

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA
Nominee for Appointment to the Position of Commander,
United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?

The Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) issues authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out U.S. military operations and activities conducted within the command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This AOR includes 50 independent states in Europe and the Caucasus region. In addition, the commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and security of the approximately 103,000 service members and their families deployed within the AOR.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by the Military Committee (MC). SACEUR commands all NATO military operations, is responsible for strategic military planning, identifies and requests the required forces to execute Alliance missions, and conducts strategic engagement and partnership building. In conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), SACEUR executes combined and joint training and exercises and conducts strategic analysis to identify and prioritize NATO's capability shortfalls.

2. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

I have been honored to serve our Nation and our service members and their families for 35 years. During that time, I have commanded at every echelon, from platoon to my current position as the U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander, serving in positions of leadership in combat and peacekeeping, and on operational deployments. In addition to specializing in Russia on the Joint Staff, I have served in Europe multiple times throughout my career and worked extensively with the interagency, policy, and intelligence communities, Allies, Partners, and with the embassy country teams throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

My professional service focused on Europe is mirrored by extensive personal experience. I was born in Würzburg, Germany, where my father, an immigrant to the United States from Italy, was assigned as a U.S. Army officer. Over the course of my life, I have traveled and engaged extensively across Europe, and I speak French, Russian, and Italian.

Complementing what I believe is a significant foundation of professional and personal experience, I have benefited from formal military education as a Eurasia-focused Foreign Area Officer. I studied at Yale University, where I earned a Master of Arts degree in Russian and East

European Studies. I further expanded my understanding and academic study of European security as a fellow at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, in Germany.

These experiences, my education, and my personal study have enabled me to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which the military instrument of power supports national strategic objectives in Europe; the importance of building relationships across the interagency and with regional Allies and Partners; and effective command and control at the combatant command level.

3. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

If confirmed, I am ready to assume command and will take the necessary additional steps to refine my understanding of critical issues in Europe. I will consult with the USEUCOM Headquarters, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), interagency partners, Allies, Partners, and other key stakeholders to increase my knowledge of the AOR. I will also work closely with the component commanders and service chiefs to understand their efforts to organize, train, and equip the force. Although I have spent a majority of my professional life studying and immersed in the European security environment, I am a strong proponent of continuous learning.

Major Challenges and Priorities

4. In your view, what are the major challenges you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

The core European security challenge is Russia. Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine heralds a new era in European security. Deterring further Russian aggression, helping Ukraine defend its sovereignty, supporting NATO's defense of the Euro Atlantic area, and countering malign Russian activities and influence remain the most significant challenges facing USEUCOM. As the current crisis has demonstrated, these complex and interrelated challenges require coordination across U.S. Government Agencies, Combatant Commands, Allies, and Partners in Europe.

5. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, developing the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

6. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

If confirmed, I will seek to counter China's growing influence and malign political and economic activity in Europe; and help our Allies and Partners deal with crisis-driven migration, violent extremism, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. We must orient on all of these challenges under the backdrop of climate change, which will be a critical consideration in all that we do, particularly in the High North.

7. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your Command's efforts on each of these priorities?

Whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance efforts are necessary to address the priorities and challenges listed above. USEUCOM's continued support to these efforts is essential. It will be essential to provide alternatives to China's One Belt-One Road projects, in order to reduce Allied and Partner nations' exposure to coercion and the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability for the U.S., Allied, and Partner nation's ability to maintain overmatch, secure sensitive supply chain processes, and protect operations and technologies from malign influence is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a holistic approach.

If confirmed, I look forward to fully assessing these priorities and challenges, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.

Technology theater infrastructure.

8. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your AOR complement the efforts of civilian agencies?

If confirmed, I will ensure our efforts complement and support a whole-of-government approach by working closely with United States ambassadors and embassy country teams across the region to advance U.S. National security objectives with the Department of State in the lead. Close alignment of our diplomatic, economic, informational, intelligence, and humanitarian goals strengthen our efforts to secure the region.

9. As Commander of U.S. Army and Africa, what are your major observations about how the security architecture of Europe has changed since Russia built up its forces around and invaded Ukraine? What implications has this had on posture requirements for the U.S. and NATO? If confirmed, what would you prioritize to address U.S. security challenges post-February 24, 2022?

In response to Russia's attack on Ukraine, the U.S., working in conjunction with our Allies, has rapidly reinforced combat power in all warfighting domains across the Alliance's eastern flank. Both the U.S. and NATO have increased our forward force posture in order to deter further Russian aggression.

Thus far, our collective force posture, operations, activities, and investments have been sufficient to deter an attack on NATO territory. However, Russia's actions in Ukraine and the changing landscape of NATO will require us to continually assess the threat and re-calibrate credible

deterrence accordingly. The outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine will be decisive in calibrating the appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and investments

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

National Defense Strategy

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China as the “most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department” and stated that Russia poses an “acute threat,” as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The NDS also identifies “[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships” as “an enduring strength for the United States.”

10. What does successful implementation of the NDS look like in the EUCOM AOR? What are the changes, trends, and/or events that would be indicators of effective NDS implementation with respect to the EUCOM AOR and the challenges posed by Russia and China?

