

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF
Nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and Commander, North American
Aerospace Defense Command

Duties and Qualifications

1. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?

I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) include defending the homeland of the United States, providing defense support of civil authorities, and conducting security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also designated as the Department of Defense Advocate for Arctic Capabilities.

2. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?

I understand that the duties and functions of the Commander of NORAD include providing aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for the United States and Canada. As stated in the bi-national NORAD agreement, the chain of command for the NORAD Commander includes both the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada.

3. What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform these duties?

I have been honored to serve our nation for over 34 years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, and I am humbled to be nominated to be the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I have tremendous regard for both commands and their vital, no-fail missions. If confirmed, I will draw upon all my experiences to lead the men and women who provide defense of our homeland.

I am very fortunate that during my assignments I have gained background and experience that directly relate to commanding USNORTHCOM and NORAD. I currently serve as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). In many ways, the USCENTCOM mission is to conduct the homeland defense “away game” by removing threats to the United States before they can strike within our borders. In this role, I see daily the importance of executing tasks as outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and coordinating with other combatant commands to provide integrated deterrence and share vital resources. I also coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters of USCENTCOM operations. As the Deputy Commander, I understand the importance of Congress’ oversight role and the need to keep Congress informed with timely and transparent responses to requests for information, reports, and testimony.

I have a strong appreciation for the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions, having flown NORAD missions for over six years during three operational flying assignments. I also served as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, where I directed the command's response to a wide range of multi-domain threats to the U.S., including ballistic missile defense of the homeland and numerous actions by peer competitors that challenged the security of the U.S. I also fully appreciate the importance of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission as we executed responses to Hurricane Dorian, supported U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the U.S.-Mexico border, and support of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, I have a strong understanding of the need to build and maintain robust relationships with federal, state, and international partners, and the importance of routinely updating Congress on matters of importance to national security.

I have been fortunate to command at the squadron, group, wing, and Numbered Air Force levels and to serve in a variety of Joint assignments. My most recent command was 9th Air Force/Air Forces Central Command, where I was responsible for all U.S. and Coalition combat air operations in the Middle East. During this assignment, I was responsible for ensuring the air defense of U.S. and Coalition locations, a task that helped prepare me to command NORAD's complex air defense mission, if confirmed. I also learned the value of gaining and maintaining strong relationships with foreign military partners. This experience will greatly benefit me if I am confirmed to serve as the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as working closely with military leaders from Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas will be critical to ensuring mission accomplishment across the wide spectrum of missions for which USNORTHCOM is responsible.

4. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD?

If confirmed, I will eagerly embrace expanding my knowledge of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD missions and how the commands can better coordinate, integrate, and cooperate with mission partners from other combatant commands, the military Services, the U.S. interagency, and foreign partners. I will maintain an open mind and seek thoughtful insight from many sources, to include Congress, to honorably and effectively carry out the duties of Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD.

Relationship to Other Federal Agencies and Authorities

5. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Council, and other federal agencies, as well as state and local authorities and representatives from the private sector?

Close collaboration and effective communication between USNORTHCOM and its federal, state, and local government partners is critical, as is the command's relationship with the private sector. If confirmed, I will establish direct relationships with my counterparts from each of the federal agencies to ensure trust is established before a potential crisis, and I will

direct the staff to do the same with counterparts at their respective levels. I will continue to build upon the command's strong partnerships, including with the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, to ensure USNORTHCOM remains ready to support DHS and other federal partners as directed.

6. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the military when supporting law enforcement in state or national emergencies?

The military is in a unique position to provide support to law enforcement agencies during emergencies due to its specialized personnel, equipment, facilities, and training. However, such support must always be consistent with the limitations established by Congress, especially the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits direct military involvement by Title 10 forces with civilian law enforcement. Therefore, the proper role for the military when supporting law enforcement is generally in a mission support role and not engaging in direct law enforcement activities, unless lawfully directed to do so by competent authority.

Major Challenges and Problems

7. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

In my view, the next Commander of USNORTHCOM must be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland against all-domain threats in a historically complex strategic environment. The People's Republic of China (PRC) will remain the pacing threat for the foreseeable future and the PRC will continue to develop increasingly advanced kinetic and non-kinetic systems capable of holding U.S. territory and interests at risk. The next commander must also deter and stand ready to defend the United States against Russian aggression, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin's blatant aggression against Ukraine, contempt for international law, and pursuit of advanced long-range conventional and nuclear missile technologies. A modern and effective Ballistic Missile Defense System will remain necessary as North Korea continues to develop increasingly advanced ICBM technology. NORAD and USNORTHCOM must maintain vigilance against plots by Iran and Violent Extremist Organizations. Meanwhile, the next commander must ensure the command remains always ready to support civil authorities in response to disasters and public health emergencies as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

8. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Addressing these challenges will require USNORTHCOM and NORAD to first continue to improve the capability to detect and respond to potential threats. If confirmed, I will advocate to keep modernization programs to improve USNORTHCOM and NORAD's ability to detect threats on track. Additionally, I will conduct seamless operations with fellow combatant commands, rapidly employ well-trained and well-equipped forces to deter or defeat aggression, and routinely communicate and operate with federal and state partners. NORAD and USNORTHCOM's record of success is due largely to its dedicated military and

civilian personnel, and if confirmed, I will also emphasize recruiting and retaining the best possible workforce to execute the commands' no-fail missions.

9. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish as Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

If confirmed as Commander of USNORTHCOM, I will establish three priorities: defend the homeland; strengthen the network of federal, state, local, and international partners; and advance the USNORTHCOM workforce. In support of these priorities, I will place heavy emphasis on integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority. This operational approach to achieving my priorities requires advancing the USNORTHCOM workforce with the skills, experience, professionalism, and dedication already demonstrated daily by the men and women of USNORTHCOM.

Relations with Congress

10. What are your views on the state of NORTHCOM's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

It is my understanding that USNORTHCOM has a strong, trusted relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress in general. If confirmed, I will ensure the command continues to communicate frequently, openly, and candidly with the Senate Armed Services Committee and Congress in order to maintain mutual trust and understanding. I am mindful of, and strongly appreciate, Congress' oversight role.

11. If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and NORTHCOM?

If confirmed, I will work to maintain a relationship of mutual respect and trust between USNORTHCOM and Congress. To do so, I will work closely with the Department to ensure all Congressional requests for information receive timely and accurate responses, and I will provide forthright and candid assessments to Congress regarding command missions, requirements, and challenges.

Mission of NORTHCOM

12. How do you define the mission of NORTHCOM?

As defined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), USNORTHCOM's assigned missions are homeland defense; security cooperation with Canada, The Bahamas, and Mexico; and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

13. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including with regard to homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)?

USNORTHCOM's homeland defense mission and DHS' homeland security and domestic law enforcement responsibilities are necessarily distinct, but they are complementary. Cooperation between USNORTHCOM and DHS is critical to the national security of the United States, as USNORTHCOM routinely provides defense support to DHS operations, including the DHS mission along the U.S. – Mexico border. USNORTHCOM also routinely supports DHS disaster relief operations in the United States through Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). To ensure collaborative responses that are effective and timely, USNORTHCOM and DHS routinely plan, exercise, and operate together, and each organization has senior liaison officers permanently assigned to the other's headquarters. If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM strengthens its already close relationship with DHS.

