

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Bryan P. Fenton, USA
Nominee for Commander, United States Special Operations Command

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?

I understand that as a Unified Combatant Command with Service-like responsibilities, USSOCOM is a strategic headquarters with the responsibility to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions. This includes responsibilities to resource, organize, train, and equip Service and Joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) Components. In that role, the USSOCOM commander is responsible as a force provider to other supported Combatant Commands as outlined in Title 10 U.S.C. Section 167 – and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the USSOCOM commander conducts operations globally.

2. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

I am honored and humbled to be the president's nominee for the position of Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. I entered the SOF ranks in 1992, going through the Army's Special Forces Qualification Course and earning the Special Forces tab. Since then, I have served for over 30 years in the SOF community and conducted, enabled, or commanded special operations on five continents at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. I have also served in SOF institutional man, train, and equip roles, developing and educating special operations forces. I have also served as the Deputy Commanding General of USINDOPACOM, and the Deputy Commanding General for the 25th Infantry Division. In these roles, I learned how combatant commands employ both SOF and conventional forces in support of national objectives.

3. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, USSOCOM?

I do. If confirmed, I will immediately consult with the USSOCOM team, the Department, the interagency, and other key stakeholders. I will also proactively seek the expertise of current and former special operations members, USSOCOM leaders, as well as other thought leaders in policy, business, academia – to incorporate lessons learned from the past and better prepare USSOCOM for the future. I will also collaborate with interagency and international partners and allies to seek their input.

Relationships

4. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander of USSOCOM to the following offices:

4(a). The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is the USSOCOM Commander's superior in the chain of command. If confirmed, I will look to the Secretary of Defense for guidance and resources to organize, train, and equip the most capable special operations forces to advance enduring U.S. national interests. The USSOCOM Commander owes the Secretary of Defense his best military advice on all SOF matters pertaining to national security.

4(b). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

As the senior military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in reviewing and communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and Secretary of Defense. Coordination of USSOCOM activities with the Chairman ensures that he remains fully informed in support of his responsibilities to provide sound and timely military advice to senior policymakers.

4(c). The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy, including matters related to planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the USD(P) to ensure USSOCOM activities support Department policies.

4(d). The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) is the principal intelligence and security advisor to the Secretary of Defense. USD(I&S) exercises authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence and security organizations within the Department, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Security Service, and the intelligence components of the combatant commands and military services. USD(I&S) is also dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and reports to the DNI in this capacity. USD(I&S) is the Department's principal interface with the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence Community and represents the Department on intelligence and sensitive operations at the National Security Council. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(I&S) to coordinate

USSOCOM matters related to intelligence and security.

4(e). The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) serves as the DOD Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) responsible for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including system design, development, procurement of goods and services, sustainment of systems, and providing Department-wide policy. Pursuant to Title 10, Section 167, the USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE) derives authority to conduct acquisition from the DAE. If confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM acquisition activities, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), are executed by the SOAE under the authorities delegated to the Command by the DAE. Additionally, I will ensure that the Command is effectively implementing policies and procedures for logistics, maintenance, material readiness, and sustainment support to the warfighter.

4(f). The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) is responsible for overseeing the research, engineering, and technology development activities across the DOD enterprise, and is mandated with driving key technologies to ensure technological superiority for the DOD. If confirmed, in coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will ensure USSOCOM Science and Technology research activities and funding are complementary to and aligned with the Department research policy, processes, and priorities. In addition, we will assist in the initiation and implementation of acquisition pathways that embrace agile practices to innovate, develop, exploit, and reduce barriers of entry for commercial technologies and non-traditional defense partners.

4(g). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))

ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall oversight of special operations activities within the Department of Defense, including USSOCOM. Section 167 of Title 10 places ASD(SO/LIC) in the administrative chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, USSOCOM to exercise authority, direction, and control with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure our special operations forces are organized effectively, highly trained, and well-equipped to seize opportunities and address the challenges of any future operational environment.

4(h). The Service Secretaries

The USSOCOM Commander's authority over the Service components assigned is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act but requires close coordination with the Service Secretaries to ensure that USSOCOM does not intrude upon each Service Secretary's responsibilities. Close coordination between the USSOCOM Commander, the ASD(SO/LIC), and each of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and maintaining the Services' support to SOF as an integral part of the Joint Force.

4(i). The Service Chiefs

In cooperation with the Service Chiefs, the USSOCOM Commander will ensure the preparedness of forces to execute assigned missions. The Service Chiefs play a critical role in the development, promotion, and assignment of SOF personnel. The Service Chiefs are also a source of experience and judgment that every Combatant Commander may call upon. If confirmed, I will continue an open dialogue and cooperative partnership with the Service Chiefs.

