



1 UNITED STATES SENATE ARMED SERVICES PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

2  
3 THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF CLINICAL NUANCE AND MEMBER  
4 RESPONSIBILITY IN TRICARE BENEFIT REDESIGN

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14 Good morning and thank you, Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and Members of the  
15 Subcommittee. I am Mark Fendrick, Professor of Internal Medicine and Health Management &  
16 Policy at the University of Michigan. I am addressing you today, not as a representative of the  
17 University, but as a practicing primary care physician, a medical educator, and a public health  
18 professional. I have devoted much of the past two decades to studying the United States health  
19 care delivery system, and founded the University's Center for Value-Based Insurance Design  
20 [[www.vbidcenter.org](http://www.vbidcenter.org)] in 2005 to develop and evaluate insurance plans designed to engage  
21 consumers, optimize the health of Americans and ensure efficient expenditure of our public and  
22 private health care dollars.

23 Mr. Chairman, I applaud you for holding this hearing on Defense Health Care Reform,  
24 because access to quality care and containing costs are among the most pressing issues for  
25 our military personnel and our national well-being and economic security. We are well  
26 aware that the U.S. spends far more per capita on health care than any other country, yet  
27 lags behind other nations that spend substantially less, on key health quality and  
28 patient-centered health measures. Since there is consistent agreement within both  
29 political parties, and among key stakeholders, that there is already enough money being  
30 spent on health care in this country, I would like to emphasize that if we reallocated our  
31 existing dollars to clinical services for which there is clear evidence for improving health  
32 and away from those that don't, we could significantly enhance quality and substantially  
33 reduce the amount we spend. Thus, instead of the primary focus on *how much* we spend  
34 – I suggest we shift our attention to *how well* we spend our military health care dollars.

35 **FROM A VOLUME-DRIVEN TO VALUE-BASED SYSTEM**

36 Moving from a volume-driven to value-based military health delivery system requires a  
37 change in both how we pay for care (supply side initiatives) and how we engage  
38 consumers to seek care (demand side initiatives). Previous discussions and earlier  
39 testimonies focused on the critical importance and progress regarding reforming care  
40 delivery and payment policies. Many sections of the 2016 National Defense Authorization  
41 Act (NDAA) address payment issues; Sec. 726 explicitly calls for a pilot program to test  
42 value-based reimbursement in TRICARE.

43 These are important and worthy conversations. Yet, less attention has been directed to  
44 how we can alter consumer behavior as a policy lever to bring about a more efficient  
45 delivery system. While you have heard about the potential of pay-for-performance  
46 programs, patient-centered medical homes, bundled payment models, and other initiatives  
47 to influence providers, today I propose that **value-driven consumer incentives -- through  
48 benefit design reforms that promote smart decisions and enhanced personal  
49 responsibility -- must be aligned with payment reform initiatives for us to achieve our  
50 clinical and financial goals for military health care.** I commend the Subcommittee for  
51 exploring this matter today.

52 **DANGERS OF A BLUNT APPROACH TO BENEFICIARY COST-SHARING – THE IMPORTANCE OF ‘CLINICAL  
53 NUANCE’**

54 Over the past few decades, public and private payers -- including the TRICARE program -- have  
55 implemented multiple managerial tools to constrain health care cost growth with varying levels of  
56 success. The most common approach to directly impact consumer behavior is consumer cost  
57 shifting: requiring beneficiaries to pay more in the form of higher premiums and increased cost-  
58 sharing for clinician visits, diagnostic tests and prescription drugs. Of note, the Defense  
59 Department budget proposal for 2017 calls for increasing the member out-of-pocket contributions  
60 for TRICARE members, most dramatically for military retirees under 65.

61 With some notable exceptions, most U.S. health plans -- including TRICARE -- implement  
62 cost-sharing in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ way, in that beneficiaries are charged the same amount  
63 for every doctor visit, diagnostic test, and prescription drug [within a specified formulary  
64 tier]. People frequently ask me whether the amount of cost-sharing faced by TRICARE  
65 members is too high, too low, or just right. The answer, of course, is “it depends.” As  
66 TRICARE members are asked to pay more for every clinician visit and for every prescription  
67 -- despite clear differences in health produced -- a growing body of evidence demonstrates  
68 that increases in patient cost-sharing lead to decreases in the use of both non-essential and  
69 essential care. Unfortunately, research suggests that increasing ‘skin in the game’ has  
70 not produced a savvier health care consumer.