14. How would you define effective civilian control of the military? Aside from civilian control of the military via the Executive Branch, please describe the extent to which you believe Congress plays a role in furthering civilian control of our military?

The United States Constitution establishes civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle of our democracy and a shared responsibility of all three branches of government. As a military officer, I have repeatedly sworn, and always adhered to, an oath to support and defend the Constitution. While the President serves as Commander-in-Chief with operational control of the military, Congress has substantial authorities that enhance civilian control of the military, including authorizing and appropriating funds, establishing rules and regulations, and the power to authorize the use of force. Additionally, the Senate advises and consents to the promotion of field grade officers and above, as well as senior-level civilian appointees. Additionally, Congress conducts oversight of the military and can compel testimony.

15. As a military officer, you take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. How do you balance this obligation with the responsibility to provide your best military advice to civilian leadership, even when that advice may differ from civilian political priorities?

My obligation to give my best military advice to civilian leadership is rooted in my oath to support and defend the Constitution. It is my responsibility to provide the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States my candid and unvarnished views, informed by operational realities, to assist in the development of directives and operational direction, regardless of political priorities or established military positions. Civilian leaders are free to incorporate all, some, or none of my advice but my duty to the Constitution is to provide it.

NORAD

16. What is your understanding of the mission of NORAD?

I understand NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in defense of North America. These missions are codified in the bi-national NORAD agreement signed by the governments of the United States and Canada.

17. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission? With Operation Noble Eagle?

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are distinct commands with complementary missions that are essential to the defense of the United States and Canada. The ironclad relationship between NORAD and USNORTHCOM and the connections between their missions are made evident by the fact that seven of the eight NORAD and USNORTHCOM joint directorates support both commands simultaneously.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE) is a bi-national U.S.-Canadian air homeland defense mission conducted by NORAD, USINDOPACOM and, when necessary, USNORTHCOM within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). While USNORTHCOM is primarily in a supporting role to NORAD for ONE missions within the USNORTHCOM AOR, those missions directly benefit the USNORTHCOM homeland defense mission. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is prepared to conduct U.S. unilateral, non-NORAD air operations as directed. Command and control of ONE operations is conducted by the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center, allowing real-time coordination between NORAD and USNORTHCOM while ensuring alignment of the commands' distinct roles and authorities.

18. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, NORAD?

In my view, the major challenge that will face the next Commander of NORAD is outpacing advanced peer competitors in order to effectively detect and warn of threats to the United States and Canada in the air and maritime domains and to defend against threats in the air domain. The key to addressing these challenges will be improving domain awareness and our ability to detect threats from wherever they may emanate. The challenges facing NORAD are closely linked to those facing USNORTHCOM. While NORAD maintains a distinct mission set from USNORTHCOM, the two commands' highly complementary missions, shared geographic boundaries, and the extraordinarily close working relationship inside the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters -- and between the United States and Canada -- means a challenge for one command is often a challenge for the other.

19. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?

As the former Director of Operations for USNORTHCOM, I saw first-hand that maintaining a combined staff and Joint Operations Center (JOC) is important to mission success for both commands and leads to effective, efficient, and mutually beneficial operations. Although executed through distinct authorities, the complementary nature of the USNORTHCOM and

NORAD missions, built on over two decades of experience and cooperation, are highly beneficial to the defense of North America.

20. What is the relationship of the Commander of NORAD to the Canadian component of NORAD, and what role does Canada play in NORAD operations and planning?

Per the NORAD Agreement, if the Commander of NORAD is a U.S. officer, the NORAD Deputy will be a Canadian officer. The NORAD Commander reports to the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and to the Secretary of Defense regarding NORAD matters. Members of the Canadian armed forces are fully integrated into the headquarters operations and planning staff. The Canadian NORAD Region is a subordinate NORAD organization and provides command and control of NORAD air defense forces in Canada. Additionally, the Commander of NORAD exercises operational control, as defined in the NORAD Agreement, of Canadian armed forces at the discretion of the CDS.

2022 National Defense Strategy

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that one of the Department's top priorities is "Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the [People's Republic of China]". The NDS also emphasizes the importance of integrated deterrence for aligning the Department's policies, resources, and activities to strengthen deterrence and pursuing a coordinated, holistic approach both within the Department and through the interagency.

21. In your view, what are the major challenges for homeland defense as the United States competes strategically with China, Russia and other potential adversaries?

In my view, homeland defense is challenged by competitors' rapid capability advances that threaten the homeland in multiple domains and from multiple approaches. Further, these advances are accompanied by a highly complex and rapidly shifting strategic environment. As a result, emphasis must be placed on improving global domain awareness; integrating homeland defense into global plans, strategies, and exercises; and outpacing competitors through innovation and rapid capability acquisition.

22. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for how the DOD should prioritize homeland defense to meet current and future challenges, including in cyberspace and space?

Homeland defense is the Department of Defense's (DoD) number one priority per the National Defense Strategy, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the People's Republic of China. If confirmed, I recommend the DoD, first and foremost, continue to develop and invest in all domain awareness capabilities that will expand leaders' decision space. I also recommend the DoD continue to invest in command and control capabilities that will help achieve information dominance and decision superiority. Finally, the Department must increase resilience to ensure our ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from any disruption in any domain.

23. What do you see as the role of NORTHCOM in an integrated deterrence approach to implementing the NDS, both within the Department and in coordination with other departments and agencies with a mission of protecting the homeland?

Homeland defense is a whole of government effort to deter attacks from adversaries in all domains. If confirmed, my role as the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be to lead the military portion of the mission and to ensure those efforts are integrated globally, including with other combatant commands, the interagency, and allies and partners. NORAD and USNORTHCOM will be most effective when executing with other elements; they are one piece of the U.S. Government's wider efforts to ensure our Nation remains safe and secure.

Integrated Deterrence requires all-domain awareness and information dominance. This allows the DoD to anticipate competitor actions and track them globally, enabling the U.S. to generate appropriate response options. Integrated Deterrence requires the DoD to achieve decision superiority over competitors in order to preserve decision space and create options for our national leaders.

Force Protection within NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

24. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's responsibility for force protection and antiterrorism within its AOR?

USNORTHCOM's primary mission is to protect the homeland, which requires increased focus on force protection and antiterrorism to ensure the safety and security of DoD critical infrastructure, personnel, information, and strategic resources. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for setting the FPCON (force protection condition) level for the CONUS (to include the National Capital Region), and Alaska, and also for U.S. installations in Canada and The Bahamas. This responsibility requires USNORTHCOM to constantly coordinate with law enforcement and the Intelligence Community to identify and pre-empt potential attacks. If confirmed, I will build upon the existing relationships with force protection mission partners to enhance information sharing and employ the DoD Force Protection Condition system to continuously tailor the security posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against current and anticipated threats.

25. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's AOR?

I believe the greatest challenges to force protection we currently face in the homeland are the emerging technologies that increase both the scope and speed of threat capabilities. The challenge of identifying potential threat actors before they can conduct an attack or commit other acts of coercion and aggression requires effective integration with others whom share the responsibility for force protection. USNORTHCOM must also maintain persistent engagement with the Intelligence Community, counterintelligence, and law enforcement at

all levels to improve our threat detection capabilities and mitigation options while simultaneously protecting civil liberties. USNORTHCOM will continue to explore technological solutions and partner with industry to identify new threat vectors and the means to both identify and effectively counter them.

