

Advance Policy Questions for Patrick Shanahan
Nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense

Duties and Qualifications

Section 132 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary to prescribe for you?

Secretary Mattis's top three priorities are to increase the lethality of our Force, strengthen alliances and build partnerships globally, and undertake business reforms in the Department. If confirmed, I will be responsible for managing the Department in support of each of the Secretary's priorities, particularly accelerating acquisition and business reforms.

What experience and qualifications do you have to manage a large, complex organization?

I have over 30 years of leadership experience at a global company in a highly-regulated industry. Boeing is one of the nation's biggest manufacturing exporters, and as Senior Vice President, I oversaw the design, production, and delivery of more than 4,300 commercial aircraft to customers around the world and, from 2011 to 2015, increased revenue from \$23 billion to \$60 billion. I was responsible for approximately 60,000 employees at three separate sites in the United States and managed 36,000 employees globally. My work involved a global supply chain and complex technical systems where the standards for reliability and safety were critical. In my experience managing business operations, I have faced similar challenges to those confronting the Department of Defense – it is a matter of scale.

Can you outline how you have managed organizations and issues similar in complexity to those you will be responsible for managing if confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense?

In my three decades of experience, I have developed and practiced a formula to create change at scale in large, complex organizations. I believe leadership is essential to changing the status quo – setting a compelling vision, establishing ambitious goals and realistic intermediate objectives, and converting strategy into action. There must be active change management processes to implement reforms. These processes include diagnosing problems, setting priorities and resourcing them, using cross-functional teams to re-engineer processes, and replicating success across the organization. Finally, management must engage employees, the leadership team, and external stakeholders (such as the Congress) to make everyone part of the solution and vested in the outcome.

I have demonstrated the application of this formula on complex issues throughout my career, improving performance and producing results when events seemed most dire.

This includes the 787 Dreamliner commercial aircraft, Army aviation programs (AH-64D/Apache and the CH-47/Chinook helicopters), the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Yes – if confirmed, I will develop a strong network of partners to implement change; this will include the Congress.

What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?

I have no recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will keep the Committee advised if my views change.

Department of Defense Reforms

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 significantly impacted the organizational structure of several key elements of the Department of Defense. For example, it provided the authority to set up cross-functional teams and a delivery unit, and it significantly expanded the mission and authority of the Defense Health Agency by giving it management and administrative responsibility for military hospitals and clinics currently run by the Services. As a result of management concerns, cost overruns, program delays, failed audits, and growing bureaucracy, this Committee also has instituted some of the most sweeping reforms at the Department of Defense since Goldwater-Nichols. These reforms restructured the Office of the Secretary of Defense, particularly with respect to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; returned more authority to the Services for program management; reduced the number of general and flag officers, senior civilians, and headquarters staff; and initiated greater qualification standards amongst the senior leadership positions. If confirmed, you will be implementing these reforms, and managing the internal operations of the Department.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department conforms with, and implements, these reforms?

The reforms directed by Congress are essential enablers to achieve a higher performing Department at better cost to the taxpayers, and requires a clear implementation roadmap that aligns ends, ways, and means across the Department. If confirmed, I will establish a timetable, clearly define roles and responsibilities, and identify relevant investments and authorities needed to ensure the Department moves out with urgency to implement these reforms.

In February 2017, Secretary Mattis announced his intention to have the first cross-functional team focus on improving mission effectiveness and efficiencies in the

Department. What, in your view, will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense's role in relation to this team's work?

I have seen cross-functional teams used with significant effect in my private sector experience. Leadership in the Department must ensure such teams are dedicated to the priorities of the Department and set clear expectations. The successful use of cross-functional teams has the potential to deliver valuable results on tough problems facing the Department. If confirmed, I anticipate being integrated into this process as senior decision-maker on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

What are your views on the potential focus areas and uses for future cross-functional teams?

I have not had an opportunity to do a first-hand assessment; however, based on my experience, such teams can have universal application across a range of problems facing the Department. Initially, I see value in focusing on areas that improve the business operations of the Department. This includes finding efficiencies in the Department's overhead and freeing resources for the readiness and modernization of the combat force. Once successfully proven, there are other difficult challenges that could be addressed through the use of cross-functional teams – bringing together the best people on the hardest problems is a proven way to help create new solutions.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to these reform-related statutory provisions?

I have no recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will keep the Committee advised.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?

The Department today faces expanding security threats globally. Within this context, the main task confronting the next Deputy Secretary is to ensure our military has the right capability, capacity, and readiness to succeed – at the most effective cost and performance possible.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

The development of a strategy is the first step to addressing these challenges. Achieving the buy-in of all relevant stakeholders – internal and external to the Department – is the next critical step, ensuring that all are aligned towards the same priorities. Establishing clear lines of accountability for the execution of the strategy will also be important. Finally, I will focus on strengthening the culture of the Department to address these shared challenges.

What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to issues that must be addressed by the Department of Defense?

Working in partnership with stakeholders in the Department, in the Congress, and in the Executive Branch, my priority will be to improve performance. This requires strong leadership across the Department, operating as a team to achieve the same objectives. I will also prioritize efforts to capture business reform opportunities and accelerate innovation as the Department modernizes the military. This includes focusing on the audit, Congressionally-directed reorganizations of AT&L and the Chief Management Officer, and related efficiencies, as well as building a leadership team that focuses on the shared objectives of restoring readiness and enhancing the lethality of our military.

Relations with Congress

What are your views on the state of the Department of Defense's relationship with the Senate Armed Services Committee in particular, and with Congress in general?

I perceive the relationship between the Department and the Senate Armed Services Committee as respectful, but marked by more tension than what I consider normal and productive. I believe there is insufficient communication on Congressionally-directed efforts and priorities – to include budgetary issues and reforms. In general, the relationship with the Congress needs to be strengthened, and especially with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to sustain a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between Congress and the Department?

If confirmed, I will invest in the relationship with the Congress. It is only through a strong partnership that we can achieve our shared priorities. I will ensure that the relevant facts and data will be provided to the Congress to inform the critical decisions ahead of us. Central principles in my approach will be transparency and inclusivity.

Torture and Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated August 19, 2014, and required by section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)?

Yes, I support using the standards for detainee treatment specified in the referenced documents. Individuals in the custody or control of the Government may not be

subjected to any interrogation technique that is not authorized by, and listed in, the Army Field Manual, which is the standard.

Continuing Use of Guantanamo as a Detention Center

What are your views on the continued use of the detention facility at Guantanamo?

In general, it is lawful to capture enemy combatants and to detain them for the duration of a war. Regarding the detention facility at Guantanamo, it is my understanding that the facilities are safe, humane, and secure.

Will you notify Congress if a decision is made to transfer a detainee to Guantanamo before the transfer occurs?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department keeps the Congress appropriately informed regarding the transfer or release of any detainee from Guantanamo Bay.

In your view, should the U.S. Government continue the current Periodic Review Board Process and the process of transferring detainees to other countries, subject to the restrictions currently in law?

I understand that the Department has processes for reviewing detention and transferring detainees from Guantanamo. If confirmed, I will assess the Periodic Review Board process and ensure that the Department is acting consistent with the law.

Management Issues

Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 created the position of Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense effective in February 2018. Currently, the Deputy Secretary serves as CMO.

In your view, how should the Department structure this new role so that it is successful?

The CMO should be structured to migrate from its current strategy and planning functions to be more responsible for implementing and executing relevant consolidation of business operations and functions. Doing so would drive better performance in the business operations within the Department. If confirmed, I will seek to build a leadership team that understands and can execute a plan to improve the cost performance of the Department across its core business areas.

Should this position have additional authorities related to managing defense agencies and field activities? If so, which authorities?

The CMO should have the resources and authorities needed to accomplish the mission it is assigned. If confirmed, I will consider whether more significant authorities are required and work in partnership with the Congress to obtain them.

What relationship do you anticipate the role of the Deputy Secretary continuing to have with the new CMO position and with the Department's business operations?

If confirmed, I view myself as accountable for the results of improved cost performance of the Department, in which the CMO will play a central role. The Deputy Secretary will provide a strong guiding role in leadership decisions and governance to ensure the CMO can perform most effectively. This will require a strong partnership with the Service Secretaries and the Congress to succeed in achieving the most efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars possible.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO?

I have no recommendations at this time. If confirmed, I will keep the Committee advised if my views change.

In your view, what role do you believe this CMO should play in coordinating with service CMOs and Deputy CMOs?

The CMO – jointly with the Service CMO and Service leadership – is accountable for the performance of Department-wide business processes. There must be a strong partnership with the Service CMOs and Deputy CMOs to effect broad process change and create efficiencies across the enterprise in core business areas.

Defense Agencies and Field Activities

The defense agencies and field activities are largely overseen by principals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Many have consistently experienced significant growth in personnel and resources and have taken on additional missions.

What is your view on the current oversight of this community? Are additional authorities needed in OSD or elsewhere?

I have a limited perspective on the interactions with and among the defense agencies and field activities. If confirmed, I will work with the CMO to examine agencies to and they are functioning effectively and aligned properly.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that feedback from warfighters or customers is guiding the performance of these agencies?

