

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

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Introduction

Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Ayotte, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the readiness of your United States Army. On behalf of our Secretary - the Honorable John McHugh and our Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Families, Wounded Warriors, and Veterans.

We live in a world that is as dangerous and unpredictable as it has ever been—from continued unrest in the Middle East, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the threat of non-state actors and transnational terrorist organizations. The Army remains engaged in worldwide contingencies with more than 66,000 U.S. Army Soldiers from all three components – Active, Guard, and Reserve -- deployed including nearly 32,000 in Afghanistan. In addition, about 85,000 Soldiers are forward stationed across the globe in nearly 150 countries. The Army remains the best trained, equipped, and led land force in the world, although reduced funding levels are contributing to existing challenges in Army readiness. Together, we must ensure our force is trained and ready to prevent conflict, conduct shaping operations for our geographic Combatant Commanders, and if necessary, win decisively in a major combat operation while denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

A trained and ready Army must be able to rapidly deploy, fight, sustain itself and win decisively against complex state and non-state threats in austere environments and rugged terrain. Readiness is measured at both the service and unit level. Service readiness incorporates installations and the critical ability of the Army to provide the required capacities (units) with the requisite capabilities (readiness) to execute the missions required by combatant commands. Unit readiness is the combination of personnel, materiel and supplies, equipment and training, that, when properly balanced, enables immediate and effective application of military power.

In 2013, sequestration and unanticipated costs in Afghanistan resulted in declining readiness throughout the Total Army (Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve). It will take time to recover from the actions we took in 2013 due to

sequestration, and a return to this method of budgeting would increase the risk to our Soldiers by not adequately preparing them to fight our Nation's wars. We must maintain balance between the three critical areas of end strength, readiness, and modernization to avoid becoming a hollow Army. An example of a hollow Army is a large force that lacks adequate training and modernized equipment, and is therefore not as effective as a smaller, well-trained force with cutting-edge technology. Yet cutting too much manpower risks not having sufficient forces to fulfill our strategic mission and deter our enemies. If we are required to further reduce Total Army end strength to 420,000 in the Active component, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and 185,000 in the Army Reserve by the end of FY 19, we will be unable to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

We are at a critical juncture for readiness in our Army. In the past few months we have received relief from Sequestration in FY 14 and FY 15, and are implementing a plan that builds readiness into a contingency response force that can partially mitigate current strategic and operational risks to combatant commanders. But with very tight constraints in FY 15, and potential sequestration in FY 16, readiness will quickly erode across the force. We must have predictable, sustained funding to ensure the necessary readiness to execute our operational requirements and the Defense Strategic Guidance.

As we emerge from two wars the force is transitioning from training for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to a comprehensive and realistic decisive action training environment that features regular, irregular and insurgent enemy forces. Sequestration in 2013 cancelled much of the essential training for this conversion, and while the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) gives us some relief and predictability for FY 14 and FY 15, unless Congress comes together to build on that model and provide additional relief in 2016 and beyond, we will face sequestration levels again, undermining this transition.

Equipment modernization is a critical part of Army readiness and the decreasing budget has forced us to reassess many programs. The Army's equipment modernization strategy focuses on effectively using constrained resources for near-term requirements and tailoring our long-term investments to provide the right capabilities for Soldiers in the future. Because of fiscal constraints, investments will focus on Science

and Technology (S&T) and incremental improvements to existing systems, with very few new start programs. If allowed to go into effect in 2016, sequestration-level spending caps would require a significant reduction to Army modernization accounts, with the majority of Army programs being affected. Major weapons programs would be delayed, impacting the industrial base both in the near and long term.

Finally, it remains an Army priority to care for our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members who have sacrificed over the last 12 years of war, and to build a resilient force ready to respond to a broad range of contingencies. While we will make every effort to protect Soldier and Family programs, they will be unavoidably affected by workforce reductions, cuts to sustainment funding, and challenges maintaining Army infrastructure.

Our Civilian workforce will also undergo a draw down concurrent with reductions to military end strength. Most have remained with us, but the impact of furloughs, pay freezes, and our inability to reward our most productive employees with performance-based bonuses has caused some of our highest quality civilians to seek employment in the private sector. We rely on our civilian teammates and these disruptions negatively affect Army readiness.

