

Advance Questions for General John E. Hyten, USAF
Nominee for Commander, United States Strategic Command

Defense Reforms

The Senate Armed Services Committee has initiated an intensive review of the organization of the Department of Defense—both military and civilian, including the elements created by the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Department of Defense to execute the National Military Strategy in the 21st Century.

Based on your experiences as a senior officer, what challenges have you observed with the current organizational structure, with particular focus on warfighting capabilities, and what modifications, if any, do you think are necessary to the current organizational structure including any Goldwater Nichols Act provisions?

Goldwater Nichols has served this nation well for the last 30 years. It greatly improved joint operations and established much more effective command and control of joint forces. The law helped generate and accelerate an amazing, positive transformation in our military. In reality, the organization created by this law, is the only military organization and structure I have ever known. Nonetheless, I believe we should always look for improvement – in everything that we do -- and Goldwater Nichols is no exception. Now is a good time to take a fresh look. The most significant challenge I see with the current structure is with global, multi-domain integration. In other words, how do we effectively integrate our forces to fight seamlessly on the land, at sea, in air, in space, and in cyberspace. Many domains, space and cyberspace in particular, create both global and theater effects and must be fully integrated in the execution of any conflict. I won't get ahead of Chairman Dunford's on-going, current assessment but my sense is the time is right to move beyond jointness towards a more complete goal of integration. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with Congress to ensure that any changes build upon the strengths of Goldwater Nichols and improve our ability to operate effectively in any multi-domain, global conflict.

On 29 March 2016, General Dunford said: “Today we’re regionally focused. We rely on kind of what I describe as cooperation and collaboration between combatant commanders. We have supported and supporting relationships, and that’s all worked well for decades ... And if you think about how I described the character of war, and you imagine the secretary of defense trying to make decisions in that environment, clearly I think we owe him better in terms of command and control, a better framework within which to make decisions in a timely manner based on the character of war we see today and, as importantly, a better process for the prioritization and allocation of resources in real time....”

In your view, what modifications to the Unified Command Plan, if any, would enhance the warfighting effectiveness of the Department of Defense and the combatant commanders?

I agree completely with General Dunford. We need a better process for the prioritization and allocation of resources in real time. I think it is essential that we remain properly organized for a changing complex strategic environment. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) has been, and will continue to be, a living document which has reflected the changing nature of military

challenges from the standup of new Commands (e.g., AFRICOM, NORTHCOM, etc.) to the elevation of new missions (e.g., Ballistic Missile Defense) to the recognition of new domains (e.g. space and cyberspace). It's premature to suggest specific changes to the UCP, but I am convinced that it's imperative the UCP remain linked with our evolving understanding of the threat, our national military strategy to address that threat and our best understanding how best to organize to meet the strategy. The UCP will enable how we intend to create the integrated, joint force of the future. Again, as I stated above, if confirmed, I pledge to work closely with Congress to ensure we are organized properly to operate effectively in any multi-domain, global conflict.

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

The Commander, US Strategic Command creates plans and conducts operations to detect and deter strategic attacks against the US and our allies; and, in concert with the joint force, defeat those who attack us when deterrence fails. USSTRATCOM is currently assigned nine, soon to be eight, distinct responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Space Operations; Cyberspace Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electronic Warfare; Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; and Analysis and Targeting. Of these nine, the President has authorized the Secretary to transfer the responsibility for synchronizing planning for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction from USSTRATCOM to USSOCOM. These diverse responsibilities are strategic in nature, global in scope and intertwined with Joint Force capabilities, the interagency process, and a Whole-of-Government approach.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

My 35 years of service has been primarily in two of USSTRATCOM's three main mission areas. I began my career in what we now term the cyberspace domain and transitioned as a company grade officer into space, first in engineering and acquisition, then in operations. In addition to my primary areas of expertise, I have also been responsible for testing our nations ICBMs – Minuteman and Peacekeeper at the time. I have been in the nuclear command and control chain of command as a Mission Director in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Command Center. I have served in multiple capacities within the Pentagon on the Joint and at the Service Secretary level staffs. Throughout my career in the Air Force I have commanded at all levels from the tactical to the strategic. My work, especially in two key domains (space and cyberspace), gives me a unique perspective for the challenges ahead – how to enable the Joint Force; thinking globally and holistically; and driving integration, relevance and resiliency.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

I am not an expert in all nine of the USSTRATCOM responsibilities I described above. They are extraordinarily diverse. If confirmed, I will work diligently to enhance my expertise in

USSTRATCOM's broad range of missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USSTRATCOM commanders and staff, as well as the other Combatant Commanders and the many organizations USSTRATCOM partners with for mission success.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 164, subject to the direction of the President, the Commander, USSTRATCOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on appropriate matters.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

As the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for Policy formulates national security and defense policy, integrates DoD policy and plans and performs oversight of defense policy goals to achieve national security objectives. These policies guide USSTRATCOM strategic planning and operations.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the advisor and PSA to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities and other intelligence-related matters. Intelligence assessments and products related to the global environment are profoundly important to USSTRATCOM.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the advisor and PSA to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DoD Acquisition; research and

development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment; services; and nuclear, chemical and biological programs. USSTRATCOM works closely with AT&L to sustain current and advocate/field future capabilities. The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics also chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Commander, USSTRATCOM is a member. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on all these matters specific to USSTRATCOM.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs

Responsibilities resident within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA) were reorganized under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on matters specific to U.S. Strategic Command.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on policy, strategy, and implementation guidance across a diverse portfolio of national and global security issues. These issues include countering weapons of mass destruction, cyber operations, homeland defense activities, antiterrorism, continuity of government and mission assurance, defense support to civil authorities and space-related matters. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on matters specific to U.S. Strategic Command.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics advises the Secretary of Defense on matters concerning nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs; develops policies, provides advice, makes recommendations on nuclear weapons, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; serves as the Nuclear Weapons Council Staff Director; and performs such additional duties as the Secretary may prescribe. If confirmed, I will work closely with this office and the Nuclear Weapons Council in support of the strategic deterrence mission.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the

Secretary of Defense as established in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 163. By law and as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman consults with the Combatant Commanders, evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. The Chairman provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the DoD. In this role, he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the Chain of Command between the President and Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders, although the President may transmit communications through the Chairman. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense informed without delay on matters for which I am personally accountable as Commander, USSTRATCOM.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over assigned forces is clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Service Chiefs serve to provide organized, trained and equipped forces to be employed by Combatant Commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. While they no longer serve in the operational chain of command, they are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs as they are individually and collectively, a tremendous source of experience and judgment.

The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DoD organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the DoD.

The Unified Command Plan assigns USSTRATCOM responsibilities for both space operations and for planning, integrating and coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as directed.

If confirmed as the Commander, USSTRATCOM I will maintain a close working relationship and continue the work both Admiral Haney and I have conducted with the Director of the NRO on space mission area requirements, to include the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operation Center (JICSPOC). The benefits of this teamwork over the last few years demonstrate the importance of bringing shared interests together to successfully address truly complex national security challenges.

The Combatant Commanders, particularly Commander, U. S. Northern Command, and Air Force Global Strike Command and U.S. Cyber Command

The Commander, USSTRATCOM has both supported and supporting relationships with other Combatant Commanders, largely identified within the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, Operations Plans and Concept Plans

U.S. Cyber Command is a USSTRATCOM subordinate unified command, which plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DoD information networks. Air Force Global Strike Command is an Air Force major command that provides combat ready forces to USSTRATCOM to conduct nuclear deterrence and global strike operations as directed. USSTRATCOM supports U.S. Northern Command's mission to conduct homeland defense to secure and defend the United States and its interests.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Combatant Commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of these relationships.

