

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
1155 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 200
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
(202) 289-2260

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in Room SD-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Good morning. The committee hearing
4 will come to order.

5 To start with, I would like to welcome our new members,
6 Senator Tom Cotton, Senator Joni Ernst, Senator Thom Tillis,
7 Senator Dan Sullivan, Senator Mike Rounds, and Senator
8 Martin Heinrich. For the benefit of our new members and
9 all, this committee has a long tradition of working in a
10 bipartisan fashion, of which we are very proud.

11 I have had the opportunity of working with Senator Reed
12 for many years. Despite his lack of quality education, he
13 has done an outstanding job here as a ranking member of the
14 committee.

15 And for those who are political trivia experts, my
16 staff tells me this is the first time that we have had a
17 chairman and ranking member from the two oldest service
18 academies, and so I welcome the opportunity of working
19 closely, as I have for many years, with the Senator from
20 Rhode Island.

21 Today, the Senate Armed Services Committee begins a
22 series of hearings on global challenges to U.S. national
23 security strategy. I am pleased to have as our first
24 witnesses two of America's most respected strategic thinkers
25 and public servants, General Brent Scowcroft and Dr.

1 Zbigniew Brzezinski. Each served as National Security
2 Advisor to the President of the United States, their
3 collective experiences of laying critical foundations for
4 the U.S.-China relationship, confronting the ayatollahs in
5 Iran, negotiating arms treaties with Moscow, and making
6 tough choices on U.S. strategy in the Middle East, have
7 clear salience for this committee today.

8 We are grateful to each of you for allowing us to draw
9 on your wisdom.

10 Four decades ago, Secretary of State Dean Acheson
11 titled his memoir on the construction of the post-World War
12 II order, "Present at the Creation." Looking out at the
13 state of that order today, it is fair to ask if we are now
14 present at the unraveling.

15 For 7 decades, Republican and Democratic leaders alike
16 have committed America's indispensable leadership and
17 strength to defending a liberal world order, one that
18 cherishes the rule of law, maintains free markets and free
19 trade, provides peaceful means for the settlement of
20 disputes, and relegates wars of aggression to their rightful
21 place in the bloody past.

22 America has defended this order because it is as
23 essential to our identity and purpose as it is to our safety
24 and prosperity.

25 But the liberal world order is imperiled like never

1 before. In a speech riddled with unrealistic, wishful
2 thinking, President Obama told the Nation last night that
3 the shadow of crisis has passed. That news came as quite a
4 surprise to anyone who has been paying attention to what has
5 been happening around the world.

6 A revisionist Russia has invaded and annexed the
7 territory of a sovereign European state, the first time that
8 has occurred since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

9 A rising China is forcefully asserting itself in
10 historical and territorial disputes, and alarming its
11 neighbors, all the while investing billions of dollars in
12 military capabilities that appear designed to displace and
13 erode U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific.

14 A theocratic Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, which
15 could unleash a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and
16 collapse the global nonproliferation regime.

17 A vicious and violent strain of radical Islamist
18 ideology continues to metastasize across the Middle East and
19 North Africa.

20 And now, in its latest and potentially most virulent
21 form, the Islamic state, this evil has the manpower and
22 resources to dissolve international borders, occupy wide
23 swaths of sovereign territory, destabilize one of our most
24 strategically important parts of the world, and possibly
25 threaten our homeland.

1 And in Yemen, the country President Obama once hailed
2 as a successful model for his brand of counterterrorism, al
3 Qaeda continues to facilitate global terrorism, as we saw in
4 the barbaric attacks in Paris. And Iranian-backed Houthi
5 rebels have pushed the country to the brink of collapse.

6 All the while, American allies are increasingly
7 questioning whether we will live up to our commitments, and
8 our adversaries seem to be betting that we won't.

9 It does not have to be this way. Working together,
10 this Congress and the President can immediately begin to
11 restore American credibility by strengthening our common
12 defense. American military power has always been vital to
13 the sustainment of the liberal world order. It enhances our
14 economic power, adds leverage to our diplomacy, reassures
15 our allies, and deters our adversaries.

16 Yet despite the growing array of complex threats to our
17 security, we are on track to cut \$1 trillion out of
18 America's defense budget by 2021. Readiness is cratering
19 across the services. Army and Marine Corps end-strength is
20 falling dangerously low. The Air Force's aircraft inventory
21 is the oldest in its history. The Navy's fleet is shrinking
22 to pre-World War I levels. And top Pentagon officials and
23 military commanders are warning that advances by China,
24 Russia, Iran, and other adversaries mean U.S. military
25 technological superiority can no longer be taken for

1 granted.

2 This state of affairs is dangerous and unacceptable,
3 and represents a failure to meet our most basic
4 constitutional responsibility to provide for the common
5 defense. We must have a strategy-driven budget, and not a
6 budget-driven strategy. We must have a strategy based on a
7 clear-eyed assessment of the threats we face, and a budget
8 that provides the resources necessary to confront them.

9 But crafting a reality-based national security strategy
10 is simply impossible under the mindless mechanism of
11 sequestration. And there would be no clearer signal that
12 America intends to commit to the defense of our national
13 interests and the international system that protects them
14 than its immediate repeal.

15 And I would hasten to add, while a larger defense
16 budget is essential, it will be meaningless without the
17 continued pursuit of defense reform, rethinking how we
18 build, posture, and operate our forces in order to maintain
19 our technological edge and prevail in long-term competition
20 with determined adversaries who seek to undermine the
21 economic and security architecture we have long championed.

22 This hearing will be the first in a series on how we
23 build a national security strategy that can sustain the
24 American power and influence required to defend the
25 international order that has produced an extended security,

1 prosperity, and liberty across the globe.

2 I am pleased we have with us such a distinguished panel
3 of American statesmen to help us begin that conversation.

4 Senator Reed?

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4 First, let me join you in welcoming our new members and
5 our colleagues who have returned.

6 Also, let me congratulate and commend you, Mr.
7 Chairman, on your leadership role. I think the committee is
8 in very strong and very capable hands, and I look forward to
9 working with you.

10 And also, to underscore your comment about the nature
11 of this committee, its bipartisan, thoughtful approach to
12 problems which we will continue, I'm sure, under your
13 leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 General Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. Both of
15 you have been leading American practitioners of diplomacy
16 and strategic thinkers for several decades. We thank you
17 for your service to your country and for your agreeing to be
18 here today.

19 Let me again commend Chairman McCain for calling this
20 hearing, as a series of hearings to look at the challenges
21 he outlined so articulately that face the United States
22 today, and how we may respond to those challenges.

23 This hearing and those that follow will provide us an
24 opportunity to hear from leading experts, retired military
25 commanders, and key leaders in our country about the

1 national security issues that we face.

2 I welcome a chance to take this broad perspective and
3 broad view. The number and breadth of these challenges
4 seems unprecedented, from Russia's aggressive and
5 destabilizing actions in Europe; to the breakdown of nation-
6 states in the Middle East and the rise of non-state actors
7 like al Qaeda and ISIL that threaten the integrity of states
8 throughout the region; to Iran's continued pursuit of a
9 nuclear weapons program and the proliferation risks
10 associated with that; to the growing assertiveness of China,
11 both regionally and globally; and to cyberthreats from North
12 Korea and other malign actors.

13 General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, we would be
14 interested in hearing your perspectives on each of these
15 challenges and the principles that you believe should guide
16 us in addressing them.

17 They include, and this is not an exhaustive list, but
18 it is a lengthy list, with regard to the Middle East, first,
19 how would you define the near- and long-term United States
20 interests in the region; second, what do you believe will be
21 required to defeat the threats from violent extremist groups
22 like ISIL, both in terms of U.S. policy and international
23 collaboration; and third, what role, if any, do you believe
24 nations outside of the Middle East should play in addressing
25 centuries-old divisions in that region, including the Sunni-

1 Shia divide, ethnic rivalries, and political and ideological
2 divisions?

3 With regard to Iran, there are a variety of ongoing
4 developments. Another round of negotiations just wrapped up
5 over the weekend. A July deadline looms. While it is a few
6 months away, it is approaching quickly. And the Senate
7 Banking Committee is working on legislation that it hopes to
8 mark up as early as next week that would impose additional
9 sanctions.

10 So the committee would be interested in your assessment
11 of the likelihood that these negotiations will succeed or
12 fail, and the value of giving this process an opportunity to
13 play out, and your assessment of Iran's regional ambitions
14 and how an Iran would, with or without a nuclear weapon,
15 change the dynamics in that region, and also the broader
16 Sunni-Shia conflict.

17 In regard to Europe, how should the United States and
18 its allies contend with an aggressive, revanchist Russia,
19 while reassuring our allies and respecting the aspirations
20 of the people of Eastern European to draw nearer to our
21 community of nations in Europe?

22 With regard to China, how should the U.S. keep the
23 relationship from spiraling into conflict, while still
24 demonstrating to its allies and partners in the region that
25 it will help to counterbalance China's assertiveness?

1 Finally, regarding the cyber problem, our society
2 appears to be very vulnerable to destructive attacks from
3 even small states like North Korea, who currently have no
4 other means of threatening the homeland militarily. What
5 are the implications of this vulnerability, not just from
6 there but from many other sources?

7 Let me, again, commend the chairman and join with him,
8 finally, in underscoring, echoing, and reinforcing his very,
9 very timely and critical comments about sequestration
10 effects on our military, and the need to couple
11 sequestration with reform of purchasing.

12 With that, I can think of no more thoughtful gentlemen
13 to ask to come forth than General Scowcroft and Dr.
14 Brzezinski. Thank you.

15 Chairman McCain: In other words, if you both would
16 take seats and proceed. However you choose to speak first
17 is fine. Who is oldest?

18 Senator Reed: Who went to a real college?

19 Chairman McCain: Go ahead, Brent.

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT
2 GROUP AND FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

3 General Scowcroft: Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed,
4 members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
5 present some of my views on issues that the chairman and
6 ranking member have laid out in a world which is difficult
7 for all of us.

8 My opening comment I hope can contribute to your
9 deliberations over some very vexing issues and choices that
10 we have. The world we live in is full of problems. Some of
11 them seem to result from new or novel forces and influences,
12 and I intend to focus on them.

13 Let me begin my comments with just a few words about
14 the Cold War. The Cold War was a dangerous period in our
15 history where problems abounded. A mistake could have
16 resulted in a nuclear war, but the Cold War had one
17 advantage. We knew what the strategy was. We argued
18 mightily over tactics, but we were always able to come back
19 to what is it we were trying to do, and that was to contain
20 the Soviet Union until such time as it changed. And that
21 helped enormously in getting us through the Cold War.

22 With the end of the Cold War, that cohesion largely
23 disappeared. But shortly thereafter, we were subjected to
24 globalization, the blending of many worldwide trends of
25 technology, trade, other kinds of things, and with it, an

1 undermining of the Westphalia structure of most of the
2 world's nation-state systems.

3 The Westphalian system was created in the 17th century
4 after the 30 Years' War and the devastation it caused. It
5 made the nation-state the element of political sovereignty
6 in the world. Totally independent, totally on its own, each
7 one, all equal technically.

8 It was a tough system. And for many, many have claimed
9 it was responsible for World War I and World War II. But it
10 is basically the structure of our nation-state system today,
11 as modified in the Westphalian system. Because the United
12 States has spent much of its national interest focus
13 softening the harsh independence of the Westphalian system,
14 like the United Nations, like laws that apply to everybody,
15 like bringing us together rather than having these unique
16 cubicles who are law in themselves but do not relate
17 outside.

