

**Advance Policy Questions for Kari A. Bingen**  
**Nominee for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

**Department of Defense Reforms**

**The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included the most sweeping reforms since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.**

**1a. Do you support these reforms?**

As a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), I had the privilege of supporting the committee in its efforts to reform the organization and management of the Department of Defense, and I support the reforms that were recently enacted into law. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the armed services committees on their implementation, as they relate to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and the defense intelligence enterprise.

**1b. What other areas for defense reform do you believe might be appropriate for this Committee to address?**

I believe there is opportunity for continued reform within the Department of Defense and, if confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in looking carefully across the organization, management, and activities of the defense intelligence enterprise to determine any areas where improvements could be made.

**Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 required the Secretary of Defense to establish cross-functional teams to address critical objectives of the Department.**

**2a. Do you agree that the Department must be able to integrate its diverse, functional capabilities well in order to successfully defend the nation from increasingly complex and dynamic security threats? Will you meet this requirement to the best of your abilities?**

Yes, I agree with the need to integrate these capabilities, and if confirmed, I would endeavor to meet this requirement to the best of my abilities. The national security threats facing the nation today are not only complex and dynamic, but diverse. Today's threats cross all domains and require not only a DoD, but a whole of government approach to developing responses. Using cross-functional teams would tap the expertise across the DoD to include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Military Departments/Services and the combat support agencies. Bringing together talent from across the Department, soliciting innovative thought, and providing an open thinking environment is crucial to improving DoD's ability to address current and emerging threats to national security.

As an example, I understand that the USD(I) has been tasked by the Deputy Secretary to oversee a cross-functional team focused on algorithmic warfare and leveraging technology to improve the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of full motion video collected from airborne platforms, which is a key intelligence capability in the defeat-ISIS campaign.

**2b. What is your understanding of the attributes and characteristics of effective cross-functional teams?**

My understanding is that DoD's cross-functional teams include subject matter experts from across the Department with the appropriate knowledge of policy, strategy, technical expertise, and operations to tackle our most daunting national security challenges. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in encouraging the best possible environment for these cross-functional teams to succeed in addressing our national security challenges.

**Duties**

**3. What is your understanding of the role, duties, and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I))?**

My understanding is that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (PDUSD(I)) is responsible for assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code.

I understand the responsibilities of the USD(I) to include: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD Intelligence Components that are also elements of the intelligence community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing the implementation of all DoD security policies and programs except for nuclear, chemical, and biological security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DoD Intelligence Components that are also elements of the intelligence community are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction from the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

**4. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I)?**

At this time, I do not have specific recommendations for changes in the duties and functions of the PDUSD(I), but if confirmed, I would keep the committee informed of any changes in view that I may have.

**5. How do you view the relationship and division of responsibilities between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?**

Secretary Mattis has emphasized collaboration. If confirmed, I would work closely and collaboratively with each of the Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and senior teams, recognizing the complementary perspectives each brings to our shared Department mission. I believe that a close and continuing partnership between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), their Principal Deputies, and their staffs helps to ensure that policy and intelligence are effectively integrated in executing the Department's mission.

**Qualifications**

**Section 137a of title 10, United States Code, requires that the PDUSD(I) be “appointed from among persons who have extensive expertise in intelligence matters.”**

**6. What background and experience, particularly in the area of intelligence matters, do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties of the PDUSD(I)?**

If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and experience to effectively perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

I have been honored to serve as a professional staff member on the HASC, from 2006 to 2011, and again from 2013 to the present. In my capacity as policy director, I have led a small team that oversees national defense policy and strategy; regional strategies, posture, and military campaign plans, including in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan; building partnership capacity efforts; and Department of Defense organization and management. I have largely been an intelligence consumer, leveraging intelligence community assessments to inform my policy recommendations to committee members and to inform legislation. I have also seen, through my oversight role, how critical intelligence support is to the operations, military planners, and the acquisitions community.

