

Advance Questions for Dr. Janine Davidson
Nominee for Under Secretary of the Navy

Defense Reforms

The Committee has recently held a series of hearings on defense reform.

1. What modifications of Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provisions, if any, do you believe would be appropriate?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed momentous change in the Department of Defense. The focus on joint operations, one of the landmark initiatives, was a welcome correction to the stovepiped system of the previous era. It is appropriate after thirty years to assess the degree to which the changes have had the desired effect and whether reform is needed. I welcome the Committee's deliberate and thoughtful effort to address this issue. There is clearly a need for improvement in acquisition, business practices, and personnel management. If confirmed I look forward to working with the committee to identify where Department inefficiencies or operational shortfalls can be identified and mitigated.

Qualifications

2. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I believe my lifelong experience, first in growing up on around naval bases as the daughter of a Navy officer, then as a military officer, a defense civil servant, and more recently as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has prepared me to execute the duties of Under Secretary of the Navy. In my career, I have had experience at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the national security enterprise. I have deep knowledge of Pentagon processes that will serve me well if confirmed.

Duties

Section 5015 of Title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary of the Navy shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.

3. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?

U.S. Code states that the Under Secretary shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe. By regulation, the Under

Secretary is the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary also serves as the Chief of Staff of the Secretariat, the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. In accordance with section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008, the Under Secretary also serves as the Department's Chief Management Officer.

4. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy, as set forth in section 5015 of title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?

After review of the statutes and regulations, I do not currently recommend any changes. If confirmed, I will propose any changes that I may identify as meriting attention through the appropriate channels.

5. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?

If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties that will utilize my strengths and experiences in assisting him with advancing his priorities and vision for the Department of the Navy.

Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to designate the Under Secretary of such military department to assume the primary management responsibility for business operations.

6. What is your understanding of the business operations responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Navy?

The Under Secretary of the Navy is responsible for overseeing the business operations of the Department and directs that the business environment be more effective and efficient. If confirmed, I will guide and prioritize our business operations opportunities to streamline processes, communicate, and share resources across the DoN. Strengthening our fleet's understanding of costs, developing efficient end-to-end business processes, reinforcing business alignment, and managing risks will be the keys to moving the Department toward achieving its business goals.

7. How do you perceive your role in setting the agenda for the Navy Deputy Chief Management Officer?

The current fiscal environment necessitates that the CMO focus on business operations. To meet these needs, it would be my role to advocate for the Navy DCMO to transition from our current focus solely on business IT oversight to the full

spectrum of an in-house business consultant, capable of bringing cutting edge business capabilities and analysis to the department.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Under Secretary of the Navy to the following officials:

8. The Secretary of the Navy

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy.

9. The Chief of Naval Operations

According to Title 10, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Under Secretary deals directly with the CNO in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary's stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO).

10. The Commandant of the Marine Corps

According to Title 10, the Commandant of the Marine Corps performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Under Secretary deals directly with the Commandant in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary's stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

11. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy

Statutorily, there are four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy performing functions and such duties as the Secretary prescribes. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to achieve the Secretary's goals.

12. The General Counsel of the Navy

The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the senior civilian legal advisor to the Department of the Navy, the Secretary's chief ethics official and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

13. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations

The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) is the second highest-ranking commissioned officer in the United States Navy, and serves as the second-in-command for the CNO. In the event that the CNO is absent or is unable to perform their duties, the VCNO assumes the duties and responsibilities of the CNO. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the VCNO to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy.

14. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy

The Judge Advocate General of the Navy is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, provides independent legal advice to the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations, and performs duties relating to any and all Department of the Navy legal matters assigned by the Secretary. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a good working relationship with the Judge Advocate General and his staff.

15. The Chief Management Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves as the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the management and improvement of integrated DoD business operations. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DoD CMO) and the DoD DCMO on the full range of matters involving the management of the DoD.

16. The Navy Inspector General

The Navy Inspector General is the senior investigative officials in the Department of the Navy and is the principal advisor to the Secretary on all matters concerning inspection, investigations, and audit follow-up. When directed, the Navy Inspector General inquires into and reports upon any matter that affects the discipline or military efficiency of the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Inspector General to achieve the Secretary's goals.

Major Challenges and Problems

17. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Under Secretary of the Navy?

The Department of Defense and all of the services are encountering numerous challenges brought on by over a decade of war and the expense associated with resetting the force. These factors along with growing instability around the world directly impact decisions on current programs, support for the warfighter, and

investment in future capabilities and requirements. Determining the best balance between meeting current challenges, building a relevant and capable future force, supporting Sailors, Marines, their families, and the civilian workforce will pose the most significant challenges in the years ahead.

If confirmed, I would work vigorously to address these challenges and priorities and would work closely with DoD, Navy and Marine Corps leadership, and this committee to develop and execute strategies.

18. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

The Secretary of the Navy has articulated clear priorities focused on Presence, People, Platforms, Power and Partnerships. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of the Navy, senior military and DoD leadership, and this committee to meet these challenges and priorities

19. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?

If confirmed, I expect the most serious problem to be determining the best balance between meeting current challenges, both fiscal and operational, and building a relevant and capable future force, while supporting Sailors, Marines, their families, and the civilian workforce.

20. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to set aggressive, but reasonable timelines and management actions to develop and execute strategies to address the challenges facing our Navy and Marine Corps. In the role as Chief Management Officer, continued improvement to program and budget development, oversight, and the cost effectiveness of acquisition programs, will remain major challenges and priorities.

Priorities

21. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

In 2013, Secretary Mabus established his strategic objectives as Presence, People, Platforms, Power, and Partnerships; supporting these objectives is the priority I would establish. Successful implementation of these priorities allows our Sailors, Marines, and civilians to maintain the presence globally on which Americans have come to depend.

Duties and Responsibilities as Chief Management Officer

Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Navy as the Navy's Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the military departments to carry out a comprehensive business transformation initiative.

22. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in the capacity as CMO of the Department of the Navy?

The CMO's primary duties are to (a) ensure that the Department can carry out its strategic plan, (b) ensure the core business missions of the Department are optimally aligned to support the warfighting mission, (c) establish performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of the Department, and (d) develop and maintain a Department-wide strategic plan for business reform.

To help ensure management processes, information technology, business systems, and administrative services are complementary, integrated and aligned to the Department of the Navy's mission, the duties and responsibilities of the CMO and DCMO are prescribed by the Secretary of Defense so that they may effectively and efficiently organize the business operations of the Department. The duty of the DCMO is to assist the CMO in carrying out those objectives and, if delegated, assume primary responsibility for those functions.

23. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?

The Under Secretary must have a thorough knowledge of the Department of the Navy; understand and respect the cultures of the Navy and Marine Corps as well as the DoN's civilian workforce. One should understand the way programs and budgets are developed and be a strong, forward-thinking leader.

If confirmed, I will use my expertise in defense strategy and policy and military operations to perform enterprise responsibilities in the oversight of the Navy's business operations. My diverse experience from serving on active duty as an Air Force officer and pilot, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Plans, and as a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of national security has given me extensive exposure and experience in the business practices of the department of defense. This experience will help me to lead the way toward the identification and implementation of business operations improvements.

Considering the importance of business operations as it supports our Navy's direct missions, I believe the CMO and DCMO of DoD should set policy, based on sound

best practices, regarding planning, development, and implementation of business practices, and verify that those policies are being followed appropriately and continue to remain best practices as years pass.

However, I also recognize that the job of CMO encompasses a very diverse set of responsibilities and challenges. So I accept that I have much to learn, and will rely heavily on the knowledge and advice of military personnel and civilian experts in the Departments of Defense and Navy.

24. Do you believe that the CMO has the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of the Navy?

I believe the CMO has the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department. If confirmed, I would work with the SECNAV, DoD DCMO, and DoD CMO if I discovered that those resources and authorities were insufficient.

25. What role do you believe the CMO should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments?

The CMO and DCMO should apply best practices regarding planning, development, and implementation of business systems and verifying that policies are being followed appropriately in accordance with DoD guidelines, and if confirmed, I would work with the DCMO to institute rigorous investment management and business process reengineering (BPR) procedures for their managed business systems.

26. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO?

At this time, I do not believe that any changes are necessary. I am aware that 10 USC § 2222 has recently been modified in section 883 of the FY16 NDAA, which provides much more autonomy for the Military CMOs. However, if confirmed, I would consult with SECNAV, DoD DCMO, and DoD CMO if my experience led me to believe that changes were warranted.

Section 2222 of Title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a “federated” approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Navy’s business systems, like those of the other military departments, remain incapable of providing timely, reliable financial data to support management decisions. In particular, the Government Accountability Office has reported that the Navy has not yet

followed DOD's lead in establishing new governance structures to address business transformation; has not yet developed comprehensive enterprise architecture and transition plan that plug into DOD's federated architecture in a manner that meets statutory requirements; and instead continues to rely upon old, stovepiped structures to implement piecemeal reforms.

27. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the Navy develops the business systems and processes it needs to appropriately manage funds in the best interest of the taxpayer and the national defense?

If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy, I will work every day to give the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Congress, and American people the highest return on their investment in their Navy and Marine Corps. Furthermore, I will ensure that the proper business case analyses and appropriate establishment and application of business enterprise architectures support the capability of providing timely, reliable data to support management decisions.

28. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of the Navy's business systems?

I believe that a single architecture for an organization as large and complex as the DoN is extremely difficult and costly; at this point, what business value it would add is unclear. All standards, policies, and processes should be established to rival the best of those in the private sector. It does mean that I am accountable to ensure the appropriate analysis and process development occurs to transform outdated and inefficient business operations into those that are streamlined, cost effective, and well-planned.

29. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222?

If confirmed, I will continue to work with DOD DCMO and ensure each of our Defense Business Systems meets the obligations specified in USC § 2222 and DOD DCMO guidance.

30. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?

Timely and accurate financial and business information is essential in managing the Department's business operations. In order to make informed decisions, the Department's senior leaders must have credible, reliable, authoritative information at the right time.

31. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not routinely available for these purposes?

I would make it a point to understand what business problems were being addressed with this information, prioritize their requirement to have processes in place and appropriate systems subsequently needed to produce the data, and determine what the cost would be to the Navy.

32. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information available to Navy managers?