18 Now we have something new to confuse the international
19 system, and it is called globalization. And two aspects of
20 it are particularly difficult to manage in this Westphalian
21 world. Globalization says that modern technology, modern
22 science and so on, is pushing the world together. And the
23 Westphalian system says nonsense, we are all unique,
24 separate, sovereign.

25 Two of the globalization efforts are particularly

1 intrusive, if that is the right word. One is
2 communications, and another, in a different way, climate
3 change.

4 Communications is connecting the world and connecting
5 people to the world like never before in history. For most
6 of history, most of the people of the world didn't
7 participate in the politics of their system, didn't
8 participate in anything except their daily lives. And they
9 were just like their parents, they expected their children
10 to be just like them, on and on and on.

11 Now, they are surrounded by information. And they are
12 responding. They are reacting to it. "It is not that kind
13 of a world at all. I am not just chattel for the boss down
14 the street to use any way he wants. I am a human being, and
15 I have unity." This is sweeping throughout the world and
16 altering our system in ways that it is difficult for us to
17 cope with.

18 One of the ways, of course, is the impact of cyber on
19 our societies, which could be enormous, as deadly as nuclear
20 war, not deadly to the person, but deadly to the society.

21 And those are the kinds of things that we face now.
22 And it focused, most importantly, on the Middle East. And I
23 think one of the things we have seen, that if you want to
24 object, like in Egypt, for example, you go out and you
25 parade in the square. Well, that is a difficult thing to

1 do, ordinarily. You have to find people who will go out
2 with you. You have to avoid the police, so on and so forth.

3 But now, globalization has made it really easy. All
4 you have to do is pick up your cell phone and say, "There
5 will be a rally tomorrow in Tahrir Square at 10 o'clock,"
6 and you can get 10 million people.

7 This is a very, very different world, where the
8 Westphalian system is blocked down. It used to keep out
9 information it didn't want its people to see.

10 And that is basically what we are facing, and we have
11 barely begun to deal with it.

12 I add climate change to it, because it demonstrates
13 what we cannot do, the nation-state, alone. No nation-state
14 can deal with climate change. We have to cooperate to make
15 it work. It is just that way.

16 These are new impacts on our system, and they make
17 governance more difficult, and more so for the United
18 States, because we have been at the forefront in
19 liberalizing the Westphalian system, in making a more just
20 world for all.

21 To help us in this difficult task, we should look to
22 our alliances, especially NATO. I think NATO, in many ways,
23 is as valuable as it was during the Cold War. In a world
24 where the relationship of the individual to the state is
25 frequently under attack, an alliance of states to whom that

1 personal relationship to the state is sacred is valuable.
2 And NATO has many areas where it can deal with these new
3 forces on us in a cooperative way, which negates the
4 independent sovereignty and atomizing the world.

5 The impact of globalization on communications seems
6 most dramatic in the Middle East where the impact of the
7 Arab Spring was very heavy and still very much being felt.
8 It has brought Sunni and Shia differences to acrimony and
9 even combat.

10 And the ISIL issue in Syria and Iraq is an excellent
11 example of the devastation that communication can create in
12 the nation-state system. It is attempting to transform
13 political state systems into a caliphate or religious order.

14 I don't think the nation-state system is under gross
15 attack, but this is a new and very different development,
16 which could be dangerous or painful for all of us.

17 Also in the Middle East, however, besides chaos, are
18 some situations where it is conceivable that real progress
19 toward peace and stability might be made. One of these
20 areas is Iran.

21 The Iranian nuclear issue is excruciatingly
22 complicated. But resolution, I don't think, is out of the
23 question. And a resolution of this difficult issue could
24 open the way to discussions of other issues in the Middle
25 East region, which we used to have with Iran when it was a

1 very different state. And it might serve to change some of
2 the Sunni-Shia issues in the region to benefit all of us.

3 Another enduring issue in the Middle East region has
4 been the Palestinian peace process. Many would say that
5 expecting progress is grasping at straws but a determined
6 effort from the top, including the U.S., might bring
7 surprising results.

8 Just a word about the nuclear arsenal. As more and
9 more nuclear delivery vehicles reach replacement condition,
10 the discussion about numbers and types required becomes more
11 voluble and more difficult. One way to calculate nuclear
12 needs could be to create a balance, and I am talking
13 particularly between the U.S. and Russia. That means that
14 nuclear weapons would never be used. And that is that our
15 numbers and character of the force is such that no one can
16 reasonably calculate that in a first strike, he would
17 destroy his opponent's systems and escape unscathed. If we
18 look at that, it gives us guidance in numbers and
19 characteristics of the system, which we need.

20 One other nuclear comment, in order to avoid a world
21 demand for nuclear reactor fuel creating other Iran-like
22 states, I think the U.S. should consider establishing a
23 nuclear fuel bank, where states can check out fuel for
24 reactors, return it after it has been used, and thus avoid
25 what could be almost endless moves toward nuclear power.

1 Mr. Chairman, I focused remarks on aspects of world
2 development I thought most vexing and unique. I would be
3 happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.

4 [The prepared statement of General Scowcroft follows:]

5 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, General.

2 Doctor?

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR AND
2 TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND
3 FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

4 Mr. Brzezinski: Mr. Chairman and members of this
5 distinguished committee, thank you for the invitation to
6 address you. I will be very brief, and I generally agree
7 with what General Scowcroft has just said. We did not
8 consult on our statements.

9 My hope is that your deliberations will shape a
10 bipartisan national security strategy. Such bipartisanship
11 is badly needed, and I think we all know that, given the
12 complexity and severity of the challenges that America faces
13 in Europe, in the Middle East, and potentially in the Far
14 East. Together, they pose an ominous threat to global
15 security.

16 In Europe, Putin is playing with fire, financing and
17 arming a local rebellion, and occasionally even intervening
18 directly by force in order to destabilize Ukraine
19 economically and politically, and thereby destroy its
20 European aspirations. Given that, the current sanctions
21 should, certainly, be maintained until Russia's verbal
22 commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty are actually
23 implemented.

24 In the meantime, NATO and especially the U.S. should
25 make some defensive weaponry available to Ukraine, something

1 that I have been urging since the onset of the crisis. Not
2 to provide them simply increases Russia's temptation to
3 escalate the intervention.

4 At the same time, I have also advocated, and do so
5 again today, that we indicate to the Kremlin that the U.S.
6 realizes that a non-NATO status for a Europe-oriented
7 Ukraine could be part of a constructive East-West
8 accommodation. Finland offers a very good example.

9 The preservation of peace in Europe also requires
10 enhanced security for the very vulnerable Baltic states. In
11 recent years, and we should really take note of this, Russia
12 has conducted menacing military maneuvers near the borders
13 of these states and also in its isolated Kaliningrad region.

14 One of these exercises quite recently involved even a
15 simulated nuclear attack on a neighboring European capital.
16 That surely speaks itself.

17 Accordingly, the only credible yet peaceful way to
18 reinforce regional stability is to deploy now in the Baltic
19 states some tripwire NATO contingents, including also from
20 the U.S.

21 Such deployments would not be threatening to Russia
22 because of their limited scale. But they would reduce its
23 temptation to recklessly replay the scenario that transpired
24 recently in Crimea. Prompt pre-positioning of U.S.-NATO
25 military equipment in nearby Poland would also significantly

1 contribute to enhancing regional deterrence.

2 Turning to the Middle East, again, very briefly, we
3 should try to avoid universalizing the current conflict in
4 Europe into a worldwide collision with Russia. That's an
5 important point. It is both in America's and Russia's
6 interest that the escalating violence in the Middle East
7 does not get out of hand. Containing it is also in China's
8 long-range interest.

9 Otherwise, regional violence is likely to spread
10 northward into Russia -- don't forget that there are some 20
11 million Muslims living in Russia -- and northeastward into
12 Central Asia, eventually even to Xinjiang, to the direct
13 detriment of both Russia and China.

14 America, Russia, and China should, therefore, jointly
15 consult about how they can best support the more moderate
16 Middle East states in pursuing either a political or a
17 military solution. In different ways, America, Russia, and
18 China should encourage Turkish engagement; Iranian
19 cooperation, which is much needed and could be quite
20 valuable; Saudi restraint, somewhat overdue; Egyptian
21 participation in seeking, if possible, some form of
22 compromise in Syria; and the elimination of the regional
23 extremists.

24 And the three major powers should bear in mind that
25 there will be no peace in the Middle East if "boots on the

1 ground" come mainly from the outside and especially from the
2 U.S. The era of colonial supremacy in the region is over.

3 Finally, with the President soon embarking on a trip to
4 India, let me simply express the hope that the U.S. will not
5 unintentionally intensify concerns in Beijing that the U.S.
6 is inclined to help arm India as part of a de facto anti-
7 Chinese Asian coalition. That will simply discourage the
8 Chinese from becoming more helpful in coping with the
9 volatile dangers that confront us in Europe and in the
10 Middle East.

11 To sum up, in my preliminary statement, global
12 stability means discriminating and determined, but not
13 domineering, American engagement.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 [The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

16 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Chairman McCain: Thank you both. Those were very
2 strong words, and that gives us a lot of food for thought.

3 I guess to begin with, would you both agree that
4 sequestration, given the events as we see them in the world
5 today, is something that we need to repeal?

6 Would you agree, General Scowcroft?

7 General Scowcroft: Absolutely, I would. It is a
8 terrible way to determine force structure, strategy,
9 anything like it. It is undermining our ability to do what
10 we need to do to retain, as Zbig says, alert for the
11 contingencies of the world. So, yes, I am very much opposed
12 to sequestration.

13 Chairman McCain: Doctor?

14 Dr. Brzezinski: I agree with Brent.

15 Chairman McCain: It seems to me that if we are going
16 to develop a national security strategy, given the myriad
17 complexities of the challenges we face, as both of you
18 pointed out, it seems to me that we have to have --

19 Dr. Brzezinski: Cyberattack.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Chairman McCain: That we need to set some priorities.
22 Would you give us your view, both of you, of what our
23 priorities should be?

24 General?

25 General Scowcroft: In foreign policy, I presume.

1 Chairman McCain: In order to develop a national
2 security strategy.

3 General Scowcroft: I believe we need, first of all, to
4 pay attention to our nuclear structure and nuclear relations
5 with Russia, because we do not want, above all, a nuclear
6 war to erupt.

7 I think we also need to look carefully at how the world
8 is changing and what we can do to assist that change, to
9 produce a better, not a worse world.

10 One of the big challenges in this world is cyber. I am
11 not intellectually capable of dealing with the cyber issue,
12 but it is a worldwide issue and, as I say, could be as
13 dangerous as nuclear weapons, and there is no control
14 anywhere about it.

15 I think I agree with Zbig that the United States has
16 areas where it can work with both the Chinese and the
17 Russians, and sometimes both of them. I think we should not
18 neglect those.

19 The Chinese especially didn't participate in the
20 Westphalian world I was talking about. Their system is very
21 different. There is China and there is anybody else. And
22 we need to learn, with the Chinese, how to communicate to
23 them so that we have the desired effect.

24 I think Russia is a very difficult case right now, but
25 I think the Cold War is not returning, and we should not aid

1 and abet its return.

2 Chairman McCain: Dr. Brzezinski, on the issue of
3 Russia, there are some that believe that because of the
4 price of oil and its effect on the Russian economy, it'll
5 lead Putin to be more conducive to lessening some of his
6 aggressive and confrontational behaviors, such as you
7 described, not only in Ukraine but with the Baltics and
8 Moldova, et cetera. There are others that say because of
9 this, it will make him more confrontational in order to
10 maintain his standing, not only with the Russian people, but
11 in the world.