Force Allocation for NORTHCOM

26. What is your understanding and assessment of how forces are allocated or planned to be allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements?

I understand USNORTHCOM requests forces through the Global Force Management process. USNORTHCOM has only a small number of permanently assigned forces and relies on requests for forces through the Joint Staff or as directed by the Secretary of Defense in order to meet the command's mission requirements. If confirmed, I will submit requests for forces based on mission requirements and will accompany those requests with a risk assessment.

27. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM will have sufficient forces available to it that are properly trained and equipped to accomplish its assigned missions?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military Service Chiefs through the Global Force Management process to ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM's mission requirements and risk are well understood. I will work closely and collaboratively with the military to assist them in their mission to man, train, and equip forces ready to take on the challenges of today's operational environment in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

28. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (active and reserve) that are apportioned or assigned for the homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of NORTHCOM's contingency plans and for its DSCA missions?

If confirmed, I will use Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to assess the readiness of forces assigned, apportioned, or allocated to support USNORTHCOM's homeland defense and DSCA missions, as well as contingency plans. I will work with the Joint Staff and Service Chiefs to address and mitigate any potential readiness shortfalls identified. Once forces are assigned, I will require commanders to sustain force readiness while conducting the tasked operations and identify when or if readiness in specific mission areas cannot be maintained and recommend appropriate measures to mitigate those impacts.

NORTHCOM Defense Support to Civil Authorities Mission

NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to provide defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations.

29. What is your understanding and assessment of NORTHCOM's awareness of and coordination for the support of the emergency response capabilities and contingency plans of civil authorities, including the states and territories, before a crisis arises?

I understand that USNORTHCOM continually participates in a wide variety of engagements, educational forums, and training events with federal, state, local, and tribal partners to be ready for a variety of scenarios. At the operational and tactical field level, USNORTHCOM employs Defense Coordination Officers (DCO), Defense Coordination Elements (DCE), and Joint Regional Medical Planning Officers (JRMPO) aligned with each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. These elements routinely coordinate, collaborate, plan, and exercise with agency partners to maintain communication and common understanding of requirements and capabilities. Finally, numerous civil federal agency representatives have liaisons embedded in the USNORTHCOM headquarters, while USNORTHCOM has senior level staff officers assigned to several federal agencies to increase understanding of DoD capabilities.

30. In your view, does NORTHCOM's plans, policies, and programs optimize the Defense Department's consequence management support to civil authorities?

I know providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) has been a high priority USNORTHCOM mission for many years. The command takes great pride in assisting federal partners and American communities in times of need, and lessons learned indicate the plans, policies, and programs are strong. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the plans, programs, and policies associated with the USNORTHCOM DSCA mission and take any steps needed to ensure the command is always prepared to provide the most effective and efficient support to the command's partners.

31. If confirmed, how would you ensure that NORTHCOM has sufficient knowledge of state and inter-state emergency response capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units, capabilities of title 10 regular and reserve component forces, and a good working relationship with state emergency response leaders?

If confirmed, I will continue the longstanding practice of maintaining liaison officers from the active and reserve components in the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters in order to maintain knowledge of state and inter-state response capabilities. We will conduct routine planning and exercising with partners at every level, hosting conferences and other events to strengthen personal relationships between the commands and their partners. Effort will be placed on improving programs that strengthen communication and collaboration between NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and all of the commands' total force and interagency partners, to include state emergency response leaders.

32. How does the Department of Defense's assistance to DHS and other civilian agencies affect readiness? Are there steps that you would recommend, if confirmed, to mitigate any harm to readiness stemming from these deployments?

In certain circumstances, deployments in support of the Department's assistance to DHS can enhance readiness for certain occupational specialties, while in other cases it may detract from individual and unit readiness. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff, the military, and the commanders of forces allocated to USNORTHCOM to assess impacts to force readiness associated with the execution of missions assigned to USNORTHCOM and implement appropriate measures to mitigate those impacts.

Process for Addressing DSCA Requests and Funding

33. What is your understanding and assessment of the policies and procedures by which federal civil authorities, states, and territories request, employ, and fund DSCA, including with respect to reimbursement of the Defense Department for such operations?

It is my understanding that states and territories request Defense Support of Civil Authorities through a lead federal agency under the authorities provided by the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act authorizes governors and emergency management officials to request support from a lead federal agency as needed to safeguard life and property in the event of a disaster. In turn, federal agencies may then request further assistance and capabilities from the DoD in support of a collaborative federal response.

While I understand reimbursement for incurred expenses is managed at the Department level, I believe the Economy Act authorizes DoD to provide support to a lead Federal agency in certain circumstances. Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, examples of qualifying events include National Special Security Events such as national political conventions or major sports events. At a local level, U.S. military units are also authorized to provide temporary direct assistance to local communities in the event of a disaster using Immediate Response Authority.

34. If confirmed, what policy or procedural changes would you propose, if any, for the processes for requesting, employing, and determining funding sources for DSCA?

Providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a critically important mission that has repeatedly delivered significant positive benefits for the nation. While USNORTHCOM does not have a role in determining funding sources for DSCA, if confirmed, I will advocate for processes that preserve USNORTHCOM's ability to provide rapid and effective support to the command's civilian partners.

DSCA on the Southwest Border

At the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense continues to provide a mix of active-duty and National Guard units, and other capabilities, to support U.S. Customs and Border Protection activities along the southwest border.

35. What is your assessment of the security situation along the U.S.-Mexico border?

Security of the U.S.-Mexico border is of significant importance to the United States and, as directed by appropriate authorities, USNORTHCOM is providing support to the DHS mission. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DHS to assess the security situation along the U.S.-Mexico border. Part of that assessment will be determining whether USNORTHCOM support to federal and international partners is being optimized.

36. What are the appropriate roles and missions for the National Guard units and active duty units, in support of DHS, including Customs and Border Protection, and its border patrol mission?

I understand that, in response to a request for assistance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Secretary of Defense has approved support to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations on the U.S.-Mexico border by U.S. military personnel. I further understand that, in accordance with the DHS request for assistance, U.S. military personnel are not engaged in direct law-enforcement activities, but provide support that includes aviation support, transportation of CBP personnel, mobile surveillance camera operators, and intelligence administrative support. As I understand them, I believe these roles and missions are appropriate.

37. If confirmed, what recommendations would you anticipate making to your chain of command, if any, to make DoD's support mission at the southwest border more effective?

If confirmed, I will immediately and carefully assess USNORTHCOM's support of the Department of Homeland Security mission along the U.S.-Mexico border and work closely with DoD and the lead federal agency to ensure that support is as effective as possible.

Counter-Drug and Counter-Transnational Organized Crime Authorities and Programs

The Director of National Intelligence's Annual Threat Assessment for 2023 found that Western Hemisphere-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and Mexican TCOs in particular, endanger the health and safety of millions of U.S. citizens through the production and trafficking of illegal drugs bound for the United States. The rapid increase in fentanyl trafficking accounts for the majority of more than 100,000 annual deaths from drug overdoses in the United States.