The Army's foremost challenge is building rapidly deployable contingency capabilities in support of the combatant commanders while simultaneously reducing its size across all components and fulfilling the existing worldwide demand for forces. We need congressional support with adequate, predictable funding, and support for a Total Force solution during drawdown. Readiness must be maintained at acceptable levels and in balance with modernization and force structure. If it is not, we put Soldiers at risk, and undermine our ability to deter our adversaries.

Support the Current Fight

Our top priority remains the readiness of units deploying to Afghanistan and elsewhere. These units will continue to receive the highest priorities for both Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds and base budget requirements. The Army retains the capability to conduct Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) necessary to support forces deploying to Afghanistan or other theaters.

There are six MREs scheduled at the CTCs in FY 14 specifically focused on Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions. It is important that Congress continues to provide sufficient OCO funding for our deploying forces.

Retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan continues on pace and we are responsibly executing our duty to recover this materiel, but need sustained support. We identify the best, most modern equipment to recover and Reset for future contingencies. In February, 2013 we had \$28 billion worth of Army equipment in Afghanistan. Currently, approximately \$15.5 billion worth of materiel remains in place, of which we plan to retain \$10.2 billion. The Army will divest through foreign military sales utilizing Excess Defense Article (EDA) transfers, or demilitarization of approximately \$5 billion worth of equipment.

A fully funded Army Reset program is critical to ensuring that equipment worn and damaged by prolonged conflict in harsh environments is recovered and restored for future Army requirements. We estimate the need for just over \$6 billion to reset the remaining equipment from both conflicts. We have been consistent in our requests for OCO funds for at least three years after the last equipment is withdrawn from Afghanistan. The Army will need Congressional support to complete this task that we believe is so important to responsibly ensuring future readiness.

Current Readiness:

The Army can currently provide only a limited number of available and ready BCTs trained for decisive action proficiency, which will steadily increase through FY 14 and the beginning of FY 15. While the Army's base budget decreased over the past two fiscal years, the Army's responsibilities under the Defense Strategic Guidance plus commitments to Combatant Commanders have not receded in commensurate amounts. While the restoration of some funding in FY 14 has helped arrest the decline in unit readiness, it has not been sufficient to fill the void in core capabilities created over the past decade of counterinsurgency operations and by sequestration. We will begin to rebuild readiness during FY 14 and FY 15 by continuing to focus resources on critical unit level training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). However, this will come at

the expense of home station training, installation support and the reset of equipment for the Total Army.

In order to achieve the most efficient readiness levels within our funding limits, the Army is implementing tiered readiness as a bridging strategy until more resources are made available. Under this strategy, only 20% of the total operational forces will conduct collective training to a level required to meet our strategic mission, with 80 % remaining at lower readiness levels. Unless National Guard and Reserve forces are preparing for deployment, they will largely be funded for readiness at the individual, crew, and squad (ICS) level. Forward stationed units in the Republic of Korea will remain ready, as will those dedicated to the Global Response Force. Forces deploying to Afghanistan will be fully trained for their security assistance mission but not for other contingencies. The Army is also concentrating resources on a contingency force of select Infantry, Armored and Stryker BCTs, an aviation task force and required enabling forces to meet potential unforeseen small scale operational requirements. The BBA improves the Army's ability to increase collective training in FY 14 and FY 15, but readiness will still take time to build.

Training and Professional Military Education (PME)

Training across the Total Army serves two main purposes: preparing units to support combatant commands worldwide and developing leaders who can adapt to the complex security environment. To meet demands across the full range of military operations, the Army will shift the focus of training to rebuilding war fighting core competencies. We are reinvigorating our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to challenge and certify Army formations in a comprehensive and realistic Decisive Action/Unified Land Operations (DA/ULO) training environment that features regular, irregular and insurgent enemy forces. We will conduct tough, realistic multi-echelon home-station training using a mix of live, virtual and constructed methods to efficiently and effectively build Soldier, leader and unit competencies over time.

From 2004 to 2011, all CTC rotations were focused on building readiness for assigned missions in a counterinsurgency environment. This shift impacted 5,500 company commanders, 2,700 field grade officers and 1,000 battalion commanders.

