

**Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General James N. Mattis , USMC**  
**Nominee for Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command and**  
**Supreme Allied Commander Transformation**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

*The Department has made great progress in the joint arena since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected long standing shortfalls. I don't believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act, however, given the current world environment and the challenges we face we need to build on the successes of Goldwater-Nichols. There is room, in my opinion, for additional refinement.*

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

*Congress should consider means to increase integration of all USG agencies in appropriate training and force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more effective "whole of government" approaches to crisis prevention or crisis resolution.*

*Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services develop 'Service-Specific' systems and capabilities after joint review and authorization to ensure joint/ interoperability issues are addressed.*

**Duties**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command?**

*The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main missions: 1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment, and 2) transforming the US military's forces to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability, championing the joint war fighting requirements of the other combatant*

commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:

- Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider. In this role, USJFCOM has combatant command over a large portion of the conventional forces of the U.S. Armed Forces and provides them as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other Combatant Commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense.
- Functionally responsible for leading joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinating the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of USJFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DoD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation.
- Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency and multinational capabilities. A recently assigned responsibility in this area is that of Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager—a DOD effort to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.
- Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. This effort is focused at the operational level with an emphasis on Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs and the ability of US forces to operate as part of a joint and multinational force. Additionally, USJFCOM is responsible for leading the development of a distributed joint training architecture and developing joint training standards.
- Leads the collaborative development of joint readiness standards for Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, functional component headquarters staffs, and headquarters designated as potential joint headquarters or portion thereof, for recommendation to the Chairman

In addition to these UCP assigned missions, US Joint Forces Command has been assigned as the Executive Agent within the Department of Defense for the following mission areas:

- Joint Urban Operations
- Personnel Recovery
- Joint Deployment Process Owner
- Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct
- Joint Experimentation

### **What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation?**

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is responsible to the Military Committee for overall recommendations on transformation. He leads transformation of NATO military structures, capabilities and doctrines, including those for the defense against terrorism in order to improve the military effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance. He cooperates with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on integrating and synchronizing

*transformation efforts with operational activities and elements. He also promotes improvements to the capabilities of NATO forces made available by nations, especially for Combined Joint Task Forces and NATO Response Force Operations. Specifically, SACT:*

- *Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the NATO Defense Planning Process, including the development of the Defense requirements review.*
- *Develops Strategic Commander Force proposals within the Force Planning Process and conducts Strategic Commander assessment of national contributions to the NATO force structure in coordination with national military authorities.*
- *Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of NATO Joint and Combined concepts, policy and doctrine, as well as Partnership for Peace military concepts in cooperation with SACEUR.*
- *Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of future Communications Information Systems strategy, concepts, capabilities and architecture.*
- *Leads, for military matters in NATO, partnership for Peace and other non-NATO joint individual education and training, and associated policy.*
- *Assists SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations with multinational and joint forces over the full range of Alliance military missions.*

**What are the advantages and disadvantages of serving in both of these roles simultaneously?**

*Both ACT and JFCOM strive for interoperable and interdependent forces. These efforts revolve around the mutually supporting themes of operational lessons learned, combined/joint training, interoperability, and concept development and experimentation. It makes great sense for one person to wear these two hats since these are parallel missions—both are trying to achieve essentially the same goal. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the joint capabilities resident in JFCOM with the transformation goals of NATO, as well as integrating NATO processes and personnel into JFCOM experimentation and training efforts—this is a win/win situation.*

*The significant challenge will be one of time management. NATO conducts its business in formal high-level forums which require the presence of both Strategic Commanders—both of whom are dual hatted with US and NATO responsibilities. The vast majority of these meetings are conducted in Europe. Maintaining the proper balance between USJFCOM and ACT duties will require my close attention, but it is a challenge that, if confirmed, I am ready to meet.*

## **Background and Experience**

**What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

*I'm very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only serve over 35 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force, which as you know, is also the Marine*

*component for US Central Command. Perhaps one of my most important opportunities was leading the Marine Corps' Combat Development Command, where I was able to help shape much of the current doctrine and training that the Marine Corps has since incorporated. It was also there that I was able to co-author, with General Petraeus, the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. Over the years, I've had what I believe is considerable experience in joint operations and working with coalition forces. In every assignment I was fortunate to serve for, and lead, brave, innovative, and hardworking people, both in uniform as well as senior civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried to learn, mentor, and lead at every chance. All of this has prepared me for this opportunity.*

## **Relationships**

**Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, to the following:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

*The Commander, US Joint Forces Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.*

### **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

*Title 10, US Code, and current Department of Defense directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to the commanders and the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

### **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

*With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, Intelligence Oversight, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the*

*Under Secretaries.*

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*The Chairman is established by Title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the Combatant Commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable.*

### **Supreme Allied Commander, Europe**

*SACEUR is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO's command structure. As NATO's other Strategic Commander, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation supports SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with multinational and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) also conducts and evaluates training and exercises of forces and headquarters, in coordination with and on behalf of SACEUR. Lastly, ACT supports SACEUR in joint analysis, evaluations and assessments of NATO-led operations and forces, including NATO Response Force certification.*

### **The North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee The NATO Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers The Military Committee of NATO**

*As one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO's command structure, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation provides military advice to the Military Committee, North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee on matters pertaining to transformation, as required. The Commander may make recommendations directly to the Military Committee, the International Military Staff, national Chiefs of Defense, Defense Ministers and Heads of State and Government on transformational matters affecting the capability improvement, interoperability, efficiency, and sustainability of forces designated for NATO.*

### **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

*The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Commander, US Joint Forces*

*Command coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip forces assigned to USJFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.*

### **The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

*The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the US Coast Guard in order to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of US Joint Forces Command.*

### **The combatant commanders**

*In general, JFCOM is a supporting command – its job is to make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their missions – today and in the future - forms a large basis of JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment dictates that JFCOM work very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our national military strategy.*

### **The commanders of each of the Service's training and doctrine commands**

*Tasked by the UCP as the executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation, a strong relationship exists between JFCOM and the Services' training and doctrine commands. General Smith has maintained a close working relationships with these organizations and their commanders via a monthly Component Commanders meeting, and if confirmed, I will continue these relationships.*

### **Major Challenges and Problems**

#### **In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command?**

*From my present view outside the wire I would postulate that the most significant challenge is meeting the COCOM's force sourcing requirements. The task of providing trained and ready joint forces, on a predictable and stable schedule that minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global Force Provider mission.*

*Second is the continuing challenge of developing capabilities that are truly born joint. First and foremost is institutionalizing Joint Command and Control. The assignment of USJFCOM as the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio manager appears to be a step in the right direction.*

*Finally, continuing the overarching transformation of our joint force while prosecuting current campaigns will be an ongoing challenge as the strategic environment continues to evolve.*

**In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation?**

*My sense is training forces for deployment to Afghanistan and other NATO operations is the most immediate challenge. Incorporating and institutionalizing lessons learned in training, capability development, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures has historically been a problem for any organization. I expect some challenges in this area. Transforming NATO military capabilities, especially those of the newest NATO members, will be a complex, expensive, and time consuming process. Preparing and cultivating partner countries for possible accession into NATO I believe will be a very delicate and complicated endeavor. Ensuring that the NATO Response Force (NRF) is well resourced and remains a vehicle for experimentation and transformation is an extremely important aspect of NATO's global warfighting capability that I believe will require my attention. Finally, working to build bridges and capabilities with Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries will be an important aspect of my responsibilities.*

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing them?**

*Since I am not confirmed yet, I have not had great insight into the internal workings of either commands, so I cannot give as complete of an answer as I would like. Certainly, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the other Combatant Commanders, as well as the Services through JFCOM's component commands, to shape JFCOM's ability to provide the most logical and effective sourcing solutions for the Joint Warfighter. With respect to developing joint solutions while programs are still on the drawing board, I would like to further expand on the Capabilities' Portfolio Management efforts that are ongoing, and look beyond just Joint Command and Control to evaluate other areas that would ripe for this style of management. Finally, I will continue to leverage the training and experimentation efforts that the Combatant Commanders and Joint Warfighters want and need, in order to take a holistic approach to shaping combat development capabilities that our forces involved in the current fight need in future years.*