The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

Title 50, U.S. Code, section 2402, appoints the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. All Department of Energy programs and activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile stewardship program are the Administrator's responsibility. Additionally, the Administrator serves on the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties that closely concern and support USSTRATCOM, but remain separate from DoD's operational control. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

The Director of the Missile Defense Agency

The Unified Command Plan charges USSTRATCOM with synchronizing planning for global missile defense including coordinating global missile defense operations support, and developing and advocating for missile defense and warning capabilities.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provides the research, development, testing and evaluation of the missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by Combatant Commanders. Given these closely aligned responsibilities, both the Commander, USSTRATCOM, and the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense must continue their close working relationship with MDA, the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the DoD.

If confirmed, I will work closely with Combatant Commanders and the Director of MDA to ensure required ballistic missile defense and warning capabilities are developed and fielded.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) is the principal staff assistant and senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in the Department of Defense (DoD). DOT&E is responsible for issuing DoD OT&E policy and procedures; reviewing and analyzing the results of OT&E conducted for each major DoD acquisition program; providing independent assessments to SecDef, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and Congress; making budgetary and financial recommendations to the SecDef regarding OT&E; and overseeing major DoD acquisition programs to ensure OT&E is adequate to confirm operational effectiveness and suitability of the defense system in combat use. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of the DOT&E in assessing the progress of command programs of interest.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Strategic Command?

Having been assigned to units assigned to USSTRACOM for many years, I am confident in saying that the command has a highly trained and motivated strategic force. I have direct insight our nations space and cyberspace capabilities and we are on a good path, though much remains to be done. It seems clear to me that the big challenges facing USSTRATCOM mirror those across our joint force. Stability in order to recruit and retain a well-trained and motivated military and civilian work force is essential. I have been impressed monitoring the work accomplished to mitigate the well-documented decline in our strategic nuclear capabilities across delivery systems (e.g., the Triad); their supporting stockpile and infrastructure; Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) and Indications and Warning/Attack Assessment (ITWAA). I am close enough to the budget process to realize however, that many of these modernization/ recapitalization efforts are just in time with little margin for slippage. If confirmed, I pledge to look closely across the many joint missions under USSTRATCOM and continue to work these challenges and others. If I identify any concerns, I pledge to share them and work them with the Congress.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

As stated above, if confirmed, I pledge to look closely across the many joint missions under USSTRATCOM and continue to work these challenges and others. If I identify any concerns, I pledge to share them and work them with the Congress. Specifically I plan to be a strong and objective advocate for the resources the command needs to succeed. I support the need to modernize our nuclear triad. I support the continued development of capabilities to deal with the threatened domains of space and cyberspace. I will continue on the path set by Admiral Haney with the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum, which he co-chairs with Ms. Betty Sapp, the Director of the NRO. This forum's goals are to ensure US space policy, doctrine, operational concepts, strategies and planning scenarios reflect that space is a contested domain, populated by dynamic actors. We have already made significant progress in partnering and shared learning. I am sure the other USSTRATCOM missions have challenges as well and I pledge to work them all to the best of my ability, if confirmed.

What are your priorities for the U.S. Strategic Command?

I am sure that my priorities will evolve if I am confirmed and assume command, but it should be clear that first and foremost, my highest priority must be to deter strategic attack against the United States and provide assurance to our Allies. A safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force is critical to the security of our nation. High on my priority list will also be the need to address challenges in space and cyberspace with capability, capacity, and resilience. I will focus on integrating our capabilities as greater than the sum of their parts by building, sustaining and supporting partnerships across the Department, the US Government and with our Allies. I will work hard to create an environment that rewards innovative thinking and a culture of integration and effectiveness.

Strategic Threats

In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats facing the United States today?

The threats are many and complicated – here are a few that cause me significant concern; the continued propagation of asymmetric methods, the unprecedented proliferation of advanced technologies, including advances in ballistic missiles, challenges and threats in space and cyberspace, the deployment of other new and advanced weapons systems, and most concerning, the increasingly provocative and destabilizing behavior by potential adversaries like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.

In addition, as noted in the National Security Strategy, the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremist groups and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to additional states clearly represent strategic threats to the United States.

What future strategic threats should the United States prepare for?

Our potential adversaries have studied the U.S. way of warfare and are actively developing asymmetric responses. The development of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles; counter-space capabilities; hypersonic weapons; unmanned aerial vehicles; and autonomous underwater vehicles are all examples of potential future strategic threats. I am also concerned about the growing cyber capabilities of advanced state actors, such as Russia and China, as well as non-state actors. The growing sophistication and availability of information technology that can be used for nefarious purposes means we face an increasing future cyber threat both in terms of speed and scope of impact.

These threat trends suggest a much more integrated approach to deterrence and warfighting and will challenge not only our operational tempo but our ability to decide in the presence of ambiguity and multiple, competing priorities across a forward fight, escalation control and homeland defense/consequence management in unprecedented ways.

What are your views of Russia's strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities?

Although I am not as close to this issue as I will be if confirmed, it seems clear that Russia has been making large investments in its nuclear weapon programs as well as modernizing both its

strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition to advancing nuclear capabilities, Russia is emphasizing new regional and strategic approaches, and declaring and demonstrating its ability to escalate if required. Collectively, Russian development of advancing weapons capabilities and its evolving warfighting doctrine is concerning.

What are your views on China’s nuclear capabilities?

Again, I am not as informed on this subject as I will be if confirmed, but I am fully aware that China continues to modernize its nuclear missile force and is striving for a secure, second-strike capability. Although it continues to profess a “no first use” doctrine, China is re-engineering its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple nuclear warheads and continues to develop and test hyper-glide vehicle technologies. These developments – coupled with a lack of transparency on nuclear issues such as force disposition and size – may impact regional and strategic stability and are cause for continued vigilance and concern.

What are your views on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?

Again, my expertise here is top-level only and will expand if confirmed, but from my perspective, North Korea does not yet represent an existential threat to the U.S., however, it remains the most dangerous and unpredictable actor in the Asia Pacific Region. Pyongyang’s evolving ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program underscore the growing threat. Kim Jong-Un continues to defy international norms and resolutions, as demonstrated by a number of provocative actions this year, including the DPRK’s fourth and fifth nuclear test. North Korea appears committed to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear delivery options, while strengthening missile force survivability. North Korea also continues efforts to expand its stockpile of weapons grade fissile material. All of this is extremely concerning.

U. S. Strategic Command Missions

In an overarching sense, how do you define the U. S. Strategic Command mission?

USSTRATCOM conducts military operations globally in support of national objectives, other Combatant Commanders and the command’s strategic deterrence, assurance, and functional objectives. Capabilities and associated operations are functional and distinct, but are interconnected and require synchronization within the command and integration with other Combatant Commands, U.S. government elements, Allies and partners.

USSTRATCOM supports our nation’s security throughout the spectrum of conflict, by delivering comprehensive warfighting solutions focused on deterring strategic attack, understanding escalation, preventing miscalculation, providing assurance to our Allies, anticipating change and confronting uncertainty with agility and innovation.

U. S. Strategic Command has absorbed multiple new missions since its creation, with the most recent addition being the establishment of the Cyber-Command, as a sub-unified command of the Strategic Command.

