercise authorities provided for in law and pursuant to the DoD directive that assigns responsibilities to USD(P). I understand that the specific duties assigned to DUSD(P) by the USD(P) has differed for every USD(P)/DUSD(P) relationship. If I am confirmed, I will support USD(P) and the Policy organization as directed by USD(P).

Qualifications

4. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you for this position?

My many years of service in the national security community, to include as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff, national security advisor for Senator Warren, Deputy Chief of Staff to former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, as a career civilian budget analyst at the Office

of Management and Budget (OMB), and my time on the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Committee have provided me with expertise, background, and experiences that qualify me for this position. This background and experience will give me a variety of perspectives on how best to support the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P).

5. Specifically what leadership and management experience do you possess that you would apply to your service as DUSD(P), if confirmed?

I have led diverse teams at multiple levels to meet or exceed their organizational objectives, both within the Department and over the course of my career. In my role as Deputy Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, I helped to stand-up several new offices and initiatives within the Department, including the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), coordinating their activities across multiple stakeholders and with Congress. Having worked directly for a Secretary of Defense gave me a Department-wide view of how the Department functions, and the role played by Policy in the broader defense organization. In my current role as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council, I lead key interagency strategy efforts, coordinating input and actions at the Assistant Secretary-level across the government. My time at OMB additionally gave me tools to understand how resources are apportioned among the departments and agencies. I believe this background will help me assist the Secretary and USD(P) with the Policy organization's responsibilities.

6. Are there any actions you would take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the DUSD(P)?

If I am confirmed, I will familiarize myself with the Policy organization, its assigned responsibilities, and the expectations of the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for me. I will seek to build and expand on relationships within DoD, other departments and agencies, and with the legislative branch to further Policy's goals.

Major Challenges and Priorities

7. What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you would face if confirmed as the DUSD(P)?

The most significant challenge for me would be the same as for the Policy organization – providing the best strategic advice to the Secretary, implementing the policies deriving from those strategies, and accomplishing these missions in a COVID constrained environment. If confirmed, I would also seek to prioritize the organizational health of the Policy enterprise.

8. If confirmed, specifically what actions would you take to address each of these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work with the Policy team on enhancing resources and examining the tools the team has to work on classified issues under the COVID challenges facing the Policy team.

9. If confirmed, what innovative ideas, if any, would you consider providing the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense regarding the organization and operations of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))?

As I have not yet served in Policy, I believe it would be premature for me to speculate before gaining a better understanding of the organization. If confirmed, I will spend time learning the organization and its operations so that I can provide the Secretary and USD(P) the best possible innovative recommendations.

Guantanamo Bay Naval Station

10. What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo?

I support the Biden Administration's stated view that it is time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly. Until that time, however, the Department must ensure the continued safe, humane, and legal care and treatment of the 39 remaining detainees through Joint Task Force - Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO).

11. In your view, what impact, if any, does the end of combat operations in Afghanistan have on the Defense Department's detention policy and strategy?

While I am aware that there is litigation ongoing on this matter, I understand that the end of combat operations in Afghanistan does not affect the legal basis for the Defense Department's detention operations, which remains the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. With regard to the Department's detention policy and strategy, in line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe it is time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly.

12. What factors should be considered in setting policy for determining the release or transfer of GTMO detainees?

I believe the factors used by the Periodic Review Board in determining whether a detainee should be considered transfer eligible, as laid out in the governing policy memo posted at prs.mil are appropriate. The Periodic Review Board review process uses available information to determine whether a detainee remains a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States and, if not, whether there are conditions which could ensure any remaining threat is mitigated such that transfer to a suitable country is appropriate.

13. In your view, what should be the Department's long-term detention strategy?

In line with the Biden Administration's policy, I believe it is time to close the detention facility at Guantanamo responsibly. It is my understanding that the Biden administration does not intend to bring new detainees to the facility and will seek to close it.

The Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, enacted in law by section 1023 of the FY 2012 NDAA, is conducted "to determine whether certain individuals detained at [Guantanamo] represent a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States such that their

continued detention is warranted”.

14. Do you think the U.S. Government should continue the PRB process and the transfer of detainees to other countries based on the PRB’s determinations, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

If confirmed, I would support the continued Period Review Board process. I understand that the PRB conducts hearings on a regular basis to make administrative determinations as to whether continued detention remains necessary, although no transfers occur unless the Secretary of Defense provides a certification in accordance with the relevant legal requirements.

15. Under what circumstances would you envision the Administration directing the activation and operations of such a migrant detention facility?

I believe the referenced facility is the Migrant Operations Center, which is located on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and operated by the Department of Homeland Security. To my knowledge this facility has a steady-state mission of housing migrants interdicted at sea while they are processed for third-country resettlement.

16. What role would the Department of Defense play in the administration and operation of this migrant detention facility?

My understanding is that the Department of Homeland Security manages the administration and operations of the Migrant Operations Center. I understand that Naval Station Guantanamo Bay provides some support services, such as medical care for staff and those housed at this center, on a reimbursable basis.

17. What is the appropriate role for a contractor to play in the administration of this facility?

I cannot speak to the appropriate role of contractors at this facility as it is operated by the Department of Homeland Security.

Department of Defense Reforms

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included an increase in the number of personnel authorized to be assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

18. Do you believe that an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) is necessary and appropriate?

I am aware that the number of personnel in the Policy organization has been reduced over the last several years. My understanding is that this has been challenging to the Policy organization, especially as our national security challenges have grown in complexity. If confirmed, I would seek to work with USD(P) to review missions and current staffing levels to determine whether the professional civilian staff is sized appropriately, and how we can best recruit and retain a skilled and talented workforce. I

would also seek to work with Congress to ensure that the Policy organization is resourced appropriately to support the Secretary and the Nation.

19. To what missions and functions would you apply such an increase, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will look to the upcoming National Defense Strategy to guide my recommendations to USD(P) about how best to use any additional resources.

20. In your opinion, how does the number of personnel assigned to OUSD(P) (as compared to the number of personnel assigned to the Joint Staff) impact civilian control of the military?

OUSD(P) personnel play an important role in advising the Secretary of Defense and ensuring civilian control of the military. As I am not yet aware of the personnel assigned to OUSD(P) and Joint Staff, and if their responsibilities are comparable, I cannot assess this question yet. If confirmed, I will commit to examining this issue closely.

21. In your view, would an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the OUSD(P) enhance civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

This is a complex question, which I am committed to examine if I am confirmed. An increase in personnel would allow OUSD(P) to increase its ability to provide the best strategic advice to the Secretary of Defense, the senior departmental official, and would be consistent with the commitment to ensure civilian control of the military.

National Defense Strategy and Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) shifted U.S. strategic priorities to focus on a rising China, an aggressive Russia, and the continuing threat from rogue regimes and global terrorism. In March 2021, the Biden Administration issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which sets out the national security priorities for the Administration. The Administration has initiated the process of preparing a new NDS, to be completed in 2022.

22. Do you believe that the 2018 NDS and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance accurately assess the current strategic environment, including the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies?

The 2018 National Defense Strategy was notable, in my view, particularly for how it accelerated bipartisan consensus on the concerning growth of China's military capabilities and its implications for the United States, and our allies and partners. As Secretary Austin has highlighted, and the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance more recently articulated, the growing scope and scale of China's military modernization make China the Department's pacing challenge. The Interim Guidance also highlights a range of other key challenges in the security environment – to include climate change, the global COVID-19 pandemic, and other biological threats. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department's ongoing NDS review accounts for key features of the security environment, to include any changes since the 2018 NDS and the 2021 Interim National Security

Strategic Guidance were published.

23. Do you support the national security priorities set out in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance?

Yes. In my current role, I am leading efforts to update the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which will ultimately result in publication of the Administration's new National Security Strategy. If confirmed, I would expect to focus on ensuring NDS alignment and implementation consistent with administration guidance.

24. What areas of current NDS implementation cause you the most concern and what recommendations would you have for addressing each of these concerns, if confirmed?

Any defense strategy, in my view, stands or falls on implementation. Assessments of past National Defense Strategies (and QDRs before them) have consistently identified the need for more deliberate planning, organization, and prioritization to execute the priorities in these documents. I understand the NDS process is well underway. If confirmed, I will work to finalize the forthcoming NDS with a deliberate eye toward ensuring that it builds implementation into its approach. In so doing, I would work with the Department's senior leadership to ensure that implementation efforts are integrated across the Department, in support of other U.S. elements of national power, and alongside our allies and partners.

25. If confirmed, what steps would you take to increase the quantity and quality of analytic capability required to support informed assessment and decision making in the OUSD(P)?

If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in working with the Deputy Secretary's recently chartered Analytic Working Group – comprised of Policy, Joint Staff, CAPE, and the Chief Data Officer (CDO) – in consultation with the Services and other components, to ensure the analytic support processes, tools, and methodologies provide civilian leadership with the variety of decision support that they need to address the scope and scale of challenges the NDS will address.

26. What is your assessment of the ability of DOD modeling and simulation capabilities to support policy missions, for example in modeling the impacts of financial market uncertainties on military operations?

While I am not in a position to know firsthand, I understand that the Department's analytic capabilities may have been strained by budgetary reductions over the past decade. At the same time, potential tools and methodologies have been evolving based on new analytic approaches and technologies and better harnessing of data. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to review these developments and ensure that Policy has the requisite personnel, tools, and methodologies to support senior leader decisions.

27. What is your view of the role that social science research, such as that funded under the DOD Minerva program, has played in support of defense policy objectives?

I believe it is important for DoD policy makers to listen to, and draw upon, a wide range of research, including from the academic community. The Minerva program, and the social science it supports, is an exemplar of such research and I understand that it has, and continues to be, an important resource for policy makers, and the wider DoD community.

In its 2018 report, *Providing for the Common Defense*, the National Defense Strategy Commission observed, “[t]he United States needs more than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational concepts that expand U.S. options and constrain those of China, Russia, and other actors. Operational concepts constitute an essential link between strategic objectives and the capability and budgetary priorities needed to advance them.”

28. What do you view as the role of the OUSD(P) in the development of operational concepts?

Operational concepts are an essential link between strategic objectives, policies, and the capability and budgetary priorities needed to advance them. As such, OUSD(P)’s role is to provide appropriate civilian guidance and oversight to ensure operational concepts are well-integrated and strategically aligned.

29. What key elements or components must operational concepts include, in your opinion, to effectively guide capability and budgetary priorities?

Joint concept development is an iterative process that requires tight linkages between civilian and military leadership. At any resource level, the Department’s concept development must balance sustaining systems capable of countering threats at lower costs, divesting systems that are not fit for purpose, and modernizing forces able to contend with threats posed by increasingly advanced competitors over time, with a prioritized focus on China. To do so, operational concepts must clearly articulate the operational problems that a threat poses over time and how the concept is intended to provide options to address the threat in relation to the above.

30. In your opinion, does the planning, programming, budgeting and execution process in the Department of Defense need to be modified to better support the emerging joint requirements of the Joint Warfighting Concept? If so, in what ways? If not, why not?

I believe the Department’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process, including the supporting force planning and development efforts, provides a transparent and neutral process for considering and prioritizing key investments that stem from the emerging defense strategy and Joint Warfighting Concept work. However, as with all processes, DoD should frequently evaluate PPBE to ensure that it is effectively providing needed alignment between strategic priorities, analysis, concepts, and specific solutions.

National Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13), *United States Cyber Operations Policy*, provides the process for approving cyberspace operations. Together with congressional clarification that clandestine military activities or operations in cyberspace can be considered “traditional military operations” under the National Security Act of 1947, NSPM-13 is credited with enabling the Federal government to undertake significant cyberspace actions on a timely basis within an effective oversight framework.

31. In your view, has NSPM-13 significantly improved the planning and approval of military operations in cyberspace?

In my view, the existing policy framework for approving offensive cyber operations has made a positive contribution by enabling the Department to effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats overseas at the source, before they reach our networks. I also welcomed Congress’s clarification in the FY19 NDAA of what constitutes traditional military activities. Together, these measures ensure that the Department is better able to operate in cyberspace and understand the evolving cyber environment.

32. In your view, can NSPM-13 be improved, and if so, how?

It is my understanding that the current policy has resulted in well-coordinated and timely DOD cyber operations. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) in reviewing the policy and any associated risks, and work to ensure that the Department remains focused on improving its effective use of the authority granted by the President and the existing interagency coordination process. I will also seek to ensure that the Department remains fully transparent with Congress as we ensure that DoD is able to perform its mission effectively in cyberspace.

The United States has been subjected to an increasing number of serious ransomware attacks facilitated by criminal organizations located in countries whose governments appear to tolerate, if not encourage, these activities.

33. In your view, specifically how should the U.S. government hold other governments accountable for failing to act against criminal ransomware organizations operating within their borders?

Addressing the threat of ransomware is a challenge, in part due to the increasingly blurry lines between nation-state and criminal actors. Some governments have let government-employed hackers “moonlight” as cybercriminals for personal benefit, and some governments have created permissive environments for criminal ransomware gangs, allowing them to operate from within their borders and shielding them from prosecution. President Biden has been clear that this is not acceptable, and that responsible countries must take action against cybercriminals who conduct ransomware activities from within their territory.

Thwarting ransomware actors requires a whole-of-government response that is coordinated with the private sector and our international partners. If confirmed, I will work to support these efforts, which include working with the defense industrial base to increase its security and resiliency; defending the Department’s networks from malware,

including ransomware; and strengthening partnerships with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security in their efforts to improve the cyber defenses of Federal, State, and local governments, as well as those of the private sector.

