

**Statement of the Honorable Madelyn Creedon
Co-Chair of the Department of Defense's
Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review
and
Principal Deputy Administrator
National Nuclear Security Administration
U.S. Department of Energy
on the
Air Force and Navy Nuclear Programs
Implementation of the Nuclear Enterprise Review
Recommendations
Before the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Senate Committee on Armed Services**

April 22, 2015

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today the report of the Department of Defense Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review team. My co-chairs on the review were Rear Admiral Peter Fanta, former Deputy for Resources and Acquisition, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Sergeant Major Patrick Alston, Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S. Strategic Command.

Our internal review of the Department of Defense (DoD) nuclear enterprise was undertaken beginning in February 2014 at the direction of former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, after a series of troubling events involving the nation's nuclear deterrent forces and their senior leadership. In addition to the internal review team's report: *Internal Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise*, Secretary Hagel also directed an external review and report. The external review was conducted by former Air Force Chief of Staff and Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Larry Welch, and former Commander of Fleet Forces Command, Admiral John Harvey. Their report: *Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise*, and the report of the Internal review team were provided to Congress this past November.

Our internal team's report is a classified report. As such, I have attached an unclassified summary describing the findings and recommendations of the internal review team's report, as well as a fact sheet developed by DoD that sets out a description of the implementation plans for changing the nuclear enterprise. Both the fact sheet and the summary were also provided to the Congress in November.

Over the course of three months, a team of 96 professionals, drawn from the relevant components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Military Services, and the

Defense Agencies, visited all of the operational nuclear facilities and most of the supporting facilities in CONUS, and a representative sampling of the nuclear forces in Europe. We established three sub-teams: Personnel, Performance, and Investment, to facilitate our review. We talked to over 1500 people—offices, enlisted, civilian, and contractors who were directly involved in or provide training, education and support to the DoD nuclear enterprise.

We talked with aircraft, missile, and warhead maintainers, shipyard workers, civil engineers, submariners, missileers, pilots, teachers and instructors, supply, sustainment and parts specialists, engineers, personnel specialists, doctors, nurses and medical technicians, security forces, financial managers and budget specialist, at all levels and ranks. Conversations were held individually and in small groups without supervisors present. These conversations were candid, honest, and direct. In addition, the team received extensive briefings from each of the services, reviewed hundreds of documents, and reviewed the findings of the previous reviews and reports.

We also received extensive support from the historians of the Air Force Global Strike and other Commands, who provided a wealth of valuable historical documents dating back to the earliest days of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.

We found that in spite of the various shortcomings in the enterprise, the men and women of the nuclear enterprise are dedicated and committed to the mission, and work exceedingly hard to ensure the safety and security of the United States.

Our review focused on current operational issues of the DoD nuclear enterprise and what is needed to sustain the force until the various elements of the Triad are replaced. We did not evaluate any of the replacement programs themselves other than to note that it will be years before the new systems are fielded, and in the meantime, the existing systems must be maintained. Similarly the internal team did not review the nuclear warheads and the life extension programs being developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration to sustain them.

One of the most important findings of the internal review team was the realization that the problems of the nuclear enterprise do not exist in isolation. The problems are inextricably interrelated. One problem begets another which begets another. This interdependence between and among the shortfalls and deficiencies requires a coordinated, holistic approach to resolving the issues. The interdependent relationship of the problems identified within each Service, but particularly the Air Force, led to our conclusion that in many instances the ultimate solutions would have to be cultural and structural, and sustained over the long term. In other words, although money is needed to solve many of the problems, money is certainly not the only solution to the problems. And while there are many things that can and need to be fixed in the near term, the solutions in many instances are long-term.

For the most part, the findings of both the internal and external reviews were very much in line with one another. The external review team placed greater emphasis on the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) while the internal review team focused primarily on the Services. There were also some differences in the recommendations and approach to addressing the problems, but in the end it is up to OSD and the Services ultimately to identify appropriate changes and put them into place.

The key recommendations contained in the internal review teams report are:

- Allow leaders to learn from mistakes;
- Provide the necessary manning and skills and address skill level gaps throughout the forces;
- Develop nuclear professionals and the career management to develop a broad nuclear career field;
- Overhaul the nuclear inspections process and reinforce distinctions between inspections, reviews, technical assistance, and exercises;
- Develop and use a rigorous self-assessment program to highlight and fix problems at all levels of command;
- Simplify administration of the personnel reliability program;
- Provide long-term sustainment and plan for parts obsolescence;
- Ensure future investments include Navy shipyard and shore installations and new facilities needed by the Air Force, including support and alert facilities;
- Direct the Air Force to upgrade Air Force Global Strike Command to a 4-star command
- Increase Air Force Global Strike Command, Navy Strategic Systems Programs, and Naval Reactors oversight and say in essential support functions;
- Direct the Air Force to upgrade Headquarters Air Force A-10 position to a 3-star position
- Create a senior position reporting to the Secretary for oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise.

Conclusion

Although not directly involved in the DoD's efforts to address the conclusions of the review teams and to implement the recommendations to address the problems in the enterprise, I am aware that much is being done to bring change to the nuclear enterprise. I also want to thank former Secretary of Defense Hagel for taking the initiative and providing the support to identify and resolve the problems that have been ongoing in the nuclear enterprise for many years. As one Air Force NCO said to our team, "There have been a lot of studies, but nothing ever changes. We want this study to be worth it this time."