I understand that several of the agencies, those designated as combat support agencies, are regularly reviewed for mission effectiveness by both the sponsoring OSD staff and the Joint Staff. If confirmed, I will ensure that the recommendations from those reviews are acted upon, and will look for a similar review process for the remaining agencies.

Audit and Financial Management

The Department of Defense is the only federal agency unable to complete a financial audit in accordance with the law, despite having invested billions of dollars over the past 16 years to do so. This has led to concerns within Congress and in the public over the stewardship of Department funds. It is not simply an abstract statutory requirement that the Department produce auditable financial statements showing where and how it spends its annual budget—the accuracy of the financial information underlying the financial statements is critical to the Department’s ability to develop an adequate defense budget and make important financial decisions in an environment where every defense dollar counts.

Do you commit to meeting the upcoming statutory audit deadlines requiring that the Department’s financial statements be ready for audit by September 30, 2017, and that the audit of the Fiscal Year 2018 financial statements be completed by March 31, 2019?

I support the Department’s audit readiness goal. If confirmed, I commit to doing everything possible to audit the Department in FY 2018.

Under your leadership, when will the Department achieve a clean audit opinion?

As the Department has not yet undergone a full financial statement audit, it is difficult to predict what type of audit opinion the Department will receive. What the auditors find, and how quickly the Department can address these findings, will determine how long it will take to achieve a clean audit opinion.

Will you be prepared to meet with members of this Committee every quarter until this happens?

Yes. If I am confirmed, you have my full commitment to this effort and I will clearly communicate the Department’s status on a regular basis.

Describe your knowledge of accounting and financial management principles and your experience leading large-scale change initiatives. Give specific examples of how you have applied this knowledge and experience in previous positions.

As an executive in a publicly-traded GAAP-compliant company, I have managed profit-and-loss for government programs using cost accounting standards as prescribed by Federal Acquisition Regulations and program and financial accounting for commercial

aircraft. I have regularly used this expertise to provide tangible performance improvements across a range of programs, to include: commercial aircraft models of the 737, 747, and 787; AH/64D Apache; MV-22 tiltrotor; SM-3; GBI; and other programs throughout my thirty year career.

What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to achieve a clean financial statement audit to date? What specific changes will you make to its approach?

My understanding is that some entities have been sustaining a clean audit opinion for several years. If confirmed, I will invest considerable attention, in partnership with the Comptroller, to make sure the audit remains a top priority for all of the Department's leaders and not just the financial management community.

What incentives need to be in place to ensure senior leaders in the military services and defense components—not just the financial management community—are fully invested and engaged in the process of achieving a clean audit opinion?

Achieving a clean audit opinion is dependent upon having a range of incentives in place to build and sustain senior leadership support. I am not aware of the incentives currently used or how effective they are. If confirmed, I will review the incentives and make necessary changes to ensure relevant communities remain actively engaged.

How will you hold senior leaders accountable if they do not meet statutory deadlines for the Department's auditability?

If confirmed, I am committed to meeting the statutory deadline for the Department to commence an audit. I will make sure that everyone involved understands their roles and responsibilities. I plan to use the audit results and progress in fixing deficiencies as measures to hold senior leaders accountable and to drive reform.

What actions will you take to link financial information to performance measurement and monitoring mechanisms to enable improved decision making about the Department's investments?

I believe that the audit—and the financial clarity it brings—will help accelerate business reforms. The annual audits will highlight and validate areas for improvement. As the Department improves its financial information, decision makers will have access to more reliable and timely data and be able to benchmark a baseline. My experience in the private sector is that audits operate in the background and serve to enforce compliance and enable the organization to obtain high-quality financial understanding. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of using reliable financial information to manage and guide the enterprise.

Will you commit to a review of the Department of Defense's financial operations structure, to include an independent assessment of the continued need for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and how other federal agencies, which

maintain clean audit opinions, successfully use modern financial systems of the Department of Treasury for non-military-unique financial transactions, accounting, and reporting?

I am committed to leveraging best practices from across the Federal government and the private sector. If confirmed, I am open to evaluating the Department's efforts to simplify its financial operations. Any such review should include an evaluation of the Department's systems environment—benchmarking the Department's systems against those used in comparable private sector enterprises.

Business Transformation

Since 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated the Department of Defense's approach to business transformation as "high risk" due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that the Department's senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight, including the creation of a Chief Management Officer (CMO), and developing a strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, in GAO's view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic planning.

Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities for key positions (such as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, CMO, Chief Information Officer, and/or leaders in financial management and acquisition), as well as relationships between these posts and their associated governance structures?

Based on my experience, I believe clarity in authorities and responsibilities is a key to achieving the mission. All leaders must understand how they must contribute to achieve the Department's objectives. If confirmed, I will assess the roles and responsibilities among key Department positions and help where necessary.

If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this objective? Which roles are most critical to address?

Generally, assessment of performance depends on having defined, measurable goals and associated metrics to measure performance. Moreover, the Department's leadership – especially the Deputy Secretary of Defense – must be prepared to hold leaders accountable for performance. If confirmed, I would use this approach to identify areas that require improvement and reform.

What authorities do you believe that the new CMO will need to successfully execute his/her mission of business transformation within the Department?

If confirmed, I will make a more detailed assessment of the authorities. However, the CMO must be able to improve business processes and reduce redundancy in core business areas in the Department.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to further refine strategic goals, performance measures, and other elements of the Department's strategic management plan?

The Secretary of Defense has established business reform as a major focus area for the Department. He has further indicated that in considering those reforms, the Department should prioritize making the force more lethal, and to eliminate unnecessary layers of management. If confirmed, I will review the performance plans, measures, and targets, making refinements where necessary. I would also conduct regular reviews of progress, and ensure that the strategic management plan is aligned with, and supportive of, the results of the revised Defense Strategy.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?

I think clear goals and metrics are essential to drive progress. I would work with the CMO to ensure that we have metrics and a regular review.

Do you believe that the CMO (or current Deputy CMO) should have control over funds for the components' business transformation programs (including business systems) to ensure that the components follow guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Department's business transformation efforts?

If confirmed, I will consider whether there are areas that would benefit from a different approach for funds management. In general, if an office has responsibility for a mission, it must have corresponding resources and authorities.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 provided the authority for the Department to set up cross-functional teams, and Secretary Mattis has since laid out his intention to have the first of these teams focus on business transformation in the Department.

How do you believe this team, and future cross-functional teams, should fit into the Department's larger business transformation efforts?

Cross-functional teams can be an effective means for identifying and developing a plan for improved staff processes. For areas of significant change, these teams may provide the essential foundation for reform.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to extend the Department's business transformation efforts and oversight into defense agencies and field activities?

If confirmed, I will study the proper alignment and oversight of the defense agencies and field activities, and consider whether more significant authorities should be provided.

Base Realignment and Closure

For the past several years the Department of Defense has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.

Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why?

Yes, I believe periodic evaluations of an organization's infrastructure are a necessary and prudent practice. My understanding is that it has been more than a decade since the Department undertook a comprehensive BRAC analysis. As much has changed since then, another assessment seems appropriate.

It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated.

What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings have occurred?

I was not privy to the BRAC discussions that took place in the run up to the 2005 round, but my understanding is that the 2005 BRAC was used as a tool for defense transformation; cost savings were not the only objective. If confirmed, and if Congress authorizes BRAC as the Department is requesting, I will work with Secretary Mattis and the Service Secretaries to ensure the primary objective is eliminating excess infrastructure to maximize efficiency, reduce costs, and reinvest savings into the joint force.

How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC round?

My understanding is that the Department's BRAC request includes language that responds to Congress's concerns over the costs of the last round, while maintaining the integrity of the process. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress in an open and fair process to weigh options and make informed decisions – ultimately, excess infrastructure means fewer planes, ships, and battalions to keep our Nation safe.

Cyber

How do you perceive the challenges we face in cyberspace?

We face significant and varied challenges in cyberspace. Of primary concern are the threats posed by our key adversaries and strategic competitors, whose activities are increasing in complexity, severity, and frequency, and who seek to use cyber capabilities to undermine U.S. military advantages. To confront these threats, we must be vigilant and employ a whole-of-government approach to ensure that our nation's security interests are protected in the challenging and dynamic cyber domain.

Briefly describe what policy objectives we should seek to achieve and the strategy you think is necessary to address these challenges.

I strongly support Secretary Mattis's position that we must develop a whole-of-government policy that addresses both our response to cyber aggression and the hardening of our information networks and critical infrastructure. In that regard, I agree that the Department should endeavor to build the forces and capabilities necessary to protect our nation's cyber security and that deters our adversaries from conducting cyber-attacks. In short, we must strengthen our offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, enhance our attribution capabilities, and ensure that we are recruiting and training military and civilian personnel needed to serve as our nation's sentinels in this challenging and highly technical domain.

What are your views about elevating U.S. Cyber Command to a unified command and about maintaining or ending the "dual hat" relationship where the Commander of Cyber Command also serves as the Director of the National Security Agency?