Successful implementation of the 2022 NDS in the USEUCOM AOR requires a combat credible U.S. and Allied posture, appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the evolving security situation in Europe. The outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine will in large measure drive the appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and investments. Primary indicators of effective implementation of the NDS would be an absence of further Russian aggression and continued wide-spread European support for the values and rules-based international order that serves as the foundation of the NATO Alliance.

Finally, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to fill capability gaps and create opportunities for the Joint Force through cooperation with Allies and Partners. Moreover, I will aim to align operations, activities, and investments within the USEUCOM AOR in a manner, which disciplines our approach to campaigning and preserves warfighting readiness for the Joint Force.

11. Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, where do you see the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to the realities of strategic competition with Russia?

Successful strategic competition with Russia requires a multi-domain, global, whole-of government approach, appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the changing NATO landscape, and the evolving security situation in Europe. Our Joint Force must be able to deter further Russian aggression, to improve its ability to deploy rapidly, and to effectively interoperate with Allies and Partners in contested environments. Enhanced capabilities and capacities are needed to compete and win across multiple domains. Our Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid technological advancements such as advanced chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy, and hypersonics.

12. The NDS identifies “integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “actions to build enduring advantages” as the primary ways by which the Department will seek to achieve its goals under the NDS. What do you see as EUCOM’s role in each of these areas?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

13. Given your current knowledge of EUCOM programs, do you believe the Command’s resources and authorities are aligned in a manner consistent with NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?

In my current role as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, the command’s resources and authorities are currently aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives. However, going forward, we must assess and re-calibrate these resources and authorities as the threat and the NATO landscape evolve.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

14. Given your knowledge of the security relationships with Allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR, what do you see as the greatest opportunity to build on those relationships to advance the strategic objectives of the NDS?

NATO unity in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been inspiring. In my current role as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa I have engaged extensively with my land force counterparts across the theater. Many of my interactions involved a deep discussion on Allied capability gaps and new equipment procurement. I believe this is the leading edge of a significant increase in European focus on modernization and readiness. Increases in Allied capability and capacity strengthen the Alliance, strengthen collective defense, and afford greater U.S. flexibility in achieving our strategic objectives.

15. One of the top priorities for U.S. European Command and NATO has been the military mobility initiative agreed to at the 2018 Brussels Summit. If confirmed, how would you address the threats China poses to this initiative and to European security through its investments and attempts to gain influence in the region?

Countering the PRC’s malign influence requires a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance approach. If confirmed, USEUCOM will continue to work with Allies and Partners to galvanize European recognition of the pacing challenge that China presents, to include Beijing’s diplomatic support of Russia in its illegal war in Ukraine, and focus operations, activities, investments, and engagements in critical areas of this strategic competition. Most importantly, we should contrast the PRC’s predatory activities that demonstrate Beijing’s treatment of nations

as “clients and customers” with the U.S.’s longstanding commitment to alliances, partnerships, and the rules-based international order.

European Deterrence Initiative

The stated objectives of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) include: enhancing the United States' deterrence posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, supporting the collective defense and security of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, and bolstering the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners.

16. In light of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine and the continuing shift in the European security environment, what changes, if any, do you believe should be made to EDI objectives or investment priorities going forward?

Sustained EDI funding remains critical to our mission in Europe and critical to combat credible deterrence. As an example, EDI has enabled us to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the current crisis, APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in deploying a full Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight, in remarkably short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI funding, objectives, and investment priorities must be informed by several factors, including the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, and in addition to force posture, an assessment of EDI funding is one of areas that I will prioritize.

17. As Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, what lessons have you learned about the Army preposition stock sites, particularly their utility as part of the increase in U.S. troops immediately prior to and during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? If confirmed, how will you take this experience and apply it across all the requirements in European Command across all domains?

Multi-year investments under EDI enhanced our prepositioned materiel and supporting infrastructure, which have proven essential in our ability to rapidly project power to deter Russia from invading a NATO Ally while also supporting Ukraine. Large Army formations were able to quickly flow into Europe with ease, draw materiel, and integrate with existing command and control structures. If confirmed, I foresee this strategy continuing in all domains (e.g., Air Force Deployable Air Base Sets (DABS), special operations forces equipment) because it enhances our ability to respond swiftly and decisively to assure our Allies and deter further Russian aggression.

18. In addition to funding dedicated to constructing and sustaining military installations in Europe, a large portion of the funding associated with EDI has contributed to major land exercises such as the Defender Series. If confirmed, will

you continue to advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and partners across all domains?

Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and Partners across all domains. Fully resourcing and executing our Joint training program builds our readiness and interoperability in command and control, integrated air and missile defense, fires, and logistics. EDI-funded exercises build US and NATO readiness, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate Allied and Partner commitment to deter further Russian aggression.

U.S. Capabilities and Force Posture in Europe

19. General Wolters testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there will be a need to examine “the breadth and depth of the European contributions, [and] be prepared to adjust the US contributions. And my suspicion is we're going to still need more” troops than before the U.S. buildup as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree?