34. Does the ability of these large cyber-criminal enterprises to target critical infrastructure pose a potential threat to national security, in your view?

Ransomware attacks can threaten our national, homeland, and economic security. Recent high-profile attacks on critical infrastructure, including attacks on the Colonial Pipeline and JBS Foods, have demonstrated ransomware's potential to disrupt the everyday lives of Americans. The cyber degradation or disruption of critical infrastructure can have cascading physical consequences that could have serious effects on our national security.

35. In your view, what factors should be considered in assessing whether a cyber action by an adversary would constitute an act of war?

The implications of any cyberattack must be considered on a case-by-case basis. This includes consideration of the total effects of an incident, such as injury, death, or significant property destruction. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department is postured to support whole-of-government responses to cyber incidents, particularly if they are destructive or target our critical infrastructure.

36. While diplomacy, law enforcement actions, and improved defenses are critical to countering the ransomware threat, do you envision a role for DOD Cyber Mission Forces in conducting disruptive actions directly against these organizations in cyberspace? Please explain your answer.

I understand that the Department is prepared to use its unique authorities to defend forward and disrupt significant ransomware threats at the source, before they reach our networks. However, ransomware actors generally target victims for financial gain, making ransomware threats criminal in nature and often the focus of law enforcement action. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department continues to support whole-of-government efforts to counter ransomware threats, including through robust sharing of information that can enable our law enforcement partners as well as the Department of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating the security of U.S. critical infrastructure.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, required the appointment of a Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) to the Secretary of Defense to coordinate across all the DOD components with cyberspace responsibilities, assist in the development of cyber strategies and posture reviews, and oversee implementation of strategies and policies. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is reviewing a recommendation to transfer the PCA role from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security to the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO).

37. What do you perceive to be both the pros and cons associated with the transfer of PCA roles and duties to the DOD CIO?

I understand the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense (PCA) and Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) play critical roles in the Department's governance and oversight of cyber policy and programs. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense the PCA's responsibilities include oversight of U.S. Cyber Command and implementation of the Department's cyber strategy playing a key role in overseeing cyber operations and policy, programs, and processes that support these operations, and integrating policy, programs, and processes germane to cyber operations across the Department. I understand the DoD CIO, as the principal staff assistant for information technology, manages the Department's cybersecurity program and develops and oversees implementation of cybersecurity policy across the Department. I am not aware of and have not been a part of internal DoD discussions about a potential transfer of the PCA role to the DoD CIO. If confirmed, and designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to contribute to those internal discussions, I would develop a recommendation based on careful review of the PCA and CIO roles and responsibilities, respectively, and DoD leaders' vision and strategy for organizing the Department for all of its cyber-related missions.

38. If confirmed, will you pledge to consult with the Committees on Armed Services of the House and Senate prior to any decision by the Secretary to transfer the PCA role from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

I understand the Deputy Secretary of Defense intends, and has promised, to consult with the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives prior to any redesignation of the Principal Cyber Advisor. If confirmed, I will ensure that consultation with these committees occurs prior to any final decision.

Spectrum

39. In what ways does DOD rely on spectrum to support warfighter requirements?

My understanding is that the electromagnetic spectrum is essential to a wide range of the Joint Force's operations, including command, control, communications, and warfighting.

40. What future spectrum warfighter requirements are essential to competing with Russia and China?

I understand that the spectrum is increasingly contested. If confirmed, I will look to better understand what the force needs to achieve spectrum access and superiority in order to prevail in a high-end warfight.

Under the July 15, 2021, *Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan and Roadmap*, and per section 1053 of the FY 2019 NDAA, the DOD CIO has now assumed responsibilities as the DOD senior official for overall implementation of the Spectrum Superiority Strategy. Yet, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P) is expected to name a Deputy Assistant Secretary to advocate and represent the USD(P) on matters related to Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).

41. Do you believe EMSO policy processes are adequately represented in this planning

structure?

I am not in a position at this time to assess whether EMSO policy processes are adequately represented in this planning structure. If confirmed, I will work with key stakeholders across the Department to advance the Joint Force's priorities for EMSO, in accordance with Policy's roles and per the implementation plan.

42. Are Combatant Commander requirements properly represented? Please explain your answer.

I understand that the EMSO cross functional team included participation by the CCMDs, but I am not in a position at this time to evaluate CCMD representation in practice.

43. If confirmed, what improvements would you propose to strengthen the role of EMSO in the policy processes under the USD(P)?

If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to ensure that Policy fully supports the consideration of EMSO in the appropriate strategic guidance documents, to include the National Defense Strategy and associated guidance on force management guidance and force planning. I would also direct that Policy's participation in the Department's budget and force management processes fully account for EMSO.

44. Do you believe it prudent for DOD to vacate or share the 3100-3450 Mhz band for commercial 5G wireless networks?

I am not in a position at this time to evaluate technical specifics, but I believe the Department must balance achieving U.S. economic development objectives while not limiting constraints on military capabilities. If confirmed, I would work so support the USD(P) in working alongside DoD's Chief Information Officer to ensure DoD's access to critical spectrum.

45. What most concerns you about the proposal that DOD vacate this particular band?

I am generally concerned that adversary actions, commercial development, and regulatory constraints could impede U.S. forces' freedom of action in the electromagnetic spectrum. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P) to ensure that the Department reforms its processes and modernize the Joint Force in order to maintain an edge in key domains, to include EMSO and 5G, in cooperation with the Department's technical experts and other stakeholders.

46. How would you articulate the impacts to the capabilities of DOD under such circumstances, and how will those impacts be mitigated, in your view?

I cannot speak to the technical specifics of how the Department is grappling with this issue from my current position, but I understand that, under the Secretary's guidance to make China the Department's overall pacing threat for modernization, the Department is prioritizing a wide range of modernization efforts. If confirmed, I would expect to play a key role in linking strategic guidance to implementation efforts and investments, informed

by robust analysis and new operating concepts.

Space

47. What are your views with respect to the necessity of civilian oversight of DOD space operations with respect to U.S. Space Command and Space Force?

Space is a critical warfighting domain, and civilian oversight of force development and operations regarding the space domain is as important as civilian oversight of force development and military operations in any other domain. Given that conflict could extend to or originate in space, and in light of the new and rapidly evolving nature of the challenge, civilian oversight regarding space is particularly important.

48. Is current civilian oversight of these organizations adequate?

I understand that when passing the legislation that established the U.S. Space Force, Congress also took important steps to strengthen civilian oversight of space by placing the Space Force under the oversight of the Secretary of the Air Force, establishing a new Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, and designating that one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense would be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. If confirmed, I would work closely with these organizations to ensure strong civilian oversight and regularly assess if further changes are needed.

49. Should the OUSD(P) play a different or greater role in oversight of these organizations? Please explain your answer.

My understanding is that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy -- who reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and whose principal duty is the overall supervision of DoD policy for space warfighting -- is well positioned to support the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in ensuring appropriate civilian oversight of both the operational and planning activities of the U.S. Space Command and the organize, train, and equip activities of the U.S. Space Force. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD for Space Policy, regularly evaluating the effectiveness of this oversight role and whether any changes might be advisable.

There is growing concern about the vulnerability of our nation's space-based systems and supporting architectures.

50. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to address these vulnerabilities?

It is essential to have strong mission assurance of the critical space-based capabilities that support our national security. If confirmed, I would prioritize understanding the extent of progress to date in transitioning to new space architectures that are resilient against the types of counterspace capabilities our strategic competitors, specifically China and Russia, are developing. I would also want to ensure DoD is taking necessary steps to protect the joint force in all domains against potential adversaries' hostile uses of space.

51. If confirmed, what changes to national security space policy, organization, and

programs would you propose?

If confirmed, before making specific proposals, I would want to receive detailed briefings on the current and projected security environment in space, and the extent of coordination and integration across the national security space enterprise to ensure the national security advantages of our space capabilities. It is critical that policy, organizational, and programmatic decisions reflect broad consensus across our government regarding the importance of space, and I would continually assess whether our efforts are producing the intended results or if further changes are required.

52. In your view, what are the roles of our allies and industry with respect to DOD space and national security operations?

Close relationships with our allies and partners, and a strong, vibrant U.S. industry, are fundamental to a successful space security strategy. If confirmed, I would look to strengthen space policy, programmatic, and operational cooperation with our allies and partners. I would also work closely with the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command to maximize our ability to leverage the dynamic and innovative capacities of U.S. industry.

Pursuant to section 955 of the FY 2020 NDAA, President Biden has nominated an individual to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The NDAA specifies that “The principal duty of the Assistant Secretary shall be the overall supervision of policy of the Department of Defense for space warfighting.”

53. Congress has repeatedly opposed diluting the missions and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with matters related to nuclear or missile defense. How will you, if confirmed, ensure a continued, laser-like focus on Space Policy within the OUSD(P)?

DoD space capabilities support all aspects of national defense strategy from peacetime competition and strategic deterrence, to operations and decision making in conventional and nuclear conflict. These capabilities support the total force across all domains as well as national leadership at the highest levels. If confirmed, I would ensure that the OUSD(P), and in particular the ASD for Space Policy, is addressing the challenges of space warfighting policy holistically, within the context of an integrated national defense strategy and total force posture, rather than from a perspective limited to just the space domain. This approach would maximize the strategic benefits of a dedicated focus on the challenges of space security.

54. What principal duties do you believe should be assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with respect to space? Please explain your answer.

I believe the principal duties of the ASD for Space Policy should center on the space policy and related matters that correspond most closely to the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in advising the Secretary of Defense. Thus, in addition to the duties assigned in statute, the ASD for Space Policy should represent the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in interagency policy and strategy deliberations and in international negotiations regarding space and related matters. The

ASD for Space Policy also should advise on the strategic and policy aspects of planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities related to space, and on integration of space and related capabilities into operations and contingency plans.

55. What other duties and responsibilities should be assigned to this ASD?

If confirmed, I would work with the USD(P) to assess the appropriate scope of responsibilities for the ASD for Space Policy, taking into account the overall structure of the Policy organization.

Middle East

56. What do you view as the Department's top priorities in the Middle East?

The Department of Defense's priorities derive from the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. I see at least three major priorities for the Department in the Middle East: preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and addressing threats from Iran's regional aggression and support for terrorism, including protecting our own forces; disrupting Al-Qaeda and related terrorist networks and preventing an ISIS resurgence; and protecting other vital U.S. interests such as freedom of navigation. Our presence in the region also provides opportunities for security cooperation with our allies and partners in the region, including Israel, as we seek to cultivate their military capabilities and build interoperability to pursue shared objectives. DoD must be mindful that China remains the Department's pacing threat and that strategic competition must be a priority in the Middle East as well.

57. To what extent does achieving U.S. national security interests in the Middle East require a continuous U.S. military presence there, in your view?

The United States cannot achieve our national security interests in the Middle East without a military presence in the region, but the Department's military posture in the Middle East must also be sustainable and balanced with global military priorities. Our military presence enables the protection of the homeland, positions us to respond to contingencies, and allows us to better cooperate with our allies and partners as DoD works to improve their military capabilities, build interoperability, and collaborate on shared security objectives. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P) to continually assess our presence in the region in light of the dynamic security environment.

58. In your opinion, is the current U.S. force presence in the Middle East appropriately sized? Please explain your answer.

The President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that in the Middle East, DoD will right-size our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital interests. If confirmed, I will work with other leaders in the Department to ensure our military presence in the Middle East is appropriately aligned with our strategic objectives.

59. What opportunities exist for increasing burden-sharing with U.S. regional and

European partners to counter threats emanating from and affecting the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)?

Sharing the responsibility of regional security with our allies and partners is critically important to achieving our national security objectives. This is one of the reasons the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance calls for prioritizing our alliances and partnerships. The Department already does this well, including through such coalitions as the International Maritime Security Construct, the Defeat ISIS Coalition, and an expanded NATO mission in Iraq. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department, U.S. interagency, and internationally to find additional opportunities to further enhance security cooperation.

60. To what extent is the Middle East relevant to great power competition?

The Middle East remains an important region for U.S. interests, particularly in terms of strategic waterways and access for global commerce, and is increasingly a key theater for competition. China and Russia both seek to displace the United States as the partner of choice in the Middle East. Their presence often undermines U.S. force protection in the region, and their weapons sales and increased technical cooperation with our Middle East partners put U.S. technology at risk.

61. How should DOD consider countering Russia and China in the Middle East, in your view?

China continues to expand its military and intelligence footprint and increase its involvement in the region, as does Russia. But the United States retains many advantages, including our long-standing partnerships in the region. I understand that the Department is investing in support for regional partners and affirming common interests to counter common threats. If confirmed, I work to ensure that the United States remains the strategic partner of choice in the Middle East.

62. In your judgment, should the Department accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR?

I believe that DoD should right-size our military posture in the CENTCOM AOR to the level required to secure U.S. national interests while keeping a focus on our global strategy.

63. How could such risks be mitigated, in your view?

The Department's prioritization of China as its pacing challenge for developing new military technology and operational concepts ensures that the United States will maintain its overwhelming overmatch vis-a-vis Iran. This overmatch, combined with the Department's demonstrated ability to rapidly deploy forces to the region, should allow the Department to adopt a sustainable posture that is less dependent on static, long-term deployments, without losing significant deterrent benefits.