4(j). The other combatant commanders

Successive USSOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in their relationships with the Combatant Commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the years as trans-regional threats have emerged. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve our common objectives against trans-regional threats, Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (CVEO), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), Countering Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-sUAS), and Military Information Support Operations (MISO). If confirmed, I will be committed to providing trained and ready SOF to the Combatant Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility to support national and theater security objectives.

Major Challenges and Priorities

5. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander of USSOCOM?

If confirmed, I will consult with the USSOCOM team, Combatant Commands, ASD(SO/LIC), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to gain a better understanding of USSOCOM's major challenges. From my current position, I assess three potential focus areas. The first is talent management – recruiting, selecting, training, and retaining the right people for special operations. Mission success requires a diverse, innovative, inclusive, and empowered team of SOF professionals. The second is addressing mission readiness. This includes ensuring SOF is prepared for crisis response tasks, maintaining a sustainable level of Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (CVEO) while strengthening SOF's capabilities and readiness for the other priorities outlined in the National Defense Strategy –

including campaigning and bolstering strategic deterrence against China and Russia. The third challenge is transforming and modernizing SOF to address the current and future operating environments – including along technological and organizational lines of effort to improve lethality, agility, and sustainability.

6. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic analysis of these focus areas against current and future operating environments, and develop plans to ensure SOF remains a capable, ready, and resilient force.

7. What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Department of Defense?

In my experience, four lessons stand above all others. The first is the importance of people. Get the right people for the enterprise, empower them, take care of them, and value them. Our people are why we win. The second is that mission readiness is critical. Our force must be trained and ready to solve our Nation’s most complex problems, at any time, in any environment. The third lesson is that transformation and modernization are essential – complacency accrues unacceptable risk to current and future mission execution. Last is the importance of relationships – including within DOD, the interagency and Intelligence Community, and with partners and allies.

8. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Commander of USSOCOM?

If confirmed, I will prioritize the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and others as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. To achieve these objectives, I will continue to prioritize people, mission readiness, and transformation.

Civilian Oversight of USSOCOM

Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, as amended, included modifications to the roles and responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) as well as the relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander of USSOCOM in order for the ASD(SO/LIC) to more effectively fulfill its “service secretary-like” responsibilities to provide civilian oversight of and advocacy within DOD for USSOCOM’s Service-like requirements.

9. What is your view of the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in promoting civilian control over the military?

In my view, civilian oversight and control of the military is critically important to the Department of Defense, USSOCOM, and our Nation. ASD(SO/LIC) exercises oversight,

authority, direction, and control with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. The role of ASD(SO/LIC) is important for SOF civilian oversight and advocacy, and vital for the health and readiness of U.S. special operations forces. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship and coordination.

10. What is your understanding of the organizational and administrative relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander of USSOCOM?

The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 922, codified the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in the administrative chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of USSOCOM for Title 10 organize, train, and equip responsibilities. This legislation recognized and strengthened the authority, direction, and control of ASD(SO/LIC) over special operations-peculiar administrative matters. The FY21 NDAA further reinforced the role of ASD(SO/LIC). If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) as he provides civilian oversight and advocacy for SOF within DOD.

11. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in:

11(a). The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget request;

Pursuant to DOD Directive 5111.10, ASD(SO/LIC) performs a budgetary role and responsibility like those of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. In close partnership with HQ USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC) provides overall supervision of the preparation and justification of Special Operations programs and budget for Major Force Program-11 to include review and approval of the USSOCOM annual budget request prior to submission to the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to being a part of this process.

11(b). Approving programs of record and the acquisition of special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM;

ASD(SO/LIC) plays an essential role in approving programs of record and the acquisition of special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC) is a partner in the development and approval of two key products for USSOCOM that define programs of record: the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board (SOCREB) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The SOCREB is USSOCOM's requirements validation board that approves all special operations-peculiar requirements and establishes programs of record. The POM determines the resources USSOCOM will apply to these programs of record. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) on resourcing and acquisition matters.

11(c). Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and service components;

Sections 138 and 167 of Title 10 assign ASD(SO/LIC) the responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control of all special operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the organization, training, and equipping of SOF – including the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and service components.

11(d). Ensuring the readiness of Special Operations Forces (SOF); and

ASD(SO/LIC) plays a vital role in the readiness of special operations forces. USSOCOM provides a quarterly readiness brief for the ASD(SO/LIC) and his staff to facilitate oversight of Special Operations readiness issues and discuss areas that warrant advocacy from the ASD(SO/LIC). Additionally, the USSOCOM staff maintains regular contact with the ASD(SO/LIC) on readiness issues. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) in the execution of his Service-like responsibilities of organizing, training and equipping USSOCOM to ensure the readiness of the force.

11(e). Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and accountability of Special Operations Forces.