How successful has U. S. Strategic Command been at integrating these new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?

I have not been assigned directly to HQs USSTRATCOM so my observations come from the point of view of a service component. Nonetheless, it seems clear to me that USSTRATCOM has been effective at integrating the expanded missions. However, our ability to recruit, train and retain personnel with the right expertise required to execute these specialized missions remains a challenge.

What organizational challenges remain at U. S. Strategic Command related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for these new missions?

Expertise and excellence in nuclear operations will always be a challenge due to its critical importance to the security of the nation. We must also permeate an operational space culture throughout the national security space enterprise. Additionally, cyberspace capabilities and capacity are still maturing and require continued support from the services to organize, train and equip the right cyber experts to meet established priorities. If confirmed, I pledge to assess the status of capabilities and determine the proper course of action to align personnel and resources to address the issues.

If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the missions currently assigned to U. S. Strategic Command? If so, what changes would you recommend?

If confirmed, I would only recommend changes in assigned missions after I have a chance to thoroughly evaluate and assess the command's mission effectiveness in the context of an evolving global security environment. It is too soon for me to make any such recommendations now.

Are you aware of any additional new missions that are being contemplated for the Strategic Command?

No. I am not aware of any new missions being considered for Strategic Command.

Strategic Command has transferred the combatting weapons of mass destruction mission to SOCOM. What are the major challenges in transferring this mission?

I have not been directly involved in this discussion, but it is my understanding the USSTRATCOM and USSOCOM staffs are still working through the details of mission and resource transfers. However it turns out, if confirmed, I pledge to remain partnered with USSOCOM before, during and after transition to ensure this critical mission remains on track.

Organization

In addition to Cyber-Command, the Command is organized into a series of joint functional component commands that correspond to the mission areas of Strategic Command.

If confirmed, would you anticipate maintaining or modifying this structure?

If confirmed, I will ensure our organizational structure remains synchronized with other pending efforts such as the National Military Strategy, the Unified Command Plan, the Goldwater-Nichols review and more. I am not wedded to the current structure for its own sake, but rather will ensure we innovate, exercise and experiment in a manner that confirms the best organizational structure to meet the evolving threat. The world is changing rapidly and if confirmed, I pledge to ensure USSTRATCOM is organized to respond to these changes with people, policies and organizational structures that value agility, objectivity and innovation.

Ballistic Missile Defense

How do you view the roles and responsibilities of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, related to ballistic missile defense?

This mission area has shown an incredible degree of maturation over the years with significant advances in synchronized planning for global missile defense across multiple Combatant Commands and their Areas of Responsibility as well as joint missile defense training. This progress was enabled in large part with the work done by the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) in partnership with the Joint Staff, Missile Defense Agency, Services and Combatant Commands. The challenge going forward is to work even more holistically in support of Missile Defeat concepts to provide the most resilient and cost effective options to the President and SECDEF.

What do you believe is the appropriate function of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?

I am not completely current on all the details regarding the functions of JFCC IMD, but I am aware that their missions are to synchronize missile defense planning, conduct ballistic missile defense operations support, advocate for missile defense capabilities, recommend allocation of missile defense forces, and execute joint ballistic missile defense training and education in support of USSTRATCOM, other Combatant Commands, the Services, and appropriate U.S. government agencies, to deter adversaries, assure allies, and defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies and partners against missile attacks. In addition, JFCC IMD serves as the primary warfighter interface to the Missile Defense Agency representing warfighter equities in the BMD development and test process. If confirmed, I will certainly dig deeper into their functions.

If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the authorities of Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, as they relate to ballistic missile defense?

Not at this time (based on my current understanding of the USSTRATCOM authorities). I am aware of a growing desire within the Department to address the missile threat from a broader Missile Defeat perspective. If confirmed, I will become engaged in this review, but in any case, plan to maintain the existing strong relationships with the Geographic Combatant Commanders, Services and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in the assessment of the military utility of U.S. ballistic missile defenses against short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-range ballistic missiles?

I know that USSTRATCOM is assigned responsibility to conduct and report military utility assessments during Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) development and transition of capabilities to the services in coordination with the Director, MDA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I plan to continue conducting military utility assessments during Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) development in coordination with the MDA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Services.

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in representing and advocating for the views and needs of the combatant commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe the warfighter perspective should inform our missile defense program?

I am aware that U.S. Strategic Command leads the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Warfighter Involvement Process to capture and articulate warfighter capability needs to inform both MDA and Service program development. I am also aware that U.S. Strategic Command develops an annual GIAMDA to articulate Combatant Commanders' IAMD risks that require remedy via acquisition, procurement, Global Force Management, and allied integration. These efforts raise the level of warfighter awareness and engagement such that they now forcefully advocate for their own needs without dependence on USSTRATCOM alone. If confirmed, I will continue close consultations with the Combatant Commanders to fully understand their needs, ensure they have the tools to assess their risk and fully partner with them to collectively advocate for missile defense capabilities.

Please describe your view of the appropriate roles for the Joint Staff and the Missile Defense Executive Board in guiding decisions on the development, acquisition, and deployment of effective missile defense capabilities.

The Joint Staff J8/Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) is responsible for defining required Service IAMD systems requirements through the normal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS); they are also heavily involved in defining interoperability and operational architectures while validating joint regional IAMD capabilities via simulation and technology demonstrations.

The Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), under the USD (AT&L), provides oversight and guidance for all missile defense stakeholders in the DoD and other agencies and departments. The MDEB also validates Warfighter Involvement Process-developed BMD requirements for MDA, which works outside the JCIDS process. JIAMDO and the MDEB work collaboratively (along with the Services) to transition tested systems from MDA to a Service in order to be organized, trained, and equipped for Combatant Commander employment, supported by USSTRATCOM and our JFCC-IMD.

I am aware much has changed since MDA received acquisition and requirements process exemptions that led to the oversight/governance structure outlined above. If confirmed, I will be prepared to support any future review of the continued efficacy of these processes. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that are to be deployed must be operationally effective and cost-effective?

Yes.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense flight tests need to be operationally realistic, and that operational testing is necessary in order to demonstrate the capabilities of our systems and provide confidence that they will work effectively?

Yes.

What are your views on the relationship between ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and nuclear deterrence?

I fundamentally believe that deterrence is created via the total, integrated capabilities of the United States, never one single element. Specifically, in response to this question, nuclear deterrence is heavily impacted through the integration of offense (nuclear deterrence) and defense (BMD)... they cannot be looked at separately. Nonetheless, our missile defenses by themselves will not defeat any but the most limited missile threats. Still, effective missile defense is an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen strategic and regional deterrence against actors of concern. Through deployment of limited homeland defenses, the U.S. seeks to dissuade such states from developing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), deter them from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by such states should deterrence fail. Currently, missile defenses are not intended to offset the strategic balance with Russian or Chinese strategic forces and are not designed to protect the U.S. homeland against large scale nuclear ballistic missile strikes. The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force of ICBMs, bombers and ballistic missile submarines (the triad) will remain the primary deterrent of major nuclear attacks against the U.S., our allies and partners, by nuclear powers such as Russia and China.

Do you support the policies and priorities stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report of February 2010? Has the passage of time changed any of the underlying assumptions, such that policy updates may be required?

