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THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MARCH 25, 2015

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Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for missile defense, a critical national security priority. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland, our partners and Allies, and deployed forces from a growing ballistic missile threat.

Let me offer my assessment of how the programs and fiscal year 2016 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) ensure we are sustaining and modernizing our homeland missile defense capability so that we remain ahead of the threat while providing effective, integrated, and interoperable regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The President's budget requests \$9.6 billion in FY 2016, of which \$8.1 billion is for the MDA to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses. Sequestration levels would, of course, be significantly lower and as Secretary Carter has said, would make the nation less secure. Even without sequestration, however, in these austere times, there is still not enough money to fund every program we might wish to have, and we are required to prioritize investments accordingly.

I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threats and other trends, and then focus on several key policy priorities: defending the United States against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, strengthening defense against regional missile threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and examining how to advance the missile defense technology base in a cost-effective manner.

Ballistic Missile Threats

Ballistic missiles continue to become more survivable, reliable, and accurate at greater ranges, and regional powers are basing more missiles on mobile platforms. Technical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses are also increasing. Several countries are designing missiles to launch from multiple transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing their mobility and capacity for salvo fires, which increases their effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch time preparations are making newer systems more survivable.

Iran

Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz. While Iran has not yet deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its progress on space launch vehicles – along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies – provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Iran publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year capable of intercontinental ranges, if configured as such.

North Korea

North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to East Asia. North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests. It is also seeking to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States, and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM to operational capacity. While the reliability of an untested North Korean ICBM is likely to be very low, North Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus successfully demonstrating technologies applicable to a long-range missile.

North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about ballistic missile technology proliferation.

Syria

While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles, and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against its own people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, all of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.

Other Trends

In the regional ballistic missile context, one trend that particularly concerns the United States is China's development of advanced ballistic missiles. China is augmenting the over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles with a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium- and intermediate range ballistic missiles that will improve China's ability to strike regional targets at greater ranges. China also continues to deploy growing numbers of anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Russia's recent behavior currently poses one of our most pressing and evolving strategic challenges – challenges felt across the strategic forces mission space. We are confronted with Russia's occupation of Crimea, continuing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia's increasingly aggressive nuclear posturing and threats, including the prospect of nuclear weapons in Crimea, and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Homeland Defense

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we are continuing to strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies to better enable us to address emerging threats in the next decade. This requires continued improvement to the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and the deployment of new sensors.

We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that are currently deployed, will provide protection against both North Korean and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve. We have also deployed a second forward-based missile defense radar to Japan, which is operating today thanks to the hard work of the MDA and the Japanese government, to meet our goal of having the radar deployed by the end of 2014. This radar strengthens both homeland and regional defense.

This year's budget request also reflects Department of Defense's (DoD's) commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us towards a more reliable and effective defense of the United States. It includes funding for development of a new radar that, when deployed in

Alaska, will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against North Korea. It also continues funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-Based Interceptor. Although we have fixed the causes of past failures in the GBI related to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the redesigned kill vehicle will have greater performance and discrimination capability.

As directed by Congress, the MDA is also conducting environmental impact studies (EIS) at four sites in the eastern United States that could host an additional GBI missile field. These EISs will be completed in 2016. The cost of building an additional missile defense site in the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from Iran has not yet emerged, and the need to fix the current GBI kill vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland are improving the reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture. The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. No decision has been made to deploy an additional missile field in the United States. If an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being taken now, to include conducting an environmental impact statement, will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a new missile defense site.

Regional Defense

The Department's FY 2016 budget request also continues to implement deployment of missile defenses that are tailored to the security circumstances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific. Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us to address crises as they emerge. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defense capabilities, and to strengthen operational missile defense cooperation. This year, we initiated a Joint Staff-led effort to update the 2012 Joint Capabilities Mix study to ensure that we are making the most effective regional missile defense investments possible. In a regional context, we know that we will not be able to purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense for the duration of a conflict. In such a situation, we must protect our most valuable assets while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide a comprehensive military approach to defeating the threat from ballistic missiles.

Europe

We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors – on land and at sea – to protect NATO European territory, our military forces, and facilities. Since 2011, the United States has operated a forward-based radar in Turkey and maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe. The Aegis Ashore site in Romania is on schedule to be completed by the end of 2015. Two additional U.S. Aegis BMD destroyers, the USS CARNEY and USS PORTER, will be joining USS DONALD COOK and USS ROSS later this year as they forward deploy to the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These multi-mission ships will support the missile defense mission, as well as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions.