I currently support the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a unified combatant command, as provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. I understand that a joint certification by the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required before a change to the current dual-hat relationship can be implemented. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with the Secretary, the Chairman, the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress to ensure that any decision carefully considers all relevant national security implications.

Do you believe we are deterring our adversaries in cyberspace? If not, what do you believe will be necessary to deter our adversaries in cyberspace?

I agree fully with Secretary Mattis's assessment that we must do more to deter our adversaries in cyber space. We must convince our adversaries that they will suffer consequences that outweigh any potential gains from conducting cyberattacks. I understand that the Department is participating in an interagency review to develop options to improve our nation's cyber security. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this review develops an effective, integrated, and whole-of-government approach to deter our adversaries from threatening our interests in this dynamic domain.

What do you believe would constitute an act of war in cyberspace?

My understanding is that the President evaluates such acts on a case-by-case basis. Malicious cyber activity, however, does not require being deemed an “act of war” to warrant a response. I believe that context is important and that threatening cyber activities should not be viewed in isolation. If confirmed, I will review how the Department addresses malicious cyber activities and work with my counterparts in other Departments and Agencies to develop an effective national strategy for responding to challenges in the cyber domain.

Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

On January 28, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum-3 was issued, which states: “It is the policy of the United States that ISIS be defeated” and directs the Administration “to develop a comprehensive plan to defeat ISIS” with the Secretary of Defense as the lead of the interagency effort.

How would you define success in the defeat of ISIS?

I would consider success in defeating ISIS to be when the threat the group poses has been degraded to a point where it is localized and periodic and when it can be addressed as a law enforcement issue by partner nations and forces without extensive assistance from the United States.

What do you view as the role of the U.S. military in the strategy to defeat ISIS?

Ultimate victory over ISIS requires integration of both military and non-military capabilities. The Department should provide capabilities and leadership for a comprehensive military campaign that is fully integrated with other U.S. departments and agencies’ whole-of-government efforts to defeat ISIS – with our coalition partners playing a vital role.

In your opinion, what are the major lessons learned from the fight against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere over the last two-and-a-half years?

It is evident that the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to defeat ISIS. The Department’s efforts must be nested within and supportive of a whole-of-government approach. The Department must work in concert with local partners to make lasting gains against ISIS. Also, even as gains are made against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there must be simultaneous focus on ISIS globally.

What non-military activities by the U.S. Government will be important for achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS?

There are a number of non-military activities by the U.S. Government that are integral to achieving a lasting defeat of ISIS. The most pressing need is a sufficient stabilization effort to consolidate military gains in the Middle East and elsewhere. Although U.S. forces, our allies, and local partners are succeeding in retaking territory from ISIS in Iraq and Syria through military efforts, consolidating these gains requires non-military resources to help stabilize the areas to prevent ISIS's return and to achieve its lasting defeat.

In addition to stabilization efforts, public diplomacy to counter violent extremism, information operations, and cyber strategies must be employed to isolate and delegitimize ISIS and its ideology. We must also continue efforts to cut off or seize ISIS's financial support, including financial transfers, money laundering, oil revenue, and human trafficking.

After Mosul and Raqqa are liberated from ISIS control, the next major military campaign will likely occur in the Euphrates River valley.

What is the strategy needed to accomplish U.S. objectives in Iraq and Syria after Mosul and Raqqa are liberated from ISIS?

I have not received classified briefings on this subject, but I understand that the strategy is to continue to work “by, with, and through” local partners and together with a global coalition of partners to defeat ISIS. As to specific next steps, if confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Department's efforts to accelerate the defeat of ISIS based on realities on the ground after the objectives of liberating Mosul and Raqqa are achieved.

What steps should be taken to prepare for the next phase in the campaign after the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary to ensure that I understand his intent and desired way forward. I also support the view that the Department should seek to preserve the element of strategic surprise by not necessarily disclosing intended actions publicly prior to taking them. If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary, my role will be to ensure that our military forces are prepared with the right capabilities and force structure to address whatever requirements emerge.

Syria

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Syria and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

The complex situation in Syria requires the Department to be prepared for a broad range of potential contingencies and, if confirmed, my role as the Deputy Secretary will be to ensure that our military is sufficiently prepared to win no matter the threat. Our core interest is to prevent Syria from becoming a safe-haven for extremists to launch external

attacks against the United States and its allies and partners. The U.S. also has interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Department works through local partners to achieve these ends, and supports diplomatic efforts to establish a lasting cessation to hostilities and to create conditions for a stable and representative political process.

How does the strategy address the residual threat from Al Qaeda in Syria and their associates?

I have not received classified briefings on operations in Syria. But I understand the Department has mechanisms in place to appropriately address multiple violent extremist threats, including ISIS and al-Qaida and their associates.

How would the defeat of ISIS impact the civil war in Syria?

The rise of ISIS in Syria was due, in part, to the Assad regime's brutal repression of its own people and the governance vacuum created by the Syrian civil war, so the military defeat of ISIS alone will not bring an end to the civil war. Defeating ISIS could help to set the conditions for a political solution to the conflict in Syria. But, it must be coupled with international pressure to bring all parties to the table to reach a negotiated political solution.

Do you believe a political resolution to the civil war in Syria is necessary to address the underlying conditions that enable violent extremists like ISIS and Al Qaeda to take root?

Yes. Only a stable, inclusive government in Syria that can exert control over its territory will be able to secure these areas against violent extremist organizations.

What are the key strategic interests and objectives of the Russians in Syria?

Moscow intends to prop up the Assad regime, re-assert its regional influence, and establish a long-term military presence in Syria. Russia claims that its primary motivation in Syria is to fight violent extremists, but its actions do not necessarily support this objective.

Discussing the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power with reporters in March 2017, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN said: "Are we going to sit there and focus on getting him out? No...."

Has the previously stated goal of removing Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria changed, and if so, what is the new objective and what are the benefits to U.S. national security interests of changing it?

The primary U.S. objective in Syria remains the defeat of ISIS. Additionally, as the U.S. strike in April demonstrates, the United States will not passively stand by while Assad

ignores international law and employs chemical weapons against his own people. I support a political resolution to the civil war in which the Syrian people decide the future of their country.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been adamant that the People's Protection Units (YPG) of the Syrian Kurds should not receive U.S. and coalition support in their efforts to liberate Raqqa.

If the United States chooses not to support the YPG in operations to liberate Raqqa, what alternative forces could be used and how would their use affect the timeline and logistical support of the operation?

I understand that the Syrian Democratic Force, which includes YPG elements, is the force most capable of seizing Raqqa within the current timeline. I also understand that the Department maintains a focus on recruiting and training more members of the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC), the Arab component of the SDF, to help retake and hold historically Arab regions. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues to discuss how to advance the defeat-ISIS campaign with Turkey, a key NATO ally, as well as how best to protect Turkey's interests as we move forward.

Iraq

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Iraq and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

Our national security interests in Iraq are to defeat ISIS and to enable Iraq to provide for its own security, allowing for a stable and sustainable political environment. The United States and the Coalition will continue to work by, with, and through the Government of Iraq to enable the Iraqi Security Forces to deliver a lasting defeat of ISIS in Iraq.

Do you believe that an enduring U.S. military presence is needed in Iraq? If so, what should be the missions and size of the enduring U.S. military presence?

The United States and Iraq are committed to improving the Iraqi Security Forces and dealing ISIS a lasting defeat. Even after the liberation of Mosul, ISIS will still have a presence in certain parts of Iraq, and the Government in Iraq will still require assistance and support from the United States. If confirmed, I will work closely with our military commanders and the Government of Iraq to ensure the size, scope, and timeline of a U.S. military presence is sufficient.

How would you characterize Iran's influence in Iraq today and what is the strategy to limit that influence in the future?

Iran's sectarian approach to Iraq contributes to extremism and instability and reinforces ISIS's appeal among select Sunni Arab populations. Iran is using its long-standing

political, cultural, and religious ties to deepen its involvement in the Iraqi state. The best strategy to limit Iranian influence is to work with the Government of Iraq, which I intend to do if confirmed, to strengthen Iraq's security institutions and promote Iraqi national sovereignty.

Iran

What is your assessment of U.S. national security interests associated with the growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East?

Iran is a significant destabilizing force in the Middle East and its policies and actions pose a substantial challenge to U.S. interests. Iranian regional destabilizing activities in the region threatens the free flow of commerce, aggravates sectarian tensions, and threatens our allies and partners both directly and by proxy.

How would you describe our strategy to counter Iran's malign influence and other activities throughout the Middle East, and more specifically, Iran's proxy networks?

We must continue to employ a whole-of-government strategy to counter Iran's destabilizing activities and proxy networks. This includes providing support to our partners and allies, remaining in a position to respond to Iranian aggression, and ensuring that the Department retains the ability to respond to any contingency threatening stability in the region.

Yemen

What are the U.S. national security interests in Yemen?