64. What, in your view, are the primary goals of our current military posture in Iraq?

The U.S. military is in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq under Operation INHERENT RESOLVE to support the Iraqi security forces as they lead in the fight against ISIS alongside our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

65. What is your view of the Administration's decision to transition combat forces from Iraq?

The announcement that the U.S. and Iraq security relationship will fully transition to a training, advising, assisting, and intelligence-sharing role is only possible because of the increased capabilities of the Iraqi security forces as they continue to lead in the fight against ISIS. It is a signal of remarkable progress and the success of the U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership.

66. Going forward, what do you envision to be the missions and size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?

The U.S. military is in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government. As Iraqi needs continue to evolve, so will the U.S. mission. If confirmed, I will work to support the USD(P) in ongoing conversations the Department and the interagency have with our Iraqi and Coalition partners.

67. Do you believe the United States should continue to provide security assistance to Iraq following the defeat of the so-called physical caliphate of ISIS? If so, for what purposes?

Although ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a threat and ISIS continues to conduct attacks, jeopardizing the hard-fought gains of Iraqi security forces over the past several years. The United States should remain committed to the defeat-ISIS mission and continue to build the capacity of Iraqi security forces to enable them to conduct counter-ISIS operations independently.

68. How should the United States regularize security assistance to Iraq in future years?

It is my understanding that during the fight against ISIS, U.S. security cooperation with Iraq has largely focused on tactical and operational needs. If confirmed, I would advocate for the United States and Iraq to look beyond immediate-term priorities toward longer-term institutional development and a future cooperation between our militaries that extends beyond counterterrorism.

69. How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq?

It is my understanding that Iran provides financial support, training, and equipment to Iraqi militia groups to grow its political and military influence, seeking both an end to the U.S. presence through both political and military means and to use Iraq as a platform for its destabilizing activities in the region. Attacks from these Iranian-backed militias not only

threaten the safety of U.S. and Coalition personnel, but also undermine Iraq's stability and threaten Iraqi civilians.

70. If confirmed, what strategy would you recommend to limit Iranian malign influence in Iraq?

If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in working with our interagency partners to craft a whole-of-government approach to limit Iranian malign influence and ensure that Iraq is strong, stable, and sovereign. Following the recent Iraqi elections, the United States should encourage a swift government formation process that results in a government dedicated to creating a brighter future for all Iraqis and advancing the U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership. The United States should also continue to support Iraq's sovereignty and improved relations with other neighboring states as a counterweight to Iran.

Iran

71. What is your assessment of the current military threat posed by Iran?

It is my understanding that the Iranian military and its proxies and partners pose a conventional and unconventional threat to U.S. forces and our regional partners. Iran leverages regional militia groups to threaten U.S. forces and partners and undermine regional sovereignty. It has attacked U.S. forces with ballistic missiles, while proliferating this capability to its partners and proxies. Iran is similarly proliferating one-way attack unmanned aerial systems to its proxies for attacks on U.S. forces and regional partners. Finally, it is my understanding that Iran also threatens freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz region through direct attacks on civilian shipping, and stockpiling naval mines designed to close the Strait.

72. What is your understanding of the objectives of the U.S. security strategy with respect to Iran?

It is my understanding that the U.S. strategy is to pursue diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region. The Department supports this effort by deterring and, if necessary, defending against Iranian aggression, and by working to build partner capacity and promote increased cooperation to address shared threats.

73. What is the role of the U.S. military in this strategy?

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense deters aggressive actions by Iran by maintaining a calibrated force presence and working with its partners to enhance regional defenses against Iran's destabilizing actions.

74. Are U.S. military forces and capabilities currently deployed to the CENTCOM AOR adequate to deter and, if necessary, respond to threats posed by Iran?

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense is currently undertaking a global posture review to, in part, answer this question. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint

Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands to carefully review the size, shape, and readiness of the force, and to ensure we are creating a flexible global posture that effectively deters threats and provides the President the options he needs by leveraging our unmatched ability to rapidly deploy forces anywhere in the world.

75. What is your assessment of U.S. national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

Countries that experience an increase in Iranian influence typically see a weakening of state authority as Iran creates and arms militias that undermine national sovereignty. These militias then use their Iranian-provided weapons to threaten or attack neighboring countries spreading conflict and instability across the region.

76. How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran’s malign influence—more specifically, Iran’s proxy networks—and other activities throughout the Middle East?

I understand the U.S. strategy aims to counter Iranian malign influence in the Middle East by enhancing the capabilities and capacity of U.S. regional partners, leveraging the international community to condemn and push back against Iran and its proxies’ destabilizing activities, and deterring and responding to any attacks from Iranian proxies.

77. If the United States were to return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), what concerns, if any, would you have for regional security? Please explain your answer.

I understand that the Administration’s intent is to use a return to the JCPOA as the first step towards negotiating a longer, stronger deal which addresses Iran’s other destabilizing regional activities. I agree with this approach because a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a tremendous threat to our regional partners and further embolden Iran in its activities to undermine regional security. At the same time, the United States should continue to push back against Iran’s destabilizing activities, working together with our partners and allies.

78. In your view, what effect, if any, has the election of President Ebrahim Raisi had on regional security?

I have not seen any indication that President Raisi has changed Iran’s destabilizing approach to the region.

Afghanistan

79. Reflecting back on the mission in Afghanistan, what do you see as some of the major strategic missteps?

The mission in Afghanistan succeeded in decimating al Qaeda, but U.S. nation building efforts were less successful. My understanding is that there are a number of proposed and ongoing inquiries and lessons learned reviews on matters related to the events of the past 20 years in Afghanistan, including the events of the last few months. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the Department, and the interagency on all such reviews.

80. How would you apply those lessons learned in future military operations?

I believe there are strategic, operational, tactical, and administrative lessons to be learned from the Afghanistan war, and that the understanding the Department develops from Afghanistan should inform our efforts going forward. If confirmed, I would seek to work with leaders in the Department and in Congress to undertake a systematic review of lessons learned. I will want to identify efforts that were effective that we should replicate in the future, as well as efforts that failed.

81. What factors do you assess as leading to the Taliban’s ultimate success in returning to power in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department and Congress to more fully understand the factors leading to the Taliban’s ultimate success. In part, we will need to understand the role of corruption and poor leadership in Afghanistan’s senior ranks of the government and the military, and the effects of the Doha Agreement on the morale of Afghan forces. We should also seek to understand how and why our own efforts to build the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces were ultimately not successful.

82. In your opinion, what are the implications of the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) for future advise, train and assist missions?

I believe that many of the lessons we have learned and will continue to learn from the Afghanistan mission will be applicable to future train, advise, and assist missions. Every context is unique, but for future large-scale train, advise, and assist missions, one key challenge will be preventing our partner security forces from developing an overreliance on international presence.

83. In light of the end of the military mission, what do you view as U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan?

It is my understanding that our vital national interest in Afghanistan has not changed: it is to make sure Afghanistan can never be used again to launch an attack on the U.S. homeland.

84. In your view, can the United States conduct effective “over the horizon” counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan without a partner force on the ground? Please explain your answer.

Yes, while difficult, in my view the U.S. can conduct an effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The Department has experience conducting counterterrorism operations from outside of target countries – or “over the horizon.” Developing effective intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities in the region is the cornerstone of any effective counterterrorism operation, regardless of whether it is from in country or from over-the-horizon. If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that we maintain an effective over-the-horizon capability to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the United States.

85. What is your understanding of the definition or characterization of an “over the horizon” counterterrorism operation or strategy?

I understand that “over the horizon” is used to describe an operation that is primarily conducted from outside the country of interest. The United States has experience in conducting military operations from over the horizon – whether it is conducting command and control from another location in the region or from a naval asset in theater, flying collection or strike operations from CONUS or a third country, performing civil affairs or conducting advise and assist operations from a neighboring country, or training indigenous partner forces in different region. All of these are examples of the Department conducting operations from over the horizon and each present their own challenges.

86. In your view, what conditions or factors would be indicative of a resurgence or reconstitution of al Qaeda, ISIS-K, or other terrorist organization in Afghanistan such that they pose a threat of international terrorism?

In the past several years, both al Qaeda and ISIS have become adept at leveraging social media to further their ideology and protect internal communications. They have leveraged aspects of the international banking system to financially enable their operations. Each of these avenues provide vectors to gain insight into the groups’ intent and influence. If confirmed, I will prioritize keeping a close eye on any intelligence that would indicate a resurgence in terrorist capabilities in Afghanistan or the broader global terrorist network. I will also seek to continue DoD’s work with our network of counterterrorism partners in order to detect and disrupt external operations against the homeland or our allies and partners.

87. What are the core components of a successful “over-the-horizon” strategy, in your view?

I understand that successful over-the-horizon operations rely on intelligence that can come from a variety of sources, along with air assets, ISR, and other capabilities typically located outside the country. Any successful strategy – whether conducted within the country of focus or from “over-the-horizon” – must reflect the reality of the operating environment and the level of threat posed by the adversary.

Pakistan

88. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

Pakistan is an important partner. The U.S. has enduring interests in South Asia, and must continue to engage with Pakistan. If confirmed, I would seek to work with Pakistan on key issues of mutual concern, including regional stability and the defeat of al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State – Khorasan (ISIS-K).

89. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan in terms of military-to-military relations and in light of the collapse of the ANDSF and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan?

I understand that U.S. security assistance and other support to Pakistan is designed to foster greater cooperation in areas of mutual security interest. We have enduring interests in South Asia and we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to counter violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change Pakistan's strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual interest, including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed, I will seek to work with colleagues at the State Department to continue the International Military Education and Training program with Pakistan, along with other opportunities to develop relationships with Pakistan's future military leaders. I would also continue to urge Pakistan to take action against militants and violent extremist organizations operating in its territory.

90. Do you believe this to be the appropriate construct for future assistance to Pakistan?

Yes. Although we need to be realistic about what we can achieve with Pakistan, the Department must also continue to press for important U.S. interests in South Asia. If confirmed, I would continue to work with Pakistan in areas of mutual interest, including counterterrorism and border security.

91. What changes, if any, would you recommend in security cooperation with Pakistan?

The United States has enduring interests in South Asia, and I believe that we must continue to engage with Pakistan in order to counter violent extremism. Although we cannot fundamentally change Pakistan's strategic calculus, we can work together in areas of mutual interest, including counterterrorism and border security. If confirmed, I would recommend we focus security cooperation on opportunities to develop relationships with Pakistan's future military leaders. I would also work to ensure any U.S. security assistance includes the necessary conditions to advance U.S. values and interests.

92. What do you consider to be areas of shared security interest between the United States and Pakistan?

I understand that in recent years, Pakistan has worked with the United States in some key areas of mutual interest, including counterterrorism and border security.

Yemen

93. What are U.S. national security interests in Yemen?

The most important U.S. national security interest in Yemen remains ensuring that groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen do not have a safe haven for conducting attacks against the U.S. homeland. Additional U.S. national security interests include securing an end to the ongoing war and addressing the humanitarian crisis. Continued cross-border attacks by the Houthis, with support from Iran, exacerbate instability in the region by violating the territorial integrity of our Gulf partners (including Saudi Arabia) and threatening freedom of navigation. A cessation of hostilities and political solution to the conflict is the only long-term solution to this crisis.

94. In your view, has Saudi Arabia responded appropriately to the threat they face from the Houthis?

I understand that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faces a persistent cross-border threat from Houthi militia forces. I also remain concerned about the incidence of civilian casualties as a result of Saudi Arabia's conduct of its military campaign in Yemen. If confirmed, I will work with others in the U.S. interagency to continue to support Saudi Arabia in defending its borders and while at the same time working to bring the war in Yemen to a close.

95. What do you see as the implications of the Biden Administration's decision to cease offensive support operations to the Saudi-led coalition?

A political resolution is the only long-term means of bringing the war in Yemen to an end. There is no military solution to the conflict. The Biden administration's decision to cease support for Saudi-led Coalition offensive operations is intended to send a signal to our Saudi partners that we need to see more precipitous steps to end the war soon even as we work to fulfill the President's commitment of supporting Saudi Arabia's defense of its borders. Ending the war in Yemen is in the national security interest of the United States.

96. In your view, what role, if any, should the United States play in supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?

I support the Biden administration commitment to ending the war in the Yemen through diplomacy, and to enhancing relief efforts.. As the President has said, Saudi Arabia faces a persistent cross-border threat from Houthi militia forces, which also puts at risk U.S. citizens residing in the Kingdom. If confirmed, I will work with others in the U.S. interagency to continue to support Saudi Arabia in defending its borders and while at the same time working to bring the war in Yemen to a close.

Syria

97. What are the U.S. national security objectives in Syria?

It is my understanding that U.S. national security objectives include preventing the resurgence of ISIS, supporting the Syrian people through the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid, and preserving existing ceasefire lines to prevent the outbreak of broader regional conflict and establish a foundation for a broader political solution under UN auspices.

98. To what extent does continued U.S. force presence in Syria support those objectives?

It is my understanding that the U.S. and Coalition military presence is necessary to prevent an ISIS resurgence. Although ISIS no longer holds territory, it remains a capable and dangerous threat. DoD support and assistance builds capacity of vetted Syrian partner forces to enable them to maintain pressure on ISIS.

99. To what extent should the United States continue to provide support to the Syrian

Democratic Forces?

While the Defeat-ISIS Coalition has made significant progress, ISIS remains a threat. I understand that working by, with, and through our Syrian partner forces, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), remains critical to keeping pressure on ISIS.

100. In your view, what are the key strategic interests and objectives of the Russians in Syria and how successful have they been in accomplishing them?

