Advance Policy Questions for Marcel J. Lettre II
Nominee for the Position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

1. **Duties**

   a. **What is your understanding of the role, duties, and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))?**

   My understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for supporting the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).

   This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD Components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DoD Components funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

   b. **What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

   If confirmed, I believe I have the proper background and experience to effectively perform the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I have had the privilege of serving as the Acting Under Secretary since May of this year, performing all of the functions of the office. Prior to that, I served as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence under Michael G. Vickers. In both positions, I have had the opportunity to develop strong working relationships with other senior leaders across the Intelligence Community along with pursuing key initiatives in operational support to policy makers and warfighters, intelligence capabilities development, and integration for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

   Additionally, I have been honored to serve as Special Assistant under three Secretaries of Defense. In that capacity, I advised the Secretary of Defense on a range of matters pertaining to U.S. national security, including intelligence-related matters.

With functional responsibilities as the civilian deputy chief of staff to Secretary Panetta, I supported the Secretary of Defense on defense strategy, budget development, acquisition oversight, national security policy initiatives, and crisis management. I also led two Secretary of Defense transition teams. For my work in support of Secretary of Defense priorities, I am honored that Secretary Panetta presented me the Defense Distinguished Public Service Award.

As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, I had responsibilities on a team executing legislative programs on Departmental priorities including the defense budget and policy; Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; strategic nuclear arms control matters, including the ratification of the New START Treaty; acquisition and export control reforms; information operations, and Secretary Gates' efficiencies initiative. For my work on strategic nuclear arms control matters, Secretary Gates awarded me the Exceptional Public Service Award.

As Senior Defense and Intelligence Advisor and then as Senior National Security Advisor to the U.S. Senate Minority and then Majority Leader, I handled all "Gang of Eight" intelligence matters for the Leader, and shaped legislation and policy initiatives in areas including: Iraq and Afghanistan strategy; counterterrorism; enhancing foreign intelligence collection and sensitive intelligence operations; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in securing passage of defense and intelligence authorization bills, appropriations bills, and war supplementals.

As a Professional Staff Member on the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I supported the intelligence after-action reviews on the 9/11 terrorist attacks and on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and advised on the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which created the Director of National Intelligence.

Prior to these positions, I served in the private sector, the foreign policy research sector, and on a congressional commission examining the organization and efficiency of the U.S. government regarding intelligence and programs to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Serving in both the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government has given me a multi-faceted appreciation for the role of intelligence. I have served as an intelligence consumer, ensuring the nation's senior decision makers are supported with intelligence products on important decisions. I have gained an appreciation of the statutory roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other senior leaders in ensuring effective intelligence capabilities. I have familiarity with a range of intelligence operations and capabilities. I have experience working intelligence resourcing issues through the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program, knowledge of key trajectories for our acquisition and investment programs, and awareness of key counterintelligence and security

priorities. I am personally committed to supporting the Secretary of Defense in focusing on the needs of the warfighter, particularly in intelligence support.

Finally, my experience has given me a deep appreciation for the important role of oversight, from within the executive branch as well as by the legislative and judicial branches of government.

c. **Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?**

If confirmed, I believe the most significant action that I would need to take would be to assist the Secretary of Defense in executing his priorities by ensuring that he receives timely and accurate intelligence to support Presidential decision-making. Additionally, in accordance with the Secretary's priorities, I would ensure that our Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to both adequately support our warfighting combatant commanders with current operations and to tackle the challenges of the future. That said, I believe that I need to more deeply understand the challenges posed by the new fiscal environment, the resource constraints that will be faced ahead, and the opportunities for further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, as we sustain and strengthen OUSD(I)'s budgetary oversight.

d. **What major challenges do you foresee in fulfilling these duties and functions?**

If confirmed as the USD(I), the major challenges that are likely to confront me are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, we must improve on protecting intelligence sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information. The next USD(I) will need to overcome these challenges while ensuring Defense Intelligence is postured with the IC to continue to provide world-class intelligence.