12 I wonder what your assessment is, and I know it is a
13 very difficult question.

14 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes, but could I comment very briefly
15 on the previous one?

16 Chairman McCain: Yes, anything, Doctor.

17 Dr. Brzezinski: First of all, about the nuclear
18 confrontation, obviously, we confront each other, and we
19 have had some crises in the past. I think we have learned a
20 great deal from them, and I hope the Russians have, as well.

21 But what is somewhat alarming is the fact that in
22 recent times, during this current crisis, which is a
23 limited, ground-based crisis, Putin has invoked the threat
24 of nuclear weapons. People haven't paid much attention to
25 it, but he has publicly commented on the fact that we have

1 the nuclear weapons, we have the capability, and so forth.
2 And he has then matched that with highly provocative air
3 overflights over Scandinavia, over parts of Western Europe,
4 even all the way to Portugal.

5 So I am a little concerned -- when I say "little," I am
6 underestimating my concern -- that there may be a dangerous
7 streak in his character that could push us to some possibly
8 very dangerous confrontations. In that respect, he reminds
9 me a little bit of Khrushchev. We all recall where that
10 led, at one point.

11 This is why it is terribly important that he have no
12 misunderstandings as to the nature of our commitment and our
13 determination. And this is why doing something on the
14 ground that deters him, first, from trying to leapfrog on
15 the ground with a military solution, is needed, and I
16 alluded to that in my opening comments.

17 Insofar as China is concerned, I think probably the
18 Chinese have some genuine interest from the standpoint of
19 the enhancement of their international power in the
20 acquisition of cyber-capabilities of a confrontational type.

21 I don't want to overexaggerate this, and I am searching
22 for words that don't create some impression of an imminent
23 danger, but part of their military strategic history is the
24 notion that you don't prepare to fight your opponent at that
25 given stage of weaponry. You leapfrog and then you engage

1 in some offensive activity.

2 I am concerned that the Chinese may feel that they
3 cannot surpass us in the nuclear area, and note at their
4 very, very significant nuclear restraint, in terms of
5 nuclear deployments. They have hardly any nuclear weapons,
6 really, targeted at us. We have many times over nuclear
7 weapons targeted on China. But the cyber issue may pose, at
8 least at this stage only theoretically but at some point
9 really, the possibility of paralyzing an opponent entirely
10 without killing anybody.

11 That could be a very tempting solution for a nation
12 that is increasingly significant economically, but does
13 realize that there is an enormous military disparity between
14 China and us. That, I think, suggests we have to be far
15 more inclined to raise those issues with the Chinese, which
16 we have done to some extent, but even more important, to
17 engage in deterrence by having a capability to respond
18 effectively or to prevent an attempt from being successful.

19 Now, on the point you've just raised, which was about
20 Putin and how to contain him, right?

21 Chairman McCain: Basically, yes. His reaction to this
22 economic crisis that he is confronting.

23 Dr. Brzezinski: He is confronting a very serious
24 economic crisis, which he is trying to deny. I think he is
25 in a denial phase. But it is quite interesting how many of

1 his former immediate associates, political allies, express
2 growing concern.

3 Now here the real question is not only how severe is
4 the crisis in Russia, but the real question internationally
5 is, will the Russian economy implode in some significant,
6 geopolitically significant fashion first, or will Ukraine
7 implode in some significant geopolitical fashion first?
8 Because a great deal of what Putin is doing is not part of a
9 comprehensive military invasion of Ukraine, other than the
10 specific seizure of Crimea, but it is to sow discord,
11 disorganization, economic tensions and costs, and the
12 demoralization, as a consequence, in a regime which is
13 expressing the will of the Ukrainian people for a closer
14 association with the West, but as a regime that came to
15 power after 20 years of very significant mismanagement of
16 the Ukrainian economy.

17 The kind of needle-sticking in which Putin is engaging
18 against Ukraine produces not only blood in some relatively
19 moderate fashion, but annoying and painful, but could
20 produce a much more serious economic crisis in Ukraine
21 itself.

22 This is why I think we have to, in a sense, more
23 credibly convince Putin that it is in his interest not to
24 engage in this needle-sticking, because we can make it
25 unpleasant for him by, for example, arming the Ukrainians,

1 while at the same time reassuring him that we are not trying
2 to engage the Ukrainians in membership in NATO. The
3 arrangement we worked out together with others, and the
4 others were more important than us, with Finland in 1945-
5 1946 has worked pretty well.

6 Chairman McCain: Thank you.

7 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, gentlemen, not only
8 for your testimony but for your extraordinary service to the
9 country.

10 About 2 years ago in 2013, I believe you coauthored an
11 open letter about the Iranian negotiations, suggesting it
12 was time now to support these negotiations, and specifically
13 saying additional sanctions now against Iran with the view
14 to extracting even more concessions in the negotiation will
15 risk undermining or even shutting down the negotiations.

16 Let me ask General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, is that
17 still your position? If Congress adopted sanctions, do you
18 feel that would undermine negotiations and perhaps miss an
19 opportunity not only in the nuclear realm but in the other
20 areas of concern?

21 General Scowcroft: Yes, Senator, it is. I think that
22 the system, the regime in Iran, is different. We don't know
23 how different, and we don't know what the results will be.
24 But their behavior is quite different from when Ahmadinejad
25 was the head of the government.

1 It seems to me that we ought to try to take advantage
2 of that. The foreign minister has served in the U.N., in
3 NATO. He is familiar with the West. They are talking
4 different, and the mullahs are not nearly as vociferous as
5 they were before.

6 Does that mean anything? We don't know, but it seems
7 to me it is worth testing.

8 I think two things are likely to happen if we increase
9 the sanctions. They will break the talks, and a lot of the
10 people who have now joined us in the sanctions would be in
11 danger of leaving, because most of the people who joined us
12 in sanctions on Iran didn't do it to destroy Iran. They did
13 it to help get a nuclear solution.

14 Senator Reed: Dr. Brzezinski?

15 Dr. Brzezinski: Basically, I have a similar
16 perspective. I would only add to what Brent said, so as not
17 to repeat, that in addition to what he said, I think the
18 breaking off of the negotiations or the collapse of the
19 negotiations would arrest and reverse the painful and
20 difficult process of increasing moderation within Iranian
21 political life.

22 We are dealing with an old generation of
23 revolutionaries, extremists, and so forth. But there is in
24 Iranian society a significant change, which every visitor to
25 Iran now notices, toward a more moderate attitude and more

1 moderate lifestyle and a more tempting inclination to
2 emulate some Western standards, including how in Tehran
3 women are dressed.

4 All of that I think indicates that Iran is beginning to
5 evolve into what it traditionally has been, a very civilized
6 and important historical country. But we have to be very
7 careful not to have this dramatically and suddenly reversed,
8 not to mention the negative consequences for global
9 stability that this would have, and the reduction in any
10 willingness, Iranian willingness, in some fashion to prevent
11 the extremists and fanatics that are attempting to seize
12 control over the Muslim world from prevailing.

13 Senator Reed: Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski, turning very
14 quickly, because my time is expiring, in September, last
15 September, you were asked to comment about the situation in
16 Syria, and you indicated that an American role is definitely
17 required, but that role essentially has to be very carefully
18 limited. Is that your view today, or do you have any other
19 comments?

20 Dr. Brzezinski: That is still my view. It probably
21 goes even further.

22 I never quite understood why we had to help or at least
23 endorse the overthrow of Assad. I am not really sure we
24 knew what we were doing when we made the statement, because
25 there wasn't any real action following on that.

1 What has happened, however, in the last 2 years or so
2 since that happened is a demonstration of the fact that,
3 whether we like it or not, Assad does have some significant
4 support in Syrian society, probably more than any one of the
5 several groups that are opposing him. So that has to be
6 taken into account.

7 I don't think that those who oppose him, perhaps with
8 the exception of the relatively small and weakest group
9 among the resisters, who favor us -- he has a better
10 standing than any one of them. Combined, maybe there is some
11 division in the country across the board, but he is still
12 there.

13 I think if we want to, in some fashion, promote the end
14 of the horrible bloodletting and the progressive destruction
15 of that country, not the promotion of democracy, I think we
16 have to take that reality into account.

17 Senator Reed: General Scowcroft, quickly, your
18 comments, if at all, on this topic?

19 General Scowcroft: I pretty much agree with Zbig on
20 Syria. I wouldn't rule out that at some point we can get
21 some support for resolving the most difficult situation from
22 the Russians. They have a big stake in Syria, and it seems
23 to me that somewhere there is the possibility that we could
24 have a ceasefire and Assad maybe steps aside, and we would
25 agree that Russia would play an important role with us in

1 resolving that.

2 Among terrible choices, it is one we ought to examine.
3 The Russians have made a few comments in the last few days
4 that they might be interested.

5 Dr. Brzezinski: May I just add one more point? I
6 think the existing borders in the Middle East have run out
7 of life. They were never authentically historic. They were
8 created largely by West colonial powers.

9 I think part of the complication we face, particularly
10 in view of this intense violence, not only just in Syria, is
11 the problem of stabilizing a region that has different, so
12 to speak, different preconditions for different borders or
13 arrangements than the ones that were imposed right after
14 World War I by the West.

15 Senator Reed: Thank you.

16 Chairman McCain: Senator Sessions?

17 Senator Sessions: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
18 you for this hearing. I look forward to serving with you on
19 the committee. There is no one in the Senate, almost no one
20 in America, who has traveled and has the depth of experience
21 as Senator McCain. It is an honor to serve with him and
22 hear his ideas on so many important issues of today's life.

23 While reading Dr. Kissinger's book, "World Order,"
24 General Scowcroft, he talks about the Westphalian system.
25 Your remarks touched me a bit.

1 You mentioned China not being part of that history. At
2 least the people of the Middle East were also not part of
3 any understanding of what went on with the Peace of
4 Westphalia.

5 Do we have a miscommunication, and I'll ask both of
6 you, in the sense of our understanding of the nation-state
7 and the reality of the nation-state in that area, and a
8 better understanding might make us more effective in
9 responding to the challenges we face there?

10 General Scowcroft: I think that is possible, but I
11 think the Middle East is a unique place.

12 For centuries, it belonged to the Ottoman Empire, which
13 loosely governed it. Then with the collapse of the Ottoman
14 Empire after World War I, the Middle East was redrawn. The
15 map was redrawn. The Sykes-Picot Agreement quite
16 arbitrarily, to pursue the interests that the British and
17 the French had in it, as Zbig said, those borders are in
18 danger. They are tenuous. They don't represent much of
19 anything.

20 It is a very difficult region now, and unique in it is
21 not participating, basically, in the European or Western
22 system, the Russian system, or the Chinese.

23 Senator Sessions: Do you think, as Dr. Brzezinski has
24 indicated, that we may be moving toward redrawing some of
25 those boundaries or boundaries being altered in the next

1 decade?

2 Either one of you, if you would like to comment on
3 that.

4 General Scowcroft: I don't think we ought to engage in
5 that. One of the things I think we should do, though, is to
6 start mending our relationships with Egypt.

7 Egypt is a big player in the region, and because of its
8 domestic problems, it has fallen off. They played a small
9 role in the recent uprising, but I think we need help.
10 Hopefully, we can get more from Turkey, but I think the
11 chances of our making it worse rather than better are
12 worrisome.

13 Senator Sessions: I thank both of you for your
14 insights. It is very valuable to us.

15 With regard to strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, I believe it
16 was mentioned earlier that we had a Cold War strategy.
17 Everybody bought into it in a bipartisan way. The reality
18 is I think it is much harder for us to have a strategy in
19 this more complex world. Maybe not, but it seems to me that
20 it is.