I have also served as the staff lead for the HASC Strategic Forces subcommittee with direct responsibility for overseeing military space, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and military intelligence programs and resources. During this time, I supported the

committee's efforts to raise awareness of space threats and the need for greater space situational awareness and space protection capabilities; to enhance our nation's missile defense capabilities in response to increasing foreign ballistic missile threats; and to invest in the modernization and enhanced safety and security of our nuclear deterrent capabilities.

Prior to working on Capitol Hill, I served as a senior space policy analyst at The Aerospace Corporation's Center for Space Policy and Strategy, providing subject matter expertise on space protection, vulnerabilities, and commercial remote sensing for the National Security Space Office (NSSO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

Prior to Aerospace, I was employed with SRA International's Adroit C4ISR Center as a space systems analyst, where I supported various defense and intelligence organizations. I provided analytical support to the NSSO in areas such as space protection, hyperspectral imaging, and satellite constellation performance; analyzed threats to U.S. space systems for customers in the Intelligence Community; examined the integration of airborne intelligence, surveillance (ISR), and reconnaissance assets into ground systems for the Air Force; and served as SRA's Deputy Program Manager providing strategic planning support to the CIA Office of Transnational Issues' Geospatial Analysis Center. In 2002, I was selected as a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Technology Fellow and assigned to the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation & Arms Control Center to examine threats to U.S. space systems.

From my legislative, executive, and private sector background, I have experience working with the defense intelligence enterprise in a variety of different roles. I understand the important role of congressional oversight; I understand the technical, operational, and programmatic complexities involved in the acquisition and fielding of ISR capabilities; and I appreciate the analytical challenges of assessing foreign capabilities and intent. I believe this cumulative experience and perspective, coupled with my technical engineering background, have uniquely prepared me for this position.

## **Relations with Congress**

### **7. What are your views on the state of the relationship between the OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with the Congress in general?**

My current responsibilities have not afforded me sufficient visibility to assess the relationship between OUSD(I) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). In my capacity as the policy director for the HASC, I found the OUSD(I) and the defense intelligence enterprise to be generally responsive to the committee. However, if confirmed, I would seek to engage the SASC and other committees of jurisdiction to better understand the state of the relationships and how they could be enhanced.

**8. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the Congress and the OUSD(I)?**

If confirmed as PDUSD(I), I would support the USD(I) in pursuing an open, continuing, and forthright dialogue with Congress concerning issues vital to defense intelligence and national defense. Furthermore, I believe it is important to engage with Congress on a regular basis; to be forthcoming in explaining intelligence activities, programs, and budgets; to provide the committees of jurisdiction the information they need to carry out their Article I constitutional responsibilities; and to be accountable to the Congress.

**Major Challenges and Priorities**

**9. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?**

From my view as a professional staff member of the HASC, I believe the major challenges confronting OUSD(I) and defense intelligence are the diverse and complex array of security challenges and continued scope and pace of global operations conducted against a backdrop of a smaller force and a constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, the demand is increasing for intelligence to support policy, operations, and acquisitions, as is the need to improve our defense intelligence posture and capabilities to better address the full spectrum of security challenges to prevent strategic and military surprise, while fully supporting ongoing operations. Furthermore, the OUSD(I) must address these challenges in a threat environment that requires better protection of our intelligence sources and methods from espionage by state and non-traditional actors and unauthorized disclosures of information.

**10. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to ongoing operations, I would assist the USD(I) in ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the defense intelligence enterprise, and that intelligence is disseminated broadly while still properly protected. I would reinforce and seek to effectively implement the USD(I)'s priorities across the defense intelligence enterprise, and ensure effective policies are developed to support the execution of these priorities. Lastly, the success of the defense intelligence enterprise depends on a workforce – a team – of highly talented and experienced professionals with a wide range of skills. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in recruiting, retaining, and developing this talent.

**11. How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time and resources as the PDUSD(I)?**

If confirmed, I would align my priorities with those of the USD(I) and the Secretary of Defense. I would anticipate dividing my time generally between oversight of intelligence

operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, internal management of OUSD(I), and other duties as the Secretary and the USD(I) may assign. In what will likely continue to be a resource-constrained environment, I would assist the USD(I) in seeking to ensure that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the defense intelligence enterprise.