Recognizing the atrophy in Direct Action/Unified Land Operations training, the Army returned to conducting decisive action CTC rotations in 2011, with a plan to cycle nearly all Active Army BCTs by the end of FY 15 along with the requisite amount of Army National Guard BCTs. However, due to sequestration, the Army canceled seven CTC rotations in 2013 and significantly reduced home station training, negatively impacting the readiness and leader development of more than two divisions' worth of Soldiers. Those lost opportunities only added to the gap created from 2004 to 2011.

Even with increased funding accommodated under the BBA, in FY 14 alone the Army will not be able to train a sufficient number of BCTs to adequately rebalance the force. Seventeen BCTs were originally scheduled to conduct a CTC rotation during FY 14. Current funding enables the addition of another two BCT rotations, for a total of 19 for the fiscal year. However, due to the timing of the additional funding, some BCTs were still unable to conduct a full training progression before executing a CTC rotation. Without the benefit of sufficient home station training, and with the years away from direct action, some BCTs begin the CTC rotation at a low level of proficiency and cannot maximize this training event.

For example, 2nd Armored BCT of the 4th Infantry Division (2-4) returned to the National Training Center in 2013 for a direct action/unified land operations rotation, its first since 2002. In the interim, 2-4 had conducted three Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) in preparation for deployments. The return to direct action in 2013 revealed that many tank platoon sergeants had never performed as a member of a tank crew, some company commanders had never maneuvered their units as a part of a combined arms team, and Field Grade officers often had no experience in combined arms maneuver. The lack of leader experience in these skills prevented 2-4 from achieving the maximum readiness that a CTC rotation would normally provide.

For BCTs that do not conduct a CTC rotation, we are using available resources to train these formations to the highest possible proficiency level (roughly battalion-level). The Army will continue to prioritize unit training at the CTCs and the FY 15 budget allows for 19 rotations.

Leader development is one of the Army's highest priorities because the increasingly complex and dangerous global security environment requires well trained

leaders. The unpredictable nature of human conflict requires leaders to not only lead in close combat but to understand the operational and strategic environment, to include its socio-economic, cultural and religious underpinnings. Our leaders must demonstrate the competence, proficiency and professional values necessary to achieve operational and strategic mission success. We must continue to educate and develop Soldiers and Civilians to grow the intellectual capacity to understand the complex contemporary security environment to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency and Multinational task forces and teams. Therefore, we will reinvest and transform our institutional educational programs for officers and noncommissioned officers in order to prepare them for the complex future security environment.

We are prioritizing our institutional educational programs for officers and noncommissioned officers. The FY 15 budget will provide for leader development by funding 8,900 officers to attend Intermediate Level Education (ILE); 7,500 Warrant Officers to attend professional development schools; and 6,100 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to attend their required professional military education. Additionally, the FY 15 Budget increases Army Civilian leader development and funds over 150 officers to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). While funding for some joint education has declined, we are prioritizing quality instruction and instructor development.

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)

The purpose of regional alignment is to improve the Army responsiveness in support of the Combatant Commands while remaining operationally available to respond to global contingencies. Regional alignment, therefore, provides Combatant Commands with mission-ready, tailored forces and capabilities that are further prepared with cultural, regional and language focused training. This improves the ability of these Army forces to work within the physical, cultural and social environments and thus increases its overall readiness. Additionally, RAF keeps leaders and Soldiers actively engaged internationally and acts as a positive retention tool.

In FY 14 we continue to regionally align our Corps, Divisions and BCTs. I Corps, stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, and assigned to U.S. Pacific

Command, provides deployable mission command capability for contingencies and enhances an already strong Army presence in the Asia-Pacific region. III Corps, stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, and 1st Armored Division headquarters, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, are both aligned with U.S. Central Command. Active Army division Headquarters (HQ) will be habitually aligned to provide at least one Joint Force-capable HQ to each combatant command. This is perhaps the most important capability the Army is providing to geographic combatant commands, as the Division HQs can access a full range of capabilities from planning to specific enablers. An example of this is the 1st Armored Division, who deployed to Jordan as part of the joint exercise Eager Lion, having already coordinated with Central Command to understand the worsening crisis in Syria. From there, a tactical command post remained in Jordan to assist the Jordanians and other partners with a wide range of activities resulting from the mass humanitarian crisis to the north.