21 I would share your concern, as I have been here now 18
22 years, that we need to be a bit more humble in what we can
23 accomplish. The world is complex. People are not able to
24 move from one century to the next overnight. And we need to
25 be more responsible and thoughtful about how we exercise

1 American power.

2 In developing a strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, do you see
3 some things we might all agree on in the next decade or so
4 that would be positive for the United States?

5 Dr. Brzezinski: I can, certainly, think of a lot of
6 things we should agree on. I am not sure we will agree.
7 But in order to agree, we have to talk to each other.

8 I am not quite sure that in recent years, particularly
9 in the face of the novelty of the challenges we face, that
10 there has been enough of a bipartisan dialogue about these
11 critical issues at the highest level, including obviously
12 you, members of this very distinguished committee,
13 irrespective of who actually controls the executive office.

14 I think we have to ask ourselves, how is the world
15 different today? I am a little more skeptical of the
16 Westphalian system as, so to speak, being in any way
17 relevant, because the Westphalian system emerged in Europe
18 when they were already being different countries with some
19 territorial definitions. This is not the case in many parts
20 of the world. China was unique in having a real advanced
21 state, so to speak, earlier than Europe.

22 But the rest of the world is now coming into being,
23 politically into being. That contributes to much of the
24 instability and uncertainty of what is happening.

25 What are the real borders in the Middle East? A lot of

1 the countries in the Middle East speak the same language,
2 for example. Why should they be here or there? Or should
3 they have a single state if they all speak the same
4 language? Or should religion be the only determinant for a
5 nation-state?

6 I am afraid this process will take a long time before
7 it settles itself. I think we should not be directly
8 involved in imposing a solution.

9 Senator Sessions: Thank you both. I appreciate that.

10 I would say, with regard to Members of Congress,
11 particularly members of the Senate, I believe we talk
12 together more collegially and with more common understanding
13 about international relations and defense issues than we do
14 about most any other subject. So I think we have not the
15 kind of intensity of disagreement as some, some pretty big
16 intensity going back, I guess, to the Iraq war and so forth.

17 But I think we are getting past that. Hopefully, we can be
18 more effective in working as a united country, because that
19 is the essential.

20 Thank you.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Heinrich?

22 Senator Heinrich: Thank you, Chairman.

23 Mr. Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. I read last
24 year a piece by Thomas Friedman that I found was very
25 interesting, where he described the Islamic state and the

1 situation in the Middle East today by saying that there were
2 really three civil wars raging in the Arab world today.
3 One, the civil war within Sunni Islam between the radical
4 jihadists and the moderate or mainstream Sunni Muslims and
5 regimes; two, the civil war across the region between Sunnis
6 funded by Saudi Arabia and Shiites funded by Iran; and,
7 three, the civil war between Sunni jihadists all other
8 minorities in the region, the Yazidis, the Turkmen, the
9 Kurds, the Christians, the Jews, and the Alawites.

10 He wrote that when you have a region beset by that man
11 civil wars at once, it means that there is no center, only
12 sides. And when you intervene in a middle of a region where
13 there is no center, you very quickly become a side.

14 I am curious if either of you would agree with that
15 assessment, and if you would also return to what you spoke
16 about a little earlier regarding how important it is that
17 the fighting on the frontlines against the Islamic state be
18 conducted by Iraqis and other regional partners and members
19 of the coalition, as opposed to Western or U.S. troops.

20 Dr. Brzezinski: I agree basically with it. I think
21 there are, fortunately, several states in the Middle East
22 that do show signs of a capacity for conducting a
23 responsible role. We have to rely on them.

24 I doubt they are going to prevail very quickly. And
25 these are the countries that were mentioned. But I don't

1 think we have any other choice. I think getting involved in
2 the internal dynamics, religious conflicts, sectarian
3 animosities of the region is a prescription for a protracted
4 engagement of the kind that can be very destructive to our
5 national interests.

6 Now to be sure, there are some circumstances in which
7 we have to act. When we were attacked on 9/11, we had to
8 respond.

9 But I remember being called in with, I think, Brent and
10 Henry Kissinger, to the session that made the basic
11 decision. And we were, of course, not participants in
12 making the decision, but we would say something. I fully
13 endorsed taking military actions against Osama and his
14 associates, al Qaeda.

15 But I walked up to the Secretary of Defense at the
16 time, Donald Rumsfeld, and said, look, let's go in. Let's
17 knock them out, do what we can to destroy the Taliban, which
18 held government control in the country, and then leave.
19 Don't get engaged in development of democracy.

20 Now maybe I was wrong. Maybe time will demonstrate
21 that I was wrong. But, certainly, I don't think anybody
22 anticipated it would be 10 years, and it might be still
23 another 10 years. And, certainly, in the rest of the Middle
24 East, if we were to try that, it would be far, far longer.

25 So I think we have to face the fact that the region

1 will probably be in some serious turmoil for a long time to
2 come, and our bets ought to be on those countries, which,
3 like the European countries in the era of formation, have
4 already acquired some cohesion as states, and I mentioned
5 them in my comments, but not try to do the heavy lifting
6 ourselves.

7 If we could get the Russians and Chinese to be more
8 cooperative, and they have a stake in being more
9 cooperative, we would be better off, and each of them, in
10 fact, be tempted to sit on the sidelines and think, well,
11 the Americans will get more engaged, and this will improve
12 our interests in competing with us here or there.

13 I don't think that is a smart solution in the long run
14 for them. But it takes someone like us to indicate to them
15 that we would like to collaborate with them in some limited
16 steps in helping the moderates in the Middle East in
17 different ways, because they have different aspirations.

18 Senator Heinrich: Mr. Scowcroft, do you want to add to
19 that?

20 General Scowcroft: I largely agree with Zbig on that.

21 I think we have to be a participant in the Middle East,
22 but we should not want to be an owner. We ought to help
23 those states that we think are trying to produce, if you
24 will, a modern system.

25 That is why I mentioned Egypt, because Egypt is a

1 serious power, and they are of the region, and they do have
2 great capability. We don't have much of a discussion going
3 on with them now, but there is a new government. And I
4 think that is one we should look to.

5 Turkey is an ally of ours. The Turks are in a very
6 difficult position now with Syria.

7 But it seems to me that we ought to be careful and use
8 force where it accomplishes specific ends. For example, try
9 to go in and end the Syrian war, I don't think we want to
10 own Syria. It is a very, very complicated country, as are
11 some of the others in the Middle East.

12 And I agree with Zbig, basically. We have to be in the
13 Middle East but not of the Middle East.

14 Senator Heinrich: Thank you, both.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Ayotte?

16 Senator Ayotte: I want to thank both of you for being
17 here, and thank you so much for everything you've done for
18 the country.

19 I wanted to follow up on your comments, Dr. Brzezinski
20 -- I found them very interesting -- about Putin and that, in
21 fact, you are concerned about some of the statements that
22 have been overlooked that he has made that have referenced
23 nuclear weapons, including some of the overflights that
24 Russia has undertaken in Scandinavia, west Portugal, other
25 areas.

1 So I wanted to follow up in light of the potential and
2 I think actual violation of the INF treaty that we have
3 seen, that I know, General Scowcroft, you have written about
4 as well.

5 In fact, General, you wrote in an op-ed in August of
6 2014 that this should be a real concern to NATO because they
7 have embarked on an across-the-board modernization of their
8 nuclear forces. And of course, if Russia has developed a
9 nuclear ground-launched cruise missile, in violation of the
10 1987 INF treaty, obviously that type of system could
11 virtually reach all of NATO Europe.

12 So how do you view, both of you, the idea of the
13 violation of this treaty, in light of where we are right now
14 and some of the statements you have heard Putin make? What
15 should our concern be about that?

16 I appreciated your comments, Dr. Brzezinski, that we
17 have to show commitment and determination to Putin, and that
18 will hopefully help him stop being so escalatory with what
19 he is doing with Ukraine, and also this treaty.

20 So I would like to get both of your thoughts on this
21 violation, what it means for their nuclear programs, our
22 interactions with them.

23 Dr. Brzezinski: I don't think he will go all the way
24 in violating the nuclear treaty. I am more concerned about
25 his misinterpreting what has happened recently.

1 Let's go back a little more than a year. I wonder how
2 many people in this room or on this very important
3 senatorial committee really anticipated that one day Putin
4 would land military personnel in Crimea and seize it. I
5 think if anybody said that is what he was going to do, he or
6 she would be labeled as a warmonger.

7 He did it, and he got away with it. I think he is also
8 drawing lessons from that.

9 I will tell you what my nightmare is. One day, and I
10 literally mean one day, he just seizes Riga and Tallinn,
11 Latvia and Estonia. It would literally take him 1 day.
12 There is no way they could resist.

13 Then we will say how horrible, how shocking, how
14 outrageous. But, of course, we can't do anything about it.

15 It has happened. We are not going to assemble a fleet in
16 the Baltics and then engage in amphibious landings and then
17 storm ashore like in Normandy to take it back. We will have
18 to respond in some larger fashion, perhaps. But then there
19 will be voices, "Well, this will plunge us into nuclear
20 war."

21 I think deterrence has to have meaning. It has to have
22 teeth in it. It has to create a situation in which someone
23 planning an action like that has no choice but to
24 anticipate, "What kind of resistance will I encounter?"

25 This is why I recommend what I do recommend, pre-

1 positioning of some forces, limited forces, so it is not
2 provocative.

3 An American company in Estonia is not going to invade
4 Russia, and Putin will know that. But he will know that if
5 he invades Estonia, he will encounter some American forces
6 on the ground and, better still, some Germans, some French,
7 some Brits, of course.

8 I think if we do that kind of stuff, we are
9 consolidating stability, including nuclear. The same goes
10 for the ongoing conflict in Russia and Ukraine.

11 I don't think Putin plans to invade Ukraine as a whole,
12 because that would be too dangerous. You cannot simply
13 predict what would happen.

14 But this continuous pinpricking can involve some
15 escalation. It has already involved escalation. There are
16 Russians, at least in the hundreds, according to some NATO
17 accounts, in terms of several thousand, fighting in Ukraine
18 against an established country. This is something that
19 cannot be ignored.

20 Economic sanctions, yes. In the long run, they create
21 an attitude, a concern in Russian society, which will
22 deprive Putin of his popular support, and this ecstatic
23 sense that we have become a superpower again. But in the
24 short run, we have to deal also with his motivations.

25 The only way to do that is to indicate to him by

1 tangible steps, such as defensive arming of the Ukrainians,
2 that we will be involved in some fashion in making that
3 military engagement more costly. And at the same time, to
4 indicate to him we are prepared to settle, send him a signal
5 about non-NATO participation for Ukraine.

6 That to me is a strategy of responding to the
7 possibility that you very rightly raise.

8 Senator Ayotte: Without taking those steps, obviously,
9 as I hear you saying you believe the economic sanctions
10 alone will not deter him.

11 Dr. Brzezinski: I am afraid that economic sanctions
12 alone will damage, in the meantime, because of what he has a
13 free hand in doing, Ukraine then Russia.

14 There is a kind of implicit race of which economy will
15 collapse first. The Ukrainian Government is still not in
16 full control of its entire society. It is putting together
17 rapidly a makeshift army, and it is getting very little
18 support in that regard from the outside.

19 I am not suggesting that the Ukrainians be armed to
20 wage an offensive war against the Russians, but I do urge
21 that we do something to make Putin ask himself, before he
22 escalates, "Am I going to be in something much bigger? And
23 what will that do to me?" That is all that is involved, but
24 it is essential.