38. What is your assessment of the threat to U.S. national security posed by drug trafficking and other activities by TCOs within the NORTHCOM AOR?

TCOs drive instability in the communities in which they operate and challenge good governance in North America to the detriment of the entire continent. Mitigating the negative consequences of TCO's illicit behavior is essential to the national security of all countries in the USNORTHCOM AOR and requires whole-of-government approaches synchronized with partner nations.

39. What is your view of the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in countering drug trafficking and the threat from TCOs and what role should NORTHCOM play with respect to such an effort?

It is my understanding that the threat to national security posed by TCO networks is acute and worsening. Department of Defense and USNORTHCOM serve in a supporting role in accordance with statutory requirements and policy guidelines. In this role, I believe it is appropriate for USNORTHCOM to provide intelligence and operational support, when requested, to support U.S. Departments and Agencies and foreign law enforcement partners in their counter-drug/counter-transnational criminal organization (CD/CTCO) activities.

40. In your view, does NORTHCOM have the appropriate authorities and resources for fulfilling its counter-drug and counter-TCOs missions?

To my knowledge, there are no shortfalls in USNORTHCOM's existing authorities or resources to support interagency law enforcement partners' counter-drug and counter-TCO mission. If confirmed, I will determine whether USNORTHCOM has the appropriate authorities and resources to conduct its support that mission as part of my 90-day assessment.

41. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of counter-drug operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and along the geographic seam NORTHCOM shares with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)?

Effective cross-combatant command integration is critical to effective counter-drug operations. If confirmed, I will conduct a 90-day assessment, which will include an assessment of USNORTHCOM support to counter-drug operations with a specific focus on the cooperation and coordination with USSOUTHCOM.

42. What metrics would you recommend the Department use to measure the effectiveness of its counter-drug programs and counter-TCOs in the NORTHCOM AOR?

Establishing effective metrics is essential to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of activities in support the counter-drug mission. If confirmed, I will assess existing metrics and, if needed, establish new metrics to measure the effectiveness of USNORTHCOM's support of federal partners' counterdrug and counter-TCO efforts as part of my 90-day assessment.

Security Cooperation with Canada and Mexico

43. What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Canada and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for strengthening that security relationship?

It is my understanding the current security relationship between the U.S. and Canada is extremely strong and is essential for the defense of North America and for maintaining

security in the Arctic. I remain encouraged by the bi-national commitments to modernizing the sensors, platforms, and capabilities necessary to execute NORAD's missions, including Canada's fielding of the F-35 and two over-the-horizon radars. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD remains a modern and effective force capable of deterring and defeating threats to North America. My priority for security relationships will be to strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of USNORTHCOM's relationship with Canada by integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority.

44. What is your assessment of the current security relationship between the United States and Mexico and, if confirmed, what would be your priorities for strengthening that security relationship?

I understand USNORTHCOM maintains an extremely strong security relationship with its Mexican military counterparts. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretaries of SEMAR (Mexican Navy) and SEDENA (Mexican Army and Air Force) to further enhance military interoperability, cooperation, and mutual objectives. My 90-day assessment will help inform my priorities for strengthening our security relationship. My priority for security relationships will be to strengthen the various networks that are the foundation of USNORTHCOM's relationship with Mexico by integrating globally, improving domain awareness, achieving information dominance, and delivering decision superiority.

45. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the United States posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Mexico? If confirmed, what recommendations would you have for enhancing the military-to-military cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Mexican Navy (SEMAR) to address mutual security challenges, including the threat from TCOs?

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) based in Mexico are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths each year in the United States and Mexico. The revenues that these organizations generate by delivering dangerous, illicit materials to U.S. markets drive violence in North America and undermine the safety and security of the continent. Illicit drugs, especially fentanyl, smuggled by TCOs into the U.S. have led to record numbers of overdose deaths, while cartel violence, exacerbated by weapons smuggling into Mexico, has done enormous harm to the Mexican people and their national institutions.

I understand USNORTHCOM's relationship with its Mexican military partners is historically strong and that Mexico is both a willing and capable partner across a number of areas affecting North American defense and security. If confirmed, I will seek to further strengthen the defense relationship between USNORTHCOM and its Mexican military partners, ideally through training and exercises, to advance our combined capability and capacity to address mutual security challenges, including countering TCOs.

Pandemic Preparedness

NORTHCOM was the lead combatant command supporting other federal agencies and states in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. What role, if any, should NORTHCOM have with respect to pandemic preparedness, including its relationship to:

46. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program, overseen by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs

If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense, to propose ways to improve cross-organizational processes to enhance the ability to respond to a Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological event quickly and effectively.

47. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense programs

If confirmed, USNORTHCOM will use lessons learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic response to coordinate with the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense programs to propose ways to improve cross-organizational processes to enhance the ability to respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear event quickly and effectively.

48. The Defense Health Agency

In accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning DoD efforts in support of the U.S. Government's response to pandemics and infectious diseases of operational significance (P&ID). As DoD's lead for Pandemic and Infectious Disease Plan, I understand USNORTHCOM maintains a close strategic and operational relationship with each of the combat support agencies, including the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the combatant commands, the military Services, and appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies. USNORTHCOM must coordinate with DHA and the interagency to share real-time awareness of health care facility capabilities and capacity, prioritization and distribution of countermeasures, ongoing health or disease prevalence, and bio-surveillance of current and emerging threats. USNORTHCOM also coordinates with DHA and the military Services to provide options for medical force employment either within the DoD or in support of civilian authorities.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in NORTHCOM

Despite significant efforts by the Department and military services over the past decade to enhance their prevention of, and response to, sexual assaults, including measures to care for victims and hold assailants accountable, the current data continues to show increasing prevalence of sexual assault and unwanted sexual conduct, primarily for female

service members aged 17 to 24. These findings echo reports this year of increases in the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the Military Service Academies.

49. Do you believe the policies, programs, and resources that the Department of Defense has put in place to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and to protect service members who report sexual assault from retaliation, are working? If not, what else must be done?

Until sexual assault, harassment, retaliation, and other harmful behaviors are eliminated from our ranks, work remains to be done by leadership at every level. The Department of Defense has taken important steps toward improving efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assault, and all commanders must remain vigilant by developing, implementing, and sustaining a culture and programs that provide the safest possible environment for every member of their command. If confirmed, the responsibility for establishing a culture of dignity, respect, and accountability will start with me.

50. If confirmed, what specific role would you establish for yourself in preventing sexual harassment within NORTHCOM, including within its civilian workforce?

If confirmed, I will immediately establish that I do not tolerate any abuse, harassment, assault, or other harmful behavior, to include sexual harassment. I will publish command policies and guidance to USNORTHCOM and NORAD to communicate my position. I will expect all USNORTHCOM and NORAD units and organizations to establish and maintain work environments that demand dignity and respect for all. I will immediately and carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD's policies, programs, and training regarding sexual assault and harassment to ensure they comply with all applicable laws and policies, and where appropriate take corrective action. I will regularly update all members of USNORTHCOM and NORAD on the status of those efforts.

51. Do you perceive that you need additional authorities from Congress to improve upon existing programs to prevent sexual harassment and sexual assault?

If confirmed, I will assess any requirements and make recommendations for improvement as necessary.