For FY13, several units below division-level were assigned or allocated to Combatant Commands. The 48th Infantry BCT, Georgia Army National Guard, is aligned with U.S. Southern Command and has deployed teams to several Central and South American countries. The 2d Armored BCT, 1st Infantry Division (2-1), currently allocated to the United States Army Africa Command, is the first brigade task organized to the RAF mission. Since March 2013, they have conducted 71 missions in 35 countries. For example, 2-1 helped train a Niger infantry battalion which was selected to participate in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Elements of 2-1 have also recently deployed to Juba, South Sudan to provide embassy protection.

Maintaining Army readiness in the Pacific is essential to the execution of the National Security Strategy and demonstrates how regional engagement supports a ready force. Land forces remain the most important actors in the region, as the Pacific theater contains 7 of the world's 10 largest armies. The U.S. Army has 80,000 active and reserve troops assigned to or on the periphery of the region; in terms of manpower, the Army is the largest contributor to US Pacific Command (PACOM). Based on persistent threats of escalation with North Korea, the Army forces on the peninsula are currently maintaining a higher readiness posture, which is also an element of the Asia-

Pacific Rebalance Strategy. The Army will maintain 19,500 Soldiers in South Korea—partially including a rotating Combined Arms Battalion and its enablers—as a key part of the U.S. strategy to fulfill our alliance commitments and deter an increasingly unstable North Korea.

Force Structure-End Strength and Total Force Policy

Adequate numbers of personnel and properly organized units are critical to the Army's ability to remain ready and fulfill the Defense Strategic Guidance. The Army is committed to the Total Force Policy: the Active Army gives us responsiveness and flexibility; the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve give us depth and endurance. Our Army is strongest with the contributions of all three components, in the right combination.

Shaping the force requires extensive analysis consisting of cost modeling and war gaming informed by our combat experiences to match specific timelines and readiness-capability levels. Army senior leaders are in constant dialogue with the heads of the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to manage reductions to all components. The Army must be able to implement prudent budgetary decisions in a timely manner to address funding cuts while producing the best possible force to meet strategic requirements. Delays in resourcing will require shifting of readiness funds to personnel accounts, further degrading readiness and contributing to the creation of a hollow Army.

Under the FY 15 Budget Request, the Army will decrease end strength through FY 17 to a Total Army of 980,000 Soldiers - the Active Component will be reduced to 450,000 Soldiers, the Army National Guard to 335,000, and the US Army Reserve to 195,000. The Army will be able to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance at this size and component mix, but it will be at significant risk. This reduction in end strength represents a 21% reduction in the size of the Active Army, a 5% reduction in the Reserve, and 6.4% reduction in the National Guard since 2011, when the Army was at a war-time high on total end strength. These cuts largely impact the Active Component and they will reverse the force mix ratio, going from a 51 % Active Component and 49 %

Reserve Component mix in FY 12, to a 46 % active component and 54 % Reserve Component mix in FY 17.

If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in 2016, the Army will be required to further reduce the Active Component to approximately 420,000 (26%), the Army National Guard to 315,000 (12%), and the US Army Reserves to 185,000 (10%) in order to meet savings goals and avoid hollowness. Under these conditions, the Army will not be able to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

Aviation Restructure

Aviation is a critically important part of the force and represents a large percentage of the Army budget. Instead of the across the board cuts imposed by sequestration in 2013, the Army sought an integrated, Total Army solution to reducing the costs of aviation, while preserving our most modern capabilities. With participation from representatives from all components, the Army developed a plan that will better meet the operational demands of our combatant commanders, sustain operational experience, and reduce costs. In the process, the Army aviation force will become smaller by 800 aircraft.

We will divest three entire fleets of aging and costly aircraft, and realign and remission remaining modern aircraft to derive the most capability and capacity from a smaller force. We will consolidate all AH-64 Apache helicopters in the Active Army, where they will be teamed with unmanned aircraft systems for armed reconnaissance or continue their traditional attack role. The Active Army will transfer 111 additional UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters to the Army National Guard and US Army Reserve. These aircraft will significantly improve capabilities for support of the homeland mission, such as disaster response, while sustaining security and support capabilities to civil authorities in the states and territories. The UH-72 Lakota will replace the TH-67 as the next generation glass cockpit, dual engine training helicopter. We will transfer nearly all Active Army UH-72 Lakota helicopters to our training base at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and will procure an additional 100 UH-72 Lakotas to support the initial entry rotary wing training fleet. At current funding levels, this approach will enable the Army National Guard to retain all of its 212 LUH-72 aircraft for general support requirements as well as

ongoing border security operations. The Active Army's overall helicopter fleet will decline by about 23 %, or nearly 700 airframes, and the Army National Guard's fleet of helicopters will decline by 8 %, or just over 100 airframes. The resulting Army aviation restructured force will retain our most capable and survivable combat power. Finally, this smaller, less expensive force will significantly increase the Army aviation capabilities most in demand by our Governors.