Assessing the outcome of this conflict and further consultations within NATO are warranted before drawing conclusions on U.S. contributions. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe, including force posture.

20. Given your knowledge of and experience in the EUCOM AOR, what is your assessment of the current U.S. force posture in Europe? Do you believe it is sufficient to support the achievement of NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?

In my current role as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, the command’s current force posture is aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives. However, our force posture going forward will in large measure be driven by the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM force posture to determine if it is appropriately scaled to achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

21. In your opinion, what implications does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have on future U.S. force posture in Europe? How should such considerations be calibrated and coordinated with NATO force posture decisions?

U.S. long-term force posture will be dependent upon a consensus about the nature of the security environment, including the threat posed by Russia, once the current conflict stabilizes. Future U.S. posture adjustments will be informed by anticipated Ally contributions to NATO’s new force model, while ensuring that we can continue to meet USEUCOM campaign objectives and

enable U.S. global operations from the USEUCOM AOR.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

22. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force that present a significant challenge to addressing current or future threats in the EUCOM AOR?

Over the years, our adversaries have been closing the gaps on exquisite types of capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic technology, as well as in the cyber and space domains. I believe we ought to continue our focus on developing “best-in-class” capabilities that address the threats of a high-end, multi-domain fight.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to identify critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force, as it pertains to the USEUCOM AOR.

23. In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? If not, what do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

From my current perspective as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, USEUCOM has good Army air and missile defense systems. However, as the security situation and threat evolve, the Joint Force will have to modernize and expand air and missile defense capability and capacity in both systems and force structure. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint and combined requirement that demands integration of all services’ air and missile defense capabilities in order to defend critical infrastructure.

A key factor to monitor is the operational tempo of U.S. Army air defense forces, for which demand remains high.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of IAMD, to identify and assess critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force.

24. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change for different kinds of units/formations?

There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each employment model. From my perspective as the Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, permanently assigned forces are more operationally effective, as they remain fully oriented to the operational environment and can

become interoperable with our Allies and Partners. However, I also appreciate that there are many other considerations that bear on this issue. Ultimately, the decision between permanent versus rotational forces must balance operational effectiveness with global demand and service considerations.

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, and force posture is one of areas that I will prioritize, to enable a fully informed recommendation to the Chairman and the Secretary.

25. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make to U.S. capabilities and force posture in Europe to support the NDS more effectively?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

26. Some have suggested that NATO should adopt a focus on “deterrence by denial,” by positioning credible forces capable of threatening Russia if it seeks to act against us along NATO’s eastern flank. What are your views on the concept of deterrence by denial?

I agree with the strategy of deterrence by denial and I believe that it would be an effective strategy in deterring a Russian attack against NATO.

27. What is your understanding of the operational value of the four *Arleigh Burke* class destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain?

U.S. Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain, coupled with Aegis Ashore provide the foundation of NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability. In addition to their ballistic missile defense mission, they allow us to better track undersea activity, boost NATO’s presence in the Black Sea, monitor Russia naval activities in the eastern Mediterranean, and provide a wide range of multi-mission capabilities.

28. The current EUCOM commander and his predecessor both testified in support of basing two additional destroyers in Rota, Spain to bolster U.S. naval posture and presence in Europe. Do you agree that two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region?

I agree with General Scaparrotti and General Wolters. Two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region.

Nuclear Posture

29. In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?

Robust nuclear deterrence is critical to maintaining regional stability and deterring conflict and underpins integrated deterrence. The U.S. strategic nuclear triad – our nation’s steadfast commitment to provide a credible, reliable, and secure nuclear deterrent – is instrumental to security in the USEUCOM AOR.

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which was part of the broader National Defense Strategy articulated a nuclear deterrence strategy that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”

30. Do you support this strategy?

Yes.

31. Do you agree, in full, to articles 40 and 41 of the June 14, 2021, NATO Brussels Summit Communique’ and in particular “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

Yes.

32. Do you support the forward deployment in Europe of United States’ nuclear weapon with capabilities and infrastructure by allies?

Yes.

33. If confirmed, what steps you would undertake to address the above goals with NATO allies?

If confirmed, I would reaffirm U.S. strategic assurance guarantees as stated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. I would also reinforce upcoming improvements that modernize our nuclear deterrence capabilities in theater and strongly reinforce our deterrence posture.

Russia

34. In your view, what are the USEUCOM and NATO activities most important to responding to Russian violence in Ukraine and deterring potential Russian aggression against NATO territory?

From my perspective as the Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, U.S. and NATO’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a remarkable whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-of-alliance effort. The activities that comprise this effort span the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities, imposing heavy costs on the Russian Federation for their unprovoked and illegal aggression. While all of these activities are crucial, I believe that NATO’s immediate response, as a unified and combat credible alliance

has been particularly critical in deterring further Russian aggression on NATO territory.

35. Are United States policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to the EUCOM AOR—sufficient to counter Russia's influence in the AOR, or are there additional measures we should be considering?

In support of whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance efforts, USEUCOM contributes to countering Russia's malign influence in the AOR. It is vital that the United States and USEUCOM continue to share information with our Allies and Partners and work together to counter malign influence across the continent.