Along with USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC) plays a critical role in overseeing the command climate and culture within SOF to ensure alignment with military ethics and values. Part of this oversight involves prevention, response, and accountability for ethical issues. If confirmed, I look forward to working with ASD(SO/LIC) to promote a culture of ethics and accountability within USSOCOM that is critical to maintaining SOF readiness, mission accomplishment, and the trust of our Nation.

National Defense Strategy

The unclassified summary of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) states “The Department will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department. Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. We will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression. The Department will remain capable of managing other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.”

12. In your view, what is the role of special operations forces in:

12(a). Long-term strategic competition with and deterring aggression by China;

In my previous experience and current role, I have seen SOF play a key part in strategic competition and deterring aggression by China – principally by supporting NDS priorities and Combatant Command campaign plans addressing this challenge. Often, this involves SOF training, advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing, illuminating, and

reporting; and offering asymmetric options for supported Combatant Commands – while posing multiple dilemmas for the PRC.

12(b). Addressing the acute threats posed by Russia;

If confirmed, I will explore this further, but in my previous experience and current role, I have seen SOF play a key part in strategic competition and deterring aggression by Russia – principally by supporting NDS priorities and Combatant Command campaign plans addressing this threat. Often, this involves SOF training, advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing, illuminating, and reporting; and offering unique asymmetric options for supported Combatant Commands, while posing multiple dilemmas for Russia. Building partner capacity has been particularly valuable to our NATO allies and other partners – USSOF’s work over the past several years in Ukraine serves as an example.

12(c). Managing persistent threats from North Korea and Iran; and

SOF play a key role in managing persistent threats from North Korea and Iran – again, principally by supporting Combatant Command campaign plans addressing these threats. This also involves SOF training, advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing, illuminating, and reporting; and offering unique asymmetric options for supported Combatant Commands and Joint Force commanders. Against the threats of North Korea and Iran, USSOCOM’s strong relationships with allied and partner forces – and irregular warfare expertise – provide placement, access, and capabilities, while messaging U.S. conviction and minimizing the risk of unintended escalation. With respect to North Korea and Iran, USSOF’s ability to sense, illuminate, and report on hostile gray zone activities is especially valued by supported Combatant Commands, as is USSOCOM’s role as Coordinating Authority for CWMD.

12(d). Sustaining pressure on violent extremist organizations

USSOCOM supports the Department and other Combatant Commands as part of the whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy, along with partners and allies. The NDS, along with the Global Campaign Plan for VEO, provide priorities for addressing global VEO threats. SOF resources are focused on monitoring and disrupting VEOs that have the capability and intent to attack the U.S. homeland. Working with like-minded partners and allies, and leveraging current and future technology, are critical to sustaining pressure on VEOs, now and in the future.

The NDS identifies integrated deterrence, campaigning, and “actions to build enduring advantages” as the primary ways by which the Department will seek to achieve its goals under the NDS.

13. What do you see as USSOCOM’s role in each of these areas?

If confirmed, I will explore this topic more fully with the USSOCOM team, but in my view, USSOCOM and SOF provide the Department and supported Combatant Commands with asymmetric options and capabilities that enable integrated deterrence and campaigning, and present multiple dilemmas to our adversaries. I assess that SOF are particularly capable in gray zone competition, and SOF provide combat credible forces to support the Joint Force

in conflict. To build enduring advantages, SOF develop resilient networks and asymmetric capabilities of our own, and to strengthen partners and allies.

14. How do you intend to balance the competing requirements of continuing global counterterrorism requirements while also supporting the NDS-directed priority lines of effort to counter China and Russia?

If confirmed, I will review these requirements, and make recommendations based on the guidance provided in the NDS. That includes addressing strategic competition and meeting Combatant Command requirements for SOF, while preserving SOF's ability to conduct crisis response and sustained CVEO. We must also maintain a sustainable balance for our service members and their families, and continually modernize and transform SOF capabilities, training, and doctrine.

15. Does USSOCOM require any additional capabilities in order to adequately support the objectives laid out in the NDS?

If confirmed, using the NDS for guidance, and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will review existing requirements to ensure SOF are capable of supporting NDS objectives in current and future operating environments.

16. Do you believe special operations forces are appropriately organized and sized to meet global requirements?

If confirmed, using the NDS for guidance, and in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will review the organization and size of SOF to ensure that it is capable of meeting global requirements in current and future operating environments.

Special Operations Missions

17(a). Do you believe the special operations activities identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and appropriate?

Yes, I do – more than ever.

17(b). What changes, if any, would you recommend?

If confirmed, I will review and provide any recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department of Defense.

18. Are there special operations missions or activities that you believe should be transferred to conventional forces or, otherwise divested by USSOCOM, and, if so, why?

If confirmed, and using the NDS for guidance, I will review the range and prioritization of USSOCOM missions and activities and provide recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the

Department of Defense.