25 Senator Ayotte: thank you.

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Manchin?

2 Senator Manchin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
3 appreciate this hearing you are having for all of us, and
4 the information.

5 I am so sorry that you see some of us running back and
6 forth. We have a Veterans Committee meeting, and they
7 overlap sometimes. I'm very sorry. I hope I don't ask the
8 same questions that have been asked.

9 But anyway, my main concern is that I am trying to
10 learn as much as humanly possible about Syria, Iran, the
11 whole sanctions on Iran. As you know, we are kind of in a
12 tug-of-war right. Should we, should we not? The President
13 has been very emphatic that, absolutely no sanctions, don't
14 sign it now. You will mess up the deal if we do.

15 I understand that my colleagues are concerned about all
16 the time that has gone by, and we really haven't had a
17 secure briefing telling us where they are. Have they
18 succeeded? Are they moving forward? Are they taking their
19 centrifuges out? Should we keep the pressure on? Should
20 this be something the President should be able to use that
21 if they don't follow through and do what they are supposed
22 to do, this is where the sense of the Senate and United
23 States Congress is, and they will follow through, so it's
24 best to work with me?

25 These are all things that I haven't made up my mind on

1 yet, and I'm trying to. So a little bit of help there.

2 Also, Syria, I know we have an awful lot of people who
3 feel strongly. I believe that America has to be strong. I
4 don't think they can succeed unless they have what seems
5 like our direct leadership in kind of prodding them. Also,
6 our airstrikes can't be as effective as they could be if we
7 don't have ground intelligence and support.

8 I understand all of that. I just don't believe we
9 should have massive forces on the ground as we have had in
10 the past. That is my belief. I know some of my colleagues
11 differ with that.

12 I think, strategically, with our Special Forces, black
13 ops, we can do certain things. But unless they want to take
14 the ground war in that part of the world, it is never going
15 to be cured.

16 But make no mistake, if they make a fool with America,
17 we should hit and hit hard.

18 With all that being said, do you believe that with
19 Syria trying to train and arm some of the Syrians at \$500
20 million is what we have set aside for that, I think, does
21 that have the possibility of being successful? Could we do
22 something different with that to be more successful?

23 And how about the Kurds? They seem to be the only
24 people who want to fight in that part of the world, that
25 want to defend, and want a country, and want identity. Are

1 we doing enough there? Could we do more? How in the world
2 do you get the Turks to participate and the Saudi's to
3 participate? That's a big thing.

4 But Syria and Iran are the two things that would be
5 very helpful to me. Whoever wants to start, I think I need
6 both of your opinions, if possible.

7 General Scowcroft: On Iran, I don't think anybody
8 knows whether or not negotiations will work, but we are in
9 the course of negotiations now. I think we should see them
10 out and not take steps, which would destroy the
11 negotiations.

12 Senator Manchin: In all due respect, we were told the
13 first time that if we would sign a letter showing that we
14 intended that these sanctions take place, it would weaken
15 the President's hand. We went ahead and signed it anyway,
16 and it hasn't weakened the hand, but there have been
17 extensions that we really don't know where we stand as far
18 as the negotiations.

19 That is the hard thing I am having a problem with.

20 General Scowcroft: It is hard, but I think the
21 outlines are sufficiently clear now -- very complicated, but
22 clear -- that I think we are in the home stretch. To change
23 our strategy now might work, but I wouldn't do it at this
24 stage.

25 Senator Manchin: I understand.

1 General Scowcroft: I would wait and see if the
2 administration is successful.

3 Senator Manchin: Dr. Brzezinski, your thoughts on
4 Syria, our training and the commitment that we have there
5 and if it might be a better investment somewhere else, in a
6 different direction.

7 Dr. Brzezinski: I am not sure whom we would train,
8 because, in fact, the groups hostile to Assad are much
9 stronger than those who seem to be inclined to rely on us.
10 After what has happened over the last couple years, I think
11 there are not terribly many Syrians who want us to wage a
12 more intense war, because they don't know what that war
13 would be. The other groupings have an advantage over us of
14 either being more sectarian and specifically identified as
15 such, or identified with specific regional goals that have
16 some historic connection to the world as the Syrians
17 perceive it.

18 So I think some sort of ceasefire and discussions about
19 the future would be the better outcome for us than an
20 intensification of the war.

21 As far as Iran is concerned, don't forget that we are
22 not the only negotiator with Iran, and all of the parties
23 negotiating, including our closest allies, as well as the
24 Russians and Chinese, favor a continuation of the
25 negotiations for reasons specific to their own interests.

1 If the negotiations broke down, the whole process would
2 collapse, and then what would be the alternative? Should we
3 then attack and bomb them and thereby make the war in the
4 Middle East even more explosive? We have to ask ourselves,
5 why should we do this?

6 "Cui bono" is a very good, simple, practical question
7 to ask. I don't see any benefit to the United States in
8 that transpiring.

9 We have made some progress. Whether we have made
10 enough progress, I don't know. Whether the negotiations
11 have been perfectly conducted or not, I don't really know
12 either, because I haven't been there. But I do have a
13 feeling that there has developed a common stake with key
14 countries in the world, which we shouldn't unilaterally
15 abandon just because we are being pressured to do so.

16 Senator Manchin: Thank you both so much. I appreciate
17 it.

18 Chairman McCain: I am sure you noted yesterday the
19 signing of an agreement between Iran and Russia, a military
20 cooperation deal, to confront U.S. interference in regional
21 and international affairs.

22 Senator Tillis?

23 Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 My question is more broad in nature. With the changing
25 of the administration, there were clearly some changes in

1 foreign policy strategy. I am interested in your view over
2 the past 5 or 6 years, more or less, if you were engaged in
3 the strategy formulation, what things do you suggest that we
4 stop doing? What things do you suggest that we start doing?
5 And what should we continue to do?

6 In other words, an objective assessment, in your view,
7 of things that are working and things that need improvement
8 in the Middle East.

9 Dr. Brzezinski: In the Middle East? Wow.

10 For one thing, I think we have to continue doing what
11 we have perhaps started doing, which is encouraging those
12 states in the Middle East that have some historical identity
13 and some capability to act, rather than to wait for us to do
14 the job overall. I think the countries that we have
15 mentioned, in varying degrees, are tempted to have something
16 done, but would prefer us to carry the heavy water and are
17 not very clear about their aspirations.

18 That leaves us in a very difficult position, because if
19 we undertake to do what is necessary, we buy the whole
20 shebang. We buy the whole conflict, and it becomes our
21 baby. If we sit back, obviously, it may deteriorate. So we
22 have to find some formula in between.

23 I happen to be an admirer of Secretary Kerry. I think
24 he has been trying really very, very energetically to find
25 some viable compromise. And it is difficult as hell to

1 achieve it in these conditions.

2 Perhaps this very painful process that we are now
3 witnessing in that region will continue for some time to
4 come. But the better part of wisdom in these circumstances,
5 in my judgment, is the one that Brent and I have been both
6 advocating, which is a policy of very selective engagement,
7 which prevents the other side, particularly the killers, the
8 sadists, the fanatics, the extreme sectarians, from winning.

9 I think we can do that. But we don't have to do much
10 more than that to maintain that.

11 Senator Tillis: Can you give examples of what
12 selective engagement would look like, in your view?

13 Dr. Brzezinski: Somewhat along the lines of what is
14 currently being practiced, in fact, which is airstrikes,
15 probably some Special Forces, intelligence, political
16 assistance, financial assistance, and a willingness,
17 perhaps, to change our position on some issues, such as, to
18 me, the still unclear motives for trying to get rid of
19 Assad.

20 I don't quite understand why we are so eager to get him
21 out of office. Is he that much worse than some other
22 regimes in the area? What is it? Was he our enemy? Was he
23 conspiring against us?

24 There were specific regional reasons why the war
25 started, by countries in the region. I don't think that was

1 our cup of tea, and we sort of got involved in it, and now
2 have the whole problem.

3 Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski.

4 Mr. Scowcroft, you made the comment that we need to be
5 in the Middle East, but not of the Middle East. Can you
6 give me an example of what that means in terms of policy
7 execution?

8 General Scowcroft: Yes, I think it means we should
9 guide, help, assist, but not be a player in ourselves, that
10 is, ground troops. I think what we are doing in Syria, it's
11 okay. It was an emergency. I think that we should not
12 carry the burden on that, much less being of the region,
13 ground troops.

14 We don't know what the best outcome for Syria is. It
15 is very, very complicated. We need to help our friends. We
16 need to encourage others to be more helpful.

17 The Turks, for example, have a heavy interest in the
18 Kurds, not necessarily the kind of interest that the Kurds
19 want them to have.

20 So we need to be careful all the way through, but help
21 those who want to do what we think would improve the
22 situation without it belonging to us.

23 Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal?

24 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want
25 to join in thanking you for holding this hearing to provide

1 some intellectual and conceptual context to the very
2 challenging work we are going to have ahead of us in these
3 next 2 years.

4 I want to thank both of our witnesses not only for
5 being here today but for your longstanding service to our
6 Nation in uniform and as National Security Advisor. Each of
7 you has contributed enormously to the readiness and the
8 preparedness and the performance of our Armed Forces in
9 protecting our national security.

10 I want to focus on an area you mentioned in your
11 opening statement, Mr. Scowcroft, cyber, a new, emerging
12 form of warfare, perhaps very difficult to imagine in the
13 days that each of you served as National Security Advisor,
14 illustrating how the nature of warfare is changing.

15 Perhaps I could ask each of you how you think we need
16 to be better prepared not only in the mechanics of cyber-
17 intelligence and cyber-warfare but also in the education of
18 our country as to the importance of this very complex area,
19 which is also probably going to be of increasing importance.

20 General Scowcroft: I think that cyber is of increasing
21 importance. I believe we are just touching the surface and
22 that we could profit by some innovative thinking about how
23 we can approach that problem and how we can get other
24 countries, like the Chinese, for example, involved in ways
25 that are helpful.

1 We may have to try several different things, but the
2 potential danger of cyber, not just to us, but to those who
3 are practicing it now, should enable us to have some serious
4 discussions with other countries. But we also need a
5 serious discussion within the United States, too, because
6 the government and some of our industries are not
7 cooperating in the way, at least to my understanding, are
8 not cooperating in the way which could really move the ball
9 forward.

10 This is a ball that looks different to different
11 people.

12 Senator Blumenthal: Do you think our response, for
13 example, to the Sony attack should be more robust and
14 vigorous? Let me pose that question to both of you.

15 General Scowcroft: Well, I think you need to know more
16 about it before you answer the question, because it depends
17 who really pushed the attack, and what kind of reaction is
18 best to move the ball forward and to give us a better grip
19 on how we can deal with this difficult situation.

20 Senator Blumenthal: Dr. Brzezinski, do you have any
21 observations?

22 Dr. Brzezinski: I don't have an answer. I have a
23 comment.

24 This is a hypersensitive issue, both in terms of what
25 it involves and the need for secrecy in dealing with it.

1 Basically, we have to seek two objectives.

2 One is to develop some predictable immunity against
3 some preemptive action by a hostile force. I alluded to
4 that possibility. That will require a major, major effort
5 and major expenditure, and probably move us into a field
6 that we haven't fully, sufficiently explored.

7 The second is to have a preemptive capability, a
8 preemptive capability to preempt some action of that sort or
9 matches some action against us tit-for-tat instantly.

10 I don't want to be too specific about who the enemy
11 might be. I don't think we need to create public hysteria
12 on the subject. But it, certainly, stands to reason that
13 there are some countries in the world that might think that
14 cyber-warfare against the United States is the best way to
15 preempt the whole issue and to change the balance of power.