I believe something we've learned from the efforts surrounding auditability thus far is that it isn't just a comptroller issue, it's something that applies to us all. If confirmed, I will work closely with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to confirm the establishment of specific requirements and execute measures thereby required to improve the quality of financial information used for decision-making.

Headquarters Streamlining

The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act directs reforms to consolidate the headquarters functions of the Department of Defense and the military departments.

33. If confirmed, what would be your role in streamlining functions, as well as identifying and implementing reductions in the Department of the Navy headquarters?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the key leadership in the Secretariat and the Services to ensure the Navy efficiently meets the consolidation requirements in the NDAA and requirements directed by OSD. I understand that the Navy and Marine Corps have plans in place to meet the streamlining goals, and if confirmed I will continue those efforts.

34. What areas and functions, specifically and if any, do you consider to be the priorities for possible consolidation or reductions within the Department of the Navy?

If confirmed I will work with the Navy team to identify the functional areas that can sustain a reduction. At this time I cannot identify which specific functional areas those are. I understand the importance of keeping a workforce in key areas. So if confirmed, I will be sure to minimize the impact on those key functional areas and the warfighting capability functional areas while meeting the reduction goals.

35. To the extent that the Department of the Navy has functions that overlap with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, or military departments, what would be your approach to consolidating and reducing redundancy?

If confirmed, I will work closely with service counterparts, OSD leadership, and the Joint Staff to look for areas of possible consolidation. If confirmed, the focus of this review will ensure that reductions in headquarters staffs do not diminish warfighting capability. The approach would be deliberate while ensuring compliance with the requirements of the FY16 NDAA.

Audit Readiness

The Department of Defense remains unable to achieve a clean financial statement audit. The Department also remains on the Government Accountability Office's list of high risk agencies and management systems for financial management and weapon system acquisition. Although audit-readiness has been a goal of the Department for decades, DoD has repeatedly failed to meet numerous congressionally directed audit-readiness deadlines.

36. What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy's efforts to achieve a clean financial statement audit by 2017?

I understand that the Department of the Navy has the Navy and Marine Corps 2015 Schedules of Budgetary Activity under audit by independent public accounting firms as interim steps to achieving the 2017 goal. However, despite progress on strengthening DON's financial management environment, a substantial amount of work remains to be completed if the Department is to achieve a clean audit opinion on all four of the Department of Navy financial statements.

37. In your opinion, is the Department of the Navy on track to achieving this objective, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls, and business process re-engineering?

Following the Department of Defense Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness strategy, I understand that the Department of the Navy is on track to achieve audit readiness on all four of its financial statements in 2017. Navy and Marine Corps have shared and incorporated lessons learned from their respective financial statement audits and other assessments to strengthen the quality of the Department of the Navy's data, tighten internal controls, and implement business process standardization.

38. If not, what impediments may hinder the Navy's ability to achieve this goal and how would you address them?

I understand that the Department of the Navy is on track to achieve a clean financial audit by 2017 even though there may be some challenges. Navy, like other federal

agencies, has complex and diverse business systems that may make attaining a clean audit a challenge. If confirmed, I will work with the Department leadership to continue the progress toward a clean audit in compliance with the 2017 statutory requirement.

39. In your view, are the steps that the Navy needs to take consistent with the steps that DOD needs to take to achieve full auditability by 2017?

I understand that the Department of the Navy is highly dependent on services provided by the Department of Defense. The Department of the Navy's strategy is consistent with and supportive of DoD's ability to also achieve full auditability by 2017.

40. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds?

If confirmed, I will maintain a steady focus and commitment on all Department efforts that enable audit readiness. This will be critical to success in 2017 and lay the foundation for a sustainable audit environment well into the future. If confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been prepared and determine whether they are reasonable and effective. I will support rationalizing the Department's financial IT systems portfolio, leading to a business environment that supports the warfighter while sustaining clean financial statement audit opinions.

End Strength

In this year's budget request and Future Years Defense Program, the Department proposes making additional cuts to the Marine Corps active and reserve component end strengths. The Department proposes reducing the Marine active component to 182,000 by 2020, and plans to keep the Marine Corps forces at 182,000 if sequestration continues.

41. In your view, can the Marine Corps meet national defense objectives at the strength levels proposed without sequestration? What about at the strength levels proposed with sequestration?

I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the Marine Corps can meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance today at the President's Budget levels, but there is no margin. Lowering end strength due to sequestration or enforcement of the Budget Control Act funding caps would not allow the Marine Corps to execute the current Defense Strategic Guidance. A new strategy would need to be developed that would take into account fewer warfighting units available to deploy in defense of the Nation.

42. If the Marine Corps must reduce its active component end strength to 182,000, where does the Marine Corps take risk with respect to the national defense strategy?

I understand the Commandant of the Marine Corps has testified that the Marine Corps has been forced to prioritize near-term readiness for forward deployed Marines and assume risk in home station readiness, modernization, infrastructure sustainment, and quality of life programs. If confirmed, I will work with Marine Corps leadership to minimize the risk to overall Service readiness.

43. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past three years?

I understand that each of the Services is involved in an OSD-led collaborative assessment of the potential need for legislative reforms to various personnel authorities, which will ensure the Department has the tools necessary to recruit, develop, shape and retain the talent necessary to meet the mission of the Department of the Navy. If confirmed, I will review those efforts in detail to ensure that they are appropriate to meet emerging requirements of the Department in general, and the specific requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps.

44. In your view, should the number of general and flag officers in the Marine Corps and Navy be reduced commensurate with the drawdown of total Marine and Navy end strength?

I understand that the Services recently conducted a Congressionally-directed review of active component general and flag officer billets. A similar review is underway now for the reserve component. If confirmed, I will ensure that any recommendations regarding changes in the number of authorized flag and general officers are based on the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, considering the nature of responsibilities associated with any specific position.

45. What are your views on the appropriate size and mix of the active-duty Navy and Marine Corps, and their reserve components?

The programmed mix of the Total Force should be based on a requirements-based estimate of force size and active-reserve mix required to meet current and future military challenges in support of the National Defense Strategy. It is essential that we have a deliberative requirements-based approach that provides the highly qualified, trained and experienced force needed to maintain the core capabilities of the Navy. The Marine Corps is the Nation's force-in-readiness and with the current size of our active duty force, meets the current defense planning guidance. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps is adequately sized to meet the current requirement in the short term, but I am concerned about our capacity to meet unexpected operational demands, especially in the event of a Major Contingency

Operation. The current reserve mix supports active duty employment as the Marine Corps plans to integrate reserves to support the range of military operations.

46. How does Navy support to the ground forces in the form of individual augmentee missions affect Navy end strength requirements?

The individual augmentee (IA) mission is an additional work requirement and therefore is not factored into the NDAA-mandated end strength value. So, the total end strength requirement will be unchanged by the IA mission.

Transformation

If confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Navy, you would play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Navy and Marine Corps to meet new and emerging threats.

47. Concerning capability and capacity to meet new and emerging threats, what are your goals regarding transformation of the Navy and Marine Corps?

A major challenge today is keeping pace with our adversaries under fiscal constraints and uncertainty. Resource limitations require that we be innovative in our approach to ends, ways and means, while also ensuring that capability, capacity and readiness are properly balanced to meet the new and emerging threats. If confirmed, one of my goals would be to transform the Navy and Marine Corps to be an even more efficient, highly capable and ready force.

Low Density/High Demand Forces

48. If confirmed, how would you address the Department of the Navy's challenge in manning low density/high demand units, ratings, and occupational specialties?

Continued application of targeted, discretionary special and incentive pays, such as the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) or officer community-specific continuation pays will be key in addressing recruiting and retention requirements among critical skill areas, particularly those in the high-demand, low-density skill sets. Carefully managed special and incentive pays can yield the desired force levels, but they must be periodically reviewed to ensure they maintain their efficacy while providing an appropriate return on investment. Although special and incentive pays are a proven method for increasing retention, if confirmed I will investigate additional avenues for managing talent across the Navy and Marine Corps, with a special emphasis on those areas of high demand and in highly competitive occupational specialties.

Navy and Marine Corps Military and Civilian Personnel Management

Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting and Retention

The retention of quality Sailors and Marines, officer and enlisted, active-duty and reserve, is vital to the Department of the Navy.

49. How would you evaluate the status of the Navy and Marine Corps in successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?

I know that for several years Navy has enjoyed recruiting and retention of highly qualified Sailors in unprecedented numbers. I would anticipate that maintaining such a high-quality force, particularly as the economy improves, will become increasingly challenging, while no less critical to meeting the Navy mission requirements and providing options to national leadership. Having previously made institutional investment, the Marine Corps is achieving all Total Force recruiting requirements. Retention is continuously assessed as both the world changes and demographics of our Nation change.

50. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and retention, in both the active and reserve components?

If confirmed, I will continuously monitor the data on recruiting and retention to ensure the Department not only has the right numbers of Sailors and Marines, but that it attracts and retains the best talent among America's next generation. I will do everything in my power to ensure the authorities, incentives, and technologies needed to maintain this high quality force, with the capabilities necessary to meet emerging global challenges are available to the Department and Navy and Marine Corps leaders.

Delivery of Legal Services

51. What is your understanding of the respective roles of the General Counsel and Judge Advocate General of the Navy in providing the Secretary of the Navy with legal advice?

The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the chief legal officer for the Department of the Navy (DON) and the principal legal advisor to the SECNAV and the Secretariat. The Judge Advocate General is the senior uniformed legal advisor for the Department and the SECNAV, as well as the principal legal advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations. My understanding is that the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate General have distinct roles in providing legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).

52. What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, respectively?

In order to execute their statutory responsibilities established in title 10, U.S. Code, it is imperative that the Judge Advocate General and Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant employ their knowledge, experience and judgment to provide independent legal advice pertaining to their respective Services. My understanding is that the Judge Advocate General is specifically responsible for providing independent legal advice, and reports directly to, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant is the senior uniformed attorney in the Marine Corps and is the primary legal advisor to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Headquarters, Marine Corps on matters falling under the Staff Judge Advocate's cognizance. The Judge Advocate General and Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant are responsible for formulating and implementing policies and initiatives pertaining to the overall provision of legal services pertaining to their respective Services.

53. What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates within the Navy and Marine Corps to provide independent legal advice to military commanders in the fleet and throughout the naval establishment?