Civilian Workforce

52. What role does the NORTHCOM civilian workforce play in executing missions effectively and efficiently?

The civilian workforce plays a critically important role in the effective and efficient execution of all USNORTHCOM missions. I understand that civilian personnel comprise more than half of NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters billets and serve in a wide range of roles, including subject matter experts, intelligence analysts, supervisors, and senior leaders. The civilian workforce lends tremendous experience, expertise, continuity, and diversity of thought to the entire defense enterprise, and I have no doubt the same is true at NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

53. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the ability of the civilian workforce to support NORTHCOM missions? Do you have any suggestions for legislative changes that would add flexibilities for managing the workforce?

Given USNORTHCOM's critical mission and reliance on civilians for over 50% of the headquarters workforce, effectively managing the civilian workforce is essential to mission success. At this time, there are no legislative changes that I would offer, but, if confirmed, I will assess key aspects of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD civilian workforce and provide recommended legislative changes, if any, through the Department.

U.S. Northern Command-DHS Relationship on Critical Infrastructure Protection

The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program manages Department activities to address risks to critical infrastructure. Of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the defense industrial base is the only sector for which the Department of Defense is designated as the Sector Risk Management Agency.

54. What is your assessment of the threat in the current strategic environment to critical infrastructure in the U.S. homeland?

Today's threat environment is likely the most complex and dynamic our Homeland has ever faced. Cyber actors operating under the direction of our near-peer adversaries routinely surveil North American critical infrastructure for intelligence purposes and could quickly transition to cyber attack in the event of conflict. In addition, Russian air and naval forces can hold North American critical infrastructure at risk with conventionally armed cruise missiles. Finally, the strategic forces of Russia, China, and North Korea are modernizing and advancing their ability to target our critical infrastructure with nuclear weapons, primarily to deter a U.S. attack but also to impose costs and compel an acceptable resolution in the event of a strategic conflict.

55. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?

I understand that USNORTHCOM has an active program to execute DoD's Mission Assurance Construct by assessing its missions, policies, plans, and programs to identify and mitigate risk from all threats and hazards to critical capabilities, functions, and supporting assets. If confirmed, I will ensure the command is able to execute missions by preventing or mitigating the loss or degradation of DoD-owned defense critical infrastructure (DCI) within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility in coordination with the DoD asset owner and the other DoD commanders.

56. What is your understanding of the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS in addressing the risks to critical infrastructure?

Addressing critical infrastructure risks requires partnership across government and with the private sector. DoD has the authority to manage risks to DoD facilities. USNORTHCOM

works closely with OSD and DHS to address risks to non-DoD defense critical infrastructure (transportation, communications, energy, etc) upon which the military depends. DHS and its agencies, like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provide an important gateway to working with government partners and the private sector in making critical infrastructure more secure and resilient.

57. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for strengthening the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS on critical infrastructure protection?

I understand USNORTHCOM has a variety of initiatives with DHS and its components. If confirmed, working with OSD, I will continue these practices and endeavor to increase information sharing with public and private sector stakeholders and foster a better understanding of the policies, authorities, and limitations that frame our critical infrastructure protection efforts. If confirmed, my 90-day assessment will include an evaluation of the relationship between NORTHCOM and DHS to determine what priorities would support the most effective relationship for critical infrastructure protection.

Relationship with the National Guard

58. What is the current status of the relationship between NORTHCOM, the Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau, and individual state National Guard headquarters?

Based on my previous USNORTHCOM experience, I know the National Guard is essential to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission success. The commands rely on well-trained and well-equipped Air and Army National Guard forces to execute assigned missions. As a result, I understand USNORTHCOM and NORAD routinely communicate, plan, and integrate with the Department, the National Guard Bureau, and the state National Guard Headquarters regarding each of the commands' missions. If confirmed, I will continue to foster these valued relationships and prioritize integration and coordination with the commands' National Guard partners.

59. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM; the Department of Defense; DHS; the National Guard Bureau; federal, state, and local first responders; and National Guard units under state authority?

USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely upon close partnerships with a wide variety of DoD and interagency partners, to include the Department of Homeland Security, the National Guard Bureau, first responders, and the National Guard operating under state authorities. If confirmed, my 90-day assessment will include an evaluation of the current liaison relationships to determine how they might be improved to support better integration between USNORTHCOM and the myriad partners across the federal, state, local, and tribal landscape.

U.S. Northern Command Joint Task Forces

Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-service task forces, such as Joint Task Force-Civil Support and Joint Task Force-North, have been placed under its authority.

60. What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint Task Force-Civil Support and what changes, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that mission?

I understand that Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) conducts CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) response planning and preparedness to maximize mission readiness and decrease response time. If confirmed, I will assess the organization and resourcing of JTF-CS and make recommendations as appropriate to ensure the ability to execute its assigned missions and meet the changing threat environment.

61. What is your understanding of the mission of the Joint Task Force North, including support to federal law enforcement activities to identify and interdict transnational criminal organizations' activities? What changes, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to its organization and resourcing to carry out that mission?

I understand Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) is tasked to support federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational criminal organization activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States. I understand that JTF-N is also responsible for command and control of units supporting the Department of Homeland Security along the U.S.-Mexico border, as approved by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will assess the organization and resourcing of JTF-N and make recommendations as appropriate to ensure the ability to execute its assigned missions.

Unmanned Aerial Systems

Routine access to the National Airspace System (NAS) is severely restricted, including along portions of the borders with Canada and Mexico. The Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies are currently working to integrate unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the NAS and have made progress in supporting training flights along the southwest border.

62. In your view, what, if any limitations are there for full integration of government operated UAS into the NAS?

I understand there are regulatory limitations on UAS operations that have been procedurally mitigated with the Federal Aviation Administration. Government-operated unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations are authorized in the national airspace under certain conditions. If confirmed, I will work with DoD, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other agencies to assess limitations and propose appropriate mitigations to assure mission accomplishment.

63. If confirmed, how do you intend to support the development of training opportunities for UAS pilots that support readiness and border security?

As I understand it, USNORTHCOM support to the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection mission along the U.S.-Mexico border provides Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) pilots and operators with practical opportunities to gain experience while conducting missions in the NAS. Furthermore, I understand USNORTHCOM synchronizes UAS operations in support of civil authorities performing emergency services such as Wildland Firefighting and Search and Rescue, missions which also reinforce UAS pilot and operator training. Both the DoD and lead federal/state agencies benefit from this arrangement. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the military Services, National Guard leadership, and supported federal partners to support these reciprocal missions.

The use of UAS by malign actors is a growing problem on the battlefield and an increasing challenge for homeland defense. In section 1692 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Congress expanded the Department of Defense's existing authorities to use counter-UAS technology and develop procedures to protect facilities and assets associated with critical mission areas within the United States. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command, plays a key role in supporting homeland defense and coordinating with civil authorities in these efforts.

64. What is your understanding of the threat posed by UAS operated with malign intent to Defense Department facilities and assets in the United States?

I am concerned about the Small-UAS (sUAS) threat to the homeland, as sUAS technology is advancing and proliferating worldwide at a rapid pace. sUAS incursions are becoming more prevalent, and sUAS are used with regularity in other regions to attack U.S. and friendly forces. I have strong concern that sUAS one-way attack tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized overseas may be used here in the future. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM participate in cross-combatant command counter-UAS lessons learned forums, and I will advocate for the procurement of counter-sUAS defeat mechanisms to defend DoD critical infrastructure.

65. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in the exercise of the authorities granted by section 1692? What actions would you take specifically to ensure the National Capital Region has the ability to detect, and if required defeat, the UAS threat?

As I understand it, USNORTHCOM does not have standing authority to execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) actions authorized by section 1692 of the FY18 NDAA, codified as section 130i of Title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military Services. DoD policy has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions authorized by the statute to commanders of covered installations and assets. I understand NORAD and USNORTHCOM have also been tasked and are developing an NCR sUAS common operating picture in support of the White House Military Office in order to detect, track and identify sUAS operating in the

NCR. Additionally, NORAD is responsible for the aerospace warning and aerospace control missions in defense of North America, and when lawful and appropriate, NORAD may respond to UAS events under its aerospace control mission. I understand most small UAS (sUAS) threats do not fall within NORAD's aerospace control mission and the responsibility and authority for defense against sUAS is distributed across multiple DoD and non-DoD agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to address this potential threat and ensure NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to collaborate with multiple DoD organizations and interagency partners to address the emerging threat of sUAS attack.

66. If confirmed, how do you plan to use the authorities outlined in section 130i of Title 10 (section 1692 of the FY18 NDAA) to address the threat posed by UAS to Defense Department facilities?

Neither NORAD nor USNORTHCOM have standing authority to execute the counter-UAS (C-UAS) authorities outlined by section 130i of Title 10. Those actions are primarily executed by the military Services as a matter of force protection for various installations. DoD policy has delegated the authority to take C-UAS actions authorized by the statute to commanders of covered installations and assets. If confirmed, I will work with the military Services and advocate for all current and future C-sUAS capability needed for the betterment of homeland defense.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Response Capabilities

NORTHCOM has two primary missions: homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, both of which include preparation for and response to an incident or attack involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) materials or weapons in the NORTHCOM AOR.

67. What is your assessment of the threat to the United States posed by CBRN materials and weapons? Given the proliferation of CBRN capabilities by state and non-state actors, how do you assess this threat will evolve in the coming years?

I am familiar with the Intelligence Community's efforts to monitor the CBRN programs of our principal state adversaries. None of these actors is assessed to be likely to employ CBRN against the Homeland outside a strategic conflict, but I am concerned destructive technologies and knowledge could proliferate to state and non-state actors whose CBRN activities may be more difficult to detect, deter, or disrupt. In the coming years, I am concerned CBRN capabilities could be rapidly transferred to or developed by extremists or criminals who could use them in unattributed attacks or attempts at extortion in the Homeland.

68. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the Department of Defense's CBRN detection and response capabilities to effectively address the threat?

If confirmed, I will assess USNORTHCOM's role as part of the larger DoD CBRN detection and response capabilities as part of my 90-day assessment. If the assessment indicates the

threat would exceed the Department's ability to respond, or if the response timelines are determined to be insufficient, I will advocate to the Department for increased or improved capabilities, as appropriate, to effectively address the threat.

69. If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents in support of civil authorities?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the DoD, the Joint Staff, the military Services, the National Guard Bureau, and partners at all levels to make certain that all partners fully understand the requirements associated with the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission and ensure the readiness and availability of forces to conduct this essential mission. The DSCA mission requires rapid access to forces that are properly trained and equipped to execute a wide range of missions under difficult circumstances, and I would ensure sufficient cross-organizational and cross-Department training and exercises are conducted to ensure plans are validated and readiness is achieved and maintained.

There are a variety of organizations and units intended for CBRN response and consequence management, including Joint Task Force-Civil Support, the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF), the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, National Guard Homeland Response Forces, National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package units, and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

70. If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?

If confirmed, I will ensure USNORTHCOM participates with all mission partners in planning events and Tabletop Exercises that consider the most likely and most dangerous CBRN scenarios that the Intelligence Community assesses the U.S. could face. These events will help determine how best to align and employ the mix of capabilities when responding to various threats. In crisis, when Federal Forces of the CBRN Response Enterprise are requested, I will coordinate through the lead federal agency to ensure the correct capabilities are provided to support the mission assignment.

71. What is your assessment of the ability of the DCMRF, as currently constituted, to provide a significant capability to support federal civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident?

I understand the Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise provides a limited response to save lives and prevent human suffering in the event of a catastrophic CBRN Incident. It is designed to be a tiered response to provide civil authorities with technical life-saving forces in the first 96 hours of an incident. If confirmed, I will assess the capability and capacity of the Defense Consequence Management Response Force

(DCMRF) to support federal authorities in the event of a CBRN incident and take any needed steps to ensure its readiness to provide support when, where, and however needed.

72. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination and planning between the DCMRF and National Guard Homeland Response Forces to ensure an adequate response to a CBRN incident?

As currently designed, the USNORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is responsible for coordinating with the Lead Federal Agency to ensure requested CBRN capabilities are quickly validated and the DCMRF and/or National Guard Homeland Response Forces are deployed in support of civil authorities with clear guidance to conduct lifesaving/life enabling operations. As part of my 90-day assessment, I will assess whether this is an optimal arrangement.

73. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing defense support to civil authorities in the event of CBRN incidents should be under the command of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command?

Yes, as the supported Combatant Commander for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, the Commander of USNORTHCOM should assume command of all military forces supporting a CBRN event within the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Additionally, the Commander of USNORTHCOM should be the lead synchronizer of DoD capabilities with the Lead Federal Agency to ensure unity of support. The Commander of USNORTHCOM should relinquish Operational Control (OPCON) of those forces upon mission completion.

WMD-CSTs and CERFPs

There are now 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), with at least one in each State and Territory, and there are 17 National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) units. In addition, there are 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces, one in each Federal Emergency Management Agency region.

74. Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?

Based on my previous experience as the USNORTHCOM Director of Operations, the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs were appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions. Additionally, WMD-CST and CERFP capabilities and readiness were tracked monthly in the Defense Readiness Report System. Part of my 90-day assessment will include a determination of whether this is still the case.

75. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?

My 90-day assessment will determine if any changes are needed. If there are required changes, I will take appropriate action to ensure the WMD-CTSs and CERFPs can accomplish their assigned missions.

Spectrum Allocation

76. Please describe the importance of spectrum allocation to the NORTHCOM missions in defense of the homeland. Are there specific systems that you are concerned about being impacted relative to the 3.1-3.45 GHz band that is being studied for sharing or vacating?

The importance of spectrum allocation to the USNORTHCOM mission in defense of the homeland cannot be overstated. There are multiple homeland defense platforms, to include maritime, airborne, and ground-based early warning systems (such as AWACS, AEGIS, Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), and PATRIOT) that provide the USNORTHCOM and NORAD threat warning, attack assessment, domain awareness, and aerospace/maritime warning that rely on the spectrum being studied. Part of my 90-day assessment will specifically focus on the national security impacts if the 3.1-3.45 GHz band is shared or vacated.

Missile Defense

One of NORTHCOM's missions is to defend the United States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as North Korea and Iran.