**Joint Force Provider**

**What is your understanding of the role of Joint Forces Command as the joint force provider to meet combatant commander requirements?**

*As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is USJFCOM's goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish this, USJFCOM provides DoD leadership with the recommended force allocation solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. USJFCOM works to source these force requirements through collaborating with JFCOM service Components, each of the Services (both active and reserve) and Combatant Commands' to meet Combatant Commands' force requirements.*

**From your experience as Marine Forces Commander, U.S. Central Command, what are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint Forces Command in meeting your combatant command's force requirements?**

*Overall, JFCOM along with the other stakeholders in the Global Force Management process are doing an outstanding job in supporting the combatant commands' force requirements. But as you know, demand is currently outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the current systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress, persistent shortfalls use of In-Lieu-Of forces, etc. The cunning enemy that we face is forcing us to adapt our force and staffing requirements. At times, the force providing processes have not proven agile enough to keep up with the pace of change and unplanned requirements. This is the source of some frustration. To their credit, however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in the Global Force Management Process are, reviewing their processes: determining how to streamline procedures and increase visibility in order to increase responsiveness to combatant command force requirements.*

**In this regard, include your observations and evaluations of the use of 'in lieu of' forces to meet theater requirements.**

*In my judgment, In-Lieu-Of (ILO) forces provide effective support to meet theater requirements. In-Lieu-Of solutions are, by definition, substitutions of force when the standard force is unavailable. As such, ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater requirements that would otherwise go unfilled. Of critical importance as In-Lieu-Of forces are continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness.*

**Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most urgent challenges requiring Joint Forces Command attention and how would you propose to meet these challenges or improve the command's efficiency or effectiveness as the joint force provider to our combatant commands?**



*The most urgent challenge impacting Joint Forces Commands effectiveness as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality force readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with OSD, the Joint Staff, Service headquarters and technical organizations (DISA) in several initiatives that are aimed at improving data access and visibility. Ultimately, a global visibility capability tool is envisioned that will enable JFCOM staff and supported Combatant Commands to more rapidly access information and use it to develop recommended force allocations for Secretary of Defense's consideration.*

## **Joint Force Readiness**

**Joint Forces Command's current mission statement acknowledges its responsibility to provide "trained and ready joint forces" to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our non-deployed forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our non-deployed land, air and sea forces?**

*That portion of the armed services making up the ground force is essentially either deployed forward in the Global War on Terror or is in some stage of resetting for future deployment. Those units that are in reset are challenged in their readiness by equipment needs, rotation of manpower and time to train. The Services are doing great work preparing these ground forces for their next deployment – but every day in reset is crucial to preparing them and, in general, they achieve a deployment ready state just in time for their next deployment rotation. The air and maritime forces are more ready across the board, but specific skill sets within those forces are also stressed due to deployments (e.g., Military Intelligence, EOD).*

**What policies, programs, or actions would you specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our non-deployed air, land, and sea forces?**

*Continued support of the Congress to provide resources necessary to facilitate rapid force reset and recapitalization is probably the most important single element to ensure a strengthening of force readiness.*

## **Readiness Reporting Systems**

**Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other contingency missions. The Department has developed and begun fielding the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.**

**Based on your years of tactical unit command, both in garrison and while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely readiness reporting system?**

*A readiness reporting system as you have described is obviously important. The readiness reporting system provides the basis for force analysis that yields readiness and availability information that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing solutions to meet the geographic combatant commander's force needs.*

**What in your view should be the requirements of a readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command's mission as joint force provider?**

*JFCOM has described the technical requirements for a readiness reporting system mission tasks or a spectrum of military missions that supports and dovetails with the aforementioned Global Visibility Capability tool. In general terms, the readiness system should reflect objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments of a force's ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum of military missions.*

**In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?**

*I would expect that JFCOM would require both to perform its Joint Force Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service components and each Service to generate the shared understanding of what Service capabilities are available and why they are available – based on unit readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force Provider processes, JFCOM has defined needs for the Global Visibility Capability tool include:*

- *Force availability*
- *Force capabilities identifies*
- *Force structure*
- *Force readiness*
- *Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance (priorities)*
- *Force location*
- *Force apportionment*
- *Common operating picture*
- *Works in progress (pending changes in the force)*

**What weight would you assign to each of the requirements you identify?**

*As JFCOM and other GFM stakeholders focus on development of the Global Visibility Capability tool high priority items include: force availability, force capabilities identifier, force structure, force readiness. GFM strategic guidance, force location and force apportionment are medium priority. Common operating picture and works in progress are low priority.*

**What is your understanding of or experience with the new Defense Readiness Reporting System?**

*The Defense Readiness Reporting System provides enhanced capability and capability, and if we achieve its goals, it can provide us solid foundation for force planning. I believe this system is an improvement over previous reporting systems although I need to discuss DRRS with the service components to determine their confidence in the system before declaring my own overall assessment.*

**How would you evaluate this new system's ability to assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and its utility in support of Joint Forces Command's joint force provider process?**

*DRRS is a subjective readiness reporting system that focuses on evaluation of a force's ability to execute mission essential tasks rather than measure equipment, supply, manning and training levels as a means of assessing readiness. DRRS continues to evolve and its full potential to succeed as a readiness system remains to be seen.*

**One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use or misuse of the commander's "subjective upgrade." Commanders are authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict application of objective standards as defined in the readiness reporting regulation.**

**Based on your years of tactical unit command, in general have you used this authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness reports? If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective upgrade or downgrade?**

*I have used subjective reporting in the past within the parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system directs an assessment of a units full spectrum combat mission, then the full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less demanding mission, for example, disaster relief – then a subjective report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning, equipment and training. It's important to keep in mind that readiness reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their information needs and intents are key variables in defining any readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. Quantitative assessments alone cannot adequately articulate a unit's readiness and I strongly endorse holistic appraisals by commanders.*

**How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and through you?**

*The USMC trains leaders to be honest, forthright, critical thinkers and they are selected*

*to leadership positions based, in large part, on their demonstration of good judgment. I have relied on the good judgment of my subordinate commanders to reflect accurately their unit's capabilities within the parameters of the readiness reporting system. The readiness of their units has been a subject of frequent discussion with my subordinate commanders. I expect them to apply their judgment and report their honest assessment.*

**What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades?**

*The obvious danger is that an inaccurate report may be used as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a mission that it is not prepared to undertake. A benefit may occur when a subjective readiness upgrade allows reflection of a capabilities that is not measured in an objective based system (e.g., a unit with a great deal of leadership experience, but not has not yet completed all training may be more capable than objective assessment reveals).*

**If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces provider?**

*I will monitor reports of force readiness through my Service component commanders who are in the best position to continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training lessons learned.*

### **Joint Force Trainer**

**Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However, Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of deploying forces at the unit or "tactical" level.**

**Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, U.S. Central Command, what is your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq or Afghanistan?**

*I can speak authoritatively only on the Marine, Navy, Air Force and Army units I have personally observed or commanded over the last six years of conflict. Technically and tactically their performance has demonstrated a high state of readiness. Gaps in our counter-insurgency doctrine and training have been addressed as we adapted to the enemy situation.*

*The readiness of forces arriving in Iraq and Afghanistan for units is good, but there is always room for improvement. The readiness of individual Augmentees, those personnel who*

*are called upon to fill niche capabilities or to augment or round out a unit is improving, but still requires more work. This assessment is based on a number of factors: improved training, better lessons learned, changes in doctrine and capabilities and the readiness to share this across the services and through Joint organizations. We have adapted to changes in the enemy but we must continue to adapt so agility is a key tenet in how we improve. The key to this process is transitioning the lessons we observe and experience on the battlefield into lessons learned in our training, doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures. It is also about recognizing and pushing forward the capabilities we need to the warfighter as soon as they are ready and have been evaluated.*