16 I think we are still in the very, very early phases of
17 responding to that, something like the United States was in
18 1943, 1944 when we started getting really serious about the
19 acquisition of nuclear weapons.

20 Senator Blumenthal: I want to thank you. My time has
21 expired.

22 We barely touched, let alone scratched, the surface.
23 But I would just offer the observation that our private
24 sector probably is less prepared than it should be. And our
25 military, or at least our civilian leadership, has the

1 opportunity to provide more incentives, and maybe more
2 compulsory measures, to ensure that we are better prepared
3 in the private sector against these kinds of attacks,
4 because certain kinds of attacks are as much a threat to
5 national security, whether they are to our financial system,
6 our utilities, even a corporation like Sony -- I shouldn't
7 say, "even a corporation like Sony" -- which employs and has
8 such an important impact on our society.

9 So thank you very much for your responses.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Senator Graham?

12 Senator Graham: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Thank you both very, very much.

14 Some observations and conclusions that you've made
15 seemed a bit -- don't reconcile for me, but we will talk
16 about that in a moment.

17 As to the Iranian situation, do you agree with me that
18 whatever chance there is to get a deal with Iranian nuclear
19 ambitions, we should take? Whatever opportunity we have to
20 get a peaceful resolution of their nuclear ambitions, we
21 should pursue that diplomatically? Just say yes.

22 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes.

23 [Laughter.]

24 General Scowcroft: I think, if I understand the
25 question.

1 Senator Graham: I am not trying to trick you.

2 So I agree with that. But one thing we should never
3 allow to happen is for Iran to get a nuclear weapon.

4 Do you both agree with that?

5 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes.

6 General Scowcroft: Yes.

7 Senator Graham: That would open up a nuclear arms race
8 in the Middle East. The Sunni Arabs would want a weapon of
9 their own, right?

10 General Scowcroft: That's right.

11 Senator Graham: Whatever problem we have today would
12 get exponentially worse. So how we find a peaceful
13 resolution to the Iranian nuclear ambitions is the primary
14 goal I share with you and everybody else in the world.

15 Do you agree that the Iranians in the past have been
16 trying to build a bomb not a peaceful nuclear power program?
17 Their past behavior would suggest they have been trying to
18 get a weapons capability.

19 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes.

20 General Scowcroft: Yes, I think there was a phase.

21 Senator Graham: Okay. Do you agree with me that
22 Congress may actually make things worse if we pass
23 sanctions, but we should have a say about the final outcome
24 through a 123 nuclear review process under the Atomic Energy
25 Act? Does that make sense?

1 Let the negotiations go forward without sanctions, but
2 when a deal is reached, would it be okay with both of you if
3 Congress, under the 123 section of the Atomic Energy Act,
4 had a chance to review it to see if it was, in fact, a good
5 deal? Would that be a good outcome?

6 General Scowcroft: I don't know that I am equipped to
7 say that.

8 Senator Graham: Okay. We have in the past approved 24
9 agreements regarding civilian nuclear programs between the
10 United States and foreign powers. All I am suggesting is,
11 let the administration pursue a deal with the P5-plus-1. If
12 they reach an agreement, bring it to Congress for our review
13 and our approval.

14 Do you think that makes sense? Would that be a good
15 check and balance?

16 Dr. Brzezinski: I think that depends a little bit also
17 on the other partners in the negotiations. We are not the
18 only ones.

19 Senator Graham: Congress is not going to let the
20 French or Iranians tell us what to do.

21 What we are trying to say to you and the administration
22 is that we don't want to disrupt the last best chance to get
23 a deal, but we don't want to be dealt out either. We would
24 like to have a say.

25 And under the Atomic Energy Act, Section 123, in the

1 past, Congress has reviewed deals between the U.S. and
2 foreign powers regarding civilian programs.

3 Would that be a provocative thing for Congress to do,
4 look at the deal after the fact?

5 Dr. Brzezinski: Well, let me take a stab at this. I
6 think you will do it anyway, won't you?

7 Senator Graham: Well, the question is, should we do
8 it?

9 Dr. Brzezinski: I think that depends a little bit on
10 the nature of the relationship with the other powers and how
11 much you are informed. You will make the judgment yourself,
12 if you want to do it.

13 Senator Graham: Fair enough.

14 Let's get back to Syria. This whole conflict started
15 when people went to the streets in Syria petitioning Assad
16 to have a better life within Syria. Do you agree with that,
17 that's how this all started?

18 General Scowcroft: That is one of the things anyway,
19 yes.

20 Senator Graham: You just made an observation that most
21 people now are going to say, "I have dignity. I am not
22 going to let the guy down the street tell me how to live.
23 We can now read and see how life could be."

24 That is a good thing. Do you both agree that the
25 individual in the world being empowered and knowing the

1 difference between a good life and a bad life is, overall, a
2 constructive thing?

3 General Scowcroft: It certainly is for humankind.

4 Senator Graham: Would you like to live in Assad's
5 Syria? Can you understand why millions of Syrians believe
6 that Assad's Syria is not what they want to pass on to their
7 children? Can you understand why people throughout the
8 world no longer want to live in totalitarian dictatorships
9 for our convenience?

10 I can understand that. There is a complication here I
11 get.

12 But the big theme sweeping the world, to me, is that
13 young people have enough living a life that none of us would
14 adopt, for our convenience. I would like to help those
15 young people, and in the process, not blow up the world.

16 So do you agree with the President that the goal should
17 be to defeat and destroyed ISIL, degrade and destroy?

18 General Scowcroft: Destroy what?

19 Senator Graham: Defeat, degrade, and destroy ISIL,
20 that should be the United States' goal?

21 Dr. Brzezinski: I will speak for myself. I think it
22 is important that we do what is necessary from the
23 standpoint of our national interests.

24 Senator Graham: I agree with that.

25 Dr. Brzezinski: If ISIL kills our people, we certainly

1 should act.

2 Senator Graham: Do you agree with the goal the
3 President has stated that it is in our national interest to
4 degrade and destroy ISIL?

5 Dr. Brzezinski: I support that, but it depends on how
6 we do it.

7 Senator Graham: I couldn't agree with you more.

8 Dr. Brzezinski: I don't want us to be the only
9 protagonists and others to sit back in the region.

10 Senator Graham: Do you agree with that, General?

11 General Scowcroft: Yes.

12 Senator Graham: Do you think the strategy in place
13 today is working to achieve that goal?

14 General Scowcroft: No.

15 Senator Graham: Okay, so I agree with you, General.
16 Would you like to comment, Doctor? Is it working?

17 Dr. Brzezinski: I don't know if it is working. I
18 think it is going to take a long time, because we are in a
19 situation where there is a mix of motivations in the region.

20 Senator Graham: Absolutely. Two good answers.

21 I just got back from the Mideast. Nobody believes it
22 is working. The best solution, from my point of view, would
23 get an Islamic coalition together. It doesn't have to be
24 all Arab. An Islamic coalition to go in on the ground in
25 Syria and take ISIL down in the name of Islam, saying, "You

1 do not represent this great religion. We are here to take
2 you on and destroy what you stand for."

3 Does that make sense? Would that be a good outcome, to
4 have religion, a coalition of the willing within the
5 religion, to go in and take ISIL down?

6 Dr. Brzezinski: If it is spontaneously formulated in
7 the region and not created by us, yes.

8 Senator Graham: I couldn't agree more.

9 Dr. Brzezinski: I think if we tried to create it, it
10 wouldn't work.

11 Senator Graham: Finally, should we support such an
12 effort giving capacity to that will where we have unique
13 capability? I am not advocating 100,000 American troops on
14 the ground in Syria, but I am advocating that the longer
15 this problem goes, the more likely we are going to get hit
16 here. I am advocating that America cannot sit on the
17 sideline and let 300,000 Syrians get slaughtered because it
18 is complicated. I am advocating that we defeat this enemy
19 to mankind, not just to Islam, and that we get the Islamic
20 world engaged, but we provide capacity when they have will,
21 that we provide airpower, that we provide Special Forces,
22 intelligence capability.

23 Gentlemen, what I will not accept is the status quo,
24 that it is okay to not go after these guys because it is
25 not. At every level in the world, it is not okay.

1 So my only plea is that you would have an open mind to
2 a ground component where we play a role, not the leading
3 role, before it is too late.

4 Thank you both for your great service to this country.

5 Chairman McCain: Would you like to make a response to
6 that tirade?

7 [Laughter.]

8 Dr. Brzezinski: I wouldn't call it a tirade. I
9 thought it was very sincere and impassioned, but I don't
10 think it deals sufficiently with the complications of the
11 region.

12 There are different countries in the region. There are
13 some regimes we can work with. There are some that are
14 playing a double game.

15 Last but not least, there is, unfortunately,
16 unexpectedly, much more support for Assad in Syria than we
17 would have wished or probably anticipated. Otherwise, why
18 is he still there and has not been overthrown?

19 Chairman McCain: General, would you like to make a
20 comment on the exchange that just took place? I think it is
21 important.

22 General Scowcroft: Syria is a most difficult place.
23 Next to Lebanon, it is probably the most mixed up in terms
24 of physical mix-up of different groups of any area in the
25 Middle East.

1 I think I understand the concern. I am reluctant,
2 sitting here, to get into executive-legislative struggles,
3 but I think we ought to do what we can without getting
4 ownership again. We have not only the Syrians to worry
5 about. We have to worry about the Turks, too, because the
6 Kurds are very heavily engaged there. And they have
7 different notions about their own future.

8 Senator Graham: Do you support a no-fly zone that
9 Turkey has been asking, to protect the Free Syrian Army and
10 the population from further destruction, a no-fly zone to
11 give people a chance to regroup?

12 General Scowcroft: I would consider that. But I would
13 not use airpower to do it. There are some 20 airfields in
14 Syria. We could bomb the runways of all of them with
15 missiles and keep bombing them, and, in effect, ground their
16 air force. I would have no problem doing that.

17 Chairman McCain: Doctor?

18 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes, I probably would have no problem.
19 But I don't think that solves the larger problem.

20 Chairman McCain: I thank you. I think it has been a
21 very important exchange.

22 Senator King?

23 Senator King: Thank you.

24 Gentlemen, I apologize for coming in and out. I had a
25 meeting with Mr. Carter, who, as you know, has been

1 nominated by the President to be Secretary.

2 Mr. Brzezinski, you mentioned something very
3 interesting, which suggested that, given the threat of
4 terrorism to Russia as well as other parts of the world,
5 does this create an opportunity for an alliance with Russia
6 to deal with an issue like ISIS that might be an opening to
7 a more general settlement in Syria, that we have a common
8 interest in dealing with this terrorist threat?

9 Dr. Brzezinski: Yes, but I wouldn't use the word
10 "alliance," because that goes too far. But I think a
11 regional accommodation, regional cooperation, might be in
12 their interest and our interest, for reasons I've mentioned.
13 They have potentially exposed themselves, and it would make
14 it more difficult for the Russians to simply sit on the
15 sidelines and watch us getting bogged down alone. They own
16 part of the responsibility for the problems in the Middle
17 East, in terms of previous policies. And much of the same
18 applies to China.

19 Senator King: I would think the Russians would see
20 this in their own national interest.

21 Dr. Brzezinski: One would have to assume that is the
22 case, because they have a national interest.

23 Senator King: A second question, partially a
24 statement, partially a question. I was delighted to hear
25 you, General Scowcroft, talk about the threat of cyber. I

1 sort of feel like we are England before World War II,
2 ignoring a threat that is right in front of us.