Russia's continued support for the Assad regime makes clear that Russia's primary interest is maintaining a regime friendly to its interests, no matter the consequences. It is my understanding that Russia's support to the Assad regime's military campaign enables continued violence and human rights abuses against the Syrian people. Russia does not appear to view ISIS as a significant threat nor does it seem dedicated to enabling its enduring defeat.

Russia

The 2018 NDS assessed a need for “urgent change at significant scale” to prepare the U.S. military for the realities of great power competition.

101. Do you agree with this assessment?

In light of the mounting and accelerating challenges to the United States from global competitors, I agree that the Department of Defense should be undertaking “urgent change at significant scale.”

102. Where do you see the greatest need for change in the Joint Force to address the realities of strategic competition with Russia?

If confirmed, I will use the NDS Review – and its implementation – to consider any changes needed in the Joint Force to address the realities of the Russia challenge. While it would be premature for me to suggest any specific changes needed in the Joint Force, I do believe that whatever changes the Department makes should be focused on ensuring that we achieve strong links between strategy, concept development, innovation, and program investments.

The Department of Defense is currently engaged in the development of a new Joint Warfighting Concept.

103. In your view, why is a new Joint Warfighting Concept necessary to overcome the strategic and operational challenges posed by Russia?

I understand the Department has developed a Joint Warfighting Concept to align with strategy and theories of victory. If confirmed, I will review this effort, and provide my assessment and recommendations to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense.

The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has the stated objectives of: enhancing the U.S. deterrence posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, supporting the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolstering the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners.

104. What is your assessment of the progress made in each of these EDI objectives?

EDI has been highly effective in increasing USEUCOM's combat capability and enhancing deterrence of Russian aggression. EDI funding has enabled DoD to increase its force presence in Europe, improve critical capabilities, establish prepositioned equipment sets, and improve U.S. and Allied readiness. Taken together, these efforts have demonstrated commitment to NATO, reassured Allies, and sent a strong message of resolve to Russia.

105. What changes, if any, would you make to EDI objectives or activities going forward?

If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the Department to determine how best to evolve EDI objectives and activities going forward, and will ensure Congress maintains visibility into EDI initiatives.

106. As many military construction programs funded under EDI reach maturity and settle into the sustainment phase, and in light of the clear signal from our military leadership that exercises such as DEFENDER 2021 sent deterrent signals to Russia, while yielding lessons learned for the United States, our European Allies, and partners, what is your vision for the future of EDI?

Many EDI resource requirements are evolving as the result of the acquisition of prepositioned equipment and completion of MILCON projects, as well as changes to USEUCOM's exercise program. If confirmed, I will work with stakeholders from across the Department to ensure we adapt EDI based on the evolving threat environment, changes in planning or operational concepts, and the ability of Allies to share more of the responsibility to present a credible defense.

107. Do you support continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine?

Yes. If confirmed, I would recommend that U.S. security assistance efforts, including the provision of defensive lethal assistance, to build the capacity of Ukraine's forces should remain a top priority.

108. If so, how does the provision of such assistance contribute to a broader U.S. regional security strategy?

It is my understanding that U.S. security assistance efforts enable Ukraine to progress toward NATO interoperability and more effectively defend itself against Russian aggression. It is also my understanding that these efforts, combined with investments through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to improve the readiness, responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of U.S. forces in Europe, contribute to

maintaining an effective deterrent against further Russian aggression.

109. In your view, what additional capabilities should Ukraine and other Black Sea regional Allies and partners develop and enhance to support regional security and deter aggression?

It is my understanding that the stability of the Black Sea region, which is vulnerable to Russian aggression, is critical to the security of NATO's eastern flank. Although I understand that the specific requirements of regional Allies and partners varies, if confirmed, I would seek to work with our partners to continue to prioritize capabilities to counter conventional and hybrid threats on land and improve their capacity to secure their territorial waters in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

110. How can the United States best support the achievement of those capabilities?

I understand that robust U.S. security assistance support through authorities such as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Foreign Military Financing, and Section 333 remains a critical component to supporting the development of those capabilities. If confirmed, I will strongly support efforts to provide training, equipment, and advisory support to build the capacity of these critical U.S. Allies and partners on the frontline of Russian aggression.

111. What role do you envision for Turkey in support of U.S. strategic priorities in the Black Sea region?

It is my understanding that U.S. access, basing, and overflight provided by Turkey, including at Incirlik Air Base, remain important for supporting emergent U.S., NATO, and Coalition requirements and missions in the region. I understand that the United States continues to encourage Turkey, and fellow Black Sea Allies and partners, to deepen cooperation in the Black Sea region.

President Biden has said that he and outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel “are absolutely united in our conviction that Russia must not be allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its neighbors.”

112. How should DOD support the achievement of this goal?

I agree with President Biden that Russia must not be allowed to use energy as a weapon to coerce or threaten its neighbors. If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department of Defense support this goal through a whole-of-government approach to deterring and defending against Russia's strategy for advancing its interests – at the expense of U.S., Allied, and partner interests – via Russia's wide range of subversive, coercive, and aggressive tactics, including the use of energy to coerce or threaten its neighbors.

113. How might Russia use energy as a weapon to undermine U.S. military efforts with Allies and partners in Europe, including those related to enhancing military mobility?

If confirmed, I will review any classified assessments of the threat Russia poses in this

regard and work diligently to address those threats with colleagues across the Department of Defense, U.S. interagency, and with our Allies and partners.

114. In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power?

Russia takes a whole-of-government approach to advancing its interests, across the spectrum of conflict and at the expense of U.S., Allied, and partner interests. I believe the key to countering such tactics is for the United States to take a whole-of-government approach to protecting our interests in response, in close coordination with our Allies and partners. This should include DoD's efforts to implement innovative approaches to irregular warfare and hybrid tactics below the threshold of conflict. Such an approach necessarily entails the careful orchestration of our diplomatic, economic, and informational strengths, as well as our military power.

115. What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat, and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the U.S. Government, and DOD, in particular, in countering that threat?

It is my understanding that Russia uses malign influence to advance its interests, typically at the expense of U.S., Allied, and partner interests, through a wide range of subversive, coercive, and aggressive tactics, while seeking to avoid direct military confrontation with U.S. and NATO forces. I am concerned that Russia may underestimate the extent to which these tactics increase the risk of unintended escalation, and if confirmed, I would therefore recommend that the U.S. Government, and the Department of Defense in particular, communicate clearly and consistently its perceptions of this risk. In addition, I would recommend that the Department of Defense must maintain its strong measures of conventional and nuclear deterrence while assisting Allies and partners in developing resilience against malign threats.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

116. In your opinion, what should the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance be in the coming years?

It is my understanding that NATO's major strategic objectives are deterring nuclear and non-nuclear aggression, defending Allied populations and territory if deterrence fails, and projecting stability beyond NATO's borders, which should remain the appropriate focus for our Alliance in the coming years.

117. Despite the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, NATO still has declared responsibilities for counter terrorism. In what ways do you believe Allies can best contribute to the fight against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan going forward?

I believe NATO can continue to play a role in countering terrorism through enhanced threat awareness and intelligence sharing, improved interoperability and development of capabilities to prepare and respond to threats, and outreach to partner nations and

international organizations. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with NATO allies and partners to continue our counter terrorism mission together.

118. If confirmed, what would be your top defense priorities for engagement with NATO Allies and partners on issues relating to China?

If confirmed, my priority for engagement with NATO Allies and partners on China would be to continue to advance the work the Alliance has been doing in recent years to understand and consider options to mitigate the challenges that an increasingly assertive PRC poses to the Alliance. This would include strengthening NATO's resilience and encouraging reflection of that perspective in the forthcoming strategic concept. I would also encourage NATO to continue strengthening relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific to address cross-cutting security issues and global challenges.

119. What are your views on the importance of the NATO Alliance?

As President Biden has said, the transatlantic alliance is the strong foundation on which our collective security and our shared prosperity are built. U.S. commitment to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to U.S. strategic interests, and our shared commitment to the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty has made NATO the most successful Alliance in history.

120. Do you believe there are areas where the United States could benefit from greater coordination and consultation with Allies?

Absolutely. There are many areas of shared interest where the United States can benefit from greater coordination and consultation with Allies. This includes engagement on major reviews that are underway in the Department of Defense right now. If confirmed, I would seek to continue those efforts to engage our Allies and ensure their perspectives are a critical part of the discussions for these reviews. If confirmed, I would also seek other ways to coordinate with our Allies in support of our shared security interests.

121. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO?

The NATO Alliance faces many challenges, the greatest of which may include continuing efforts to ensure ready forces and capabilities in the wake of this global pandemic and maintaining unity in the face of continuing efforts by Russia to fracture the Alliance.

122. What are the most important capability improvements that the Alliance must make to deal with the threats it faces?

It is my understanding that readiness remains a critical improvement the Alliance must focus on to deal with the threats we face. The Alliance must continue to rebuild a culture of readiness in order to procure, prepare, and provide interoperable and ready forces and capabilities, which enables our credible deterrence and defense. Contributing to that is the continuing ability of the Alliance to adapt to the changing security environment.

123. What, in your opinion, are the most useful measurements of allied commitments to carrying the burden of common security and collective defense?

Cash, capabilities, and contributions, as Secretary General Stoltenberg has often said, are all important markers of sharing responsibility for our common defense. Without the investment in defense today, we will not have the necessary capabilities and contributions tomorrow. In 2014, Allies signed onto the Wales Defense Investment Pledge, committing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. I appreciate that several Allies have taken important steps in this direction in the past few years, and if confirmed will seek to continue this progress.

124. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries for over 60 years has successfully deterred aggression against the Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. They also continue to provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, and as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat, I believe U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in NATO countries.

NATO has made a series of declarations, at successive summits, to improve our credible deterrence and defense posture. Among these are the NATO Readiness Initiative announced at the 2018 Brussels Summit and the 2021 Summit pledge to “ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right place at the right time.”

125. If confirmed, how would you support DOD efforts to work with our Allies to make progress on these initiatives?

If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to increase the number of ready and interoperable forces and capabilities as we continue to rebuild NATO's culture of readiness. With our Allies, U.S. European Command, and our Mission to NATO, I would, if confirmed, take the next steps to implement the recently adopted NATO Military Strategy and NATO Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, which outline Alliance capability and force structure requirements needed to address current and emerging threats in NATO's area of responsibility.

126. In your view, how do these initiatives align with U.S. priorities in Europe?

It is my understanding that these initiatives are closely aligned with U.S. priorities in Europe. This administration is seeking to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, and the NATO Alliance is absolutely critical to that effort. Reaffirming, investing in, and modernizing NATO serves to recognize this fact, and ensuring a credible deterrent and defense in Europe is even more important in an increasingly complex security environment.

Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific Region

127. In your view, how can DOD more effectively cultivate multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?

I understand that Indo-Pacific security depends on the ability of the United States and like-minded partners to work together to prevent and respond to crises. To enable this goal, it is critical to build stronger linkages between U.S. allies and partners across the region – including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). If confirmed, I would work to ensure DoD strengthens ties across its bilateral and multilateral security networks to build interoperability; pursue more advanced multilateral training activities; and build common norms in new defense domains, such as space and cyber.

128. What is your assessment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India?

I understand that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) plays an increasingly central role in promoting security, prosperity, and shared values in the Indo-Pacific region. The commitment of all Quad countries to elevate their consultations, including convening historic Head of State Summits in March and September 2021, reflects growing strategic convergence between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. I understand that through a wide range of shared activities, such as space cooperation, technology cooperation, and vaccine production, the Quad partners are working to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific, including in support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) centrality in the region.

129. What military lines of effort can be strengthened through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to benefit deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region and what do you view as the challenges to doing so?

I understand that the strength of the Quad partnership lies in the willingness of like-minded democracies to leverage their combined resources to address emerging crises and maintain regional stability, as they did in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. There are opportunities for the Quad countries to expand their cooperative activities in areas that will prevent future instability, such as maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and to enhance their crisis response capabilities through joint exercises. These cooperative activities, however, do not reflect a formal alliance structure. Rather, they reflect the partners' abiding commitment to ensuring the durability of shared principles such as the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

130. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Indo-Pacific?

I understand that the United States has a fundamental interest in building a strong network of capable and like-minded partners who are committed to preserving a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would recommend that DoD leverage our capacity-building resources to support partners in protecting their own sovereignty and territorial integrity and building resilience, and enable them to collectively address shared

transnational threats, such as proliferation, violent extremism, and humanitarian disasters.

131. How would you prioritize the types of programs or activities that should receive support under these security assistance authorities?

If confirmed, I would recommend that DoD prioritize programs that enable partners to preserve their own sovereign rights, such as maritime security and border security initiatives, and activities that strengthen their capacity to address transnational threats, such as proliferation and violent extremism. I would also ensure that DoD continues to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the Department of State as we leverage our full suite of diplomatic, economic, and security tools to strengthen the capacity and capabilities of our partners.

132. In your view, how should DOD seek to engage with partner nations to better support their ability to protect their sovereignty and natural resources?

If confirmed, I would recommend that DoD should support partners in building the necessary capabilities, personnel resources, and operational capacity to protect their own sovereignty. This should include providing sustained capacity-building training and exercises, as well as an increased emphasis on defense professionalization and military education. It is also my understanding that DoD can support partners in preserving their own sovereign rights through U.S. presence operations and military activities, and by strengthening the capacity of multilateral organizations such as ASEAN.

133. Respect for human rights has long been a core principle of U.S. foreign and security policy. In your view, what role does U.S. military engagement, including efforts to help professionalize foreign partner militaries, play in encouraging respect for human rights?