2. <u>**Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986**</u>

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

However, the global environment has changed a great deal since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, while the relationships and responsibilities of DoD's various components have

not. This Committee has begun a comprehensive review of the United States' defense organization to identify challenges and potential reforms to the Department of Defense and the armed forces.

a. **Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

My present duties have not yet afforded me an opportunity to systematically review and address any potential modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions that would improve the Department's defense intelligence enterprise performance, but I am prepared to work with this committee and other stakeholders to pursue any initiatives that will improve the effectiveness of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. **If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

I look forward to contributing to the dialogue ahead on whether potential modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions might further advance the performance of defense intelligence. Reform efforts of the last thirty years under Goldwater-Nichols, and intelligence reform efforts since 9/11, have achieved tremendous gains in ensuring jointness and integrated effort across intelligence organizations, pursuing operational speed and agility, and spurring innovation and adaptation in the face of major strategic and technological change. I look forward to continuing to work with the committee to pursue initiatives that would continue to advance this integration, agility, and innovation in defense intelligence.

3. **Relationships**

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

a. **The Secretary of Defense**

Pursuant to statute, departmental directives, and direct guidance from the Secretary of Defense, if confirmed as USD(I) I will serve as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, and security, and exercise SecDef authority, direction and control over the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide support to the Deputy Secretary consistent with that which I would provide to the Secretary, as described above, in support of the Deputy Secretary's responsibilities and priorities.

c. **The other Under Secretaries of Defense**

If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of the Under Secretaries, their Principal Deputies, and senior teams, as I have while serving as the Acting USD(I). A close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I), and their Principal Deputies, is particularly important, so I intend to fully support those relationships. In my former positions within the Department, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, and Principal Deputy USD(I), I had positive relationships with the Under Secretaries, which I would continue to develop if confirmed as USD(I).

d. The Chief Information Officer

The Chief Information Officer (CIO), like its predecessor the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, has had oversight of enabling capabilities which are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the CIO to ensure that this support remains robust.

e. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy

If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and operations.

f. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC)

USD(I) and the ASD SO/LIC work closely together in several areas, and this close partnership has grown substantially in recent years. If confirmed as the USD(I), I will contribute to ensuring that this close partnership continues.

g. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors

If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program. As appropriate, I will work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the current and future security environment, and that the intelligence organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the Department, and the Nation.

h. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD)

In my previous positions in DoD, I have worked closely with the General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue to closely collaborate with the

General Counsel and seek his advice on the legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.

i. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

In my previous positions in DoD, I have worked closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior leaders on the Joint Staff, on a range of issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I will seek to continue this close relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands.

j. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command

If confirmed as USD(I), I will seek to ensure that the intelligence needs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including the Commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command, are met.

k. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies

If confirmed as USD(I), I will exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over NSA, NGA, NRO, and DIA. I will also help sustain the deep relationship shared with the DNI by working with the Office of the DNI to ensure clear and consistent guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies.

l. The Director of National Intelligence

Since serving as the Acting USD(I), I have sought to maintain a strong relationship with the DNI. If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to continue my full support of our mutual goal of greater Intelligence Community integration. Because the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI on Defense Intelligence capabilities.

m. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to sustain the relationship I have developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and their senior team.

n. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to bolster the already close relationship I have developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director of the NCTC.

o. The Director of the National Counterproliferation Center

If confirmed as USD(I), I will work to maintain the relationship I have developed as the Acting USD(I) with the Director of the NCPC.

p. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence

If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support and cooperate with the Principal Deputy, Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure integration and unity of effort in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

q. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities

If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters for senior officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and will seek to ensure a strong working relationship with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis.

4. Priorities

a. How would you anticipate developing priorities for allocating your time and resources as the USD(I)?

If confirmed, I would develop priorities for allocating my time consistent with priorities set by the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence. In general, I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of current intelligence operations, the development of future intelligence capabilities, and the integration of intelligence across the Department of Defense and with the full range of national security partners, as well as internal management of OUSD(I) operations and other duties the Secretary may assign. In what will continue to be a resource-constrained environment, I will seek to ensure that resources are strategically allocated to, and across, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

b. If confirmed, what would be your priority issues to be addressed by the OUSD(I)?