Staff judge advocates must use their independent professional legal judgment in providing advice to commanders in order to meet operational requirements and execute day to day responsibilities. Such advice must be consistent with applicable professional responsibility requirements and community oversight.

Judge Advocate Resourcing

Several years ago the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) completed a study of manpower requirements for the Navy in which it concluded that the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps was significantly understrength for its mission. Over the past several years this Committee has promulgated significant modifications to the military justice system.

54. What is your understanding of the current and projected manpower requirements in the Navy JAG Corps?

Based on current and programmed manning, I believe the Navy JAG Corps has the manpower to meet its required legal mission.

The Navy JAG Corps' continued ability to recruit, access, and retain high quality legal talent is critical to meeting JAG Corps manpower requirements. It is important to note that the recruiting environment has become increasingly

competitive, with applications to the Navy JAG Corps dropping by more than half over the last five years as law school admissions have fallen to their lowest level since 1973. At the same time, the cost of a legal education has increased dramatically, with Navy JAG Corps accessions currently reporting an average total student loan debt exceeding \$149,000. The DON will continue to be sensitive to these issues to ensure the Department maintains the necessary capacity.

55. What is your understanding of the sufficiency of the number of active-duty judge advocates in the Marine Corps to provide legal support for all the Marine Corps' missions?

Judge Advocates play a critical role in the Marine Corps. Advising on a range of critical issues from sexual assault to operational concerns, Marine Judge Advocates are key advisors who are highly valued and utilized by commanders. I have not had the opportunity to review the current and future manning requirements. If confirmed, I am committed to studying the issue to ensure that Marine Judge Advocates continue to play an integral role in the Marine Corps.

56. If confirmed, will you review the judge advocate manning within the Navy and Marine Corps and determine whether current active-duty strengths are adequate?

Yes.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

57. What is your assessment of the Navy's sexual assault prevention and response program?

The Navy has demonstrated that sexual assault prevention and response is a priority. It is apparent to me that the Navy is continually looking for ways to confront this criminal activity and create an environment that facilitates prompt reporting and enables victim care. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Richardson, and General Neller are each personally engaged. This senior-leader partnership has been a key feature since at least 2009. It is my understanding that victim support has been dramatically improved, training programs have been transformed for the better, and commanders understand their responsibilities.

I understand the Navy seeks a Department-wide culture of respect, where sexual assault is never tolerated and ultimately eliminated, where all sexual assault survivors receive support and protection, and where offenders are held appropriately accountable. I understand the importance and the scale of what to the Department must achieve, and I accept the challenge of breaking new ground in doing so.

Nothing else is more consistent with our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment.

58. What is your assessment of Navy and Marine Corps programs to address and prevent retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or sexual assault?

I understand that retaliation, including ostracism and maltreatment, is a crime punishable under the UCMJ. I understand that in addition to training senior leadership on this matter, a key component to the Department of the Navy's response is confronting such conduct through strengthening leadership skills among managers at the lower ends of the chain of command and in individual workplaces. The Department is building new and better training tools for that right now. They are also working in partnership with DoD on strategies to identify cases and assess our responses. If confirmed, I will continue to assess this closely and take appropriate measures.

59. What do you see as the greatest challenges to the success of those programs?

If confirmed, I would actively seek to ensure the Navy implements all legislative and Department initiatives and that we continue to actively assess the effects of these programs to eliminate sexual harassment and sexual assault.

Across these endeavors, I see three fundamental challenges.

The first involves sustaining commitment and efforts in ways that accurately convey their central and enduring importance.

The second is continuing to adapt our training and response process as we continue to understand the dynamics of the problem.

The third is deriving accurate measures of success. For example, as awareness is raised about the Department's new initiatives for victim assistance and prosecutions, an increase in the number of reports may or may not indicate an actual increase in the number of incidents. It may simply demonstrate that more victims feel comfortable coming forward.

60. If confirmed what changes if any would you make to improve those programs?

If confirmed, I would look for best practices across the Service and Departments. Each Service and Military Department is taking innovative measures to combat sexual assault. We don't have to do everything exactly the same, and our working environments differ importantly, but there is more we could learn from each other. I believe it will be important to maintain an ongoing critical assessment and be willing to change course when necessary.

61. What is your assessment of Navy and Marine Corps programs and policies to hold individuals accountable for retaliation or reprisal against individuals who report sexual harassment or sexual assault?

The Department of the Navy (DON) seeks to achieve a culture of gender respect, where sexual assault is never tolerated and ultimately eliminated, where all survivors receive support and protection, and where offenders are held appropriately accountable. I will find it intolerable when those with the courage to report a sexual assault or sexual harassment are subjected to reprisal, maltreatment, or ostracism.

The Navy has a criminal and Inspector General processes to address retaliation in all forms. Additionally, the Service JAGs are working with DoD to review legal definitions and clarify when command action is warranted. The Department is working with DoD on strategies to utilize local Sexual Assault Response Coordinators to receive and report better information on cases as they arise, and to ensure that individual information is reviewed by installation Case Management Groups for the purpose of protecting and supporting sexual assault survivors. Furthermore, they are also developing interactive, live-action training programs that directly address issues of peer support for sexual assault survivors -- building on prior successes and lessons learned with a similar approach to promoting bystander intervention with regards to retaliation.

62. What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?

Both restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults are valuable tools for supporting sexual assault survivors. Both seem to be well accepted by Sailors and Marines. Restricted reporting provides some individuals with a mechanism to seek support more on their own terms. I support that opportunity. The most important things we can do is to get victims to come forward. We cannot address this problem unless victims come forward.

63. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

Victims of sexual assault must be supported. Sexual assault prevention and victim support are fundamental leadership responsibilities. Commanders are accountable for the mission readiness of their commands, that is, their ability to do their job when called to do so. The health, welfare, and safety of their personnel need to be the number one priority to ensure mission effectiveness. That means commanders are ultimately accountable for the physical and mental well-being of the Sailors and Marines under their charge. Commanding officers must not only set the tone for command climate through words and deeds, they must also ensure a positive command climate through training and leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure Navy

and Marine Corps leaders at all levels have the resources they need to implement command-wide training on how to support survivors and to implement military policies regarding sexual assault prevention and response.

64. What is your assessment of the Department of the Navy's implementation of the requirement to establish special victim's counsel?

I understand that it is working well. The Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC) serves as a personal legal advocate to ensure victims are in the best position to leverage all of the tools available to them. Most Navy VLCs have built strong relations with local commanding officers and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program personnel. Their unique role is well respected. As of 11 Dec 15, Navy VLC have assisted 1,759 sexual offense victims. VLC Survey feedback indicates victims are extremely satisfied with the services provided by their VLC and feel they have a voice in the process.

65. What is your understanding of the adequacy of Navy resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

It is my understanding that effective services are widely available, and sexual assault victims receive a high priority for care and support. I am aware that the Department has established significant resources to provide support to victims, including Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), deployed resiliency counselors, and Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC), as well as Victim Advocates who, together, represent a full spectrum of resources available to support a victim's physical, emotional and legal needs. I understand major naval commands have added Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) officers at the rank of Commander or higher to ensure commands are responsive; and I understand the medical community strives to provide individuals with compassionate, competent, and victim-centered care.

66. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults both at home station and deployed locations?

The Navy and Marine Corps are expeditionary forces that are forward deployed. As such, the Navy engagement in combatting sexual assault is world-wide. Both Services have deployed robust training efforts and command engagement Department-wide and have world-wide resources for victim support and criminal investigations. If confirmed, I will continue to watch and be vigilant and demand improvements where they need to be.

67. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources Navy has in place to investigate and prosecute allegations of sexual assault?

I understand that Navy and Marine Corps criminal investigators and litigators are well trained. NCIS has hired cadre of approximately 18 criminal investigators to respond to and investigate sexual assault cases. I understand the Department has hired an additional 54 NCIS agents to focus on sexual assault investigations – specifically in response to the increased NCIS workload resulting both from policy requirements to investigate all allegations of sexual assault of any nature, and from the success of Department-wide efforts to make Sailors and Marines more comfortable in reporting sexual assaults in the first place. Recent efforts have also explored using reserve or active duty Masters-at-Arms personnel to work with NCIS in investigating some cases but not conducting victim interviews. The average caseload trended down in FY15 (to 14) and the average time from initial notification to “active complete” status is now under 100 days. In addition to implementing the VLC program both the Navy and Marines have implemented special training for lawyers in sexual assault case management.

In 2007 the Navy’s Military Justice Litigation Career Track (MJLCT) was established to identify, develop, and retain judge advocates who demonstrate military justice knowledge and trial advocacy skills. Due to the effectiveness of this program, an experienced cadre of litigation specialists is spread across the Navy’s prosecution offices. This includes nine regional Senior Trial Counsel who litigate, oversee, and assist the prosecution of the most complex cases while supervising, mentoring, and training subordinate trial counsel. As a general matter, the Navy’s most junior trial counsel would have undergone at least two years of formal training and on-the-job training in all JAGC principle practice areas before taking on any cases as lead prosecutor. Additionally, MJLCT officers and other judge advocates occupying litigation billets are provided advanced training focused on various aspects of sexual assault litigation, prosecution and defense.

If confirmed, I would monitor these programs and encourage and support NCIS and the JAG corps in seeking opportunities to advance continued training and resources to address recognized needs in this area.

68. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults occur?

Command leadership is the lynchpin of military culture and command climate. Leaders at every level, from the Secretariat to the deck plate and the fire team are our best and most critical asset in achieving culture change. Culture change does not happen overnight, but requires sustained focus by and communication from leadership.

69. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

If confirmed, the issue of sexual assault in the Navy and Marine Corps will be a priority focus for me. I would support any policy change that enhances the confidence in the military's justice system and ensures that every Sailor and Marine has a safe working environment.

70. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address the problem of sexual assaults in the Navy?

My priority, if confirmed, will be to sustain the emphasis on current efforts. I would ensure these programs are meeting their intended purposes and are beneficial to victims and to the Navy in combating sexual assault. I would carefully consider the recommendations of the Judicial Proceedings Panel (JPP) and of independent review groups that can improve the Navy's sexual assault prevention and response program. In addition, I would seek to review and evaluate the training of leadership at all levels ensure Navy leaders are equipped to create and sustain command climates that are intolerant of sexual assault and in which victims of sexual assault can feel safe as they continue to serve the Navy and Marine Corps.