U.S. military training and education can play a valuable role in professionalizing partner militaries, by reinforcing the importance of respecting human rights, supporting the rule of law, and adhering to the principle of civilian oversight of the military. It is my understanding that DoD consistently emphasizes that these values are critical to the continued advancement of our defense relationships.

134. In your opinion, what are the key capabilities the United States should encourage, enable, and support for partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific to enhance deterrence of China?

It is my understanding that our allies and partners require capacity-building support to strengthen their ability to preserve their sovereign rights, especially in the air and maritime domain. Increased maritime domain awareness is a foundational capability that would help regional partners develop a common operating picture. It is also my understanding that additional investments in asymmetric defense capabilities and concepts could also enable allies and partners to raise the cost of potential Chinese aggression. If confirmed, I would recommend that DoD should continue to prioritize expanded exercises, training programs, combined planning, and security cooperation that strengthens the self-defense capabilities of our allies and partners.

China

135. Is the current posture of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region sufficient to support the NDS? Please explain your answer.

To deter our adversaries and defend our interests, allies, and partners, the United States requires a combat-credible, resilient, and forward force posture in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM and the military services to support DoD's development, assessment, and implementation of posture concepts that effectively address key operational challenges and maintain the military advantage that is foundational to deterrence. But our success in the Indo-Pacific should not be measured only as a function of our forward-established posture -- it is just as critical that we make the right investments in modernization, operational concepts, and readiness to ensure we improve our future deterrence capabilities.

136. The INDOPACOM commander indicated China could achieve military overmatch in the Indo-Pacific as soon as 2026, at which time China might be tempted to use military force to forcibly change the status quo in the region. Do you agree?

I agree that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is urgently seeking to obtain the military capability to achieve its stated strategic objectives. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department of Defense is focused on maintaining combat-credible deterrence and warfighting capabilities.

137. If not, what approximate year do you see this happening?

I would not want to speculate on a specific date that the People's Republic of China (PRC) may decide to use force, but as indicators of increasing risks in the near-term and beyond, I would point to the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) 2027 modernization goal announced last year, President Xi Jinping's consistent refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the PRC's increasingly provocative military activities near Taiwan and ongoing coercion.

138. What types of behavior or signaling on the part of China might provide early alert to the United States of Chinese intentions in this regard?

It is my understanding that the PRC would likely signal its intent through a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military measures and actions.

139. In your assessment, what are the priority investments DOD could make that would implement the NDS and enable a more favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific?

To deter and prevail in a future conflict with China, I believe the Department must prioritize investment in preserving and enhancing a military edge in areas such as long-range strike, associated kill chains, undersea warfare, base resilience, critical munitions, EMSO, space, and cyber. Over the longer-term, DoD must invest in areas such as artificial

intelligence, autonomy, and directed energy to ensure we do not fall behind China or other potential adversaries' advancements in these areas.

140. The NDAA for FY 2021 established the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. What is your assessment of the value of this initiative?

The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) promises to serve as both a key tool for Congressional oversight of investments related to strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a means to enhance the Department's ongoing focus on this goal as part of China pacing. If confirmed, I will seek to closely align PDI with congressional intent.

141. What is your assessment of DOD's implementation of this initiative?

I understand that PDI is not a separate appropriation, but that DoD has used its FY 2022 PDI submission as a means to highlight select investments and activities that support deterrence of China, as well as reassurance of allies and partners in the region. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department further refines its future PDI submissions, consulting closely with Congress in order to meet intent and enhance the PDI's impact.

142. What non-military activities and resources do you believe are necessary to effectively address the challenge posed by China?

It is my understanding that the PRC is increasingly synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives, so I believe that it is essential that non-DoD departments and agencies are sufficiently aligned and resourced to address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's Interim National Security Strategy has set forth the whole-of-government agenda that would strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to prevail in strategic competition with the PRC. If confirmed, I would work closely with interagency partners to ensure a whole-of-government approach.

143. Do you believe the activities in which DOD is currently engaged are sufficient? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, I would focus on ensuring the Department of Defense has the right strategy, concepts, capabilities, and posture to deliver combat-credible deterrence and warfighting. I would recommend that DoD, as well as whole-of-government efforts, prioritize cooperation with and support to our Indo-Pacific region allies and partners, including expanded bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement, increased economic and technological partnerships, and joint military exercises and operations. It is my understanding that improving partner resilience to the PRC's military and economic coercion is essential for deterring PRC aggression throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Enhanced coordination on military and non-military efforts will serve as a force multiplier for strategic competition with the PRC.

144. What are the United States' responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act?

The Taiwan Relations Act states that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, is a threat to the region and of grave concern to U.S. interests. It is

my understanding that for more than 40 years, it has been U.S. policy to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability and to maintain the capacity to prevent any use of force or other form of coercion that would jeopardize the security or way of life for the people of Taiwan. If confirmed, I would seek to support the USD(P) in implementing U.S. policy in accordance with the TRA.

145. What policy recommendations do you have for improving U.S. support to Taiwan?

China's military modernization, its refusal to disavow the use of force, and its coercive and aggressive military actions near Taiwan present an increasingly urgent challenge. I support the continued and bipartisan U.S. commitment to Taiwan to maintain U.S. policy commitments to Taiwan and to ensure that Taiwan can defend against PRC coercion or aggression.

146. In your view, what security capabilities should Taiwan acquire to enhance deterrence of Chinese aggression?

I believe that Taiwan should continue to acquire asymmetric capabilities that are capable of denying the PRC any forced or coerced control of the island against the wishes of its people. These capabilities should be mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In addition to specific asymmetric capabilities, it is critical that Taiwan's Armed Forces and civil defense institutions work together to provide a layered defense against coercion and aggression - one that ensures the resiliency of Taiwan's economy, political institutions, and democracy. If confirmed, I would work within the Department and the interagency to understand and address these requirements.

147. What areas of security capability would you consider appropriate for potential coproduction by the United States and Taiwan?

It is my understanding that Taiwan's talented workforce and technology sector already provide a number of key capabilities and systems that are critical to the global supply chain. Taiwan is also a leading manufacturer of other defense-related components, and if confirmed, I would support administration efforts to explore opportunities in aeronautics, shipbuilding, and missile technology.

148. Considering the NDS and China's crackdown on Hong Kong, how do you view the U.S. relationship with Taiwan in the context of broader U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific?

I believe that Taiwan's economy, its flourishing democracy, and its position within the first island chain are all critical to U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. Insofar as Taiwan's population interpreted efforts of the PRC in Hong Kong as a manifestation of the PRC's "one-country, two-systems" policy, so too do other allies and partners view PRC coercive efforts as an affront to not only Taiwan but the entire region.

149. To what extent do you believe multilateral engagement is important for addressing the challenges posed by China?

Continued multilateral engagement is critical to preventing the PRC from subverting the international rules-based order and coercing its neighbors. Our network of allies and partners is a key advantage in addressing the challenges posed by the PRC, and multilateral formats provide opportunities to share concerns, speak with one voice, pool resources, and promote a more stable and secure strategic environment.

150. In your view, what are the most important multilateral relationships in the region and where do you perceive opportunities to improve multilateral coordination?

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a central role in bringing the region together and building habits of cooperation, and I understand that the Department of Defense works through the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus to build cooperation on security issues with these partners. Quadrilateral discussions with Australia, India, and Japan provide growing opportunities for cooperation across a wide range of shared priorities. It is my understanding that DoD also engages in several trilateral forums, including with Australia and Japan, the Republic of Korea and Japan, and now with Australia and the United Kingdom through the new AUKUS mechanism. If confirmed, I would work to strengthen the Department's efforts to collaborate on security and build linkages between like-minded partners, including through new and expanded multilateral partnerships where opportunities arise.

Japan

151. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

I understand that the U.S.-Japan security relationship forms the cornerstone of the U.S. Indo-Pacific security strategy. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is resolute and resilient, facing the regional security challenges of today, and adapting to new challenges in the future. It is a comprehensive Alliance, training and operating together across the spectrum of potential conflict, and its capabilities are strong and getting stronger.

152. If confirmed, what policies would you recommend to continue to improve this relationship and improve U.S.-Japanese military force interoperability?

If confirmed, I would recommend that continued examination of roles and missions, especially relating to the maintenance of regional security, is an important subject for the Alliance to carefully consider. Working together to build the capabilities of regional partners is also a recent area of cooperation that we should expand.

153. How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, predominantly China, North Korea and South Korea, influence the U.S.-Japan relationship, in your view?

It is critical that there are strong and close relationships between and among our allies. I understand that we have a common view of the immediate dangers posed by North Korea, and the strategic challenge from China, and we are working together to face those. If confirmed, I would support efforts to build a strong trilateral security relationship with the Republic of Korea and Japan, while recognizing that there are historical sensitivities between the two that complicate that trilateral relationship.

154. What steps should Japan take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

It is my understanding that Japan has made significant strides to play a security role more commensurate with its economic and political strength in the region. If confirmed, I would encourage the continued development of that role, while acknowledging the legacy regional and domestic constraints Japan must consider.

155. What specific security capabilities do you believe Japan should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to contribute to the deterrence of China?

Japan possesses a modern, capable and well-equipped Self-Defense Force. I understand we are working closely with Japan to improve interoperability in operations critical to regional stability, such as integrated air and missile defense, and maritime interdiction operations. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan to chart an ambitious path to acquire improved capabilities in view of increased requirements, consistent with transformed Alliance roles.

156. How would you describe Japan's burden sharing contributions, including host nation support, for U.S. forces stationed in Japan?

Japan provides approximately \$1.8B per year to offset some of the cost of stationing more than 50,000 U.S. forces there, equipped with some of our most advanced capabilities. I understand we are in negotiations on a new five-year host nation support agreement and expect to reach a fair and equitable conclusion in the near future.

157. Do you believe that Japan should acquire integrated air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and other missile threats?

Yes. I am aware that Japan is a longstanding BMD partner and has invested heavily in IAMD. The Self Defense Forces possess significant maritime and ground-based missile defense capability, and Japan has decided to procure two additional Aegis system-equipped vessels. As an Alliance, I understand the United States and Japan are working to increase interoperability. If confirmed, I would support continued progress to meet current and future challenges, as threat capabilities continue to evolve and the U.S. means of response adapts to those challenges

North Korea

158. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction represents a threat to U.S. security and interests and that of our allies and partners. It is my understanding that the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula is inextricably tied to regional security and stability. Our network of allies and partners in the region gives us a significant advantage as compared to our adversaries. In particular, our relationships with the Republic of Korea and Japan provide a

powerful deterrent to North Korean threats. If confirmed, I would work to ensure U.S. and allied forces have what they need to maintain our robust deterrent and readiness posture in Northeast Asia.

159. In your view, what should be the overall U.S. strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to our allies in the region and to the United States?

The United States, in close coordination with allies and partners, has a vital interest in deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), defending against its provocations or use of force, limiting the reach of its dangerous weapons programs, and, above all, keeping the American people and our allies and partners safe. I believe that the role of the Department of Defense is to maintain a robust defense and deterrence posture that ensures that the United States engages the DPRK from a position of strength. Having a strong and credible deterrent is essential to any potential path that the United States and our allies pursue to meet the North Korean threat, including diplomatic engagement. We must also continue to pursue robust sanctions enforcement to mitigate the nuclear proliferation threat posed by North Korea. The administration completed a whole-of-government strategy review to articulate its way ahead on the DPRK, and if confirmed, I would work with stakeholders across the government, as well as our regional allies and partners, to forge a comprehensive approach to North Korean threats, including those emanating from nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, missile, and cyber programs.

160. What policy recommendations would you make to ensure U.S. and allied forces can secure weapons of mass destruction sites in North Korea in the event of a contingency?

U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces must maintain a “fight-tonight” readiness on the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korean aggression and to be able to respond quickly and effectively should deterrence fail. It is my understanding that a critical element of this readiness is the ability to secure nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites in order to prevent the further proliferation of these capabilities in a contingency. I understand DoD is improving capabilities that could reduce the threat posed by WMD and missile sites in North Korea in the event of a contingency, and is working closely with the ROK in this regard. If confirmed, I would consult closely with our operational commanders, intelligence specialists, and resource providers in this effort.

Republic of Korea

161. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is a linchpin of peace and security in the region. Since its establishment in 1953, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has proven strong and durable in the face of new global conditions and is among the most interoperable, capable, and dynamic bilateral Alliances in the world. It is my understanding that the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains at a high level of readiness and continues to maintain a robust combined defense posture to protect the Republic of Korea against any threat or adversary. If confirmed, I would prioritize working with our ROK allies on identifying and addressing

future security challenges, including those beyond the Korean Peninsula, to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

162. What is the value to U.S. national security of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, in your view?

I understand that the U.S.- ROK Alliance is critical not only to the security of the ROK, but also to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Beyond the region, over the course of its 70-year existence, our Alliance has evolved into one of global importance, with the ROK having deployed alongside U.S. service members in nearly every conflict since the Korean War. I understand that the ROK is a critical partner for our broader priorities in the region, and principal among these priorities is upholding the rules-based international order that has underpinned global prosperity since World War II. If confirmed, I would work with our ROK allies to ensure that we continue to strengthen the relationship and also invest in the right combination of capabilities to provide for our common defense.

163. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack by North Korea?