If confirmed, I would continue to execute the priorities of our organization during my tenure as the Acting USD(I), including: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qa'ida and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, countering Russian aggression, bolstering our national cyber defense, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, operationalizing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise, fully exploit emerging

opportunities, and pursuing innovative future capabilities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that: we have the right collection and analytical priorities; that we have a robust ISR architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future; that the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those of the CIA and National Clandestine Service; that the President's highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced; that analysis addresses the needs of policy makers and operational commanders; that intelligence is timely, accessible, and independent; and, where appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to improve our intelligence capabilities.

c. **If confirmed, how would you balance the need to provide intelligence support to the war-fighter with the need to provide intelligence support to policy makers?**

In support of the Secretary's own commitments to both ensure the strength of today's fighting force and provide the President with his best national security advice, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise continues to satisfy intelligence requirements foremost in support of current military operations and planning but also in collaboration with Interagency partners to inform political-military decision-making by our national leaders. In the USD(I)'s dual-hatted capacity as both a Defense and National Intelligence official, if confirmed I would seek to consistently identify and communicate the critical intelligence needs of the war-fighter.

d. **If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Geographic Combatant Commands are adequately assessing and prioritizing their intelligence needs?**

If confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to strengthen integration and collaboration between the Geographic Combatant Commands and components of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to inform the allocation of tools and expertise to efficiently assess and prioritize intelligence needs suited to their respective missions. These intelligence needs should be continually assessed and prioritized in consideration of those of each other Combatant Command and the fluidity of the threat environment in some areas of operations, given current resource constraints. If confirmed as USD(I), I also would work to ensure fruitful communication with the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and between the Combatant Commands to support intelligence integration in functional and topical areas where their needs cross the geographic boundaries from one command to another.

e. **If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated and deconflicted with other activities carried out by the intelligence community?**

Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements. My understanding is that USSOCOM liaises with members of the Intelligence Community in the

Washington, D.C. area, at the Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, and on the battlefield. If confirmed as USD(I), I would work to ensure the demonstrable gains achieved in intelligence coordination with the interagency and international partners during the past several years are not only sustained but continue to improve. If confirmed, I also would welcome a continued dialogue with the committee to ensure clear, coherent and regular reporting to the congressional oversight committees of these activities, consistent with critically important committee oversight responsibilities.

5. **Cyber and Information Operations**

   In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee noted that "Information operations, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic warfare, operational security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception. Each of these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, they are interwoven. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command organizationally separated cyber operations from the other elements making up 'information operations.'"

   The committee asked you how this separation complicates integration across these elements, and what is your understanding of the Department's efforts to mitigate its impact?

   You responded at that time as follows: "If confirmed, I look forward to studying this question further. My current understanding is that Information Operations as currently defined refers to the integration of various information activities to achieve effects across the information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The establishment of U.S. Cyber Command does not change the relationship of cyberspace operations to the other capabilities necessary for DoD to conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct information operations in the cyber domain."

   a. **Have you studied this question further? What is your current view of how well the Department is integrating across the elements of "information operations," and especially across electronic warfare and cyber?**

      As PDUSD(I) and Acting USD(I), I have continued to engage in this set of issues, working in collaboration with and in support of the broader Defense Department team of stakeholders, under guidance from the Secretary and the Principal Cyber Advisor.

      The April 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy has set a framework for guiding planning, programming, and budgeting, as well as strategy, capability development, and operations, regarding the cyber domain. We are using this strategy to support DoD's ability to build and maintain ready Cyber Mission Forces and their capability to conduct cyberspace operations. In implementing this strategy, particular emphasis is being placed on integrating cyberspace operations to enable information operations and electronic warfare. Implementation efforts to date have revealed the requirement

for further study on how best to integrate electronic warfare effectively within all DoD capabilities.

I view the establishment and continued buildout and adaptation of U.S. Cyber Command as a positive development to meeting the challenges of effectively operating within the cyber domain. If confirmed as USD(I), I look forward to continuing to participate in refining organizational relationships and authorities within the Department to improve integration of cyber efforts without compromising the agility necessary for success in this domain.

6. **Efficiencies in Human Intelligence Collection**

In signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and space reconnaissance, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community (IC) decades ago consolidated national-level activities into single agencies – the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, respectively. However, in the sole area of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, DOD and the IC maintain separate, stand-alone programs in the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Twenty years ago, the Aspin-Brown Commission, led successively by two former Secretaries of Defense, catalogued the historical problems that limited the effectiveness of clandestine HUMINT operations conducted by DOD, and recommended that HUMINT operations be consolidated in the CIA, with DOD maintaining a cadre of military case officers for assignment to CIA.

The problems that the Aspin-Brown Commission described 20 years ago persist to the present day.

In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee asked you what the justification is for maintaining two organizations in this mission area in a time of severe budget austerity?

You responded that "the Department of Defense maintains organic human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities because it operates under different authorities than the CIA and also responds to different customers, priorities, requirements, and targets."