Balance Between Civilian Employees and Contractor Employees

The Navy employs many contractors and civilian employees. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as federal employees. Both contractors and civilians make up an integral part of the Department's total workforce.

71. Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Navy?

I do believe we must continuously evaluate our total workforce balance to meet the requirements of 10 USC 129a, to determine the most appropriate and cost efficient mix of military, civilian and contractor personnel to perform the mission of the Department of Defense. As requirements change so could the balance of the workforce.

72. In your view, has the Department utilized contractors to perform basic functions in an appropriate manner?

I do believe that contractor personnel have been used appropriately. However, as previously noted we must continuously evaluate our workforce mix and the use of contractors to ensure they are being used efficiently and for the appropriate mission sets/requirements.

73. Do you believe that the Navy should undertake a comprehensive reappraisal of "inherently governmental functions" and other critical government functions, and how they are performed?

I do not have any reason to believe that the DON needs a comprehensive reappraisal of “inherently governmental functions” and other critical government functions. I believe this to be a continuous process of workforce balancing and that effort is even more critical in downsizing environments as reductions need to be made smartly to have the least impact on our ability to perform the mission.

74. Are there non-monetary reasons why the Navy would need or desire one type of manpower over the other? If so, provide relevant examples where of those reasons? Under what circumstances should cost be used as the primary factor?

Yes, there are non-monetary reasons that could drive the use of different types of manpower. Clearly, the type of requirement impacts the reasoning, i.e. is it a military or inherently governmental function. But other factors such as skill set requirements, schedule (urgency of requirement), expected duration of effort, etc. all impact the manpower decision process. Example could be in cyber where urgent need for technical expertise, not currently organic to the DON, would need to be acquired from the private sector. Cost tends to be a primary factor when commercial type functions – not impacted by the other factors mentioned - are evaluated for accomplishment.

75. If confirmed, will you work with other appropriate officials in the Navy to review the contractor and civilian force mix for cost and mission effectiveness?

I will work with the appropriate officials in the Navy on the balance of our workforce as I see the manpower equation as one of the primary areas impacting both our resources and our ability to execute mission.

76. Would you agree that the balance between civilian employees and contractor employees in performing Navy functions should be determined by the best interests of the Navy and its mission requirements?

Yes, I agree with that statement.

77. If confirmed, will you work to remove any artificial constraints placed on the size of the Navy’s civilian and contractor workforce, so that the Navy can hire the number and type of employees most appropriate to accomplish its mission?

Yes, if confirmed I will work with Department officials to determine if there are constraints that impact our ability to hire the right workforce to efficiently and effectively accomplish the mission of the DON.

Women in Combat Integration

The Marines recently released the results of their major research study on combat

integration. Before reviewing the report, Secretary Mabus indicated that he will not support any exceptions to policy to close any ground combat elements to women.

78. Will you commit to conducting a thorough review of the report?

I am aware that Secretary Mabus is a strong advocate of opening all occupational specialties to women and that he made that recommendation based on his careful review of all available data including the Marine Corps Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force (GCEITF) report. If confirmed, I would avail myself of all information and facts related to the issue.

79. The Marine Corps' research demonstrated that women suffered higher injury rates among women than men when engaged in field combat exercises and training. Does that concern you?

The health and welfare of all service members is of great concern to me. The studies that were conducted provided a significant amount of data concerning the physiology, types of injuries, and injury rates sustained by both men and women. Through this research, I am confident that we can improve our training to mitigate these risks.

80. Do you believe Congress should amend the Selective Service Act to require the registration of women?

I understand that the Department of Defense is working with the Department of Justice to appropriately address the issue of how the decision to open all combat arms positions and units to women may impact the selective service act.

81. If women become subject to the draft, should they also be prepared for involuntary assignment based upon the needs of the Navy?

Secretary Carter's decision ensures that our all-volunteer military has access to the broadest range of talent, men and women, that the U.S. has to offer. In the highly unlikely event of a draft, requiring women to register with Selective Service would not necessarily mean women members would be forced to serve in the same capacity as men.

82. What is your opinion on whether men and women in combat and special forces MOSs should be subject to the same physical requirements for participation in those MOSs?

I support SECDEF's guidance in his 3 Dec 2015 memo that states "The Services will continue to apply previously developed and validated operationally relevant and objective standards for all career fields to assure that leaders assign tasks and career fields throughout the force based on ability, not gender. This approach is integral to

preserving unit readiness, cohesion, and morale, and it will continue to form the foundation for full integration.” Currently, physical fitness tests are gender normed to gauge a service member’s general health and fitness which is why the Marine Corps developed operationally-relevant, occupation-specific, gender-neutral standards specific to each physically demanding job. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all standards are operationally relevant and accurately reflect the tasks required to accomplish the mission and that women meet the same standards as men for the same MOS’s.

83. What is your opinion on whether men and women in the combat MOS should have the same physical fitness tests for the duration of their careers?

Navy uses Navy-wide physical fitness tests that are gender- and age-normed independent of a service member’s career field. For specific jobs, including combat MOSs, all members of a given MOS should meet the same physical standards required for that job as long as they serve in that position. Both the Marine Corps and Navy certified that their physical standards are current and in accordance with public law as of September 30, 2015. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that equitable opportunities exist for both men and women.

84. In light of Secretary Carter’s decision to open all military positions to women, what do you believe are the primary challenges to implementing full integration in the Department of the Navy and how do you plan to address them?

The primary challenges to implementing full integration are addressing the concerns raised by various Services’ studies as articulated in SECDEF’s 3 Dec 2015 memo. These concerns include:

- Transparent Standards – Assigning tasks and career fields throughout the force based on ability, not gender;
- Population Size – Addressing equipment sizing, supply, and facilities;
- Physical Demands and Physiological Differences – Addressing ways to help mitigate the injury rate and impact to individuals and the teams they are assigned;
- Conduct and Culture – Addressing attitudes toward team performance through education and training;
- Talent Management – Addressing recruiting, retaining, and advancing based on merit-based system;
- Operating Abroad – Addressing presence of women in cultures where complications may occur due to cultural restrictions;
- Assessment and Adjustment – Addressing monitoring, assessment, and adjustment issues to enable sustainable success.

Maternity Leave

Secretary Mabus recently announced his plan to provide 18 weeks of maternity leave for Sailors.

85. Do you support the Secretary's decision to allow 18 weeks of maternity leave for Sailors?

Yes, I believe the Services must ensure that the All-Volunteer Force continues to remain competitive with America's workforce and evolve with the changing times to address the needs, desires and goals of those Sailors and Marines who selflessly serve and sacrifice for our nation. This initiative provides a better balance between the need to retain high-performing, highly-educated and experienced Sailors and Marines, in whom we have already heavily invested.

86. If confirmed, what would be your plan to augment or back-fill those positions occupied by female Sailors on extended maternity leave? Would you consider utilizing reservists to back-fill those positions?

The Navy and Marine Corps' standard process for replacing all losses for operational units uses the enlisted distribution system management with similar skills to back fill at-sea units. These re-assignments can negatively affect billet "fit" for both sea and shore commands, but do not create at-sea manning gaps for deploying commands. Commands have the option to request reservists to back-fill those positions, if funding is available. The Marine Corps does not back-fill positions occupied by female Marines on Additional Maternity Leave (AML). If confirmed, I will work with Navy and Marine Corps leaders to determine the degree to which the new maternity leave policy requires adjustments to current procedures for augmenting or back filling.

87. In your view, how would the Navy account and pay for the cost of additional personnel to fill positions left vacant by Sailors on extended maternity leave?

It is my understanding that Navy has implemented plans to mitigate the impact of 18 weeks of maternity leave on operational units. Navy's standard plan for replacing losses to operational units, including those for maternity leave, leverages Sailors at shore establishments with similar skills to back fill at-sea units. It is my understanding that this mechanism has the capacity to absorb Navy's historical at-sea pregnancy rates. The Marine Corps does not back-fill positions occupied by female Marines on Additional Maternity Leave (AML).

88. Would the Navy require an increase to their authorized end strengths to accommodate additional manning requirements?

I do not believe that Navy and/or Marine Corps feels an increase in end strength is necessary to accommodate the policy, but that it will require careful management

and monitoring to ensure that operational readiness is not adversely impacted or a burden is placed on other Sailors or Marines to accommodate a member on maternity leave. The policy naturally includes flexibility and discretion for when members may take the leave, and permits it to be taken over multiple periods to meet the needs of both the member and the Services.

89. Do you support paid uncharged paternity leave for male Sailors in excess of the 10 days afforded by statute? If so, how many weeks do you believe is an appropriate amount of time?

Given the higher percentage of male service members currently serving, any substantial increase in paternity leave could impact readiness. An increase in the current 10 days of uncharged paternity leave afforded by statute would have to be carefully examined to thoroughly understand those impacts, and any resulting second or third order effects. If confirmed, I will investigate how best to balance the needs of Navy and Marine families against the requirement to remain combat ready to determine if changes to the paternity leave policy are needed, and at what cost they might be implemented.

90. Do you believe the Navy fully understands what the cost of this reform will be? If so, describe those costs.

The Department of the Navy has not yet been able to accurately determine the cost of the reform. Future attempts will be made to understand the complex monetary and non-monetary (e.g., retention) costs associated with the reform.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

91. If confirmed, what challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy and Marine Corps MWR programs in the future fiscal environment?

It is vitally important not to marginalize MWR program contribution to readiness and retention in the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure program relevance and sustainability. In a fiscally constrained environment, it is critical to optimize MWR's revenue generating capability and to protect the profitability of the military exchanges that help fund MWR programs.

Military Health Care

92. In your view, what should the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery do to improve access to care in its medical treatment facilities?

Timely access to health care - where and when it's needed - is a top priority for Navy Medicine. Navy Medicine is focused on continual improvements to medical care to Sailors, Marines and their families. Examples that Navy is exploring and

implementing include: virtual care, mobile convenience, and telemedicine solutions in order to keep Sailors, Marines and their families healthy and on the job. If confirmed, I would support the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery's efforts to improve both access and convenience through such innovative, 21st century solutions.

93. If confirmed, how would you work with the Surgeon General of the Navy to improve the healthcare experience for Sailors, Marines and their families?