The President's budget request also supports the Aegis Ashore site that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be deployed on land and at sea later this decade. As these capabilities become operationally available, they will extend BMD coverage to all NATO European territory.

Our NATO Allies are also making significant contributions to the European missile defense mission. Romania, Spain, and Turkey are hosting U.S. missile defense assets and provide the external security for the facilities. Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in Europe, Poland has also announced its intention to spend up to \$10 billion to acquire advanced air and missile defense capabilities. DoD is engaging directly with Poland to assist it obtaining a lower-tier missile defense system to meet its missile defense requirements. The U.S. Patriot system is a finalist in this competition. Several other Allies are in the process of considering the purchase of air and missile defense capabilities. The United States will continue to encourage its NATO Allies to do more to cooperate and invest in missile defenses that will contribute to Alliance security.

Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be equipped with BMD sensor or interceptor capability upgrades. The Netherlands and Denmark have committed to upgrading the SMART-L radars on their frigates to contribute to NATO BMD.

The Netherlands and Germany have committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to NATO missile defense as demonstrated through the ongoing NATO deployment in defense of Turkey. Spain recently replaced the Netherlands in the defense of the Turkey mission through deployment of a Patriot system, and is strengthening its air and missile defense capabilities by acquiring additional Patriot systems from Germany.

France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and has offered the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which became operational in 2013, to NATO BMD.

The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance missile defense capabilities and integration. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is engaged with NATO in the development of a biennial NATO-led BMD exercise event that serves to reinforce and expand upon other, routine BMD training evolutions that take place on a quarterly and semi-annual basis.

Many NATO Allies also participate in NIMBLE TITAN, an unclassified, two-year, multinational, BMD campaign of experimentation. The overarching purpose of NIMBLE TITAN is to serve as a venue for collaboration, exchange of views, and coordination of BMD policy and operational development among participating nations and organizations, along with U.S. government agencies and military organizations. The NIMBLE TITAN 16 campaign, which began last year, has 25 participating nations and organizations, including NATO.

Asia-Pacific

In the Asia-Pacific region, our force posture includes Aegis BMD capable ships, along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South Korea. We have also maintained the THAAD battery deployment to Guam in response to North Korean provocation.

The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan, and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.

South Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked closely with South Korea to ensure that our Alliance

maintains the capacity to do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In addition, South Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2 batteries. DoD has been consulting with South Korea about how it can upgrade its missile defense capabilities as part of an Alliance response to the growing North Korean missile threat.

Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries, early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems. Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD capability with certification scheduled for FY 2018 and FY 2019, and plans to build two additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase its inventory to a total of eight BMD-capable ships. As mentioned earlier, Japan also hosts two U.S. missile defense radars.

Additionally, Japan is a critical international partner for BMD development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA.

The United States and Australia have forged a longstanding partnership on missile defense research and development – most notably with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the United States, Australia, and Japan.

We will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of sensor data among Allies to take full advantage of the benefits of system interoperability and integration.

Middle East

We also maintain a robust missile defense presence in the Middle East including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of our forward deployed forces, allies, and partners. This is in addition to our efforts to build the capacity of those allies and partners that will ultimately contribute to their ability to defend themselves.

The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense figured prominently in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise we conducted with Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise in history. A similar exercise, JUNIPER COBRA, is scheduled to take place in May of this year.

The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales program. The United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, with the first delivery expected later this year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot systems, which have been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries. Qatar also joined the international community of U.S. Patriot partners late last year – a community which also includes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in addition to the UAE.

U.S. Air Force Central Command maintains a series of regular exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for future BMD planning and operational cooperation.

As the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, the United States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of those capabilities across the region. The desired end state is a regional missile defense architecture in which GCC member states participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a networked, layered defense of key strategic centers that strengthens deterrence and increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic missile attack.

Technology Development

We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that our investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning us to respond to threat developments in the next decade. Areas for priority technology investment include persistent discrimination in the current and future Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor architecture; high power lasers for multiple BMD applications; common kill vehicle technology leading to a multi-object kill vehicle; advanced technology for high risk/high pay-off breakthroughs; and a rail gun to lower the cost per kill.

Conclusion

The austere budget environment will continue to compel us to make difficult choices here. Sequestration would undermine our ability to improve the GBI fleet, emplace new and more advanced sensors, and defend our deployed forces and Allies against ballistic missile attack. Quite simply, it would hinder our ability to keep up with the growing threat. We cannot let our guard down at any time, much less in the current security environment. I urge you to repeal sequestration before it causes irreparable damage to the nation's missile defenses.

Thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to your questions.