**12. If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide intelligence support to the warfighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?**

My understanding is that one of OUSD(I)'s primary responsibilities is to ensure the appropriate balance between intelligence support to the warfighter and to policy makers. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working to ensure the defense intelligence enterprise continues to satisfy intelligence requirements—foremost in support of current military operations and planning, while working collaboratively with interagency partners to inform political-military decision-making by our national leaders. If confirmed, I would seek to identify and communicate the critical intelligence needs of the warfighter. If confirmed, I would also assess the current level of support to policy-makers and warfighters across the national intelligence community and defense intelligence enterprise, and seek ways to improve coordination and integration.

**13. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the geographic combatant commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?**

If confirmed, and in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would support the USD(I) in seeking to strengthen integration and collaboration between the geographic and functional combatant commands, and the components of the national intelligence community and the defense intelligence enterprise. I understand that OUSD(I) has a central responsibility, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure a continuous dialogue with the combatant commands regarding their priority intelligence requirements. Combatant command intelligence requirements are continually assessed and prioritized, taking into account U.S. national security interests, Secretary of Defense priorities, combatant command priorities, and resource constraints. From my experience serving as a professional staff member with the HASC as well as my work within the intelligence community, I have seen how important it is for the national intelligence community and defense intelligence enterprise to recognize and respond to warfighter needs dynamically and with maximum agility. If confirmed, I would work diligently to ensure effective communication across the defense intelligence enterprise, the national intelligence community, and all combatant commands.

**Budget**

**14. What is your assessment of the impact of the budget caps required by the Budget Control Act on the capacity and capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet requirements?**

I understand that the impact on the readiness, capacity, and capabilities of the defense intelligence enterprise has been significant. This enterprise has been squeezed by five consecutive years of budget reductions to meet budget caps. At the same time it has been stressed to meet warfighting requirements while also addressing strategic and full spectrum challenges. From my position on the HASC, I have seen delays in system upgrades, reduced facility maintenance, and a slower than desired pace to address the emerging challenges presented by China's rapidly growing military and a resurgent Russia. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in addressing these challenges.

### **Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques**

**15. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?**

Yes, I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the current Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Individuals in the custody or control of the United States Government may not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual.

### **Management of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise**

**16. What is your understanding of the role of the OUSD(I) in overseeing and coordinating the efforts of the elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise?**

My understanding is that the PDUSD(I) is responsible for assisting the USD(I) in supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. This includes exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over the Defense Intelligence Components of the Department of Defense.

**17. Are additional authorities, policy guidance, or resources necessary for effective oversight of the enterprise?**

If confirmed, I would carefully assess the adequacy of the existing authorities, policies, and resources and evaluate potential options to recommend to the USD(I) to increase the effectiveness of the defense intelligence enterprise.

**18. Are there opportunities to improve coordination with the National Intelligence Community to improve intelligence support to the warfighter and, if so, where are the opportunities?**

Yes, I believe there are opportunities to improve collaboration across the national intelligence community and defense intelligence enterprise on behalf of the warfighter. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in engaging early and often with the combatant command commanders to understand their needs and to elicit their feedback on how OUSD(I) can better support them. I would also support the USD(I) in engaging on a frequent basis with leaders in the national intelligence community to communicate warfighter needs and identify opportunities to improve warfighter support. I am particularly interested in improving the integration of national and defense ISR capabilities, and applying greater attention to faster, more agile and adaptive processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence data to better support the warfighter. Improvements can also be made to increase warfighter awareness of compartmented intelligence community capabilities, so they are able to take advantage of them.