Keeping Sailors, Marines and their families healthy and on the job is Navy Medicine's top priority. The Navy does provide services that don't require a trip to the hospital, and it is my understanding that they are expanding those services. However, when services are needed at a hospital, the Navy is working to ensure it is easy and timely to get those services, and that those services are top quality and patient-centered.

If confirmed, I would work with the Surgeon General of the Navy to continue those efforts and drive toward, and resource, the tenets of a high reliability organization. Grounded in the sacred trust we share in caring for America's sons and daughters, our Sailors, Marines and their families deserve the best healthcare experience possible.

Family Readiness and Support

Sailors, Marines and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.

94. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for Sailors, Marines and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints?

Sailors, Marines and their families are the Department of the Navy's greatest assets. Understanding and addressing their needs can be more challenging in times of war or contingency operations, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment. This requires a focus on communication. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, the Department remains agile and responsive to the needs of service members and their families, within fiscal realities. Whether assisting them in transitioning to civilian life, or supporting their financial health throughout their service, addressing their needs and desires will be essential to success.

Suicide Prevention

The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continue to be of great concern to the Committee.

95. If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs and policies for the Department of the Navy to prevent suicides and increase the resiliency of Sailors and Marines and their families?

I share the Department of the Navy view that every suicide is a tragedy, and that suicide is also a leadership issue. I understand that the Services have taken significant steps to improve suicide prevention efforts. If confirmed, I will support efforts to encourage strength and resilience among Sailors, Marines and their families, and to foster command climates supportive of psychological health and help-seeking behavior. It is critical that the Department continues to emphasize the importance of personal responsibility, peer-support and bystander intervention, and that it continues to emphasize that seeking help is a sign of strength.

Support for Wounded, Ill, and Injured Sailors and Marines

Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from the Navy and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

96. What is your assessment of the progress made by the Navy and Marine Corps to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured Sailors and Marines?

I appreciate the Committee's and Congress' continued interest and support for wounded warriors and their families and caregivers. This is an enduring mission that will continue long past the current conflicts as we provide a lifetime of support to our seriously wounded, ill, and injured Sailors and Marines.

To date Navy Wounded Warrior-Safe Harbor has provided non-medical support to more than 2,288 Sailors and Coast Guardsmen that are enrolled in the program. They have also provided assistance to an additional 1,540 service members with less severe conditions who still need help. The Marine Corps' Wounded Warrior Regiment provides support to a monthly average of approximately 850 Marines who are joined to a subordinate element and / or assigned a recovery care coordinator. In an effort to ensure Marines who transition from active service are not left without necessary support the Wounded Warrior resource and outreach call center has provided assistance to nearly 32,000 post 9/11 medically retired and veteran Marines since its inception in 2009.

It is my understanding that much progress has been made since the programs were established under the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Non-medical care management teams throughout the country tailor support to each enrolled service member's recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration needs. This support can include Comprehensive Recovery Plan development, addressing pay and personnel issues, connecting them to family resources, offering adaptive sports and recreation opportunities, and linking them to education, employment, and training benefits. Support does not conclude at the door of a medical treatment facility or when a wounded warrior's military career concludes. It offers enrollees a host of services that ease their transition to civilian life and ensures they are cared for throughout their lifetimes.

97. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's support for wounded Sailors and Marines, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

In 2008, Congress expanded support for our wounded warriors beyond combat wounded to include serious illness and injuries. It is my understanding that the vast majority of Sailors and Marines are enrolled as a result of non-combat conditions. These programs address an enduring need and must remain capable of responding when or if the nation engages in a future conflict. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that they are properly resourced into the future even in the midst of these challenging budget environments.

Senior Military and Civilian Accountability

While representative of a small number of individuals in DOD, reports of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard.

98. What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department?

Even if isolated, the abuse of rank or authority can undermine trust in a military organization. Senior civilian and military leaders must uphold the highest standards of integrity and principled leadership. An organization that fails to hold senior individuals accountable when warranted sends the wrong message to Sailors, Marines and civilian personnel in the Department of the Navy as well as to the public.

99. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps are held accountable for their actions and performance?

If confirmed, I will continue to foster the Navy and Marine Corps' earnest commitment to the highest ethical standards of principled leadership and service. I will ensure timely investigation of allegations. I will ensure that, when required, accountability actions are exercised in strict adherence to principles of due process, consistent with law and regulation, and transparent to our Congressional oversight committees and the American public.

Shipbuilding Plan

Despite the Navy's 308-ship requirement to meet the maritime demands of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 272 battle force ships. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for its shipbuilding plan by approximately 12 percent.

100. Do you consider the 308-ship force structure requirement to be appropriate given the current and future strategic environment? If not, please describe what changes may need to be made.

Currently, yes. The 308-ship Force Structure Assessment (FSA) update was completed in 2014 based on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The 308-ship battle force possesses the minimum capability and capacity to continue protecting American interests, to deter or contain conflict and, if called upon, to fight and win our nation's wars.

101. Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with executing the Navy's shipbuilding plan?

While I'm not familiar with the analytic methodology used in the CBO's assessment, if confirmed, I will ensure that the differences between the Navy and CBO shipbuilding cost estimates are understood.

102. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?

I know that the Department is focused on affordably acquiring all of the weapon systems that the Navy and Marine Corps team requires. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASN(RDA) to ensure that all cost reduction opportunities are explored and that budget estimates are realistic.

103. How would you characterize the risks to national security posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and tactical aircraft?

It is my understanding that today, the Navy meets all requirements of the current defense strategy, albeit with considerable risk.

104. What adjustments to the respective shipbuilding programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce operational risk?

Based on our current strategy, I believe the FY 2016 President's Budget Request reflects the best balance of available resources to meet the Department of Navy requirements. If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate this question as a critical part of my responsibilities.

105. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's shipbuilding program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?

The Navy has been working hard to reduce cost growth and increase affordability and stability within all of the shipbuilding programs. Should these measures prove inadequate, if confirmed, I will work with Defense Department leaders and the Congress to determine the appropriate responses and to develop acceptable adjustments.

Aircraft Carriers

After more than \$2 billion in cost growth in each of the first three *Ford*-class aircraft carriers, the costs of these ships range from \$11.5 billion to \$13.5 billion.

106. Do you support the on-going Navy study of alternatives for future development of aircraft carriers that would replace or supplement the *Ford*-class carrier?

I fully support consideration of alternatives to the current aircraft carrier design as well as changes to the existing FORD-class design to reduce cost while retaining essential capability. The study should provide insight into the requirements, capabilities, costs, and alternatives for aircraft carriers. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the findings.

107. In your view, should the Navy build 11 *Ford*-class aircraft carriers or should the Navy pursue a different mix of platforms for sea-based tactical aviation?

The current plan for the FORD Class construction is the Navy's plan for meeting the demand for an 11 aircraft carrier force. If confirmed and once the alternative study is completed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to explore the right mix of platforms.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report states the reliability of four systems – the electromagnetic aircraft launching system, advanced arresting gear, dual band radar, and advanced weapons elevators – are the most significant risks to the USS *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN-78) for successfully completing initial operational test and evaluation.

108. What is your understanding of the testing and reliability status of each of these key systems on CVN-78, which is scheduled to deliver in June 2016?

I understand that production of CVN 78 is nearly complete and that the Navy is now focused on completing construction of the ship, completing the ship's test program, and taking delivery of the ship. I understand that the four systems highlighted by DOT&E are indeed new technologies introduced to the ship and because they are new, provide risk to the program. I understand that testing on many of these systems has begun and, if confirmed, I will ensure that progress on testing is regularly conveyed to the Committee.

109. What is your understanding of the measures being taken to ensure these key systems are stable for the next aircraft carrier, USS *John F. Kennedy* (CVN-79)?

I understand that the Navy continues to incorporate lessons learned from CVN 78 test programs and shipboard installation into CVN 79 plans.

Ohio-class Replacement Program

Navy leaders have testified that the *Ohio*-class Replacement Program will require significant investment and will result in equivalent reductions in the Navy budget, if a higher Navy topline or outside funding is not provided.

110. What is your view on how the *Ohio*-class Replacement Program should be funded?

It is absolutely critical for the nation to replace the Ohio class submarines. I understand that the Navy is taking appropriate measures to limit requirements and control cost for this Class while maintaining the level of performance necessary to ensure the high survivability provided by the sea-based strategic deterrent. Ultimately, however, the unique requirements of this program drive high cost to the Navy's overall shipbuilding program which, absent a higher topline, would equate to approximately one-third of the historic average shipbuilding budget. Such an impact to Navy shipbuilding over the 15 year period of building the OHIO Replacement submarines would have a direct impact to the future Navy Force Structure and therefore, the ability of the Navy to meet its mission in the decades ahead. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Defense Department leadership and the Congress to address this significant challenge.

Navy leaders have testified that 12 *Ohio*-class replacement submarines must be procured and the *Ohio*-class Replacement Program schedule cannot be delayed in order to ensure the first deterrent patrol occurs in 2031.

111. Do you support the view that there is no room for delay of the *Ohio*-class Replacement Program?

I understand that the Navy has stretched the Ohio class to the maximum extent possible, from 30 to 42 years and that there is no room for further delay of the Ohio Class Replacement without introducing risk to meeting the requirements for the sea-based strategic deterrent. If confirmed, I will review this assessment in further detail with appropriate requirements and acquisition arms of the Department of Defense and determine whether there are further appropriate steps available to mitigate the schedule risk associated with meeting our strategic requirements.

Congress established the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund in section 1022 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.

112. What are your views on how the Navy should use this Fund to acquire *Ohio*-class replacement submarines?

It is clearly in the best interest of the Department of Defense and the Congress to ensure the OHIO Replacement Program is executed as efficiently as possible in order to meet the significant cost and schedule challenges posed by this high priority program. I understand that this need has been the motivation behind the formulation of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. If confirmed, I will review and, as appropriate, identify measures necessary to further reduce cost and schedule risk associated with developing, designing, and building the OHIO Replacement Class submarines. It is likely that such measures will include additional authorities to be granted by Congress, and to the extent that these authorities are included in the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, then I will work closely within the Department of Defense and with the Congressional Defense Committees to ensure concurrence as well as full transparency in the exercise and oversight of these unique authorities.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The Navy plays an important role in defending the nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats. Today, the Navy has approximately 33 BMD-capable ships, with just three of these having the advanced BMD 5.X capability. In 2020, the Navy projects having 39 BMD ships, with 16 having BMD 5.X capability.

113. Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?

Yes, it is a proven capability the Navy provides to the Joint Force.

114. What options should be explored to reduce the shortfall in meeting the stated requirement of 40 ships with the advanced BMD 5.X capability?

If confirmed, I will work with Navy and Missile Defense Agency leadership to explore all options for fielding capability earlier than currently planned while balancing fiscal realities.

Cruise Missiles

115. What is your understanding of the Navy's cruise missile defense strategy?

My understanding is that the Navy has conducted numerous analyses to defend naval forces and advanced bases from the cruise missile defense threat and has invested in near, mid, and far term capabilities to counter the emerging threat. The Department of the Navy will continue to resource capabilities and provide properly trained and equipped forces to the Combatant Commanders.

116. In your view, how serious is the cruise missile threat to the Navy?

The cruise missile threat is very serious to the Navy and nation.

117. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the Navy is adequately addressing this threat?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of the Navy properly resources cruise missile defense, and that those resources are properly balanced across the Department.

Amphibious Fleet Requirements

118. What is your view of the need for and size of the Navy's amphibious ship fleet?

Amphibious ships are a critical element of joint force capabilities. I support the current requirement of 38 amphibious ships and the plan to build 34, given fiscal constraints. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to continue to meet amphibious requirements.

119. What alternatives would you consider to augment amphibious ships in providing lift to Marine Corps units? In what scenarios would these alternatives be necessary and appropriate?

The Marine Corps and Navy have been innovative in their use of alternative lift options for permissive environments. Given the evolving threats, however, I would be wary of using such options to mitigate any shortfalls in the amphibious ship

requirements specifically for assault echelon. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to identify the most appropriate solutions in supporting our Naval Expeditionary Force and operations around the globe.

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

In December 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to upgrade the Littoral Combat Ships, designated LCS-33 through LCS-52, to provide a more capable and lethal small surface combatant, generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate.

120. Do you support the Secretary of Defense's decision to upgrade the LCS?

From what I have read, I believe the modifications to the LCS design will add valuable lethality and survivability capability improvements to the final 20 hulls.

121. What is your understanding of the acquisition strategy for the LCS and LCS mission modules, as modified by the Secretary of Defense's decision?

I understand that in December 2014, the Secretary of Defense decided that the Navy will procure a modified LCS (Frigate) to follow the current LCS design, resulting in an inventory of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates. If confirmed, I will review the acquisition strategy details with ASN(RDA).

122. What is your view of the peacetime and wartime mission of the LCS?

LCS provides the Navy critical capabilities to Surface Warfare (SUW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) requirements in both open ocean and the littorals.

123. What is your understanding of the requirements for survivability of the LCS?

I understand that concerns about LCS survivability are what led to Secretary Hagel's directed review of LCS alternatives, which resulted in the shift to an enhanced design. I am aware that all ships have an assigned level of survivability in keeping with their mission and concept of operations. If confirmed, I will review with the Chief of Naval Operations the survivability levels for LCS.

124. What is your understanding of the delivered survivability capability of the LCS?

Since 5 LCS ships have been accepted by the Navy and are serving in the fleet, it is my understanding that they meet the survivability requirement for the Class.

125. Do you support the Navy force structure assessment requirement of 52 small surface combatants? If not, please explain.

I support the Department's current inventory objective of 52 small surface combatants which has been validated by the Navy's Force Structure Assessment. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense's decision to transition to a frigate, the 52 ships will be met by a combination of 32 LCS and 20 Frigates.

Tactical Fighter Programs

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, which is the largest and most expensive acquisition program in the Department's history, was formally initiated as a program of record in 2002 with a total planned buy of 2,443 aircraft for the U.S. At projected procurement rates, the aircraft will be procured by the Department well into the 2030 decade to reach its total quantity buy. The program has not yet completed its systems development and demonstration phase, and is not due to enter full rate production until 2019, 17 years after its inception.

The overall requirement for 2,443 aircraft was established nearly 20 years ago. Since that time, however, there have been countervailing pressures to: (1) reduce force structure to conserve resources; (2) improve capability to respond to prospective adversary technological advances and increased capabilities from updated threat assessments; and (3) respond to an evolving national defense strategy.

126. Do you believe the Department of the Navy's F-35B and F-35C requirements are still valid?

Yes, both the F-35B and the F-35C will be vital parts of future Naval Aviation and critical to meeting warfighting requirements.

127. Do you believe the Department of the Navy can afford and needs to procure 310 more F-35Cs with a procurement cost of over \$42 billion?

The F-35C provides essential 5th generation strike fighter capability to the Department's Carrier Air Wings. Without this capability, the Navy cannot achieve air superiority. The Department of the Navy currently has a requirement for 340 F-35Cs. If confirmed, I will work with ASN (RD&A) and the joint program office to most affordably procure the F-35C and will work with the Chairman and other service chiefs to revalidate the appropriate number of aircraft the Navy requires to meet the mission.

128. Do you believe that the Navy will still want to buy the F-35C, an aircraft design that will be 30 years old before the Navy production is scheduled to finish?

The Navy is committed to making the F-35C the next Carrier Air Wing fighter,

complementing the F/A-18E/F until that aircraft reaches the end of its lifetime in the 2030s.

129. Do you believe the Navy's current and planned force mix of tactical aircraft is sufficient to meet current and future threats around the globe, and most especially in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations where the "tyranny of distance" is such a major factor?

Currently, I do. There are capability, inventory, and readiness aspects to delivering the required force mix. If confirmed, I will work with leadership to determine the best options to pace the threat in a dynamic security and fiscal environment.

The Secretary of the Navy recently remarked that he believed the F-35 should be and would be the nation's last manned fighter aircraft.

130. Do you believe this to be true?

It is crucial that we push the boundaries of what unmanned technologies can achieve; the next generation in tactical aviation will play a large part in this transformation. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to aggressively advance the development of unmanned systems.

131. What will be your role in leading capabilities and requirements development to increase the role of unmanned aerial combat systems in the Navy?

If confirmed, I intend to make the continued development of unmanned systems a hallmark of my tenure. I intend to lead the Navy into new ways of thinking about combinations of people and technologies to maximize our operational advantage.

132. How do you see the future balance developing between manned and unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy's future force structure?

I believe that the advent of advanced information technology is redefining the approach to obtaining the most effective relationship between people and technology. There is vast potential to change the balance of manned and unmanned platforms in combat aircraft and across all platforms, and this potential is a key to helping the United States minimize the risk to our people and stay ahead of rapidly evolving threats.

Readiness

133. What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet national security requirements across the full spectrum of military operations?

My understanding is that while forward deployed Navy forces continue to meet readiness standards, there is concern about Navy's ability to meet the timelines associated with providing either follow-on or "surge" forces should they be requested by Combatant Commanders. For instance, Navy is currently not meeting its required crisis response capacity and does not fully recover until 2021. For the Marine Corps, deployed units are sufficiently resourced to undertake assigned missions but about half of non-deployed units are insufficiently resourced to full spectrum readiness levels limiting their readiness to respond to unexpected crises or major contingencies. If confirmed, one of my first actions will be to review the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps team.

134. What is your assessment of the near-term trend in the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps?

The 2016 President's Budget Request provides the minimum resources to achieve the levels of readiness to meet requirements by 2021. This plan still includes considerable risk, and does not allow for any unexpected contingencies.

135. How critical is it to find a solution to sequestration given the impacts we have already seen to readiness in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015?

It is absolutely critical. Without relief from the current budget caps, Navy will fall farther below requirements to the point that it will not be able to meet the responsibilities in the current strategy. The recent Bipartisan Budget Agreement is helpful in that it provides stability but at a reduced resource level. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant to determine the implications of these reductions.

136. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of Navy and Marine Corps equipment?

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have detailed processes that attempt to balance the real time and projected needs of the operators/warfighters with the scheduled lifecycle sustainment requirements and depot maintenance capacity. These processes need to be designed to accommodate surges and other unplanned operations, which have become, and will continue to be, the norm.

My understanding is that the Navy and Marine Corps maintenance requirements processes are thorough, but I am concerned about the time allotted to conduct reset maintenance of the force given the high operational tempo and COCOM demand signal.

137. Given the backlog in equipment maintenance over the last several years, do you believe that we need an increased investment to reduce this backlog?

It is my understanding is that the FY 2016 President's Budget Request, with OCO funding, has provided funding to address this backlog. However, it will take time to physically complete the work.

The budget fully funds ship maintenance to continue life cycle maintenance reset of CVNs and surface force ships. To address workload to be completed in public shipyards, the budget also provides funds for additional workforce in public shipyards and will send selected submarines to private shipyards. Navy has also funded aviation depot maintenance to capacity. As with the ships, it will take time to work through the backlog.

138. How important is it to reduce the materiel maintenance backlog in order to improve readiness?

It is very important. I understand maintenance backlogs have delayed deployments, which have in turn forced extensions for those already deployed. This comes at a cost to the resiliency of Sailors and Marines, sustainability of equipment, and service lives of ships and equipment.

139. How important is it to receive OCO funding after the end of combat operations in order to ensure all equipment is reset?

It is very important. The Department of the Navy remains reliant on OCO funding for ongoing overseas operations, reset, and some enduring requirements.

140. In your judgment, is recent operational tempo adversely affecting the readiness or retention of Sailors and Marines on active duty and in the reserve component?

I believe the Chief of Naval Operations recently highlighted the fact that after three years of budget shortfalls and a high operating tempo, Navy is currently operating with considerable risk in its ability to fully execute warfighting mission in accordance with existing plans. I am unaware of any significant impact the current tempo of operations is having on retention, in general, but I imagine that it will just be a matter of time, especially in an improving economy, before Sailors and their families begin to vote with their feet and choose to leave. Near-term operational readiness and the readiness of those Marines who are forward deployed and forward engaged remains a top priority. The Marine Corps continues to reconstitute to a ready force after over a decade of persistent conflict. As the Nation's ready force, the Marine Corps does not have the luxury to take an operational pause after completing major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will work with the Department and the Congress to ensure the Marine Corps is properly resourced to deliver a ready Marine Corps today and in the future.

Navy leaders have stated rotational deployments will be stabilized and more

predictable through continued implementation of an improved deployment framework called the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP).