U.S. national security interests in Yemen are countering terrorism, including the Islamic State in Yemen and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and denying those violent extremists safe havens from which to attack U.S. and partner regional interests. Other interests also include maintaining freedom of navigation in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea and facilitating a return to the UN-sponsored political negotiation process.

In your opinion, should we be doing more to help the Saudi coalition in its efforts to find a solution to the conflict in Yemen, and if so, what steps would you recommend?

I believe current levels of targeted U.S. military assistance in support of Saudi efforts to defend its borders are appropriate. At the same time, we should urge all parties to return to UN-sponsored peace talks.

Afghanistan

What are the key U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and how would you describe the strategy to secure them?

There are several U.S. interests in support of a stable and secure Afghanistan, but foremost is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe-haven for terrorists and violent extremist organizations to attack the U.S., U.S. interests, or our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense and the interagency process to develop and execute a strategy to promote a stable and secure Afghanistan.

In a hearing on Afghanistan before this Committee in February 2017, General Nicholson said that we are in a stalemate after more than 15 years of fighting.

Do you agree with General Nicholson that we are in a stalemate in Afghanistan, and if so, what strategic changes would you recommend?

I believe the situation in Afghanistan is dynamic and fluid. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in his evaluation and implementation of potential changes regarding our policies and military approach in Afghanistan and the broader region.

Do you agree with General Nicholson that there is a need for additional coalition troops in Afghanistan?

The military advice of the commander on the ground is important, and I believe the Department's civilian leadership should consider and weigh such advice appropriately. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commander, and our leadership in country to thoroughly evaluate any recommended force level adjustments in Afghanistan.

What key Afghan capabilities need to be enhanced to promote long-term strategic stability?

As stated previously, the military advice of the commander on the ground is important. General Nicholson has noted that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces need to enhance close air support capabilities, develop their leaders, and counter internal corruption. If confirmed, I will examine these recommendations and consider what other Afghan capabilities are necessary to promote long-term strategic stability.

What is the role of U.S. and coalition military operations in promoting reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and other insurgent groups?

I understand that the Department of State serves as the lead U.S. agency for coordinating U.S. reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan and the Department of Defense supports the Department of State in this capacity. In that regard, I believe U.S. military operations should promote stability and develop the capability of the Afghan National Defense and

Security Forces to improve security conditions in Afghanistan, and to create the conditions for reconciliation.

What is your view of Russian claims that they are in discussions with the Afghan Taliban to promote reconciliation and also to partner in the fight against ISIS?

I agree with Secretary Mattis that Russia has chosen to be a strategic competitor of the United States. That said, where possible, I believe we should engage with Russia as a means to achieve our national objectives. With respect to Afghanistan, I believe that all regional states, including Russia, should respect and work within the framework of an Afghan-led peace process.

Do you agree that the sanctuary for extremist forces in Pakistan is a key factor affecting the stability and security of Afghanistan? If so, what recommendations would you have to end this sanctuary?

Sanctuary for the Taliban and other militant networks inside Pakistani territory continue to negatively affect security conditions and stability in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and our Commanders to find ways in which we can deny extremist forces sanctuary in Pakistan.

Do you agree that any future reductions in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces from the 352,000 troop level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?

In principle, I believe that recommendations on force structure should be based on security conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I will examine carefully any proposals on force level reductions in the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and make informed recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Pakistan

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

It is important for the United States to maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan that advances mutual interests. But, the United States should also demonstrate its serious concerns about Pakistan expanding its nuclear program and providing safe-haven for militant groups.

What policy changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

The United States should continue the military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, and build the trust necessary for it to be an effective partnership. If confirmed, I will be

prepared to examine what policy changes, if any, I would recommend for the U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan.

U.S. security assistance and other support to Pakistan is designed to foster greater cooperation in areas of mutual security interest.

Do you support this as a construct for future assistance?

It is important for the United States to maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan that advances mutual interests. If confirmed, I would assess whether the current model for U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan is a useful construct for future assistance.

What areas do you consider to be of shared security interest between the United States and Pakistan?

The United States and Pakistan have some common interests, including countering terrorism and maintaining regional stability. In addition, Pakistan has cooperated in operations against al-Qaida and its associates and against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan Province.

What changes, if any, would you recommend in security assistance to Pakistan?

Security assistance to Pakistan should further U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I would assess what changes, if any and consistent with our national security interests, should be considered for security assistance to Pakistan.

China

From your perspective, what effect does China's expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how does that growth influence the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

I believe that China's rapid rise, growing assertiveness, and expanding military capabilities create uncertainty and tension in the region. I agree with Secretary Mattis that we should seek to engage and collaborate with China where possible, but also be prepared to confront inappropriate behavior if China chooses to act contrary to our interests. If confirmed, I will thoroughly examine the full impact of China's growing influence on our U.S. security posture in the region in the context of the overall security dynamic in the Asia-Pacific region.

What can the United States do, both unilaterally and in coordination with allies and partners, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the East and South China Seas? In your view, what should be the Administration's overall strategy on the East and South China Seas?

China's aggressive behavior has caused countries in the Asia-Pacific region to look for stronger U.S. leadership. If confirmed, I will evaluate if the United States can implement any policies unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally to address the challenge China poses in the East and South China Seas. If I am confirmed, I will work with the Department of State to reassure our partners, uphold our alliance commitments, and steadfastly protect the rights and freedoms of the international community to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

Given that China's land reclamation in the South China Sea demonstrates a disregard for international rules and norms, do you support the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea? Do you believe the United States should ratify the convention?

I believe it is essential to U.S. economic and national security interests that we uphold freedom of navigation and overflight as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. I also understand the Law of the Sea Convention, to which China is a signatory party, reflects customary international law. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of State to support policy measures intended to preserve and protect the global mobility of U.S. forces.

China's defense budget seems to be increasing at an alarming rate year after year. However, China's plans and strategies do not seem aimed at military domination outside of its immediate neighborhood. How do you explain this discrepancy? Why is China engaged in such a massive military build-up?

China's military reforms seek to enhance its ability to conduct joint operations and improve its ability to fight short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. China's global interests are growing, and its military will increasingly be called upon to safeguard China's trade, investments, and citizens abroad. The Chinese base construction in Djibouti reflects this growing interest that is beginning to reach beyond China's immediate neighborhood.

North Korea

In your view, what should be the U.S. strategy to mitigate the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea, to our allies in the region, and to the United States?

I agree fully with Secretary Mattis that the United States should cooperate closely with our allies in the region, in particular the Republic of Korea and Japan, to seek a denuclearized North Korea. We should also work with other states with important interests in the region, including Russia and China. In addition, we should strengthen our defensive capabilities and work with our allies to deter and, if necessary, respond to aggression by North Korea. If confirmed, I will, in my role as Deputy Secretary, work to ensure the U.S. military is appropriately prepared to support diplomatic action.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

It is apparent that North Korea is a near-term threat to our national security interests. The North Korean regime has no regard for its international obligations and is intent on developing a ballistic missile system capable of delivering a weapon of mass destruction against our allies and the U.S. homeland. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government approach, work with our allies and partners, and ensure our military is prepared for any potential contingency.

The deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to South Korea is a good first step. What other steps is the Administration prepared to take to ensure the safety and security of South Korea and U.S. forces stationed in the region?

It is my understanding that the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea is a highly visible, concrete action the United States is taking to counter the North Korean ballistic missile threat. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense to evaluate any other defensive options that will improve U.S. force posture and promote the safety and security of U.S. and allied personnel on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.

Russia

Senior U.S. military officials have said Russia is the number one threat to the United States.

What are the challenges to U.S. national security interests from Russia and what are the key principles that must underpin a successful strategy to protect our interests?

Russia has chosen to be a strategic competitor with the United States and our allies. The challenges to our interests stem from its efforts to undermine global norms, fracture the cohesion of NATO, and extend a sphere of influence over the countries on its periphery. Russia's provocative behavior also includes alarming messages regarding the use of nuclear weapons; treaty violations; the use of hybrid warfare tactics to destabilize neighboring countries; and aggressive cyber and information warfare. Buttressing NATO will be fundamental to meeting these challenges, as will unified action across the U.S. Government to counter both traditional and emerging threats.

Should the United States condition its military engagement with Russia on certain changes in Russian behavior, and if so, what conditions if any, would you recommend?

I understand that, in response to Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine, the Department suspended military-to-military cooperation with the Russian Federation, both as a matter of policy and due to legal constraints laid out in Section 1232 of the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In order for the legal restrictions to be

lifted, Russia must “cease its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” I would recommend a waiver to the Secretary only when higher priorities dictated it was necessary. It is hard to envision those circumstances, but surprise is always a possibility.

Do you agree with General Scaparrotti that our current force posture in Europe is “inadequate” to deter Russia? What changes to our force posture would you recommend?

The Department has taken significant steps to enhance the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in the European theater, as well as to build up the military capacity of the Baltic States. These include both near-term enhancements to the U.S. defense posture through European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding as well as longer-term investments in advanced power projection capabilities. I trust our commanders to judge their own situation. Whether further increased posture is needed will depend on Russia and NATO reaction to our present efforts, as well as understanding competing priorities.