77. Do you believe that it is important to conduct operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system?

Yes. I believe operationally realistic flight tests provide valuable information that informs development and operational employment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system capabilities. Flight tests also build confidence in the capabilities being deployed against potential missile threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Missile Defense Agency throughout testing and fielding to maintain confidence in the GMD system.

78. Do you support the current plan for modernizing the GMD system, which anticipates the deployment of a Next Generation Interceptor in about a decade?

Yes, I support continued modernization of the GMD system and the deployment of the Next Generation Interceptor, which I understand will provide increased capability and capacity to pace the threat from rogue nations such as North Korea and potentially Iran. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Missile Defense Agency to deliver the Next Generation Interceptor as early as possible.

79. What are your views on the utility of constructing a second GMD site on the East Coast of the United States?

It is my understanding an additional Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptor site on the East Coast is not operationally required at this time. However, as in all military operations, it is important to incorporate depth and dispersion into operations. Given the rapid advancement of rouge nation capabilities, I would support recurring assessments of the advisability of constructing a second GMD site.

80. In your view, what should the United States be doing to improve protection of the homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles in the interim?

I understand USNORTHCOM is working closely with the Missile Defense Agency to improve the sensor architecture and interceptors required to keep pace with the rapidly advancing North Korean ballistic missile threat. If confirmed, I will strongly support these ongoing efforts, while also looking for additional opportunities for enhanced capabilities to defend the homeland against the rogue state threat now and in the future.

81. Do you support the policy – reiterated by the 2022 Missile Defense Review – that the United States should continue to rely on nuclear deterrence to defend against large-scale missile attack from Russia and China?

Yes, I believe strategic deterrence is the foundation for homeland defense against the threat of a large-scale missile attack from Russia and China.

82. Do you believe the United States should develop the capability to defend the U.S. homeland against hypersonic glide vehicles?

Yes, I believe the U.S. should develop the capability to defeat hypersonic glide vehicles. NORAD is responsible for providing tactical warning and attack assessment of hypersonic glide vehicles, as well as defense against hypersonic cruise missiles (a capability Russia has employed against Ukraine).

83. What is your assessment of the importance of a space-based sensor capability to support homeland missile defense?

I strongly support the development of a more robust space-based sensor capability to augment the existing terrestrial and space-based sensor architecture and provide a more comprehensive, layered capability against all missile threats. With the advancement of competitor missile threat capabilities, a space-based sensor capability could support homeland missile defense by improving domain awareness against these threats, with persistent global tracking and discrimination of the missiles throughout their flight.

The 2022 Unified Command Plan realigned missile defense responsibilities across the combatant commands to integrate U.S. Space Command into the mission space.

84. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's role in missile defense?

I understand the 2022 Unified Command Plan (UCP) did not change USNORTHCOM's role in homeland missile defense. Together with NORAD, USNORTHCOM remains responsible

for the planning and execution of homeland missile defense. The 2022 UCP transitioned the missile defense roles and responsibilities that USSTRATCOM traditionally executed in support of all combatant commands to USSPACECOM. USSPACECOM is tasked with trans-regional missile planning and operations support in coordination with other combatant commands which compliments their role of global sensor manager that USSPACECOM already executes.

Cruise Missile Defense

NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise missiles.

85. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United States and its territories?

I assess cruise missiles to be a significant threat to the U.S. and its territories because cruise missiles can be launched from multiple air-, sea-, and land-based systems from significant ranges and from multiple avenues of approach. Additionally, cruise missiles can fly at speeds and altitudes that are difficult to detect with existing radar systems. If confirmed, I will aggressively pursue more robust detection and defeat capabilities that outpace advanced cruise missile threats.

86. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to address this threat?

I understand NORAD is working closely with the Air Force and the government of Canada to enhance sensor capabilities that provide advanced detection and warning of cruise missiles before they reach North America. If confirmed, it will be a top command priority to continue the advancement of these capabilities. I will also advocate for improved capabilities to defeat cruise missiles, including by non-kinetic means.

Continental Air Defense – NORAD

87. How has the continental air defense mission changed or evolved with the advent of a resurgent Russia, rising China, and an ongoing terrorist threat?

Both Russia and China have significantly increased their ability to challenge the NORAD air defense mission in recent years. Both countries have fielded long-range cruise missiles that can be launched from ranges that challenge NORAD's aerospace warning capabilities. The improved cruise missiles, when launched from bombers, can fly toward North America from a variety of avenues of approach, making NORAD's aerospace control mission more difficult. With regards to an ongoing terrorist threat, strong interagency partnering and cooperation, as well as advances in intelligence, defense systems, and procedures have improved NORAD's posture to respond to a terrorist threat. The rapidly evolving airborne threats from peer competitors and potential adversaries provide the greatest challenges for continental air defense today, and if confirmed, I will work closely with Department of

Defense, international, and interagency partners to obtain the capabilities to defend against current and emerging airborne threats.

88. Do you believe that current U.S. air defense capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs with respect to great power competition?

Yes, I believe NORAD can defend North America with current U.S. air defense capabilities. However, strategic competitors' capabilities are rapidly advancing, and the U.S. (and Canada) must keep pace to maintain the ability to detect, track, and defeat all threats. If confirmed, I will advocate for the advanced capabilities NORAD requires to stay ahead of the threat and execute its aerospace warning and aerospace control missions.

89. In your view, what are the key modernization priorities for NORAD's early-warning radar systems and other air defense capabilities?

Part of my 90-day assessment will include identifying the key modernization priorities for NORAD's early-warning radar systems and other air defense capabilities. However, based on my prior experience at NORAD, strategic competitors continue to develop advanced capabilities that can range North America from greater distances. As our competitors evolve, our detect systems must evolve faster and ensure we have the air and missile warning systems that provide for timely detection, tracking, and warning of threats before they reach North America. Older technology in the legacy systems will lose its effectiveness for warning against these increasingly complex, longer range weapons, and NORAD's capabilities must evolve and improve to outpace the threats.

90. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?

If confirmed, I will thoroughly evaluate the fielded and proposed domain awareness (sensing and detection) systems and programs NORAD uses to meet its air defense responsibilities for the United States and Canada. I will coordinate with DoD and the Government of Canada to prioritize identified deficiencies and address those deficiencies to ensure NORAD can accomplish its aerospace warning and aerospace control missions.

91. In your view, are current NORAD modernization efforts to replace the North Warning System on track and proceeding with an appropriate level of urgency?

If confirmed, I will need to assess the current state of the NORAD North Warning System (NWS) as part of my 90-day assessment. Proposed modernization efforts involving other sensors in a system-of-systems will represent a dramatic improvement over the 30-year-old NWS which was not designed to detect modern weapons and delivery systems, such as long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles. Ensuring effective awareness ultimately requires a family-of-systems approach including a network of Canadian and U.S. sensors from the sea floor to outer space. Present investments in NORAD modernization are critical to both continental defense and enhanced domain awareness.

In February 2023, a Chinese high altitude balloon entering U.S. airspace went undetected by NORAD. General VanHerck, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, NORAD, said that there was a “domain awareness gap” that resulted in the balloon not being detected.

92. What is your assessment of the threat to homeland defense from Chinese surveillance balloons potentially entering U.S. airspace?