Vladimir Putin has discussed Russia's plans to develop a variety of new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, an intercontinental hypersonic missile, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, and an undersea drone. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin has put Russian nuclear forces on high alert and threatened "consequences that you have never experienced in your history."

36. What is your assessment of Putin's capabilities and intent to follow through on threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in response to the Ukraine crisis?

According to New START Treaty statements on 1 September 2021, Russia declared 1,458 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Russia currently has an active stockpile of up to 2,000 warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). These include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, and Russia's anti-ballistic missile system.

Continued Russian rhetoric about the potential use of nuclear weapons is irresponsible and destabilizing. If confirmed, monitoring these indicators and warnings will remain a top priority for me.

37. Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine capability, such as the deployment of the highly capable Russian submarine *Severodvinsk*, what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare in the EUCOM AOR?

The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) continues to increase the scope and complexity of its undersea operations in the European theater through ongoing efforts to replace Soviet-era platforms with a number of new, technologically advanced multi-mission submarines that present a qualitative evolution in the subsurface threat. Maintaining our undersea advantage will require a comprehensive approach to undersea warfare using aircraft, surface ships, submarines, satellites, electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, unmanned vehicles in the air and water, and fixed and portable underwater sensors.

38. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure U.S. forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?

USEUCOM'S concept of operations to mitigate the systems intended to contest the operating environment is well developed and well-rehearsed. Capabilities to support the operations concept and USEUCOM's capacity continue to increase with the addition of 5th Generation fighter aircraft and key Army fires assets. Coupling U.S. capabilities with Allies and Partners makes this concept of operations stronger and more resilient.

39. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean, regardless of how the war in Ukraine progresses?

Russia seeks to dominate the Black Sea and compete favorably in the Mediterranean for defense, military power projection, and control of economic trade routes. Control of the Black Sea provides Russia with access to a warm water port (Sevastopol), access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits building Russian strategic defensive depth and allowing access to world oceans to challenge U.S. and allied operations and freedom of maneuver. Russia will continue building naval port infrastructure and adding Black Sea Fleet combatants including fielding additional long-range strike capable ships intended to defend southern approaches, and extend continuous naval rotations in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia may also seek diplomatic and legal agreements to restrict access and constrain Black Sea nations to Russian military and economic advantage.

40. Russia will still have the ability to threaten Ukraine, blockade its economy, and otherwise disrupt freedom of the commons in the Black Sea regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine. If confirmed, what actions would you recommend the U.S. and NATO take to mitigate Russia's threats in this body of water, and in its strategic connection to the Eastern Mediterranean?

The conflict in Ukraine has only increased the strategic importance of the Black Sea region to Russia. Russia employs a variety of approaches to further their regional interests through diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means. If confirmed, I would pursue a whole-of government, whole-of-alliance Black Sea security strategy, to ensure a coordinated U.S./NATO approach to countering Russian regional interests.

China

41. In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most important to mitigating the potential strategic implications of Chinese influence and investments across the AOR?

Mitigating PRC influence and investments in the USEUCOM AOR requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance effort. Providing U.S., Allied, or Partnered

nation alternatives to China's investments and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure can mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road projects, reduces Europe's exposure to coercion, and ensures access to critical infrastructure. Our collective ability to secure sensitive supply chain processes and protect operations and technologies is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a holistic approach.

If confirmed, I will fully assess China's malign activities in Europe, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.

42. As NATO seeks to revise its Strategic Concept, what role do you envision for the Alliance in countering the challenge from Chinese malign influence in the EUCOM AOR?

More than at any time in recent years, our European Allies and Partners recognize the risk the PRC presents to European security and interests. The June of 2021 NATO heads of state communique described NATO's growing concern over the PRC's malign actions on the continent and outlined NATO's policy to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge, and address challenges to the rules-based international order. Beijing's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only furthered these concerns. With NATO releasing its new strategic concept this summer in Madrid, I think we will continue to see the growing importance NATO is placing on China and additional whole-of-alliance efforts to counter malign PRC activities in Europe.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government, Allies, and Partners to assess and counter China's malign activities in Europe.

Russian Hybrid Warfare

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2022, General Wolters stated "Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and the manipulation of energy markets to support Moscow's efforts at political subversion and economic intimidation."

43. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have sufficient resources for countering Russia's cyber-enabled information operations and other hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or capacities are required in the EUCOM AOR to effectively counter these Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

USEUCOM collaborates directly with CYBERCOM to generate cyberspace options to counter state and non-state malicious activities within the European theater. CYBERCOM, as the force provider for Cyberspace Operations Forces, uses persistent engagement to interact and compete with adversaries in cyberspace short of armed conflict. We know Russia invests heavily in cyber-enabled information and hybrid warfare operations worldwide. It is imperative that the United States not cede this key terrain. USEUCOM's operations in the information environment contribute to the Command's and the U.S Government's overall efforts to advance U.S. interests

in Europe. If confirmed, we will continue to expand our interoperability with our Allies and Partners, where we realize the full benefit of our competitive advantage over Russia.

44. What do you assess as key priorities for, and limitations on, the conduct of information operations against Russia in the EUCOM AOR?