To clarify, the committee's question was aimed at the Department's national-level HUMINT program conducted under Title 50, U.S.C., and funded by the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and not the Department's tactical HUMINT activities. The National Clandestine Service administered by the CIA also operates under Title 50, U.S.C. and NIP budget, and is charged with providing HUMINT support to the Defense Department.

a. **In this era of reduced budgets, manpower pressures, and interest in reducing duplication and overhead in DOD, do you think the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendation should be reconsidered today?**

I have an open mind to exploring any ideas the Committee believes should be explored that may improve the effectiveness of defense HUMINT capabilities. DOD has unique customers, priorities, requirements and targets that need to be met. At the same time, it is important not to have unnecessary redundancy and wasteful duplication in any mission area. In my experience to date, the recent evolution of defense HUMINT capabilities, including those in the Defense Clandestine Service, has been a sound, efficient, and effective approach to meeting defense intelligence requirements and has strengthened capabilities. In order to ensure successful efforts in this regard, strong leadership, clear guidance, rigorous standards and effective operational concepts are needed. Under any model, close CIA and DOD relationships and collaboration are critical. Recent modernization efforts launched at CIA also require us to continue to review how to optimize our close partnership and collaboration. I welcome a continued dialogue with the committee on this important capability area.

7. **Responsiveness of Defense Intelligence Agencies to Combatant Command Operational Requirements**

This committee and some current and former senior officers and officials in DOD are concerned that DOD intelligence Agencies are not sufficiently responsive to DOD operational, wartime requirements.

a. **Are you aware of these concerns and do you think they have a valid basis?**

I am aware of these views. The need for continuous improvement of our support to the warfighter is not only valid, it is essential. If confirmed, meeting the requirements of the warfighter will be central to my decisionmaking.

The support that DOD Intelligence Agencies provide to the warfighter during times of war or threat to national security have been a longstanding oversight concern to Congress, the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense. As one manifestation of this concern, in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Congress directed the Chairman to conduct biennial assessments of the Combat Support Agencies (CSA)– including DIA, NGA and NSA – to assess this crucial facet of their operations. These, and other reviews, have yielded regular reports on how best to posture, and adapt, the support of DOD intelligence agencies for responsiveness to DOD operational, wartime requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee to seek to implement any adjustments and refinements that can be identified that will strengthen agency responsiveness to operational, wartime requirements.

b. **How would you address these concerns?**

When the biennial assessments and CSA review teams identify systemic areas of
concern that may impact optimizing support to the warfighter – such as
communications, information technology, foreign disclosure, and foundational
intelligence – these insights need to drive additional emphasis on resolving them
through the operational oversight and resource allocation systems. Doing so will
require innovative solutions and collaboration across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the CSAs continue to address
these shortcomings to the satisfaction of the warfighter they support.

8. **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force**

**In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established the ISR Task at the most senior
levels of the Department to address acute shortfalls in intelligence support to military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The establishment of this Task Force reflected the
failure of the existing ISR planning and programming process in the military
departments and across the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
The ISR Task Force was an effective expedient solution to an immediate problem, but
since it by-passed established processes and organizations, it responded only to
symptoms and did not fix the underlying causes of the problems.**

a. **What is your perception of the underlying causes of the failure of the Services
and OSD to recognize and respond to the demand signal from battlefield
commanders, and how would you propose to correct them?**

If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring the Nation does its best to meet
warfighter requirements, particularly in terms of ISR support. Many of the underlying
issues associated with the challenge of providing timely and effective ISR support to
the warfighters highlighted in 2008 still exist today. USDI, in coordination with other
elements of the Department, CCMDs, and Services, are actively seeking methods to
improve this situation. The successor to the ISR Task Force, the ISR Operations
Directorate, has now been successfully integrated into the OUSDI. Its charter
includes developing solutions to warfighter ISR requirements ahead of the Future
Years Defense Program, within 18-24 months of the identification of the warfighters'
requirements. These rapid acquisition efforts streamline the acquisition process.
While accepting risk, this approach maximizes innovation to match emergent ISR
requirements with capability residing in industry. These activities, conducted under
close oversight of USDI and the USD AT&L, are a necessary complement to the
traditional program of record acquisition process.