19. Are there any additional missions or activities that you believe should be assigned to USSOCOM? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, and using the NDS for guidance, I will review the range and prioritization of USSOCOM missions outlined in Section 167 of Title 10 and provide recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.

Combating Terrorism

20. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other VEOs, to the U.S. homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which group or groups, in your view, currently present the greatest threat to the United States?

Per the NDS, terrorism and violent extremism comprise a persistent threat to U.S. interests abroad and to our homeland. ISIS and al-Qaeda have been degraded by sustained counter-terror operations – often in close partnership with our allies and partners. However, these and other terror groups continue efforts to target U.S. personnel, our homeland, and allied interests. More broadly, VEOs remain a significant destabilizing force both strategically and regionally, particularly in areas of the Middle East and Africa.

In my view, Al Qaeda and ISIS present the greatest VEO threat to U.S. interests.

21. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

Yes, I do. If confirmed, I will continually reassess our authorities and activities, and their impact against adaptive terrorist threats, and make appropriate recommendations through the Department.

22. If confirmed, how would you seek to fulfill USSOCOM's assigned responsibilities for synchronizing global operations against terrorist networks?

As the Coordinating Authority for global operations against terrorist networks, USSOCOM coordinates with all combatant commands and across the DOD to conduct strategic planning, assesses DOD execution of the global campaign plan, and makes recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense for improvements as appropriate. If confirmed, I will review and seek to improve existing USSOCOM processes; consult with DOD, Intelligence Community, and interagency stakeholders; and provide recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense.

23. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?

If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM's current efforts and make recommendations to the Department as needed. Effective synchronization across departments and agencies is vital in the CVEO fight. The SOF enterprise has made remarkable improvements since 2001, and today we can point to examples like Operation GALLANT PHOENIX, a SOF-led interagency and multinational CVEO task force created to share intelligence, disrupt, and degrade Sunni extremist VEOs. These and similar efforts increase joint, interagency, and multinational coordination.

24. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?

USSOCOM supports the Department and other Combatant Commands, as part of the whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy. The NDS, along with the Global Campaign Plan for VEO, provide priorities for addressing global VEO threats, and monitoring and disrupting the most dangerous VEOs – those with the capability and intent to attack the U.S. homeland. Working with like-minded partners and allies makes CVEO more effective.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)

25. Under the Unified Campaign Plan, USSOCOM is tasked with coordinating DOD's efforts on CWMDs.

That is my understanding as well.

26. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?

I understand that as the Department of Defense CWMD Coordinating Authority, USSOCOM coordinates with all combatant commands and across the DOD to conduct strategic planning, assesses DOD execution of the CWMD campaign, and makes recommendations to the Department for improvements as appropriate. USSOCOM is also responsible for integrating key CWMD concepts into doctrine, informing intelligence prioritization, and facilitating translation of strategic objectives into operations, activities, and investments.

27. In your assessment are there any resources, authorities, or organizational changes needed to better execute USSOCOM's CWMD mission?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of USSOCOM's CWMD capabilities, and its role as Coordinating Authority for CWMD, using the Unified Command Plan and the NDS as guides. If changes are needed, I will make appropriate recommendations in close

coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and ASD (Space), to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense.

10 U.S.C. 127e Operations

Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

28. What is your assessment of this authority?

In my experience, the 127e program has been an essential tool in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The ability to organize, develop, and train a partner force provides placement, access, and opportunities for action not previously available. With the reduction of forward deployed CVEO forces and bases, and increasing levels of technical surveillance overseas, the ability to partner with local forces is of growing importance, generating greater return on investment and mitigating overall risk to U.S. forces.

29. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate 127e proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?

If confirmed, I would review the current USSOCOM processes used to evaluate 127e proposals, with other stakeholders as appropriate. Evaluation factors I would consider include: NDS priorities, COCOM priorities, a defined end-state and off-ramp plan, clear measures of performance and effectiveness, a monitoring and reassessment process for meeting objectives, and effective screening of the partner force.

Irregular Warfare

Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as irregular warfare and “gray zone operations.”

30. What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by adversaries in this domain of warfare?

I assess that gray zone campaigning has become a preferred approach by adversaries, particularly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These gray zone activities seek to coerce the U.S., allies, and partners into accepting acts of aggression, and seek to degrade U.S. advantages in technology, influence, and defensive capabilities. These gray zone activities – which include use of Chinese maritime militia fishing fleets, Russian private military companies, and malicious Iranian cyber activities – threaten U.S. interests.

31. What should be the guiding principles of the Department of Defense's strategy to counter these threats?

The current NDS considers this problem in detail, and emphasizes the principles of integrated deterrence, campaigning, accelerating modernization, and synchronizing DOD efforts across the whole of government, warfighting domains, and the instruments of national power – in close partnership with our allies and partners. The Department has committed to developing, designing, building, and managing a Joint Force with the lethality, resilience, sustainability, survivability, agility, and responsiveness needed for campaigning.