A whole-of-government methodology coupled with the appropriate authorities is key to conducting effective information operations to counter Russian malign influence. Expanding this approach to include the entire NATO Alliance, the European Union, and individual Partner nations will further increase efficacy. If confirmed, my intent is to ensure that USEUCOM continues its practice of close coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Department of State to comply with department policy guidance, as well as department granted authorities and permissions.

45. In your assessment, how important is a whole-of-government approach to countering Russian hybrid warfare against the United States? In your assessment, can the United States be successful against Russian hybrid warfare if we fail to invest in non-military tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach?

The Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to utilize all of its instruments of national power to achieve their desired outcomes. The United States must continue to invest in critical tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach to counter hybrid warfare. Efforts are more effective when aligned with Allies and Partners. Increased alignment will increase the speed at which the U.S., our Allies, and Partners compete, allowing us to be proactive versus reactive. With respect to the recent Ukraine crisis, through close coordination among agencies and departments, the USG was particularly effective at establishing and maintaining a dominant narrative exposing Kremlin intent and mobilizing support to Ukraine's defense of its sovereignty. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government to assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.

46. How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and partners?

It is imperative that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression be synchronized with our allies and partners. USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments in our AOR contribute daily to establishing and maintaining a narrative that effectively challenges Russia's malign activities. The demonstrated professionalism of our Armed Forces, our persistent presence across all domains, our strong Alliance and partnerships, our information and intelligence sharing agreements, our ongoing and unprecedented Security Force Assistance efforts, and our robust Joint and Combined Exercises all demonstrate our ironclad commitment to regional security, while promoting U.S. strategic interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government and our Allies and Partners to assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.

47. What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect, deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?

NATO's cyberspace capabilities depend on the combined strength of its member nations. Each country in the Alliance is responsible for their own cyber security. In recent years, NATO has expanded their focus on cyber by establishing additional force structure and a Cyberspace Operations Center, located in Mons. In my current capacity as the Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, I have observed that throughout the current crisis, NATO's cyberspace capabilities have been more closely integrated than at any other time.

If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues collaborative efforts with organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command and NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to improve training, rapidly disseminate best practices, and facilitate information-sharing across the AOR.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the EUCOM AOR

48. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?

It is my understanding that USEUCOM supports a whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism. USEUCOM, in coordination with the U.S. interagency, implements the strategy by supporting and enabling our Partners, Allies and other stakeholders through information sharing and building partner capacity.

49. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

My understanding is that threat assessments suggest relatively low risk for violent extremist organizations within the USEUCOM AOR. Moreover, I assess that in general, the U.S. military's largest contribution in the fight against transnational threats often comes in the form of information sharing and capacity-building. If confirmed, I would strive to grow Allied and Partner nation networks to counter the threats that promote extremist ideologies and criminal activities within and beyond Europe, as we defend the homeland forward.

50. Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?

In my current capacity, the highest priority for counterterrorism operations is protecting the homeland, followed by mitigating threats to U.S. interests and those of our Allies and Partners in the region.

51. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations to the EUCOM AOR?

If confirmed, I will assess the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, IS, and other VEOs in the USEUCOM AOR. Speaking in my current roll as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, I can say that a terrorist threat to U.S. Army Forces in Europe persists, despite a decline in attacks in the past two years. ISIS in particular directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist locations in the past couple of years. The group intends to expand its operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to conduct attacks in Europe. Al- Qa'ida also intends to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership and resources.

52. What is your assessment of Russia’s role in supporting violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR? What steps, if any, would you recommend to counter this support?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of Russia’s role in supporting violent extremist organizations or groups (VEOs).

U.S. Commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

53. In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5?

The U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5 is vital to U.S. strategic interests. The National Defense Strategy clearly articulates the importance of strong alliances to respond to shared challenges. NATO is the premier alliance on the world stage, and Article 5 represents the enduring commitment that binds our nations together.

54. How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations is follow through on Article 3 which commits Allies to develop their “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”?

Commitment to Article 3 is essential to ensuring the success of Article 5 obligations. Article 3 charges independent nations with the responsibility to provide for their own defense as a precondition for collective defense.

NATO Burden Sharing

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies pledged to spend at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense by 2024 and to move towards spending at least 20% of their defense budget on major new equipment. Since that time, Allies have made significant progress in increasing defense spending and investing in major equipment.

55. Where have you seen the greatest progress on burden sharing in the NATO Alliance?

As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine we have seen our NATO Allies increase – in some cases dramatically increase – defense budgets, and provide large quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. Some nations donated the entirety of a specific capability in their inventory. We also witnessed the rapid deployment of NATO forces across a large portion of southeast Europe. Personally, I am most pleased by many Allies' commitments to upgrade existing equipment. These new procurement initiatives will ensure a more combat credible Alliance. At the Madrid Summit in June, heads of state will chart the course with respect to burden sharing for the foreseeable future - just as the Wales Summit did in 2014. The outcomes of the summit will give us a better understanding of where the Alliance stands on burden sharing.

56. What is your assessment of current national plans of NATO allies for meeting the 2% of GDP defense spending goal? Are you concerned that certain national plans are not realistic for meeting the 2% goal by 2024?