*As the Joint Force Provider I will be committed to working through our Components Commands Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Command, Fleet Forces Command, and Army Forces Command, Services, and the Combatant Commanders to make sure we provide the most ready forces that meet COCOM criteria across the globe. One of my first tasks will be to assess this readiness with the Components and take stock of COCOM requirements and then ensure that JFCOM provides and supports those units going into harm's way.*

*As the Joint Force Trainer I will continually assess and make improvements in Joint training through Joint Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Exercises, Joint Task Force training certification, Joint Operational Analysis, and through direct interaction with the Combatant Commanders. We will also review individual Augmentee training and improve it using capabilities such as the Joint Knowledge Online system that is designed to support the U.S. and Coalition force individual augmentees from predeployment, through deployment and post deployment to provide courses and a place to ask the expert. I look forward to the challenge of improving our readiness and training.*

**Based on your observations and evaluations, should Joint Forces Command be assigned a greater role in setting standards and the certification of the training readiness of tactical units prior to their deployment?**

*I believe that the Commander of the unit together with their higher headquarters which is usually a JFCOM Component is in the best position to certify training readiness of the units. Setting standards for readiness is primarily accomplished by the Combatant Commander and the Service but as the Commander, Joint Forces Command I will continually assess and provide support to ensure that our troops are trained and ready. This will include realistic training for commanders and staffs of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan. Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability. We will continue to improve enabling technology for all major Service training centers and Combatant Commanders to train together in a distributed environment through the Joint National Training Capability. We will continue to provide dedicated assessment teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to identify areas for improved command and control of US and multi-national forces and as Commander of Allied Command Transformation I will ensure that these improvements are shared throughout NATO.*

## **Lessons Learned**

**One of Joint Forces Command's missions is to conduct lessons learned studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and doctrine. These efforts are informed by the command's wargaming experimentation program, as well as a number of advisors, including retired general officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the operational situation.**

**Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, U.S. Central Command, what are your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's lessons learned efforts?**

*JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) embedded collection teams with the Joint Force Commander's Headquarters during the course of operations. Those forward teams were in daily communication with each other and reached back to analysts in the US. This daily information sharing uncovered both immediately applicable lessons for the commanders in the field, and provided more comprehensive information on causality for subsequent analysis. This approach is a great leap forward over sending interview teams forward to collect information after the fact as we've historically done. It provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has not been achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams have also moved to this approach. This method has permitted rapid adaptation and sharing of "best practices" between our various services and units. It is a proven force multiplier in making us learning organizations.*

**What are your observations and evaluation of how these lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan?**

*I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and recommendations being shared with senior DOD and USG leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the sharing of joint and service lessons learned, training has been reoriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war.*

**If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the command's lessons learned systems?**

*Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work and advocate with my fellow Combatant Commanders to set the conditions at the highest level for the continued success of JCOA's employment as*

*primary tool for operational level analytical support to the fielded Joint Task Force headquarters. We will continue to infuse a sense of urgency in disseminating best practices uncovered by sharing lessons learned.*

*Additionally, the ability of US forces to turn world-wide collected lesson observations into knowledge will reach a new level with the implementation this year of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS allows for transparency among all the service and combatant commands' lessons learned databases. The key for JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide improvements for the Joint Warfighter.*

*Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the recommendations that go forward based on our analysis and are approved through the JROC process.*

**As the Consolidated Disposition Authority, you reviewed the investigations into the conduct of Marines that resulted in civilian deaths in Haditha, Iraq.**

**What insights did you gain as a result of this duty?**

*The incident illuminated a number of issues, among them how the violent extremists use civilians as cover for their activities as well as the enemy's disregard of any historic norms for the protection of innocents. In such wars "among the people," our units must demonstrate high performance coupled with strong self-discipline and cultural understanding coupled with precision fires. We also require engaged leaders who act as emotional "shock absorbers" for their younger troops. Accountability, real and omnipresent, is as critical to victory today as is training and equipping our forces.*

**If confirmed, how would you incorporate these insights into your responsibilities as Commander, United States Joint Forces Command?**

*I will incorporate the lessons learned from this event into joint training evolutions, especially in pre-deployment training for units rotating into Iraq and Afghanistan. Live, simulated, and computer based training, that replicates the ethical dilemmas found in combat will be effective in minimizing these types of events. It is important to teach our service men and women when and when not to use their weapons. I will work with the services through the JFCOM Components to ensure these training capabilities are highlighted. Additional language and cultural training for our forces is also helpful in mitigating the challenging situations that are often found in a counterinsurgency environment. The Haditha incident also demonstrated the need to develop better Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) capabilities. I will work with the Services and Combatant Commands to develop these capabilities*

**National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions**

**An issue of concern to the Congress is the apparent low levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great confidence the true "readiness" of the Guard for its domestic support missions because there is no national readiness reporting system that objectively captures the Guard's personnel, equipment, or training requirements or their status relative to those requirements.**

**What is your assessment of the Guard's current readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may face?**

*I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally faced by a state in a given year. This year National Guard forces have responded, under state control, to floods, fires, hurricanes, tornados, and the tragic bridge collapse in Minnesota. Governors and their TAGs generally will not offer National Guard forces for deployment if they believe that offering will negatively impact the state's ability to respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard forces that have returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan generally are at lower readiness levels and the Army is working diligently to reset these forces.*

**What in your view is the role or responsibility of Joint Forces Command, as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness reporting system that monitors the Guard's readiness for civil support missions?**

*Once the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is fully evolved and National Guard units are reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task based readiness system could reflect Guard readiness for civil support missions.*

### **Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

**The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified.**

**How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the Department's acquisition process?**

*Yes, in my experience as Commander, Marine Forces Central Command where I have been the ultimate customer for decisions that the JROC makes, my belief is that the JROC has been effective at engaging the acquisition and programming communities earlier in the requirements process to improve JROC decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition programs. For example; JFCOM collected and analyzed lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. These lessons were compared to the Integrated Priority Lists and Joint Quarterly*



*Readiness Reports submitted by the Combatant Commanders. This comparison was then used to develop recommended approaches for resolution which were submitted to the Joint Staff and JROC. All of these recommendations were endorsed by the JROC.*

**Do you see the need for any change in the organization or structure of the JROC?**

*The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the organization and structure of the JROC is about right in order to provide that independent military voice. However, I would strongly support the VCJCS and the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as advisors, from across the Department and the Interagency, to inform the JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. I believe the Combatant Commanders also need to have an effective voice in the resource decisions of joint requirements and should be included as advisors to this important body. It will be the one way that Combatant Commanders can continue to influence the need to keep acquisition programs interoperable. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating options that include Combatant Commander representation in the JROC.*

**If confirmed, how would you plan to interact with the JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?**

*I would offer that the direction that Admiral Giambastiani charted is sound and I am confident that General Cartwright will continue to lead us in the right direction. All I can offer is that if confirmed I will continue to bring the most significant warfighting challenges pertaining to JFCOM and the COCOMs to the visibility of the JROC so that the JROC can make the best possible decision about future capabilities and programs.*

**Do you feel that the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, should have a larger role in the activities of the JROC, given the unique JFCOM mission to support joint warfighting?**

*In my view, we must continue to “operationalize” the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). A variety of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge.*

*Congress has assisted by providing authorities such as Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) to JFCOM. This authority has proven to be of great value. One near-term solution is to extend this authority and dedicate appropriate resources in order to have funds available to quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities for the Combatant Commanders. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to adapt to more effectively meet the demands and pace of today’s*

*operations. If confirmed, I look forward to helping to develop a systemic way to address these concerns.*

### **Joint Requirements**

**Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, is responsible for advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process.**