It is my understanding that the U.S. obligation to the ROK in the event of an attack, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty, is to consult on the best appropriate response and act together in the defense of the ROK. If confirmed, I would remain committed to enhancing the combined deterrence and defense posture of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

164. In your view what factors should trigger the commitment of U.S. forces to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

It is my understanding that in accordance with U.S. obligations in the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will maintain the ability to deter, defend, and, if necessary, defeat any adversary that threatens our treaty ally.

165. Under what conditions should wartime operational control be transferred from the United States to the Republic of Korea, in your opinion?

The transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the ROK is and should remain conditions-based, consistent with the bilateral Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan, or COTP. Any transfer of wartime OPCON must fundamentally strengthen U.S.-ROK combined defense posture. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the ROK to ensure all conditions for OPCON transition are met.

166. In your view, should U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula remain focused on defense of South Korea or should U.S. forces in Korea also be available for regional or global operations? Please explain your answer.

I believe that the United States must maintain operational flexibility to ensure that our forces are ready to meet emerging threats to the United States, as well as to our allies and partners in the region and around the world. It is my understanding that the Defense Department must continue to consider adjustments to every command in every theater to

ensure the optimization of our global force posture to meeting emerging challenges. If confirmed, I would prioritize a continued “fight tonight” readiness within our Alliance with the ROK, as well as force assignment and allocation that advances our national interests.

167. What specific security capabilities do you believe South Korea should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to contribute to the deterrence of China?

The ROK is among the most capable military forces in the region. If confirmed, I would review the entire range of current and proposed activities to enhance U.S. and allied capabilities to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as to counter North Korea. I would also work with our allies and partners to prioritize capabilities, readiness, and interoperability, that could be leveraged in a variety of contingencies.

168. Do you believe that South Korea should acquire integrated air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and other missile threats?

Yes. I understand that the United States is cooperating with South Korea via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases to upgrade its existing PAC-2 PATRIOT batteries to the more advanced PAC-3 system. It is my understanding that one of our key priorities with South Korea is to ensure the ROK builds capabilities to contribute to the Alliance’s counter-missile capability required for the conditions-based OPCON transition. In order to strengthen deterrence and work together more effectively in the event of a missile attack from North Korea, the United States and ROK also need to work toward a more integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)-based approach to enhance missile defense of the Peninsula.

Australia

169. What is your assessment of the current U. S.-Australia security relationship?

This year we proudly celebrate the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty as the U.S.—Australia security alliance remains an anchor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region. It provides operational reliability, political viability, and mutual confidence, facilitating a combined Alliance approach to the current and future global operational environment. Our shared commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rules-based international order remains steadfast and resolute. The recently announced Australia-UK-U.S. partnership further demonstrates the depth of our security relationship with Australia.

170. What is the value to U.S. national security of the U.S.-Australia alliance, in your view?

Our allies and partners are our greatest strategic asset and central to achieving our collective goals in an increasing complex and challenging security environment. Australia is a critical ally in the Indo-Pacific region, providing strategic capabilities, operational access, and support in building other alliances and partnerships to facilitate our operational freedom of maneuver, deterrence of PRC aggression, and preservation of the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

171. What specific security capabilities do you believe Australia should emphasize, develop, and procure to improve its ability to contribute to the deterrence of China?

At the recent AUKUS announcement, the United States and UK committed to support Australia to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. In addition, Australia committed to establish a sovereign Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise. Strategic capabilities such as hypersonic weapons and electromagnetic warfare are key areas of bilateral defense cooperation. It is also important for Australia to have a strong and resilient defense supply chain and provides maintenance repair and overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.

172. Australia was included as part of the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) in the FY 2017 NDAA. What is your view on the utility of Australia's inclusion in NTIB and of the recent AUKUS initiative to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy?

The operational effectiveness of our Alliance is underpinned by the strength of cooperation on science, technology, strategic capabilities, and defense industrial base integration. It is my understanding that Australia's inclusion in the NTIB allows our countries to enhance industrial collaboration, build supply chain resiliency, and facilitate technology transfer and protection. The AUKUS initiative further deepens our integration of defense and security-related science, technology, industrial bases and supply chains, and deepens our cooperation on a range of defense capabilities.

173. Do you believe that Australia should acquire integrated air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities, to defend against advanced ballistic, cruise, and other missile threats?

Yes. The United States has a very close and expanding alliance relationship with Australia, which encompasses the full scope of defense cooperation, including integrated air and missile Defense (IAMD). Australia currently deploys Aegis-equipped ships and by the end of the decade has plans to field a new class of Aegis-equipped frigates. If confirmed, I would work with Australia to advance IAMD cooperation, such as through Australia's planned AIR 6500 project to field a Joint Battle Management System, which will represent the core of the Australian Defence Force command and control system and hold great potential for future IAMD interoperability in coalition operations.

Africa

174. How do you define U.S. national security interests in Africa?

Africa is a continent with great opportunities to advance common values and security interests. It is my understanding that our national security interests in Africa are diverse and include the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in both East and West Africa; competition with strategic competitors for access, influence, and values; the threat to secure lines of communication in the maritime domain; and the threat that climate change has on regional stability. It is my understanding that U.S. national

security interests across the continent are pursued through whole-of-government efforts to ensure continued U.S. access and influence to protect our people, partners, resources, and interests.

175. What should be the Department's top priorities in Africa?

It is my understanding that DoD plays an important role in supporting whole-of-government efforts focused on defense, development, and diplomacy priorities in Africa. If confirmed, I would recommend that our top priorities should focus on VEO threats to the U.S. homeland, maritime challenges that impact our trade and communications, and the influence and access our strategic competitors continue to gain in Africa. I understand that our defense engagement in Africa protects the U.S. homeland and fosters opportunities for mutually beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting stability and security. Finally, I understand that African countries often desire U.S. engagement and support shared values, such as fostering global trade, addressing conflict, and promoting human rights.

176. What is your assessment of the current U.S. force posture and the associated resourcing in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) AOR?

It is my understanding that DoD supports strategic priorities in Africa through our forward presence, periodic engagements, and supporting force laydown in neighboring U.S. European Command. This posture is complemented by a range of security cooperation and assistance activities, which serve as our most powerful tool to strengthen partnerships and counter competitors in Africa. If confirmed, I would support the USD(P) in considering all Commander, AFRICOM requests and requirements, and advocate for continued security cooperation efforts, participation in U.S.-led exercises, and professional military education.

177. In your view, are the current forces available to AFRICOM sufficient to support U.S. strategic objectives in the AOR?

It is my understanding that DoD's "by, with, and through" approach to achieving security and stability in Africa has proven effective with a limited forward presence. Often our security cooperation efforts enhance larger ally and partner force operations, which achieve shared strategic objectives and build enduring relationships. Central to this approach is the limited forward presence on the continent and a focus on building African partner nation capabilities while supporting efforts of other international partners.

178. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other violent extremist organizations in Africa?

Worldwide, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates continue to pose threats to U.S. interests around the globe, including Africa. It is my understanding that persistent pressure from the U.S. and our allies and partners remains necessary. These groups continue to present regional and localized threats in Africa to U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will review our regional counterterrorism approach to ensure our resources are being employed appropriately and effectively toward priority threats in the region.

179. Which groups are of greatest concern to you, and why?

East Africa, Somalia specifically, remains of strategic concern, as Al-Shabaab has become the largest and wealthiest associated force of Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has expressed intent to target the homeland and has demonstrated capability to target U.S. interests in the region.

180. What should be the priorities and associated policy objectives of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Africa?

Terrorism will remain a persistent threat to our national security. The Department must remain focused on maintaining the proficiency of special operations forces in order to deny violent extremist organizations their safe havens in Africa and to help degrade and disrupt terrorist groups from further destabilizing these areas. The ability to work alongside regional and international partners in these regions is key to maintaining our objectives while conducting such operations in a resource sustainable manner.

181. What are the associated policy objectives and, in your view, is the current U.S. approach meeting those policy objectives in Africa?

The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance sets a priority to prevent terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the United States homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas. Special Operations Forces remain a key contributor to the nation's counterterrorism missions in Africa by supporting and enabling local partners and allies in pursuing shared objectives, including degrading terrorist threats.

182. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the current U.S. approach?

I believe a resource sustainable approach is necessary to address all of our global challenges, including counterterrorism, as we confront an increasingly complicated global environment of threats to our national security. I understand that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy is a whole-of-government approach to integrating military and non-military efforts, calibrated to varied threats and the regional context in which they exist. DoD employs kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, enabling other U.S. Government departments and agencies and regional partners. U.S. SOF complements a broad set of national instruments of power in countering terrorism in Africa and worldwide. If confirmed, I will review our counterterrorism approach in the region to ensure our resources are being employed appropriately and effectively toward priority threats in the region.

183. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic objectives in Africa?

It is my understanding that both Russia and the PRC have expanded their strategic focus on Africa and use engagement in Africa to bolster their international standing, obtain access to raw materials, undermine Western influence, and pursue access agreements to support force projection in the region. The methods vary widely between the two.

China is engaging diplomatically, economically, and militarily across the Continent. Specific to our military interests, it is my understanding that the PLA continues

improvements to its military base in Djibouti and has expressed interest in opening more bases in Africa.

Russia markets its security services and experience to African countries to expand its influence and challenge U.S. interests. Russia's outreach is not as wide reaching as China's; however, Russia continues to contribute to instability through the use and presence of Russian private military companies (PMC) in several African countries, like Libya and the Central African Republic, but is also trying to expand its presence in other areas, like the Sahel region. Russia remains a key arms supplier for many African militaries and continues to look for opportunities to project power.

184. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with those of the U.S.?

Actions by Russia and the PRC could create future access challenges and currently undermine our efforts in African countries to promote regional stability, civilian control of the armed forces, transparency, and accountability.

185. In your view, what should be the DOD role in supporting U.S. strategic objectives in Africa?

It is my understanding that DoD engagement in Africa protects the U.S. homeland and fosters opportunities for mutually beneficial partnerships in other sectors by promoting stability and security. By building partnerships and bolstering security exporters, DoD assists African partners in overcoming security challenges. The U.S. is especially sought after as a security partner thanks to the high quality of U.S. military equipment, expertise, and training.

186. What should be the role of DOD with regard to China and Russia in Africa?

As part of our whole-of-government approach, I would prioritize DoD's efforts to build partner capacity to address security challenges and to reinforce U.S. influence in strategically critical countries, both in Africa and throughout the Global South.

Latin America and the Caribbean

187. Do you define U.S. national security interests in Latin America and the Caribbean?

It is my understanding that U.S. national security interests in the Western Hemisphere include protecting the American people, promoting economic prosperity and opportunity, supporting and strengthening democratic institutions, and upholding human rights and dignity. Our security depends greatly on the security and well-being of our Western Hemisphere neighbors. We face many challenges in the Western Hemisphere, including the migration crisis, natural disasters, drug trafficking and other transnational criminal networks, COVID-19, climate change, and the efforts of foreign competitors and adversaries to undermine democratic governments and U.S. interests. If confirmed, I would help ensure that the Department of Defense plays an appropriate supporting role to help address these challenges.

188. What should be the Department's top priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean?

If confirmed, I would recommend that the Department should build and strengthen its cooperation with Western Hemisphere partners to address shared security challenges. From this basis, the Department could help support partner nation efforts in traditional areas such as countering narcotics trafficking and other transnational crime, disaster response, and strengthening defense institutions. In addition, there are opportunities for cooperation in newer fields such as cyber defense and addressing climate change. If confirmed, I would expect to help ensure the Department focuses on cooperation to help enable our partners' self-sufficiency in defense and their contributions to regional and hemispheric security.

189. What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian strategic objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean?

It is my understanding that Russia and the PRC actively seek opportunities to deepen their influence in the hemisphere through diplomatic, economic, and security inroads. If confirmed, I would recommend that the United States leverage all elements of national power to counter PRC and Russian activities intended to interfere with our security relationships and undermine the rules-based international order. Working within a whole-of-government response, DoD has an important role in building and maintaining strong defense and security partnerships, enabled by engagements and presence, intelligence and information exchanges, and educational programs and exercises. If confirmed, I would help lead the Department's employment of these tools to minimize the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere.

190. In what ways, if any, do these objectives conflict with those of the U.S.?

It is my understanding that Russian and PRC activities pose challenges to security and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. For example, their support to authoritarian governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba undermines democracy and freedom of expression in those nations. PRC-flagged vessels conducting illegal fishing activities engage in economic theft and environmental destruction of Western Hemisphere nations' resources. PRC-based transnational criminal organizations and money laundering firms contribute to the illicit drug trade responsible for killing tens of thousands of people each year in the United States. Russian attempts to influence populations through social media activities and other misinformation operations aim to undermine U.S. goals for the hemisphere. If confirmed, I would recommend to the Secretary that we help counter these activities through a whole-of-government approach and robust engagements with our partners in the region, promoting the values of democracy, respect for human rights, and cooperation in a rules-based international order.

191. In your view, what would be the appropriate role for DOD in addressing the sources of instability in the region, including criminal violence, corruption, environmental devastation, and the health crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic?

The President's Interim National Security Strategy recognizes the challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations, corruption, environmental crime, and COVID-19 to

security in the Western Hemisphere. I understand that Congress provides dedicated authorities and funding to enable DoD to help U.S. and foreign law enforcement partners disrupt drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and smuggling, weapons trafficking, trafficking in wildlife and natural resources, and illicit financial flows. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to provide appropriate support to U.S. and foreign partners with the resources that Congress dedicates for this purpose. I'm also aware that DoD has helped neighbors in the Western Hemisphere in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, through the provision of field hospitals, freezers to store vaccines safely, oxygen generators to make medical-grade oxygen, therapeutic drugs, and other medical equipment and supplies.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) articulated existing U.S. policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

192. In your view, should U.S. missile defense policy should be limited to countering only rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran?