Essential Investments: People and Equipment

Soldiers, Families and Army Civilians

The size and scale of mandatory reductions in end strength may force the Army to separate many quality, experienced Soldiers. Reenlistment quotas are lower, and Officer Separation Boards (OSBs) and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) are taking place for many officers. These started with Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, and now we are looking at senior Captains and Majors in year groups that were assessed to support a larger force during the height of the two recent conflicts. This force reduction in the officer corps causes a loss of valuable leadership and combat experience and thus degrades readiness. To ensure we are caring for the needs of those who have served the Nation, the Chief of Staff of the Army created the Soldier for Life Program in 2012 to facilitate the successful reintegration of our Soldiers, Veterans, and their Families into their post-Army careers. Our Veterans are our best ambassadors and critical to sustaining the All-Volunteer Force.

We will make every effort to protect our most important Family programs, but budget cuts are ultimately affecting every facet of the Army. To ensure we maintain our focus on rehabilitating, resetting, and reshaping the force after 12 years of conflict, we continue to develop the Ready and Resilient Campaign (R2C). The purpose of R2C is to establish an enduring cultural change that integrates resilience into how we build, strengthen, maintain, and assess total fitness, individual performance, and unit readiness. The Army's culture must embrace resilience as part of our profession and as a key and critical component to readiness. The campaign leverages and expands existing programs, synchronizing efforts to eliminate or reduce harmful and unhealthy behaviors such as suicide, sexual harassment and assault, bullying and hazing,

substance abuse and domestic violence. Perhaps most importantly, the campaign promotes positive, healthy behaviors while working to eliminate the stigma associated with asking for help. The Army recently published an update to the R2C order directing the incorporation of resilience into our holistic assessment of Soldier and Unit Readiness by establishing a unified system of performance measurement that will drive actions and culture change.

Modernization

The Army's equipment modernization strategy plays a key role in future force readiness. Equipment modernization must address emerging threats in an increasingly sophisticated technological environment. The Army must maintain its ability to contend with such diverse threats as cyber attacks, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, chemical and biological agents, and air and missile threats. Yet significant budgetary constraints have forced the Army to make substantial reductions in modernization investments. Planned research, development and acquisition (RDA) investments in FY 15 have declined 39% since the FY12 budget planning cycle. The Army's Equipment Modernization Strategy calls for a mix of divestiture of selected legacy systems, incremental upgrades to existing platforms, selected investment in new capabilities, and prioritized science and technology investments to mature and develop next-generation technologies. We have also allocated funding toward building the skilled workforce needed for future innovation.

In the short-term, the Army remains focused on several efforts. We are reducing procurement to match force structure reductions. We will continue to apply business efficiencies such as multiyear contracts, planning for should-cost, and studies to facilitate smarter investing. We will tailor capabilities in development to meet requirements under affordability constraints. We will not transition four programs to the acquisition phase, to include the Ground Combat Vehicle and the Armed Aerial Scout. Additionally, we will end 4 programs, restructure 30 programs and delay 50 programs. A notable restructure includes the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3.

Lastly, the divestiture of materiel and equipment, where appropriate, will reduce maintenance and sustainment costs and maximize resources. Over the long-term, investing in the right science and technology and applying affordable upgrades to existing systems should allow us to keep pace with technological change and improve capabilities.

Army Organic Industrial Base

The Army industrial base consists of commercial and government-owned organic industrial capability and capacity that must be readily available to manufacture and repair items during both peacetime and national emergencies. The Army must maintain the critical maintenance and manufacturing capacities needed to meet future war-time surge requirements, as well as industrial skills sets that ensure ready, effective and timely materiel repair. During FY 13, the Army lost more than 4,000 employees from the organic industrial base and will continue to lose highly skilled depot and arsenal workers to other industries due to fiscal uncertainty. Hiring and overtime restrictions, in addition to furloughs, affected productivity and increased depot carryover, not to mention the detrimental effect on worker morale. Yet we must continue to size the organic industrial workforce and leverage the commercial industrial base appropriately, while sustaining core depot and arsenal maintenance competencies to support future contingencies.