Do you support continued U.S. security assistance to Ukraine and, if so, how would the provision of such security assistance fit within the broader U.S. strategy for stability within the region?

If I am confirmed, I will support continued U.S. training, equipping, and advising efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine’s forces to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These programs, combined with efforts to improve the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe through programs such as ERI, will help to deter further aggressive Russian actions in the region.

Do you support providing lethal defensive security assistance to Ukraine as in the interest of the United States?

The provision of lethal defensive equipment as part of our already robust security assistance program is an option I plan to look at closely if I am confirmed. I do not have access to classified assessments of the performance of the Ukrainian and Russian militaries in the course of the conflict, and particularly the impact of the security assistance we have provided thus far. I plan to examine this issue closely.

In your view, what are the key elements of a strategy to counter Russian hybrid tactics that employ both hard and soft power and present attribution challenges?

The presence of credible and capable U.S. forces continues to help deter Russia’s hard power efforts to undermine our interests around the world. We are hampered in countering other hybrid tactics by insufficient coordination and attention among many parts of the U.S. Government, as well as own inhibitions about applying similar tactics to those used against the U.S. and its allies. Increased awareness and improved resiliency are a good start. If we do not already have classified capabilities and ongoing operations

to disrupt Russian influence networks, I would advocate for these types of measures if confirmed.

What is your assessment of the Russian malign influence threat and what recommendations, if any, would you have for the role of the U.S. Government, and the Department of Defense in particular, in countering this threat?

Russia's actions pose a serious threat to the United States, its allies, and its partners. Their disinformation campaign is part of a broader approach to undermining global security that also involves elements of cyber operations, manipulation of information, and espionage. It is a persistent and growing threat. Any strategy to respond should account for these dimensions through an integrated cross-governmental approach and should explore both defensive and offensive measures.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

In your opinion, does the NATO Alliance benefit the national security interests of the United States?

Yes, absolutely. NATO is a major source of political will and operational capability that enables the United States to deter and counter threats to our security interests.

What are the major strategic objectives of the NATO Alliance in the coming years?

I believe NATO's strategic objectives include deterring aggression and, if necessary, defending allies against strategic competitors; improving the resilience of the alliance; more equitably sharing the burden of collective defense; enhancing its operational capabilities in the fight against terrorism; and, if necessary, projecting power to counter emerging threats.

In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges for NATO and the most important capability improvements that the Alliance must make to deal with the accelerated and growing threats it faces?

In my view, the greatest challenge for the NATO Alliance will be the need to confront aggressive Russian actions and related threats to the security of its members. The Alliance will also need to maintain solidarity on issues related to deterrence, defense, and projecting stability.

To deal with the growing threats the Alliance faces, I believe NATO should emphasize increased burden sharing; improved readiness; missile defense; counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities; and enhancements to combat enablers such as command and control systems, precision munitions, and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

What is your perspective on accusations that our NATO Allies do not carry their fair share of the security burden?

At the 2014 Wales Summit, all 28 Allies pledged to halt cuts in defense spending and agreed “to aim to move towards” spending 2 percent of GDP on defense – with 20 percent going to major equipment purchases – within a decade.

I fully agree with Secretary Mattis’ calls for our NATO Allies to live up to the Wales Pledge, and I am encouraged that Allies made additional commitments in that regard at the NATO Leaders’ Meeting on May 25, 2017.

In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes, I believe there is. NATO has a well-settled commitment to be a nuclear alliance. In fact, our NATO Allies reaffirmed this stance at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, and I support the conviction that to maintain an adequate deterrent, NATO must deploy an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities.

If confirmed, will you support making the F-35 dual capable for the Block 4 configuration for the United States and its allies in the shortest feasible time?

I fully agree with Secretary Mattis that our nuclear and extended nuclear deterrence posture must maintain the capability to forward-deploy strategic bombers and dual-capable aircraft. If confirmed, I will take a careful look at this issue and consult with the Committee as appropriate.

Balkans

How would you describe today’s threats to the security and stability of the Balkans?

Although intra-state and state-on-state conflict are no longer the primary threats to security and stability in the Balkans, complex ethnic-based challenges continue to threaten the region’s long-term stability. These challenges include corruption, organized crime, fragile rule of law, and malign Russian influence. Russia uses ethnic, historic, and religious ties to the region to promote an anti-NATO and anti-U.S. agenda; meanwhile, violent extremist organizations exploit the region’s relative poverty and fragile rule of law to recruit and to transit fighters from and through the region.

What do you see as the role of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and what conditions are required before that presence can be reduced or eliminated?

As the only institution universally supported by all ethnic communities in Kosovo, KFOR remains critical to ensuring freedom of movement and a safe and secure environment

throughout Kosovo. KFOR is the “third responder” to security incidents, behind the Kosovo Police (first responder) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission known as EULEX (second responder). The key conditions that will allow a reduction in KFOR is for Kosovo to have trained, professional, and multi-ethnic security forces to provide both domestic security and territorial defense, and for Kosovo to have good relations with its neighbors, including neighbors that do not recognize its independence.

Africa

What is your assessment of the current counterterrorism efforts in Africa? What are the associated policy objectives?

The Department's current counterterrorism efforts have had largely positive effects and serve as an example of how a combination of strategic patience, targeted investments, and strong partnership can achieve the associated U.S. policy objectives to protect the homeland and western interests.

What changes, if any, would you recommend?

We should continually assess and look for ways to improve our efforts there. If confirmed, I will look into this and ensure the Department has the right balance of investment in enabling partners and, in limited cases, unilateral action.

Navy Shipbuilding

The Navy recently announced a requirement for 355 ships, up from 275 ships today, in order to meet its operational requirements.

What is your view of the Navy’s assessment that produced the requirement for 355 ships?

An increase in the number of ships is consistent with the Secretary of Defense's priority to grow both the capacity and lethality of the joint force. If confirmed, I believe the Defense Strategic Review will help determine the appropriate goal for the Navy’s fleet. However, growth would require repeal of the Budget Control Act caps and a substantially higher topline over the coming decades to pay for increases in procurement as well as in maintenance, operations, and associated manpower necessary for a larger fleet.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States procured the current *Ohio*-class SSBN submarines within the Navy’s shipbuilding (SCN) account. In 2015, Congress created a special fund, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), for procurement of *Columbia*-class SSBNs, the replacements for the *Ohio*-class SSBNs.

Do you have a view on how the cost of *Columbia*-class SSBNs should be funded—solely from Navy resources, from a combination of Navy and other-than-Navy (e.g., OMB and other Defense) sources, or with a different approach? If so, please explain.

The Columbia-class SSBNs represent the future of the most survivable leg of our nuclear deterrent. Funding this program is critical. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Defense in working with Congress to ensure this program is fully funded as part of the overall recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise.

Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Stewardship

What is the role of U.S. nuclear weapons?

The U.S. nuclear deterrent remains the bedrock of our national security and is a no-fail mission. The fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States and our allies and partners. In addition to deterring a nuclear attack, a robust, flexible, and survivable U.S. nuclear arsenal underpins our conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons provide the President with credible options to maintain deterrence and extend deterrence to our allies, which discourages them from developing their own nuclear weapons.

The President’s June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy affirmed that the United States will maintain a nuclear triad, noting: “Retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.”

Do you agree that modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad and the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex is a critical national security priority?

Sustaining all three legs of the triad best maintains strategic stability and responsiveness, and is the surest way to maintain effective nuclear deterrence. I understand that the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is looking at all elements of the force to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is sufficient to deter evolving threats. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing in depth the recapitalization plans for the triad.

Do you support the Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) and its timely replacement of the AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile?

I understand that the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review is looking at all relevant capabilities to ensure the continued effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. If confirmed, I will carefully review this program and report back with a more informed answer.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

What are your views of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program?

The DoD CTR Program, which is an important component of the Department's countering strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction, has a more than two decades-long track record of working cooperatively with foreign partners to dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction, prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and detect and report outbreaks of diseases of security concern.

If confirmed, will you ensure it is capable of meeting its mission to roll back the threat of weapons of mass destruction?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the DoD CTR Program effectively accomplishes its mission of mitigating threats from weapons of mass destruction.

Russian Violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

In your view, what are the consequences for U.S. national security of Russia's actions in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty?

The Russian Federation's violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty poses a direct threat to our allies and threatens U.S. forces and interests. Russia's actions in violation of the INF treaty, if unchecked, could lead to doubt in the stability of current and future arms control agreements and initiatives.

What do you believe would be appropriate responses for the United States to take in order to: 1) convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty, or 2) ensure that U.S. national security is maintained if Russia does not return to compliance?

I understand that the Administration is reviewing a number of potential responses as part of its ongoing review on this issue, and I will be keenly interested in making sure these are translated into action. The United States should work in concert with our allies to ensure that Russia does not achieve a significant military advantage from violating the INF Treaty.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The U.S. homeland and its deployed forces enjoy a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran, yet the threat continues to grow. During the past year, North Korea conducted several missile tests and continued development of mobile long-range missiles. Likewise, Iran continues to test

ballistic missiles of increasing range. Russia and China also continue to deploy ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles that threaten U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland.