**From your perspective has the U. S. Joint Forces Command effectively represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the military services?**

*Yes, US Joint Forces Command has well represented the requirements and needs of the combatant commanders to the JROC.*

**In your view, are combatant commanders capable of identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly acquiring needed capabilities?**

*Yes, as one of the component commanders for US Central Command it is my belief that the Combatant Commander in working with their component commanders is perfectly suited to identify those joint urgent needs for adjudication by the JROC.*

**What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting capabilities?**

*This is a difficult question and one that I will be interested in getting my hands around should I be confirmed. I will tell you that COCOMs currently have the ability to provide their requirements to the Service acquisition community through the Joint Staff. This system works for long term needs. COCOMs also have the ability to forward Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement to address their short-term, urgent needs. It is my responsibility as a COCOM in a supporting relationship to help them find solutions to their problems.*

### **Joint Capability Development**

**In your view, how successful has U.S. Joint Forces Command been in developing and delivering new joint capabilities to the warfighter?**

*I think very successful. USJFCOM continues to work with the COCOMs to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and look for solutions. USJFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering with the Services, and leverages our experimentation expertise, our Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and our interim joint capability development efforts to find solutions that can be operationally tested and fielded. For example, USJFCOM has partnered with Services to develop and field test Machine Foreign Language Translation Systems (MFLTS) that enable troops to better communicate with Host nation populations. Several thousand of one-way translation devices are currently in use and a two-way translation device is undergoing developmental testing in Iraq.*

**What steps would you take to improve JFCOM's efforts in this area?**

*The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions that meet the warfighter's needs. In addition to R&D funding, interim solutions also require temporary O&M to ensure sustainability. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that JFCOM in partnership with OSD AT&L and others as appropriate, are adequately funded and provided the authorities necessary to enable the development and fielding of interim solutions, until a Service Program of record is available to meet COCOM urgent needs.*

**Transformation**

**By serving as the Department's "transformation laboratory," U.S. Joint Forces Command enhances the combatant commands' capabilities as outlined in the Department's Unified Command Plan.**

**Do you believe U. S. Joint Forces Command should play a larger role in transformation and setting transformation policy? If so, how?**

*USJFCOM's role and influence in transformation continues to grow through constantly expanding interaction with the Services, Joint Staff and OSD in the joint experimentation, joint training, joint integration, and joint force providing responsibilities as assigned by the UCP. The JFCOM transformation role includes both interactions within the existing DOD developmental processes and the ability to act as a coordinator of Service, COCOM, and Agency efforts. Transformation policy clearly rests with the Department. However, JFCOM is afforded substantial and sufficient opportunity to inform policy makers and to shape the mechanisms that execute transformation policy.*

**In your view, what capabilities that have been fielded are truly transformational?**

*JFCOM and its partners have fielded several capabilities that are truly transformational, not least of which is the Training Transformation initiative that combines real forces with*

*individuals and crews in simulators and computer-generated forces that integrate into a common operational picture for training. This Joint National Training Capability rides on a permanent network that continues to expand around the globe. Units and forces can train at instrumented ranges or from home station, depending upon their training objectives.*

*Enabling capabilities developed by JFCOM and partners, and transforming the way operators perform in the field, include:*

- The Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE) is a state-of-the-art data fusion capability and operations center that has proved highly successful in meshing hundreds of data sources to provide focused knowledge products on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). KnIFE serves thousands of customers including warfighters in the field and in training, the research & development community, and inter-agency. KnIFE is a Division of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and is being expanded to address a variety of other asymmetric threats.*
- The Joint Training Experimentation Network (JTEN), developed as part of the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC), created a 24x7x365 persistent network for joint training & experimentation, where none existed before. The persistent network has enabled permanent interconnectivity at the US SECRET-level between numerous Service Component and COCOM national training facilities, live instrumented ranges, model & simulation centers of excellence, and other standing training networks such as the USAF's Distributed Mission Operations Network (DMON) and the Navy's Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE).*
- The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) is the DOD Training Transformation (T2) program responsible for transforming individual joint training capability. In the spring of 2007, JKDDC delivered the newly enhanced Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), an enterprise portal system providing access to a learning management system of joint courseware and web-based learning tools and services via Internet, military unclassified and classified networks. JKO provides a more effective and convenient online training opportunity for individuals to prepare in advance for collective training exercises and integrated operations.*
- JFCOM assisted the Geographic Combatant Commanders as they established core elements for their Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It transformed the concept of readiness for operational-level joint command and control by establishing a permanent, trained and ready organization for the Combatant Commanders to employ when needed, providing joint C2 capability to a Service-proved headquarters.*
- Joint Enabling Capabilities are a transformational approach to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commanders that are not currently met by the Services. They include Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Elements, the Joint Communications Support Element, the Joint Public Affairs Support Element and Quick Reaction Teams of targeteers and collection managers from the Joint Transformation Command – Intelligence. Several other Joint Enabling*

- Capabilities are under development and in testing with operational forces.*
- *Advanced terrain analysis prototype software (Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire systems planning and placement.*
  - *Machine Foreign Language Translation System – facilitates working with and establishing rapport with the indigenous population.*
  - *Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) – this tool models and simulates reactions of institutions, organizations, and individuals that make up a society and their effects on joint operations, and has been employed in support of ISAF.*
  - *Angel Fire—a Near Real Time Persistent Forensic Capability, currently being tested on the battlefield by the Marine Corps. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square kilometer area and can provide the joint war fighter with a dedicated sensor to rapidly respond to enemy actions and near real-time reaction to an improvised explosive device (IED).*

**What capabilities currently under development do you consider to be truly transformational and deserving of support within the Department and Congress?**

*The most critical lesson we have learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Katrina is the need for a whole of government approach to achieve national objectives. USJFCOM experimentation in knitting together the interagency and multinational communities has already resulted in significant cross-domain collaborative advancements and more realistic training for all who participate.*

*This whole of government approach also has considerable applicability to the structure and functions of the new AFRICOM and for the emerging regional objectives of CDRUSSOUTHCOM. Applying organizational and functional principles developed in experimentation venues and refined in training venues can have a transformational effect in our regional security cooperation and conflict prevention.*

*Operational modeling and simulation capability has a potentially transformational effect on the operational planning, mission rehearsal, operations execution, and effect assessment requirements of operational commanders. New modeling capabilities that focus on the human element have great potential for planning and assessing the effects of irregular warfare.*

*Ensuring the integration and interoperability of US and Coalition command and control capability is one transformational area that JFCOM is making a major effort. Recently, JFCOM led a large Joint and Coalition combat identification exercise at the Army's National Training Center in California and Nellis AFB, Nevada. All four US service, Special Operations Command, and partners from 8 NATO/ISAF nation participated, bringing a total of 1800 personnel, 40 vehicles, and 40 aircraft to the desert for two weeks to examine 16 different combat identification technologies as well as procedures for executing digital joint and*

*combined close air support. I look forward to seeing the after action report and technology analysis.*

*The management of DOD requirements, resources, and acquisition strategy across specific capability portfolios to improve efficiency and interoperability and reduce redundancy is another key transformational area where JFCOM has a major effort ongoing. As directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JFCOM is the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager, one of four such portfolio efforts across DoD. We have just finished a 5 month effort geared toward recommending changes to Service programs for the FY09 POM that provide DoD with a more balanced and responsive Joint Command and Control portfolio. We are will do the same for the FY 10 and beyond.*

**What metrics should the Department use to determine whether it is investing enough resources and placing a high enough priority in the transformation of its capabilities?**

*The ultimate metric is how well the capability meets the current and future needs of the customer – the Combatant Commanders and Services. Assessing these metrics requires constant engagement with Regional and other Functional Commands, the Service Chiefs, and other Agency Staffs. Overall metrics need to be at the National Strategic level across the Whole of Government. Any metric that is solely focused on DOD tells only part of the story.*