**Allocation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets Through the Global Force Management Process**

**The Committee has expressed concerns about the process and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the combatant commands under the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP). While these GFMAP problems are numerous, the Committee has noted in particular that, since the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, to the point where the Committee expressed doubt that “a rigorous analysis would consistently rank the lowest priorities of one or more combatant commands higher than the highest priorities of other combatant commands.”**

**19a. What is your understanding and assessment of the adequacy of the process for allocating ISR capabilities under the GFMAP process?**

I understand that the GFMAP process was designed to allocate forces and capabilities across the combatant commands to best meet their requirements, including ISR requirements. If confirmed, I would work with the USD(I), in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the appropriate balance in ISR allocation, informed by rigorous analysis of tradeoffs and risks to ongoing combat operations and support to all other combatant commands.

**19b. In your view, are modifications to the process warranted?**

My present duties have not yet afforded me an opportunity to systematically review and assess the GFMAP process in connection with the allocation of ISR assets. However, if confirmed, I would study this matter and not hesitate in providing recommended modifications if warranted.



I recognize there are immense challenges posed by the need to fulfill U.S. Central Command ISR requirements while still ensuring other combatant commands receive adequate support to achieve their assigned missions. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working closely with the key stakeholders in the GFMAP process across the Department, Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Departments/Services, and combat support agencies to ensure the tradeoffs and risks to missions and forces associated with global ISR allocation are thoroughly analyzed and understood.

## Cyber

### **20. How do you perceive the challenges we face in cyberspace?**

I believe the challenges we face in a constantly changing and dynamic cyberspace environment are significant. In recent years, malicious cyberspace activities conducted by our adversaries have become increasingly complex, technologically advanced, disruptive, and persistent. Correspondingly, DoD continues to face challenges in protecting and securing its networks, systems, infrastructure, and in developing its overall cyber capabilities.

### **21. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve in the cyber realm and the strategy you think is necessary to address these challenges.**

The Secretary has discussed the need for a whole-of-government effort and policy regarding U.S. responses to cyber aggression, and the need for hardening our information networks and critical infrastructure, which I fully support. If confirmed, cyber will be a key focus area of mine, as the OUSD(I) continues to support efforts to better assess the threat and technological advancements, to rapidly develop the capabilities to deter our adversaries and protect our networks, to support cyber operations, to develop the Cyber Mission Forces, and to support the implementation of section 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command.

### **22. What role should the OUSD(I) play in addressing challenges in cyberspace?**

I believe that OUSD(I)'s role is to provide a holistic and integrated perspective on cyberspace, as it relates to intelligence. This includes a holistic look at the capabilities, operations, personnel, and resources across the defense intelligence enterprise necessary to provide more effective and efficient intelligence support to cyberspace operations, to DoD decision-making, to protection of the Defense Industrial Base, and to DoD plans for cyber deterrence and defense.

**23. What is your understanding of the support that the OUSD(I) should provide to the Principal Cyber Advisor's cross-functional team under section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014?**

I understand that OUSD(I) supports the Principal Cyber Advisor (PCA) cross-functional team through direct liaison with the OUSD(I) SIGINT and Cyber Directorate under the Director for Defense Intelligence responsible for technical collection and special programs.

**Space**

**24. What do you perceive as the threats to our national security space satellites?**

We face a number of threats to our national security space systems which, given our high dependency on space, can have severe consequences on the battlefield. Our adversaries recognize this dependency and have invested in a range of anti-satellite capabilities, from kinetic kill weapons to be employed against our satellites to non-kinetic cyber weapons that can disable our satellite ground stations and jam command, control, and communications links. Also, space has become increasingly congested, with the number of objects in orbit steadily growing.

**25. Briefly describe what policy objectives the Defense Department should be seeking to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to address these threats.**

I would defer to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to articulate the Department's space policy objectives. However, I believe that our defense intelligence enterprise must have the capabilities, personnel, and resources to adequately assess space threats and technology, to better support the acquisition of new space capabilities, Furthermore, I believe that OUSD(I) can work to better integrate intelligence with operations to better protect our space capabilities, and to better integrate space and air to provide greater continuity of ISR support to users.

**26. Given that the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) would be required to respond operationally to active threats to reconnaissance satellites by adversaries in a conflict, should the Department consider designating the NRO as a combat support agency?**

If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in assessing whether that relationship should change based on the current and predicted threat environment.