9. **Allocation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets Through
the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP)**

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In the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015, and the accompanying report (S. Rept. 113-176), the Committee voiced strong concerns about the process and underlying analysis supporting the allocation of ISR assets to the combatant commands under the Global Force Management Process (GFMAP). While these GFMAP problems are numerous, the Committee noted in particular that, since the events of September 11th, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has received the overwhelming share of ISR assets, to the point where the Committee expressed doubt that "a rigorous analysis would consistently rank the lowest priorities of one combatant command higher than the highest priorities of other combatant commands." While CENTCOM's ISR needs remain extremely high, there are serious and growing requirements in Africa, Europe, and the Pacific.

   a. **What actions, if any, have been taken by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to respond to these concerns and the direction in section 1058 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015?**

   Balancing ISR requirements across the combatant commands remains a challenge, and I share the committee's concern about the shortfalls that exist for ISR in regions like Africa, Europe and the Pacific. With the ongoing operations to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria, urgent operational needs continue to drive high demand in USCENTCOM for ISR, while serious and growing requirements exist in Africa, Europe and the Pacific. In my tenure, OUSDI has focused its efforts to provide the warfighter with ISR in three core areas: ensuring a rigorous review of requirements in order to allocate available ISR as optimally as possible across CCMDs; seeking to gain more efficiency out of available ISR through efforts such as dynamic reallocation of platforms; and seeking to grow the number of ISR platforms and associated capabilities.

   b. **What further actions would you recommend?**

   I remain open to the possibility that automated and operational research and systems analysis tools can help improve the acquisition and GFM processes. I am also open to continuing to explore the option of supporting unfulfilled ISR requirements with contract capability when and where it makes sense. Lastly, improving coordination and cooperation with key allies who may possess identical or complementary ISR resources can augment our capabilities.

10. Improving the Integration of Intelligence Operations and of Intelligence Systems and Strike Assets

Success in modern warfare will depend on synchronizing the operations of different types of satellites and diverse airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and the rapid sharing of data with and among strike assets. Today, however, imagery systems are tasked separately from signals intelligence systems, and satellites are controlled separately from airborne systems. The ability to share

information from intelligence systems directly with strike assets, and even between the strike platforms themselves, is poor.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the one official in the executive branch with strong direct oversight authority over both National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program budgets and programs.

   a. **What changes do you think are necessary in operational tasking processes and program planning to achieve synchronized support to strike operations?**

   Synchronizing the diverse satellite and airborne ISR collectors and shrinking the timeline to targeting is a difficult challenge but is increasingly important in the threat environments we face now and projected in the future, including in high-end anti-access area-denial warfighting scenarios. This is a challenge with no single solution and thus requires constant advancements in standardizing data, developing advanced ISR analytics, improving interoperability, and refining processes to receive, analyze, and push data from our ISR processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) nodes to strike assets. At the same time, many of our latest generation assets such as the F-35 are ISR nodes themselves, allowing us to expand our collection network. While a positive development, this adds to the complexity of synchronizing ISR and combat operations.

   In order to address this challenge, USDI has been working across the Department to mature the Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) to improve intelligence data standards, sharing, and interoperability. Likewise, we are taking steps to factor in intelligence support considerations much earlier in the acquisition process. I believe we can improve the common operating picture capability for our future weapons systems by identifying upfront in the acquisition process requirements associated with linking the entire ISR constellation of programs to the tactical user.

11.   **Intelligence Support to Cyber Mission Forces**

   The Department of Defense (DOD) is establishing Cyber Mission Teams (CMTs) to support the war plans of the combatant commands. Among these units' missions is to create effects on the battlefield in integrated operations with electronic warfare and traditional weapons systems engaged in kinetic operations. Having the ability to affect adversary weapons systems and battlefield command and control will require special and focused intelligence collection.

   a. **What guidance and direction have been given to the national intelligence agencies to support the Department's needs for intelligence support to offensive cyber operations?**

   Planning for cyber operations and capability development is generally informed by the DOD Cyber Strategy released in April 2015. The development of options for DOD offensive cyber operations, like military operations within other domains,

receives intelligence support from the national intelligence and combat support agencies consistent with the relative prioritization of the specific combatant commander requirements and guidance and direction from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence.

b. Are the intelligence community and DOD's foreign material acquisition and exploitation (FMA/E) programs today properly prioritizing the collection of intelligence needed to support the CMTs?