**In your view, what role should U.S. Joint Forces Command play in supporting the Department, including the services and Defense agencies, in achieving successful systematic migration of mission capabilities to these new military technologies?**

*This is one of those questions in which I must immerse myself if I am confirmed, because being outside Joint Forces Command until now hasn't given me the familiarity I need to answer. The answer probably lies somewhere between providing the joint context as JFCOM currently does for all Service and Defense Agency acquisition decisions, and some measure of greater influence over acquisition decisions. What I do know is that no capability we provide will survive unless it meets a warfighter's need and is ultimately sustained in a Service or Joint program of record.*

### **Budget and Resources**

**Since 2001, the U.S. Joint Forces Command budget authority has risen considerably because of additional functional mission responsibilities assigned to the command.**

**Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you foresee the need for future growth?**

*For the most part, resources have kept up with the growing mission responsibilities. I*

*understand, the resources to support the JFCOM portfolio of solutions and capabilities has been a departmental effort over the past few years, and the informed allocation of those resources is intended to provide for that mission in support of delivering the appropriate Joint tools to the warfighter. As in any organization available resources drive the prioritization of work.*

*As for future growth, I can not discount that possibility. As Joint Warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be critical for the department to assess the risk, prioritize their effect on the overall ability of the force to complete the mission, and then determine the appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as required to mitigate or accept that risk.*

**In what specific areas do you see the need for future growth?**

*This is difficult to answer without having had a chance to evaluate the command performance, but I believe there may be two areas once evaluated to be ready for expansion, but that will need to be a Departmental and Presidential decision. .*

*First is in the area of Joint Force Management. Our current Global Force Management operations : Emergent Force sourcing, Rotational Force sourcing, Individual Augmentation, Exercise Force sourcing, and Adaptive Planning Contingency sourcing, continue at an unprecedented pace. This elevated operating tempo has placed significant stress on the global force pool and highlighted the need for continued improvements in; visibility and sourcing of global force requirements, Adaptive and contingency Planning, global assessment of risk, and rapid evaluation of force readiness and availability.*

*Second, as we expand the scope of the Department's Capability Portfolio managers, there will be some near term requirement to selectively expand the skill set and capacity of those personnel executing the Joint Command and Control (JC2) Capability Portfolio management functions for the Department at JFCOM. The critical effect desired will be to foster the integration and interoperability of strategic, operational and tactical C2 within a net-enabled environment; scalable C2 capabilities responsive to evolving command structure size, and seamlessly integrated with components and mission partners; and the phase-out of non-interoperable, excess and/or duplicative capabilities.*

*Lastly, as the Joint Enabling Capability concept expands to fill more and more of the Combatant Commanders' force requirements not met by Service forces, there may be a need for increased manpower and funding to maintain the readiness of these operational-level capabilities commensurate with Combatant Commander requirements and the readiness level of the tactical forces they command.*

**Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to efficiently manage this increase in budget authority?**

*It is my understanding that efforts are underway to examine that question. The rapid growth in the command's resources since 2001, combined with a complex resourcing*

*environment is driving JFCOM toward an internal review that looks at business management and execution processes to ensure that the command is adequately staffed. A quick analysis, of the last 6 years of resourcing, appears to show that management infrastructure has remained relatively flat, while mission resourcing has grown, if confirmed, it is something that I will urge the staff to continue to look at as we move forward.*

**Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate government technical staff to deal with its increasing role in acquisition programs?**

*I believe the short answer is no, but if confirmed, I will need to investigate this issue more closely. It is my understanding that JFCOM is working with the department to determine required capacity and capability, and identify the resources (fiscal and manpower) needed to effectively execute the Joint Command and Control (JC2) Portfolio Management mission. As JFCOM continues to expand its influence and management across the JC2 portfolio, it will be critical to develop and build upon the existing acquisition program oversight capacity and capability. The likely solution will be a combination of organic (JFCOM assigned) and non-organic (matrix'd as required) technical staffing to provide the appropriate assessment and review.*

**Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is government civilians or contractors.**

**In your view, is this large civilian and contractor workforce a function of JFCOM's multiple functional responsibilities or is it a reflection of a shortage of military personnel?**

*It is my understanding that JFCOM is working to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders today while ensuring we are ready for the requirements of tomorrow. In my experience this requires the right mix of military, government civilians and contractors who together make up an experienced work force. The contractor portion of the workforce provides the flexibility to surge to taskings and to work on different subject areas that may or may not have traditionally been part of JFCOM's expertise. Contractors provide expertise and afford organizational agility as missions change or new ones are added. Government civilians provide program management, corporate knowledge and continuity of effort. As military personnel become less available for program management tasks to fill existing billets, they may be replaced by government civilians. But government civilians cannot replace the fresh operational expertise that military personnel bring to solving JFCOM's problem sets.*

**Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel?**

*If confirmed, one of my initial tasks will be to review JFCOM's work force and ensure it meets mission requirements and most optimally utilizes military, civilian and contractor personnel.*



## **Joint Experimentation**

**How would you rate the success of the joint experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in supporting the development of new concepts of operations?**

*Experimentation plays a useful and proven role in transformation for identifying needed near and far term capabilities. The art and science of experimentation have evolved considerably since the days of Millennium Challenge 02, which cost far too much for the learning achieved. Today's experimentation achieves far more at much lower cost by employing a distributed network and involving far fewer players, who can work from their home stations, all driven and assessed by sophisticated, tailored modeling and simulation.*

*This increasingly sophisticated experimentation network allows conceptual solutions to warfighter challenges to be tested through hundreds if not thousands of iterations over short periods of time. Testing elements of the supporting operating concepts to the Joint Operations Concept process thus becomes much easier and far more comprehensive.*

*By providing access to all sorts of military and other interagency partners, this network has increased DOD-wide productivity and enabled the Department to increase value derived from its experimentation dollars, whether those dollars are joint or Service-specific.*

**What changes would you recommend to increase the effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?**

*Recent Department initiatives linking joint experimentation to other acquisition and strategic guidance processes will go a long way to aligning what have been to date very stovepiped processes. How well remains to be seen, since the first information call is only now being answered. But I believe this initiative has great potential for increasing effectiveness across more than just experimentation.*

*The entire body of experimentation work has recently moved from being defined as activity-driven to being defined as productivity-driven, so that venues are now developed directly in response to experimentation objectives, rather than objectives being tailored to fit existing venues. This should have a considerable impact on effectiveness.*

*One area requiring considerable improvement is the transition into Service programs of record of those solutions validated through joint experimentation in order to field and sustain those capabilities for the joint operators.*

*Multinational and interagency participation and partnership in DOD joint experimentation needs to be resourced and expanded.*

**Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of our future forces?**

*The Department is obviously committed to joint experimentation. We will move to a higher level of integration when Defense agencies are fully incorporated in joint experimentation. Efforts must continue to better align Service Title X and joint experimentation. Current investments in joint experimentation have shown improvement in the integration and interoperability of joint forces. Security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a comprehensive approach to include interagency and multinational partners. Current funding and policy for joint experimentation do not facilitate this broadened body of work.*

**What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM in determining how the respective Services should invest their experimentation dollars?**

*The UCP assigns USJFCOM responsibility to lead joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of USJFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DoD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a clear communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal authorities under Title 10, guided by that common vision of the course of experimentation.*

### **Urban Operations**

**JFCOM's experimentation and lessons learned efforts have had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and development of urban operations concepts.**

**What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct urban operations?**

*The capability is improving but there is much work to be done in this area. I believe my combat experience during OEF and OIF will be helpful in this area.*

**What major issues need to be addressed to improve those capabilities?**

*The center of gravity for success in the urban environment is winning the support of the population. They will decide which side will succeed. If we win them over, we have millions of allies on our side. If we lose their support, we have at best case, millions of non-supporters; worst case, millions of enemies.*

*We gain the support of the population by securing and improving the systems that make*