I have only recently reviewed this report and have not had time to fully evaluate the findings. If confirmed, I will certainly do this. Nonetheless, I believe the policies and priorities laid out in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) are still valid. The defense of the homeland, followed by partners and allies against ballistic missile attack are still national imperatives. The Chairman provided the Department with his Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision 2020, which calls for the deeper integration of capabilities to defeat the growing set of air and missile threats, including cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The next logical step, at a minimum, is to evolve the Chairman's vision into a broader Missile Defeat framework to improve resilience and cost effectiveness.

Do you support the homeland ballistic missile defense initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel on March 15, 2013, including the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska?

Yes, I support this program. The additional 14 GBIs in Alaska are adding capacity to US homeland defense against limited long range threats. We must also remain focused on ensuring this increased capacity is employed in the most effective manner possible with discriminating sensors, complete tracking and robust command and control.

Do you agree with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that additional analysis is needed, including analysis of the missile threat from Iran, before making a decision on whether to deploy such an additional missile defense site in the future?

Yes. Moreover, as we continue to monitor and evaluate potential/emerging long-range missile threats to the Homeland we will remain mindful of the entire package of capability that may be needed from additional interceptors to supporting sensors and command/control.

Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense on the importance of enhancing our missile defense sensor capabilities to improve discrimination and kill assessment for homeland ballistic missile defense?

Yes. Discrimination (coupled with associated Battle Space Awareness) is the critical component to improving the effectiveness of our deployed interceptors as well as providing multiple response options especially as potential adversaries embark on improving countermeasures against our systems. In addition, I believe a space-based element will be critical to this future.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe (EPAA), and do you believe this approach will provide a timely and effective capability to address existing and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats to Europe?

Yes, the initial operational capability declaration of Phase II of the EPAA has been a great success. Phase III will provide in-depth coverage and far superior capability to protect our forward forces, allies, and partners.

The Government of Iran continues to pursue ballistic missile testing, production and deployment; therefore if confirmed, I will continue to assess our progress and make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

What role do you believe Strategic Command should play in the development and implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and other regions?

USSTRATCOM is synchronizer of global missile defense plans, coordinator of global missile defense operations support, and Joint Functional Manager for global force management of missile defense capabilities.

USSTRATCOM ensures the Geographic Combatant Commanders have the capability to: (1) effectively utilize our limited air and missile defense forces, (2) share warning and defense sensor data from one region to another, and (3) as directed, plan and conduct transregional attacks on missile threats before they launch.

Cyber Security

What are your priorities for the U.S. Cyber Command?

If confirmed, I will have further discussions with the commander of US Cyber Command, ADM Mike Rogers, but from my perspective today, assuring our warfighting missions and defending our information networks and are the top priorities for U.S. Cyber Command. This requires strengthening and expanding partnerships in the domain as well as building the capacity and capability to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations. Integrating cyberspace capabilities into Combatant Command plans and operations across the DoD will also bring additional flexibility needed to simultaneously address competitors and others who are preparing to challenge our advantages in cyberspace.

In your view, what are the most important unmet priorities for the development and deployment of cyber security tools and capabilities?

I really only have detailed knowledge from an AF perspective at this point, but I know that USCYBERCOM is working through Department processes to accelerate resourcing of immediate needs. From my perspective today, some immediate needs include:

- enhanced abilities to defend critical infrastructure and DOD weapon systems,
- improved capabilities to counter violent extremist organizations
- robust command and control (C2) of cyberspace forces
- a unified platform for military cyberspace operations
- additional options to strategically deter adversary aggression in and through cyberspace

If confirmed I will work closely with ADM Rogers to advocate for and pursue these critical capabilities.

If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing policy for U.S. Cyber Command?

If confirmed, as authorized with my combatant command authority, and in collaboration with Commander U.S. Cyber Command, I will actively support the establishment of new policy and the revision of current policy to carry out my Unified Command Plan-assigned responsibilities. Additionally, I will engage with leaders across the Department of Defense, the interagency, and Congress to ensure the joint force has adequate and appropriate strategies for cyberspace operations.

What are your views on the issue of elevating U.S. Cyber Command to a full unified command, including the timetable for elevating the Command?

The evolution of the threat suggests to me it is simply a matter of when, not if, U.S. Cyber Command is elevated into a full unified command. If confirmed, I will continue to enhance the capability and partnership between USSTRATCOM, U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency until the decision is made to elevate – and then, if the decision is made, I will support their elevation to rapidly achieve unified command status without loss of any momentum or current cyberspace operational capability. I have only one concern – and it can be mitigated with the proper attention. I was a part of a combatant command earlier in my career that was a single domain Combatant Command – US Space Command. Many members of that command (not the leadership) tended to focus on the challenges in their own domain, and placed less focus on their critical support to theater operations (Geographic Combatant Commands). If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure US Cyber Command maintains a proper focus on the theater as they also focus on the other challenges in cyber – however the decision on elevation resolves.

Space

What is your view on the responsiveness of current space systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the Operationally Responsive Space program to meet military and other space requirements such as space based environmental monitoring?

In my current role as Commander, Air Force Space Command I have been concerned with and focused on the issue of responsiveness in the face of adversary advances. Responsiveness is interconnected with resilience and was a key attribute behind our Space Enterprise Vision developed in collaboration with the National Reconnaissance Office and the other Services. The pace of commercial innovation and quickly accelerating threat trends suggest it is no longer sufficient to field systems with extremely long durations and inflexible development and replenishment. While the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program has been a successful pathfinder to responsiveness – and it will continue this superb service in the future – we must also infuse this thinking across our entire enterprise and into the broader space industry. I will continue this focus if confirmed as Commander, US Strategic Command.

What is your view of the ability of the DOD to develop and deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?

We have not had a good track record but we have improved significantly over the last decade. We are finally building and delivering capabilities in a time-certain and price-certain manner. Although there are still exceptions (e.g., GPS III and the next generation Operational Control Segment (OCX), we have created some very good processes. We know if we focus on requirements, make sure they are achievable, and avoid requirements growth inside our programs, we can deliver. These are critical fundamentals of the Space Enterprise Vision and we must have the discipline to follow through. We must also explore options to the current paradigm within the DoD of only developing large, complex satellite systems. Heretofore, we have delivered some highly capable systems with long on-orbit endurance that were appropriate for a benign space environment. While there will certainly continue to be many cases where this approach is essential, we must also be able to deliver smaller systems within much shorter timelines. We should be able to field a new satellite design on a timeline closer to private industry (3-5 years). In my view resilience is enabled by cost-effective responsiveness. In addition to satellites, these fundamentals also apply to our ground systems and launch. We must move on to an Enterprise Ground Architecture in the future and we must continue to maintain assured access to space while driving launch costs further down. The challenges are difficult but essential to the future viability of the space enterprise.

What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to improve the responsiveness of current space systems?

There are a few key components; we must continue our efforts to improve the partnership between the DoD and the IC, continue to improve both the systems and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with space battle management command and control (BMC2), and improve the way we move and share data. In addition, we must pursue different architectures and integrated defensive capabilities to ensure we can respond to any future threat.

In your view, what are the most important unmet requirements for space systems?

We've outlined an integrated approach to future space capabilities and resilience in the joint Air Force Space Command/National Reconnaissance Office Space Enterprise Vision. The vision focuses on continued support to terrestrial operations along with new initiatives for space control, battle management/command and control and a responsive ground architecture. An integrated ground architecture is perhaps the most important unmet requirement today. All our legacy capabilities were developed separately, in stovepipes. They work perfectly in a benign environment. In a threat environment, however, we need to integrate across the enterprise. We are pursuing this with renewed vigor and I will continue to advocate for this capability if confirmed.