I support the longstanding U.S. policy that homeland missile defenses should remain focused on defending against comparatively limited rogue state ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and Iran, not against attacks by near-peers China and Russia which possess much larger strategic missile arsenals that could overwhelm U.S. homeland missile defenses. To address the threat of a comprehensive and technologically sophisticated strategic missile attack by China or Russia, the United States should continue to rely on the same strategy it has employed for more than half a century – nuclear deterrence.

193. If so, what role do you believe integrated air and missile defenses should play in defending limited areas and defeating smaller scale cruise or hypersonic glide missile attacks by larger threats, such as Russia and China?

Defending the U.S. homeland against non-strategic missile attacks by near-peers such as China or Russia remains a difficult problem. I agree that missile defense cannot defend against every threat and that it must be only one capability within a broader range of options to increase our overall protection against the growing number of advanced missile threats. I understand the Department is examining ways to enhance its architecture against conventional missile threats. If confirmed, I would support continuing improvements to our homeland missile defense architecture.

The global U.S. architecture for detecting and tracking threat missiles is a highly complex maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space-based “system of systems,” with the constituent pieces managed and sustained by a number of different DOD components.

194. Do you believe these various systems are appropriately integrated and provide operational commanders with a holistic threat picture capable of supporting real-time

operational decisions? If so, please explain your answer. If not, please explain what steps you would take, if confirmed, to improve global sensor integration.

Having a persistent and integrated network of sensors is integral to the success of any effective missile defense architecture. Sensors provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information that is critical to policymakers during a crisis. The existing Department of Defense global network of sensors on land, at sea, and in the air and space domains is highly complex and must be improved to increase operational awareness and decision making. If confirmed, I will work within the Department to ensure that this element of the U.S. missile defense architecture is prioritized appropriately.

The cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program with the replacement of the Next Generation Interceptor program has resulted in a likely delay of at least 10 years before the deployment of modernized ground-based interceptors for homeland ballistic missile defense.

195. Do you support the Next Generation Interceptor program and the fielding of additional interceptors from this program, presuming the program achieves its acquisition objectives?

Yes. Defense of the homeland is a DoD priority, and missile defense is a central component of this mission. I support the Department's decision to move forward with development of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), as well as other ongoing efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) which currently protects the United States homeland against limited Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats from North Korea. If confirmed, I will support continuing improvements to our missile defense architecture.

Recently, a Navy Aegis Destroyer was able to successfully intercept an ICBM-class target, raising the possibility of using a system of Homeland Defense layered between the Ground Based Interceptor at mid-flight and the Aegis system for intercepts in the final phases of the ICBM's trajectory.

196. In your view, would this layered approach require a change in policy with respect to the types of interceptors used, the defended area, and the specific threats each is deployed against?

Any decision to bolster homeland defense with new or existing capabilities would require weighing a variety of factors: cost, feasibility, and potential impacts on strategic stability against the potential added benefit to security. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department uses the layered homeland defense analysis called for in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 to help determine the proper mix of capabilities to defend the homeland against the limited ICBM threat from North Korea.

197. What are your views regarding U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's (INDOPACOM's) unfunded priorities with respect to missile defense and Guam?

Guam is a critical forward operating position. Although I do not have access to the specific unfunded priority lists, I agree with INDOPACOM that ensuring Guam has sufficient defenses

against growing adversary anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) conventional missile capabilities is critical. Active missile defenses that enable the United States to sustain military operations during a conflict are one important component of what should be an integrated approach. If confirmed, I will work with INDOPACOM to ensure that it has the right combination of capabilities on Guam to enhance the U.S. regional deterrence and defense posture, assure allies and partners, and increase readiness to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

In recent months, missile and rocket attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East have highlighted the shortage of Theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TIAMD) assets available to protect deployed U.S. forces. This same shortage is most acute in U.S. European Command and INDOPACOM, where the missile threats are much more sophisticated. Air defense units remain the highest-demand, lowest-density forces in the Army.

198. In your view, should DOD expand its theater missile defense capabilities (including improvements to existing systems or the development of new systems), capacity (increased procurement of existing systems), or both? Please explain your answer.

Each Area of Responsibility (AOR) has unique sets of challenges and requirements. If confirmed, I will work closely with Department stakeholders, including the Joint Staff and the relevant Combatant Commands, to help determine the most appropriate mixture and allocation of missile defense capabilities and other posture requirements to maintain theater readiness and a strong deterrent.

199. Do you believe the United States should encourage regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements?

Yes. The world has arrived in a new era of offensive missiles. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries are pursuing A2/AD strategies centered on their missile forces with the intention of inhibiting and disrupting U.S. and allied military freedom of maneuver. Allies and partners have the lead role in their sovereign defense, backed by mutual security treaties and other relationships with the United States. If confirmed, I would work closely with our allies and key partners as they strengthen their own Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities. Such allied investments offer common protection, enhanced deterrence, and improved interoperability. They also complicate adversary planning and attack calculus, and provide leverage for leaders to negotiate against threats from a position of strength in peacetime, as well as during a crisis and/or conflict.

200. If confirmed, on which specific allies and partners would you focus in this regard, and specifically what would you encourage each to do?

If confirmed, I would continue to support strong U.S. missile defense cooperation, which occurs with many different allies and key partners throughout the world, and is strongest with NATO, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and Israel. Our cooperation with these countries strengthens collective deterrence efforts and offers assurance essential to the unity of our alliances which are threatened by missile coercion and attacks particularly from China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. I would also prioritize continued dialogue and

progress toward greater interoperability, including regular military-to-military exercises and training.

Nuclear Weapons

201. Do you agree with former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s statement that our nuclear deterrent is the “bedrock” of every national security mission we undertake?

Yes.

202. Do you agree with the assessment of the past four Secretaries of Defense—including Secretary Austin, and as well, Deputy Secretary Hicks—that nuclear deterrence is DOD’s highest priority mission and that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority?

Yes. I agree with Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks that nuclear deterrence is DoD’s highest priority mission and that modernization of the triad is a critical national security priority.

203. In your view, is the sustainment and timely modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad essential? Please explain your answer.

Yes. As Secretary Austin has explained, the service life of many elements of the nuclear triad has been extended long past the time it should have been modernized. We must continue to modernize the triad and sustain legacy nuclear delivery systems.

204. Is the current program of record sufficient to support full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and the supporting National Nuclear Security Administration infrastructure?

If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding the program of record for the nuclear triad and, in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, for nuclear infrastructure. In gaining this understanding, I recognize that the administration is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious manner that provides us the necessary capabilities when they are needed.

The 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Reviews concluded that the United States will maintain a substantial portion of its nuclear forces on continuous alert, including keeping nearly all ICBMs on alert, and maintaining a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.

205. Do you agree with this conclusion? Please explain your answer.

Yes. Although I am not familiar with the specific details of the United States’ nuclear forces readiness posture, I understand this posture has remained consistent over multiple presidential administrations and has contributed to global stability for many decades. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding these details with a focus on enhancing deterrence,

maximizing decision time, and preserving the range of U.S. response options.

In response to conditions set forth in the Senate Resolution of Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama certified on February 2, 2011, that he intended to “(a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the United States rocket motor industrial base.”

206. Do you agree with and support these objectives for modernizing the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? Please explain your answer.

The triad has provided a strong nuclear deterrent for decades, and I believe we must continue to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent in the years to come. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding the program of record for strategic nuclear delivery systems, recognizing that the administration is committed to a triad of nuclear forces and to modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious manner that provides us the necessary capabilities when they are needed.

Admiral Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, recently reaffirmed the longstanding assessment of the Department of Defense that extending the service life of the Minuteman III (MM III) system is no longer a cost-effective option for preserving the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force.

207. Do you agree with the Commander’s assessment?

I agree that we cannot extend the life expectancy of legacy systems indefinitely without increased cost and risk. If confirmed, I commit to consult closely with the STRATCOM Commander to better understanding the specific details surrounding the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system and its replacement system, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). I would also consult with Minuteman III and GBSD program managers and other experts to understand the budgetary, programmatic, and operational implications of further life extensions.

The Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO) is intended to replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)—a system that is 20 years past its retirement, under increasing threat from adversary air defenses, and considered essential to maintaining the air leg of the triad.

208. Do you support the Long Range Stand-Off weapon as a replacement for the aging ALCM?

Yes. As Secretary Austin testified, maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is critical to our Nation’s defense. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Department thoroughly studies all proposed plans and alternatives to ensure we are on the most cost-effective path to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.

209. If confirmed as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, what steps will you take to advocate for, and ensure the continued development of, the Ground Based Strategic

Deterrent and Long Range Stand-Off programs? Please explain your answer.

I understand that both the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) program are being addressed in the NPR. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the NPR is conducted in an analytically rigorous manner and takes into account changes in the strategic environment, recognizing that we face two nuclear-armed near-peer competitors. I will also commit to better understanding the details surrounding both programs, recognizing that the administration is committed to modernizing the triad in a cost-effective and judicious manner.

210. Do you support the continuation of the W93 program and parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding the W93 program and parallel efforts to collaborate with the United Kingdom in the maintenance of its independent nuclear deterrent. I do recognize the critical importance of the long-standing nuclear deterrence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the continued value of the United Kingdom's continuous at-sea deterrence mission to NATO's deterrence and defense posture.

Per Secretary of Defense Austin's direction, the Department is undergoing an integrated deterrence review, which includes a review of nuclear deterrence.

211. Please explain your views on how nuclear weapons can be part of an integrated deterrence with conventional weapons.

Although I understand that DoD is developing a National Defense Strategy that is intended to focus on an integrated deterrence approach, I am not yet familiar with the specific details of that review. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding this issue and the role of nuclear weapons in such an approach along with other military capabilities, including those in the conventional, space, cyber, missile defense and information domains.

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command has referred to reports of China's nuclear force expansion as "breathtaking" and contends that China's efforts to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. and Russia is a "strategic breakout," which represents an unprecedented threat to global stability.

212. Do you agree with this assessment? Please explain your answer.

Although I am not familiar with the specific details surrounding Admiral Richard's assessment, I agree that China's nuclear forces are rapidly improving both quantitatively and qualitatively. I understand issues such as those identified by Admiral Richard are being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will consult with Admiral Richard and other experts to better understand how the United States should posture itself in response.

213. What are your views on Russia's nuclear modernization effort?

Of most concern in Russia's nuclear modernization and expansion are its development and fielding of systems that are not accountable under – and thus not constrained by – the New START Treaty, including so-called “novel” systems of strategic range; as well as continued development and fielding of a large variety of ground-, air-, and sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapon systems, many of which are dual-capable. The development of such systems undermines global and regional stability and the goal of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.

214. Russia is now fielding their Avangard hypersonic strike system, which is accountable under the New START Treaty. What are your views on the effects of this system with respect to strategic stability and missile defense?

The Avangard hypersonic system has the potential to undermine strategic stability and is being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding this capability and how the United States should respond from both a military posture and arms control perspective.

215. What are your views on the recent expansion and modernization of China's ICBM force?

I am concerned by reports of China's nuclear modernization and expansion, including its ICBM force. This concern is exacerbated by China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well as its strategy and doctrine. I understand issues such as these are being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will have seek to ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic environment such as these into account.

216. What is your understanding of China's rationale for this expansion?

I understand that the recent expansion and modernization of China's nuclear forces, including its ICBM force, are the result of its strategic ambitions and evolving view of the security landscape. Moreover, the PRC's nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary's first strike.

217. How should the United States respond to China's efforts, in your opinion?

I understand issues such as China's expansion and modernization of nuclear forces are being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic environment such as these into account.

218. What are your views on China's fielding of an SSBN-class submarine fleet and what are your concerns with respect to its continued development over the next 5-10 years?

Fielding of an SSBN-class submarine fleet will contribute to a survivable and functional nuclear triad. While an SSBN force by itself is just one facet of China's nuclear forces expansion and modernization, it affirms the 2021 Threat Assessment Report from the U.S. Intelligence Community noting that “China is building a larger and increasingly capable nuclear missile force that is more survivable, more diverse, and on higher alert than in the past, including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional escalation and ensure an

intercontinental second-strike capability.”

219. Do you believe China is developing a triad of delivery systems?

Yes, I do.

220. If so, on what do you base this belief and to what motivations do you ascribe China’s actions?

China’s development of a triad of nuclear delivery systems is a fact established by voluminous evidence about China’s ground-, sea-, and air-based nuclear forces, reinforced in testimony by numerous DoD and U.S. intelligence officials and DoD reports to Congress on China’s military. I understand that the recent expansion and modernization of China’s nuclear forces are the result of its strategic ambitions, evolving view of the security landscape, and concerns over survivability of its nuclear forces. I further understand that its nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the maintenance of a survivable nuclear force that can retaliate against an adversary’s first strike.

221. How can the United States best counter China in this regard?

If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding China’s nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its other nuclear developments, and how the United States might need to adjust its posture, policy or doctrine in response.

222. In your understanding, has this expansion been accompanied by a change in China’s nuclear weapons use doctrine?

China continues to maintain a stated no first use policy. I understand, however, that there is a degree of ambiguity surrounding the conditions under which China’s no first use policy would no longer apply.