I believe CMT needs are appropriately prioritized but that this requires regular attention, review, and refinement. The Department annually incorporates national and defense foreign materiel priorities in providing strategic guidance to the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and the Test and Evaluation community through the DoD Foreign Materiel Annual Plan. Since at least 2013, strategic guidance has included advancing US understanding of foreign military capabilities in several priority areas, including cyber capabilities. This past year, DIA and USCYBERCOM supported ranking DoD cyber requirements, resulting in more than two dozen prioritized cyber-specific requirements. For next year, USCYBERCOM is expected to not only provide unique cyber requirements but to also support ranking the overall DoD top priorities list for foreign materiel.

c. Does the National Security Agency (NSA) provide adequate insight into the data it collects that could be useful for the Cyber Mission Teams and FMA/E programs?

Based on analysis I have been provided so far, it appears that NSA provides relevant insight and the Department has improved the coordination process across key stakeholders to ensure the exchange of intelligence information and provision of support to cyber mission forces and FMA/E programs.

d. Is there an effective process in place to task NSA collection?

The Department continues to use the established collection requirements process to drive collection supporting the CMF and cyber requirements, and based on analysis that I have been provided so far, it appears effective.

e. What priority would you assign to providing such support, and how would you propose to shift resources to this task?

The previous USD(I) established development of intelligence support to cyber operations as one of his five long-term capability development priorities for the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. If confirmed, I intend to continue these prioritized efforts in alignment with the Department's overall Cyber Strategy. Given the current state of the CMF build out, the Department continues to study the high priority need for intelligence support to the CMF and cyberspace operations. Studies identify a continued strong demand signal for intelligence analysis. If confirmed, I will

continue to refine cyber intelligence priorities as more of the CMF becomes fully operational.

12. **Relationship with respect to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC)**

   a. **How are responsibilities for the oversight of the activities and programs of special operations forces delineated between the USDI and ASD SOLIC?**

   The Secretary of Defense has assigned oversight responsibility for intelligence and intelligence-related activities to various officials in DoD, consistent with law and executive order. Primarily, the Secretary of Defense has assigned oversight of intelligence and intelligence related activities to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), and oversight of special operations and low intensity conflict policy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) in their respective charter directives.

   The Department oversees SOF intelligence and intelligence-related activities during: (1) the conduct of the activity, (2) the capability development and approval process, (3) the funding and budgeting processes for both capabilities and activities, and (4) the reporting of clandestine activities to Congress. This oversight requires collaboration and partnership between USDI and ASD/SOLIC across a range of mission areas.

   The USD(I) is responsible for oversight of all intelligence and intelligence related activities, development and execution of the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and oversight of MIP-funded intelligence-related capabilities, programs, and production of the clandestine quarterly activity reports to Congress. The OUSD(I) staff conducts these functions in concert with the ASD (SO/LIC) staff.

   As the acting USD(I), one of my priorities has been to increase integration between OUSDI and DoD components and staff. We work daily and closely with ASD (SO/LIC) to identify shortfalls in intelligence support to SOF as we develop plans, programs, or activities that support SOF capability to conduct their assigned missions. I will continue to foster this collaboration.

   b. **Are there any programs that are currently overseen by the USDI that would be more appropriately overseen by ASD SOLIC?**

   In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, OUSDI and ASD (SO/LIC) staff are reviewing USSOCOM intelligence and intelligence-related programs. The review is still being conducted. Should the review identify potential programs whose oversight could properly change from current arrangements, we will work together with ASD (SO/LIC) to develop appropriate proposals and would consult with the Armed Services committees.

13. Personnel Security and Insider Threats

The Committee has enacted significant legislation in recent National Defense Authorization Acts mandating and guiding urgent reforms in personnel security processes and insider threat detection and prevention. The recent severe breach in personnel security records held by the Office of Personnel Management has now also driven a re-evaluation of which element or elements of the government should conduct background investigations (BIs) and be responsible for protecting the information that such investigations produce.

a. **What are your views about the pace of this reform effort?**

I support the need for personnel security process reform. With regard to the pace of these efforts, a sense of urgency is needed – recognizing the complexity of the system architecture and the amount of interagency coordination which must be accomplished to achieve the desired reforms. Recent National Defense Authorization Act provisions increase and improve the Department's ability to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by any DoD personnel who represent a threat to DoD personnel, facilities, operations, or resources.

b. **What are your views about whether the Department of Defense should be responsible for conducting BIs and protecting that sensitive data?**

As a member of the Suitability and Security Performance Accountability Council (PAC), the Department has been participating in the on-going Office of Management & Budget (OMB)-led review of the background investigation process that began in July 2015. A key focus area of this review is to prioritize the security of sensitive personnel data. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the PAC and our interagency partners to implement the OMB review recommendations, to include ensuring that any entity conducting investigations has sufficient cybersecurity protections.