*up the city. This includes basic services such as power, water, and sewage, but also the political system, the information system, even the social and cultural systems. When we successfully provide the population a more compelling view of their future than that provided them by our opponents, the population will take over and make it impossible for the threat to exist there.*

*The tasks associated with securing the broad spectrum of urban services are outside our traditional tactical thinking. We also understand that this mission cannot be successfully accomplished with military capability alone and that we need greater participation from the interagency community, where much of this type of expertise resides. The requirement for the use of military force to defeat the threat has not gone away, but we now understand that military force must be precisely applied in a much broader operational context.*

*Critical needs include:*

- Increased capacity for human intelligence.*
- Greater urban operations reconnaissance and surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight*
- Joint command and control systems that enable the integration not only of military capability, but also of interagency capability in a coalition environment.*
- Precise weapons effects that minimize collateral damage*
- Strategic communications capabilities that improve our ability to help the population understand the truth about what we are doing and gain their support.*
- The ability to better visualize the urban operating environment, including the ability to sense through the massive structures of the city*
- Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we know exactly where all of our forces are located*

**Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015 experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.**

**What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?**

*It is incredibly valuable. Combatant Commanders consistently identify “persistent surveillance” as a capability gap in their integrated priority lists, despite the fact that U.S. and Coalition warfighters operate and maintain numerous aerial surveillance platforms of varying capabilities. These individual platforms are inherently limited in their ability to conduct persistent surveillance primarily due to platform design and sensor characteristics, particularly against an adaptive, elusive adversary; ISR data derived from the platforms/sensors largely remains “stovepiped” within the platform/sensor architecture until its value is diminished. A critical component in implementing this approach is the development/implementation of common standards, application, interfaces, and data registries. If confirmed, I intend to continue to*

*emphasize the development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting capabilities.*

### **Joint Forces Command Limited Acquisition Authority**

**Congress has provided Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces.**

**What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?**

*Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA), granted to the Secretary of Defense, has proven to be an exceptionally useful and flexible tool for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in support of other Combatant Commands, however, no funds were allocated to JFCOM to support LAA. The benefits of authorities to rapidly acquire solutions for the joint warfighter are obvious. But without proper resourcing we will continue to lag the problem.*

*Based on warfighting shortfalls validated by Combatant Commanders, LAA has allowed JFCOM to field mature technologies or improved capability to the warfighters in the regional Combatant Commands more rapidly than the normal DOD acquisition process.*

*Since 2004, USJFCOM's implementation of Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) in support of the Combatant Commands has been used to fund and accelerate seven critical capabilities to the warfighter, in some cases years earlier than the standard acquisition process would have provided them.*

**Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office in its April 2007 report which were somewhat critical of JFCOM's past and continued use of limited acquisition authority?**

*I think that what JFCOM has been asked to do with Limited Acquisition Authority is a challenging assignment particularly in light of the resource constraints that JFCOM must follow.*

*That being stated, I do not agree with all the findings of the GAO report, but concur with the Department's response to the GAO. My interpretation of the GAO report is that GAO believes there is duplication of effort between JRAC and LAA. While there may be cases where the two processes may overlap, the intent is different and should an overlap exist, coordination between JFCOM and JS/JRAC eliminates any duplicative effort.*

*I will, if confirmed, fully participate in a review of the LAA statute and JRAC processes to determine the role LAA should play in support to operational needs of the joint warfighter and inform Congress of the results of that review.*

**What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the execution of the authority?**

*If confirmed I would commit to studying this more thoroughly, but would offer that the statute could be modified to include use of O&M funding to sustain capabilities provided under the statute until either the recipient can POM for sustainment funding or the capability transitions to a DoD Program of Record. Another possibility could be to provide an acquisition contingency program element made up of RDT&E, O&M and OP dollars to USD (AT&L) to fund JRAC and LAA approved projects.*

**Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size is necessary?**

*I am not in a position to speak for USD (AT&L) on makeup and organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DoD. JFCOM, however, has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time since all acquisition transactions under LAA are executed through Service/Agency Acquisition staffs using Service Acquisition authorities. If the LAA statute was made permanent, and JFCOM was empowered by USD (AT&L) to execute all aspects of acquisition authority, I would then revisit the need, size and organization of an acquisition staff to execute LAA responsibilities.*

**Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?**

*It is my understanding that JFCOM has submitted a FY2008 Legislative proposal to that effect, which is currently under consideration by the Congressional Defense Committees. In light of the GAO report, I think a thorough evaluation of the authority should be reviewed and only after that review should LAA be made permanent. In the meantime, I don't think Congress should let the current Limited Acquisition Authority statute expire. I assure you that I will most certainly advocate the best and most expedient way to get joint capabilities in the hands of the warfighter.*

**What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does U.S. Joint Forces Command require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?**

*None at this time.*

**Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?**

*SOCOM already has acquisition authority to meet specific needs of their special*

*operations mission. It is my belief that LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique interoperability and C2 missions assigned to the command under the UCP and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the DEPSECDEF. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2 problems faced by all the COCOMs.*

**Will you recommend that the Department directly fund JFCOM to support the authority - which has not occurred to date?**

*I would like to reserve judgment on whether to directly fund JFCOM to support the authority pending my own internal review of JFCOM's Limited Acquisition Authority. Although an acquisition contingency fund (Program element) made up of RDT&E, O&M and OP subheads available to USD (AT&L) to fund LAA approved projects might be an attractive interim course of action.*

**What role should oversight officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology play in the utilization of JFCOM's acquisition authority?**

*While approval of LAA projects should remain the decision of Commander, USJFCOM, USD (AT&L) should have a responsibility to arrange funding for the LAA projects and continue to perform an oversight role in ensuring JFCOM doesn't violate acquisition regulations in the execution of the LAA mission.*

### **Defense Science and Technology Programs**

**The Department's Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters -- now and in the future -- have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.**

**Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities the Department will need in the future?**

*It is my understanding that JFCOM has developed an excellent working relationship with DARPA over time; if confirmed, I intend to examine these issues more closely.*

**Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?**

*This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more closely should I be confirmed.*

**What is the role of JFCOM's modeling and simulation program in development on new warfighting capabilities for DOD?**

*While USJFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) has focused on developing new warfighting capabilities, more importantly it has facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the national and global security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It replicates the complexity and terrain of the security environment without placing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines in harms way. In addition, USJFCOM M&S enables complete integration of the other key players in national security, such as multinational and interagency partners, with little attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network, and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging participation.*

*The two major elements of JFCOM's M&S enterprise are experimentation and training. M&S enables both in ways not even considered possible less than ten years ago.*

*For experimentation, the case of Urban Resolve is instructive. The experiment modeled many of the situations we are facing in the urban environment today, and modeled situations we fear may materialize in the not too distant future. In this simulation-supported experiment, JFCOM was able to take dozens of looks at proposed solutions, and when something failed, reset and look again and again. Analysis took only weeks, and successfully capabilities transitioned to fielding programs within a few months.*

*For training, JFCOM manages the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) that integrates live forces (the principal training audience) with a virtual input from individual/team trainees operating simulators with constructive inputs from computerized models. Live-Virtual-Constructive inputs are all combined into a single operating picture that all the participants share.*

*Finally, Modeling and Simulation not only enables development of new warfighting capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting capability in itself. Some of the M&S transformational capabilities that have already been fielded are operational applications of models developed for other reasons that are now being applied in planning, mission rehearsal, mission execution, and assessment in direct support of operators.*

## **Technology Transition**

**The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.**

**What are your views on the success of JFCOM programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?**

*Service and defense agency efforts to provide new and emerging technologies to the*

*warfighters have continued to improve during execution of the Global War on Terror. JFCOM has played a role in that effort with LAA. While the efforts to date are praiseworthy, challenges remain in the execution of all rapid acquisition efforts and transition of the provided capabilities to the units who will render life cycle support to those capabilities. In all the efforts to get new technology into the hands of the warfighter, those providing the capability must not forget, in their earnestness, that training, logistics and life cycle support planning/execution are the true determination of how well any new technology will improve, over the long haul, the warfighter's ability to effectively employ and sustain the capabilities these new technologies bring to our forces.*