Do you believe any urgent needs or capability gaps exist? If so, please specify in detail.

A specific urgent need was recently identified and validated in the form of a Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) for space battle management/command and control. This will support our ability to change the warfighting culture of our space cadre as well as ensuring we have the ability to fully plan and employ our space control capabilities.

What do you believe should be done to meet those requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest priority?

Again, the priorities are laid out in our Space Enterprise Vision with a focus on space control, battle management/command and control and a responsive ground architecture supported by a cadre of well-trained space warfighters focused on a contested domain.

How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance, and what programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?

Persistent surveillance is an enduring priority needed to detect, collect, disseminate, and characterize activity across the battlespace. This applies to all domains. While space, airborne, maritime, and terrestrial programs all contribute to ISR, it's the integration of sensors spanning multiple platforms that will be most critical in increasing persistent surveillance.

What is your view on the effectiveness of efforts to cooperate with the commercial space sector to improve space situational awareness and how could this effort be expanded and made more successful?

Our initial interactions are promising but much work remains to be done. We should have made more progress by now but have been slowed mostly by our own inability to integrate disparate data sources in a modern, integrated, command and control architecture. We are working hard to correct that deficiency, and are committed to exploring incorporation of both commercial and foreign partners to provide a more comprehensive space picture.

What are your views on disaggregation of space sensors systems, particularly for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency and the Space Based Infrared Systems?

Disaggregation is just one of many options we are evaluating to improve the resilience of our space capabilities. Disaggregation shows promise as one means to achieve some of the

objectives for our future space systems. What are really looking for are more resilient warfighting constellations and capabilities that can operate through any future postulated threat. This includes building new architectures (some disaggregated) and integrating them with other options (e.g., defensive capabilities). Disaggregation for its own sake, however, is not a goal. Disaggregated architectures will be evaluated against the metrics of cost, schedule, performance, survivability, and resilience.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national security payloads into space. The two launch vehicles have been combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S. Government with the expectation that this would improve both the efficiency of space launch and reduce the cost.

What are your expectations with respect to future space launch efficiencies and cost savings?

I expect the cost of launch to continue to follow the downward trend we have already seen with the introduction of additional commercial launch providers. Driving down the cost of launch is an important component of all our future space architectures and it must also be more nimble and responsive.

In the next several years the rate of space launches is expected to increase, what new approaches to space launch, in your view, should be implemented to handle this increased rate of launch?

We should continue to improve the way we manage the assignment of payloads to lift vehicles. Ultimately, a space program manager should be able to predictably schedule his lift to space based on a planned and published lift schedule. Commercial providers offer both a model for this approach and additional capacity to help handle the increased demand. It is important for a number of reasons that when a satellite is ready to launch, we launch it. This stabilizes the launch manifest, drives down costs, prevents us from storing satellites on the ground (expensive and risky to the satellite), and adds resilience to our on orbit constellations. In addition, we must consider to modernize and automate our ranges. We are pursuing the integration of Autonomous Flight Safety Systems (AFSS) on our ranges that will improve throughput and reliability. It will also allow us to continue to take advantage of the expanding commercial sector who are pursuing AFSS in many ways.

What, in your view, should the United States do in the future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?

The United States must continue to work closely the entire launch industry as well as with commercial providers to encourage a robust space lift industry. I believe the future challenges we face can only be conquered through a robust public, private partnership. If confirmed, I will advocate for continued development of critical technologies, further development of the commercial launch sector, and improvement of our range operations and lift manifest management in coordination with the Services, the NRO, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Do you believe that the nation should sustain redundant space launch capabilities?

Yes. Redundant launch capabilities are necessary to assure access to space. We cannot allow our access to space and the ability to quickly and reliably place critical systems on orbit to be subject to a single point of failure.

What do you see as the greatest problem implementing a new entrant strategy?

The highest hurdle is certification. We must maintain a robust certification standard given the national security implications of losing a satellite during launch. We will be demanding customers of all new entrants and continue to employ a robust mission assurance policy.

What are your views regarding the phase out of the Delta IV Lift vehicle?

It's been National policy for many years to maintain assured access to space through multiple commercially viable launch service providers. Given the lack of the price competitiveness of the Delta IV vehicle and anticipated fielding of several new launch vehicle families, I support the eventual phase out of the Delta IV launch vehicle family – but only when other capabilities are reliably available that can provide the assured access. The additional Atlas V RD-180 engines under consideration in the FY 17 NDAA and current Falcon 9 Upgrade capability provide a bridge to these next generation launch vehicles. Nonetheless, we must all monitor these capabilities carefully. If confirmed or not, whether as Commander AF Space Command or Commander US Strategic Command, I pledge to continue to work with the Congress to make sure this nation ceases our reliance on the Russian RD-180 as soon as possible and never loses assured access to space. This is primarily an AF responsibility, but I believe USSTRATCOM must be a demanding customer due to the criticality of space launch to our national security.

Recent decisions, and probably future decisions, about launch capabilities made by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will impact national security space launch cost and capacity.

What, in your view, should the Strategic Command do to coordinate civil and national security space launch?

This is primarily an AF, NASA, and NRO responsibility. However, U.S. Strategic Command is intimately connected with all aspects of the U.S. space launch enterprise through the Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE). If confirmed I will be a very demanding customer of the US Air Force and monitor closely our ability to maintain assured access to space. If I am confirmed, and I am concerned in any way, I will not hesitate to share my concerns with the Congress.

In your view, what are the most significant challenges that the U.S. faces in military and national security space programs and policy?

Our challenges are rooted in the increasingly congested, contested and competitive nature of the space domain. If confirmed, I'll continue to address the following top challenges: (1) threats to U.S space capabilities, (2) threats from adversary space capabilities to U.S. military forces and (3) maintaining our national security space programs in a difficult budget environment.

Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically important to future military success.

While much has been done to incorporate space assets into all aspects of military operations, in your view are there additional steps that should be taken to address this challenge?

U.S. Strategic Command, in partnership with other DOD components and interagency partners, has already started taking steps in the right direction. The recent addition last year of over \$5 billion of additional funding in military space was a good start, but we have a long journey to get to where we need to be. The Space Enterprise Vision was designed to act as a roadmap along the way for the materiel acquisition piece. In terms of investing in human capital, the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum and Space Mission Force construct are working to evolve our culture to prepare for a conflict that extends into space. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM is heavily invested in integrated planning with its fellow commands to integrate space's contributions to multi-domain military operations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our joint partners and across the National Security Space community in order to fully address this challenge.

What role does the National Security Space Institute play in the training process, and how could their training programs be improved?

The National Security Space Institute (NSSI) currently provides crucial training and education for our joint space professionals. We need to continue to explore and expand the curriculum to improve the thinking of the joint force to meet the demands of an increasingly contested, dynamic and operationally limited space domain.

What, in your view, are the priorities for improving space situational awareness?

While we continue to more efficiently manage the current space situational awareness (SSA) network, field new capabilities such as the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) and the Space Fence, and work with Allied and commercial entities to expand the data pool, the main limiting factor going forward is our ability to fuse, integrate, exploit and share these sources of information. This is the top priority and we must come up with improved capabilities quickly in this area.

What programs and policies, in your view, should be changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?

Current programs such as Space Fence and Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) must continue along existing paths to full operational capability. While these programs develop, we should look for opportunities to incorporate new technologies into the enterprise.

The Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum (JSDTF) is focusing on this very issue and is making progress on information sharing between DoD and IC across the classification divide. The Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) JEON work will also ensure we are better organized to support the growth in SSA data from new systems and new

allied and commercial sources by ensuring a command center focused on directing, optimizing and exploiting SSA sensors and data while offloading day-to-day execution to an independent squadron.

What are your views on how military and national security space should and could be better integrated?

First, I believe the integration between military and national security space is excellent today and continues to advance with improved collaboration and interaction, primarily through the Joint Space Training and Doctrine Forum co-chaired by the Commander of USSTRATCOM and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. However, there is always room for improvement and I see possibilities in three primary areas. The first is in following our shared vision (the Space Enterprise Vision) for architectures that develop and complement one another. The second is an operational approach, which encompasses planning, training, and exercises. The third pertains to execution; specifically, along the line of improved BMC2. The JICSpOC is an excellent example of how U.S. Strategic Command is working with national security space entities to improve BMC2.

In your view, what role should the Defense Space Council play in integrating military and national security space?

The Defense Space Council should continue to provide oversight to the military space enterprise, integrate all elements of national security space where appropriate, provide a forum to resolve the different positions from across the Department, support the Principal DoD Space advisor in her duties (see 65 below), and provide consolidated space resource recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense.

In your view, should the role of the Defense Space Council be modified or expanded in any way?

No, the Defense Space Council has evolved into a collaborative forum across key space stakeholders. In particular, US Strategic Command is a voting member and key contributor to the Defense Space Council.

The General Accountability Office published GAO Report 16-592R “Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes Will Resolve Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight” – do you agree with its principal findings on fragmentation?

Yes, especially the “too early” characterization. The national security space leadership responsibilities are fragmented across approximately 60 stakeholder organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Executive Office of the President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA) [to the Secretary of Defense] with responsibilities that include: promoting a unified approach to space issues; overseeing the entire DOD space portfolio; and serving as an independent advisor on all space matters to top DOD officials. It is working so far, but the real test will be how it continues over the change of administration.

Do you believe that in a time of conflict in space there should unity of command for title 10 and title 50 space systems?

I now believe that in time of conflict we can effectively respond to any threat with unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 50. This was not my opinion one year ago. Last year, I was a strong believer that we required unity of command. However, we have now accomplished a series of high fidelity and challenging experiments as part of our evolving Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) aimed at addressing the question of unity of command versus unity of effort between Title 10 and Title 50. To date, those vignettes clearly show that unity of effort is appropriate to meet space threats and execute space control missions. If desired, I can share the specific reasons why I believe this now in a classified discussion with either members of Congress or cleared staff.

What do you see as the greatest challenges in the area of counter space?

I think our greatest challenge will be how fast we need to move. We are currently well ahead of any potential adversary but we must move fast to keep it that way. Our processes tend to move very deliberately. We like to analyze threats and challenges for years. We do not have time anymore. We must move fast. This applies to our acquisition processes and our personnel. We must create space warriors capable of operating in a contested, congested and competitive space environment. Continuing pursuit of protection measures for our critical national space assets and evolution of our Battle Management Command and Control capability are key enablers for this change.

What is the long term mission of the Joint Interagency Center for Combined Space Operations and how will it interface with the Joint Space Operations Center to ensure complimentary capabilities?

The JICSpOC is currently an experimental environment where we are exploring our ability to effectively respond if a war extends into space. In the future, we expect it to develop in to a real, integrated operational capability that can fight the enterprise effectively. Our vision is that the JICSpOC, will become responsible for defense of the space Joint Operating Area (JOA) and will leverage an organic IC presence to aid on-orbit activity characterization and provide enhanced Indications and Warning (I&W). A capable Battle Management Command and Control system is being designed to allow effective and timely command and control of space forces in the JICSpOC for both the DoD and the NRO. Through continued experimentation and exercises the JICSpOC will operationalize and develop Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) which will enable it to detect, track and if required, defeat threats posed to our critical space systems. The JICSpOC is dependent on and fully leverages the JSpOC to execute, coordinate and/or synchronize space activities with other Combatant Commands, allies and partners. The JSpOC will be focused on the support to the terrestrial fight – but it is envisioned that the two centers will be able to integrate effectively along with the rest of the National Security Space Community. The JSpOC is fully occupied today with the terrestrial fight – space is critical to every military operation around the world...and many civilian activities as well. They must retain that focus. The JICSpOC is fully occupied figuring out how to prepare to effectively fight conflict that extends into the space domain. If we tried to integrate either with the other, both would be at significant risk of failure. For the foreseeable future, they need to focus on their unique, full time requirements.

What do you see as the largest hurdles to fully developing CONPLAN 8035 for space operations?

CONPLAN 8035 has been completed and provided to all USSTRATCOM Components as well as other Combatant Commands for reference and employment.

However, it is not enough to develop a plan focused solely on space operations. It is also critical for USSTRATCOM to work closely with OSD, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commanders to integrate space into all OPLANs, just as any other war fighting domain with both unique capabilities and limitations that must be factored into adversary-specific contingency plans. If confirmed, I pledge to continue this work.

What do you see as the most significant issue of the space element of the Integrated Threat Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) and if confirmed how will you advocate for this system?

The linchpin of our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) system remains our Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Spaced Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) satellites. Maintaining a viable capability mandates continued investment with the aim of increasing resiliency in light of continued advancements in adversary threats. Therefore, if confirmed, I will continue to advocate for global OPIR coverage, including the Polar Regions, as we continue to replace aging systems with newer technology.

Please specific elements of the space element of the ITWAA system that most concern you?

My top two priorities are preserving mission assurance and ensuring our on orbit systems maintain pace with adversary advancements and capable of detecting and reporting emerging threats.

Cruise Missile Defense

In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?

I agree with the Director of DIA world-wide assessment that a growing cruise missile threat is real and credible.

What role do you believe U. S. Strategic Command should play in the cruise missile defense of our nation and our deployed military forces?

Although I am not fully up to speed on the issue of cruise missile defense, I know that USSTRATCOM is continuing (in coordination with MDA, JIAMD, USNORTHCOM, and other combatant commands) to pursue means to detect and track cruise missiles in operationally relevant timeframes, to include integration of USSTRATCOM assigned assets. If confirmed I will become better informed on this issue and pledge to work with the other Combatant Commanders and the Congress to ensure we can respond to this, and any threat, to our homeland, allies, and deployed forces.

Prompt Global Strike

In your view, how adequate are current efforts to establish requirements and develop a prompt global strike capability?

I have not been directly involved in these efforts, but know that several Combatant Commands are involved in establishing conventional prompt strike requirements. I am encouraged by the Department's continuing efforts and progress in developing capabilities able to defeat time-sensitive, high value targets in anti-access / area denial (A2AD) environments. The ability to rapidly strike defended targets at long range is an important capability that a number of combatant commanders require. If confirmed, I will become more involved in this issue and will share my thoughts with the Congress in the future.

Do you believe that adequate analysis is being conducted to determine whether a prompt global strike capability should be launched from air, land, maritime surface or subsurface platforms, or a combination thereof?

I know significant work has been done and I have seen some of the initial analysis, but I am not well enough informed to make any meaningful assessment of its adequacy at this time. If confirmed, I pledge to fully evaluate the analysis so I can provide a full assessment to the Congress if so requested.

Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations

Strategic Command is the designated combatant command for synchronizing electronic warfare as well as ensuring the warfighting has adequate spectrum resources to conduct operations.