What are your priorities for U.S. missile defense capabilities in the following areas: 1) homeland missile defense; 2) regional missile defense; 3) improved discrimination and sensors; 4) next generation missile defense; and 5) defense against cruise and hypersonic missiles?

The missile threats to the homeland, our forward deployed forces, and our allies and partners are exponentially increasing. Our top priority should be to defend the homeland and protect our forces abroad, and we should invest accordingly. We should then work with our allies and partners to help them build their own defenses. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the Ballistic Missile Defense review and ensuring that we appropriately invest and innovate in this important capability.

Do you believe that the United States should encourage our regional allies and partners to increase their missile defense capabilities to contribute to regional security and help reduce the burden on U.S. forces and requirements?

Yes. If confirmed I will look for opportunities to encourage allies to invest in missile defense capabilities that contribute to regional security.

Test and Evaluation

Congress has understood the need for adequate developmental and operational testing of weapon systems. At the same time, there was a risk that in the past, with limited time criticalities to deploy a system and decades-long technology development cycles, the level of testing may not have been constrained by cost or schedule.

In an era where the changes in the threat and our technology needs and cycles are now measured in months, what is the appropriate balance between reducing acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?

The Department needs to execute enough testing to ensure warfighters are equipped with what they need to win, in the timeframe required, and with the best cost performance possible. A one-size-fits-all answer is not advisable. Large, new complex systems which need to work under stressful combat situations require different types and degrees of testing compared with smaller scale upgrades or new payloads on existing systems which may have to function under less demanding situations. That said, my experience suggests that it is best to develop smaller increments of capability that can therefore be tested more quickly.

Readiness Funding

After more than 15 years of combat operations, each of the military services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair, while balancing the need for new procurement. The Army reports that only one-third of its brigade combat teams report a ready status. The Navy currently has 275 ships, yet the Chief of Naval Operations is calling for growth to 355 ships, which would require the Navy to obligate shipbuilding funding while maintaining the current fleet. The Marine Corps reports that only 43 percent of its aircraft are ready for combat, partly stemming from backlogs of the F/A-18 Legacy Hornets within the organic industrial base. The Air Force is short more than 3,500 maintainers while reporting only half of its fighter squadrons are ready to fight. While each service has its individual concerns, as a whole, flying hours for pilots are at historical lows and training continues to be diminished.

What balance do you believe should exist between maintaining the equipment currently in inventory while leveraging procurement funding to modernize the force?

The Department must strike the appropriate balance between maintenance and modernization, optimizing investments to succeed in current operations and a range of future challenges. Maintenance is essential to continued success in our current operations. The current level of global operations in which the Department is engaged demands that we keep the equipment we already own in the highest state of readiness – fully mission capable and outfitted with the best available capabilities. We know that the demands on our forces are growing, not subsiding, while the capabilities and technologies of our potential adversaries continues to advance. Therefore, modernization remains important; we cannot afford to mortgage the future for today. For both of these objectives, maintenance and modernization, stable and predictable funding is the key. Conversely, disruptions such as continuing resolutions introduce unnecessary risk to our personnel and our materiel investment and disrupt the delicate balance between these two objectives.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address maintenance backlogs and ensure that the military departments request adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance requirements?

Secretary Mattis has made the Department's improving readiness a priority. If confirmed, I plan to work with the Services to monitor their readiness recovery plans and maintenance backlogs, and ensure that the Department places appropriate urgency on this high priority, to achieve its objectives.

Personnel and Entitlement Costs

According to the Bipartisan Policy Center, military personnel costs, as a percentage of the overall Defense Department budget, have remained consistent for the last two

decades at 30 percent while the size of the force continues to decrease. As a result, the one-third of the budget devoted to military personnel buys far less today than it did yesterday, despite the overall defense budget being significantly higher. In 1980, active-duty end strength was 2.1 million; this year, it is approximately 1.3 million, a drop of over 60 percent.

If this percentage remains constant as overall defense spending flattens, or even declines in real terms, what would be the impact on the size of the force and the Department's ability to execute the national defense strategy?

The health and sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force is a national priority. I agree with Secretary Mattis that we must support our force, and structure our pay and benefits in a way that continues to benefit recruiting and retention—but the best support we can give service members is to train and equip them properly. Moreover, as the Secretary has said, we owe it to the American people to field a force that can win. However, if the defense budget flattens or declines, defending the nation's vital interests will involve increasing levels of risk.

In your view, what would be the impact on other areas of the Department's budget if military personnel costs continue to rise while the overall defense budget remains flat, or even declines in real terms?

People are the Department's most valuable asset and we must ensure that military pay and benefits attract and retain a high-quality All-Volunteer Force. However, the Department must continually balance the costs of this pay and benefits package against other investments that are critical to achieving the Department's strategic goals. If confirmed, I will examine this question in detail, but clearly personnel costs must be measured in conjunction with other critical needs of the force.

What actions do you believe can and should be taken to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?

I am aware that in the past few years, the Department has submitted several military compensation reform proposals and Congress has enacted some significant reforms. If confirmed, I will work to explore options that can further control costs while properly compensating the members of our fighting force.

Personnel Authorities

Do you believe that more flexibility is needed in the military personnel system? If so, what ideas do you have to achieve a system that is both flexible to the needs of service members and adaptable to future national security challenges?

I believe it is good business practice to periodically review an organization's administrative and personnel management systems to identify areas of improvement. If

confirmed, I will review the military personnel system to identify areas of concern before recommending any modifications to the Secretary. A guiding principle of this review must be that any recommended changes are consistent with maintaining the highest level of readiness for the force.

What is your opinion on the health of the current Department of Defense civilian workforce? What is your plan to recruit the talent needed by the Department in order to best support the future warfighter?

In my experience, the Department's civilian workforce is generally highly skilled and dedicated to achieving the Department's mission. However, I also understand that it is the intent of Congress that the headquarters elements within the Department are reduced. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the Department's staffing and needs to ensure the most efficient recruitment and retention of the civilian workforce.

Based on your experience in the private sector, what are human resource best practices that you would be interested in bringing to the Defense Department to make military or civil service a more attractive option for talented Americans?

As with the military personnel system, I believe it is good business practice to periodically review an organization's personnel management systems. If confirmed, I will review the civilian employee systems to identify areas of concern before recommending any modifications to the Secretary. A guiding principle will be to ensure the Department's recruitment and hiring practices are efficient and target highly skilled talent to support the Secretary's goals of improving readiness and restoring lethality to the force.

Costs of Medical Care

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Department of Defense requested \$47 billion in operation and maintenance funding for the military health system in 2016, about 9 percent of the total funding requested for the Department's base budget. CBO has calculated that those costs will reach \$64 billion by 2030 if their growth reflects anticipated national trends in health care costs.

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of the Department's health care costs on military readiness and overall national security?

We must balance rising health care costs with the need to fund military readiness. If confirmed, I would look at ways to reduce waste and inefficiency in the direct care facilities as well as in how the Department purchases health care from the civilian sector in order to maintain the balance between benefits and readiness.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate the effect of the Department's rising medical costs on its budget top-line while simultaneously implementing

programs to improve health outcomes and to enhance the experience of care for all beneficiaries?

We need to look at all possibilities to improve the Department's health care delivery. That includes looking at the costs of the direct care facilities, how the Department buys health care from the civilian sector, and promoting healthy life styles among our beneficiaries to reduce the demand for health services. The bottom line, however, is that we must take care of our people.

Military Health Care Reform

Section 702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 transferred direct oversight and management of military hospitals and clinics from the military services to the Defense Health Agency (DHA). In March 2017, this Committee received the Department of Defense's preliminary draft interim report on section 702, which described the Department's intent to develop a component model to administer and manage military treatment facilities. Under this component model, the Department would establish service intermediary commands, and those commands would be subject to two separate lines of authority—the DHA and the Services.

In your view, how would a component model streamline the administration and management of military treatment facilities?

Presently, the three Service Medical Departments and the Defense Health Agency (DHA) have four separate headquarters functions dedicated to the administration and management of the Military Treatment Facilities. It is my understanding that Department's proposed component model centralizes the Services' headquarters functions under DHA, which will be the single organization responsible for the Military Treatment Facilities in the specific areas identified in the FY 2017 NDAA.

In your view, how would a component model achieve the Committee's goal to eliminate multiple inefficient layers of management and bureaucracy in Department of Defense medical operations?

I understand that the Department's component model will eliminate the Service Medical Department headquarters functions responsible for the administration and management of healthcare in the Military Treatment Facilities and align them within DHA, which may lead to greater efficiencies. However, I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of the Department's component model to determine whether this will achieve the Congress's goal to eliminate bureaucracy. If confirmed, I will review the model and make an assessment on its potential effectiveness.

In your view, how would a component model eliminate the current stove-piped medical command structures of the Services?