32. What role should Special Operations Forces have in executing such a strategy?

I believe that U.S. special operations forces were created for just this type of strategy. In concert with geographic combatant commands, SOF provide: resident expertise in unconventional and irregular warfare; cultural awareness and knowledge of foreign languages; scalable, asymmetric options in land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains; and are well-versed in current and emerging technology. Special operations forces are well-suited to presenting adversaries with multiple dilemmas, and counter their activities in gray zone competition below the level of warfare.

33. Do you believe that Special Operations Forces have the appropriate authorities and capabilities to operate effectively in this domain of warfare? Please explain your answer.

If confirmed, I look forward to conducting a holistic review of SOF's authorities and capabilities and making appropriate recommendations through ASD(SO/LIC) to the Department.

Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces.

34. What is your assessment of this authority?

From my experience, Section 1202 is a valuable tool that enables U.S. special operations by building partner capacity and capabilities, giving the U.S. additional placement and access, thereby generating multiple dilemmas for our adversaries and options for U.S. forces. 1202 authority allows USSOCOM to build irregular warfare capability that mitigates risk to U.S. forces while gaining placement and access to otherwise contested or denied areas and impose costs on adversaries. Properly implemented, 1202 allows SOF to provide a broader range of sustainable and cost-effective irregular warfare options to compete in the gray zone, assure allies and partners, and strengthen deterrence.

35. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate section 1202 proposals to

ensure they comply with policy guidance, are complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government irregular warfare efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?

If confirmed, and with relevant stakeholders, I will review the current USSOCOM processes used to evaluate 1202 proposals. Evaluation factors I would consider include: NDS priorities, COCOM priorities, a well-defined end-state and off-ramp plan, clear measures of performance and effectiveness, a monitoring and reassessment process for meeting objectives, and effective screening of the enabled partner force.

Information Operations

36. In your view, are the Department and the broader interagency appropriately organized to compete with state and non-state adversaries in the information environment? If not, what recommendations would you make?

In my view, the information environment is key terrain in every region of the world. As the DOD Coordinating Authority for web-based military information support operations, USSOCOM has an important role in advancing U.S. interests and achieving information advantage. If confirmed, I will review current processes to ensure USSOCOM's military information support operations are coordinated and aligned with military objectives and Department policy, assess how well the Department and broader interagency are organized to compete in the information environment, and make appropriate recommendations through the Department.

37. What is the appropriate role of the Department and, specifically, Special Operations Forces in the broader information operations and strategic communications efforts of the U.S. Government?

If confirmed, I will explore this issue more fully, but based on my experience, special operations forces conduct information operations in coordination with interagency and Intelligence Community partners to support DOD and U.S. government objectives.

38. Do you believe that USSOCOM's military information support capabilities can be more effectively utilized? If so, are there doctrinal, organizational, training, or authority modifications that you believe could make military information support capabilities more effective?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of USSOCOM's military information support capabilities. If there are doctrinal, organizational, training or authorities-based modifications that would improve USSOCOM's MISO capabilities, I will recommend appropriate changes to ASD(SO/LIC), the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense.

39. Are there additional military capabilities that should be developed by the Department to more effectively compete in the information environment?

If confirmed, I will work with the USSOCOM team, Combatant Commands, and the Department to conduct a holistic assessment for additional military capabilities and report back to the Department. In my current role, I believe the nexus between SOF, Space, and Cyber capabilities offers new possibilities for strategic competition and integrated deterrence, and if confirmed, I look forward to exploring this concept for use by special operations forces in the information environment and other domains.

Intelligence Operations

40. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by Special Operations Forces different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

In my experience, SOF principally conduct intelligence operations in support of the warfighter and the Department – to achieve national security objectives. However, special operations forces do not do this alone; they integrate, coordinate, and deconflict these operations with partners in the Intelligence Community and interagency, as appropriate.

41. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are properly coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?

My service in USINDOPACOM, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and other regions reinforced the importance of integration, coordination, and deconfliction with the broader Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will reinforce the importance of these partnerships as SOF continue to maintain a global presence and work with the Intelligence Community to identify and understand evolving threats. I will also evaluate the existing coordination and oversight processes, and recommend changes to the Department as appropriate.

Civilian Casualties

Earlier this year, Secretary Austin released the results of an independent study by RAND into the Department’s policy, processes, and procedures related to investigating and responding to civilian casualty incidents and committed to issuing new Department-level guidance on these issues within 180 days – both of which were required by previous National Defense Authorization Acts.

42. In your view, what are the primary challenges for the combatant commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations? How would you seek to address these challenges if confirmed as USSOCOM Commander?

We have a legal, moral, and ethical obligation to minimize, and where possible, prevent civilian casualties during military operations. In my experience, the Department of Defense

is strongly committed to protecting civilians, and along with Combatant Commands have developed policies and procedures to mitigate civilian casualties during military operations, conduct timely and thorough investigations, and share lessons learned.