71 A noteworthy example of the undesirable impact of ‘one-size-fits-all’ **increases** in  
72 cost-sharing is a *New England Journal of Medicine* study that examined the effects of  
73 increases in copayments for all doctor visits for Medicare Advantage beneficiaries [Trivedi  
74 *A. N Engl J Med.* 2010;362(4):320-8]. As expected, individuals who were charged more to  
75 see their physician(s) went less often; however, these patients were hospitalized more  
76 frequently and their total medical costs increased. While this blunt approach may reduce  
77 TRICARE expenditures in the short-term, lower use rates of essential care may lead to  
78 inferior health outcomes and higher overall costs in certain clinical circumstances. This  
79 effect simply demonstrates that the age-old aphorism ‘penny wise and pound foolish’  
80 applies to health care.

81 Conversely, **decreases** in cost-sharing applied to all services regardless of clinical benefit --  
82 which may have been the case in certain TRICARE plans -- can lead to overuse or misuse of  
83 services that are potentially harmful or provide little clinical value. For the record, I  
84 support high cost-sharing levels for those services -- but only those services -- that do not  
85 make TRICARE members healthier. That said, I don’t think it makes sense to raise

86 cost-sharing on the services I beg my patients to do, such as fill their prescriptions to  
87 manage their chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes, depression, HIV) and laboratory tests that  
88 allow the monitoring of a specific disease (e.g., cholesterol, blood sugar).

89 Since there is evidence of both underuse of high-value services and overuse of low-value  
90 services in the TRICARE program, **'smarter'** cost-sharing is a potential solution -- one that  
91 encourages TRICARE members to use more of those services that make them healthier,  
92 and discourages the use of services that do not. Therefore, to more efficiently reallocate  
93 TRICARE medical spending and optimize health, the basic tenets of *clinical nuance* must be  
94 considered. **These tenets recognize that: 1) clinical services differ in the benefit  
95 provided; and 2) the clinical benefit derived from a specific service depends on the  
96 patient using it, who provides it, and where it is provided.**

97 Does it make sense to you, Mr. Chairman, that my TRICARE patients pay the same  
98 copayment to see a cardiologist after a heart attack as to see a dermatologist for mild  
99 acne? Or that the prescription drug copayment is the same amount for a lifesaving  
100 medication to treat diabetes, depression, or cancer, as it is for a drug that treats toenail  
101 fungus? On the less expensive generic drug tier available to most TRICARE members  
102 (current copayments are \$10 at retail pharmacies and \$0 through a mail order pharmacy),  
103 certain are drugs so valuable that I often reach into my own pocket to help patients fill  
104 these prescriptions; while for the same price there are also drugs of such dubious safety  
105 and efficacy, I honestly would not give them to my dog. The current 'one-size-fits-all'  
106 cost-sharing model lacks clinical nuance, and frankly, to me, makes no sense. As we  
107 deliberate Defense Health Care benefit redesign, there is bipartisan recognition that the  
108 current structure of the TRICARE benefit is outdated, confusing, and in need of reform.  
109 Taking steps to improve the current array of confusing deductibles, copayments and  
110 coinsurance is long overdue. I could not agree more that our military personnel deserve  
111 better. Only after we acknowledge the limitations and inefficiencies of the TRICARE  
112 cost-sharing structure, can we identify ways to improve it. It is my impression that  
113 TRICARE members avail themselves of too little high-value care and too much low-value  
114 care. Precision medicine needs precision benefit design. We need benefit designs that  
115 support consumers in obtaining evidence-based services such as diabetic retinal exams and  
116 discourage individuals through higher cost-sharing from using dangerous or low-value  
117 services such as those identified by professional medical societies in the Choosing Wisely  
118 initiative. By incorporating greater clinical nuance into benefit design, payers, purchasers,  
119 beneficiaries, and taxpayers can attain more health for every dollar spent.