14. Duplicative Intelligence Oversight

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) oversees all aspects of the large Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence agencies, the service components of the National Intelligence Program, and the Military Intelligence Program-funded activities and programs of the military services and U.S. Special Operations Command. This oversight covers policy, budgets, acquisition programs, personnel, information technology (IT), and operations. OUSDI maintains staff to oversee all these activities even though functional expertise for policy, acquisitions, personnel, and IT resides in the Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Manpower and Readiness; and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), respectively. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ASD(SOLIC) oversees all aspects of U.S. Special Operations Command, including its intelligence activities and programs.

In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee asked you whether the OUSD(I) staff should continue to duplicate the functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries, the CIO, and ASD(SOLIC), and if so, why?

You responded as follows: "In support of the USD(I), I look forward to assessing this in more detail, if confirmed, as the current fiscal environment does require a careful look to ensure inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication are eliminated across headquarters elements."

    a. **Have you assessed this matter since you began serving as Principal Deputy? Could efficiencies and more effective oversight be achieved by jointly leveraging these existing pillars of functional expertise for oversight of intelligence programs, personnel, policy, and IT issues?**

        If confirmed, I will continue to place a priority on eliminating inefficiencies and unnecessary duplication across headquarter elements. I have an open mind to ideas the Committee might wish to explore for continuing to refine effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence programs, personnel, policy and IT issues.

        In my experiences to date, each of the Under Secretaries, the CIO, and ASD(SOLIC) bring unique capabilities and expertise to bear. Joint, integrated approaches to oversight and management across these key functions and organizations are effective in ensuring complex strategic challenges are comprehensively addressed. This approach takes best advantage of the complementary nature of the expertise arrayed across OSD, including the unique intelligence, counter-intelligence and security expertise resident in the OUSDI staff. For example, USD(I)'s close partnership with the DoD CIO in responding to the Office of Personnel Management breach leverages both organizations' unique areas of expertise while ensuring that defense intelligence and defense information responses to the breach are fully coordinated and not duplicative.

15. U.S. Special Operations Command Intelligence Operations

    a. **In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?**

        In my view, Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence activities and capabilities are consistent with how other DoD service components execute and develop intelligence activities. SOF organic intelligence capabilities focus on the SOF

Commander's mission critical information needs, which enable SOF to accomplish missions assigned by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Intelligence Community components do not typically focus on these tactical intelligence requirements due to capacity limitations or the short timelines associated with supporting ongoing GCC operations.

In my view, the unique set of SOF missions range from enduring, current, to emergent, all of which require very precise and detailed intelligence to ensure their operations achieve national security objectives. The range of missions unique to SOF also requires agile and flexible intelligence capabilities in order to meet operational timeline requirements. This allows our most sensitive operations, such as hostage rescue operations, to take advantage of opportunities as they arise and/or respond sufficiently to emergent needs or crises.

Lastly, SOF intelligence activities are expected to be coordinated fully with the IC partners to ensure the necessary de-confliction and to avoid redundancy. Also, any intelligence discipline specific activities must follow the relevant intelligence coordination processes, for instance the Intelligence Community Directive 304 coordination process for any human intelligence activities.

b. **If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?**

If confirmed, I would continue to work to advance efforts to integrate SOF intelligence capabilities with those of the Intelligence Community. These efforts have strengthened coordination among and between SOF and the Intelligence Community. In my intelligence oversight role, I would ensure SOF intelligence activities adhere to the appropriate coordination process and provide visibility of these activities to Congress through the clandestine quarterly reporting process.

16 <u>**Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis**</u>

Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of command chain and political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.

a. **If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within the DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure?**

It is imperative that DoD intelligence analysis be objective and free from pressure of any kind. Analysts are expected to "speak truth to power" and to call it as they see it. If confirmed, I will make the necessity of protecting the analytic integrity within their organizations a point of emphasis in my interactions with the senior leadership of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, as I have done in the past. I will also seek to ensure

that DoD intelligence training emphasizes analytic integrity requirements as established in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (Analytic Standards) and Joint Publication 2-0 (Joint Intelligence) - safeguarding analytic objectivity, integrity, and independent of political consideration.