However, as evidenced by Secretary Austin's January 27, 2022 Memorandum "Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response" there are opportunities to improve. I look forward to the results of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP) and the upcoming DOD Instruction to provide refined guidance on mitigating and responding to civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will ensure this guidance is implemented throughout USSOCOM; as a learning organization we will incorporate and institutionalize these lessons learned and refined guidance to improve our tactics, techniques and procedures to mitigate civilian casualties.

43. How should Department of Defense policies and procedures be revised to more effectively support the objectives of mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?

If confirmed, I will review current and future Department policies and, where appropriate, improve USSOCOM's processes for mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. This review will be informed by the forthcoming CHMRAP and DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response. We have a legal, moral, and ethical obligation to minimize, and where possible, prevent civilian casualties during armed conflict, as any and all civilian casualties are a tragedy.

44. Do you believe the combatant commands are sufficiently resourced for mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?

If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM components, fellow combatant commanders, and other stakeholders to assess the resources required to mitigate, investigate, and respond to allegations of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations – and make appropriate recommendations to the Department.

45. When civilian casualty allegations arise, do you believe they should be investigated by personnel sufficiently independent of the unit or task force which conducted the strike?

When allegations of civilian casualties arise, I believe they should always be investigated by sufficiently impartial, unbiased, and objective investigators.

46. How can the Department more effectively capture and share lessons learned from civilian casualty investigations so they can be incorporated into future operations?

Capturing and sharing lessons-learned is an important part of DOD culture. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my fellow combatant commanders and the Department on implementing and widely sharing lessons learned from civilian casualty investigations – and improving training and operations to better mitigate civilian casualties.

USSOCOM Acquisition Authorities

Section 167(e)(4) of title 10, U.S. Code, assigns to the Commander, USSOCOM the authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, and to acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services. The Commander, USSOCOM is advised and assisted in these matters by a command acquisition executive.

47. What technology areas and capabilities do you believe should be prioritized to enable special operations forces to most effectively support the objectives of the NDS?

If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM’s current technological capabilities and priorities with the NDS as a guide and make appropriate recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.

48. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating a determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel, supplies, or services is “special operations-peculiar”?

If confirmed, I would review USSOCOM’s current processes and procedures, and if appropriate, recommend changes through the Department. I understand that “special operations-peculiar” refers to equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander, USSOCOM, for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the Commander, USSOCOM, as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission.

49. If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each of the three aspects of the special operations-peculiar acquisition process—requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

If confirmed, I would do a holistic assessment of requirements, acquisition, and budgeting aspects of USSOCOM’s SO-peculiar acquisition process, to identify what to sustain and any improvements that may be required – in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC). I assess it is critical to continuously evaluate and refine USSOCOM's acquisition system to ensure it can support the evolving operational environment and unique SOF operational requirements. Also, I believe it is essential that USSOCOM retain the agility and flexibility

necessary to respond rapidly to emerging battlefield requirements.

50. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and prioritized?

If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM's existing processes, SOF operator feedback, and NDS priorities – in close coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) – to ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and appropriately prioritized. Weaponizing innovation is both a mission requirement and a hallmark of U.S. special operations forces; SOF often serve as a pathfinder for the Joint Force in this regard.

51. If confirmed, how will you ensure that special operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?

If confirmed, I will review current USSOCOM processes and make changes where appropriate, while continuing to seek integration of the developments and capabilities USSOCOM is pursuing into the broader DOD and Joint Force. This ensures transparency, collaboration, and acceleration of research and development.

Ethics and Accountability

In January 2020, USSOCOM completed a Comprehensive Review of Special Operations Forces Culture and Ethics. Among other things, the Comprehensive Review found that “selective implementation” of recommendations from four previous reviews related to the culture and ethics of Special Operations Forces since 2011, including two such reviews mandated by Congress, have resulted in continued challenges related to the assessment and selection of Special Operations Forces, leader development, and force structure and employment.

52. What are your views on the current culture of ethics and accountability in U.S. Special Operations Forces?

In my over 30 years of SOF experience, the SOF culture has been primarily one of service and quiet professionalism, with the overwhelming majority of our service members and civilian team exhibiting the standards of ethics and accountability each and every day. Yet, we have witnessed examples of ethical and accountability problems – these must be addressed through leader action and example, reinforcing a culture of service and trust, and holding people accountable.

53. What is your understanding of the actions required to complete full implementation of the 16 recommendations provided by the Comprehensive Review?

It is my understanding USSOCOM has completed 14 of the 16 recommended actions from

the Comprehensive Review, and that the command is on track to complete the remaining recommended actions by the end of 2022. If confirmed, I look forward to being part of that process.