The PRC will likely make similar attempts in the future to gather sensitive information that might provide a competitive advantage, including flight over sites that are critical to homeland defense. The keys to mitigating the PRC surveillance balloon threat are shared intelligence, improved domain awareness, and streamlined information sharing.

93. In your assessment, have NORTHCOM and NORAD taken sufficient steps to address the factors causing the domain awareness gap that led to the Chinese surveillance balloon not being detected?

Protecting U.S. sovereign airspace is a core tenet of homeland defense. If confirmed, I will review this event closely to determine whether NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken sufficient steps to address the factors causing the domain awareness gap. It is my current understanding that USNORTHCOM and NORAD have done so.

Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) System

The ITWAA system is a set of dual phenomenology sensor systems for which U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Northern Command have shared responsibility. The U.S. Air Force, and in particular the Space Force, is the title 10 service that manages the material performance and acquisition of the system. Recent advances in non-ITWAA certified sensor systems have made major progress in the discrimination of threats to the homeland, but their integration into the overall threat management decision process is still undergoing review.

94. What is your understanding of how responsibilities for the missile warning mission are divided under the 2022 Unified Command Plan?

The 2022 UCP specifies that the Commander of USSPACECOM will support the combatant commands with missile and nuclear detection warning capabilities. As the Global Sensor Manager, USSPACECOM is responsible to plan, manage and conduct operations of the space-based and ground-based sensors that contribute to missile and nuclear detection warning. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is the supported commander for these critical capabilities as they relate to homeland defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSPACECOM to optimize missile warning and nuclear detection in accordance with the NORAD Agreement and to strengthen my role as the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment authority.

95. What is your assessment of the management of the ITWAA system and the integration of non-certified ITWAA sensors, particularly those in space?

It is my understanding that NORAD and USSPACECOM work with the Air Force and Space Force to ensure current ITW/AA capabilities are sustained and modernization efforts addressing advanced threats are funded and delivered. I believe the integration of non-ITW/AA sensors will contribute to higher levels of attack confidence while minimizing gaps in coverage. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these efforts to achieve critical all domain integration.

96. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the ITWAA system is sustained and modernized in order to perform its critical function?

If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD continues a strong relationship with U.S. Space Command for management of the Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system, as well as with the Department of the Air Force and mission partners to ensure the ITW/AA system is sustained and modernized to address warfighter requirements for the developing threats. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing these relationships to ensure NORAD has the capabilities required for warning and assessment of potential threats against North America.

97. Do you believe the concept of ITWAA as it was envisioned in the 1970s, which focused exclusively on large formations of bomber aircraft and long range ballistic missiles, should be revisited given the proliferation of low-observable threats that can approach from multiple trajectories?

Yes, I believe the ITW/AA Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures should be continually assessed and updated to reflect the realities of the current threat. The legacy ITW/AA system was designed to deliver early detection and threat assessment to maximize senior leader decision space. This was possible due to easy-to-detect ballistic missile profiles that allowed commanders to make a high-confidence attack assessment. Today's advanced threats, including low-observables and hypersonic glide vehicles, add ambiguity into those determinations, potentially delaying assessment and decreasing vital decision space.

Maritime Warning and Maritime Domain Awareness

98. NORAD has the mission of Maritime Warning for North America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime Domain Awareness mission, and what is your assessment of the ability of NORAD and NORTHCOM to fulfill these missions?

I understand the NORAD maritime warning mission requires broad area maritime domain awareness and information sharing across multiple combatant commands, agencies, and Canadian areas of operation to develop a unique bi-national, comprehensive understanding of maritime activities with all partners. If confirmed, I will review the ability of USNORTHCOM and NORAD to fulfill their varied maritime domain awareness missions as part of my 90-day assessment.

Arctic Region Mission

99. If confirmed, how will you work with the Military Services to identify, develop and enhance DoD capabilities to protect and defend U.S. sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region?

If confirmed, I will collaborate with fellow combatant commanders and the military Services to assess requirements for addressing threats from or through the Arctic. I believe NORAD and USNORTHCOM's ability to defend North America depends on the commands' ability to conduct all-domain operations in the Arctic and to interact seamlessly with U.S. European Command and U.S. IndoPacific Command as operations transit between the operational boundaries for each command.

100. If confirmed, by what process will you identify requirements for support from other government agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, in fulfilling requirements for the Arctic region?

USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements in the Arctic may be fulfilled by a number of DoD and interagency partners. For example, I understand that a significant portion of the validated USNORTHCOM requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor Alaska will be addressed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-led expansion of the Port of Nome. Likewise, the U.S. Coast Guard provides critically important capability and support in the Arctic. If confirmed, I will continue to place strong emphasis on NORAD and USNORTHCOM's longstanding partnership with the Coast Guard and the command's other partners in the Arctic. When needed, I will request Coast Guard support via a Request for Forces submitted to the Joint Staff and advocate for efforts by the commands' interagency partners to improve the overall U.S. capability and capacity for operating in the Arctic, to include those that directly and indirectly support NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission requirements.

101. Does DOD currently have the appropriate capabilities and assets to meet its goals in the Arctic?

As I understand it, DoD has improved the capability to meet its goals in the Arctic, but much work remains ahead. If confirmed, I will carefully assess USNORTHCOM and NORAD requirements and advocate for those requirements to be sourced. If confirmed, I will also serve as the DoD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities, and as such, I will work closely with the Commanders of U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command to ensure their Arctic requirements are met.

102. What changes, if any, are necessary for the Department to support the implementation of the October 2022 National Strategy of the Arctic Region?

I understand that more than half of the USNORTHCOM AOR and the NORAD Area of Operations are in the Arctic. To compete in the Arctic, it is important for the military Services to develop the capability and capacity necessary to meet combatant command all-domain Arctic requirements as well as the objectives detailed in the individual Arctic

strategies. If confirmed, I will closely assess both commands' missions and associated requirements in the Arctic and make recommendations for any changes necessary to ensure the Department's ability to support the implementation of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

Law of the Sea Convention

103. Do you support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention? If so, please explain why.

Yes, I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides a comprehensive regime for the governance of the world's oceans, including the Arctic, and U.S. accession would further demonstrate our commitment to an international rules-based order. Acceding to the treaty would enable U.S. representation during critical international negotiations that impact the maritime domain, provide an additional mechanism to counter countries like Russia and China that continue to exploit our absence from key ocean governance diplomatic forums, and ultimately help protect our nation's rights and interests in this critical sphere of operations.

104. Given NORTHCOM's responsibilities for the Arctic region, do you believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would help the United States protect its interests in the Arctic, including against competing claims from foreign nations?

Yes, I believe accession to the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) would help the U.S. protect its interests in the Arctic. Accession would demonstrate our commitment to a rules-based order, ensure our best interests are represented during international negotiations regarding territorial disputes and challenges to longstanding maritime customs and practices, and improve our ability to advocate for our ocean governance interests around the globe, including in the Arctic. Engagement through UNCLOS is particularly critical today as multiple nations vie for access and control in the Arctic and seek to modify international norms to accommodate expansionist ambitions around the globe in general, and in the Arctic in particular. Finally, accession would preclude Russia and China from exploiting U.S. absence in forums.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

105. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

106. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

107. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

108. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

109. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

110. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

111. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes

112. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer with a simple yes or no.

Yes