**Do you believe there are improvements that could be made to transition critical technologies more quickly to warfighters?**

*This is another one of those questions in which I must immerse myself if I am confirmed, because being outside Joint Forces Command until now hasn't given me the familiarity I need to answer. Both the JRAC and JFCOM LAA ensure that provided capabilities have a plan to sustain the provided capabilities brought by new technology to the battle space.*

### **Joint Command and Control (JC2) Capability Portfolio Manager**

**DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight role of JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager.**

**As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding levels?**

*As I understand it, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked JFCOM to manage a group of like capabilities—in this case, Joint Command and Control—across the enterprise to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. He also asked that JFCOM integrate requirements/capabilities, acquisition and programmatic - across materiel and non-materiel (DOTMLPF) considerations. As such, it fits exactly within the overall JFCOM mission space. However, there maybe a need to selectively expand this capability in the future.*

**What do you see as the major challenges towards the development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control, and communications systems?**

*Portfolio management is a truly transformational effort by the Department to apply common business rules to our warfighting enterprise. In essence, we say we fight in a joint, combined, and interagency environment that requires interoperable, scalable, net-enabled command and control and associated systems, but we design and procure these systems at the Service level, often independently from similar efforts in the other Services. That is the niche JFCOM fills. The command provides the Joint, multinational, and interagency context and*



*understanding that is by definition missing from the Services and it uses that knowledge to fill the critical joint gaps that exist in the individual Service C2 and associated DOTMLPF efforts.*

### **End Strength of Active Duty Forces**

**What level of Active Duty personnel (by Service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?**

*This is not strictly a numbers game—the key is to find the right amount of capability and have an instituted process for effectively and efficiently employing it. Increasing the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps can add capability, but it is just one tool we can use to meet the demands of missions now and in the future.*

**How would you assess the progress made to date by the Services in reducing the numbers of military personnel performing support functions through hiring of contractors or substitution of civilian employees?**

*The Services have made significant inroads into shifting duties from military personnel to contractors in the areas of combat operations and moving support work to government civilians in non-hostile areas around the globe. There are over 100,000 contractor personnel working in Iraq right now which have enabled the military to stay focused on the mission. Outside the conflict area, the government civilian community provides a wealth of manpower to fill support positions. The conversion of military to civilian billets is making good progress, however it is imperative that we not lose sight of the funds required to sustain this effort. We must also fund the continued development our civilian workforce. There is a challenge with government civilians working in a combat zone and their pay incentives. These individuals do not receive the tax and pay benefits currently afforded uniformed military personnel. Given that we ask government civilians to volunteer for work in a combat zone, I would encourage Congress to examine government civilian compensation in a combat zone and enact legislation in support of deployed government civilians.*

### **Reliance on Reserve Component**

**The men and women of the Reserve Component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism and have been greatly relied upon in Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions that should be assigned to the Reserve forces is a matter of ongoing study.**

**What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?**

*Our Reserve forces have demonstrated that with proper training and equipping they are capable of performing along side their active counterparts in support of virtually any mission. I*

*would not categorically constrain any mission to either the active or the reserve components. I believe the National Guard should remain a dual-missioned force available for both State and Federal Support missions.*

**What should the focus of U. S. Joint Forces Command be in ensuring that Reserve forces are trained and ready to participate effectively in joint operations?**

*My experience is our Reserve forces operate equally with our Active Duty forces as an integral part of Joint operations. The focus for Reserve forces should be to prepare them to seamlessly participate effectively in joint operations alongside their Active duty counterparts, and coalition partners regardless of the mission. Joint Forces Command, along with the Services, should provide training for Reserve Forces in the same manner that they train Active Duty forces.*

**The Department's Training Transformation Implementation Plan of June 10, 2003, provides that the Department's training program will benefit both the Active Duty and Reserve Components.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Reserve and the National Guard benefit from the Joint National Training Capability, a key component of the Training Transformation Implementation Plan?**

*I will stay actively engaged with the leaders of the reserve components and JFCOM's Component Commander to ensure all Joint forces have an opportunity to benefit from the JNTC, appropriate to their mission. Together, we will continue to develop collaborative understanding of the joint enhancements required at key Reserve and National Guard training programs.*

### **Stability and Support Operations**

**Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.**

**What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?**

*The Department has made great progress in the area of Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) and has put emphasis on military planning for post-conflict scenarios. The Department's efforts have helped to codify the best practices and procedures that the recent experiences have taught us. The Department has given a priority to Military Support to post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations comparable to that we have historically placed on preparations for major combat*

operations.

*However, post-conflict operations require a whole of government effort. Typically during a crisis, those in military and civil service have come together with the best intentions and eventually respond in a unified manner. The lack of planning can make the initial efforts awkward, uncoordinated, and inefficient. The Department is an active participant in the Executive Branch's efforts to improve the integration of U.S. Government efforts.*

**How can the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations be better implemented?**

*One of the most important ways to better implement the directives is to institutionalize and expand the Department's efforts towards integrated whole of government planning. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will keep the emphasis on matters for which I am personally accountable such as:*

- *Capturing the Joint lessons learned and improving our ability to share them with our interagency partners*
- *Developing Joint concepts in collaboration with interagency partners*
- *Expanding Joint exercises to include interagency partners in the event development and execution*
- *Expanding Joint Training efforts to include interagency partners access and participation in exercises, courseware development and online distributed training*
- *Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command and Control solutions.*

**What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

*Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and training for post-conflict operations is related to the importance of integrating our Interagency and Multinational partners. The integration issues emphasize the need to invest in:*

- *Defining the lead and supporting roles and responsibilities in the planning process*
- *Developing collaborative decision-making processes*
- *Developing compatible information systems to include interface controls, data sharing and disclosure processes*
- *Expanding Joint exercises to include interagency and multinational partners in the exercise scenario and objective development and execution.*

**Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)**

**In September 2004, the JFCOM Chief of Staff (MG James Soligan) issued a memorandum entitled, "Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission Guidance," stating, in**

part, that "the use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA," and that "JPRA personnel will not conduct any activities or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation techniques or activities without specific approval from the JFCOM Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff." The memorandum further noted that, "Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for action."

**If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, would it be your intent that JPRA continue to operate within these policy guidelines?**

*Yes, I will ensure that JPRA continues to operate in these guidelines.*

### **NATO Transformation**

In their Summit Declaration issued at Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Heads of State emphasized "the importance of continuing transformation of NATO's capabilities and relationships." They also endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which provides a framework and political direction for NATO's transformation over the next 10 to 15 years.

**What do you believe is the role of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in bringing about the transformational change to NATO forces?**

*Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is the Commander responsible to the Military Committee for overall recommendations on transformation. In this capacity, he leads the transformation of NATO military structures, and capabilities and doctrines in order to improve the military effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance. Of the two Strategic Commanders, SACT leads the Defense Planning process and in coordination with SACEUR, delivers a comprehensive and capabilities based Defense Requirements Review that identifies the Minimum Military Requirements in order to fulfill the Level of Ambition that NATO's political leaders have set.*

*With respect to the transformational change to NATO forces, SACT's role is to:*

- Transform NATO's military capabilities through a rigorous process highlighted by concept development, experimentation and a comprehensive training program.*
- Work with SACEUR to continue to describe how NATO should conduct operations in the future and identify the associated required military capabilities.*
- Respond to emerging operational requirements stemming from current operations thereby assisting SACEUR.*
- Assist nations through the review of their individual national defense plans and reform efforts.*

**If confirmed, what would be your priorities for meeting alliance capability requirements?**

*The Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, and helps ACT focus its work in support of improving NATO's ability to conduct operations and missions, and developing usable capabilities. If confirmed, my priorities for meeting Alliance capability requirements would focus on aiding the efforts to develop agile, expeditionary, interoperable and sustainable forces that can deploy quickly and operate in an unpredictable, asymmetric environment; support the improvement of deployability and sustainability of NATO forces, and information superiority. Furthermore, I will focus on specific capabilities in the field of training and education, which are also essential as ACT moves forward with NATO's transformation endeavor.*