How capable do you believe Russia and China are in electronic warfare?

I have only basic knowledge in this area but will have more if confirmed. I know that Russia and China have each committed significant resources to both electronic warfare capabilities and dedicated military operators. The recent Crimean and South China Sea operations are excellent examples of the layered advantage each country has attained. Each realizes that controlling the battle within the electromagnetic spectrum is a key precondition in order to achieve operational success.

What are the major issues associated with joint electronics warfare operations?

Joint electronic warfare is in a rebuilding phase – both in capability and forces. The Department is also engaged to ensure these efforts are integrated in such a manner that fosters Service interoperability. With our increasing spectrum dependence, assuring access to and freedom of maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum can no longer be guaranteed. This is an area where we must improve.

Do you believe the Department has adequate simulation capability to test joint electronic warfare operations?

Not today. The Department's modeling and simulation test capabilities are in need of continued and sustained modernization. Due to the congested nature of the electromagnetic spectrum, the ability to conduct open-air testing is increasingly constrained. There are few ranges where advanced electronic warfare testing can take place; often these locations are forced to cease testing due to unintended interference. These challenges also affect the manner by which the joint force trains.

Do you believe the Department should develop a Concept of Operations Plan for electronic warfare?

Yes. A detailed Department-wide roadmap is crucial to the future success of joint electronic warfare and spectrum superiority.

What are the major spectrum issues facing the military in its ability to conduct operations?

The Department is actively seeking solutions to provide situational awareness across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and for command and control of offensive and defensive EMS operations across all domains and mission areas.

Additionally, the spectrum continues to be constrained by increased commercial use, limiting the availability for operational, training, and testing purposes. We need to ensure that we achieve a balance – where possible – to advance new virtual approaches enhancing joint electronic warfare capabilities and training without dependence on spectrum access.

Nuclear Deterrence

If confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, you would be involved in implementing the new Nuclear Posture Review and the reductions under the New Start Treaty.

Do you support the New Start Treaty? Would you support a five-year extension at this time?

Yes, I support the New START Treaty. New START has been an important transparency mechanism for maintaining U.S.-Russian stability. The verification regime permits key insights into the Russian strategic triad which significantly contributes to our understanding of their force posture. New START is the most recent in a decades long, bipartisan effort by the U.S. and Russia to advance strategic nuclear arms control via transparency and an effective verification regime. However, I believe that further analysis and dialogue within the interagency is necessary prior to making a final determination on a five-year extension.

Do you support the 2013 revision to our nuclear employment strategy?

Yes, our nuclear employment strategy supports our global strategic stability and national security objectives by deterring potential adversaries and assuring our Allies and partners.

Do you believe we need a fleet of 12 ballistic submarines to replace the Ohio class submarines?

Yes. I have looked at our current & expected future strategic deterrence requirements, and strongly believe that 12 Ohio-class Replacement submarines are the minimum number of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) required to meet USSTRATCOM's mission. It is essential that this program remain on schedule to prevent a future capability gap as Ohio-class SSBNs retire.

What in your view are the most pressing modernization requirements for the Minuteman III ICBM, following completion of the current upgrades?

As directed by Congress, the Air Force is taking the necessary measures to ensure the current MM III ICBM fleet is sustained through 2030.

In addition, the Air Force is enhancing its security systems to include a new Payload Transport vehicle and a UH-1N Replacement helicopter which will span both MM and GBSD.

Do you support the development and fielding of a follow-on program to the Minuteman III ICBM?

Yes. I have looked at our current & expected future strategic deterrence requirements and I fully support the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program as the follow on to the MM III. GBSD is a complex weapon system & the program must deliver on schedule to maintain an effective, land based nuclear deterrent capability.

Do you support and intend to advocate for the modernization of all legs of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles?

Yes. Strongly.

Do you support the development of the Long Range Standoff Weapon and why?

Yes, the development & deployment of the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile is essential to maintaining an effective & credible air-delivered nuclear deterrent, especially as adversaries deploy advanced air-defense systems. It is a critical capability to ensure the long term viability of the bomber element of the triad. The LRSO cruise missile's ability to continue to hold global high value targets at risk is critical to provide the President flexible response options & assure Allies & partners as part of our extended deterrence commitments.

In your view, is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please describe the relationship.

Yes, United States nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation policies both serve to advance regional and strategic stability. Extending the U.S. nuclear deterrent reaffirms our commitment to the security of our allies and partners, thereby dissuading them from developing their own acquisition programs. Further, it works to convince potential adversaries that there is little benefit to be gained by seeking nuclear weapons.

What are your views on nuclear command and control readiness in terms of personnel, material and operations?

Although we have made significant improvements recently, particularly within the AF, I remain somewhat concerned. The ability to command and control nuclear forces across the spectrum of conflict is an essential element of nuclear deterrence, equal in import to the strategic delivery platforms. And like the platforms, many aspects of the NC2 enterprise are operating well beyond planned service life and must be recapitalized and/or sustained until replacement systems are fielded. There have been many recent improvements however. We have improved our readiness reporting and assessment programs so that we now have visibility into issues impacting our operations in real-time and have the insight required to make corrective actions and programmatic adjustments. USSTRATCOM also conducts quarterly nuclear force readiness reviews focused on critical resources required for this vital mission. As a service component to USSTRATCOM, I have seen these improvements, but our equipment is very old.

If confirmed will you commit to this committee to actively participate in the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership Command, Control and Communications System?

Yes, I will actively participate as a chartered Council member.

Have you read the report “National Leadership Capability and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications Enterprise Review Report, May 2015 and if not, then if confirmed will you commit to this committee to be briefed on it and at a later date give this committee your view on it?

Only recently so I have some knowledge of the findings and recommendations. If confirmed, however, I pledge to give the committee my specific views at a later date.

If confirmed will you commit to this committee to advocate that the Mobile Ground System and its capabilities are upgraded for its nuclear detection, space based infrared signal collection and support of its capability to conduct remote and enduring support are maintained?

Yes. The MGS, as currently fielded and envisioned for upgrades, is a top priority for USSTRATCOM and must be maintained and sustained. If confirmed, I will also conduct a detailed study of the mission as a whole and provide any findings and recommendations to Congress.

What is the significance of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia?

When considering the broader nuclear balance there are a number of factors to consider including, but not limited to, strategic nuclear weapon systems, non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities, and associated infrastructure. While strict numerical parity is not required, large disparities could raise concerns and may not be conducive to a long term stable relationship. I believe the goal quoted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) “Address non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, in any post-

New START negotiations with Russia,” remains valid though problematic given the lack of interest from Russia. Thus, continued examination of the issue is prudent.

Do you believe the U.S. government understands today how to verify reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons?

I am not fully aware of our capabilities in this area, but if confirmed, I pledge to study the issue and provide my assessment at a future date.

Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Yes, per Title 10, Section 179 of the United States Code (10 USC 179).

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?

If confirmed, my top priority would be to ensure we maintain a safe, secure, effective and ready nuclear deterrence force to meet strategic deterrence employment guidance. This includes sustaining a robust weapon stockpile and developing a responsive, capable supporting infrastructure that can respond to future uncertainty.

What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

As I have yet to participate in a NWC executive session, it would be pre-mature for me to recommend any changes at this time.

What role is the NWC playing or should it play in the discussion with respect to any future nuclear arms control treaties?

The NWC principals will continue to provide policy, military & technical advice as required to support future treaty efforts.