223. If so, how has China’s doctrine changed?

My understanding is that China’s publicly-stated nuclear weapons use doctrine has not changed—and that Beijing continues to affirm that it abides by a no first use policy. However, the lack of transparency in the scope, scale, and speed of its nuclear expansion raises fundamental questions about its future doctrine.

224. Should U.S. doctrine change also?

I am familiar with, and concerned by, reports of China’s nuclear modernization and expansion, as well as its other nuclear developments. I understand issues such as this are being addressed in DoD’s ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR takes developments in the strategic environment such as these into account and examines how the United States might need to adjust its posture, policy, doctrine or arms control approaches in response.

225. What are your views with respect to deterring both Russia and China, in light of China’s

expansion of its nuclear arsenal (as compared to its arsenal of 10 years ago)?

I am generally familiar with concerns regarding the prospect of having to deter two peer or near-peer nuclear adversaries simultaneously in the coming years. If confirmed, I commit to better understanding the details surrounding these issues to include how the United States should posture itself in response, and whether arms control efforts can contribute to reducing this threat.

During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin voiced his agreement that any future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces should only be taken within the context of a formal, verifiable arms control agreements with adversaries, rather than by unilateral actions.

226. Do you agree with this statement? Please explain your answer.

The administration is committed to reestablishing U.S. credibility as a leader in arms control as demonstrated, in part, by the extension of the New START Treaty earlier this year. With that said, I agree that the United States should not unilaterally reduce nuclear forces without some corresponding action on the part of our adversaries.

227. In your opinion, should the United States pursue arms control and strategic stability talks with China while it is undertaking this expansion of its nuclear arsenal?

The administration is committed to reestablishing U.S. credibility as a leader in arms control. We have long been concerned with China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear forces, as well as its strategy and doctrine. Dialogue aimed at such transparency, improving strategic stability and risk reduction through mutual understandings, and possibly leading to arms control agreements that improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners is in the interest of the United States, China and the global community.

228. In your assessment, how would delaying or cancelling current nuclear modernization plans and programs affect our arms control negotiation leverage with near-peer and peer competitors?

I believe maintaining credible nuclear forces and pursuing verifiable reductions are both aspects of strategic stability. How current nuclear modernization plans intersect with our arms control approach is an important matter that I understand is being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review as well as in an ongoing interagency process. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure the NPR fully considers the potential impact of modernization choices on our arms control negotiation leverage.

229. Do you believe that the United States should consider accepting limitations on its missile defense, cyber, or conventional power projection capabilities as part of an agreement with Russia or China on nuclear weapons' reductions? Please explain your answers.

I believe we should be careful not to limit our ability to defend ourselves against limited missile threats or other types of attack from rogue states. I understand the intersection of arms control and integrated deterrence is an issue being considered as part of the administration's strategic reviews, including but not limited to DoD's National Defense Strategy review and

Nuclear Posture Review, as well as an ongoing interagency arms control process. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure DoD views are fully represented in any future nuclear arms control negotiations with either Russia or China.

230. What if your view of the value of the supplemental capabilities recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, including the deployed low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile and possible return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force? Please explain your answer.

As set out in the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the administration is committed to taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. I understand that the need for the so-called supplemental capabilities is being addressed in DoD's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I will have a role in overseeing the NPR, and I commit to better understanding the arguments for and against such capabilities in light of the foregoing guidance.

231. If confirmed, would you recommend any significant change in U.S. nuclear posture or declaratory policy, including reducing alert status of ICBMs or adopting a "No First Use" policy? Please explain your answer.

As the Deputy Secretary testified, declaratory policy is a decision made by the President of the United States. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that the NPR process that informs any such decision includes rigorous, fact-based analysis that takes into account recent changes in the strategic environment, and to make certain that the views of the STRATCOM commander and other senior military leaders are fully represented, and that we conduct meaningful consultations with treaty allies who rely on our extended deterrent.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities for COVID-19 Response

Through contracting support, the program previously known as Operation Warp Speed, and National Guard and active duty deployments for vaccine support teams and other support efforts, DOD has provided significant assistance to the U.S. Government's response to the COVID-19 crisis.

232. What in your view is the appropriate role for the DOD in providing support to Civil Authorities as part of the COVID-19 response?

I believe that it is appropriate that DoD has played an important supporting role in our nation's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead Federal agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead Federal coordinating agency bringing together the full capabilities of the U.S. Government to support response efforts to a national emergency. If confirmed, I will seek to support continued and effective DoD support to whole-of-government efforts.

233. Are there additional types of support that DOD should be providing, or types of support that the DOD should not provide, in your view?

To the best of my knowledge, DoD has been responsive and effective in providing assistance to the broader U.S. COVID-19 response efforts. I believe DoD should continue to play a supporting role to the lead Federal agency or the lead Federal coordinating agency. DoD assistance supplements, not supplants, responsibilities that by law belong to States and other Federal departments and agencies.

234. What should be done to minimize the risk to Department personnel who are tasked with providing defense support to civil authorities during the coronavirus crisis?

DoD's highest priority should remain the protection of our nation and its people. While DoD cannot execute its missions risk-free, DoD can mitigate and manage risks to ensure that DoD does not compromise the safety and security of our force or the nation. I understand that DoD implemented force health protection measures early in the pandemic designed to mitigate risks and has continued to adapt these measures as our nation's understanding of COVID-19 has improved.

235. What in your view are the major lessons learned from the Department's support to civil authorities in response to the COVID-19 crisis, and how should DOD position itself to be better prepared to support civil authorities in response to a future pandemic?

I understand that DoD routinely conducts after-action reviews to identify opportunities to improve. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to examine DoD's reviews and the lessons the Department intends to incorporate into its plans and procedures as well as into whole-of-government policies and processes.

236. What risks do you envision to the vaccine program as DOD draws down from the Countermeasures Acceleration Group, and how would you mitigate those risks, if confirmed?

It is my understanding that DoD had an important, albeit supporting role in the vaccine program. If confirmed, I will review DoD's posture for providing support and will work with partners to mitigate any risks, should DoD be asked to provide support again.

Foreign Disinformation on COVID-19

China, Russia and other nations are disseminating disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19, to advance their strategic interests.

237. What role, if any, should the Department play in countering disinformation and false narratives relating to COVID-19?

In support of whole-of-government efforts, I would expect the Department to be an important voice in reinforcing fact-based information and leverage trusted relationships with our own personnel, our defense communities, allies, and partners to counter

disinformation. If confirmed, I would look to support the Department's efforts to counter COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives in support of the Administration's efforts and to provide timely and accurate health information to the workforce.

DOD Security Cooperation

238. What is the appropriate role of the DOD in the conduct of security cooperation in the strategic cooperation with China and Russia?

Aligned with whole-of-government security sector assistance efforts, Department of Defense security cooperation tools bolster ally and partner capabilities for defense, advance shared national security interests through addressing regional security challenges, and strengthen relationships with key allies and partners. DoD security cooperation, developed and executed in coordination with the State Department, serves to reinvigorate and modernize U.S. alliances and partnerships, reinforcing a critical American asymmetric advantage in strategic competition.

239. What is your view of the value of a strategic and integrated approach to DOD security cooperation as a tool for strategic competition?

DoD building partner capacity efforts should focus on enhancing ally and partner capabilities to effectively operate alongside and in lieu of U.S. forces to address shared national security challenges. Security cooperation investments should be targeted to advance broader goals in strategic competition. I understand the forthcoming National Defense Strategy will address the strategic objectives and integrated approach of DoD security cooperation.

240. What specific steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department's security cooperation strategy is integrated across the combatant commands, Military Services, and other DOD components?

I understand the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, exercising responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 382, has made significant progress in advancing the strategic oversight of security cooperation activities since the reforms codified by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. If confirmed, I will review existing processes and assess whether additional guidance may be necessary to ensure DoD security cooperation activities are developed, executed, and integrated across echelons and in alignment with the forthcoming National Defense Strategy.

241. What should be the Department's relationship with the Department of State in the conduct of these security cooperation activities?

Effective DoD security cooperation aligns with and advances broader U.S. foreign policy objectives driven by the Department of State. Ensuring this alignment requires thorough collaboration with the Department of State through interagency processes and regular engagement between the two departments at all levels. If confirmed, I would seek to support consistent coordination and engagement with the Department of State

and other interagency partners.

242. In your view, are the current security sector assistance authorities available to DOD sufficient to accomplish our strategic objectives?

DoD security cooperation authorities and investments are essential to the national security strategic goal of reinvigorating and modernizing U.S. alliances and partnerships. If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's responsibility for oversight of strategic policy, guidance, and resource allocation for security cooperation programs and assess whether authorities or resource adjustments may be necessary in support of DoD strategic priorities.

243. What changes, if any, would you recommend in this regard?

If confirmed, I will assess whether any additional organizational, legislative, or resource adjustments are necessary for the effective implementation and strategic oversight of Department of Defense security cooperation activities.

Civilian Oversight of Special Operations Forces

The NDAA for FY 2017 included provisions designed to enhance civilian oversight of, and advocacy for special operations forces. Among other things, these reforms established an administrative chain of command from the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SOLIC)) to the Secretary of Defense, mirroring the relationship between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their Service Chiefs.

244. What is your understanding of the "service secretary-like" responsibilities of the ASD(SOLIC) with regard to special operations forces?

In accordance with reforms enacted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the ASD(SO/LIC) reports directly to the Secretary of Defense in exercising authority, direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of special operations forces. I understand that the ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict, and special operations-peculiar administrative matters and, after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the principal official for these matters.

245. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SOLIC) as the "service secretary-like" civilian for special operations forces?

DoD implements the organizational role of the ASD(SO/LIC) with a dual reporting chain. In supporting the dual role, I will reinforce the independent role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in regard to his principal staff assistance responsibilities that are similar to those of a Military Department secretary by, for example, supporting and reinforcing the ASD(SOLIC)'S role as the Department's lead for the manning, organizing, training, and

equipping of SOF. One way I will do this is by ensuring the ASD(SOLIC)'s participation in the appropriate department-wide fora, and by ensuring the proper separation of tasks between the ASD(SOLIC)'s service-like responsibilities and functions, and the responsibilities and functions for which he is under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P).

246. In your view, how should these responsibilities be balanced with other ASD(SOLIC) responsibilities related to policy and operational issues?

The ASD (SOLIC)'s dual responsibilities are complementary. Every leader across the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be working to integrate information and to ensure thorough coordination of policies and issues for the Secretary. The ASD(SOLIC)'s dual role ensures special operation forces are properly prepared for current and future missions and that the DoD strategy and policy realistically reflect the capabilities and operational options these forces provide the nation.

Sexual Harassment

In responding to the 2018 DOD Civilian Employee Workplace and Gender Relations survey, 17.7 percent of female and 5.8 percent of male DOD employees indicated that they had experienced sexual harassment and/or gender discrimination by “someone at work” in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.

247. What is your assessment of the current climate regarding sexual harassment and gender discrimination in the office of the OUSD(P)?

There is no place for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and other harassment within OUSD(P); any such behavior is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will assist the USD(P) in reviewing previous workforce assessments including surveys, both internal and from the Office of Personnel Management, and any other documentation that would give me insight into the Policy organization to help determine next steps. I am aware of the GAO's report, issued earlier this year, recommending steps the Department take to address sexual harassment and assault among the civilian workforce. If confirmed, I will support the Department's ongoing efforts to promote a culture of dignity and respect, including a commitment to tackling the corrosive issue of sexual harassment.

248. In your view, is the civilian workforce harassment prevention and response training for civilian employees in OUSD(P) adequate and effective?

As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current harassment prevention and response training. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to work the Policy team to determine if it is adequate and effective.

249. In your view, does the OUSD(P) program for response to complaints of harassment or discrimination provide appropriate care and services to OUSD(P) civilian employee victims?

As I have not worked in OUSD(P), I cannot judge the current program for response to complaints of harassment or discrimination. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure appropriate care and services are provided to victims, in alignment with the Administration's commitment to improving prevention and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault for both civilians and military personnel.

250. If confirmed, what actions would you take were you to receive or otherwise become aware of a complaint of sexual harassment or discrimination from an employee of the OUSD(P)?

If confirmed, and I received or became aware of such complaints, I would take them seriously and immediately contact the appropriate office to initiate an inquiry to gather all facts, conduct the necessary interviews, collect appropriate information, and address the complaint within the specified guidelines of Federal statutes and Department of Defense regulations and policies. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(P) in reiterating to the workforce that they deserve a respectful workplace, of the importance of equality and diversity to the entire team, as well as our support for the Department's zero tolerance for harassment.

Relations with Congress

251. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the OUSD(P) and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in particular, and with the Congress in general?

If confirmed, I will assess the relationship between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Congress. As a former Senate staffer, I recognize that the Senate Armed Services Committee provides important oversight of the Department and issues within the purview of OUSD(P). If confirmed, I am committed to continuing regular engagement with Congress and maintaining these important relationships to ensure the Committee can fulfill its legislative and oversight role.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

252. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, dated August 19, 2014?

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DoD Directive 2310.01E, DoD Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014. Individuals in the custody and control of the U.S. Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

253. If confirmed, what role will you play in the ongoing triennial review and revision of FM 2-22.3 mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016?

Since FM 2-22.3 is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, I understand that my role in the review and revision will be to coordinate on the suggested manual revisions.

254. Are there certain policies or processes set forth in FM 2-22.3 that in your view are in particular need of revision? Please explain your answer.

I am not aware of any policies or processes that are in need of revision at this time.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

255. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

256. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

257. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

258. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

259. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

260. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

261. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.