The Army is assessing key portfolios and the health of the supply chain, and has taken specific steps to mitigate impacts. Mitigation measures include advocacy for Foreign Military Sales (FMS), extended production in certain programs, and investment in key suppliers on a case-by-case basis. The FMS program helps maintain a healthy base by keeping production lines and shipping depots active. For example, we are advocating the Foreign Military Sale of Chinooks, Apaches, Patriot missile systems, Excalibur rounds, Guided MRLS, and Javelin Anti-Tank missiles to our most trusted allies. Additionally, stretching out our production requirements over multiple years and advocating public-private partnerships for dual use items helps maintain workloads and keeps production lines open. For example, we are executing a HMMWV modernization

program for the Army National Guard using a teaming agreement between Red River Army Depot and AM General.

The Army continually assesses the health of key suppliers. For example, the A.T. Kearney study on the combat vehicle industrial base identified two critical areas of the supply base that might require specific mitigation: Abrams tank transmissions and forward looking infrared radar (FLIR). To mitigate these specific production gaps we will procure up to 124 new transmissions and 560 critical sensor components on the FLIR. Similar studies have identified inspectors who test and adjust turrets and a small subset of welders as critical skills to combat vehicle manufacturing that must be protected.

Finally, in terms of the organic industrial base, the Army has initiated Joint Acquisition & Sustainment Reviews (JASR) to highlight problems faced by Program Executive Offices and our depots and arsenals. These periodic reviews led by the Army Materiel Command and Army Acquisition Executive help us manage the challenges across the materiel enterprise.

Where We Need Support from Congress

Congress can help the Army by providing adequate financial support for ongoing contingencies including Afghanistan and other named operations, as well as the continued costs after these missions conclude. The costs associated with Operation Enduring Freedom will persist for years to come in the form of redeployment, reset, and rehabilitation. The expense of the transfer of equipment is significant and reset will continue for three years after the last equipment arrives in the U.S. We will, of course, provide the best available care for our wounded warriors, but this also comes at a cost.

Congress should continue recent efforts to provide the Army a more sufficient and predictable budget. The responsibility also lies with the Army to mitigate costs, but functioning under sequestration causes inefficiency and rapidly undermines readiness. Yet, in 2016, without congressional intervention, sequestration-level caps will return. We will do our part to ensure the Army is ready to defend the Nation, but I ask for Congress's help with a sufficient and predictable budget.

Finally, we need Congressional support of a Total Army solution to drawdown. Troop reductions, reforms, and reorganization are necessary after 12 years of war to

prioritize funding in preparation for future contingencies. Cuts must come from the Total Force – Active, Reserve, and National Guard – to maintain the balance among all components to best execute the Army’s strategic mission. Any delay to this process will force further cuts to modernization and readiness and slow the process of rebalancing the force. We need Congressional support to achieve a Total Army solution.

Conclusion

Throughout our history we have rapidly grown our Army for wars, and then downsized at war’s end. Our Army will be smaller than it was in 2001 and the smallest it has been since before World War II, with less capacity to deter aggression, reassure allies, defend the homeland, and decisively defeat adversaries. Invariably, there will be a period of hollowness and decreased readiness during the downsizing, but the severity of cuts combined with the unpredictability of the current budget environment and ongoing worldwide commitments has overly complicated our challenge of keeping the force in balance. Yet we must strive to achieve this balance as we cannot predict when our nation will chose to employ the Army again. If history is any indicator, the Army will be needed in the next two decades to fulfill our commitments, secure the Nation’s interests, and defeat aggression that threatens American citizens or territory. We have also learned, in the desert passes of North Africa, in the mountains of Korea, and on the streets of Iraq, that the penalty for improperly managing the readiness of our forces ultimately falls on the backs of our fighting Soldiers. It is our solemn duty to ensure our Army is prepared to fight when called upon.

Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Ayotte, and members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our Army Civilians, Families, Wounded Warriors, and Veterans. Army Strong!