## 120 **VALUE-BASED INSURANCE DESIGN [V-BID]: IMPLEMENTING CLINICAL NUANCE**

121 Realizing the lack of clinical nuance in available public and commercial health plans, more  
122 than a decade ago the private sector began to implement clinically nuanced plans based on  
123 a concept our team developed known as Value-Based Insurance Design, or V-BID. **The  
124 basic V-BID premise calls for reducing financial barriers to evidence-based services and  
125 high-performing providers and imposing disincentives to discourage use of low-value  
126 care.** A V-BID approach to benefit design recognizes that different health services have  
127 different levels of value. It's common sense -- when barriers to high-value treatments are  
128 reduced and access to low-value treatments is discouraged, these plans result in better  
129 health with the potential to substantially lower spending levels.

130 Let me be clear, Mr. Chairman, I am not asserting that implementing V-BID into TRICARE is  
131 a single solution to TRICARE’s problems. But, if we are serious about improving our  
132 members’ experiences and health outcomes, while also bending the health care cost curve,  
133 we must change the incentives for consumers as well as those for providers. **Blunt**  
134 **changes to TRICARE benefit design -- such as those recently announced -- must not**  
135 **produce avoidable reductions in quality of care.** Instead, I would recommend clinically  
136 driven -- instead of a price driven -- strategies.

137 I’m pleased to tell you that the intuitiveness of the V-BID concept is driving momentum at a  
138 rapid pace in both the private and public sectors, and we are truly at a ‘tipping point’ in its  
139 adoption. Hundreds of private self-insured employers, public organizations, non-profits,  
140 and insurance plans have designed and tested V-BID programs. The fundamental idea of  
141 ‘buy more of the good stuff and less of the bad’ has made V-BID one of the very few health  
142 care reform ideas with broad multi-stakeholder and bipartisan political support.

143 V-BID implementation has occurred in many of the states represented by members of this  
144 subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, V-BID principles have been implemented in your State of  
145 South Carolina Medicaid program to ensure that vulnerable beneficiaries have better  
146 access to potentially life-saving drugs used to treat chronic diseases. Senator Gillibrand,  
147 the Empire state has highlighted V-BID in Governor Cuomo’s state innovation plan and is a  
148 key element of the State Innovation Model (SIM) program. Senator King, V-BID has a  
149 similar high profile role in the Maine SIM program. Senator Cotton, Arkansas has been a  
150 national leader in aligning consumer engagement initiatives with the episode-based  
151 payment model. Senators Tillis and Blumenthal, V-BID plans are now offered to state  
152 employees in North Carolina and Connecticut. Of note, the Connecticut Health  
153 Enhancement Plan -- a V-BID plan for state employees -- has demonstrated high levels of  
154 participation in healthy behaviors (98%), and preventive care, and has significantly reduced  
155 emergency room visits in only two years. This plan has become a national model used by  
156 several other states and public employers.

157 The last and most important example I would like to mention is the implementation of V-BID in the  
158 Medicare program, a crucial component of our nation’s commitment to take care of the elderly  
159 and disabled among us. The ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to Medicare coverage dates back to its  
160 inception in the 1960s, driven by discrimination concerns. Over the past several years, bipartisan,  
161 bicameral Congressional support has grown to allow Medicare to implement clinically nuanced  
162 benefit designs. In 2009, Senators Hutchison and Stabenow introduced a bipartisan bill,  
163 “Seniors’ Medication Copayment Reduction Act of 2009” (S 1040), to allow a demonstration of V-  
164 BID within Medicare Advantage plans. Last May, Senators Thune and Stabenow introduced the  
165 “Value-Based Insurance Design Seniors’ Copayment Reduction Act of 2015” (S 1396). A  
166 companion bill included in the “Strengthening Medicare Advantage through Innovation and  
167 Transparency for Seniors Act of 2015” (HR 2570) passed the U.S. House of Representatives in June  
168 with strong bipartisan support.