The USSOCOM Comprehensive Review found that “a USSOCOM culture overly focused on force employment and mission accomplishment creates the contexts or situations allowing for misconduct and unethical behavior to develop within the SOF enterprise.”

54. What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment play in decisions relating to misconduct by Special Operations Forces?

There is no place for misconduct or unethical behavior in our formation. Past mission accomplishment should have no bearing on decisions relating to reporting and investigating misconduct by special operations forces.

Health of Special Operations Forces

55. What is your assessment of the health and readiness of Special Operations Forces?

From my current position, I assess SOF’s readiness level is high. This level of SOF readiness – and USSOF’s record of mission success – is due in large part to the attention, resources, and oversight provided by this committee and Congress as a whole. Current and future readiness is constantly evolving, and SOF leaders must continually maintain rigorous standards, conduct challenging training, ensure ethical behavior, and care for SOF teammates and families. Readiness and health of the force are at the heart of all we do.

56. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing the stress on Special Operations Forces?

If confirmed, first and foremost I will continue the efforts of my predecessors with respect to POTFF, the Comprehensive Review, and Service programs. Also, I will work with the Joint Staff and combatant commands to maintain sustainable personnel and operational tempos that provide predictability to the force and their families. A holistic approach is key to addressing stress on the force.

57. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address suicides in Special Operations Forces?

Suicide is a tragedy that directly impacts our force and families. If confirmed, I will continue the vital work on suicide prevention for Special Operations Forces, including supporting POTFF programs, de-stigmatizing mental healthcare, expanding and enhancing routine screening, and seeking expertise from inside and outside of DOD to give leaders the best tools to engage our people and foster resiliency. Mental health is health. I have made, and will continue to make, preventing suicide a top priority.

58. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM’s Preservation of the Force and Families program?

The POTFF program is an incredible asset for the USSOCOM team that augments Service-provided efforts.

In my current command, with people as my top priority, there is no more important task than taking care of our force and families. The first SOF truth is “humans are more important than hardware,” and our people are why we win – they are SOF’s competitive and comparative advantage. We ask an incredible amount from service members, civilians, and families. In that light, we must do everything possible to preserve their health, safety, and readiness – and POTFF does that.

If confirmed, I will continue USSOCOM’s tremendous work in this area and look forward to working with the Department and Congress to ensure USSOCOM continues to promote physical, psychological, cognitive, social, and spiritual wellness that POTFF addresses.

Recruiting and Retention

59. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the USSOCOM community?

In my current role, I have limited visibility on USSOCOM’s recruiting and retention challenges, but if confirmed, I will examine this issue closely, in partnership with the Services. I anticipate some of the challenges include competition from the civilian workforce and lack of predictability. Command involvement in talent management, caring for service members and families, and special pays have proven helpful to maintaining our special operations forces and meeting our operational requirements.

60. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the recruiting and retention goals of each of the services’ SOF?

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment with the USSOCOM team and Services to better understand recruiting and retention issues. This includes carefully monitoring deployment-to-dwell ratios in accordance with Department guidance; support to family programs; and a total wellness approach that spans the physical, psychological, cognitive, social, and spiritual domains. The SOF community asks a great deal of its personnel, and we owe them the same. Caring for our team is a moral imperative that will also help us retain the operational experience, expertise, and capability necessary for mission success.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

61. What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in USSOCOM, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

We must do everything in our power to address the problem of sexual assault in our ranks – this criminal behavior violates our values, degrades safety and readiness, and destroys trust within our formations. As a military officer – and an Army dad with two daughters who have each chosen to serve this Nation – I take the issue extremely seriously.

If confirmed – as I have done in previous commands – I will ensure sexual assault prevention, response, and accountability remain top priorities across the USSOCOM enterprise, and that Department policies and programs are fully implemented. We must provide the total force (military, civilian, and contractors) with a safe and inclusive command climate where every member is valued, feels psychologically and physically safe, and is treated with dignity and respect. This important issue will always have my direct and full attention.

62. What is your view of the adequacy of USSOCOM policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for reporting the assault?

If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of all USSOCOM policies and procedures to assess and ensure we protect victims from retaliation. We must continue to foster an environment where victims feel empowered to come forward without fear of retaliation and trust leadership to take appropriate actions.

63. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in USSOCOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of the training and resources available to prevent, investigate, and respond to allegations of sexual assault, in close concert with the Services and in line with Departmental policies.

64. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold service members accountable for sexual misconduct?

From my experience, there is a strong willingness by DOD and SOF leaders at every level to hold service members appropriately accountable for sexual misconduct. Accountability is leader business, and an obligation we take seriously. Sexual misconduct degrades trust and unit cohesion. Leaders must ensure all allegations of sexual misconduct are fully investigated, and where appropriate, that service members are held accountable.

65. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in USSOCOM to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of USSOCOM's regulations and implementation of DOD policy regarding sexual assault prevention and response. Education and training on sexual assault prevention and response is critical – a key component of that education is ensuring the force has a strong understanding of the resources that are available to victims of sexual assault.

66. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

The chain of command plays a critical role in supporting victims of sexual assault to ensure they receive appropriate care and services, including medical, psychological, and legal support. Meaningful chain of command engagement in sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention and response helps foster an environment of trust where victims understand they will be supported and will not be retaliated against for reporting. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders and command teams within USSOCOM understand my priority to provide the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.

67. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

The chain of command is key to establishing and changing military culture. Present and engaged leadership sets the course for our culture. Leaders must engage closely with our people to create and sustain a culture where all members feel valued, physically and psychologically safe, and are treated with dignity and respect. Through meaningful engagement and training, leaders must also establish a culture where it is universally understood that sexual misconduct has no place within our force, and that perpetrators will be held appropriately accountable. I embrace my obligation to ensure our culture reflects our core values.

68. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

In my assessment, the current sexual assault policies and procedures on restricted reporting are effective. Restricted reporting is an important option that empowers victims with the ability to receive medical care and counseling.

69. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement if confirmed as USSOCOM Commander?

If confirmed, I will examine current USSOCOM processes and remain fully committed to eliminating the scourge of sexual assault from our ranks – and I will ensure USSOCOM works closely with the Military Services and the Department to maintain transparency,

consistency, and accuracy in reporting. Making informed decisions through accurate data and trend analysis is a critical component of preventing and responding to sexual assault. Studies – such as the report produced by the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military – provide meaningful insights and recommendations for action that are relevant across the Services.

Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces

70. What is your assessment of the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

From my experience, both SOF and general purpose forces are capable of conducting security force assistance and building partner military capabilities. Generally, SOF are utilized in politically sensitive environments where a large U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host nation or U.S. country team, while general purpose forces are well-suited for environments where a larger U.S. force presence is desired and acceptable. In cases where both SOF and general purpose forces share the mission of building partner military capability, it is normally preferable for the U.S. special operations forces to partner directly with the host nation special operations forces, and for U.S. general purpose forces to partner directly with the host nation's conventional force counterparts.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities

71. In your view, how should the responsibility for providing enabling capabilities for special operations missions be divided between USSOCOM and the services?

From my experience, few SOF missions are accomplished without non-SOF assistance. As the organization tasked with preparing SOF to carry out assigned missions, USSOCOM is responsible – with oversight and advocacy from ASD(SO/LIC) – for acquiring or managing SOF-peculiar equipment, training, and budget. USSOCOM relies on the Services to provide critical support, including personnel, logistics, and Service-common equipment, without which SOF cannot accomplish the vast majority of its assigned missions.

72. How would you ensure that the enabler requirements of Special Operations Forces are appropriately communicated to and receive support from the services?

From my experience, the Joint Staff Global Force Management Process provides the means to communicate special operations requirements for Service support – normally in support of Combatant Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will examine this issue, and rely on the Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council, and ASD(SO/LIC) – with his Service Secretary-like responsibilities – to advocate on behalf of USSOCOM support requests from the Services.

73. Do you believe USSOCOM and the services are maintaining adequate enabling

capabilities to support special operations missions?

If confirmed, I will analyze this issue more closely. Few SOF missions are accomplished without non-SOF assistance. In many ways, these enablers have made possible SOF's remarkable record of mission success in recent years. However, as the Joint Force implements the new NDS and pivots to a more sustainable means of CVEO campaigning – with reduced overseas footprint and bases – it will be critical to re-evaluate enabling capabilities for special operations missions.

Supported Combatant Command

Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command.

74. In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

If confirmed, I would explore this issue with the USSOCOM team and relevant stakeholders and make recommendations to the Department. From my understanding, USSOCOM has rarely served as a supported combat command. Unless the President and Secretary of Defense direct otherwise, the Combatant Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility receive operational control of special operations forces and capabilities.

75. In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for USSOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

If confirmed, and using the NDS as a guide, I will evaluate USSOCOM's resources, organization, and force structure to determine whether USSOCOM can effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities – and I will make appropriate recommendations through ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.

Theater Special Operations Commands

76. Based on your professional military experience, how would you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations component to a geographic combatant command in providing responsive special operations planning and capabilities in support of the combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?

As a former Theater Special Operations Command commander in USINDOPACOM, I recognize that these organizations are the leading edge of SOF operations for both combatant commands with geographic areas of responsibility, and for USSOCOM. Their work is extremely important to integrated deterrence, campaigning, and conflict – and highly valued by geographic combatant commanders. They are the operational end of the

USSOCOM team, responsible for planning and controlling special operations and other SOF activities in support of their respective combatant commands.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

77. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

78. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

79. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

80. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.

81. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Yes.