**What do you foresee as the major challenges to NATO transformation?**

*In current and future NATO missions, NATO HQ and tactical operations are increasingly joint and will be a common denominator which will require need for interoperability and common standards at the lowest tactical levels. Increasingly, these NATO operations are alongside, and often include non-NATO nations and non-military actors. One of the main challenges will be to ensure that NATO possesses clear standards to ensure equipment interoperability and the right processes, capabilities and the validation and qualification tools to deliver the requisite training and education to ensure interoperability of tactics, techniques and procedures.*

*Other major challenges that I foresee to NATO transformation are:*

- The delivery of timely transformational products to Allied Command Operations and the nations that improve and transform the military forces.*
- Advancing a clear and common understanding throughout the Alliance of military transformation and ACT's role in the process, and provide the appropriate resources to meet the associated requirements.*
- Capturing the right lessons learned from NATO operations today, and implementing appropriate corrective actions so that we can provide increasingly effective capabilities for tomorrow's operations.*

**It has been reported that NATO is reassessing the size and scope of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a central element of NATO's transformation efforts.**

**What is your assessment of the current capabilities of the NRF?**

*The NATO Response Force (NRF) is based on a sound concept to deliver capable expeditionary forces and to assist in transforming our military capabilities to meet the security*

*needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The NRF achieved Full Operational Capability in November 2006. However, it has been reported lately that Nations are, at this stage, not in a position to meet the full demands of the Force and hence cannot provide all required capabilities. The primary reason seems to be the current high operational tempo, including operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans that directly competes for forces and capabilities that might otherwise be available for the NRF. This situation however impairs the ability of the NRF to conduct the full range of its missions. The NATO Response Force as a vehicle for NATO transformation remains a solid premise and one that I shall support.*

**What role do you believe the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation can play in improving the capabilities of the NRF?**

*The NATO Response Force has been identified as a primary vehicle for transformation; besides being a credible force for expeditionary operations across the full spectrum of military operations. As such, it becomes the primary platform for improving and broadly incorporating enhanced capabilities such as Counter IED, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Fratricide Prevention equipment and procedures into Alliance forces so they are available to the warfighter. The rotation of NRF forces facilitates modernization and transformation of military forces across the alliance, and then NRF exercises incorporate, refine, and ensure joint and multinational interoperability to include doctrinal and structural changes.*

*Therefore, I believe that the vital role SACT plays, in cooperation and coordination with SACEUR, in improving the capabilities for the NRF follows:*

- Ensuring that the NRF remains a key driver for enhancing interoperability within the Alliance, particularly through joint and combined education and training.*
- Promoting the NRF as the fundamental vehicle for the incremental implementation and dissemination of new concepts and capabilities and the one that possess the ability to rapidly incorporate capability enhancements and implement them into national forces that are committed to expeditionary joint and combined operations.*

**Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is supported in its transformational efforts by a number of multinational centers of excellence (COEs). Currently there are seven NATO-accredited COEs.**

**What do you believe is the proper role for COEs in supporting ACT's transformation mission?**

*While not part of NATO's command/manning structure, ACT can leverage some of the COE's expertise and products in support of the transformation mission. By looking to ACT for recommendations on annual work plans, the COEs can be assured of a focus of effort complimentary to ACT and of benefit to the Alliance transformation efforts. Specifically, there should be a good synergy of effort with the Netherlands Command and Control, U.S. Combined*

*Joint Operations from the Sea, German-Netherlands Civil Military Cooperation, and Czech Joint CBRNE Centers of Excellence.*

### **USJFCOM-Allied Command Transformation Relationship**

#### **What do you believe is the proper relationship between U.S. Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation?**

*There is a great opportunity for synergy, collaboration and support between the two Commands— and it is very much a two-way street that benefits both NATO and the US. The work being accomplished in the areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training directly complement similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The expansion of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan has increased the frequency of cooperation between the two commands. Lesson learned in Afghanistan by NATO can be applicable for U.S forces in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and as we stand up USAFRICOM. The Global War on Terror and our enemy mandates that we continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship between the two Commands. As NATO's North American Strategic Command I believe the vision to place it in Norfolk alongside US Joint Forces Command was exactly correct. The co-location of NATO's Transformation Command with USJFCOM has already proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of all NATO countries, including the United States. I will push hard to ensure we are working to maximize this relationship especially in key areas of training, doctrine development, C2, intelligence fusion and dissemination, new capabilities and experimentation, and lessons learned and best practices. We will improve this effort as this relationship matures in the crucible of support to the warfighter.*

### **Responses to WMD Threats and Natural Disasters in the United States**

**Deficiencies in the responses of federal, state, and local agencies to Hurricane Katrina have generated debate about the appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.**

#### **What do you see as the appropriate role for Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command; Commander, U. S. Northern Command; and the Governors and Adjutant Generals of each state and territory in responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents within the United States?**

*As CDRUSJFCOM has no AOR, JFCOM's role is that of Joint Force Provider to CDRUSNORTHCOM, or any other designated Supported Commander, following a WMD incident. JFCOM is tasked to provide forces requested by the Supported Commander and validated by the Joint Staff (SECDEF) in a timely manner. CDRUSJFCOM does not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have purview over their own State National Guard forces, however if those forces are federalized by the President, they could be provided to the*

*Supported Commander by CDRUSJFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case of a WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under Title 10, but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response be limited to Title 32 forces, USJFCOM would have a limited role in the response.*

**What is the appropriate role and response for Active-Duty military forces in supporting civil authorities in responding to natural and manmade disasters not involving WMD threats within the United States?**

*Active Duty military forces are always ready and willing to give their help in recovering from disasters at home and have demonstrated that repeatedly in the past. Most recent examples are the Hurricane Katrina aftermath and the bridge collapse in Minnesota. DoD has always demonstrated an appropriately aggressive posture toward assistance, in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) following a disaster, often deploying forces within hours of stated need.*

**Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster operations.**

**In your view, how could U. S. Joint Forces Command influence joint and interagency training to enable better coordination and response for natural disasters operations?**

*There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations: experimentation and training. The first discovers best practices, the second trains the entire interagency and non-governmental partners in those best practices.*

*The Noble Resolve series of experiments that JFCOM initiated this year brought together federal, state, and local governments, commercial organizations, Department of Homeland Security and its subordinate agencies, all the Services, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, and subordinate operating forces, the National Guard Bureau, and the National Guards of Virginia, Oregon, Washington state, and Texas. These partnerships, and the progress they made in Noble Resolve on best practices and organizational structures for both natural and man-made disaster response, were very impressive and bode well for the future. This series needs to continue.*

*Multinational Experiment 5 does the same for international partners, and is informing EUCOM and AFRICOM on ways to integrate a whole of government and multinational approach to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and preventing conflict in Africa.*

*Joint exercises spread the best practices identified in lessons learned and experimentation, and practically integrate Joint Forces and Interagency partners. Of the 13 priority exercises conducted in FY07, three focused primarily on Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA / DR) and Consequence Management or Foreign Consequence*



*Management.*

### **Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Units**

**What role do you believe U. S. Joint Forces Command should play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units with WMD response missions, such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force?**

*USJFCOM will assume expanded responsibilities in training and assessment for the National Guard centric CCMRF construct scheduled to IOC in FY09. USJFCOM is tasked to ensure that Service training plans are in accordance with USNORTHCOM JMETs for CCMRF units, which is a relatively new mission for JFCOM. USJFCOM will also assess readiness against those JMETs and report that assessment to the SECDEF monthly and the SROC quarterly. JFCOM will not employ those units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a Supported Commander following SECDEF validation of a requirement.*

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

*Yes*