169 This strong Congressional backing led the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) to  
170 announce a program to test V-BID in Medicare Advantage (MA) plans in September 2015. The  
171 5-year demonstration program will examine the utility of structuring patient cost-sharing and  
172 other health plan design elements to encourage patients to use high-value clinical services and

173 providers, thereby improving quality and reducing costs. The model test will begin in January  
174 2017, in Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.

## 175 **INFUSING ‘CLINICAL NUANCE’ INTO TRICARE**

176 Flexibility in benefit design would allow TRICARE plans to achieve even greater efficiency  
177 and to encourage personal responsibility among members in the following ways:

### 178 **I. DIFFERENTIAL COST-SHARING FOR USE OF DIFFERENT PROVIDERS OR SETTINGS**

179 Since the value of a clinical service may depend on the specific provider or the site  
180 of care delivery, **TRICARE plans should have the flexibility to vary cost-sharing for a**  
181 **particular outpatient service in accordance with who provides the service and /or**  
182 **where the service is delivered.** This flexibility is increasingly feasible, as quality  
183 metrics and risk-adjustment tools become better able to identify high-performing  
184 health care providers and/or care settings that consistently deliver superior quality.

### 185 **II. DIFFERENTIAL COST-SHARING FOR USE OF DIFFERENT SERVICES**

186 To date, most clinically nuanced designs have focused on lowering patient  
187 out-of-pocket costs for high-value services (carrots). These are the services I beg  
188 my patients to do -- for which there is no question of their clinical value -- such as  
189 immunizations, preventive screenings, and critical medications and treatments for  
190 individuals with chronic disease such as asthma, diabetes, and mental illness (e.g. as  
191 recommended by National Committee for Quality Assurance, National Quality  
192 Forum, professional society guidelines). Despite unequivocal evidence of clinical  
193 benefit, there is substantial underutilization of these high-value services by TRICARE  
194 members. Multiple peer-reviewed studies show that when patient barriers are  
195 reduced, compliance goes up, and, depending on the intervention or service, total  
196 costs go down.

197 Yet, from the TRICARE program’s perspective, the cost of incentive-only  
198 ‘carrot-based’ V-BID programs depends on whether the added spending on  
199 high-value services is offset by a decrease in adverse events, such as  
200 hospitalizations and visits to the emergency department. While these high-value  
201 services are cost-effective and improve quality, many are not cost saving --  
202 particularly in the short term. However, research suggests that non-medical  
203 economic effects -- such as the improvement in productivity associated with better  
204 health -- can substantially impact the financial results of V-BID programs.

205 While significant cost savings are unlikely with incentive-only ‘carrot’ programs in  
206 the short term, **a V-BID program that combines reductions in cost-sharing for**  
207 **high-value services and increases in cost-sharing for low-value services can both**  
208 **improve quality and achieve net cost savings.** Removing harmful and/or  
209 unnecessary care from the system is essential to reduce costs, and creates an  
210 opportunity to improve quality and patient safety. Evidence suggests significant  
211 opportunities exist to save money without sacrificing high-quality care. For  
212 example, in 2014, the lowest available estimates of waste in the U.S. health care  
213 system exceeded 20% of total health care expenditures. Though less common,

214 some V-BID programs are designed to discourage use of low-value services and  
215 poorly performing providers. Low-value services result in either harm or no net  
216 benefit, such as services labeled with a D rating by the U.S. Preventive Services Task  
217 Force.

218 It is important to note that **many services that are identified as high quality in**  
219 **certain clinical settings are considered low-value when used in other patient**  
220 **populations, clinical diagnoses or delivery settings.** For example, cardiac  
221 catheterization, imaging for back pain, and colonoscopy can each be classified as a  
222 high- or low-value service depending on the clinical characteristics of the person,  
223 when in the course of the disease the service is provided, and where it is delivered.