Finally, I will look for opportunities to support analytic ombudsman programs across the enterprise. My intent is to make sure that our analytic leadership and workforce are fully knowledgeable of the required integrity standards and that analysts have effective recourse available to them if they believe that the independence of their analysis is being hindered in any way.

b. **Has your office investigated the charges that intelligence assessments in U.S. Central Command of the emergence of the Islamic State terrorist group and the failure of the Iraqi Army were altered inappropriately? If so, what was the result of the investigation?**

The allegations involving the U.S. Central Command are being thoroughly and impartially investigated by the DoD Inspector General. As such, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for my office to conduct a separate, parallel investigation. If confirmed, I will review and implement as appropriate recommendations developed by the IG that protect and strengthen the integrity of our analytic processes.

17 **Analytic Capabilities and Capacity**

In the Advance Policy Questions for your recent confirmation as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the committee noted that the DOD Inspector General (IG) had recently issued an assessment of DOD long-term intelligence analysis, which concluded that the Department has significant problems in three areas. One is broadly termed "non-traditional support" to the combatant commands in such areas as shaping the environment and deterring potential adversaries, partner engagements, long-term analysis for campaign planning, and evaluation of cyber threats. A second is scientific and technical intelligence support to the acquisition process. A third problem area is lack of in-depth expertise in the analytic workforce.

The committee asked you whether you agreed with the IG's assessment, and, if so, how do you believe the Department can address these problems despite declining budgets and personnel levels, while sustaining support for counterterrorism and other transnational requirements, and the pivot to the Pacific?

You stated that "I am not familiar with this assessment, but if confirmed, I will review it and discuss the IG's observations with Dr. Vickers to ascertain the best way to address the issues raised."

a. **What have you done to follow up on this issue since your confirmation?**

I have reviewed the referenced IG report and believe that fully addressing its findings are challenged in that, as the Committee notes, the Department is in an era of budgetary constraints. Nevertheless, a number of initiatives are underway to mitigate the concerns raised.

In the current global environment, the Department's intelligence requirements (traditional, non-traditional, acquisition support, cyber, and others) are expanding, while our analytic budgets are constrained. This limits the ability to fully satisfy our intelligence requirements. The enterprise must instead maximize efficiencies, and effectively prioritize our Defense Intelligence Enterprise operations to ensure that we are applying our available resources against the Department's highest needs. As Acting USD(I), and at the direction of Congress, I have directed my staff to develop the Integrated Defense Intelligence Priorities (IDIP) framework as a means to appropriately integrate the full range of Department customer intelligence requirements into one tool. If confirmed, I will continue to make the IDIP development a high-emphasis effort to effectively allocate and manage our analytic efforts against our highest priority requirements.

I believe that one way to significantly bolster our analytic capacity is to leverage and integrate the intelligence capabilities of our foreign partners to the maximum extent possible. Accordingly, as PDUSD(I) and Acting USD(I) I have made the strengthening and proactive expansion of our defense intelligence partner engagement program a priority effort. I believe these engagement initiatives, along with continued advances in information technology and intelligence sharing via capabilities such as Battlefield Intelligence Collection & Exploitation System (BICES) can achieve significant benefits in enhancing our collective intelligence capacity and detecting and preventing threats. If confirmed, I will continue to place significant emphasis in this area.

Regarding analytic workforce expertise, the Department is beginning implementation of a skills certification program for all-source analysts that will better enable it to assess analyst capabilities and to guide future hiring and development of the analyst cadre. If confirmed, I will work with the Service and agency leadership to look for resource-neutral opportunities to increase our analysts' expertise.

The demand for Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) is outstripping the Department's ability to meet the operational requirements of advanced weapons systems, both those fielded and still being acquired. IMD, providing the foundation for operational mission data, is the result of scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) analysis, and is used to define the capabilities of these advanced weapon systems. There are many simultaneous National and DoD efforts underway to better support integration of intelligence into the capability development and acquisition process to address S&TI support to the acquisition process. From policy changes to significant resource reallocation, the enterprise has established and is refining a governance

structure to identify, prioritize, and address resourcing and prioritization of cradle-to-grave IMD requirements.

18. <u>Congressional Oversight</u>

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

a. **Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

b. **Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?**

Yes.

c. **Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

d. **Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.