I am not sufficiently familiar with the details of the Department's component model to determine whether it would eliminate existing stove-pipes within the Services' medical commands. If confirmed, I will review the model and make an assessment on its potential effectiveness.

If confirmed, will you reevaluate the Department's decision to proceed with a component model to implement section 702?

It would be premature, at this stage, to comment on whether the Department's decisions should be reevaluated. However, if confirmed, I will remain open to reevaluating the Department's approach, if it is warranted.

If confirmed, how would you ensure a rapid and efficient transfer of the operations of the military medical facilities to the DHA?

If confirmed, I will work with the leaders of the Department to meet the FY17 NDAA timelines and if there are any concerns with the timelines, I will inform the Congress.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Services reduce their medical headquarters staffs and infrastructure (including regional command staffs and infrastructure) to reflect the changing scope and size of their health care missions?

If confirmed, I will actively oversee the development of the section 702 implementation plan and ensure the Department meets the intent of the FY 2017 NDAA requirements.

Mental Health Care

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater and to service members and families upon return to home station locations with insufficient community-based mental health resources?

The health and sustainment of the all-volunteer force is a national priority. As Secretary Mattis has said, we have a moral obligation to sustain the mental health of the force as well as service members' families. If confirmed, it will be a priority to ensure that the Department is devoting appropriate resources to mental health, and working effectively with the Department of Veterans Affairs to identify issues and close any gaps in coverage. I will advise the Committee if more resources are required.

If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that robust mental health resources are available for Guard and Reserve members and their families?

I include the Guard and Reserve in my assessment that the health and sustainment of the all-volunteer force is a national priority. Understanding the uniqueness of their service, I will work to ensure members of the Guard and Reserve and their families are included in

the equation and that the appropriate amount of resources are available to support their mental health care.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Sexual assault is a crime – and the only acceptable outcome is zero. If confirmed, I will examine the adequacy of the training and resources currently in place to get the Department to zero.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove the disposition authority from military commanders over violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

I am not sufficiently familiar with the complex legal and readiness impacts of removing from military commanders the authority to dispose of allegations of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If confirmed, I would closely examine this issue, even as I focus on reducing the number of sexual assaults to zero.

What is your assessment of the military's protections against retaliation for reporting sexual assault?

The Department must do more to ensure Service members can report any crime, including a crime involving sexual assault, without fear of retaliation. If confirmed, I intend to examine the early implementation of the Department's efforts in this area and assess whether improvements are needed.

Sexual Harassment

Department of Defense annual sexual assault reports consistently document that sexual assaults are more common in units where sexual harassment is prevalent. Section 579 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual harassment in the Armed Forces and to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives no later than one year after January 2, 2013, setting forth a comprehensive policy. This Committee still has not yet received this report.

Do you agree with the premise that units with a command climate that tolerates sexual harassment is more likely to have increased incidents of sexual assault?

I cannot say definitively whether there is a cause-effect relationship. However, zero tolerance for sexual harassment is the only acceptable stance. A zero tolerance mindset must start with senior leaders and commanders that set the command climate.

What is the reason the Department has not complied with the requirement to develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy?

I do not have enough information at this time to be able to answer the question. However, if confirmed, I will evaluate why the Department has not complied with this Congressional requirement and address the Committee's concerns.

If confirmed, will you assure this Committee that the Department will promptly promulgate a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual harassment in the Armed Forces and to submit this policy to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013?

Yes, I will.

Suicide Prevention

If confirmed, how would you maintain a strong focus on preventing suicides in the active and reserve components and in their families?

While suicide is an issue in society in general, zero is the only acceptable outcome for the Department. We must do more to remove the stigmas associated with mental health issues. If confirmed, I will bring the broad resources of the Department to bear on this problem and will not hesitate to recommend relevant outside expertise as well.

Religious Accommodation in the Military

In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Yes. My understanding is that the rights of our service members to observe their individual religious beliefs are well protected. As Secretary Mattis has said, the religious practices of our service members should be accommodated in a manner consistent with our obligation to maintain operational readiness, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. If confirmed, I will monitor the issue to ensure the Department's policies remain consistent with our principles.

Role of National Guard and Reserves

As the active forces have been drawn down, the reserve components have been mobilized more in order for the military to meet the requirements of the National Military Strategy.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between the active forces and the reserve components?

The Reserve Components are an integral part of our Total Force, providing the skills and capacity to help support current operations while also maintaining the strategic depth needed for major crises.

In your view, do the reserve components serve as an operational reserve, a strategic reserve, or both? Which role should they occupy going forward?

As Active Duty force structure has been reduced, it is important that the Reserve Components serve as both a strategic and operational role going forward.

If active-duty end strength is increased, what specific parameters would you use to most appropriately determine what a corresponding reserve component end strength should be set at in order to support those active-duty forces?

I expect the defense strategy currently under development in the Department will help set parameters to guide the size, shape, and missions of the Reserve Component relative to the Active Component. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the defense strategy and achieving the right mix from a Total Force perspective.

Department of Defense Schools in the Continental United States (CONUS)

Some have questioned the continuing need for Department of Defense-operated schools for military dependent children within CONUS.

In light of past administrations' requests for additional Base Realignment and Closure authorities and the Department's current fiscal constraints, should the Department update its criteria for the continued operation of Defense Department schools within CONUS?

It is worth considering whether the Department should continue running schools within the continental United States. If confirmed, I will review how to provide educational options to military families.

If confirmed, how would you approach the task of eliminating some Defense Department-operated schools in CONUS?

Military dependents' education plays an important role in the success, stability, readiness, and retention of our service members and their families. Military families bear an extraordinary burden for our freedom, and the availability of quality education options is a critical quality of life factor. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders, in collaboration and consultation with the Military Departments and Congress, to review the best options for providing education support for military families.

Commissary and Military Exchange Systems

What is your view of proposals to consolidate, eliminate, or privatize commissaries and exchanges in certain areas where they are duplicative of services readily available at reasonable cost in the community?

I believe the quality of life value of these benefits is of great importance to our service members and their families. If confirmed, I am open to assessing whether the value provided by the commissary or exchange systems could be more effectively provided by a private party.

As for consolidation or elimination, if confirmed, I will look into opportunities for the commissary and exchange systems to achieve operating efficiencies through enhanced collaboration and the development of common business systems and practices.

If confirmed, would you approve a pilot program to test privatization of the defense commissary system?

If confirmed, I am open to assessing whether the value provided by the commissary system could be more effectively provided by a private party.

Senior Military and Civilian Accountability

While representative of a small number of individuals in the Department of Defense, reports of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to perform up to accepted standards are frequently received. Whistleblowers and victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard.

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense?

Abuses of rank or grade and authority have no place in the Department. Moreover, senior military and civilian leaders should be held accountable for failing to perform up to accepted standards. If confirmed, I would apply these standards in performing my duties as the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders within the Department are held accountable for their actions and performance?

If confirmed, I will ensure that appropriate standards are in place to promote a culture of professionalism, ethical behavior, and high levels of performance. In addition, I will ensure that appropriate procedures are in place to address substantiated allegations.

What changes, if any, would you propose to whistleblower laws to strengthen protections for whistleblowers within the Department of Defense, including those in the military, the civilian workforce, the intelligence community, and contractors?

Whistleblower laws are important to ensure the effective operation of the Department and protect its military and civilian workforce. If I am confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and if I determine that whistleblowers in the Department are inadequately protected, I will examine the existing laws and propose appropriate changes.

Guam

Section 132 of title 10, United States Code, states in part: “(e) Until September 30, 2020, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall lead the Guam Oversight Council and shall be the Department of Defense’s principal representative for coordinating the interagency efforts in matters relating to Guam, including the following executive orders: (1) Executive Order No. 13299 of May 12, 2003 (68 Fed. Reg. 25477; 48 U.S.C. note prec. 1451; relating to the Interagency Group on Insular Affairs); and (2) Executive Order No. 12788 of January 15, 1992, as amended (57 Fed. Reg. 2213; relating to the Defense Economic Adjustment Program).”

What is your view of the broader Asia-Pacific realignment of U.S. forces including Guam, Japan, and South Korea?

I share the Secretary of Defense’s view that the Asia-Pacific region is likely to remain the most consequential region for the United States for decades to come. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to appropriately resource our critical priorities and continue to develop a regional force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

Do you believe that you will be able to implement the Guam provisions, which are critical to the realignment of forces from Okinawa, Japan?

The Secretary has stated clearly that we will remain steadfast in our efforts to realign U.S. forces in Japan, especially on Okinawa. I understand that the realignment of Marines to Guam is essential to establishing a more geographically dispersed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture in the Asia-Pacific region and that the overall program remains executable within the guidelines set by law. If

confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and our Japanese allies to continue implementation of this important program.

Technological Superiority

We have heard for the past several years that the U.S. military-technical advantage is diminishing. Recent secretaries and deputy secretaries have undertaken a variety of initiatives to address this strategic problem, ranging from new technology investments to creating new acquisition organizations and attempting acquisition reform.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the U.S. military continues to enjoy technological superiority over increasingly capable near-peer competitors?