224 Fortunately, there is growing movement to both identify and discourage the use of  
225 low-value services. The ABIM Foundation, in association with Consumers Union,  
226 has launched Choosing Wisely, an initiative where medical specialty societies  
227 identify commonly used tests or procedures whose necessity should be questioned  
228 and discussed. Thus far, over 40 medical specialty societies have identified at least  
229 five low-value services within their respective fields. Substantial and immediate  
230 cost savings are available from waste identification and elimination. Thus, **V-BID**  
231 **programs that include both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ may be particularly desirable in**  
232 **the setting of budget shortfalls.**

### 233 **III. DIFFERENTIAL COST-SHARING FOR CERTAIN SERVICES FOR SPECIFIC ENROLLEES**

234 Since a critical aspect of clinical nuance is that the value of a medical service  
235 depends on the person receiving it, we recommend that TRICARE plans encourage  
236 differential cost-sharing for specific groups of enrollees. **The flexibility to target**  
237 **enrollee cost-sharing based on clinical information (e.g., diagnosis, clinical risk**  
238 **factors, etc.) is a crucial element to the safe and efficient allocation of**  
239 **expenditures.** Under such a scenario, a plan may choose to exempt certain  
240 enrollees from cost-sharing for a specific service on the basis of a specific clinical  
241 indicator, while imposing cost-sharing on other enrollees for which the same service  
242 is not clinically indicated. Under such an approach, plans can recognize that many  
243 services are of particularly high-value for beneficiaries with conditions such as  
244 diabetes, hypertension, asthma, and mental illness, while of low-value to others.  
245 (For example, annual retinal eye examinations are recommended in evidence-based  
246 guidelines for enrollees with diabetes, but not recommended for those without the  
247 diagnosis.) Without easy access to high-value secondary preventive services,  
248 previously diagnosed individuals may be at greater risk for poor health outcomes  
249 and avoidable, expensive, acute-care utilization. Conversely, keeping cost-sharing  
250 low for all enrollees for these services, regardless of clinical indicators, can result in  
251 overuse or misuse of services leading to wasteful spending and potential for harm.

252 Permitting ‘clinically nuanced’ variation in cost-sharing would give TRICARE plans a  
253 necessary tool needed to better encourage members to receive high-value services. This  
254 addition would eliminate many of the challenges and limitations of the ‘one-size-fits-all’  
255 model.

256 **ALIGNMENT OF CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT WITH ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MODELS**

257 The TRICARE program is currently examining many exciting, some unproven, value-based  
258 reimbursement initiatives such as bundled payments, pay-for-performance, and patient-centered  
259 medical homes, some of which are explicitly addressed in the 2016 National Defense Authorization  
260 Act. As these initiatives provide incentives for clinicians to deliver specific services to particular  
261 patient populations, it is of equal importance that consumer incentives are aligned. As a  
262 practicing physician, **it is incomprehensible to realize that my patients' insurance coverage may**  
263 **not offer easy access for those exact services for which I am benchmarked.** Does it make sense  
264 to offer a financial bonus to get my patient's diabetes blood sugar under control, when her  
265 benefit design makes it prohibitively expensive to fill her insulin prescription or provide the  
266 copayment for her eye examination? **The alignment of clinically nuanced, provider-facing, and**  
267 **consumer engagement initiatives is a necessary and critical step to improve quality of care,**  
268 **enhance the member experience, and contain cost growth for the TRICARE program.**

269 **CONCLUSION**

270 As this committee considers changes to the TRICARE benefit design, it is an honor for me  
271 to present one novel approach to better engage TRICARE members. As a practicing  
272 clinician, I believe that the goal of the military health system is to keep its members  
273 healthy, not to save money. That said, I strongly concur that health care cost  
274 containment is absolutely critical for the sustainability of the TRICARE program and our  
275 nation's fiscal health. While there is urgency to bend the health care cost curve, cost  
276 containment efforts should not produce avoidable reductions in quality of care. As  
277 cost-sharing becomes a necessity for fiscal sustainability, I encourage you to take a  
278 common-sense approach of setting member co-payments on whether a clinical service  
279 makes a TRICARE member healthier -- instead of the current strategy of basing member  
280 contributions on the price of the service. **In other words, make it harder to buy the**  
281 **services they should not be using in the first place.** If such principles encourage the  
282 utilization of high-value providers and services and discourage only low-value services,  
283 TRICARE plans can improve health, enhance consumer responsibility, and reduce costs.

284 Thank you.

285