3 What if Sony, instead of a movie production company,
4 had been the New York Stock Exchange or a gas pipeline? I
5 have never seen an issue where we have had more warnings and
6 we're doing less.

7 I hope you would concur with me that this should be one
8 of Congress' highest priorities, to deal with this cyber-
9 threat and develop our cyber-strategy.

10 Would you agree with that?

11 General Scowcroft: Yes, I do agree with that. I think
12 we are still at step one, and I think we need the very
13 serious analysis of what the character of the problem is,
14 what our alternatives to take a more positive role can be,
15 and which one we should select.

16 Senator King: I thought one of your interesting
17 suggestions was kind of a reprise of the mutually assured
18 destruction strategy of the 1950s in the cyber area, to
19 create a deterrent, not only a defensive posture, but a
20 deterrent posture.

21 Could you elaborate on that a bit?

22 General Scowcroft: I used that only to show how
23 serious a threat I think cyber is. It is on the par with
24 nuclear weapons. It doesn't kill people itself, but it can
25 destroy the sinews of a country.

1 Senator King: General, I just hope what you said today
2 and that analogy is a headline tomorrow, because we have to
3 deal with this issue.

4 One other area of concern, Dr. Brzezinski, I'm very
5 interested in developing a strategy beyond ad hoc military
6 intervention to deal with ISIS and the whole issue of
7 jihadists and extremism.

8 Could you talk about what you would think would be the
9 elements of an anti-extremist strategy beyond just military
10 response?

11 Dr. Brzezinski: Some form of cooperation with the more
12 moderate and more established states in the region in
13 creating viable outcomes that consolidate well-being, permit
14 their political evolution, and so forth. The list has been
15 mentioned. It is Turkey. It could be Iran, under some
16 circumstances. It could be Saudi Arabia, which otherwise
17 might face serious international problems. It, certainly,
18 is Egypt. And on a more limited basis, it includes Lebanon
19 and Jordan, with the latter being close to an explosive
20 situation given the number of refugees that have flowed into
21 the country.

22 There is some potential commonality of interest here,
23 but it should not be focused primarily on American military
24 action as such, though we have the right of self-defense and
25 we have the right to deal with threats that become extensive

1 enough to the possibility of destabilizing the region.

2 Last but not least, if I may say so, we should be very
3 careful not to proclaim our actions are somehow or other
4 anti-jihadist. You used the term. Because we don't want to
5 convey to that part of the world that we in any way are
6 engaged in a religious war against them.

7 Jihad means holy war. And so we don't --

8 Senator King: Anti-extremist might be a better term.

9 General Scowcroft: Yes, exactly. Something along
10 those lines. Fanatics. In some cases, sadists, like those
11 beheadings. But certainly, avoid saying we are engaged in a
12 struggle against jihadist terror, because that, frankly,
13 attracts some people to engage in what they say is holy war.

14 Senator King: That is a very good point. I appreciate
15 that.

16 I think the other side of that is we have to be very,
17 very careful in this country to not lump in the Muslim world
18 with these extremists. I think that also is a recruiting
19 poster for them, if we do that. This cannot be a war
20 between the West and Islam.

21 General Scowcroft: That is right.

22 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

23 Chairman McCain: Senator Rounds?

24 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our

1 country. I apologize for not being here for the entire
2 discussion this morning. We had several different committee
3 hearings going on, as usual, it appears.

4 I did have one question that I'd like to focus on, and
5 perhaps in a little different vein than I heard in the last
6 15, 20 minutes, and that has to do with the National
7 Security Strategy that was last presented in 2010.

8 My understanding is that normally that would be updated
9 or had been expected to be updated in 2014. The QDR was
10 presented and completed based upon the 2010 strategy that
11 was in place.

12 I don't understand but I was hoping you might give us
13 your thoughts a little bit about whether or not that
14 strategy that was completed in 2010, whether or not, with
15 all of the changes today, particularly those issues in the
16 Middle East, changes in terms of Russia and what has
17 happened since 2010, whether or not the QDR that we
18 currently operate with and the strategy that was proposed in
19 2010 that we operate with today, whether or not we are
20 missing something here and does it really matter? Is it
21 time for Congress to take a different approach in terms of
22 looking at the overall strategy when it comes to our
23 national defense?

24 General Scowcroft: That is a very difficult question
25 to answer. I think my answer is both.

1 The Congress is responsible for providing funding for a
2 particular strategy for the military themselves. The
3 President is in charge of the Armed Forces. That is the
4 kind of cooperation that is getting increasingly difficult,
5 but it still is the way we have to proceed. And when you do
6 unilaterally the kind of things like sequester, it destroys
7 what is needed, which is consent between the Congress, who
8 is responsibility is the Armed Forces, and the President,
9 who runs the Armed Forces.

10 Dr. Brzezinski: I would only add to this, and maybe
11 this is not what you have in mind, that I think there is a
12 bit of a problem in that the State Department has a policy
13 planning council that presumably plans for diplomacy. The
14 Defense Department has similar agencies in terms of defense
15 capabilities and needs. The CIA has its own view on how the
16 world is changing. I am not aware of any large-scale,
17 systematic effort in the National Security Council to define
18 national objectives and to help the President think it
19 through and eventually endorse it as a kind of overall
20 national security planning mechanism. I think we could use
21 that, and perhaps that would be helpful in clarifying some
22 issues.

23 Senator Rounds: Would you consider that to be new in
24 terms of how we have operated, or is that something that
25 have you both seen. You have both seen the interactions

1 between the administration and Congress over a period of
2 literally decades. Is this new? Is this something that
3 people have looked at and said that is the way it is, or is
4 this something that clearly presents a threat in terms of
5 how we do systematically the planning for the defense of our
6 country that has not been there before?

7 Dr. Brzezinski: I think we ought to take a look. I
8 don't know if it is new or not. But I think we ought to
9 take a look at the existing system.

10 My sense is we don't really have in the White House a
11 service to the President when he makes his decisions, a
12 deliberate effort at creating what might be called a
13 national security plan for 4 years or whatever an
14 administration is in office. The other agencies do that.
15 And I think that creates, perhaps, some of the uncertainties
16 as to what exactly we are doing.

17 Senator Rounds: I just have one more thought on this.
18 It seems to me that, in business, when we talk about those
19 issues that we are concerned about as being important versus
20 on a day-to-day basis, those issues that come up as being
21 urgent and in front of us -- and we tend sometimes to focus
22 on the urgent as opposed to the critical or important.
23 Would you care to comment?

24 Right now when we look at the defense of our country,
25 we look at the issues that our military men and women face

1 on a daily basis around the world today, of those items that
2 all appear to be in front of us regularly, those urgent
3 issues, have they clouded our ability to keep in front of us
4 those important issues that we are losing sight of?

5 Dr. Brzezinski: I don't know how to answer that.

6 General Scowcroft: I think the answer is probably yes.
7 But it is not an easy thing to do, to bring all the elements
8 of the government together on such a thing as our national
9 military strategy.

10 We have tried different things. Some worked better
11 than others. But it is also a political exercise as well as
12 a strategic exercise. And I don't think we have developed
13 anything that goes beyond bureaucratic to genuine steps
14 forward. But I think we ought to keep trying.

15 Senator Rounds: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

16 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look
17 forward to working on this committee and continue with my
18 colleagues.

19 And I thank both of the witnesses for their presence
20 today.

21 What is each of your opinion about the need for
22 Congress to expeditiously work on an authorization of
23 military force to cover the war on ISIL, which is now in its
24 sixth month?

25 General Scowcroft: I'm not sure how to answer that. I

1 think we should not be more involved in the ISIS exercise.

2 I believe that this is a case where the region is being
3 threatened, and the powers of the region are being
4 threatened. The states of the region are being threatened.

5 We ought to encourage and help them to respond, but not
6 respond for them.

7 That is a difficult line, but I think it is an
8 important one, because the Middle East does belong to the
9 Middle East countries. And we ought to encourage them to be
10 behave responsibly.

11 Senator Kaine: Dr. Brzezinski?

12 Dr. Brzezinski: In different ways, I think we ought to
13 strive, first of all, to engage the other major powers in
14 the world to be involved. It shouldn't be our baby only.
15 And I have in mind particularly, and I have said this this
16 morning, Russia and China.

17 Secondly, I think we have to minimize the visual
18 involvement in the problem of other powers who could be
19 helpful but whose record in the region is so negative
20 because of their involvement with colonialism that they in
21 fact handicap the effort of dealing effectively with the
22 region.

23 And third, we have to try to involve, and that's a
24 difficult process, those states in the region that have both
25 viability of sorts and some inclination to be moderate.

1 Senator Kaine: You each answered my question in the
2 strategic and tactical sense, and I actually meant it in the
3 institutional and constitutional sense.

4 The President started a unilateral military campaign
5 against ISIL on the 8th of August that is now in its sixth
6 month, justifying that based on the two previous
7 authorizations that were done in 2001 and 2002. The
8 President last night said Congress should do an
9 authorization and weigh in and vote about whether this
10 mission is in fact in the national interest.

11 Do have you an opinion on whether that is an important
12 matter for Congress to take up?

13 Dr. Brzezinski: If he asks, and since he's acting as
14 Commander in Chief, I should think that he's entitled to
15 make that request, and probably Congress should consider it,
16 if for no other reason that it helps to consolidate national
17 unity on that delicate but terribly complicated issue.

18 Senator Kaine: I think, as I understood your last
19 answer, on the tactical side, let me do a follow-up
20 question, there has been much discussion about the role of
21 ground troops as necessary in Iraq or Syria to defeat the
22 threat of ISIL, ground troops broadly defined, regional
23 ground troops, the Peshmerga, the Iraqi Security Forces,
24 Syrian-trained Syrian moderate.

25 What do each of you think about the wisdom of using

1 United States ground troops in the mission against ISIL in
2 Iraq or Syria?

3 Dr. Brzezinski: Except in very special individual
4 circumstances where the use of ground forces would be very
5 limited in terms of its mission, I'm basically against what
6 is called boots on the ground, as far as the United States
7 is concerned. I think the political and historical climate
8 is so uncongenial to us doing it, that we will simply become
9 involved in a protracted conflict, which will be extremely
10 costly, and which will be very difficult for us alone to
11 win.

12 Senator Kaine: The President has announced a plan to
13 withdraw U.S. forces completely from Afghanistan by the end
14 of 2016. Should the U.S. actions with respect to its forces
15 in Afghanistan be based on a date on the calendar? Or
16 should it be based on conditions on the ground and whether
17 there is sufficient stability to allow us to withdraw
18 without plunging the country back into a chaos that could
19 affect the region and the world?

20 Dr. Brzezinski: You can't entirely separate the two,
21 but you have to take into account that at some point a
22 prolonged engagement at the very least begins to create its
23 own emphasis and you begin to be stuck with growing
24 resentment on the part of the people in the region itself.
25 So I think some end line is absolutely necessary.

1 General Scowcroft: I think in the case particular case
2 of Afghanistan, an end line right now is not the right way
3 to go. It is my sense that Afghanistan has made
4 considerable progress, that the new leadership shows great
5 promise, and that what their military security forces really
6 need is a sense of a U.S. hand on their shoulder. "We are
7 back here. We will give you some advice. We will help you
8 here. We are not bailing out on all the effort we have put
9 in, in past years."

10 I believe I don't know how many, but a few thousand
11 forces would pay us back big dividends if Afghanistan moves
12 forward in the direction that it seems to be moving. And it
13 is, certainly, worth a few thousand troops to be that hand
14 on their shoulder.