**Relationship with Respect to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC)**

**27. How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the OUSD(I) and ASD SOLIC?**

It is my understanding that OUSD(I) and ASD(SO/LIC) have some concurrent responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces (SOF). The Secretary of Defense assigned to the USD(I), in DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))," the responsibility to oversee all DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related activities. I understand that the Secretary of Defense assigned to the ASD(SO/LIC), in DoD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))," the responsibility to oversee all DoD special operations and low intensity conflict activities. To the extent that SOF engage in intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, or other intelligence-related activities, the USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC) share responsibility for overseeing those activities.

If confirmed, I would foster continued collaboration between USD(I) and ASD SO/LIC to ensure any overlap of responsibilities strengthens rather than weakens the Department's oversight of SOF activities and programs.

**28. Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the OUSD(I) that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC?**

I have no program recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(I), in collaboration with ASD SO/LIC and in consultation with Congress, to make any adjustments in oversight, as necessary, and also work to ensure no gaps in oversight coverage of activities and programs.

**Personnel Security and Insider Threats**

**The Committee has enacted significant legislation in recent National Defense Authorization Acts mandating and guiding urgent reforms in personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention. Breaches in personnel security records held by the Office of Personnel Management has now also driven a reevaluation of which element or elements of the government should conduct background investigations (BIs) and be responsible for protecting the information that such investigations produce.**

**29a. What is your assessment of the current process for conducting BIs and what changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the process?**

I am aware of the significant challenges in the current process for conducting background investigations and of the growing backlog of investigations, which are affecting not only DoD personnel and contractors, but also many employees on the Hill. I am also familiar with the committee's actions in this area in recent National Defense Authorization Acts. If confirmed, I would be in a better position to examine the process in detail, assess the

problem, consider options, and make any recommendations for improvements to the process.

**29b. What is your understanding of the technical and systems integration challenges involved in improving personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention within the Department of Defense?**

At this time, I do not have a detailed assessment of the technical and systems integration challenges, but I would surmise that they are significant. I do believe that technology, coupled with process and education, can improve personnel security and insider threat detection. I am interested in the technical efforts within OUSD(I) to conduct automated record checks and to leverage continuously available data sources, to include social media. If confirmed, I would support the USD(I) in working with our interagency partners to accelerate the development of our IT solutions and other automation initiatives to deliver timely, cost-effective and quality background investigations.

**29c. What are your views about whether the Department of Defense should be responsible for conducting BIs and protecting that sensitive data?**

I am aware of the significant backlogs and delays in background investigations and the impact this has on getting talented personnel to work, including on the Hill. However, in my current capacity, I have not studied this issue in depth. In support of the USD(I), I would assess the process, analyze options, and consider costs and benefits before providing an informed view and any recommendations for the Secretary.

**U.S. Special Operations Command Intelligence Operations**

**30. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?**

It is my understanding that SOF's unique set of missions all require very precise and detailed intelligence to ensure their operations are effective. The range of missions unique to SOF also requires agility and flexibility provided by defense intelligence capabilities in order to meet operational timeline requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a deeper understanding of how SOF conducts its intelligence activities.

**31. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?**

It is my understanding that SOF intelligence activities are coordinated fully with the intelligence community to ensure necessary de-confliction and avoid redundancy. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(I) in advancing efforts to improve coordination and integration of SOF activities with those of the intelligence community.

## **Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis**

**32. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence analysts within the Defense Department, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are independent and free of pressure from influence from their chain of command to reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference?**

If confirmed, I would fully support policies and programs that ensure defense intelligence analysis is objective and free from the personal or political biases of individual analysts or managers. I am aware of and fully support actions taken by OUSD(I) in light of recent recommendations made by the DoD Inspector General to ensure analytic integrity, such as establishment of an analytic ombudsman at each defense component, a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, and other important initiatives.

## **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**33a. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**33b. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?**

Yes.

**33c. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?**

Yes.

**33d. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.

**33e. Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?**

Yes.