141. What is your understanding of the O-FRP?

My understanding is that O-FRP is designed to align manning, maintenance, and modernization of platforms with training in order to achieve readiness and meet regional needs in the most effective and efficient manner. O-FRP should allow the Navy to achieve stable and predictable 7-month deployments, which will help to reset our readiness and increase certainty for our Sailors and families.

142. Do you support implementation of the O-FRP?

Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CNO to ensure O-FRP remains on track to meet strategic objectives.

143. To what extent will implementation of the O-FRP improve the material readiness of the fleet?

My understanding is that O-FRP is designed to improve material readiness by providing greater stability and predictability in maintenance schedules. Restoring predictability to maintenance periods, when combined with sufficient and predictable resources in our shipyards and depots should allow for better maintenance outcomes and improved overall fleet readiness.

144. What metrics should Congress use to track the material readiness and material condition of Navy ships and aircraft, as well as the effectiveness of O-FRP?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the material readiness of our fleet is promptly known to Departmental leadership and the Congress.

Science and Technology Program

145. Do you believe that the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Department of the Navy needs?

I believe that we must maintain a balance across our R&D investments to ensure our current Fleet is equipped with the capabilities they need today, to maintain the Navy and Marine Corps operational advantage by developing and fielding next generation weapon systems to change the face of future naval warfare and avoid technological surprise by aggressively pursuing high risks R&D initiatives. I also believe an increase in rapid prototyping and experimentation with the Fleet will help to inform the Department's R&D budget and ultimately deliver the capabilities our naval forces need today and well into the future.

146. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Navy and Marine Corps missions?

S&T investments provide the underpinning for assurance that our naval forces retain and widen our technological superiority in naval warfare. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to properly invest in innovative defense science and technology; increase rapid prototyping and experimentation to expedite fielding of new and advanced warfighting capabilities. I would advocate pursuit of game changing science and technology discoveries to spawn the development and realization of new operational concepts.

147. If confirmed, what guidance would you give to ensure research priorities that will meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in 2020?

To remain competitive against emerging threats, research in new technologies needs to be coupled with innovative concepts for future war fighting. If confirmed, my guidance and oversight of research efforts will be focused on ensuring we are as creative in our development of new technologies as we are in our ideas of how to use them.

Military Space and Cyber

148. Do you believe that the current Department of Defense management structure for space and cyber programs sufficiently protects Navy and Marine Corps space and cyber equities?

Yes. My understanding is that the new management structure for space programs, which has designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisor, provides the Navy and Marine Corps sufficient opportunity to actively represent critical equities affecting Space & Cyber mission areas and capabilities. Similarly, the current Department of Defense structure also appropriately balances Service and Joint cyberspace equities. If confirmed, I will review this management structure with Department of Navy space and cyber community leaders to ensure Department of Navy equities are adequately represented.

149. In your view, how actively should the Navy and Marine Corps be engaged in the management of space and cyber programs?

The Navy and Marine Corps have a responsibility to manage programs which provide the capability to operate and defend its networks and space capabilities. The Department's focus ensures the security and resiliency of weapons systems and warfighting platforms. The Services must remain actively involved as these capabilities are critical to the success of Service mission in the modern cyber and space reliant operating environment.

150. In your view, is the Navy and Marine Corps adequately involved in the requirements process for space and cyber programs?

Yes. The Navy and Marine Corps participation in the Space & Cyber requirements process generally occurs through their respective service requirements processes and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. My understanding is that the recent standup of the Principal Department of Defense Space Advisory Staff and the DoD Principal Cyber Advisor should improve Joint participation and better facilitate requirements development for future space and cyberspace capabilities.

151. What is the Navy and Marine Corps' appropriate long-term role in space and cyber systems, other than as a user of space and cyber products?

My understanding is that, in addition to being a user of space and cyber products, the Department has structured the Naval Science and Technology Strategy to discover, develop and deliver decisive naval capabilities, near- to long-term, by investing in a balanced portfolio of breakthrough scientific research, innovative technologies and talented people. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps are working to incorporate the cyber domain into all of the Services' efforts to make reducing cyber vulnerability as fundamental a priority as physical protection of personnel, ships, aircraft, submarines, land systems and infrastructure.

Electronic Warfare

152. In your view, what steps must the Navy take to regain supremacy in electronic warfare, both offensive and defensive?

I see electronic warfare as a warfare domain that offers great promise for innovation and experimentation with potential to increase the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team. Electronic Warfare will make our ships and aircraft hard to find, hard to kill and lethal. To that end, if confirmed, I would support the Navy's continued investment in technologies and policies to leap ahead in the Electronic Warfare domain

Joint Operations

Naval operations are becoming increasingly "joint" as Marines plan to deploy in larger numbers and on a wider range of ships; the U.S. Army and Air Force begin to invest in counter-maritime capabilities; and air and naval forces continue to develop and implement interoperable capabilities to defeat anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networks – a process that started with the Air-Sea Battle Concept in 2010.

153. How would you characterize your familiarity with how each of the Services organize, train and equip their forces?

Under Title 10, Man, Train, and Equip responsibilities reside with each Service. The challenge remains to produce a more effective operational Joint force. My understanding is that within the Navy and Marine Corps, there is a continuing effort through the Naval Board to align the naval Services when it comes to war gaming and long range planning. The intent is through early and continuous collaboration to improve cross-domain capability and capacity.

154. Are there other innovative ideas you are considering to increase Joint interoperability and ensure opportunities to improve cross-domain capability and capacity are not missed?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders to seek new ways to combine forces in adaptive and responsive force packages. I look forward to improving information sharing standards and architectures within the Naval and Joint Forces to enhance interoperability.

Investment in Infrastructure

Decades of under-investment in installations has led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, substandard living and working conditions, and has made it harder for the Services to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.

155. Do you believe the Department of the Navy is investing enough in its infrastructure? Please explain.

In order to comply with fiscal constraints and maintain operational readiness, the Naval forces have been compelled to continue accepting risk in infrastructure investment and operations. However, if confirmed, I'll remain committed to investing in our Shipyards and Depots and exceeding the minimum 6% investment described in 10 USC 2476. I will also support the ongoing prioritization of nuclear weapons support, base security, airport/seaport/range operations, and quality of life programs for our Sailors, Marines and Families. It is essential that we accept risk judiciously by prioritizing life/safety issues and efficiency improvements to existing infrastructure and repairing only the most critical components of our mission critical facilities. By deferring less critical repairs, especially for non-mission-critical facilities, the Department of the Navy is allowing certain facilities to degrade and causing our overall facilities maintenance backlog to increase. This backlog must eventually be addressed.

Acquisition Reform

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 emplaced myriad changes to defense acquisition processes, including reinserting service chief influence and accountability into acquisition processes.

156. Do you support the acquisition reform provisions in the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act?

Yes. I support many of the provisions in the FY 16 NDAA. In particular, I support the legislation that reinforces the roles of the CNO and CMC in decisions regarding the balancing of resources and priorities, and associated tradeoffs among cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and performance on major defense acquisition programs. This legislation is consistent with the Department of the Navy's Gate Review process. This is a collaborative process that involves the CNO and CMC or their representatives throughout the acquisition process.

157. What additional acquisition-related reforms do you believe the Committee should consider?

If confirmed, I will work with SECNAV, USD (AT&L), and ASN (RDA) to identify reforms that help the Services more effectively manage program risks and budget uncertainty associated with major defense acquisition programs. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with the Committee to improve these processes.

158. How can the Department and the Navy better access and integrate commercial and military technology to remain ahead of its potential adversaries?

Continual sharing of requirements and technological ideas between DON and industry is critical. If confirmed, I will ensure that communication with industry is robust and will continue to seek ideas from large and small businesses by use of existing tools such as the Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Secretaries of the Navy, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

159. Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

Yes, I strongly support accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For over thirty years the United States has benefited greatly from the legal regime provided by the Convention. The U.S. position that this complex framework reflects customary international law, and thus the U.S. is entitled to its benefits without accession to the treaty itself is not universally accepted. Accession would eliminate the need for the U.S. to assert that vital portions of the Convention addressing traditional uses of the oceans are reflective of customary international

law. Where the Convention broke new ground, such as in the creation of a mechanism for securing international recognition of extended continental shelf claims, the U.S. cannot rely on customary international law to guarantee acceptance of its own extended continental shelf claims, including in the Arctic region. The U.S. should lead in maintaining a stable set of rules for the oceans and not being a party to the treaty prevents us from maintaining a credible position to influence these issues. We should lead in the development of law and policy for oceans and becoming a party to the treaty puts us in the strongest position to do so.

160. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

The ability of our armed forces to operate freely on, over, and above the world's oceans is critical to our national security. The Convention codifies binding tenets of international law that are essential to the global mobility and operations of our military. These include the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation, the twelve nautical mile limitation on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea, and the reaffirmation of sovereign immunity for our warships. As a maritime nation, free access to the oceans has always been critical to our security and economic well-being. Becoming a party to the Convention provides us with a credible position to raise issues and concerns for the freedom of navigation under which maritime commerce is able to move safely and securely on ships around the world.

161. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?

Events in the South China Sea and the Arctic are illustrative of the significant and increasing pressures on the maritime environment. This calls for United States leadership. Unfortunately, we are the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the only Arctic nation that is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention provides the only internationally accepted process for nations to establish legal title to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Only by submitting its claim of an extended continental shelf to the Commission set up under the Convention can the U.S. guarantee international acceptance of its claim to an extended continental shelf off its coasts, including sovereign rights to potentially vast energy resources in the Arctic. We need to be inside the Convention to bring the full weight of our leadership to influence the resolution of South China Sea and Arctic issues and to have the most effective impact on other future developments in oceans.

U.S. Force Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Department continues the effort to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific as announced in the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance.

162. Are you satisfied with the rebalance efforts to date?

Thus far, I am satisfied with the Navy and Marine Corps rebalance efforts to date as part of a longer term plan. These plans have and will continue to result in a significant adjustment in U.S. Navy force structure and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

163. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region over the next couple of years and what specific Navy and Marine Corps capabilities or enhancements are needed in to meet those priorities?