15 Senator Kaine: Thank you.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Senator Wicker: Thank you, gentlemen. This has been
18 very helpful.

19 Let's talk about Russia and NATO. When Russia
20 innovated Georgia, about all we could do was talk about it
21 and denounce it. When Russia took the action they took in
22 Crimea, a treaty ally of ours whose border we had promised
23 to defend if they gave up nuclear weapons, military action
24 was clearly off the table. Presumably, Russian action in
25 Transnistria would not call for military action by the

1 United States.

2 But, Dr. Brzezinski, you draw a line when it comes to
3 the Baltic states. And I'd, certainly, want to agree with
4 you there.

5 Let me ask you this. Could you explain a little more
6 your idea about working with NATO on tripwires in the Baltic
7 states?

8 General Scowcroft, what do you think about that idea as
9 you understand it having been described? And what can we do
10 to get our NATO allies to take national defense and Western
11 defense responsibilities seriously? We asked them to spend
12 a mere 2 percent of their GDP on the military and, frankly,
13 it is only two or three of those NATO allies who actually do
14 that.

15 If you would comment on that, and, Dr. Brzezinski, you
16 can begin.

17 Dr. Brzezinski: First of all, on your last question, I
18 think we should address that in NATO, and perhaps some
19 device, some procedure could be formulated, whereby NATO
20 members that fail to meet that 2 percent standard lose some
21 of their entitlement to participate in key decisions. I
22 don't know precisely how to work that out, but it seems to
23 me, if you don't pay, you don't decide. That at least might
24 make them a little more conscious of the fact that
25 collective obligations should be treated seriously.

1 Insofar as the guarantee itself of the Baltic
2 countries, what I said earlier I'll simply repeat. I think
3 the Russians really don't know how active we would be in
4 saving them for one reason or another. The leader of the
5 Russian Federation decided that he can get away with a
6 seizing, with a quick action, which altogether alters the
7 situation that he finds so abhorrent, namely the creation of
8 independent states or the re-creation of independent states
9 in the place that the Soviet Union occupied in the late
10 1930s and early 1940s.

11 If he were to do that, we would be faced with a
12 horrible situation, because we don't have the means to stage
13 an amphibious warfare that results in the landing of our
14 forces and then gradual ground war, presumably in the
15 territory of the Baltic states under expulsion. So the only
16 sensible step we can now take, I think, is to pre-position
17 some tripwire type forces, forcing Putin to consider
18 seriously whether he's prepared to go into major conflict
19 with us.

20 And if he does that, then we have no choice but to
21 respond, not only in the Baltic republics but perhaps
22 elsewhere. For example, impose a worldwide embargo on any
23 movement of Soviet ships or airplanes, other actions of
24 semimilitary type, which would be a response designed to
25 impose further costs, and including perhaps some occasional

1 military engagements chosen elsewhere, if we couldn't do
2 something directly in the Baltic.

3 Senator Wicker: If we wouldn't defend our NATO allies
4 in the Baltics, I don't know what our word would be worth.

5 General Scowcroft, what do you think of this topic?

6 General Scowcroft: First, I think that we don't want
7 to re-create the Cold War, and I don't think it is
8 necessary. I think if we want to do something, tripwires --
9 NATO is the tripwire, to me. And I think if we want to tell
10 them what we will do if they do certain things, then they
11 better not, I don't have a problem with that.

12 But I can see Putin just trying to provoke us to spend
13 more efforts. And I'm not sure it is necessary. I believe
14 the contribution of some of the Europeans to NATO is
15 deplorable.

16 There are two facts. First of all, they don't feel
17 threatened. And secondly, they are basically exhausted
18 after two wars, and they are just happy to leave everything
19 up to us, including paying for it.

20 There, I think we ought to give it some thought, but my
21 sense is we would get greater European support if we had
22 ideas about how to use NATO usefully now that, to me, a
23 threat of a march of Russian troops into Western Europe is
24 not a reasonable thing to happen.

25 Senator Wicker: let me ask you briefly, if the chair

1 will indulge, do you have any comments for this committee
2 about the adequacy of our naval fleet at the present time?
3 The chair in his opening remarks talked about the size of
4 our military being roughly the equivalent to what it was
5 after World War I. Do we have enough ships? Are we
6 building enough ships? Is our fleet adequate to protect
7 national interests?

8 Dr. Brzezinski?

9 Dr. Brzezinski: I have not looked into that
10 specifically, so I can't give you a straightforward answer.

11 General Scowcroft: I don't think any one of us has
12 examined that kind of question. Simply don't have an answer
13 to that.

14 Senator Wicker: thank you very much.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Donnelly?

16 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 And thank you both for being here. ISIS has said that
18 they are establishing a caliphate. And their caliphate that
19 they want to establish is a whole lot bigger than where they
20 are right now. And so can we simply watch this? Can they
21 be left in place, if this is their goal, when their goal
22 also, if you don't share their religion, you either convert
23 or you are killed? And they intend to expand.

24 So how does the United States watch this when -- and I
25 don't want to get into exact historical references, and I

1 don't mean to by this, but we have seen this kind of thing
2 before.

3 Dr. Brzezinski: Well, the danger is that if we get
4 involved directly in opposing them, we will make it easier
5 for them to promote the whole concept.

6 Senator Donnelly: I don't mean directly. I mean as a
7 partner.

8 Mr. Scowcroft, you were talking about not getting more
9 involved in ISIS actions. With training an Arab army or
10 advising, providing that kind of assistance, helping them to
11 plan, helping them to train, do you think those are
12 appropriate actions?

13 General Scowcroft: I have no problem with training as
14 appropriate action. But let's remember that ISIS or ISIL,
15 whatever you want to call it, is in the Middle East. There
16 are a number of our friends and allies who live in the
17 Middle East. Would they be happy to just sit back and have
18 us deal with the problem? Maybe.

19 But this is a problem that is a potential threat to
20 other Middle Eastern countries.

21 Senator Donnelly: Do you see us having a role though
22 as a partner?

23 General Scowcroft: Yes, I think a role in doing the
24 kinds of things that they can't do, and encourage them in
25 the things that they can, we can help them know how to do,

1 yes, absolutely. But that is training.

2 Senator Donnelly: Right. I don't think anybody is
3 looking at our troops being the ground troops, but being
4 somebody who can help provide with the backbone, the
5 planning, the training. Does that make sense to you?

6 General Scowcroft: Absolutely.

7 Senator Donnelly: Because it strikes me as no matter
8 what we hope, and being from Indiana where we have suffered
9 from them already, we have already lost citizens who have
10 been kidnapped and killed by them. They continue to put
11 plans together to cause other activities.

12 So with their stated goals of further establishment of
13 this and taking activities elsewhere, it would seem to me
14 that we have to be engaged in some form with partners. It
15 seems that the goal, it's not something that is going to
16 stay static. It either grows or gets eliminated.

17 Would you agree with that?

18 General Scowcroft: Yes.

19 Senator Donnelly: Dr. Brzezinski?

20 Dr. Brzezinski: I also agree with that.

21 Senator Donnelly: Okay. As we look at Putin, what do
22 you think his endgame is in Ukraine?

23 Dr. Brzezinski: My own estimate is to reverse what
24 transpired a year or so ago, namely the decision by the
25 Ukrainian people to associate themselves and their long-

1 range identity with the West. I think he views that as a
2 major intrusion of a historically significant component of
3 the larger Russian empire.

4 I think he has this general concept of imperial
5 restoration as guiding him. If you look at some of the
6 things he has done to define the presidency, the symbolism
7 associated with it, and so forth, it has a lot of imperial
8 trappings.

9 He is prepared to use force to make that happen. Our
10 position has been that we have no desire to intrude into
11 Russian security aspirations, but that a nation has a right
12 to define itself voluntarily.

13 That is a very complicated issue. As a consequence, we
14 now have this very serious problem between us and the
15 Russians regarding the future of Ukraine. He's clearly
16 striving to destabilize Ukraine, not risking an all-out
17 invasion, but to destabilize it from within.

18 Senator Donnelly: If he takes similar action in
19 Latvia, his little green men and all those things, going
20 into Latvian territory, and NATO does not respond, is that,
21 in effect, the end of NATO?

22 Dr. Brzezinski: I would say so, because NATO is meant
23 to be a collective alliance. If the United States does not
24 respond, that certainly would be the result.

25 Now, conceivably, we could let him do it, let him take

1 Latvia or Estonia, and then we would mobilize NATO to
2 counter this somehow, either on the spot or on the larger
3 world front. But that would be a much more risky enterprise
4 than doing what I advocate, which is simply to create a
5 tripwire in Latvia and Estonia, which communicates clearly
6 to Russia that NATO would be involved, that the United
7 States, in particular, is present, and therefore, the risks
8 you are taking are much, much higher than you might
9 calculate in light of the ease of the operation in seizing
10 Crimea.

11 Senator Donnelly: General Scowcroft, would you also
12 see that as, that is the end of NATO?

13 General Scowcroft: Certainly, it would be the end of
14 NATO if the Soviet Union moved into a NATO member and we did
15 nothing. Absolutely, it would.

16 But I don't see that happening. Putin is a nasty piece
17 of work. I probably should not have said that. But I don't
18 think he is evil incarnate. I think if we tell him quite
19 clearly what we won't stand for, in terms of NATO members,
20 especially, there won't be such an action.

21 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 Dr. Brzezinski: And the best way to tell him is to do
23 something to make him think about it.

24 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst?

25 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I
2 appreciate your service very much.

3 Today, we have talked a lot about ISIS and the Middle
4 East, and the fact that we do need partners in that region.
5 We do need those Arab allies to come forward. And you have
6 mentioned it, both of you, as more of an aside comment. But
7 I would really like to understand how can we can more
8 effectively engage Turkey, which is an ally, which is a
9 friend in that region. How can we engage them more to
10 combat ISIS and those other threats that exist in the Middle
11 East?

12 Dr. Brzezinski: Well, the Turks are playing a role.
13 It is partly worrisome, a little, party very helpful. The
14 Turks have a large minority in their country who are Kurd,
15 so they have multiple concerns about what goes on. They
16 also have very emotional feelings about Syria.

17 But I think we can help the countries of the Middle
18 East -- Turkey is one -- with great military capability. As
19 I say, Egypt is another one. Egypt is a large country in
20 any part of the world.

21 And they ought to want to shape their own region in the
22 right direction. We ought to encourage that rather than
23 taking their place in forming the region.

24 Senator Ernst: Thank you. I do agree. I would love
25 to more concrete methods of engaging them. They do have a

1 lot at stake in that region, and I think they can be very
2 valuable partners. I just would love to know how we get
3 them to play a more prominent role in the Middle East.

4 Thank you very much, gentlemen.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

6 Chairman McCain: Could I say that I thank you both,
7 not only for your appearance here, but for your many years
8 of outstanding service to the country, your wise and
9 knowledgeable advice and counsel that you have provided to
10 many Presidents, and you have proven again before this
11 committee.

12 Obviously, there are some disagreements. In fact, I
13 might make mention that the head of MI5 recently gave a
14 speech, a week ago, saying that he believed that ISIS is
15 planning an attack on the United States of America. I don't
16 disagree with him.

17 I think that would change the outlook of the American
18 people about the degree of our involvement, if there was
19 such a thing, which we hope will not happen. But when you
20 have thousands of young men going into this fight who will
21 then be returning from the fight, I think it is something
22 that is not beyond the realm of responsibility.

23 But I would like to say that I am personally very
24 honored to be in the company of two individuals who have
25 served our country and continue to do so with such

1 distinction.

2 Thank you very much.

3 [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25