Maintaining a Safe, Secure and Reliable Stockpile

If confirmed you would play a major role, in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S stockpile of nuclear weapons.

What are your priorities for implementing that responsibility?

My first priority is ensuring stockpile surveillance activities provide the necessary confidence in weapon reliability and that ongoing weapon life extension programs remain on track.

Additionally, I will continue to provide my perspective on the stockpile’s military effectiveness through my annual assessment and provide advice regarding implementing the long term stockpile sustainment strategy, including the need for a modern, responsive industrial complex.

The Strategic Command is an integral part of the annual certification process for nuclear weapons.

Would you recommend any changes in the Strategic Command's role in the annual process or the process generally?

Not at this time, however, if confirmed, I will assess the process and provide recommended changes as necessary.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously assess and annually certify the U. S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to meet its goal in effectively and continuously assessing the stockpile to ensure we maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal without returning to underground nuclear testing.

To ensure we maintain confidence in a 'no test' environment, we require modern facilities, improved modeling and simulation, and advanced computing capabilities.

In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

Maintaining confidence in the stockpile's readiness is challenged by the age of our nuclear arsenal (weapons now averaging over 28 years old), coupled with the loss of the intellectual capital associated with an aging workforce. Sustained funding is required to ensure we maintain the capacity to fully understand and respond to technical issues as they are identified. In addition, a concerted effort must be made to recruit, rebuild and retain required expertise.

Do you believe that all nuclear weapon life extension methods, refurbishment, reuse, and replacement, should be given equal consideration?

As described in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), I believe we should consider the full range of options with a strong preference to refurbishment and reuse where applicable. Again, I have only cursory knowledge in this area, but if confirmed, I will assess this issue and provide recommendations as necessary.

The Administration is proposing overhauls of the B-61 gravity bomb, and an interoperable warhead to provide for hedging between different legs of the triad.

What are your greatest concerns with the B-61 life extension program?

From an AF perspective I am aware that stable and sustained funding is required to ensure the Air Force's tail kit assembly program and NNSA's warhead efforts remain aligned to deliver the

B61-12 on time. I am not technically informed as to the specific design but if confirmed, commit to informing Congress of any concerns I find.

Do you support giving the weapons design laboratories the ability to work on new capabilities to exercise their design skills?

Yes, I support the congressionally-mandated stockpile responsiveness program. While the Department does not require any new nuclear weapon capabilities at this time, adversary advancements may necessitate developing advanced capabilities in the future. Given the highly skilled, unique work required and long lead time to develop and deploy nuclear weapon systems, I fully support our national laboratories efforts to recruit & retain qualified people to conduct the necessary weapons design work our nation requires.

Military-to-Military Cooperation Programs

The U.S. Strategic Command has a long history of conducting military-to-military exchanges and discussions with its counterparts in Russia, but in recent years these exchanges and discussion have stopped for the most part.

If confirmed, would you seek to continue or expand this dialogue?

If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S. European Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage Russia. In general, however, I am a big believer in the value of mil-to-mil exchanges and will advocate for future dialogue.

Would you seek to establish military-to-military programs to include other countries, such as China?

If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage China. In general, however, I am a big believer in the value of mil-to-mil exchanges and will advocate for future dialogue.

Strategic Forces and Missions

During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces. This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to U.S. Strategic Command make clear.

What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic Forces today and in the future?

Detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against the US, its territories, possessions, and bases, and employing appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail.

With the decline in numbers of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, is it now more important to take into account non-strategic nuclear weapons?

Yes. I believe the position of the 2010 NPR “Address non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, in any post-New START negotiations with Russia,” remains valid though problematic given the lack of interest from Russia. Thus, continued examination of the issue is prudent. Likewise, improving dialogue and transparency with respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons is one element among a wide array of items that can advance stability.

Should we think differently about the use of strategic forces today?

No. The fundamental purpose of our strategic forces remains today – deterring adversaries from strategic attacks on the US and its allies.

Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it, what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?

Our current Triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and air delivered weapons provide both unique and complementary capabilities that are critical to deterring adversaries and assuring our Allies and partners around the globe.

The Triad provides the President with flexible options to respond appropriately to a wide range of scenarios. This combination of assured, rapid, and global nuclear strike capabilities enhances strategic stability by ensuring no adversary could defeat or coerce the U.S. with their nuclear capabilities. In order to maintain a credible and effective nuclear deterrent, the U.S. must sustain and modernize the Triad; provide an assured and reliable NC3 capability; and field requisite intelligence to deliver timely, relevant indications and warning.

The nuclear weapons in Europe are under the command of the Commander of European Command.

How would you plan to work with that command with respect to nuclear weapons security, and policy?

USSTRATCOM and its personnel possess significant experience and expertise in nuclear policy, strategy, planning, and operations. If confirmed, I will ensure that Commander, U.S. European Command has my full support. I fully intend to discuss and understand his challenges and I will work with him to advocate for safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons to meet his needs.

How will you work with the Combatant Commanders to enable theater nuclear planning capabilities?

If confirmed, I fully intend to continue the Secretary of Defense and Chairman's efforts to integrate nuclear planning into all appropriate Combatant Command OPLANs. I intend to work closely with fellow Combatant Commanders to ensure USSTRATCOM integrates our planning efforts and synchronizes actions with all of the Combatant Command.

How will you work with NATO in their planning capabilities?

USSTRATCOM and its personnel possess significant experience and expertise in nuclear policy, strategy, planning, and operations. I fully intend to explore areas to improve our valued relationship with the alliance. I believe there is already a close relationship with USSTRATCOM and our NATO partners. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities to improve planning and cooperation in support of this critical alliance.

Nuclear Weapons Security and Handling

What in your view are the most challenging aspects of maintaining security in the handling of nuclear weapons?

Assuring our allies and deterring strategic attack are predicated on preventing unauthorized access, physical damage, theft or misuse of nuclear weapons and materials. If confirmed, I will ensure all of the forces that work with and secure our nation's most lethal weapons understand the grave importance of what they do every day. It is the responsibility of every commander to foster a culture that is motivated, vigilant, and committed to the protection of our nuclear deterrent.

Emerging threats such as unmanned aerial vehicles and violent extremist organization threats require us to adapt and evolve our tactics, techniques, and procedures. Ensuring continued security of our nuclear forces will require us to advocate for, develop, and procure new defensive technologies, such as the replacement for the aging UH-1N helicopter. Likewise, fielding the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and the enhanced features inherent in stockpile life extension programs will further improve nuclear security and surety.

What role do you think the Strategic Command should play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are securely stored, transported, and handled when in control of the military services?

As the Combatant Command responsible for our nation's strategic forces, USSTRATCOM has an obligation to ensure the safety and security of our nuclear assets. If confirmed, I will aggressively advocate for the infrastructure and equipment necessary for the Services to safely and securely handle, transport, and store our weapons. USSTRATCOM will continue to cooperate with the Services, Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, and provide policy recommendations that are adequate and executable to ensure the safety and security of those weapons.

Science and Technology

In the past, USSTRATCOM had a stand-alone Science and Technology (S&T) advisor – as other COCOMS currently have, but that role has been subsumed into other staff positions.

If confirmed, what would be your views on reconstituting a USSTRATCOM Science and Technology advisor and if that is not necessary, what priorities would be assigned to that individual?

I am aware that upon taking command the current STRATCOM Commander reviewed the Command approach for handling the S&T advisory role and found it sufficient to support his needs. If confirmed, I plan to conduct a similar review of the situation.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.