If confirmed, I will set clearer policies to incentivize investments by the national labs, Services, and industry. It will be difficult to regain superiority simultaneously in every warfighting domain, so I will prioritize technologies based on their maturity, potential, and ability to better advantage our warfighters. I will also look closely at how to take advantage of the new AT&L organization, and expect to empower the new R&E.

What specific technological areas should the Defense Department prioritize for investment in order to develop next generation operational capabilities?

Our historical approach to projecting military power over transoceanic distances will not work in the future. Among many other areas, we will need to invest in better and more munitions, learn how to operate when under attack, leverage machine learning, increase autonomy, and harden our information pathways. When published, the revised Defense Strategy will provide a more comprehensive guide. More important than technology will be exploring new operational concepts and organizations. Experimentation and risk taking should be encouraged.

Are you satisfied with the quality of the Department of Defense research, laboratory, and engineering workforce and infrastructure, especially relative to its industry and academic peers, and global competitors?

My impression is that the Department's RDT&E possesses considerable advantages in many areas relative to peer and competitor institutions. Certainly, our adversaries think so, which is why they work so hard to steal our intellectual property. My experience in industry suggests there will be ways to improve upon what is already a strong base. I believe the challenge is not so much on the quality or extent of original research, increasingly less of which is done by the government. The challenge is more on transitioning new technology into the field, where it can be used.

Acquisition Reform and Innovation

To what extent do you believe that the Department of Defense's technological superiority challenges are a function of internal factors such as organizational design, process, leadership, and culture?

The technological superiority challenges facing the Department are due to a wide range of internal and external factors. Strong leadership and strong partnerships, geared to a shared objective, create high-performing organizations. If confirmed, I will assess the impact of internal factors on technological superiority and make recommendations to the Secretary and the Congress.

How do you view the current state of the defense acquisition system and what changes will you seek to implement, as part of the acquisition reorganization process, to enable the system to better support innovation for the warfighter?

Like most experts and most citizens, my impression is that the acquisition system too often delivers late to need and at higher than expected cost. What I will do, if confirmed, is bring to bear my industry experience on this problem, with which I have some experience in the private sector. I am under no illusions about the probability of both reforming the present system to be more responsive while incorporating more innovation. Even modest improvements will require difficult changes, and the assistance of Congress. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, the Secretary, the Department's technology and acquisition professionals, warfighters, and leaders within industry to promote innovation in the entire defense acquisition process.

What role do you believe you should fulfill, if confirmed, in leading the creation of the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment?

If confirmed, I will ensure the new organizations are established in a manner consistent with section 901 and 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. I would work closely the leadership of the Department and the Congress to ensure these offices have the authorities and resources they need to be successful.

How will you, if confirmed, simultaneously support technological innovation and ensure that the Department of Defense delivers large programs on time and on budget?

I view these as separate and distinct opportunities. Critical to do both will be a strong partnership with leaders inside and outside the Department to make sure the basics are in place to deliver on the reforms called for by Congress. For technological innovation and the establishment of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, this will require dedicated leadership focused on ensuring technical excellence and shortening the innovation time constant to match and beat the pace in the commercial sector and of our adversaries. For excellence in acquisition and the establishment of the Under Secretary

for Acquisition and Sustainment, it will require increased expertise and major concentration on the high-value, near-term payoff improvements in acquisition that can be captured quickly and deliver results.

Acquisition Accountability

In your view, what role should the Services and Service Chiefs have in delivering acquisition programs on time and on budget and who should be responsible for large-scale acquisition failures?

I believe responsibility ultimately lies with the decision authority who must ensure there are realistic requirements, achievable technologies and need dates, a realistically affordable plan, and highly capable people with the resources to successfully execute. The Services and Service Chiefs have a strong role in setting these conditions, and sustaining them. There must also be careful monitoring of execution, and a willingness to adjust course if circumstances warrant.

If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability?

There is a need to shift from lagging indicators of performance to leading indicators of performance. Holding leadership accountable to leading indicators will affect what can be controlled.

Operational Energy

In his responses to the advance policy questions from this Committee, Secretary Mattis talked about his time in Iraq, and how he called upon the Department to “unleash us from the tether of fuel.” He stated that “units would be faced with unacceptable limitations because of their dependence on fuel” and resupply efforts “made us vulnerable in ways that were exploited by the enemy.”

Do you believe this issue remains a challenge for the Department of Defense?

Yes. The delivery of energy to globally deployed forces is challenged by distance, geography, anti-access and area-denial threats, and our own demand for energy. These challenges are relevant across a range of scenarios, from Afghanistan to the Asia Pacific to Europe.

If confirmed, what will you do to unleash the military from the tether of fuel?

If confirmed, I believe the Department should reduce the dependence of our forces on vulnerable fuel supply chains by increasing the operational reach of our warfighting platforms as well as ensuring sufficient and survivable logistics and infrastructure to move the needed volumes of energy to deployed forces. To do so, we must consider the

risks of dependence on fuel across the full range of innovation, requirements, acquisition, planning, and programming processes used to develop, deploy, and sustain military capabilities.

If confirmed, what priorities would you establish for Defense investments in and deployment of operational energy technologies to increase the combat capabilities of warfighters, reduce logistical burdens, and enhance mission assurance on our installations?

If confirmed, I would prioritize operational energy investments by the same standards used in other Department decisions, namely their direct contribution to the Department's primary warfighting missions and their contribution to enhancing readiness and combat effectiveness. In doing so, I will look to both our Combatant Commands and the Services to identify relevant operational risks, and seek out Department, whole of government, and private sector sources of innovation.

Energy and Acquisition

How can our acquisition systems better incorporate the use of energy in military platforms?

If confirmed, I will ensure our acquisition systems address the use of energy in military platforms. Additionally, I would certainly seek support from outside organizations like academia and the private sector to improve military capability through changes in our use of energy.

Energy Resiliency in the Fight Against ISIS

Back in July 2016 after a coup attempt, the Turkish government cut off power to Incirlik Air Base, which is the primary platform for launching coalition airstrikes in the fight against ISIS. For roughly a week, deployed units had to operate off backup generators, which is expensive and not the preferred method of operation given the demanding tempo of sorties against ISIS.

If confirmed, specifically how will you address and make energy resiliency and mission assurance a priority for the U.S. military, to include acquiring and deploying sustainable and renewable energy assets to improve combat capability for deployed units on our military installations and forward operating bases?

If confirmed, I would prioritize energy resiliency and mission assurance efforts according to their effects on the Department's primary warfighting missions and their contributions to enhancing readiness and combat effectiveness. In general, I believe that the Department should explore new concepts, technologies, and renewable energy sources that are reliable, cost effective, and capable of mitigating the risks of dependence on

vulnerable energy supplies. Where appropriate to the mission, I also would continue the Department's effort to take advantage of third party financing to enhance energy resilience at our permanent installations.

To what extent, if any, are Title 10 training exercises and wargames dealing with energy outages? If not, why?

As I understand the issue, Service wargames have identified energy as a significant constraint. If confirmed, I will ask for a complete update on the role of energy disruptions and outages in exercises and wargames.

Do you support the J-4's enforcement of the energy supportability key performance parameter in the requirements process?

Yes. If confirmed, I intend to consult with the Department's subject matter experts on this issue, including the Joint Staff J-4 and J-8. As an indicator of energy supportability under combat conditions, the "energy key performance parameter" provides an important tool for improving the capability of the future force.

Section 2805 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 gave the Defense Department new authority to plan and fund military construction projects directly related to energy resiliency and mission assurance, and to help address and mitigate against incidents like Incirlik, not to mention secure micro-grids to help prevent cyber-attacks.

If confirmed, will you commit to use section 2805 to support mission critical functions and address known energy vulnerabilities with projects that are resilient and renewable?

Yes. Section 2805 grants the Department authority to expand the energy conservation investment program to include energy resiliency and energy security projects. This expanded authority enhances our ability to fund energy resiliency projects (that could include renewable technologies) that support our energy resilience strategy, ensuring our military installations are prepared for and are capable of recovering from energy disruptions that can affect mission assurance.

Environment

If confirmed, will you comply with environmental regulations, laws, and guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency?

Yes

If confirmed, will you make the same level of investment for the Defense Department's Environmental Research Programs?

If confirmed, I will give the Department's Environmental Research Programs a careful review.

If confirmed, will you work with the Department of Interior and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to find cooperative ways to ensure military readiness and protect the environment on and around U.S. military installations?

Yes

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

I agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

I agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to my responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

I agree to ensure that appropriate testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

I agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, and to consult with this Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents.

Do you agree to answer letters and requests for information from individual Senators who are members of this Committee?

I agree to respond appropriately to letters and requests for information from members of this Committee.

If confirmed, do you agree to provide to this Committee relevant information within the jurisdictional oversight of the Committee when requested by the Committee, even in the absence of the formality of a letter from the Chairman?

I agree to respond appropriately to letters and requests for information from members of this Committee.