The 2% goal represents a reasonable expectation of investment by each nation towards the collective defense of all. Last year was the seventh straight year of increased defense spending by European Allies. I am, however, concerned that not all nations will meet their 2% commitment goal by 2024. On the other hand, I am optimistic that NATO members will remain focused on defense investments given the current security environment. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage Allied officers to advise their nations to meet the Wales Pledge of 2%.

57. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military capabilities so as to enable appropriate contributions to NATO operations?

If confirmed, I will continue the momentum towards Alliance reinforcement, readiness, and responsiveness. I will encourage Allies who are falling short to accelerate their efforts, and deliver credible plans towards the 2% mark. We will assist political leaders by clearly articulating the Alliance's operational requirements. I also intend to inform Allied investment by continually messaging that we can address present and future threats only through an adapted and modernized Alliance – equitably sharing the responsibility. I believe the principal mechanism to influence Allied defense spending is consistent engagement, at all levels, paired with transparent dialogue.

Although the “2 percent” goal is important, it is also critical that our allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at the speed of strategic and operational relevance.

58. In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to encourage allies to focus more on the attainment and refinement of critical capabilities vice meeting a dollar threshold?

Yes; however, we should not allow a renewed focus on capabilities to dilute our commitment to a 2% spending floor. If confirmed, closing critical capability gaps within the Alliance will be one

of my top priorities. We must work to ensure that the U.S., Allies, and Partners tie investments in capabilities and capacities to clear-eyed collective defense plans that address the evolved threat.

59. What recommendations for additional reforms should NATO consider to speed decision-making, improve the ability of the Alliance to realistically plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the speed of strategic and operational relevance?

In my current role as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa I am not privy to the specifics associated with internal NATO matters. However, the ability to plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the speed of relevance will be a top priority. If confirmed, I will make an assessment of NATO decision-making, planning, and force generation. Also, I would be deeply involved in the development of these plans and providing advice to the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) to improve the speed of decision making and overall readiness across the Alliance.

60. In your view, can NATO be enlarged through the addition of countries such as Sweden and Finland while remaining an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?

Yes.

61. If Finland and Sweden seek to join NATO, in your opinion, would they be a net provider or consumer of the Alliance's collective security?

Finland and Sweden will both be net providers of collective security if they join the Alliance. Finland and Sweden are already capable security partners who routinely participate in the USEUCOM exercise program. Both countries demonstrate the values that the Alliance is built on and have advanced military capability and extremely competent leadership. If confirmed and if they are admitted, I look forward to welcoming both nations into the Alliance.

NATO-Russia and U.S. Relations

62. What is your view on the NATO-Russia Council? Does it remain valid after Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year?

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) previously served as a forum to encourage dialogue with Russia. Russia, however, has broken the trust at the core of cooperation, and has challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In light of the current situation in Ukraine, the U.S. Government should reassess the utility of this mechanism. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary my best military advice on U.S. participation in the NRC.

63. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russia security relations?

The principal objective for U.S.-Russia security relations should be to prevent direct military conflict. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain an alliance-based and credible force to serve as a deterrent. Carefully managed and focused dialogue with Russia, through the appropriate, authorized channels, will be important to mitigating the risk of unintended escalation.

64. Are there, in your view, any areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

Given Russia's status as a great power and significant player in global affairs, cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual interest should be a key element of global security and stability. These areas could include nuclear arms control, containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering transnational threats such as terrorism and narcotics, and managing escalation in the space and cyber domains. Ultimately, cooperation with Russia must be within our core national security interests and must be accomplished in the spirit of transparency and reciprocity.

NATO—European Union (EU)

65. How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship today?

The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO, and the NATO-EU relationship is stronger today than it has been in decades. NATO and the EU currently have 21 member countries in common. Both organizations agreed to 74 cooperative areas since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, including closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats, counterterrorism, information sharing, exercises, and crisis management. Congruent with NATO's Strategic Concept, the EU's Strategic Compass identifies Russia as the significant threat to peace and world order.

66. What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression?

The EU plays a critical role in securing the populations' and parliamentarians' support for national expenditures necessary to deter and defeat Russian aggression. Also, strengthened border security and surveillance efforts by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) provide additional early warning and situational awareness to our Allies and Partners in the region. Deterrence efforts are more impactful when EU and NATO efforts are synchronized.

67. What role does the EU play in countering Russian malign influence?

The EU plays an important role. EU sanctions are powerful diplomatic and economic tools that amplify U.S. and NATO efforts to counter Russia's malign influence. Ongoing EU-NATO coordination regarding cyber threats and the EU's 2018 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats focus awareness, increases resilience and improves our collective response to Russian hybrid aggression.

68. In your opinion, is the European Union acting in a complementary role to

NATO's security objectives, or counter to them? If confirmed, what more would you focus on to increase coordination between the two organizations?

The EU, like NATO, is a key pillar of the European Security Architecture. In my opinion, the EU is acting in a complementary role to NATO's security objectives. EU influence on NATO Allies to contribute funding toward defense matters and the Alliance is critical. The EU views Russia as the largest security threat in Europe, and strategic EU documents are aligned with NATO planning efforts. I am, however, concerned that EU initiatives might compete with NATO obligations in an already constrained environment.