Our U.S. regional priorities remain a) preservation of a rules-based international order, b) regional stability, and c) enhanced alliance/partner relationships. Naval forces contribute significantly to all three with their credible forward presence, which contributes to conventional deterrence against aggressive behavior. In order to protect our interests, the U.S. faces a range of challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including provocations by North Korea and the growth of its ballistic missile programs, as well as China's expansion into the Pacific and Indian oceans, supported by their rapidly growing navy. Our naval capabilities, including our strategic deterrent, must be modernized to continue supporting the stability essential to this region's significant contributions to the global economy. Moreover, we require sufficient capacity (ships, subs and tactical aviation) to be able to sustain deployed and lethal naval forces.

Anti-Access/Area Denial

Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.

164. Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern?

Yes. The development and proliferation of advanced systems that can sense, target and strike Naval assets at increasing ranges and accuracy is a vital concern to me. If confirmed, I will work with other defense leaders and leaders in industry to develop technologies and concepts of operations that assure all-domain access by the joint force.

165. If so, what do you believe the Navy and Marine Corps need to be doing now

and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?

The free use of the maritime commons is critical to the global economic system and U.S. national interests. I believe the Navy should continue to first and foremost be present and exercise freedom of navigation in international waters and to reassure our allies and partners. Further the Navy and Marine Corps must continue to develop new concepts, platforms, and technologies that can effectively address this emerging threat to access. The Marines should continue their work to creatively adapt their operating concepts for more distributed maneuver into contested littoral areas.

China Assertiveness

166. How has China's aggressive assertion of territorial and maritime claims, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea, affected security and stability in the region?

China's actions in the South and East China Seas, as well as its rapid military modernization and growing defense budgets, have led many in the region, including the U.S., to question its long-term intentions. China has still not clarified its 9-Dash Line claim, and it continues to conduct land-reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea. Such behavior has been destabilizing for the region and has increased the risk of miscalculation or conflict among regional actors. Our allies and partners in the region are increasingly looking to the U.S. for leadership and support in the face of these challenges, and so our response to China's challenges to the international maritime order should be firm and consistent.

China

167. What is your assessment of the current state of the U.S.-China military relationship?

The U.S.-China military-to-military relationship is a critical component of our overall bilateral relationship and an important aspect of our regional maritime strategy. Right now, I believe the military relationship is contributing to stability in the region. This stability allows us to increase cooperation on areas of overlapping interests, while improving our ability to manage other aspects of the security relationship responsibly. The broader bilateral relationship can improve through strengthening trust and transparency between the two militaries, without sacrificing operational security.

168. What are your views regarding China's interest in and commitment to improving military relations with the United States?

While I have had very little interaction with Chinese military leaders, my understanding is that China's leadership understands that as they increase their interaction throughout the region, they have a shared interest with the United States in preserving lines of communications to maximize common interests and minimize miscalculations.

169. What is your view of the purpose and relative importance of sustained defense-to-defense relations with China?

I believe China recognizes the U.S. will have an enduring presence in the Pacific and therefore has a clear interest in sustaining military-to-military contacts. If confirmed, I will continue to use the military relationship as a tool to build sustained and substantive dialogue, develop areas of practical cooperation, and manage competition in a way that protects national interests and supports overall stability in the relationship and the Asia-Pacific region.

Unmanned Systems

The Navy's current plan for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system aircraft is to develop an airframe optimized for unrefueled endurance (~14 hours) and the ISR mission.

170. Given the combat radius of the planned carrier air wing, are you concerned the Navy's aircraft carriers will lack the ability to project power at relevant distances, given emerging anti-access/area-denial threats?

Yes, I am concerned. Rapidly evolving technological and security environments require the Department of the Navy to continually work to develop new concepts and technologies. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to ensure there is an integrated and affordable approach to assessing warfighting capabilities of the entire Air Wing.

Strategic Thinking

171. How do you plan to foster a dedicated, educated, and assigned group of strategic thinkers and planners who rise to the rank of flag rank officer?

The strength of our Navy and Marine Corps team remains its people. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary my frank assessment of the existing professional and educational opportunities available to our officer cadre within each of their respective career paths, and will make recommendations regarding any changes necessary to ensure the best strategic thinkers and planners are developed and

nominated.

The Navy and Marine Corps must improve their ability to develop senior leaders who are able to formulate and implement strategy. The promotion and selection processes are effective at choosing accomplished officers, well versed in operational-level planning, programming and engineering thinking, but may not always pick officers for executive positions who are skilled in the strategic arts. Today's geo-strategic environment demands we have military leaders who can ensure that programs and technologies are linked to strategy and concepts of operations that are focused on what it takes to secure America's strategic interests around the world.

The CNO and CMC began initiatives to enhance the strategic education of officers, and added an officer subspecialty for strategy. I will work with them to support these efforts and investigate the possibility of creating a cadre of strategists who have strategy development and implementation as their primary specialty and whose career paths place them in billets where their intellectual contributions will have a cascading effect on the overall direction of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Conventional vs. Nuclear Deterrence

172. What role do you see for the Navy and Marine Corps in conventional deterrence?

Naval forward presence is critical to conventional deterrence. Captured in the phrase that the Navy is “where it matters, when it matters” is the ability of our entire Navy/Marine team to operate forward with combat credible forces to enhance stability and deter undesired behavior. Our flexible forward-deployed posture materially contributes to deterrence and generates crisis response options.

173. How do strategic and conventional deterrence complement one another?

Strategic and conventional deterrence are complementary. Our nation's strategic deterrent has been a bedrock of peace and stability, precluding major wars for over 50 years. The Navy's contribution to this is the SSBN force, which has provided a survivable and responsive capability and 100 percent alert coverage since the 1960s. The force recently celebrated its 4,000th strategic deterrent patrol. Complementing this strategic deterrent our conventional naval forces are present to be seen and to reassure our partners that we have a global reach that protects the international system. Both work in tandem with the Joint force to guarantee stability.

Offset Technologies

During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces

unparalleled superiority until now. However, with advancements by our emerging adversaries, it seems like the military technological superiority is beginning to erode. As a result, it is critical that the United States once again focus on offsetting the erosion of our technology advantages being achieved by our potential adversaries.

174. Which technology priorities do you believe the Navy and Marine Corps should be pursuing to maintain the military technological superiority of the United States?

Our adversaries are indeed pursuing and increasing their investments in military modernization programs that threaten our technological superiority. If confirmed, I believe we should focus on affordable technology priorities that develop a more capable and ready force, and capabilities broadly applicable to a wide variety of threat. In addition, we should investigate using advanced capabilities in new innovative ways to help us meet our military objectives. In particular, I believe that key warfighting areas such as power projection, electronic warfare and cyber, anti-access/area denial (A2AD), air warfare, and undersea warfare are all important priorities. I would place special emphasis on unmanned systems.

175. What strategies would you recommend be implemented to develop these technology priorities?

I would recommend we focus on prioritizing development of advanced capabilities and looking at how we can use them differently in a more innovative fashion to gain a warfighting advantage. For the longer term, I would recommend planning our research and development efforts to focus on future threats and how to address them.

176. What role should the services play in their development?

The Services need to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense, as well as other government agencies, industry, universities, labs, think tanks, and partner nations. The faster cycle time of technology advancement today demands that we share the vibrant innovation across all entities in order to stay competitive. By working together and sharing the strengths each brings to the table, the Services can find synergies to apply to the joint fight.

Science and Technology

177. If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science and technology in meeting Department of the Navy missions?

S&T investments provide the underpinning for assurance that our naval forces retain and widen our technological superiority in naval warfare. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to properly invest in innovative defense science and technology; increase rapid prototyping and experimentation to expedite fielding of

new and advanced warfighting capabilities; and advocate pursuit of game changing science and technology discoveries to spawn the development and realization of new operational concepts.

178. Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Navy needs?

I believe that we must maintain a balance across our R&D investments to ensure our current Fleet is equipped with the capabilities they need today, to maintain the Navy and Marine Corps operational advantage by developing and fielding next generation weapon systems to change the face of future naval warfare and avoid technological surprise by aggressively pursuing high risks R&D initiatives. I also believe an increase in rapid prototyping and experimentation with the Fleet will help to inform the Department's R&D budget and ultimately deliver the capabilities our naval forces need today and well into the future.

179. What role would you have in helping the Department implement the nascent Third Offset Strategy?

If confirmed, I will work closely with DoD and Navy and Marine Corps leadership to ensure we are providing the right strategic direction, that we are rigorously exploring innovative operating concepts via wargaming, and prioritizing our S&T investments in support of the ongoing innovation programs in the Department of the Navy that support the Third Offset Strategy.

Technical Workforce

A significant challenge facing the Department of Defense today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Defense laboratories and technical centers.

180. In your view, what are the pros and cons of having active-duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Department of the Navy research and acquisition system?

Active duty Navy and Marine Corps personnel in many cases have the best understanding of the performance requirements of defense systems and platforms. In the capacity of scientists and engineers, Sailors and Marines who understand both the operational environment and the technical dimensions of acquisition decisions will be able to positively influence future acquisition requirements. Having the end-user actively engaged in developing technology and defining requirements may also help shorten the acquisition timeline. The challenge to the DON is the availability of Sailors and Marines to fill new positions as scientists and engineers.

181. How would you ensure that directors of labs in your service have the tools they need to dynamically shape their S&T workforce?

I am aware that laboratory directors currently have authorities to rapidly respond to emerging technology threats through the Naval Innovative Science and Engineering (NISE) program which allows the directors to make investments in basic and applied research, technology transition, workforce development, and laboratory revitalization. In addition, I am aware that the laboratory directors have direct hiring authority to hire key scientists and engineers quickly. If confirmed, I will work with Navy leadership to continue to identify ways to build upon these policies and others to ensure the S&T workforce is equipped with the tools, facilities, knowledge and experience to maintain technological superiority over emerging threats.

Test and Evaluation Issues

182. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

The developmental and operational test and evaluation communities play valuable roles in rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition or evolutionary acquisition. For these various acquisition processes, testing will help in obtaining useful knowledge to support systems development, make programmatic acquisition decisions, and inform users about the system's operational characteristics and performance.

183. What are your views on the appropriate roles of OSD developmental and operational testing organizations with respect to testing of Navy and Marine Corps systems?

OSD test organizations can provide useful inputs on test and evaluation, participate on acquisition program test and evaluation working groups, and provide constructive critiques in their evaluations of system performance.

Congressional Oversight

184. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated

members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Navy?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.