NATO-led Kosovo Force

The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 650 U.S. service members. KFOR's mission is to assist in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

69. In your view, does KFOR remains an essential deterrent to instability in the Western Balkans?

KFOR is essential for regional stability. KFOR assists in providing a safe and secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. Its professional presence affords Kosovo and Serbia a chance to normalize relations through continued dialogue. The KFOR mission is a success story for NATO and a significant investment by the United States and the Alliance for over two decades. The U.S. Army's current force level at Camp Bondsteel is appropriate. U.S. presence in KFOR shows solidarity with our Allies and remains an essential deterrent in preventing a new crisis or conflict.

70. What do you see as the major challenges in the Western Balkans? What is EUCOM's role in addressing these challenges?

Continuing ethnic tensions, weak institutions, and malign external influences are the major challenges facing the region. The Western Balkans is a competitive zone where the U.S. and Europe compete with Russia and China. Russia leverages its historical and cultural ties as well as energy to exert influence. China employs economic means and a corrupt environment to gain a foothold in numerous states to include Alliance members. EUCOM with its interagency partners and country teams working together can counter these threats. EUCOM must also continue to maximize the State Department's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a key program in creating shared values in the ranks of our Allies and Partners. If confirmed, I look forward to completing a thorough assessment of EUCOM's role in the Western Balkans.

71. If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, what would be your approach to assisting the development and transition of the KSF?

USEUCOM supports the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) according to their agreed upon 10-year transition program. Conducted in close coordination with the U.S. and other NATO Allies, this program strives to ensure the KSF becomes a professional, unbiased, and effective security organization. We encourage the KSF to maintain a multi-ethnic, professional force responsive to all the citizens of Kosovo. Leveraging security cooperation programs from regional exercises to professional military education are key for the KSF's development. Last year the KSF participated for the first time in U.S. Army Europe's DEFENDER regional exercise. Also, security assistance primarily through foreign military financing (FMF) will provide the KSF with the equipment required to execute a variety of missions.

NATO Special Operations Headquarters

The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of, and promote interoperability between, the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO member nations.

72. What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future contingencies involving NATO SOF?

Enhancing capability, capacity, and interoperability is NSHQ's primary focus. NSHQ should continue to develop strategic and operational level command and control capabilities, and also support Alliance efforts to integrate irregular warfare and SOF capabilities into counter hybrid threat plans. During a contingency, NSHQ would serve as an integrating headquarters, ensuring that NATO SOF units are properly incorporated in a manner which best leverages their unique capabilities.

73. How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?

The NSHQ plays a vital role in the training and education of NATO SOF. The NSHQ can increase capability and interoperability by setting capability targets, ensuring synergy in command and control arrangements, integrating common network platforms, and assuring SOF presence in critical areas. By serving as the connective tissue between various members of NATO SOF, the NSHQ will enable more coherent planning and mission execution.

74. What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command in providing guidance and resources to the NSHQ?

The USEUCOM Commander, as SACEUR, is the executive agent responsible for the NSHQ. Duties include coordinating with the Commander, USSOCOM to review and validate force structure requirements for U.S. support to the NSHQ. The Commander, USSOCOM provides military advice on capabilities that support allied and partner interoperability with U.S. forces for areas that fall within USSOCOM responsibilities. USSOCOM also provides doctrine, training, and equipment standards for special operations, irregular warfare, and security force assistance capabilities. USSOCOM promotes standardization policies and procedures for special operations

equipment, and validates NSHQ's special operations requirements to ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.

European Phased Adaptive Approach

The United States is deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense capability.

75. Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to protect U.S. forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?

Yes. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is adaptable and suitable to defend U.S. and NATO Allies in Europe against existing and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats. As the U.S. national force contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Standing Defense Plan, EPAA forces provide the foundation of NATO ballistic Missile defense (BMD). As Iran continues their missile development, USEUCOM, with support from the Missile Defense Agency, will continue to work closely with our Allies to ensure the capabilities provided by EPAA remain effective against current and emerging Russian and Iranian threats.

76. In your opinion, is there a need to assess defense capabilities of the U.S. in Europe as well as those of NATO Allies and partners against a Russian ballistic missile threat?

We must continually assess defense capabilities regarding a Russian ballistic missile threat – this is an iterative process. Our goal is to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture including U.S., Allied, and Partner capabilities to defend sovereign airspace and national assets against any air or missile threats from outside Europe or NATO territory. In accordance with the Missile Defense Review (MDR), assessments conducted alongside our Allies and Partners must ensure that any such architecture is effective against current and future advanced air and missile threats. The U.S. is encouraging NATO Allies to improve their missile defense capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data sharing and integration, and taking other steps to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats.

77. In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and other escalatory actions directed at NATO, are the U.S. and the Alliance sufficiently postured to deter Russia from threatening our Allies beyond a hybrid or gray zone scenario, as Putin directed against Ukraine?

It is essential to synchronize efforts to counter Russian aggression with our Allies and Partners. Countering multi-domain activities below the threshold of armed conflict requires a whole-of-government approach that is most effective when aligned with similar allied approaches. USEUCOM is expanding its online counter-propaganda efforts and continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM to compete with Russia below the threshold of armed conflict. Additional

military personnel specializing in information operations related disciplines would benefit the command in countering Russia's "malign influence campaign."

NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring, and responding to cyber-attacks. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to make this a priority. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond, and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations. In short, NATO's cyber defense capabilities and capacity are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce vulnerabilities across the Alliance.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

78. What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in EUCOM, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

We can never be satisfied with our efforts until all sexual assaults cease. Sexual assault is abhorrent; it is against our values, and damages military readiness. Sexual assault exists along a continuum of harm, so we must detect and correct harmful behaviors before tragic incidents occur. This issue will always have my direct attention. If confirmed, I will work to ensure prevention and response is a top priority for USEUCOM.

In my current capacity as Commander, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, I established a sexual harassment/assault response and prevention (SHARP) Fly Away Team to ensure a sexual assault victim would receive immediate care from any location within USAREUR-AF. The team included available Army aircraft, SHARP advocates, sexual assault medical forensic examiners, special victims' counsel, and investigators.

79. What is your view of the adequacy of EUCOM policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for reporting the assault?

The Department of Defense and Military Services are continuing to develop policies and procedures that appropriately implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting requirements required by the 2018 NDAA to protect those who report sexual assault. It is my understanding that USEUCOM is steadfast in protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation. I will, however, review the adequacy of USEUCOM policies and procedures for protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation, and the effectiveness of the training and implementation of such policies and procedures.

80. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

If confirmed, I will ensure the resources used to investigate and respond to these allegations are maintained to the highest standard. Criminal investigative agencies must prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of complex cases. In addition, I would welcome innovative, data-informed and public health methods that work to combat sexual assault.

81. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold service members accountable for sexual misconduct?

In my career, I have observed a strong willingness by military leaders to hold service members appropriately accountable for sexual misconduct. We are still not where we need to be and more must be done. Disciplined, fit, and cohesive teams can only be built on a foundation of trust. Sexual misconduct destroys trust and the cohesion so necessary for a ready and lethal fighting force. If confirmed, I will remain committed to bringing to bear the resources required in the AOR to ensure any service members responsible for sexual misconduct are held appropriately accountable.

82. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in EUCOM to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

Congress has been a critical partner in helping the Department of Defense ensure we have a robust response system and the resources available for victims of sexual assault. We must constantly reevaluate and assess our effectiveness in ensuring victims have access to restorative care. Commanders play a critical role in this capacity.

The Department of Defense provides commanders with many resources and programs to care for our personnel. We continually pursue the most effective tools to expand our ability to support victims with quality medical, psychological, and legal assistance. Part of my initial command assessment will include issues surrounding services provided to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders and leaders at all levels within USEUCOM are personally aware of all available resources and actively inform their subordinates of their availability.

83. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

The chain of command sets the climate and the culture of an organization. Commanders need to make it a priority to promote an atmosphere of unwavering support for victims and ensure victims who have made the brave decision to come forward are afforded care and consideration, to include preventing retaliation within the unit. This is a crucial step toward creating the environment we need. I wholeheartedly believe in the concept "People First;" therefore, if

confirmed I will ensure commanders understand my priority to provide the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.

84. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

The chain of command is essential in instituting cultural change in the military. Leaders set the example for others to follow.

Organizational culture starts at the top. I embrace the obligation to ensure our military culture reflects our core values and ethos. My commitment continues to be building disciplined, fit, cohesive teams, wherein everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Those who volunteer to serve in uniform are our Nation's sons and daughters, and I am absolutely determined to ensure they will serve in environments in which they are treated with dignity and respect.

85. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

Yes. This reporting option allows us to ensure survivor care, while also supporting any desire for privacy.

I believe that we must continually assess all policies associated with sexual assault to ensure that we, as a Department, are providing adequate resources to the victims of sexual assault. One sexual assault is one too many; we must improve our efforts to prevent this terrible crime. The restricted reporting option is effective in getting survivors the care and services they need, but I would like to see more Restricted Reports convert to Unrestricted due to the limitation of actions associated with restricted reporting.

Secretary Austin approved a four-tiered roadmap for implementing the Independent Review Commission's (IRC) recommendations that focuses on the necessary foundational investments needed to systemically improve accountability, prevention programs, command climate, and victim care and support. I am committed to implementing the Department's roadmap in USEUCOM, if confirmed.

86. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement if confirmed as EUCOM Commander?

Given the threat sexual assault poses to our force, any legal and appropriate method for monitoring trends and continually assessing our efforts is worthy of consideration. Certainly, continuous communication with subject-matter experts, careful review of incident reports, collaboration with the Inspector General, and close examination of command climate assessments are among the methods we would use. If confirmed, I will work closely with subject matter experts on the findings and recommendations of the Independent Review Commission and continue to implement in accordance with Secretary Austin's direction.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

87. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

88. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

89. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

90. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

91. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

92. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

93. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.